





















































































u C,r 


1 1 uci y 



COPYRIGHTED 1866 BY HARPER A BROTHER8. COPYRIGHTED 1894 BY ALFRED H. GUERNSEY AND HENRY M. ALDEN. COPYRIGHTED 1894 BY MCDONNELL BROS. 

ABP 

GIFT 

PUBLISHED 

COPY 





































































































































ULYSSES S. GRANT. — From a Photograph taken in 1865, 

















TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Oq 

I 

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On/ 


Page 

INTRODUCTION.1-24 

FORT SUMTER.25-64 


UPRISING OF THE NORTH... .65-121 
THE WAR FOR THE UNION. 


CHAPTER I. 

THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY. 

. 122 

CHAPTER II. 

EASTERN AND WESTERN VIRGINIA 

AND MISSOURI.. 135 

CHAPTER III. 

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 145 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—BALL*S 

BLUFF.. 159 

0 CHAPTER V. 

KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI. 169 

CHAPTER VI. 

NAVAL OPERATIONS. 178 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOV¬ 
ERNMENT. 184 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAV¬ 
ERY. 199 

CHAPTER IX. 

POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOV¬ 
ERNMENT. 209 

CHAPTER X. 

EASTERN KENTUCKY—MIDDLE CREEK 

AND MILL SPRING. 220 

CHAPTER XI. 

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 225 

CHAPTER XII. 

ROANOKE AND NEWBERN. 242 

CHAPTER XIII. 

THE VIRGINIA AND THE MONITOR.... 250 

CHAPTER XIV. 

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 261 


1. Fort Sumter, at Low-water, 26. 

2. Keys and Candlestick, Fort Sumter, 27. 

. Anderson’s Entry into Fort Sumter, 28. 

. Anderson’s Quarters, Fort Sumter, 28. 

6. The Prayer at Sumter, 29. 

6. The Sloop-of-war Brooklyn, 33. 

7. The Steam-ship Star of the West, 36. 

8. Firing upon the Star of the West, 37. 

9. The first Flag of Truce, 38. 

10. Morris’s Island, from Fort Sumter, 50. 

11. Interior of Sally-port, Fort Sumter, 53. 

12. Iron-clad Battery, Cummings’s Point, 53. 

13. Fort Johnston, from Fort Sumter, 55. 

14. Ten-inch Columbiad, 57. 

15. Fort Moultrie, from Fort Sumter, 58. 

16. Removing Powder, Fort Sumter, 59. 

17. Nailing the Flag, Fort Sumter, 60 

18. Around the Bulletin-board, 61. 

19. Bombardment of Fort Sumter, 62. 

20. The Gorge, Fort Sumter, 65. 

21. The Uprising of the North, 66. 

22. Casemate Battery, Fort Pickens, 70. 

23. Flag-staff Bastion, Fort Pickens, 70. 

24. Sally-port and Glacis, Fort Pickens, 71. 

25. Fleet off Fort Pickens, 74. 

26. First Re-enforcement of Fort Pickens, 77 

27. Second Ke-enforcemcnt of Fort Pickens, 78. 

28. Harper’s Ferry and Maryland Heights, 80. 

29. Harper’s Ferry, 81. 

30. March upon Harper’s Ferry, 81. 

31. Destruction of Norfolk Navy Yard, 82. 

32. Destruction of Ships at Norfolk, 83. 

33. Burning of Arsenal, Harper’s Ferry, 84. 

84. Riot at Baltimore, April 19, 1861, 87. 

35. Burning of Bridge at Canton, Maryland, 90. 

36. The Seventh N. Y. Regt. in Broadway, 91. 

37. Annapolis, Maryland, 92. 

38. Repairing Railroad-bridge, 93. 

39. The Seventh New York on the March, 95. 

40. Relay House, Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 101. 

41. Viaduct at Washington Junction, 101. 

42 Sand-bag Battery, 102. 

43. Raising the Flag at Baltimore, 102. 

44. The Winans Gun, 103. 

45. Fortifications at St. Louis, 106. 

46. Corner Scene, St. Louis, 107. 

47. Attack upon Volunteers, St. Louis, 108. 

48. Galleries under Senate Chamber, 109. 

49. Bread-ovens under the Capitol, 109. 

50. Barricade in Treasury Building, 110. 

51. Troops in the Rotunda, 110. 

52. Fort McHenry, Baltimore, 111. 

63. View of Richmond, 114. 

64. Henrico County Jail, Richmond, 114. 

65. The Capitol, Richmond, 115. 

56. Prisons at Richmond, 115. 

67. Montgomery, Alabama, 117. 

68. The White House, Montgomery, 118. 

69. Montgomery, February 8,1861,122. 

60. Bird’s-eye View-of Washington, 134. 

61. Fortress Monroe, Moat and Sea-Face, 135. 

62. Fortress Monroe, the Entrance, 135. 

63. The Army crossing the Potomac, 137. 


CHAPTER XV. Page 

BUTLER'S ADMINISTRATION AT NEW 

ORLEANS. 272 

CHAPTER XVI. 

THE TRANS-MISSISSIPri CAMPAIGN OF 

1862. 282 

CHAPTER XVII. 

KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE AND NORTH¬ 
ERN MISSISSIPPI. 299 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.—I. FROM 
THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKA- 
HOMINY.328 

CHAPTER XIX. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.;—II. ON 
THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICK- 
AHOMINY.343 

CHAPTER XX. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. — III. 
FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE 
JAMES . 361 

CHAPTER XXI. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.—IV. THE 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENIN¬ 
SULA. 380 

CHAPTER XXII. 

POPE’S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 381 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.— AN- 

TIETAM . 393 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

BURNSIDE’S CAMPAIGN—FREDERICKS¬ 
BURG. 406 

CHAPTER XXV. 

NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS.421 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

THE WAR ON THE MISSISSIPPI. 430 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

THE WAR ON THE MISSISSIPPI (CON¬ 
TINUED). 457 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

HOOKER IN COMMAND.—CHANCELLORS- 

VILLE. 483 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

SCENES AND 

64. Lyon’s March from Boonesville, 139. 

65. Western Virginia, Mountain Region, 141. 

66. Battle of Rich Mountain, 143. 

67. Bull Run, Railroad Bridge over, 145. 

68. Manassas Junction, 147. 

69. An escaped Zouave, after Bull Run, 153. 

70. Covering the Retreat, Bull Run, 155. 

71. Battery at the Chain Bridge, 160. 

72. Fort Runyon, Interior of, 160. 

73. Fort Corcoran, Arlington Heights, 161. 

74. Fort Albany, Alexandria, 161. 

75. Manson’s Hill, 162. 

76. Confederate Batteries, Evansport, 162. 

77. Confederate Batteries, Budd’s Ferry, 163. 

78. Engaging Batteries at Evansport, 164. 

79. Edwards’s Ferry, Stone’s Division at, 166. 

80. Lewinsville, Virginia, 177. 

81. Building Huts, Army of the Potomac, 168. 

82. Water Batteries, Columbus, Ohio, 169. 

83. Pilot Knob, Missouri, 171. 

84. Lexington, Missouri, Defense of, 174. 

85. Fremont’s Bridge across the Osage, 175. 

86. Springfield, Missouri, 176. 

87. Destruction of the Nashville, 177. 

88. The Privateer Savannah, 178. 

89. The Privateer Sumter, 178. 

90. Burning of Hampton, Virginia, 180. 

91. Bombardment of Fort Pickens, 183. 

92. Attack on Fleet at Southwest Pass, 183. 

93. The Wigwam at Chicago, 199. 

94. Stampede of Slaves to Fort Monroe, 202. 

95. Feeding Negroes at Hilton Head, 203. 

96. Cumberland Gap, Kentucky, 221. 

97. Foote’s Gun-boat Fleet, 226. 

98. Foote’s Gun-boats at Fort Henry, 228. 

99. Alabama Loyalists greeting Gun-boats, 229. 

100. Fort Donelson, Tennessee, 230. 

101. Water Battery, Fort Donelson, 232. 

102. Gun-boat Attack on Fort Donelson, 233. 

103. Bowling Green, Kentucky, 237. 

104. Green River, Mitchell crossing, 238. 

105. Nashville, Tennessee, 239. 

106. Nashville, Railroad-bridge at, 240. 

107. Nashville, Capitol at, 241. 

108. Columbus, Kentucky, 241. 

109. Burnside’s Expedition, 242. 

110. Storm off Hatteras, 244. 

111. Landing below Ncwbern, 246. 

112. Sinking of the Confederate Fleet, 246. 

113. Elizabeth City, North Carolina, 247. 

114. Water Battery at Newbern, 247. 

115. Landing at Slocum’s Creek, 248. 

116. Bombardment of Newbern, 248. 

117. Bombardment of Fort Macon, 249. 

118. The Merrimac, or Virginia, 251. 

119. Interior Views of the Monitor, 252. 

120. First Voyage of the Monitor, 253. 

121. Fight between Monitor and Merrimac, 257. 

122. The Monitor in a Storm, 257. 

123. The Passaic at Sea, 257. 

124. Pumping and Bailing, 257. 

125. Loss of the Monitor, 258. 


CHAPTER XXIX. Page 

THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.— 

GETTYSBURG. 501 

CHAPTER XXX. 

MEAD’S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 517 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.— I. 


THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 525 
CHAPTER XXXII. 

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.— II. 
THE ADVANCE FROM MURFREES- 


BOROUGH. 529 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.—III. 

THE ARMY OF THE OHIO.—RECOV¬ 
ERY OF EAST TENNESSEE. 531 


CHAPTER XXXIV. 

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.—IV. 


THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.. 535 

CHAPTER XXXV. 

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.—V. 

THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.550 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.—VI. 

DEFEAT OF BRAGG. 555 

CHAPTER XXXVII. 

SHERMAN’S MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN_ 569 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

THE FLORIDA EXPEDITION. 574 

CHAPTER XXXIX. 

THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. 576 

CHAPTER XL. 

PRICE’S MISSOURI RAID. 593 

CHAPTER XLI. 

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 597 

CHAPTER XLII. 

THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.—FROM 

THE RAPIDAN TO THE JAMES.621 

CHAPTER XLIII. 

THE INVESTMENT OE PETERSBURG.. . . 637 

CHAPTER XLIV. 

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF 1863... . G41 

CHAPTER XLV. 

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF 1864... . 654 


IN VOLUME I. 


INCIDENTS. 

126. Asleep on Deck, 258. 

127. Forging a Bloom, 259. 

128. Forging a Plate, 259. 

129. Vertical Section of Turret, 259. 

130. Vertical Section of Turret and Hull, 260. 

131. Cordon of Turrets for Harbor Defense, 260. 

132. Ship Island and Defenses, 263. 

133. Fire Rafts on the Mississippi, 264. 

134. Bumbardment of the Forts, 265. 

135. The Hartford on Fire, 267. 

136. New Orleans in 1860,268. 

137. New Orleans, the Levee, 269. 

138. Passing up the Bayou, 270. 

139. New Orleans, the City, 271. 

140. Repairing the Levee, 275. 

141. Feeding the Poor at New Orleans, 277. 

142. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 279. 

143. New Orleans, the French Quarter, 281. 

144. Indian Camp, Minnesota, 283. 

145. Squaws winnowing Wheat, 283. 

146. Fort Wachita, Texas, 286. 

147. Fort Arbuckle, Texas, 286. 

148. Fort Davis, Texas, 286. 

149. Fort Brown, Texas, 287. 

150. Fort Lancaster, Texas, 287. 

151. The Alamo, San Antonio, 287. 

152. Tucson, Arizona, 289. 

153. Battle of St. Charles, Arkansas, 290. 

154. Issuing Passes at St. Louis, 292. 

155. The Carondelet at Island No. 10, 292. 

156. Naval Mortar, 293. 

157. Building Mortar-boats, 203. 

158- Gun-boats dropping down Stream, 294. 

159. Steamers towing Mortar-boats, 294. 

160. Bombardment of Island No. 10, 294. 

161. Island No. 10, 295. 

162. Shiloh Church, 297. 

163. Pittsburgh Landing, 297. 

164. Crossing Duck River, 297. 

165. Hamburg Landing, Tennessee, 300. 

166. Interior of Sanitary Steamer, 301. 

167. Commissary Store-boats, 301. 

168. Landing Cannon, 3ul. 

169- General Hospital, Hamburg, 301. 

170. Moving Cannon, 301. 

171. Fort Pillow, 302. 

172. Ellet’s Ram Fleet, 302. 

173. Ellet’s Rams approaching Memphis, 303. 

174. Naval Battle before Memphis, 303. 

175. Memphis, the Cotton Levee, 304. 

176. Jackson’s Monument, Memphis, 305. 

177. Hoisting Flag at Memphis, 305. 

178. Huntsville, Alabama, 306. 

179. Cincinnati, Ohio, 308. 

180. Volunteers crossing the Ohio, 308. 

181. Feeding Troops at Cincinnati, 308. 

182. Buell’s Army entering Louisville, 310. 

183. Movement of Troops up the Ohio, 311. 

184. Perrysville, Kentucky, 315. 

185. Iuka,.Mississippi, 315. 

186. Grand Junction, Tennessee, 818. 

187. tfolly Springs, Mississippi, 319. 


CHAPTER XLVI. Page 

AFTER ATLANTA. 670 

CHAPTER XLVII. 

BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. 675 

CHAPTER XLVIII. 

SHERMAN’S CAMPAIGN.—THE MARCH 

TO THE SEA. 683 

CHAPTER XLIX. 

THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 693 

CHAPTER L. 

THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.—EARLY 

AND SHERIDAN. 707 

CHAPTER LI. 

SHERMAN’S CAMPAIGN.—THE CARO¬ 
LINA MARCH. 713 

CHAPTER LII. 

RECOVERY OF THE ATLANTIC COAST. 

—I. WILMINGTON. 722 

CHAPTER LIII. 

RECOVERY OF THE ATLANTIC COAST. 

II. CHARLESTON. 733 

CHAPTER LIV. 

THE MOBILE CAMPAIGN. 744 

CHAPTER LV. 

WILSON’S AND STONEMAN’S RAIDS... . 749 

CHAPTER LVI. 

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG AND 

RICHMOND. 751 

CHAPTER LVII. 

THE RETREAT AND SURRENDER OF 

LEE. 767 

CHAPTER LVIIL 

JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER. 773 

CHAPTER LIX. 

FLIGHT AND CAPTURE OF DAVIS. 777 

CHAPTER LX. 

THE DEATH OF LINCOLN. 781 

CHAPTER LX I 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 789 

CHAPTER LX II. 

RECONSTRUCTION.—1865-1867. 799 

Index,.827 


188. Railroad D^pot, Holly Springs, 319. 

189. Confederate Armory, Holly Springs, 319. 

190. Murfrecsborough, Tennessee, 323. 

191. Deserted Encampment, Murfreesboro’, 323. 

192. Stone River Monument, 324. 

193. William Tecumseh Sherman, 325. 

194. Loyalists fleeing North, 326. 

195. Fort Negley, Nashville, 327. 

19t>. Bridge at Blackburn’s Ford, Bull Run, 33L 

197. Manassas Junction evacuated, 331. 

198. Confederate Camp at Centreville, 332. 

199. The Nelson House, Yorktown, 333. 

200. Fortifications at Yorktown, 333. 

201. Making Road through the Swamp, 335. 

202. Batten 1 11 No.l, before Yorktown, 336. 

203. Mortar Battery before Yorktown, 336. 

204. Remains of British Works, 336. 

205. Taking Possession of Yorktown, 337. 

206. The White House on the Pamunkey, 337. 

207. Flag of Truce at Norfolk, 340. 

208. The Council Tree, near Norfolk, 340. 

209. Entering Norfolk, 240. 

210. Hoisting the Flag nt Norfolk, 340. 

211. Burning of the Gosport Navy Yard, 340. 

212. The March from Williamsburg, 342. 

213. Cold Harbor, near the Chickahominv, 343. 

214. Front Royal, Virginia, 345. 

215. Battle-field of Front Royal, 346. 

216. Bridge across the Chickahominy, 348. 

217. Shelling across the Chickahominy, 349. 

218. In Camp on the Chickahominy, 350. 

219. Railroad to Richmond, 350. 

220. Railroad-bridge over Chickahominy, 350. 

221. Spring on the Railroad, 350. 

222. Bridge-builders, 350. 

223. The last Resting-place, 350. 

224. Searching for the Dead and Wounded, 352. 

225. Pickets in the Woods, 354. 

226. Burying Dead and burning Horses, 355. 

227. Picket-guard on the Chickahominy, 356. 

228. Woodbury’s and Alexander’s Bridge, 357. 

229. Bird’&-eye View of Richmond, 359. 

230. Camp Lee, near Richmond, 361. 

231. Conscript Office, Camp Lee, 361. 

232. Ashland, 361. 

233. Mechaniesville, 361. 

234. Ellison’s Mill, 362. 

235. New Cold Harbor, 364. 

236. Final Charge at Cold Harbor, 366. 

237. Cavalry Charge at Cold Harbor, 366. 

238. Skirmishing in the Woods, 367. 

239. Commencement of the Retreat, 369. 

240. Dest ruction of the Train, 371. 

241. Savage’s Station abandoned, 371. 

242. Jackson in Check at White Oak Cr., 372. 

243. Bayonet Fight at Frazier’s Farm, 373. 

244. On the Field at Frazier’s Farm, 874. 

245. U. S. Battery D. at Frazier’s Farm, 374. 

246. First Mass. Battery at Frazier’s Farm, 376. 

247. Gun-boats at Malvern Hill, 376. 

248. The Battle of Malvern Hill, 376. 

249. The Retreat from Malvern Hill, 377. 






































































ILLUSTRATIONS. 


MAPS AND PLANS 


250. The Declaration of Independence, 6. 

251. Yulee’s Letter, 32. 

252. Charleston Harbor, 54. 

253. Harbor of Pensacola, 69. 

254. Balloon View of the Seat of War, 125. 

255. Map of the Southern States, 126. 

256. Pictorial Map of Virginia, etc., 128. 

257. Balloon View of Fortress Monroe, 132. 

258. Plan of Operations at Bull Hun, 149. 


259. The Battle-field, Bull Run, 156. 

260. Kentucky and Northern Tennessee, 223. 

261. Mill Spring and Vicinity, 224. 

262. Western Campaigns, February, 1862, 231. 

263. Coast of North Carolina, 243. 

264. Ship Island and Vicinity, 263. 

265. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, 264. 

266. Seat of War in Missouri, 282. 


267. Battle-field of Pea Ridge, 285. 

268. New Mexico, 289. 

269. Plan of the Battle of Prairie Grove, 291. 

270. The War in Kentucky and Tennessee, 296. 

271. Plan of the Battle of Shiloh, 298. 

272. Plan of the Battle of Perryville, 314. 

273. Southeastern Virginia, 329. 

274. The Peninsula, below Williamsburgh, 334. 


275. Siege of Yorktown in 1781, 337. 

276. Siege of Yorktown in 1862, 337. 

277. The Vicinity of Richmond, 344. 

278. The Valley of the Shenandoah, 346. 

279. Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, 351. 

280. Map of Region near Richmond, 370. 

281. Positions and Movements, June 26 to July 

1, 1862, 378. 


282. Adams, Charles Francis, 195. 

283. Adams, John, 4. 

284. Adams, Samuel, 4. 

285. Anderson, Robert, 25. 

286. Ashmore, John D., 216. 

287. Baker, Edward D.,167. 

288. Barksdale, William, 213. 

289. Bartlett, Josiah, 4. 

290. Beauregard, Gustav T., 49. 

291. Bell, John, 16. 

292. Benjamin, Judah P., 210- 

293. Blunt, James G., 291. 

294. Bonham, Milledge L., 2i6. 

295. Boyce, William W., 216. 

296. Breckinridge, John C., 15. 

297. Brown, Albert G., 213 

298. Brown, John, 14. 

299. Buchanan, James, 14. 

300. Buell, Don Carlos, 177. 

301. Burke, Edmund, 3. 

302. Butler, Benjamin F., 201. 

303. Butterfield, Daniel, 365. 

304. Calhoun, John C., 12. 

305. Carroll, Charles, 4. 

306. Casey, Silas, 351. 

307. Cass, Lewis, 22. 

308. Chase, Salmon P., 192. 

309. Chase, Samuel, 4. 

310. Chestnut, James, 216. 

311. Clark, Abraham, 4. 

3)2. Clay, Clement C., 215. 

3'3. Clay, Henry, 13. 

314. Clopton, David, 215. 

315. Clymer, George, 4. 

316. Cobb, Howell, 16. 

317. Cobb, Williamson R., 215. 

318. Collamcr, Jacob, 207. 

319. Cooper, Samuel, 358. 

320. Corcoran, Michael, 154. 

321. Couch, Darius N., 352. 

322. Craufurd, S. W., 25. 

323. Crawford, Martin J., 214. 

324 Crittenden, John J., 191. 

325 Curry, Jabez L. M., 215. 

326 Curtis. Samuel R., 282. 


327. Davis, Jefferson, 41, 210, 213. 
£28. Davis, Jefferson C., 25, 312. 

329. Davis, Reuben, 213. 

330. Devens, Charles, 165. 

331. Doubleday, Abner, 25. 

332. Douglas, Stephen A., 15. 

333. Ellery, William, 4. 

334. Ellsworth, Elmer E., 136. 

335. Ericsson, John, 250. 

336. Everett, Edward, 17. 

337. Ewell, Richard S., 368. 

338. Farragut, David G., 261. 

339. Fitzpatrick, Benjamin, 215. 

340. Floyd, John B., 16. 

341. Floyd, William, 4. 

342. Foote, Andrew H., 225. 

343. Forrest, Napoleon B., 307. 

344. Foster, John G., 25, 245. 

345. Franklin, Benjamin, 4. 

346. Fremont, John C.’, 172. 

347. Garfield, James A., 221. 

348. Gartrell, Lucius J., 214. 

349. Gates, Horatio, 2. 

350. Gerry, Elbridge, 4. 

351. Gilman, J. H.,69. 

352. Goldsborough, Louis M., 244. 

353. Greble, John T., 138. 

354. Greene, Nathaniel, 2. 

355. Grow, Galusha A., 185. 

356. Hale, John P., 206. 

357. Hall, Lyman, 4. 

358. Hamilton, Alexander, 5. 

359. Hamlin, Hannibal, 189. 

360. Hammond, James II., 216. 

361. Hancock, John, 4. 

362. Hancock, Winfield S., 338. 

363. Hardeman, Thomas, 214. 

364. Harrison, Benjamin, 4. 

365. Heintzelman, Samuel P., 154. 

366. Henry, Patrick, 5. 

367. Herron, Francis J., 291. 

368. Hewes, Joseph, 4. 

369. Heyward, Thomas, 4. 

370. Hicks, Thomas H., 88. 

I 371. Hill, Ambrose P., 3G4. 


PORTRAITS. 

372. Hill, Joshua, 214. 

373. Hooper, William, 4. 

374. Hopkins, Stephen, 4. 

375. Hopkinson, Francis r 4. 

376. Houston, George S., 215. 

377. Houston, Sam, 288. 

378. Hovey, Alvin P., 320. 

379. Hunter, David, 150. 

380. Hunter, Robert M. T.,210. 

381. Huntingdon, Samuel, 4. 

382. Iverson, Alfred, 214. 

383. Jackson, James, 214. 

384. Jackson, Thomas J., 152, 347. 

385. Jay, John, 5. 

386. Jefferson, Thomas, 4. 

387. Jeffers, William N., 252. 

388. Johnston, Albert S., 299. 

389. Johnston, Joseph E., 148. 

390. Jones, John J., 214. 

391. Kane, George P., 88. 

392. Keitt, Lawrence M.,216. 

393. Keyes, Erasmus D., 152. 

394. Lamar, Lucius Q. C., 213. 

395. Lee, Francis Lightfoot, 4. 

396. Lee, Richard Henry, 4. 

397. Lee, Robert E., 358. 

398. Lewis, Francis, 4. 

399. Lincoln, Abraham, 47. 

400. Livingstone, Philip, 4. 

401. Livingstone, Robert R., 4. 

402. Longstreet, James, 262. 

403. Love, Peter E., 214. 

404. Lynch, Thomas, 4. 

405. Lyon, Nathaniel. 140. 

406. Lyons, Lord, 19G. 

407. Magrath, A. G., 18. 

408. Mallory, Stephen M., 210. 

409. Mason, James M., 194. 

410. McCall, George A., 365. 

411. McClellan, George B., 159. 

412. McClcrnand, John A., 227. 

413. McCook, Robert L , 224. 

414. McCulloch, Ben, 173. 

415. McDowell, Irwin, 146. 

416. McKean, Thomas, 4. 


417. McQueen, John, 216. 

418. McRae, John J., 213. 

419. Meade, R. K., 25. 

420. Memminger, Charles G., 210. 

421. Mercer, M., 196. 

422. Middleton, Arthur, 4. 

423. Miles, William Porcher, 216. 

424. Mitchell, Ormsby M., 237. 

425. Mitchell, Robert B., 314. 

426. Moore, Sydenham, 215. 

427. Morgan, John, 307. 

428. Morris, Governeur, 4. 

429. Morris, Lewis, 4. 

430. Morris, Robert, 4. 

431. Mulligan, James A., 173. 

432. Nelson, Thomas, 4. 

433. Nelson, William, 172. 

434. Oglesbv, Richard F., 316. 

435. Ord, Edward O. C., 317. 

436. Pacn, William. 4. 

437. Paine, Robert Treat, 4. 

438. Patterson, Robert, 148. 

439. Pickens, Francis C., 39. 

440. Pinckney, CharlesCotesworth, 5. 

441. Pitt, William, 3. 

442. Polk, Leonidas, 170. 

443. Porter, David 1).,262. 

444. Porter, Fitz-John, 365. 

445. Porter, William 1)., 229. 

446. Price, Sterling, 170. 

447. Pugh, James L.,215. 

448. Read, George, 4. 

449. Reagan, John II., 210. 

450. Reno, Jesse L., 245. 

451. Reynolds, John F., 363. 

452. Rosecrans, William S., 321. 

453. Ross, George, 4. 

454. Rowland, Thomas F., 251. 

455. Rush, Benjamin, 4. 

456. Rutledge* Edward, 4. 

457. Rutledge, John, 4. 

458. Schofield, John M., 290. 

459. Scott, Winfield, 35. 

460. Seward, William H., 184. 

461. Seymour, Truman, 25, 353. 


462. Shepley, George F., 274. 

463. Sherman, Roger, 4. 

463a. Sherman, William Tecumseh,325 

464. Shields, James, 342. 

465. Singleton, Otho R., 213. 

466. Slemmer, A. J., 69. 

467. Slidell, John, 184. 

468. Slocum, Henry W., 365. 

469. Smith, James, 4. 

470. Smith, William F., 335. 

471. Snyder, G. W., 25. 

472. Stallworth, James A., 215. 

473. Stanley, David S., 314. 

474. Stanton, Edwin M., 187. 

475. Stephens, Alexander II., 43, 210. 

476. Stimers, Alban C., 252. 

477. Stockton, Richard, 4. 

478. Stone, Thomas, 4. 

479. Stonemun, George, 338. 

480. Stringham, Silas II., 181. 

481. Stuart, James E. B., 360. 

4Ji2. Sumner, Edwin V., 352. 

4£3. Talbot, T., 25. 

4. <? 4. Thomas, George II., 223. 

485. Toombs, Robert, 19, 210, 214. 

486. Toucev, Isaac, 16. 

487. Twiggs, David E., 45. 

488. Underwood, John W. II., 214. 

489. Walker, Leroy 1\, 210. 

490. Wallace, Lewis, 235. 

491. Walton, George, 4. 

492. Weitzel, Godfrey, 262. 

493. Whipple, William, 4. 

494. Wilkes, Charles, 195. 

495. Williams, William, 4. 

496. Wilson, Henry, 187. 

497. Wilson, James, 4. 

498. Wilson, William, 182. 

499. Witherspoon, John, 4. 

500. Wolcott, Oliver, 4. 

601. Wood, Fernando, 99. 

502. Worden, John L., 2o5. 

503. Wythe, George, 4. 

504. Yancey, William L., 193. 

505. Zollicotfer, Felix, 223, 


ILLUSTRATIONS IN VOLUME 


II. 


1. Thoroughfare Gap, 387. 

2. Groveton Monument, 389. 

3. Bull Run Monument, 391. 

4. The Confederates crossing the Potomac, 392. 

5. View from Maryland Heights, 395. 

6. Signal Station, Maryland Heights, 396. 

7. Boonesborough and Turner’s Gap, 397. 

8. After the Battle—At the Fence, 401. 

9. After the Battle—Burying the Dead, 401. 

10. Stone Bridge over the Antietam, 402. 

11. Site of a Battery, 403. 

12. Scene of a Charge, 403. 

13. Behind a Breastwork, 403. 

14. Shelter for Wounded, 403. 

15. Cavalry Reconnoisance in Virginia, 405. 

16. Fredericksburg from Falmouth, 407. 

17. Acquia Creek, 408. 

18. An Army Train, 409. 

19. Building the Bridge at Fredericksburg, 410. 

20. Sumner’s Division crossing the Rappahan¬ 

nock, 411. 

21. Franklin's Division crossing the Rappahan¬ 

nock, 412. 

22. Assault upon Marye’s Hill, 414. 

23. Franklin’s Division recrossing the Rappa¬ 

hannock, 415. 

24. The Campaign in the Mud, 418, 419. 

25. Mortar Batteries attacking Fort Pulaski, 

420. 

26. Hauling Mortars, 420. 

27. Attack on Fort Pulaski, 420. 

28. Capture of the Harriet Lane, 421. 

29. Destruction of the Westfield, 422. 

30. Bahia, Brazil, 423. 

31. Destruction of the Alabama, 426. 

32. A Night Encampment, 427. 

33. Battle of Kingston, 427. 

34. Action at Whitehall, 428. 

35. Skirmish near Goldsborough, 428. 

36. Crevasse on the Lower Mississippi, 431. 

37. Admiral Porter’s Mortar Fleet, 434. 

38. Natchez upon the Hill, 436. 

39. Natchez under the Hill, 437. 

40. Ellis’s Bluffs, 437. 

41. Vicksburg from the River, 438. 

42. Porter’s Mortar Fleet in Trim, 439. 

43. Farragut’s Fleet running the Vicksburg Bat¬ 

teries, 439. 

44 . Mortar-boats firing on Vicksburg by night, 

440. 

45. Davis’s Fleet on the way to join Farragut’s, 

440. 

46 . The Arkansas running through the Union 

Fleet, 440, 


SCENES AND 

47. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 441. 

48. Death of General Thomas Williams, 442. 

49. Destruction of # the Arkansas, 443. 

50. Cotton Hoards in Southern Swamps, 443. 

51. Sixth Missouri at Chickasaw Bayou, 446. 

52. Porter’s Fleet at the Mouth of the Yazoo, 

447. 

53. Attack on Arkansas Post, 448. 

54. Transport bringing Cattle to Vicksburg, 449. 

55. The Queen of the West and the Vicksburg, 

449. 

56. Loss of the Queen of the West, 450. 

57. The Indianola running the Vicksburg Bat¬ 

teries, 451. 

58. Admiral Porter’s Dummy,” 451. 

59. Lancaster and Switzerland running the Bat¬ 

teries, 452. 

60. Negroes at work on the Canal, 453. 

61. Break in Levee near the Canal, 454. 

62. In the Swamps, 454. 

63. Bayou Navigation, 454. 

64. Among the Bayous, 454. 

65. McClemand’s Corps marching through the 

Bogs, 454. 

66. Grant’s Transports running the Batteries, 

455. 

67. Saving the Pearl River Bridge, 456. 

68. Destroying Railroads, 456. 

69. Grierson’s Command entering Baton Rouge, 

456. 

70. The advance on Port Gibson, 457. 

71. Attack on Grand Gulf, 457. 

72. Logan crossing the Bayou Pierre, 458. 

73. Banks landing at Baton Rouge, 459. 

74. Burning of the Mississippi, 460. 

75. View on the Teche, 460. 

76. Occupation of Alexandria, 461. 

77. Banks’s Army leaving Simmsport, 462*. 

78. Crocker’s Charge at Jackson, 463. 

79. McPherson and his Chief Engineers, 465. 

80. Cotton Bridge across the Big Black, 466. 

81. Vicksburg from the Rear, 467. 

82. The Approaches to Vicksburg. 469. 

83. The Investment of Vicksburg >■ Sherman’s 

Right, 470. 

84. The Assault on Port Hudson, 473. 

85. Port Hudson from the opposite Bank, 474. 

86. Entrance of Gallery to the Mine, 475. 

87. Miners at work under the Fort, 475. 

88. Explosion of Fort, 475. 

89. Battery Ilickenlooper, 476. 

90. Interview of Grant and Pemberton, 478. 

91. Old Vicksburg Monument, 478. 

92. New Vicksburg Monument, 478. 


INCIDENTS. 

93. Surrender of Vicksburg, 479. 

94. Federal Troops before Jackson, 480. 

95. Saluting the Hag at Port Hudson, 481. 

96. Arrival of the “ Imperial” at New Orleans, 

482. 

97. Headquarters of Army of the Potomac, 485. 

98. Picket Guard, 487. 

99. Crossing at United States Ford, 488 

100. Cavalry crossing at Ely’s Ford, 488. 

101. Sedgwick’s Corps crossing the Rappahan¬ 

nock, 489. 

102. Laying Pontoons for Sedgwic k’s Corps, 490. 

103. Sedgwick’s Bridges laid, 492. 

104. Stampede of Eleventh Corps, 494. 

105. Near Chancellorsville, May 1, 495. 

106. Near Chancellorsville, May 1, 496. 

107. Chancellorsville, May 1,497. 

108. Burning the Bridge over the Susquehanna, 

504. 

109. Gettysburg, 506. 

110. Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, 507. 

111. Wheat-field where Reynolds fell, 508. 

112. Meade’s Headquarters, Cemetery Ridge, 

508. 

113. Lee’s Headquarters, Seminary Ridge, 508. 

114. Breastwork in the Woods, 509. 

115. Summit of Little Round Top, Gettysburg, 

510,511. 

116. Union Position near the Centre, Gettys¬ 

burg, 510, 511. 

117. Gettysburg, July 3, 1863, 514, 515. 

118. In Camp, 517. 

119. Camp at the Foot of Blue Ridge, 519. 

120. In Camp at Warrenton Springs, 520. 

121. D£pot of Supplies on the Railroad, 521. 

122. Confederate Centre, Mine Run, 522. 

123. Recrossing at Germania Ford, 522. 

124. Warren’s last Position, Mine Run, 522. 

125. Winter Quarters—On Picket, 524. 

126. Pack-mules in the Mountains, 527. 

127. The Courier Line, 528. 

128. Impromptu Barricade, 532. 

129. Morgan’s Raiders, 532. 

130. Dragging Artillery over the Mountains, 534. 

131. Occupation of Cumberland Gap, 535. 

132. Stevenson, Alabama, 536. 

133. Chattanooga from the opposite Bank, 540. 

134. View of Knoxville from Keith's Hills, 553. 

135. Longstreet’s Assault on Fort Sanders, 554. 

136. Attack on a Federal Train above Chatta¬ 

nooga, 555. 

137. The Thomas Medal, 556. 

138. Hazen’s Brigade descending the Tennes¬ 

see, 557. 


139. Chattanooga from the Federal Camp, 55$ 

559. 

140. View of Lookout Mountain from Chatta¬ 

nooga Creek, 561. 

141. Top of Lookout Mountain, Nov. 25, 563. 

142. Battery on the Top of Lookout, 563. 

143. Hooker’s Column storming Lookout, 563. 

144. Crest of Lookout Mountain, 563. 

145. To the Top of Lookout, 563. 

146. Capture of Works at White House, 564. 

147. Storming of Missionary Ridge, 566. 

148. Captured Confederate Cannon, 568. 

149. The Fort Pillow Massacre, 573. 

150. Forrest’s Attack on Irving Prison, 574. 

151. Attack on Sabine Pass, 580. 

152. Banks’s Landing at Brazos Santiago, 580. 

153. Confederate Evacuation of Brownsville, 

580. 

154. Porter’s Fleet on Red River, 584. 

155. Land Attack on Porter's Fleet, 588. 

156. Banks crossing Cane River, 589. 

157. Fleet passing the Dam, Alexandria, 590. 

158. Ruins of Lawrence, Kansas, 591. 

159. Little Rock, Arkansas, 592. 

160. Refugees entering St. Louis, 595. 

161. Grant receiving his Commission, 599. 

162. Signal Station near Ringgold, Georgia, 602. 

163. Ringgold, Georgia, 602. 

164. Buzzard’s Roost Pass, 603. 

165. Geary’s Assault on Dug Gap. 604. 

166. Shelling the Railroad near Resaca, 605. 

167. Sherman’s Army entering Resaca, 606. 

168. Lost Mountain at Sunrise, 607. 

169. Crest of Pine Mountain, where Polk fell, 

607. 

170. Kenesaw, from Little Kenesaw, 608. 

171. Howard’s Corps crossing the Chattahoo¬ 

chee, 609. 

172. Distant View of Atlanta, 610. 

173. Scene of McPherson’s Death, 613. 

174. Sherman in Council, 615. 

175. Ezra’s Church, 616. 

176. Dead Brook, Ezra’s Church, 616. 

177. Sherman’s Army destroying the Macon 

Railroad. 616. 

178. Atlanta, Georgia, 617. 

179. Confederate Prisoners from Jonesborough, 

618. 

180. Confederate Exodus from Atlanta, 619. 

181. Workshops—Army of the Potomac, 622. 

182. Hancock’s Corps erossingthe Rapidan, 026* 

183. Fighting in the Wilderness, 627. 

184. Scene of Wadsworth’s Death, 629. 

185. Fire-proof where Sedgwick fell, 630. 














ILLUSTRATIONS. 


186. Spottsylvania Court-house, 631. 

187. Jericho Mills, North Anna, 632. 

188. Rifle-pits, North Anna, 632. 

189. Quarles’s Mills, North Anna, 632. 

190. Battery on the North Anna, 632. 

191. Crossing the Ny, 633. 

192. Crossing the North Anna, 633. 

193. Crossing the Pamunkey, 634. 

194. Cold Harbor, 635. 

195. Petersburg, 638. 

196. Fight with the Military—New York Riots, 

652. 

197. New York Rioters hanging a Negro, 652. 

198. Charge of Police at the Tribune Office, 652. 

199. Burning of Colored Orphan Asylum, 653. 

200. Soldiers voting for President, 668. 

201. Hood’s Attack on Allatoona, 672. 

202. Destruction of the Depots, etc., at Atlanta, 

675. 

203. Nashville from Edgefield, 680. 

204. Nashville from the opposite Bank, 680. 

205. Eastport, Tennessee, 681. 

206. Saltville, Virginia, 682. 

207. Salt Valley, 682. 

208. Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps leaving 

Atlanta, 683. 

209. Sherman and his Generals, 684. 

210. Atlanta in Ruins, 685. 

211. Millen Prison—Exterior, 687. 

212. Millen Prison—Interior, 687. 

213. Destruction of Millen Junction, 687. 

214. Capitol at Milledgeville, 688. 

215. Fort McAllister, 688. 

216. Assault on Fort McAllister, 689. 

217. Sherman’8 Army entering Savannah, 690. 

218. Fort Jackson, Savannah, 691. 


814. Map of the Campaign in Virginia, 384. 

815. Map of Operations August 28, 29, 30, 386. 

816. Map of Operations in Maryland, 394. 

317. Movements from September 10 to 17, 397. 

318. Routes to Richmond, 407. 

819. Plan of Attack on Fort Pulaski, 420. 

320. Chart of Galveston Bay, 421. 

321. Route from Newbern to Goldsborough, 428. 

322. Course of the Mississippi River, 429. 

323. Bird’s-eye View of the Mississippi Basin, 

435. 

324. Map of Mississippi Central Railroad, 444. 

325. Operations on the Yazoo and Arkansas, 

445. 

326. Battle of Chickasaw Bayou, 446. 

327. Williams’s Canal, 452. 

328. The Lake Providence Route, 452. 

329. The Yazoo Pass Rente, 452. 

330. The Steele’s Bayou Route, 452. 


381. Ames, Adelbert, 728. 

382. Ayres, Romeyn B., 760. 

383. Banks, Nathaniel P., 577. 

384. Barlow, Francis C., 400. 

385. Bellows, Henry W., 792. 

386. Bimey, David B., 694. 

387. Blair, Francis, Jr., 684. 

388. Blake, Homer C.,425. 

389. Booth, J. Wilkes, 784. 

390. Brough, John, 654. 

391. Buford, John, 507. 

892. Burnside, Ambrose E., 406. 

393. Cnnby, E. li. S., 744. 

394. Chase, Salmon P., 665. 

895. C’olfax, Schuyler, 806. 

396. Conkling. Roscoe, 810. 

397. Corbett, Boston, 785. 

398. Crook, George, 711. 

399. Curtin, Andrew G., 654. 

400. Cushing, W. B., 722. 

401. Dalhgren, Ulric, 523. 

402. Davis, Charles II., 486. 

403. Davis, Jeff. C., 684. 

404. Davis, Henry Winter, 662. 

405. Dayton, William L., 664. 

406. Dupont, Samuel F., 734. 

407. Ellet, Charles, 433. 

408. Ellet, Charles Rivers, 433. 

409. Ellsworth, Oliver, 665. 


219. Confederates evacuating Savannah, 691. 

220. Sherman’s Headquarters at Savannah, 692. 

221. Battery before Petersburg, 694. 

222. Building Works, 695. 

223. A Mortar Battery, 695. 

224. Return of Kautz’s Cavalry, 696. 

225. Signal Station, 697. 

226. Carrying Powder to the Mine, 697. 

227. Explosion of the Mine, 698. 

228. In the Trenches before Petersburg, 700. 

229. Confederate Works at Hatcher’s Run, 701. 

230. Union Works on the Weldon Road, 702. 

231. Bringing in Prisoners by Night, 702. 

232. Destruction of the Weldon Railroad, 703. 

233. Union Works before Petersburg, 704. 

234. Dutch Gap Canal, 705. 

235. Raid of the Confederate Iron-clads, 706. 

236. Cutting the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 

707. 

237. Pillaging at Hagerstown, 708. 

238. Sacking a Flour-mill, 708. 

239. Early recrossing the Potomac, 708. 

240. Ruins of Chambersburg—Main Street, 709. 

241. Ruins of Chambersburg—The Town Hall, 

709. 

242. Confederate Rout at Winchester, 710. 

243. Fort Thunderbolt, Savannah, 714. 

244. Slocum crossing the Savannah at Sister’s 

Ferry, 715. 

245. Pocotaligo Depot, 715. 

246. Marching through the Swamps, 716. 

247. Entering Blackville, South Carolina, 716. 

248. Crossing the South Edisto, 716. 

249. Sherman entering Columbia, 717. 

250. Columbia on Fire, 719. 

251. Winnsborough, South Carolina, 719. 


252. Hanging Rock, South Carolina, 719. 

253. Fomgers starting out, 720. 

254. Foragers returning to Camp, 720. 

255. U. S. Arsenal at Fayetteville, 720. 

256. Tug-boat Donaldson with Supplies, 721. 

257. Albemarle attacking the Federal Fleet, 722. 

258. Sassacus ramming the Albemarle, 723. 

259. Destruction of the Albemarle, 723. 

260. Blockading Fleet, Wilmington—Old Inlet, 

724. 

261. Blockading Fleet, Wilmington—New In¬ 

let, 724. 

262. The Powder-boat Louisiana, 725. 

263. Fort Fisher, 726. 

264. Iron-clad Monitor Monadnock, 726. 

265. Federal Fleet at Hampton Roads, 727. 

266. Transport Fleet off Federal Point, 728. 

267. The Monitore in a Gale, 728. 

268. Landing of Troops above Fort Fisher, 731. 

269. Fleet celebrating the Capture of Fort Fish¬ 

er, 732. 

270. Fort Sumter, 733. 

271. City of Charleston, 733. 

272. Dupont’s Expedition leaving Beaufort, 735. 

273. Confederate Rams engaging the Fleet off 

Charleston, 735. 

274. Bombardment of Fort Sumter, 736. 

275. Sinking of the Keokuk, 738. 

276. Ruins of Light-house. Morris’s Island, 740. 

277. Sharp-shooters before Wagner, 741. 

278. The Swamp Angel, 741. 

279. Portion of Charleston under Fire, 742. 

280. Confederate Evacuation of Morris’s Island, 

743. 

281. Federal Fleet in Mobile Bay, 745. 

282. Capture of the Tennessee, 746. 


MAPS AND PLANS. 


331. From Milliken’s Bend to New Carthage, 

455. 

332. Scheme of Grierson’s Raid, 456. 

333. Map of Port Hudson, 460. 

334. The Bayou Teche Campaign, 460. 

335. Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign, 465. 

336. Map of the Vicksburg Defenses, 474. 

337. Siege of Vicksburg, 477. 

338. Region near Chancellorsville, 491. 

339. Invasion of Pennsylvania, 503. 

340. Plan of Gettysburg Cemetery, 507. 

341. Battle of Gettysburg, 509. 

342. Map of Campaign, July—November, 1863, 

518. 

343. Advance through Hoover’s Gap, 530. 

844. Middle Tennessee Campaign, 530. 

345. Burnside’s East Tennessee Campaign, 533. 

346. Rosecrans’s Movements, September, 4-12, 

538. 


347. Position before the Battle of the 19th, 543. 

348. Battle of Chickamauga, Sept. 19th, 545. 

349. Battle of Chickamauga, Sept. 20th, 547. 
850. Siege of Knoxville, 552. 

351. Battle of Wauhatchie, 556. 

352. Battles about Chattanooga, 565. 

353. Map of Mississippi, 570. 

354. Forrest’s Tennessee Expedition, 571. 

355. Map of Louisiana, 578. 

356. Plan of Fort De Russy, 584. 

357. The Red River Campaign, 585. 

358. Map of Missouri, 694. 

359. The Atlanta Campaign, 608. 

360. Rousseau’s Raid, 611. 

361. Cavalry Raids—Atlanta Campaign, 614. 

362. Operations in Virginia, May, 1864—April, 

1865,636. 

363. Isometric View of the Virginia Campaign, 

639. 


PORTRAITS. 


410. Emory, William H., 472. 

411. Ewing, Hugh, 468. 

412. Fessenden, William Pitt, 800. 

413. Foster, Lafayette S., 806. 

413a. Franklin, William B., 398. 

414. Geary, John W., 657. 

416. Gillem, Alvin G., 750. 

416. Gillmore, Quincy A., 740. 

417. Granger, Gordon, 745. 

418. Grant, Ulysses S.,,621. 

419. Grierson, Benjamin H., 456. 

420. Griffin, Charles G., 761. 

421. Grover, Cuvier, 472. 

422. Hnlleck, Henry W., 381. 

423. Hampton, Wade, 718. 

424. Harold, David C., 787. 

425. Ilarker, Charles G., 608. 

426. Hays, Alexander, 626. 

427. Hazen, William B., 684, 690. 

428. 11ooker, Joseph, 483. 

429. Howard, Oliver O., 614, 684. 

430. Humphreys, Andrew A., 518. 

431. Jay, John, 665. 

432. Johnson, Andrew. 799. 

433. Kearney, Philip, 390. 

434. Kilpatrick, Judson C., 684, 6S6. 

435. Lincoln, Abraham, 781. 

436. Logan, John A., 463, 684. 


437. Lovejoy, Owen, 648. 

438. Mansfield, Joseph K., 399. 

439. Marshall, John, 665. 

440. McCook, Daniel, 608. 

441. McCulloch, Hugh, 801. 

442. McPherson, James B., 465, 618. 

443. Meade, George G., 501. 

444. Miles, Nelson A., 761. 

445. Morgan, James D., 671. 

446. Mott, Gershom, 694. 

447. Mower, A. J., 684. 

448. Negley, James S., 539. 

449. Parke, John G., 554. 

450. Payne (Powell), Lewis, 786. 

451. Pemberton, John C., 464. 

452. Pendleton, George II., 669. 

453. Pleasonton, Alfred, 493. 

454. Pope, John, 382. 

455. Porter, Benjamin II., 730. 

456. Porter, David D., 730. 

457. Potter, Robert B., 531. 

458. Preston, Samuel W., 730. 

459. Ransom, T. E. G., 587. 

461. Rodgers, John, 430. 

462. Rousseau, Lovell II., 671. 

463. Ruffin, Edmund, 772. 

464. Sedgwick, John, 630. 

465. Semmes, Raphael, 424. 


283. Fort Morgan after its Surrender, 747. 

284. Light-house at Fort Morgan, 747. 

285. Grant’s Headquarters, City Point, 751. 

286. Field Hospital, Ninth Corps, 752. 

287. I -egro Quarters—Army of the James, 752. 

288. Union and Confederate Works before Pe¬ 

tersburg, 754. 

289. Bridge on Military Railroad, 756. 

290. Ewell’s Headquarters, near Richmond, 758. 

291. Works captured by the Sixth Corps, 762. 

292. Evacuation of Petersburg, 763. 

293. Occupation of Petersburg, 764. 

294. Richmond, from Gamble’s Hill, 765. 

295. Ruins of Richmond—Main Street, 766. 

296. McLean’8 House, 767. 

297. Position of Lee’s Army when surrendered, 

770. 

298. The last Shot, 771. 

299. The last Review, 772. 

300. James Bennett’s House—Johnston’s Sur¬ 

render. 775. 

301. Johnston’s Surrender, 776. 

802. Small-arms surrendered by Johnston, 777. 

803. Accoutrements surrendered by Johnston, 

777. 

304. Lincoln at Home, 781. 

305. Lincoln’s Home, Springfield, Illinois, 782. 

306. Ford’s Theatre, Washington, 783. 

307. Garrett’s Barn and Outhouses, 785. 

308. Booth’s Inscription on the Window-pane, 

786. 

309. Mrs. Surratt’s House, Washington, 787. 

310. Grand Review at Washington, 790. 

811. Grand Review at Washington, 793. 

312. Confederate Prison-camp, Elmira, 794. 

313. Andersonville Cemetery, 796. 


364. Map illustrating Hood's Invasion, 676. 

365. Battle of Nashville, 678. 

366. Map of the March tq the Sea, 688. 

367. The Lines at Petersburg and Richmond, 

693. 

368. Approaches to Savannah, 713. 

369 # Sherman’s Carolina March, 718. 

370. Plan of Columbia, South Carolina, 718. 

371. Wilmington and its Approaches, 722. 

872. Map of Fort Fisher, 729. 

373. Charleston and its Environs, 739. 

374. Mobile Bay, 745. 

875. Map of Wilson’s Alabama and Georgia 
Campaign, 748. 

376. Stoneman’8 North Carolina Raid, 749. 

377. Five Forks—Warren’s Movements, 759. 

378. Retreat and Pursuit of Lee, 769. 

379. Flight and Pursuit of Davis, 779. 

380. President’s Box at Ford’s Theatre, 783. 


466. Seymour, Horatio, 651. 

467. Shaw, Robert G., 740. 

468. Sheridan, Philip H., 623. 

469. Sherman, William Tecumseh, 597, 684. 

470. Sickles, Daniel E., 498. 

471. Sigel, Franz, 388. 

472. Slocum, H. W., 684. 

473. Smith, A. J., 587. 

474. Smith, W. S., 571. 

475. Steedman, James B., 679. 

476. Stevens, Isaac J., 390. 

477. Stevens, Thaddeus, 812. 

478. Strong,George C., 740. 

479. Sturgis, S. D., 574. 

480. Sumner, Charles, 657. 

481. Surratt, John II., 787. 

482. Taney, Roger B., 665. 

483. Terry, Alfred II., 731. 

484. Torbert, Albert, 712. 

485. Vullandighum, Clement, L., 644. 

486. Wadsworth, James S., 628. 

487. Wagner, G. D., 677. 

488. Warren, Gouverneur K., 624. 

489. Washburoe, C. C., 471. 

490. Williams, A. S., 721. 

491. Wilson, James H., 750. 

492. Winslow, John A., 425. 

493. Wright, Horatio G., 630. 




















From Harper's Weekly. 


THE FIRST PEAL FOR LIBERTY. 


Copyright, 1867, by Harper A Brothers. 
















































































INTRODUCTION. 

Colonization of the Country which became the United States of America.—The Colonists 
of one Race, and almost of one Condition.—Difference in Occupation, Religious Character, and 
Education.—Slavery.—British Arrogance and Oppression.—First Colonial Congress.—Conti¬ 
nental Congress.—Revolutionary War.—Independence won, not by any Colony, but by the 
United Colonies.—A Nation in Fact, but not in Form.—Lack and Need of a Sovereign Power. 
—Constitutional Convention.—A “National” Government formed, and not a Confederation.— 
Sovereignty in the Central Government: States never Independent Sovereignties.—Constitu¬ 
tion adopted by the People, and not by the State Governments.—Prosperity.—The one Ele¬ 
ment of Discord and Misfortune.—Necessary Compromise of Opinions and Interests.—Great 
political Advantages gained by the Slave Interest.—Consequent Tendencies in the Slave States 
to Oligarchy.—Addition of new States to the Union.—Slavery retains its political Advantage. 
—Great Increase of the Free States in Wealth and Population.—Formation of a Slavery Party. 
—Reprobation of Slavery throughout Christendom.—The Colonization Society.—The Missouri 
Compromise.—The Abolitionists.—Effect of the Abolition Agitation.—Aggressive and pro¬ 
scriptive Policy of the Fire-eating Slaveholders.—Endeavors to extend and to limit the Area 
of Slavery.—John C. Calhoun’s Position.—The Fugitive-slave Law.—Obeyed to the Letter by 
the People of Massachusetts.—The Kansas-Nebraska Bill.—The Territorial Issue.—The Strug¬ 
gle in Kansas.—Assault on Senator Sumner.—The Dred Scott Decision.—Resistances by Free 
States.—Personal-liberty Laws.—Breaking up of the Democratic Party.—John Brown’s Raid. 
—Presidential Nominating Conventions of 1860.—The Democratic Convention broken up on 
the Slavery Issue.—This Result brought about by the Politicians of the Cotton States.—Nomi¬ 
nation of Bell and Everett, of Lincoln and Hamlin, of Douglas and Johnson, of Breckinridge 
and Lane.—Treason in President Buchanan’s Cabinet.—Election of Abraham Lincoln.—No 
sectional Division of the Country.—Homogeneousness of the People of the United States.—The 
Difference produced by Slavery and Ignorance, and Freedom and Education.—Excitement 


upon the Election of Mr. Lincoln. — Preparations for Secession in South Carolina.—The Peo¬ 
ple of the other Slave States not ready or willing to Secede.—Agitation throughout the South. 
—Forced Inaction of the Government.—Gloom at the North.—Opposition to the Course of 
South Carolina throughout the Slave States.—Meeting of Congress.—President Buchanan’s 
vacillating Message.—An empty Treasury.—Efforts to Preserve the Union.—Obstinacy of South 
Carolina.—Passage of her Ordinance of Secession.—President Buchanan found wanting.—Fi¬ 
nancial Disturbance and Ruin in Northern Cities. — Confidence at the South. — Fraud and 
Treason in the Cabinet.—Gloom and Despondency at the North. 

T HE people of the North American colonies lying between New Bruns¬ 
wick on the north and Florida on the south took a place among the 
nations in the year 1789. They were English people. For the Dutch col¬ 
ony of New Netherlands was so small and so inert that, even in its Dutch 
day, it made little impression upon the country, and none at all of an en¬ 
during kind upon the character of the new nation ; while the Swedes, who 
settled near the mouth of the Delaware, were such a mere handful of men 
that, in this respect, they are not even to be taken into consideration. 1 The 
new nation was singularly homogeneous, whether in regard to the race or 
the condition of the people who composed it. The nation from which it 

1 In 1647 the population of Virginia and Maryland was 20,000; that of New England as many 
more; while in New Netherlands, including the Swedes on the Delaware, there were only between 
two and three thousand ; and of these so large a proportion were Englishmen that, some years be¬ 
fore, it had been found necessary to appoint an English secretary to the Dutch governor, and to 
promulgate ordinances in English. To New England, Virginia, and Maryland were afterward 
added the English colonies of Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and Georgia. 



























































































2 


INTRODUCTION. 


[1750. 


had severed itself, being composed of English, Welsh, Scotch, and Irish ele¬ 
ments—four distinct peoples, of widely different origin, traits, and habits, hav¬ 
ing been gathered by accident and the sword into the kingdom of Great 
Britain—was upon this point notably its opposite. But even in England 
proper there was not a greater predominance of sheer English blood; while 
the absence of any distinction of rank, and the comparative rarity of any 
wide difference of condition among its citizens, was almost peculiar to it 
among the states of Christendom. The sameness of its component parts 
was therefore so great that, compared in its substance with any other nation, 
it consisted of but a single element. Its marked and almost unprecedented 
homogeneousness was its distinctive character. 

Such difference as there was between the people of the several common¬ 
wealths which formed this nation was caused almost entirely by variety of 
occupation, of religious conviction, and of consequent social habits; and 
thus the difference was, both in kind and in degree, merely such as always 
exists among people not only of the same nation, but of the same city and 
the same neighborhood. The settlements at the North were made by men 
who sought chiefly that liberty in religious affairs which they, in their turn, 
austerely denied to others: those at the South were planted, not settled, by 
men of wealth and rank in England, who sent over such adventurers as they 
could induce to embark in their enterprise, while they themselves remained 
at home to receive the lion’s share of the profit. To those who went out as ad¬ 
venturers to the Plantations, as the American settlements were called, 2 there 
were added quite a large number of convicts, many of whom doubtless se¬ 
cured there the opportunity of reformation, and the means of reputable 
life. At the North the settlers clustered in farm-houses round their churches, 
and wrung a frugal living from a reluctant soil, seeking to lead a thrifty, 
independent, “ godly” life, according to their stern notions of godliness. At 
the South men sought great profit by the rude culture of large tracts of rich 
land, upon which labor soon began to be performed chiefly by negro slaves; 
and dwelling-houses were consequently scattered widely through the Planta¬ 
tions, until at last each farm came to be called a plantation. At the North, 
religion, as distinguished from the practice of the Christian virtues, was min¬ 
gled with all public and private affairs; the tone of society was ascetic; 
and there was no hierarchal church government. At the South religion was 
not regarded, except in so far as it w T as a proper and a reputable thing to be 
attended to; no artificial restraint was placed upon social intercourse; con¬ 
vivial habits prevailed ; and in religious affairs, except among a few Scotch 
devotees of Presbyterianism, the Church of England had full control. To 
these traits of unlikeness must be added one other, which, in the event, 
proved to be of greater importance than either, or, indeed, than all of those 
which have been named. In New England, hardly were the comforts of 
life moderately secured, when provision began to be made for the intel¬ 
lectual education of the people, and this not only by the establishment of 
a college for the cultivation of the higher branches of learning, but by the 
instruction, in grammar-schools and by clergymen, of all the children in the 
colony. But at the South, only persons of some wealth and social position, 
and not all of those, sought the advantages of intellectual culture for their 
sons. 3 From the beginning to the present day this education of the mass of 
the people has been the grand distinctive feature between the country lying 
north of the Potomac and the Ohio, and that upon the south, with some excep¬ 
tion as to Maryland and Kentucky. Consequently, the education of the coun¬ 
try at large, and its position in literature, science, and the arts, are almost en¬ 
tirely due to the northern part of it. The men of the South who were edu¬ 
cated received their education mostly at New England colleges, or in those of 
states which were settled by New England men, or had been brought under 
New England influence; or they 'were taught at home by tutors who were 
themselves educated in those colleges; and the comparatively little knowl¬ 
edge diffused through the mass of poor and untaught people around them has 
been due to intercourse with men who, born and bred in the northern, have 
sought homes in the southern part of the country. But, although the men¬ 
tal instruction of the whole country has thus come mainly from the North, 
the original difference in moral training and social organization between the 
northern and southern colonies has been mainly preserved. 4 * 

In one point society in these colonies was somewhat peculiar: the people 
of all of them, north and south, held negro slaves, and dealt in them. But 
neither the presence of the negroes nor their enslaved condition was due to 
the direct agency of the colonists; nor were they, in this respect, absolutely 
distinguished from their fellow-subjects of the mother country. Slaves were 
transported to the colonies at first against the wishes of the colonists; and 
whoever chooses to examine the London papers of the last century may find, 
even as late as 1776, advertisements of “black boys,” and even of “black 
girls,” who “ have lived in England several years,” and who are to be “sold 
at a bargain.” There was, then, no essential difference between the English¬ 
men of America and the Englishmen of Great Britain. The former, taken 
as a whole, corresponded to the middle class of Englishmen in the mother 

s Plantation was merely another English word for colony, colonizing. 

3 In 1671, more than sixty years after the settlement of Virginia, Governor Berkeley, of that 
colony, said, in a report to the Privy Council, “I thank God there are no free-schools nor print¬ 
ing, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience, 
and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divulged them, and libels against the best 
government; God keep ns from both.” 

4 John Adams, writing to Joseph Hawley, Nov. 25th, 1775, says; “The characters of gentle¬ 
men in the four New England colonies differ as much from those in the others as that of the com¬ 
mon people differs; that is, as much as several distinct nations almost. Gentlemen, men of sense, 
or any kind of education, in the other colonies, are much fewer in proportion than in New En¬ 
gland. Gentlemen in the colonies have large plantations of slaves, and the common people among 

them are very ignorant and very poor. . These gentlemen are accustomed, habituated to higher 

notions of themselves, and the distinction between them and the co mm on people than we are.”— 
John Adams's Works } vol. ix., p. 367. 


country, exhibiting about the same moral, intellectual, and social variety of 
character, modified, and perhaps not for the worse, by the enterprise and 
self-reliance taught them by their comparative isolation, by privation, and 
adversity. 

Such was the people which the British government began to alienate, 
about 1750, by denying them their rights of birth as Englishmen; by treat¬ 
ing them as mere creatures of convenience, to be worked for the benefit of 
British commerce and the aggrandizement of the mother country; by im¬ 
posing burdensome taxes and irritating laws upon them without their con¬ 
sent; by rejoining to their plea in behalf of the establishment of a college 
in Virginia, that they had souls to be saved, “Souls! damn your souls! 
plant tobacco l” 6 Of this arrogance of purpose and insolence of manner, 
and of this notion that Anglo-Americans should exist chiefly for the benefit 
of British commerce and British manufactures, we shall see that two wars 
and the lapse of more than a hundred years have not quite rid the governing 
classes of Great Britain. This unnatural and selfish policy had its natural 
antagonizing effect. The outside pressure bound together the people upon 
whom it was brought to bear. Though scattered over a wide extent of coun¬ 
try, and having separate local governments, they had free intercourse; and 
their common trial made them feel that they were not only one in blood, but 
one in interest. They began to act in concert, not for independent political 
existence, but for self-defense within the British Constitution. 

In 1765 the first Colonial Congress for redress of grievances assembled at 
New York. But it was in no sense an authoritative body. It was composed 
of delegates from the several Colonial Assemblies, with three exceptions, who 
acted under special instructions. They set forth a Declaration of Rights and 
Grievances; they petitioned the King, and sent memorials to Parliament. 
But they only claimed all the privileges of Englishmen as their birthright, 
and therefore protested against being taxed by a body in which they were 
not represented. Their doings were warmly approved by the Assemblies 
and the people of all the colonies, and the first step was unconsciously taken 
toward the political union, the separate national existence, of the English race 
in America. The lapse of nine years, passed in the endurance of a common 
oppression from their common mother, and in continuous consultation as to 
their means of resistance, developed rapidly a unity of feeling in the colo¬ 
nies, which took form in the Continental Congress, composed of leading men 
from twelve provinces, which assembled in Philadelphia. Under the guid¬ 
ance of this body the power of the British government was in the course of 
events defied, and the independence of the colonies declared and maintained; 
but at first it merely imitated its predecessor in adopting a Declaration of 
Rights, in which the privileges of Englishmen and British subjects were 
claimed—most important of all, the right of being bound by no law to which 
they had not consented by their representatives. It took no active measure 
of resistance, and merely recommended one which may be called passive— 
a voluntary association, pledging the associators to entire commercial non¬ 
intercourse with Great Britain. It is desirable to bring to mind these well- 
known facts in view of the character and the pretensions of the rebellion 
the course of which we are about to trace, and also of the grounds on which 
the government of the United States took up arms for its suppression. 

The Continental Congress, assembling first as a mere deliberative body, as¬ 
sumed, in the rapid course of events, 
the sole and absolute direction of the 
common interests .of the colonies; 
and this assumption received the 
hearty, though informal, assent of a 
majority of the people so large that 
to all intents and purposes it was 
unanimous. As the War of Inde¬ 
pendence went on, as the people of 
the several provinces shared each 
other’s anxieties and bore each oth¬ 
er’s burdens, as they stood shoulder 
to shoulder in defense of their com¬ 
mon birthright, their common lib¬ 
erty, and their common interests, 
and saw each other in great masses 
face to face, as the leading men of 
one province were placed in author¬ 
ity over the people of another — 
the Virginia planter, Horatio Gates, commanding the northern army, and the 

Rhode Island iron-master, Nathaniel 
Greene, the southern—as social inter¬ 
course became at once more diffused 
and more intimate, they felt with 
unanimity that since they had de¬ 
clared themselves no longer part of 
the British nation, they were one na¬ 
tion of themselves. Their identity 
of blood was a patent fact, like the 
presence of the sun in the heavens, 
neither to be denied nor to be assert¬ 
ed; and sentiment, interest, and fu¬ 
ture security led them to regard their 
union as of paramount importance. 
These people were at last solemnly 



HORATIO QATE8. 



NATHANIEL GREENE. 


5 Reply of Seymour, Attorney General under William and Mary. See Franklin’s Correspond* 
ence, voL i. f p. 155. 





PAUL REVERE'S RIDE, APRIL 19, 1775. Drawn by Charles G. Bush. 



















































































































































4 


INTRODUCTION. 


1781. 


absolved from the bond which bound them politically to the mother coun¬ 
try—a bond which, instead of being a tie of kindred, love, and mutual re¬ 
spect, as they at first assumed it was and then hoped it might be, had been 
made, against the protests of the best and brightest intellects in the British 
Parliament—chief among them Pitt (Lord Chatham) and Edmund Burke— 




It - 


WILLIAM PITT. 


EDMUND BURKE. 


a galling fetter. They were independent, they were united, they were one 
people. In the fierce heat of their fiery trial and under the blows which 
had fallen so thickly and heavily upon them, they had been welded togeth¬ 
er as iron is welded into iron. But, although a nation in fact, they were not 
a nation in form. Distinguished as we have seen that this people was 
among the nations by its essential homogeneousness, it yet lacked that form¬ 
al political unity which was necessary alike to its government as one na¬ 
tion at home and its recognition as one nation abroad. This great defect 
was felt the more from the exhaustion, the confusion, and the partial dis¬ 
organization of society which followed the long War of Independence. 
But it was chiefly brought to the attention of the thinking men of the 
country by the jealousy with which the states began to watch and defend 
their interests, and by the inability of the Continental Congress, which was 
the representative power of the Confederation, to fulfill treaties, raise rev¬ 
enue, and maintain an army. There was no sovereign authority. The col- 


* Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts 
Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations , Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva¬ 
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Not'th Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgiu. 

Article 1. The style of this confederacy shall be, “The United States of America.” 

Art. 2. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, juris¬ 
diction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in 
Congress assembled. 

Art. 3. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other 
for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; 
binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, on 
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretext whatever. 

Art. 4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the peo¬ 
ple of the different states in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these states (paupers, vaga¬ 
bonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
free citizens in the several states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and re¬ 
gress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, 
subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively, 
provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property im¬ 
ported into any state to any other state, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided, also, 
that no imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any state on the property of the United 
States, or either of them. 

If any person guilty of or charged with treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor, in any state, 
shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall upon demand of the gov¬ 
ernor, or executive power of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, and removed to the 
state having jurisdiction of his offense. 

Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts, and judicial 
proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state. 

Art. 5. For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, 
delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the Legislature of each state shall di¬ 
rect, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November in every year, with a power reserved 
to each state to recall its delegates or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send oth¬ 
ers in their stead for the remainder of the year. 

No state shall be represented in Congress by less than two nor by more than seven members; 
and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six 
years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United 
States, for which he, or any other for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind. 

Each state shall maintain its own delegates in any meeting of the states, and while they act as 
members of the committee of the states. 

In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each state shall have one 
vote. 

Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or 
place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from ar¬ 
rests and imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from and attendance on Congress, 
except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. 

Art. 6. No state, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send 
an embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, 
or treaty, with any king, prince, or state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or 
trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title 
of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States in Con¬ 
gress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility. 

No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between 
them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the 
purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue. 

No state shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties 
entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pur¬ 
suance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain. 

No vessels of war shall ho kept up in time of peace, by any state, except such number only as 
shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled for the defense of such 
state or its trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any state in time of peace, except 
such number only as, in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed 
requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such state; but every state shall always 


onies or provinces had never possessed sovereignty. They had their As¬ 
semblies, by which their local laws were made, which, in most of them, re¬ 
quired the assent of a governor appointed by the British crown ; but the sov¬ 
ereignty over all of them was in the government of Great Britain. In 1776 
they declared, not their individual sovereignty, but their independence as 
“united colonies;” as united colonies they won that independence, under the 
almost absolute exercise of power by the Continental Congress. Not only 
did no colony assert its sovereignty, but no colony won its independence. 
Yet it is not strange that a people who had just cast off the restraint of one 
sovereignty should have been slow, in their first days of relief, to assume that 
of another, especially when they were provided with local governments of 
ample powers to administer their local affairs. And beside all this, local in¬ 
terests, local ambitions, local jealousies, such as exist in the oldest and most 
compact nations, could be used by designing men to prevent consolidation, 
and might have an influence that way even with the candid and the patriotic. 
So the very Articles of Confederation themselves were adopted only after 
long hesitation. 6 Proposed by the Continental Congress in 1777, they were 
not ratified by all the states until 1781. By these articles the states enter¬ 
ed into “a firm league of friendship” with each other for their common de¬ 
fense and general welfare ; each state renounced the right to send embas¬ 
sies, make treaties, and declare war; and the union was to be perpetual. 
But aside from the fact that a league implies sovereign “high contracting” 
parties, by the second of these Articles of Confederation it was expressly set 
forth that each state retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and 
all rights and powers not explicitly granted byJ<hat instrument to the Con¬ 
gress. The vote in the Congress was by states; each state had but one vote; 
and each paid its own delegates. There was no supreme executive, legisla¬ 
tive, or judicial power for the whole country. The ministers and commis¬ 
sioners of the Congress, and the people themselves, proudly claimed the posi¬ 
tion due to “ an independent nation ;” and yet the nation was, politically, not 
one, but many. In a very few years the consequence was discord and confu¬ 
sion within, impending anarchy and threatening danger without. The Con¬ 
tinental Congress, once omnipotent, was every day more and more disre¬ 
garded. The new nation found that, in spite of its colonial Assemblies, which 
had been renamed State Legislatures, if it would continue its existence, some¬ 
thing was needed in place of the sovereignty which had been cast off. That 
needed, but perhaps not altogether desired, supremacy, it found at last in 
the Constitution of the United States. 


keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall pro¬ 
vide and have constantly ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, 
and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. 

No state shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assem¬ 
bled, unless such state be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have certain advice of a resolution 
being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the danger is so imminent as not 
to admit of a dclny till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any 
state grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it 
be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the 
kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under 
such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such 
state be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted < ut for that occasion, and 
kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall 
determine otherwise. 

Art. 7. When land forces are raised by any state for the common defense, all officers of or un¬ 
der the rank of colonel shall be appointed by the Legislature of each state respectively by whom 
such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such state shall direct; and all vacancies shall 
be filled up by the state which first made the appointment. 

Art. 8. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense 
or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out 
of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of 
all land within each state granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings 
and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States in 
Congress assembled shall from time to time direct and appoint. 

The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of 
the Legislatures of the several states, within the time agreed upon by the United States in Con¬ 
gress assembled. 

Art. 9. The United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right and 
power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth Article : of 
sending and receiving embassadors: entering into treaties and alliances; provided that no treaty 
of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrain¬ 
ed from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or 
from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatso¬ 
ever : of establishing rules for deciding in all cases what captures on land or water shall be legal, 
and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall 
be divided or appropriated: of granting letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace: ap¬ 
pointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and establishing 
courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures; provided, that no 
member of Congress shall be appointed judge of any of the said courts. 

The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes 
and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concern¬ 
ing boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always be exercised 
in the manner following: whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any 
state in controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in ques. 
tion, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative 
or executive authority of the other state in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of 
the parties, by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent commis¬ 
sioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if 
they can not agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from 
the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until 
the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more 
than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by 
lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commission¬ 
ers or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the 
judges, who shall hear the cause, shall agree in the determination; and if either party shall 
neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress shall judge suf¬ 
ficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons 
out of each state, and the Secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or re¬ 
fusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court to be appointed in the manner before pre¬ 
scribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the au¬ 
thority of such court, or to appear, or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless pro¬ 
ceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive, the 







1781. 


INTRODUCTION. 


5 





PORTRAITS OF THE BIGNESS OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 

As the formation of the people of the colonies into one independent state, 
or nation, had been brought about not suddenly, but by events extending 


through half a century—brief period though that seems to the stu¬ 
dent of history—as their very independence was declared and won 
by a body appointed originally for no such purpose, so the consti¬ 
tution under which they assumed political form and unity was but 
the perfected fruit, the bud and 
blossom of which were the old 
Colonial and Continental Con¬ 
gresses ; and it was elaborated by 
a convention at first designed for 
a minor, incidental purpose con¬ 
nected with commerce and navi¬ 
gation, and which finally assem¬ 
bled with nothing more than the 
bettering of the Articles of Con¬ 
federation as its avowed and im¬ 
mediate object Among that as¬ 
sembly of fifty-five men were 
George Washington, Benjamin 
Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, 

Roger Sherman, Robert and Gouverneur Morris, Oliver Ellsworth, 
Rufus King, Edmund Ran¬ 
dolph, Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, John Rutledge, 

William Livingston, and 
JamesWilson,aman whose 
reputation is beneath his 
merits, of whom Washing¬ 
ton said that he was “as 
honest, candid, able a mem¬ 
ber as the Convention con¬ 
tained.” It is not surpris¬ 
ing that a convention com¬ 
posed of such men, and of 
those who were worthy fo 
be their associates, soon 
found that the Articles of 
Confederation were past all 
mending, except such as 

consists in remaking. In fact, the nation had far outgrown them. 
In spite of some jealous, short-sighted anxiety about state “sover- 
eignty,” and some doubts whether the Convention was empowered 
to do more than amend and work over the old confederation, the 
very first resolution adopted in Committee of the Whole, after twen¬ 
ty-one days’ debate, was, “That a National government ought to be 
established, consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, and Ju¬ 
diciary.” The national and supreme character of the government 
which they were about to frame being thus deliberately decided 
upon, and explicitly declared, they addressed themselves to their 
labors. These were based in the main upon two plans by Edmund 
Randolph, of Virginia, and Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina. 
Mr. Randolph’s plan proposed a national Legislature of two branch¬ 
es, the most numerous to be chosen by the people, the right of suffrage be¬ 
ing in proportion to the rate of free population, or taxes paid; a national ex- 


judgment or sentence, and other proceedings, being in either case transmitted to Congress, and 
lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned: provided, that ev¬ 
ery commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the 
judges of the supreme or superior court of the state where the cause shall be tried, “well and 
truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, with¬ 
out favor, affection, or hope of rewardprovided also, that no state shall be deprived of territory 
for the benefit of the United States. 

All controversies concerning the private right of soil, claimed under different grants of two or 
more states, whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands and the states which passed such 
grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have 
originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, '-hall, on the petition of either party to the 
Congress of the United States, be finally determined, as near ns may be, in the same manner as is 
before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different states. 

The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and pow¬ 
er of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the re¬ 
spective states; fixing the stnndard of weights and measures throughout the United States: reg¬ 
ulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any of the states; 
provided, that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated: 
establishing and regulating post-offices from one state to another, throughout all the United States, 
and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray 
the expenses of the said office: appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the 
United States, excepting regimental officers: appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and 
commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States: making rules for the gov¬ 
ernment and regulation of the 6aid land and naval forces, and directing their operations. 

The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee to sit in 
the recess of Congress, to be denominated “ a Committee of the Statesand to consist of one del¬ 
egate from each state, and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary 
for managing the general affairs of the United States, under their direction: to appoint one of 
their number to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of President 
more than one year in any term of three years: to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be 
raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying 
the public expenses: to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting 
every half year to the respective states an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted : 
to build and equip a navy: to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions 
from each state for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such state; 
which requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the Legislature of each state shall appoint the 
regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldier-like manner, at 
the expense of the United States; and the officers and men to be clothed, armed, and equipped, 
thall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Con¬ 
gress assembled; but if the United States in Congress assembled shall, on consideration of cir¬ 
cumstances, judge proper that any state should not raise men, or should raise a smaller num¬ 
ber than its quota, and that any other state should raise a greater number of men than the 
%uota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the 


same manner as the quota of such state, unless the Legislature of such state shall judge that such 
extra number can not be safely spared out of the same; in which case they shall raise, officer, 
clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And 
the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and 
within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled. 

The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque 
and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate 
the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of 
the United States or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United 
States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or pur¬ 
chased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of 
the army or navy, unless nine states assent to the same; nor shall a question on any other point, 
except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the 
United States in Congress assembled. 

The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and 
to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration 
than the space of six months; and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except 
such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment re¬ 
quire secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state on any question shall be en¬ 
tered on the journal when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a state, or any of 
them, at his or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such 
parts as arc above excepted, to lay before the Legislatures of the several states. 

Art. 10. The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute in 
the recess of Congress such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, 
by the consent of nine states, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with; pro¬ 
vided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of 
Confederation, the voice of nine states in th$ Congress of the United States assembled is requisite. 

Art. 11. Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United 
States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to, all the advantages of this Union; but no other col¬ 
ony shall be admitted into the same unless such admission be agreed to by nine states. 

Art. 12. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted by or under the au¬ 
thority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present Con¬ 
federation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and 
satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged. 

Art. 13. Every state shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assem¬ 
bled, on all questions which, by this Confederation, are submitted to them. And the Articles of 
this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the Union shall be perpetual; 
nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be 
agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterward confirmed by the Legislatures of 
every state. 

These Articles shall be proposed to the Legislatures of all the United States, to be considered, 
and if approved or oy ttiem, they arc advised to authorize their delegates to ratify the same in the 
Congress of the United States; which being done, the same shall become conclusive. 








EVACUATION DAT—WASHINGTON'S ENTRANCE INTO NEW YORK NOV. 25. 1783. From 



















































INTRODUCTION. 


7 


I787.J 

ecutive and a national judiciary, both to be chosen by the national Legisla¬ 
ture; the national Legislature to have a negative on all state laws incon¬ 
sistent with the Articles of Union, and the national executive and judiciary 
to have, as a Council of Revision, a qualified negative upon all laws, state as 
well as national. These were its most important and characteristic points. 
Mr. Pinckney’s plan proposed essentially the same system, but attained its 
ends by simpler means; and this seems to have been the actual ground¬ 
work of the present Constitution of the United States. 

Another plan was proposed by the delegates from New Jersey, Delaware, 
and New York. This plan was the result of an avowed attempt to perpetu¬ 
ate the old confederation. It proposed to empower the Congress to appoint 
an executive of federal laws, officers for the federal army, and to establish a 
federal judiciary. It was but a make-shift; but even this plan proposed 
that the acts of Congress in accordance with the Articles of Confederation, 
and the treaties ratified by it, should be the supreme law of the land—a 
proposition which showed the necessity of that which the plan sought to 
avoid; for, without the establishment of a supreme government, it would 
have been impossible to enforce this provision against any powerful state 
which chose to set it at naught The vital difference between the govern¬ 
ment proposed by this plan and that proposed by Virginia and South Caro¬ 
lina was, that the former dealt with states as the individuals responsible to 
it, and the latter with the whole people individually, as citizens of the United 
States, into which union, for all national purposes, the individuality and so- 
called “sovereignty" of the states was entirely merged. There was no mis¬ 
apprehension of the issue^ It was clearly stated. “The true question is,” 
said Mr. Randolph, “whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or intro¬ 
duce the national plan. ... A national government alone, properly consti¬ 
tuted, will answer the purpose.” After a debate of four days, the national 
plan was adopted, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the 
two Carolinas, and Georgia voting for it, New York, New Jersey, and Dela¬ 
ware against it, the vote of Maryland being divided.’ It is worthy of 
special note that Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, which 
then included Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, were all sup¬ 
porters, in express terms, of the “ national” government, and that the plan 
which was the foundation of the system adopted was proposed by a dele¬ 
gate from South Carolina, while that which was its counterpart came from 
Virginia. 

After four months of patient, thoughtful labor, free discussion, considera¬ 
tion, reconsideration, commitment, and recommitment, and of mutual conces¬ 
sion to interest and to feeling, the Convention perfected the Constitution as 
it now exists, without the amendments made immediately upon its adoption. 
Probably not one of the delegates was entirely satisfied with it. Franklin 
avowed his dissatisfaction with several parts of it; Hamilton had proposed a 


ALEXANDER HAMILTON JOHN JAT. 

system essentially different from that which it established; yet they both de¬ 
voted themselves earnestly to the task of securing its adoption by the people, 
the latter (aided by Madison and Jay) in a series of papers which enjoy the 
rare distinction of having moulded popular opinion in their day, and of be¬ 
coming authority in statesmanship and classics in political literature. But, 
whatever the merits of the system of government established by this Consti¬ 
tution, there was no misap¬ 
prehension of its character 
in any quarter. Of two men 
in Virginia who opposed its 
adoption, Patrick Henry said 
in the Convention of that 
state, June, 1788, “ Who au¬ 
thorized them to speak the 
language of ‘We, the peo¬ 
ple,’ instead of ‘We, the 
states?’ States are the char¬ 
acteristic and the soul of a 
confederation. If the states 
be not the agents of this com¬ 
pact, it must be one great 
consolidated national govern¬ 
ment of the people of all the 
states.” And George Mason 
in the same body also said, 
“Whether the Constitution 
be good or bad, the present clause clearly discovers that it is a national gov¬ 
ernment, and no longer a confederation.” The reply was not a denial of 
the nationality of the government, or an attempt to soften or gloze over its 


consolidated character, but the avowal of these features, and the showing, 
by James Madison, that they were necessary. The same eminent patriot 
and statesman replied also to an inquiry by Hamilton, on the part of New 
York, whether the Constitution could be adopted with a reserved right to 
secede, in case certain amendments were not made, by a decided negative; 
the Constitution “required an unconditional adoption in toto, and forever.” 
By June, 1788, nine states had adopted the Constitution, and thus merged 
their independent political existence in that of a new nation; but it was not 
until May, 1790, that Rhode Island, the last of the thirteen, consented to be 
absorbed into the Union, and the many became one. 

As by the Constitution the powers not delegated by it to the United 
States, or prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, ol 
to the people, let us see what rights and powers they were which the people 
of each state gave up. They were the right and power to levy taxes and 
impose duties, to regulate commerce, to make naturalization laws, to coin 
money, to regulate post-offices and post-roads, to define and punish piracies, 
to declare war, to provide an army and navy, to enter into any treaty, alli¬ 
ance, or confederation, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to emit bills 
of credit, to keep troops, ships of war in time of peace, and to enter into any 
agreement or compact, either with each other, or with a foreign power. 
They placed the decision in any controversy between either one of them 
and another, or the citizen of another, or the United States, in the hands of 
the national judiciary; and, most important and significant concession of 
all, they gave up the right to change their very form of state government. 
This Constitution, according to one of the most eminent of its framers, was 
adopted by all the states “ unconditionally, in toto, and forever;” this Union, 
by the terms of that Constitution, was to be “ perpetual.” Had the revolted 
colonies secured an individual sovereignty when they won their collective 
independence, this instrument would have left them none of it, according to 
the manifest intention of its framers. After its adoption there would have 
remained no semblance of sovereignty, but simply the right of independent 
self-government in local matters—that wise reservation which has secured 
the strength of centralization with the protection of local interests and the 
development of local resources by the people who are most concerned in 
them and best understand them; which insures the vast fabric based upon 
this Constitution from falling to pieces by its own weight, like the great em¬ 
pires of the past, by giving it stable support throughout its wide extent, in¬ 
stead of making it rest solely upon its central point; which frees us from an 
exhibition of that political incongruity seen in the mother country, where 
all interests, small or great, are controlled by the Imperial Parliament, and 
where we see the attention of that most important body given, day after day, 
to one petty county or parish matter or other, about which its members know 
little and care less. But this sovereignty the revolted states did not achieve. 
Sovereignty is the attribute of that power alone which has no superior; and 
of that sovereignty the colonies had none before their declaration of independ¬ 
ence ; and by that declaration which they made as united colonies, and which 
they won only as united colonies or 
states, they can not be said to have 
gained an individual sovereignty 
which they had not before. Upon 
this very point Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, of South Carolina, one of 
the delegates for the formation of 
the Constitution, in course of the 
debates in the Legislature of South 
Carolina herself on the adoption of 
the Constitution (January, 1788), 
said of the Declaration of Independ¬ 
ence, “ This admirable manifesto 
sufficiently refutes the doctrine of 
the individual sovereignty and in¬ 
dependence of the several states. 

* * * * The several states are not 

. . . . CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY. 

even mentioned by name in any 

part, as if it was intended to impress the maxim on America that our free¬ 
dom and independence arose from our union, and that without it we never 
could be free and independent. Let us, then, consider all attempts to 
weaken this union by maintaining that each state is separately apd indi¬ 
vidually independent, as a species of political heresy which can never ben¬ 
efit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses.” If this be the 
bearing of the Declaration of Independence upon state sovereignty, what 
is that of the Constitution—an instrument which vests all the attributes of 
sovereignty in the national government, and which does this not by the act 
of the individual states, but by that of “the people of the United States?” 
It is also of importance to note that the Constitution was submitted, not to 
the Legislatures and corporate representatives of the states, but to the peo¬ 
ple ; and for the very reason that it was supposed that the pride of state sov¬ 
ereignty would prevent the former from adopting it. James Wilson said, 
“ I know that they [the Legislatures and state officers] will oppose it. I am 
for carrying it to the people of each state.” It was unavoidable that the 
people should act by states, not only because that was the only mode of 
combined action in their power, but because the very question to be decided 
touched the resignation of power by the state as an individual. It seems 
impossible to avoid the conclusion that, after the adoption of that Consti¬ 
tution, there was no avoidance of its obligations or withdrawal from its 
pale, except in virtue of that inalienable right of revolution, which, to be 





PATRIOK HENRY. 



’ New Hampshire and Bhode Island were not represented m this Convention. 









8 


INTRODUCTION. 


[1787. 


complete, must have good cause, and power to maintain that cause. And 
this right belongs not to the people by virtue of state organization, or of res¬ 
idence within state limits, but to the inhabitants of any country or locality 
who are like-minded, and can make their rebellious determination good. As 
if to put this question, as far as he could, beyond a peradventure, the leader 


• CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 

PREAMBLE. 

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, in¬ 
sure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and se¬ 
cure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu¬ 
tion for the United States of America. 

ARTICLE I. 

SECTION I. 

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 

8ECTION II. 

1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the 
people of the several states: and the electors in each state shall have the quuliticatious requisite 
for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. 

2. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five 
years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen. 

3. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be 
included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by 
adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, 
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall 
be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within 
every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner ns they shall by law direct. The number of 
representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one 
representative; and until such enumeration shall b? made, the state of New Hamjishire shall be 
entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Con¬ 
necticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, 
Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three. 

4. When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the executive authority there¬ 
of shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. 

5. The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers, and shall have 
the sole power of impeachment. 

SECTION III. 

1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen 
by the Legislature thereof, for six years, and each senator shall have one vote. 

2. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be 
divided as equally as may be, into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall 
be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth 
year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be chosen ev¬ 
ery second year; and if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the 
Legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next 
meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies. 

3. No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been 
nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that 
state for which he shall be chosen. 

4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no 
vote, unless they be equally divided. 

6. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the ab¬ 
sence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States. 

6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that pur¬ 
pose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the 
chief justice shall preside : and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds 
of the members present. 

7. Judgment in case of impeachment shall not extend farther than to removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States, 
but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and 
punishment according to law. 

section ir. 

1. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, 
make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators. 

2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the 
first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. 

SECTION V. 

1. Each hoase shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own mem¬ 
bers, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may 
adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in 
such manner and under such penalties as each house may provide. 

2. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly be¬ 
havior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member. 

3. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, 
excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy ; and the yeas and nays of the mem¬ 
bers of either house, on any question, shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered 
on the journal. 

4. Neither house during the session of Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn 
for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. 

SECTION VI. 

1. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascer¬ 
tained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United .States. They shall in all cases, except 
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at 
the session of their respective houses, and in going to or returning from the same; and for any 
speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. 

2. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed 
to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the 
emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any of¬ 
fice under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office. 

8ECTION VII. 

1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate 
may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills. 

2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before 
it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign 
it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, 
who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after 
such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together 
with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved 
by two thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses 
shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the hill 
shall be entered on the journal of each house res|»ectivcly. If any bill shall not be returned by the 
President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the "same 
shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment pre¬ 
vent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. 

3. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Repre¬ 
sentatives may he necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be presented to the Pres¬ 
ident of the United States ; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or be¬ 
ing disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representa¬ 
tives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. 

8ECTION VIII. 

The Congress shall have power— 

1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the 
common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall 
be uniform throughout the United States; 


of the armies in the War of Independence, the president of the Convention 
who formed the Constitution, the first president of the United States under 
that Constitution, said of it in his Farewell Address to his Countrymen, 
“ Until changed by an explicit and deliberate act of the whole people, it is 
sacredly obligatory upon all.” 8 


2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States; 

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes; 

4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruffl- 
cics, throughout the United States; 

5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights 
and measures; 

C. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United 
States; 

7. To establish post-offices and post-roads; 

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; 

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; 

10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against 
the law of nations ; 

11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures 
on land and water; 

12. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer 
term than two years; 

13. To provide and maintain a navy; 

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land ni d naval forces; 

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrec¬ 
tions, and repel invasions; 

10. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part 
of them as may tie employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively 
the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress; 

17. To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whntsoever^pver such district (not exceeding 
ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of Congress, become 
the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places pur¬ 
chased, by the consent of the Legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection 
of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings ; and, 

18. To make nil laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the fore¬ 
going powers, and all other powers vested bv this Constitution in the government of the United 
States, or in any department or officer thereof. 

SECTION IX. 

1. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such imj>ortation, not exceeding ten 
dollars for each person. 

2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in case of re¬ 
bellion or invasion, the public safety may require ir. 

3. No bill of attainder, or ex-post-facto law, shall be passed. 

4. No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enu¬ 
meration herein before directed to be taken. 

5. No tax or duty shall be laid on artirles exported from any state. 

6. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one 
state over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear, 
or pay duties in another. 

7. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by 
law ; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money 
shall be published from time to time. 

8. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office 
of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, 
emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state. 

section x. 

1. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and 
reprisal; coin money; emit hills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in 
payment of debts ; pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts ; or grant any title of nobility. 

2. No state shall, withont the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or 

exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net 
produce of all duties and impests laid by any state on imports or exports shall be for the use of the 
treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the 
Congress. # 

3. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ship# 
of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a for¬ 
eign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger os will not 
admit of delay. 

ARTICLE II. 

SECTION I. 

1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He 
shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen 
for the same term, be elected as follows: 

2. Each state shall appoint, in such manner ns the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of 

electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state may be en¬ 
titled in the Congress: but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or 
profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. % 

The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom 
one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a 
list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall 6ign 
and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to 
the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The per¬ 
son having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and 
have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by 
ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest 
on the list, the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the Pres¬ 
ident, the votes shall be taken by states; the representation from each state having one vote; a 
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and 
a majority of ali the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the 
President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice-President. 
But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them 
by ballot the Vice-President.* 

3. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors and the day on which they 
shall give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the United States. 

4. No person except a natural-bom citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the 
adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person 
be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been four¬ 
teen years a resident within the United States. 

5. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; 
and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both 
of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then nor as President; and such 
officer shall act accordingly, until the disability l»e removed or a President shall be elected. 

G. The President shall, nt stated times, receive for his services n compensation, which shall nei¬ 
ther be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall Imvc been elected, and he 
shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them. 

7. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation : 

“ I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the 
United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, aud defend the Constitution 
of the United States ” 

SECTION II. 

1. The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States and 
* Altered by the 12tb amendment 







1 
































FACSIMILE OF THE ORIGINS 


Declaration o 


L }L ciiL ICV 1 TED STATES 

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IGHT BY JEFFERSON! OFTHE 

independence 

uly, 1776. 

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1" 


INTRODUCTION. 


1787. 


Thus one in blood and like in condition, blessed with an unexampled dif¬ 
fusion of intelligence and Christian morality, possessor of a vast expanse of 
rich and varied soil yielding wealth and inviting immigration, freed from 
the political burdens which oppressed and the social bonds which cramped 
the people of older states, presenting to the world outside a single, compact 
government, but secured from centralization within by absolute local inde¬ 
pendence, this nation rapidly rose to the first rank; and so solidly based 
were its power and prosperity, that, but for one element of internal discord, 
it would have remained forever, as nearly as man can judge, a happy ex¬ 
ample of the working of republican institutions. Nor, in fact, are republi¬ 
can principles at all affected by the events which shook that power and dis¬ 
turbed that prosperity. 

At the time of the formation of the Constitution all the states but two ad¬ 
mitted negro slavery. But in all except two this institution was regarded 
as an exotic, inherited evil, to be borne as well as might be until it should 
pass away with time. All the statesmen and leaders of the Revolutionary 
period, including those from Virginia, so regarded it. Jefferson himself did 


of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he 
may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, 
upon anv subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power to 
grant reprieves and pardons tor offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 

2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, pro¬ 
vided two thirds of the senators present concur; and lie shall nominate, and by and with the ad¬ 
vice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint embassadors, other public ministers and consuls, 
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may 
by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers ns they think proper in the President alone, in 
the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 

3. The President shall have power to fill tip all vacancies that may happen during the recess of 
the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of the:* next session. 

SECTION III. 

He shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and 
recommend to their consideration such measures as lie shall judge necessary and expedient; he 
may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them; and in case of disa¬ 
greement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such 
time as he shall think proper; he shall receive embassadors and other public ministers; he shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United 
States. 

SECTION iv. 

The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from 
office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde¬ 
meanors. 

ARTICLE III. 

SECTION I. 

The judicial power of the United States shall, be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such in 
ferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior; and shall, at stated 
times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not he diminished during their contin¬ 
uance in office. 

SECTION II. 

1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitu¬ 
tion, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their au¬ 
thority; to all cases affecting embassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of ad¬ 
miralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to 
controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another stale; between 
citizens of different states ; between citizens of the same stale claiming lands under grants of dif¬ 
ferent states; and between a state, or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects. 

2. In all cases affecting embassadors, other public ministers, an I consuls, and those in which a 
state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases 
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, 
with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. 

3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of imjieaehmcnt, shall be by jury; and such trial shall 
be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed 
within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. 

SECTION III. 

1. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in ad¬ 
hering to their enemies, giving them aid ami comfort. So jicrson shall be convicted of treason, 
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in o|»en court. 

2. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason ; but no attainder of trea¬ 
son shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. 

ARTICLE IV. 

SECTION I. 

Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial pro¬ 
ceedings of every other state. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in 
which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. 

SECTION II. 

1. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states. 

2. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice 
and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which 
he fied, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. 

3. No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into anoth¬ 
er, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such sendee or labor, 
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. 

SECTION III. 

1. New states may be admitted bv the Congress into this Union; hut no new state shall be 
formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the 
junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the Legislatures of the 
states concerned, as well as of the Congress. 

2. The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations re¬ 
specting the territory or other property belonging lo the United States; and nothing in this Consti¬ 
tution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular state. 

SECTION IV. 

The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of govern¬ 
ment, and shall protect each of them against invasion ; and, on application of tho Legislature, or 
of the executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence. 

ARTICLE V. 

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amend¬ 
ments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all 
intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths 
of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of 
ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided, that no amendment which may be made 
prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and 
fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first Article; and that no state, without its consent, shall 
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. 

ARTICLE VI. 

1. All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, 
shall be as valid against the.United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. 


not hesitate to denounce it openly as “a violation of Human rights,” and to 
say that not only the honor, but “the best interests of the country” demand¬ 
ed its extinction. In the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, 
which is in Jefferson's own hand, one of the grievances most strongly in¬ 
sisted on as a justification for the Revolution is the infliction of slavery 
upon the colonists, and the perpetuation of the infamous traffic in human 
beings.® But in the Convention for the formation of the Constitution, the 
delegates from South Carolina and Georgia announced, upon the proposal 
to suppress the slave-trade immediately, that if this were done those states 
would not become part of the Union, for they must have slaves. Rut¬ 
ledge said, “ Religion and humanity had nothing to do with this ques¬ 
tion. Interest alone is the governing principle with nations. The true 
question at present is whether the Southern states shall or shall not be par¬ 
ties to the Union.” Charles Pinckney said, “ South Carolina can never re¬ 
ceive the plan if it prohibit the slave-trade. In every proposed extension 
of the powers of Congress, that state has expressly and watchfully excepted 
the power of meddling with the importation of negroes. If the states be all 
loft at liberty on this subject, South Carolina may perhaps, by degrees, do 
of herself what is wished, as Maryland and Virginia already have done.” 


2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance there¬ 
of; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
shall l>e the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in (lie constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 

3. The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state 
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several 
states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test 
shall ever be required os a qualification to any office, or public trust, under the United States. 

ARTICLE VII. 

The ratification of the conventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this 
Constitution between the states so ratifying the same. 


Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the states present, the seventeenth day of Sep¬ 
tember, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the In- 
dc)icndcncc of the United States of America the twelfth. In witness whereof, we have hereunto 
subscribed our names. 

GEOliGE WASHINGTON, President and Dejmty from Virginia. 


New Hampshire. —John Lasgdon, Nicholas 
Gilman. 

Massachusetts. —Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus 
Ivino. 

Connecticut. — Willi am Samuel Johnson, 
Roger Sherman. 

A ’em Vor/:. —Alexander Hamilton. 

AW Jersey. — William Livingston, Wil¬ 
liam Paterson, David Bkearley, Jonathan 
Dayton. 

Pennsylvania .—11 en.i am in Fit a nklin, 1 lou ert 
Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, James Wilson, 
Thomas Mifflin, George Clymeu, Jared Ix- 
gersoll, Gocvernecr Morris. 

Attest, 


Delaware. —George Read, John Dickinson, 
Jacob Broom, Gunning Bedford, jun., Rich¬ 
ard Bassett. 

Maryland. —James M‘Henry, Daniel Car- 
roll, Daniel of St. Tho. Jenifer. 

Virginia. —John Blair, James Madison, jr. 

North Carolina. — William Blount, Hugh 
Williamson, Richard Dobbs Spaight. 

South Carolina. —John Rutledge, Charles 
Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 
Pierce Butler. 

Georgia. — William Few, Abraham Bald¬ 
win. 

WILLIAM JACKSON, Secretary. 


ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO AND AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION. 

Art. 1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the light of the peo¬ 
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 

Art. 2. A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 

Art. 3. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to l*c prescribed by law. 

Art. 4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but ujion 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be search¬ 
ed, amlilie persons or things to !>c seized. 

Art. 5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in eases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the militia when in actual service in time of war, or public danger ; nor shall any person bq subject 
for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled, in any crim¬ 
inal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. 

Art. G. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 

Art. 7. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-ex¬ 
amined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law. 

Art. 8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inHietcd. 

Art. ‘J. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retnined by the people. 

Art. 10. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the states, arc reserved to the states respectively, or to the jicople. 

Art. 11. The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another 
suite, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. 

Art. 12. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and 
Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not lie an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; 
they shall name in their ballots the person voted for ns President, and in distinct ballots the person 
voted for ns Vice-President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as Pres¬ 
ident, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the nuinlicr of votes for each, w hich 
list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of government of the United States, 
directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be count¬ 
ed ; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such num¬ 
ber be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, 
then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted 
for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately by ballot the President 
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each 
state having one Vote ; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two 
thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the 
House of Representatives shnll not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve 
upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as 
President, us in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. 

The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-President, 
if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, ami if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice-President: 
a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of senators, and a ma¬ 
jority of the whole numLer shall be necessary to a choice. 

But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of 
Vice-President of the United States. 

9 See this complaint in the fac simile of the original draft given on pages 6-7. It was stricken 
out before the adoption of the instrument in deference to the feelings of South Carolina. 

























































































































12 


INTRODUCTION'. 


Baldwin, of Georgia, also declared that that state “would not confederate if 
not allowed to import slaves.” The existence of the nation as one and in¬ 
divisible seemed of more importance at that period to the men to whom 
this announcement was made than the immediate suppression of a traffic 
which was then looked upon without the horror which it now excites; and 
so, to satisfy South Carolina and Georgia, in the dainty phraseology of the 
Constitution, “ the migration or importation of such persons as any of the 
states existing shall think proper to admit” was allowed until the year 1808. 
Men who held negroes as property naturally expected, and reasonably claim¬ 
ed, that if they united themselves under a national government with other 
men who would soon pass laws for the extinction of such a right of prop¬ 
erty under their own local governments, these laws should not operate to the 
injury of those who did not adopt them; and so that other dainty but strin¬ 
gent clause was added, providing that any person “ held to service and labor 
in one state under the laws thereof,” escaping into another, “ shall be deliv¬ 
ered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” 
It had been proposed in the Continental Congress that in the apportionment 
of taxation (which was to be according to population) slaves should be reck¬ 
oned at three fifths of their actual numbers, because, as it was argued, the 
labor of five negroes was not more than equal to that of three white men. 
This principle of tax apportionment was adopted in the Constitution; and, 
consequently, as taxation and representation were to go hand in hand, rep¬ 
resentatives were apportioned in the same manner. Slaves were not to be 
represented as property; but three fifths of their actual number in each state 
went to swell the aggregate, according to which the representation of each 
state was more or less numerous in the popular branch of Congress and in 
the College of Electors for President and Vice-President. 

The two former provisions of the Constitution in regard to slaves were, at 
the time of their making, the more highly prized by the slaveholders, but 
the last was of far the greatest importance in regard to the strength and per¬ 
petuation of slavery. For it gave to every citizen of a slave state, whether 
a slaveholder himself or not, a preponderance in the national government 
greater than that of a citizen of a free state, by three fifths of the number of 
slaves in bis state; so that while thirty thousand citizens of a free state would 
send but one representative to Congress, twelve thousand citizens of a slave 
state would also send one representative if they collectively owned thirty 
thousand slaves. This provision also made it desirable, as far as regarded 
political preponderance, for slaveholders to discourage the presence in their 
state of citizens who were not also slaveholders, and to increase the aggre¬ 
gate number of slaves; for it is clear that, the greater the number of slaves 
and the fewer the number of their owners, the greater the concentration of 
political power in the hands of the latter. Thus a provision of the Consti¬ 
tution, made for the purpose of insuring the proper relation between repre¬ 
sentation and taxation, actually destroyed the political equality of citizens 
of the United States, in theory the very corner-stone of the republican gov¬ 
ernment which it was framed to establish, while, at the same time, in the 
states which got the advantage in this inequality, two fifths of what 'was 
really productive property was exempted from direct taxation. Thus special 
privilege was added to the disproportionate political preponderance of the 
slaveholder. It was the power conferred by this inequality and this priv¬ 
ilege on the one side, co-operating with the growth of the feeling against 
slavery throughout civilized Christendom on the other, which brought about 
the great rebellion against the government of the United States. 

At the time when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, 
seven of the thirteen states which formed the Union, New Hampshire, Mas¬ 
sachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Penn¬ 
sylvania, either had abolished slavery or were sure to do so; but the six 
which retained it, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, 
and Georgia, were in the aggregate the more populous and the wealthier, 
while, as we have just seen, their citizens had by the terms of the Union ac¬ 
quired peculiar privileges and advantages of representation. Consequently, 
at the beginning, the interests of the slave states, as a body, outweighed those 
of the free states, as a body. This advantage was assiduously preserved, un¬ 
til it was swept away by the irresistible onflow of events. On the 11th of 
March, 1784, Thomas Jefferson, Virginia’s most eminent representative, pro¬ 
posed, in the Continental Congress, that after the year 1802 there should be 
“neither slavery nor involuntary servitude” in any state to be thereafter 
formed from the territory of the United States. This proposition failed to 
become an ordinance only by the lack of the vote of New Jersey, which was 
lost by the absence of one of her delegates. But in 1787 the important or¬ 
dinance was passed by which slavery was prohibited in all territory of the 
Union northwest of the Ohio River. It was more than thirty years, however, 
before this ordinance had a direct influence upon the great question which 
was to shake the Union. Meantime Kentucky and Vermont, offshoots of 
Virginia and New Hampshire severally, were admitted to the Union in 1792, 
the former slave, the latter free. The slave state of Tennessee came in in 
1799, and in 1802 the free state of Ohio. In 1803, the Territory of Louisi¬ 
ana, then a French colony, and including (after the indefinite fashion of co¬ 
lonial boundary claims) all the vast tract of land lying around the mouth of 
the Mississippi, and stretching westward and northwest thence from the banks 
of the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean. Slavery was already established in 
this territory, from which, in 1812, a slave state was admitted into the Union. 
Free Indiana followed in 1816. Mississippi and Illinois, Alabama and 
Maine, alternately slave and free, were formed and recogniz.d between 1817 
and 1820. 

Ten states had now been added to the original thirteen. Five admitted 


[1820. 

slavery, and five excluded it; so that in the Senate, where the states, large 
and small, were equally represented, the original distribution of power be¬ 
tween the free and the slave states had not been disturbed. But in the 
House of Representatives and in the College of Presidential Electors the as¬ 
pect of affairs was much changed. At the time of the first census, 1790, the 
aggregate population of the states which had abolished slavery, or were 
about to abolish it, and of those which had not and since have not done so, 
was about equal; while the advantage of wealth and the anticipated increase 
in numbers were altogether on the side of the latter. But the census of 1820 
showed authoritatively what all observing men well knew in a general way, 
that the states which had abolished slavery were increasing in population 
and in wealth much more rapidly than those which had retained it. In that 
year the population of the free states was found to be nearly three quarters 
of a million greater than that of the slave states, and the tide of immigration 
from Europe, which bad then begun to set strongly in, bore its wealth of 
labor to the free states almost entirely. In itself there was nothing either 
surprising or alarming in this revelation. Had the country been in its nor¬ 
mal condition, with its political power equally distributed, and all its citi¬ 
zens counting each a unit, and no more, in the choice of its executive and 
legislative officers, it would have been a matter of no political moment to 
any particular number of states where the increase of wealth and population 
was, so long as they were individually prosperous. For, as to their local af¬ 
fairs, the absolute control of those was secured to them by the Constitution, 
which also pledged to the preservation of their equal voice in the Senate. 
But in the thirty years which had passed since the formation of the national 
government a great and important change had taken place in the relations 
of slavery to the country at large. We have seen that it was regarded at 
that period, except by two of the states, as a legacy from the mother coun¬ 
try, which conferred no benefit sufficient to compensate for its reproach and 
its disadvantages, and as an institution which must gradually disappear. The 
two states which were not of this mind were South Carolina and Georgia, 
who, it will be remembered, had refused to enter the Union if the slave-trade 
were immediately made illegal. In these states a small and active school of 
politicians soon arose, which devoted itself not only to the protection of sla¬ 
very where it already existed, but to its extension and the increase of its 
power. This school rapidly attained a potent influence throughout the 
slave states, where it soon included nearly all the wealthy planters. This 
class of men saw the advantage which, in virtue of their slaves, they enjoyed 
by reason of their more numerous representation in Congress and the choice 
of President. They saw, too, that the tendency of affairs under their local 
government was to make them richer, and the poor men round them, who 
owned few or no slaves, poorer, and thus their mere dependents and crea¬ 
tures; and so, misled by mistaken self-interest, their power was gradually 
massed and marshaled under the direction of what may be conveniently and 
correctly called the South Carolina school of politicians, and slavery became 
a compact interest, to be protected and advanced in the councils of the na¬ 
tion. The only single and sectional interest to be so cared for, in fact; for in 
the free states men asked for nothing else than that freedom of action which 
was already secured to every citizen of the republic; nothing else was need¬ 
ful to their prosperity. Agriculture, manufactures, commerce, were inter¬ 
ests, indeed, in which different parts of the country had different stakes; but 
they existed in a greater or less degree in all parts of the country; they were 
natural and universal manifestations of activity and civilization; and they 
existed in virtue of no special law, and required none for their undisturbed 
security. But with slavery it was not so; and the politicians who had 
chosen ft, both as the interest which they were to defend and the weapon 
which they were to wield, saw with apprehension the rapidly increasing 
voice of the free states in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral 
College. The privilege which they feared to lose had become more precious 
in the very lapse of time which had also brought about the events which 
threatened them with its loss. By the invention of the cotton-gin the means 
of producing that staple in a marketable condition had been increased a 
hundred-fold, and the introduction of the steam-engine into the sugar-mill 
had more than doubled the value of the plantations in Louisiana. Not only 
so. These new processes, requiring capital and inviting capital, tended not 
more to the increase of the aggregate wealth of the states which profited by 
them than to the concentration of wealth of all kinds, and particularly of 
land and slaves, in the hands of the few. Consequently, the rich planters 
saw themselves, year by year, with more political power in their hands; and 
society in the slave states came to consist in the main of a small governing 
class of planters, with the bankers, merchants, and professional men whose 
functions were required by the business of the plantations, and a large class 
of poor people, becoming every day poorer, more wretched, more depend¬ 
ent, and, at the same time, prouder of their political advantages over the poor 
men of the free states, by which they were raised to a sort of equality with 
the wealthy slaveholders upon whose sufferance they existed. This anti-re¬ 
publican, oligarchal system of society the South Carolina school of politicians 
sought to protect, perpetuate, and propagate. 

Meantime the anti-slavery sentiment had spread widely over the civilized 
world, which in this respect followed the humane lead of the government 
and the mass of the people of the United States. In the year 1794 Congress 
passed an act against fitting out vessels for the slave-trade, and in 1800 an¬ 
other, forbidding citizens of the United States from holding property in for¬ 
eign slave-ships, and also authorizing United States ships to seize slavers. 
In 1807, as the bringing of slaves into the United States was to become un¬ 
lawful by constitutional provision in 1808, an act was passed prescribing 
heavy penalties for this crime. During all this time the slave-trade was 
lawfully carried on in British ships; and it was not until March 25, of this 



















































































































































































































14 


INTRODUCTION. 


1820 . 


very year 1807, tbat the carrying off of negroes from Africa into slavery 
under the British flag was forbidden by act of Parliament. The returns of 
the Charleston Custom-house, quoted in Congress, show that, of 39,075 ne¬ 
groes imported into South Carolina from Africa between the years 1804 and 
1808, 19,649, or more than one half, were imported by British subjects. 
25,834, or nearly two thirds of the whole number, were imported by foreign¬ 
ers, while traders of the maritime free states imported only 8838. In 1820 
Congress passed an act declaring the slave-trade piracy, punishable with death. 
In 1833 slavery was abolished throughout the British Possessions after the 
1st of August, 1834, as it had been a generation back in the most enlightened 
and Christianized states of the American Union, and as it would have been 
in all were it not for the absolute protection secured by the Constitution to 
every state in regard to its local government. The special advocates of 
universal freedom may think ill of a provision which resulted in the perpet¬ 
uation of bondage in a part of the republic. But we must never forget that 
the men who framed our national government found slavery in the land, or 
that this provision has but incidentally kept in bonds a race which takes 
easily to compelled servitude, which under kind treatment can be happy in 
bondage, which continues servile after generations of freedom, taking pleas¬ 
ure in serving the superior race, pleased when it pleases that race, and proud 
when noticed by it, or, finally, that this provision was absolutely necessary 
to secure the political unity, and therefore the independence and peaceful 
progress of the race, which has made the American Republic the hope and 
the lode-star of the advocates of popular government throughout the world. 

But the rights of states, however guarded, could not stay the advance of 
opinion; and the year 1816 saw a new attempt to do away with slavery— 
the Colonization Society was formed at Washington, having for its object 
the removal of free negroes from a country where they were in contact with a 
superior race having instinctive repugnance to equal association with them, to 
one where, being surrounded only by people of their own blood, they could 
attain such elevation as they were capable of, and even become the nucleus 
of a negro civilization. The benevolent hope was also expressed by the 
founders of this society, that slavery might be gradually abolished in the 
states which then permitted it, and that this so much desired end might be 
furthered by the means afforded of ridding the country of the freed negro, 
and enabling him to set out in his new life with some comfort and prospect 
of success. The leading members of this association were slaveholders, 
James Madison, John Randolph, and Judge Bushrod Washington, of Vir¬ 
ginia, Henry Clay, of Kentucky, Charles Carroll, and Wright, of Maryland, 
being among them. The feeling of which this society was the fruit was akin 
to that which, according to Professor St. George Tucker, of William and 
Mary College, Virginia, produced ten thousand manumissions in that state 
between 1782 and 1797. But the leading men of the cotton-growing states 
looked askance upon this project, although it was directed neither directly 
nor indirectly against any of their rights as slaveholders. 

Such was the position of affaire when the question of the organization and 
admission of Missouri as a state came before Congress. Missouri, as part of 
the ceded French territory, Louisiana, was already slave soil; as lying north¬ 
west of the Ohio River, it was debarred from slavery by the ordinance of 
1787. The residents asked to be admitted to the Union with a state Consti¬ 
tution allowing slavery. The delegates from the slave states said “ Yes; for 
slavery is already attached to the soilthose from the free states said “No; 
for slavery is excluded forever northwest of the Ohio.” Upon this question 
suddenly great warmth of feeling was manifested on both sides, and all party 
distinctions at once faded away. The occasion is of particular interest to us, 
not only as the beginning of that strife which, after a lapse of forty years, 
came to bloody arbitration, but from the fact that, in the course of the 
fierce altercations to which it gave rise, the determination of the extreme 
slavery party to carry their point, at all hazards to the country, was even 
then distinctly avowed. It having been proposed by James Talmadge, of 
New York, to restrain the further introduction of slavery into Arkansas, and 
by John Taylor, of the same state, to impose a similar restriction as to Mis¬ 
souri, the debate thereon was long and violent; and Mr. Cobb, of Georgia 
—ominous name!—in the course of a furious speech said,directing himself 
particularly to Talmadge, that “a fire had been kindled which all the waters 
of the ocean could not put out, and which only seas of blood could extin¬ 
guish;” adding that if the Northern members persisted “the Union would 
be dissolved.” To this fierce onslaught Talmadge replied by firmly and 
calmly reasserting his position and that of his constituents, maintaining it 
with arguments which even those who do not allow them to be conclusive 
must admit are clear and cogent, and saying, “ If the civil war which gentle¬ 
men so much threaten must come, I can only say, let it come 1” Thus early 
did the two parties to this question show the style in which they would act 
upon it: the one in passion and with ferocity, the other in calmness and 
with fortitude. 

Few readers need be told how this dispute was then settled. Missouri was 
admitted with her slave-bearing Constitution, with the proviso that forever 
after there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any terri¬ 
tory of the United States north of the parallel of 36° 30' (the southern 
boundary of Missouri), but that south of that line states might be admitted 
either with slavery or without it. With this “ Missouri Compromise,” al¬ 
though it was first proposed by a Northern member, John Taylor, of New 
York, the whole country, and particularly the South, appeared to be well 
content; and it was believed that the firebrand of disunion was extinguished. 
But, alas! it smouldered. 

From this period the political power of the slaveholding states became 


practically a unit upon the subject of slavery, and all questions which bore 
upon it; and this being the only subject upon which there was'a compact 
organization, and a united and vigorous policy conducted by men born and 
bred to conduct it, the slave interest soon came to be the controlling power 
in the government. The leaders of its extreme, or South Carolina school, 
generally assumed an arrogant, insolent tone to the members from the free 
states, and attempted, too often with success, to browbeat them openly upon 
the floor of Congress. Seeing how much destructive power the dogma of 
“state sovereignty” placed in their hands, they assumed it as the cardinal 
point of their political creed, in the very teeth of the assertions, the teach¬ 
ings, and the counsels of their own statesmen of the Revolutionary and post- 
Revolutionary generations. At what she thought a convenient occasion, 
South Carolina undertook to act upon this principle; but what short and 
sufficient measures for the maintenance of the power of the national govern¬ 
ment her attempted nullification of the Tariff Act of 1832 met at the hands 
of General Jackson, need not be told here. Her conduct in this affair, and 
her headlong rush into the rebellion of 1861, impatient to be the leader in 
the attempt to destroy the republic, form her chief claims to distinction in 
American annals. 

In her nullification outbreak, South Carolina had not the support of even 
her sister slave states. Yet after her subjection the slave power continued 
to maintain its united front, and through an alliance, rarely broken, with the 
great Democratic party, North and South—each using the other for its own 
ends, after the universal practice of politicians—it always had a potent, and 
generally a controlling voice in the national government. For a few years 
there was no occasion for political controversy as to slavery. But soon a 
small, virulent, and fanatical body of men did yeoman’s service to the cause 
of the extreme school of slaveholders by commencing an agitation upon the 
subject, which had, under the circumstances, no possible good end in view. 
But this mattered little to the Abolitionists. They were in their very nature 
impracticable men. Either not knowing, or not caring for the fact that 
government has to deal with existing powers and obligations, and not with 
abstract principles, they reduced statesmanship in America to one simple syl¬ 
logism: It is wrong to hold man in bondage; the negro is a man; therefore 
negro slavery is wrong; therefore it ought at once to be abolished utterly. 
Regardless of all the circumstances by virtue of which the master found him¬ 
self in possession of the slave; regardless of all traits of race in the slave and 
considerations of treatment by the master which modified the nature of the 
relation between them; and equally regardless whether the government 
of the United States, or even the people, had either the right or the power 
to abolish slavery, they clamored and agitated for its abolition. The people 
of the slave states, solemnly guaranteed in the undisturbed possession of 
their slaves by the organic compact of the nation, were naturally indignant 
at this movement toward a violation of their vested constitutional rights. 
Nor were they alone in this feeling. The mass, practically the whole of the 
people of the free states, wrongful as they felt slavery to be, yet knew that as 
citizens of the United States, or members of free commonwealths, they were 
in no way responsible for it, and had no power over it, and they regarded 
this agitation as dangerous to society and subversive of government. The 
Chancellor (Walworth) of the State of New York, and David B. Ogden, 
one of its most eminent and upright jurists, declared that “the doctrine of 
immediate emancipation” was “a direct and palpable nullification of the 
Constitution.” This it undoubtedly was, and an attempt to carry it into 
effect would have been revolution, rebellion. 

But the multitudinous opponents of the Abolitionists, North and South, 
not content with discountenancing, persecuted them, and, as a natural conse¬ 
quence, abolitionism took firm root and began to spread. Placed under a 
ban, it became bitter, vehement, denunciatory, void alike of common decency 
and of Christian charity. It denounced slavery, an institution which pre¬ 
vailed over one half the country, and among some of the purest and most 
eminent citizens of the republic, as “the sum of all villainies,” 10 and it did not 
hesitate to brand the Constitution itself as “ a covenant with death and a 
compact with hell.” It is not in the nature of man that an agitation should 
be carried on in such a spirit without provoking violent antagonism. Ev¬ 
ery man who held slaves—every man who, although he owned no slaves, 
did not believe that George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson, and Charles 
Carroll, to say nothing of perhaps his own grandfather or father, had passed 
their lives in villainy—e.very man who did not believe that the Constitution 
was a bargain with death and hell, was an opponent of abolitionism; and in 
the South the new movement did more than any other possible agency could 
have done to produce a unity of Southern feeling, to imbitter that feeling 
toward the North, and to mass more compactly the vast political power of 
slavery. The leaders of the extreme school were not slow to avail them¬ 
selves of the weapons which their opponents had placed in their hands. 
Working remorselessly toward their end, and having already almost entirely 
the political leadership in their several states, they boldly assumed the whole 
control of Southern social and political affairs. They brought the press of 
their own states into entire subserviency to their purposes; they made it so¬ 
cial damnation to subscribe for any newspaper or periodical in the free states 
which was not itself also subservient to their faction ; they'managed to ex¬ 
clude from political preferment all rising men who were not heart and soul 
devoted to that faction. By all manner of misrepresentation and craft they 
exasperated their numerous poor slave-less dependents against the Abolition¬ 
ists ; and taking ground that whoever was not for them was against them, 
they fixed the stigma of abolitionism upon all who did not look upon negro 
slavery as a just, wise, and beneficent institution—a test which, it need bard- 


10 John Wesley furnished the first of these stock phrases, and William Lloyd Garrison the second. 






1850. 


INTRODUCTION. 


15 


ly be said, ranged nearly all the people of the free states among the Aboli¬ 
tionists, where, indeed, it would have placed the best, if not,the most of those 
of the slave states a generation before. Thus these adroit and unscrupulous 
managers were enabled to excite among the residents of the slave states what 
they most desired—a wide-spread prejudice, deepening into enmity, against 
their fellow-citizens north of the Potomac and the Ohio. They represented 
the latter as a body of fanatics, ready to set the Constitution recklessly at 
naught in their disregard of the rights of those who differed with them in 
opinion. The loose and reckless lives of a large proportion of the Southern 
and Southwestern population, and their readiness to quarrel and to use arms, 
especially the knife, upon slight provocation; the rigid conformity to the 
“ code of honor” among the better born and bred; and, on the other hand, 
the devotion of the people at the North to the pursuits of peace, their abso¬ 
lute subservience to law, their disuse of the duel, and the contempt and odi¬ 
um into which it rapidly fell among them, made it easy to implant a belief 
among the former that the latter were poor, mean-spirited, cowardly crea¬ 
tures, bound up in fanaticism and love of money. This was done; and no 
means were left untried by the Southern leaders to produce a conviction 
among their blinded followers that the inhabitants of the free states and the 
slave states were a different and an antagonistic people, the former being the 
superiors of the latter in all the heroic virtues, as the latter were their supe¬ 
riors in mechanical arts and the tricks of trade. 

The feeling thus excited was, however, factitious and artificial; and it was 
possible only because the mass of those in whom it was implanted were ig¬ 
norant—so uneducated, in fact, as generally to be unable to write, and, in a 
large proportion of cases, even to read ; because, also, the great mass of them 
were never in a free state, or out of their own neighborhood, and never saw 
a “Yankee,” except a peddler, who, perhaps, cheated them, and who certainly 
had to worry them for payment if they bought of him; and chiefly because 
their leaders, or “ big men,” as they called them, were able to shut out from 
them all knowledge of the free states through newspapers, except by extracts 
either from those which lauded or palliated slavery, or from those which de¬ 
nounced it and slaveholders in rancorous and unmeasured terms. But their 
influence in this regard stopped at the boundaries of slavery. The animos¬ 
ity which they excited was not reciprocal. Throughout the free states there 
was a disposition to soothe and to conciliate, and to make all sacrifices of 
feeling and of interest which could reasonably be asked, and even more, to 
what was regarded as the waywardness, the morbid sensitiveness, and the 
exasperated feeling of the people of the slave states. The interests of trade, 
too, interposed their influence; and merchants and manufacturers brooked 
without resentment many a provocation upon the subject of slavery from 
alarmed and apprehensive men, who, if deprived of their slaves, would be 
both without the occasion to buy and the means of paying for that which they 
had bought already. Of these feelings, as well as of the political importance 
which their compact organization and positive policy gave them, the ex¬ 
treme, or, as they began now to be called, the “ fire-eating” Southern men 
took advantage. There were no bounds to their assumption of superiority 
in Congress, and little to their insolence and arrogance of manner. To any 
stand against the aggression of slavery they replied by threats of disunion ; 
to any protest against insult, by such retort as brought the issue to the al¬ 
ternative of submission or a bloody encounter. All this the free states en¬ 
dured for peace’ sake and for the Union. 

But the South was not content. Encouraged by the deprecatory attitude 
of their opponents, and impelled by economical considerations, the leaders 
of the slavery interest undertook to make the whole power of the govern¬ 
ment subservient to their will; to break down the landmarks which, with 
their own consent, had been set up; and to change the political standing of 
slavery from that of a local institution, existing in virtue of municipal law, 
and having certain specified and sharply-limited guarantees in the Constitu¬ 
tion, to that of a national institution, existing in virtue of the Constitution, 
and protected every where by the national flag. 

Exhaustive in its agriculture, and constantly needing new soil to make 
the labor of the wasteful, shiftless negro profitable, seeking also to preserve 
its superiority in the national government, slavery was unsatisfied with the 
acquisition of Florida and Louisiana, especially after the establishment of the 
Missouri Compromise line. For below the parallel of 36° 30' the advance 
of slavery westward was stopped by the territory of Mexico, which bound¬ 
ed Louisiana and Arkansas on the west, and stretched along the Arkansas 
River and the 42d parallel of latitude to the Pacific Ocean. Hence the dis¬ 
cussion in the Southern and Southwestern states of the annexation of Texas, 
as early as 1829, on the express ground that it would strengthen and ex¬ 
tend the influence of slavery, and raise the price of slaves. Hence the in- 
decorously-hasty recognition of the independence of that vast country and 
its admission to the Union, the consequent Mexican war, and the acqui¬ 
sition of California, New Mexico, and Utah. Hence the attempts, by 
browbeating and bowie-knife, to drive the free state settlers from the 
golden shores of California—an attempt which, after a little promise of 
success, failed utterly; and California, rapidly becoming populous and 
rich, and stretching far below the Missouri Compromise line, chose to ex¬ 
clude slavery, and was admitted to the Union as a free state, with Ore¬ 
gon soon to follow her. The manifest intention of the leading Southern 
politicians to use the national flag and the national forces, not only for the 
protection of slavery where it existed in virtue of local law, but for its dif¬ 
fusion throughout the national domain, led to the counter attempt in the 
bill brought in by David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, and known as the Wil- 
mot Proviso, which provided that slavery should be excluded from all ter¬ 
ritory which had been or should be acquired from Mexico. In spite of the 
union, for better for worse, between the Democrats of the slave and the free 


states, this bill passed the House of Representatives, and only failed to be¬ 
come an act by a majority of ten against it in the Senate. The feeling 
against the propagation of slavery was now becoming stronger and stronger 
in the free states; petitions for the abolition of the internal slave-trade and 
of slavery in the District of Columbia were presented to Congress; and the 
Free Soil party came into existence, with the motto, “ Free soil, free speech, 
free men.” The counter move was one, not of conciliation or of compro¬ 
mise, but of extreme audacity. Mr. Calhoun, who had been a member of 



JOUN C. CALUOC2*. 


President Monroe’s cabinet when the Missouri Compromise was adopted, 
but who had led the nullification movement in South Carolina, who had 
nursed the doctrine of state sovereignty, and developed it from a querulous 
crotchet into a dangerous dogma, and who was the unblushing advocate and 
fearless champion of negro slavery, brought a series of resolutions into the 
Senate which denied the right of Congress to legislate upon the subject of 
slavery in the Territories, and declared any law which prevented the citizens 
of any state from going with their “ property” into any of the Territories of 
the United States unconstitutional and void. This he did it) face of the ac¬ 
tion of Congress in first establishing the Missouri Compromise line, and aft¬ 
erward extending that line to Texas. The effect and the intent of these 
resolutions was to throw the whole territory of the United States, from the 
southern boundary of New Mexico to the line of the British Possessions on 
the north, open to slavery. Mr. Calhoun also wrote and published a letter, 
in which he said to his fellow-citizens of the slaveholding states, “Itis our 
duty to ourselves, to the Union, and our political institutions, to force the 
issue on the North,” for the reason, as he sagaciously saw, that “ we are now 
stronger relatively than we shall be hereafter, politically and morally.” He 
also proposed, in direct violation of the Constitution, if the free states did 
not allow slaveholders to bring their slaves when they visited or traveled 
through them, and did not refrain from putting any hindcrance in the way 
of returning fugitive slaves, to exclude their ships from the ports of the 
slaveholding states; and he recommended a convention of the cotton-grow¬ 
ing states to take these matters into consideration. His resolutions did not 
pass, and his proposed convention was not then held; but his movement 
was only a few years too early. 

From this time events tending toward the rebellion of the slaveholders 
succeeded each other rapidly. The passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 
1850 was another attempt to allay the excitement in which the “fire-eaters” 
at the South, with the aid of the reckless Abolitionists of the North, managed 
to keep the country. As this act imposed no new duties upon the residents 
of the non-slaveholding suites, but, on the contrary, relieved their local offi¬ 
cers of any responsibility in the matter of returning fugitives by the appoint¬ 
ment of special commissioners for that purpose, and as its only operation was 
to give efficiency to a provision of the Constitution, delegates from the free 
states, not admirers of slavery, gave it their votes, and justified their course 
by the state of feeling in the slaveholding states. There had been a con¬ 
vention of delegates from the slave states at Nashville; the Legislatures of 
South Carolina and Mississippi had proposed the assembling of a Southern 
Congress; in the former body secession from the Union was openly advo¬ 
cated; and on the 4th of July, 1850, the memories of the day were not al¬ 
lowed to abate, for even a few hours, the feverous folly of the slave-monoma¬ 
niacs, whose festivities were deformed by toasts defamatory of the Union. 
But the great excitement which was produced at the North by the passage 
of this law for the mere enforcement of a compact as old as the nation, and 
yet not so old as to have become antiquated and obsolete, showed the great 
change of feeling which the aggressive policy of the slavery propaganda had 
produced in a single generation. The Abolitionists, of course, were frenzied; 
and even those who were not of that faction regarded the law in form and 
spirit as intentionally aggravating and humiliating. The feeling upon the 
subject was deepened by the sudden flight to Canada, from the most northern 
free states, oflargc numbers of negroes, some of whom had lived there many 







16 


INTRODUCTION. 


1854. 


years. The people of these states, although not very anxious to retain the 
negroes for their own sakes, yet saw with sorrow, ami sad foreboding, what 
a multitude of their humble fellow-creatures they might have been, and still 
might be, called upon to send back into bondage. Yet they did not, as a 
body, flinch from their loyalty to the Constitution. Slaves claimed were 
delivered to claimants who established their cases, repulsive though the duty 
of rendition was. The slaveholders pressed their claims with a pertinacity 
which would have been very unwise if they had desired unity and good 
feeling; but which, as their object was to either provoke discord, hatred, and 
disunion, or to bring about the absolute subjection of the free states to their 
dominion, was shrewdly politic. 

At last a negro named Anthony Burns was claimed in Boston, and put in 
detention during the investigation of the claim. Some of the more reckless 
of the Abolitionists, assisted by free negroes, attacked the building in which 
he was detained pending the examination, and a deputy marshal was shot. 
There was popular commotion, and a riotous disposition among a small part 
of the townspeople. But order was preserved and the law sustained by the 
state and city, as well as by the national authorities. The ablest counsel in 
the state appeared for the negro, and the investigation was protracted. The 
excitement increased and quickly spread throughout the state and the whole 
country. The claimant established his ownership, the negro was remanded; 
and on that day was seen in Boston one of the most imposing sights the world 
ever looked upon. Popular feeling w T as at its height, and the streets swarmed 
with people, not only from the city itself, but the adjacent country. It was 
feared that there would be an attempt to take the slave from the marshal as 
he was on his way to the vessel which was to carry him southward. The 
marshal had special aids well armed, and there was a company of marines at 
his command ; but, in addition to these, and to prevent any contact between 
the excited people and the United States officers, the whole militia force of 
the vicinity was placed under arm's, and acted as an escort to the marshal 
and the slave. Considerably more than ten thousand men thus voluntarily 
took up arms in support of a law which they loathed, and throughout that 
swarming, excited city there was not an act of-violence committed on that 
day. Such deference to law merely as the law, in a populous city where 
feeling upon the subject of the law was all-pervading, and excitement had 
been rising for days, is unprecedented. But the slavery party were not sat¬ 
isfied with such sacrifices. They declaimed against the necessity of calling 
out ten or fifteen thousand troops to insure the return of one slave, as an 
evidence of a desire on the part of the community in which it occurred to 
violate their constitutional obligations; they did not see, or, seeing, chose to 
disregard the fact that those troops were volunteers, residents of Boston and 
the surrounding villages, and that, had not the people of Massachusetts been 
determined to fulfill their constitutional duty to the very letter, the United 
States would have been obliged to send an army, and a large one, to take 
that one negro away from Boston. The slaveholders claimed, in effect, a 
hearty and cheerful performance of this duty; but that they could not have, 
and had no right to exact. 

The last test of the willingness of the free states to submit to aggression 
for peace’ sake was applied in 1854 bv the passage of the bill for the terri¬ 
torial organization of Kansas and Nebraska. Senator Douglas, of Illinois, a 



Stephen a. docglas. 


bold, adroit, persistent man, having in some excess the politician’s failing of 
regarding the end rather than the means, and almost openly ambitious of 
the presidency, brought the bill for the organization of these territories into 
the Senate, and made one enormous, and, as he thought, overwhelming bid 
for the support of the whole South by introducing a clause which (in ac¬ 
cordance with Mr. Calhoun’s resolutions before mentioned) set aside the Mis¬ 


souri Compromise as unconstitutional, and opened the whole western terri¬ 
tory up to the British line to slavery. The proposition fell upon the coun¬ 
try like a thunder-clap. The Missouri Compromise was looked upon as a 
solemn settlement of the question to which it referred for all time, and was 
held in the free states and in the border slave states in veneration second 
only to that felt for the Constitution itself. Yet such was the condition of 
i parties, such the ability of those who undertook to bring about the passage 
of this important and portentous measure, such, too, the effect of the sud¬ 
denness with which it was sprung upon the country, that it received a ma¬ 
jority of both houses of Congress, and became the law of the land. But the 
event created a deep-seated and wide-spread alarm throughout the whole 
population of the free states. Large numbers of Northern Democrats, w'ho 
dreaded the advance of slavery more than the breaking up of their party, 
clove away from it; and of these, and the Free Soil partv, and a large rem¬ 
nant of the old Whig party, whose leader was slaveholding but not slavery- 
propagatmg Henry Clay, was formed the Republican party, which waxed 



UEXBT CI.AY. 


strong apace, and soon found that it must fight its way with weapons phys¬ 
ical as well as moral. 

The issue before the country was now sharply defined. The Democratic 
slavery party said, “You shall not exclude the Southerner from the terri¬ 
tory of the republic, purchased with the common blood and treasure of its 
citizens. You can go there with your property, and shall he not go there 
with his?” To this the Republican replied, “There is no such exclusion. 
The Southerner can go into the Territories and take with him all that the 
Northerner can. There is, as there should be, no difference in this respect 
between them. But no; the Southerner demands that he shall not only 
take with him such property as the Northerner takes, but something else— 
property of a very extraordinary character, which is property only in his 
state by local law or custom, and which is not secured to him by the Con¬ 
stitution any where else except for its return to him there—property, the 
presence of which excludes the Northern citizen, whereas the exclusion of 
that property does not exclude the Southern citizen. This can not be.” 
And then began the open, final struggle. 

The first battle-ground of the new party was Kansas itself, whither the 
free soil men flocked to secure that fair land for free labor. Some went 
only of their own motion and with their own means; but ma«y were sent 
out by emigrant-aid societies formed in the East. They went, however, as 
settlers in good faith. But how they were harried by ruffians from the bor¬ 
der of Missouri; how they were outvoted at the polls by armed men, who 
swarmed into the Territory just before the elections, to return to Missouri 
immediately after they were over; how’ they were shot in cold blood and in 
hot blood; how they had to stand guard over their log cabins, their wives 
and children, and their cattle, as our forefathers stood guard over theirs 
against the savages; how there were two capitals and two constitutions, and 
governor after governor was sent out at the bidding of the South to support 
the false and crush the true; and how not one had either the ability, or the 
conscience, or the heart to do it; and how, finally, after a Congressional in¬ 
vestigation, the shameful story was all rightly told, and truth triumphed— 
this we all know. But in all these sad commotions the country took great 
strides toward revolution, though at the time we did not see it. Then came 
an outrage which shocked the world — the assault upon Senator Sumner. 
He was not entirely blameless. A member of the highest legislative body 
of one of the foremost civilized nations might have done a wiser and a bet 
ter thing in a set speech upon a momentous subject than call one senator, 
who was tall,“the Don Quixote,” and another, who was short, “the Sancho 
Panza of slavery;” for this designation of Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, and 
Mr. Douglas, of Illinois, may be called the point of a studiously irritating 
speech by which Mr. Sumner provoked the wrath of the slaveholders, with¬ 
out any hope of either curbing their party or strengthening his own. What 
he said might have been wiser and better, indeed, but not more cutting, be- 











1859. 


INTRODUCTION. 


17 


cause it was severe, personal, and true. But for all that, when Preston 
Brooks attacked Mr.Sumner as he sat bending over his desk in the deserted 
Senate-chamber, and beat him senseless, he played not only the part of a ruf¬ 
fian, but of a traitor to the liberties of his country.* lie brought shame upon 
it throughout all Christendom ; shame which the free states east from them 
without soil by their indignant denunciation of the act at the voice of men 
of all parties among them; shame which the South Carolina politicians and 
their followers took with effrontery to themselves by making a hero of the 
assailant, and by assuming in Washington an air of greater defiance and in¬ 
solence than ever. This act of violence provoked the resistance it was meant 
to intimidate, and added many thousands to the large vote cast in 1856 for 
Colonel Fremont, the first candidate of the new Republican party. Bear¬ 
ing the Sumner outrage in mind, men voted for Colonel Fremont who had 
never gone to the polls before since the}' became of age. Indeed, so strong 
had the conviction become in the free states that the safety of the republic 
demanded a firm check upon the aggressions of slavery, that it seemed at one 
time as if the Republican party would carry the day at its first struggle; 
and then went up the usual threats of disunion from the “fire-eaters;” and 
Governor Wise, of Virginia, declared that, if Colonel Fremont were elected, 
he would march with the militia of his state upon "Washington and seize the 
Capitol and the national archives. But Fremont was not elected, and the 
country had another breathing-spell, and the rule or ruin party of the South 
another four years’ period of preparation—preparation for their attempt to 
destroy the republic; for as to aggression they had no more to make; the 
Supreme Court having decided, in the case of Dred Scott, a negro who claim¬ 
ed to be free on the ground that his owner had taken him into a free state, 
and afterward into a part of the old Louisiana territory north of 36° 30', 
that the Missouri Compromise Act, in prohibiting slavery north of that par¬ 
allel, was unconstitutional, and also that slave-owners might take their slaves 
into any state of the Union without detriment to their right to the service 
and labor of those slaves. This decision virtually converted the whole Union 
to the purposes of slavery, regardless of any local law; aud in the Union 
there was nothing left for slavery to gain. 

The position taken by the Supreme Court in this case was regarded 
throughout the free states as a direct attack, under cover of law, upon that 
independence in local legislation so carefully secured by the Constitution, 
and consequently as an open attempt upon their liberties. Nearly all of 
them at once took measures of the same kind as the resolution passed in the 
Legislature of New York, which body declared, by large majorities in both 
houses, “that this state will not allow slavery within its borders, in any form, 
or under any pretense, for any time, however short, let the consequences be 
what they may.” This, however justifiable, was revolution—indirect, and it 
might have been bloodless, but still revolution; for either the State of New 
York must fail to make good its solemn asseveration, or else maintain a posi¬ 
tion in the teeth of the Constitution, as it was declared by the authority ap¬ 
pointed to interpret it So also were the Personal Liberty Laws passed in 
some of the free states revolutionary. That of Vermont, for instance, which 
provided that every person who might have been held as a slave who 
should in any manner go into that state should be free; and that any per¬ 
son who should attempt to hold any free person as a slave in that state for 
any time, however short, on the pretense that that person was or had been 
a slave, should be subject to imprisonment for five years or a fine of not less 
than $1000 and not more than $10,000. Upon this point, however, no occa¬ 
sion offered of open rupture. The free states continued to return fugitive 



JAMES UVCBAMAN. 


slaves, though sometimes rescues were attempted ; and no slaveholder ven¬ 
tured to test the willingness of New York or any other free state to allow 
slavery within its jurisdiction at the bidding of the Supreme Court. President 
Buchanan, Colonel Fremont’s successful competitor, acted on the assumption 
that the only way to preserve the Union was to yield every thing to the de¬ 


mands of the South Carolina faction, whose infamous policy in Kansas he sus¬ 
tained so unscrupulously that he disgusted even those who used him as their 
tool, and gave Mr. Douglas an opportunity to win support in the North by 
opposing him upon the very question which Mr. Douglas himself had thrown 
like a fire-brand into the country. The support even of the border slave 
states fell away from President Buchanan. Mr. Douglas gained some of it, 
the Republican party the rest. 

While these events were taking place, the aggressive slaveholders were 
lashing themselves and the humble non-slaveholders around them into hatred 
and fury against their fellow-citizens of the free states. Of the manner of 
doing this and the result, there is one notable and melancholy instance. In 
the summer of the year 1855 the towns of Norfolk and Portsmouth were 
desolated by the yellow fever. The pestilence was so fearful that many of 
the native physicians fled before it, and of those in the neighboring country 
few could be induced to visit the scene of its ravages. Under these circum¬ 
stances, a large number of medical men from Northern states hastened to the 
aid of their suffering countrymen, and remained with them, serving them 
night and day until the scourge had passed. Unacclimated as they were, 
weary and worn with watching in the pest-houses, many of them were at¬ 
tacked by the fever, and fourteen died and were buried in the land whither 
they had gone as ministers of mercy. It might be reasonably supposed that 
where their bodies lay would be hallowed ground; that it would be marked 
by some enduring token of the gratitude of the people for whom these men 
laid down their lives; that fathers would take their children there to teach 
them the noblest lesson of Christianity, self-sacrifice. But the truth is sadly, 
shamefully otherwise. The simple stones that marked their graves were 
made the targets of opprobrium. They stood there silent witnesses of what 
Northern men could dare to do for their countrymen, their brethren, who 
had reviled them for years without mitigation or remorse: they testified 
without ceasing that opposition to the spread of slavery did not spring from 
hatred of slaveholders; and to those who hardened their hearts they became 
an unendurable reproach. At last a leading newspaper in one of these 
towns’ openly declared (it can hardly bn believed of men in civilized Chris¬ 
tendom) that the state of feeling toward the North “ required the removal” 
of the bodies of these martyrs to benevolence. Such was part of the ma¬ 
chinery, the infernal machinery, which was contrived for the destruction of 
the republic! 

This was the condition of affairs when an event occurred which, although 
without immediate consequences of moment, except to the actors in it, seems 
as if it had been foreordained to precipitate the impending revolution. 
John Brown, an anti-slavery fanatic of the blindest and most furious sort, 



JOU.X liEOVTS. 


but with determination in his nature and method in his madness, who had 
been harried and hunted by border ruffians in Kansas, and had in turn har¬ 
ried and hunted them as they deserved, made in October, 1859, that raid 
upon Harper’s Ferry which is so fresh in all memories. How we all won¬ 
dered when the telegraph told us that the national arsenal at that place had 
been seized by a band of men who proved to be only twenty-two in number! 
How we wondered still more when it proved that this treason against the 
United States was committed merely for the purpose of running off as many 
slaves northward as could be excited to fly! Ilow, in the midst of our con¬ 
demnation of the act, we felt a certain admiration of the calm self-devotion 
of the old man and his followers, whom it took a company of marines to dis¬ 
lodge, and whom the State of Virginia hanged with great pomp and formal¬ 
ity, and with a display of military force which the pretense of an apprehend¬ 
ed rescue by the Abolitionists did not prevent from being ridiculous. Vir¬ 
ginia should not have been allowed to punish an offense committed, not 
against her local law, but against the sovereignty of the United States. But 
she boldly assumed the control of the affair. The occasion was too valuable 


1 The Norfolk Argus. 










18 


INTRODUCTION. 


I860. 


to the conspirators against the republic (for such we must now call them) to 
be lost. It must not be slobbered over, but made the most of, as a means 
of stirring up the masses of the people in the slave states into the proper 
state of turbulence for revolt And, indeed, like all of the radical abolition¬ 
ist movements, its only effect, its only possible effect, was, to carry the ex¬ 
citement, the antagonism, and the genuine fears of the slave states to a higher 
pitch than before. Had the disunionists of the South deliberately contrived 
to bring about some event which would give a new and resistless impulse 
to their cause, they could not have planned one which would have served 
their purpose half as well as this reckless raid of a poor old fanatic frontiers¬ 
man. And so, although the closest and most jealous investigation of “the 
John Brown affair” had failed to connect any party or any leader at the 
North with it, the militia of Virginia were kept under arms until the middle 
of November, and South Carolina was placed under martial law, not for de¬ 
fense, but to beget an opinion that defense was necessary. 

Opportunely for the disunion party, this strange event—unique of its kind 
in the annals of the country—happened but a short time before the canvass 
for the presidential election of 1860 was about to begin. John Brown was 
hanged in December, 1859, and the Democratic Nominating Convention as¬ 
sembled in Charleston in April, 1860. In that body the delegates from the 
slave states demanded an adoption of the doctrine that slavery existed by vir¬ 
tue of the Constitution in all of the Territories, as one of the principles of the 
Democratic party. They made this demand knowing that it would not be ac¬ 
ceded to; and they were not disappointed. The Democrats from the free states 
had yielded year after year, for the sake of the party and the Union, until they 
felt that it would be ruinous to both to yield any farther. The platform of 
the slavery propaganda was rejected by a decided, immovable majority, and 
that of the free state delegates, which on the great question conformed to the 
decision of the Supreme Court as to the territories, but asserted the right of 
the people of the territories to admit or exclude slavery, was adopted. Upon 
this the delegates from Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Ar¬ 
kansas, Florida, and Texas withdrew from the Convention, which, thus di¬ 
minished to a bare majority of its members, adjourned to meet at Baltimore 
on the 18th of June. It should be observed that, of the fifteen slave states, 
eight, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and Missouri, including, as will be seen, four of the most import¬ 
ant, did not join in this attempt to disorganize the Democratic party for the 
purpose of making the election of the Republican candidate sure. This 
purpose was clearly seen at once by all the people of the free states, and 
equally by all the members of the Democratic party in the great and im¬ 
portant slave states whose delegates had not taken part in the movement; 
and Mr. Douglas, the acknowledged leader and presidential candidate of 
the Democratic party in the free states and this part of the slave states, ex¬ 
posed in his speeches thoroughly and mercilessly the underhand measures 
by which the South Carolina faction had sought to use the Democrats of the 
North for the furtherance of their designs. The feeling occasioned by these 
events was profound; and it was seen that the old alliance between the 
slavery party and the Democratic party was at an end, that the power of 
the latter was destroyed, and, as regarded the immediate issue, that Mr. 
Douglas’s chances of an election had vanished. 

Foreseeing and dreading evil consequences from the election of a Presi¬ 
dent by the Republican party, a large and influential body of citizens in 
both slave and free states sent delegates to a convention at Baltimore, in 
which John Bell, a Tennessee slaveholder of moderate views and unsuspect¬ 
ed patriotism, was nominated for the presidency, and Edward Everett, of 
Massachusetts—a man who had been United States Senator, Governor of 
Massachusetts, President of Harvard College, and American minister to Great 
Britain, and who, with the knowledge, as it afterward appeared, of the great 
need of his exertions, had devoted himself for a few years to the preservation 
of the bond of union between the free and the slave states, and who had 
thereby incurred the sneers of the extreme Republicans as a “Union-saver,” 
which was with them a term of reproach—was nominated as vice-president. 
The representatives of no party, and having no political organization or 
electioneering machinery at their command, the gentlemen who nominated 
these eminent citizens had no hope of electing them at the ballot-box. But 
it was thought probable that they would receive votes enough to prevent 
any choice by the people, and that thus the election would be thrown into 
the House of Representatives; in which case the election of Messrs. Bell and 
Everett or Messrs. Douglas and Lane was looked for. 

Third in order, but first in importance, was the Convention of the Repub¬ 
lican party, which took place at Chicago on the 16th of May. The nomina¬ 
tion of Senator Seward, the congressional leader of this party, was regarded 
as a foregone conclusion. But, to the surprise of the country, Mr. Seward 
failed of a unanimous nomination at the first ballot; and one Abraham Lin¬ 
coln, of Illinois, was his chief competitor. Of Mr. Lincoln little was known 
out of his own state. Only those who devoted more than a common atten¬ 
tion to politics remembered that he had been a member of the House of 
Representatives for Illinois; that he had “stumped the state” with some 
effect in opposition to Mr. Douglas as candidate for the Senate in 1859; and 
tnat he had made a clever speech upon the great issue before the country at 
the Cooper Institute, in New York, in February, 1860. Yet the plea that 
he could be elected, and that Mr. Seward certainly could not, was urged 
with such effect that after a sharp contest he received a large majority of the 
votes. The nomination of Mr. Polk, or of Mr. Pierce, was not a greater 
surprise to the country; and as the captain of the homeward-bound China 
ship, when he approached Sandy Hook, hailed an outward-bound vessel and 
inquired, “Who’s President of the United States?” and being answered 
“James K. Polk,” hallooed back, “Who in-is James K. Polk?” so the 


people of the United States with one accord asked, “Who is Abraham Lin¬ 
coln?” The answer had some significance. Ho was the grandson of a 
Kentucky pioneer, a fellow-emigrant and friend of Daniel Boone. Left an 
orphan at six years of age, the eldest of a family of four, he could be spared 
to go to school but six months, and began to earn his living ere he was well 
out of his childhood—first as a shepherd-boy, then as an apprentice in a 
saw-mill, then as a Mississippi boatman, then as a farm-hand on new clear¬ 
ings, in which employment he performed great feats in splitting rails. All 
this before he was legally a man; and when he came of age he went to 
Illinois, where he became general helper in a country store, then salesman, 
giving all his spare time to self-education. In the Black Hawk war he vol¬ 
unteered; and his capacity and popularity were soon acknowledged by his 
election to the captaincy of his company. His military service over, he was 
chosen member of the State Assembly of Illinois, to which position he was 
re-elected thrice. He now was admitted to the bar of his state, and practiced 
with no little success. He mingled much in politics, and in 1846 was elected 
member of Congress, but soon found it necessary to give his attention exclu¬ 
sively to his profession and his family. But the crisis of 1859 was too mo¬ 
mentous for him to stand quietly aside, taking no part in it; and he entered 
the field again as candidate for the Senate in opposition to Mr. Douglas, his 
controversy with whom showed him a match for that daring, dexterous de¬ 
bater and practiced politician. He had early gained, and through all these 
vicissitudes of fortune, had kept, with the consent of co-workers and oppo¬ 
nents, the name of “Honest Abe.” Such was the man who was suddenly 
placed before the American people as a candidate for the most important 
office in their gift. Of all those who had been placed in a like position, 
Mr. Lincoln was the most perfect example of the working of that repub¬ 
lican principle which puts the highest honors of the state within the reach 
of the humblest born and bred among its citizens. Not one of the men 
who had preceded him as a candidate for the presidency had started in life 
upon so low a level, or had passed so many years without any advantages 
of intellectual and social culture. Born in a slave state, and having chosen 
his wife from the same community, he was, although a Republican, a con¬ 
servative—not tinged in the least with the revolutionary mania of abolition¬ 
ism. The Republican Convention selected him because of his availability; 
he accepted its nomination modestly. 

The adjourned Democratic Convention, which assembled at Baltimore in 
June, excluded the delegates which had withdrawn from its Charleston ses¬ 
sion, but admitted new delegates from Alabama and Louisiana who were 
known to be supporters of Mr. Douglas. Upon this the delegates from Vir¬ 
ginia withdrew, accompanied by most of those from the other slave states, 
and some of those from the free states—all, in fact, who were determined, 
in Mr. Calhoun’s words, to “force the issue” upon the country of slavery 
throughout the Union or disunion. This faction organized itself, and nom¬ 
inated as president John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, a man who had hard- 



JOUN C. BRECKINRIDGE. 


ly attained middle age, and who, without remarkable ability, had been made 
a pet by the extreme slavery party and by the politicians of the South gen¬ 
erally, and as vice-president General Lane, of Oregon. The original body 
nominated Senator Douglas for the presidency, and Herschel V. Johnson, of 
Georgia, for the vice-presidency. 

Of the four parties now in the field, only one—that of Breckinridge and 
Lane—represented the rule or ruin, slavery or disunion, principles. Indeed, 
this party was obliged to nominate its candidates only because of the distinct 
avowal of all the other three that slavery in the Territories of the United 
States was not placed by the Constitution out of the control of the people of 
the United States, and that in any case the perpetuity of the republic was 
before the propagation of slavery. The party at the other extreme, whose 
candidates were Lincoln and Hamlin, were the advocates of free soil in the 
Territories, but absolute non-interference with slavery in the States. This 





THE GREAT MEETING IN UNION SQUARE, NEW YORK, TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT, APRIL 26, 1861. F '““ w„ki. 




















































































20 


INTRODUCTION. 


party the Abolitionists not only refused to vote with, but constantly de¬ 
nounced ; so that the latter were not represented in the contest. It is import¬ 
ant to remember these facts in measuring the significance of the vote cast 
at this strange and momentous election. 

The influence of the President, the Cabinet, and the holders of office 
throughout the country was openly and shamelessly exerted for the rule or 
ruin party. Mr. Howell Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury, while on a visit to 



New York pending the canvass, avowed himself a disunionist; said that, in 
case of Mr. Lincoln’s election, secession would have the sympathy and co¬ 
operation of the administration ; and even declared that he did not believe 
another Congress of the United States would meet. The threats of disunion 
in case the Republican candidate were elected increased in violence; but, 
such was the temper of the people, they were no longer regarded as of old. 
“Gentlemen,” said a Virginia planter, trembling with passion, in a conver¬ 
sation between half a dozen persons in the parlor of a New York insurance 
office, before the Republican nomination had been made, “gentlemen, if you 
elect Mr. Seward President, we shall break up this Union.” “I think not, 
sir,” calmly replied the man to whom he seemed more particularly to address 
himself. “ You’ll see, sir—you’ll see; we will surely do it.” “Then, sir,” 
said the other, as quietly as before, but looking him steadily in the face, “ we 
shall nominate Mr.Seward. Mr.Seward is not my man; for I am a free 
trader and an old Democrat. But if Virginia, or any other state or states 
shall declare that, upon the constitutional election of any citizen of the United 
States to any office, the Union shall be broken up, then I nominate that man 
and vote for him on principle;” and all present, with a single exception, ut¬ 
tered a hearty Ay. Such was the feeling of the canvass: a canvass con¬ 
ducted, nevertheless, with a notable moderation of language and bearing, 
except in a few isolated places in the Gulf states; a canvass remarkable, 
too, for the fact that, while in the free states the advocates of the extreme 
slavery or disunion party spoke freely and worked vigorously, without hin- 
derance and almost without rebuke, in the slave states, with one or two ex¬ 
ceptions, no word was uttered—none would have been allowed to be uttered 
—in behalf of the Republican party. Had any man ventured to declare 
publicly in South Carolina, or south of that state, that Mr. Lincoln was a 
proper person for President of the United States, he would have done so at 
imminent peril of his life. Not, as we shall see, because there were not 
many persons there who were willing, though not desirous, that he should 
assume that office, if constitutionally elected to it, but because the fierce 
faction which had seized the control of affairs in those states were determ¬ 
ined, right or wrong, to brook no interference, and would either have made 
way with their presumptuous fellow-citizen by the knife, or driven him 
with violence out of their states into others where the freedom of speech 
guaranteed bj' the Constitution really existed, and where respect for law 
was enforced by an enlightened public opinion. In those states the Repub¬ 




ISAAC TOtJOEY. 


JOHN li. FLO VP. 

licans, the better to marshal and manage their forces, organized “ Wide 
Awake Clubs,” the chief, in fact the only function of which seemed to be to 
parade the streets at night in oilskin caps and capes, each man carrying a 


[1860. 


swinging lamp. But, as if even this harmless w'ay of wasting time and oil 
could not be contrived without helping the disunionists, these torch-light pro¬ 
cessions were made, not in the customary order of civic processions, but by 
platoons in companies, with captains and lieutenants, each club having a sort 
of military organization. It was at once pretended that the real object of all 
this nightly drill and parade was a preparation to invade the South, and a 
new impulse was given to the formation of volunteer companies and bodies 
of minute-men in the slave states. Secession, in case of the election of Mr. 
Lincoln, was openly proposed in the Legislatures of South Carolina and Al¬ 
abama; the governor of the former recommending the reorganization of the 
militia of the state, and the immediate enlistment of one thousand volunteers. 

Meantime a species of treason was going on in the very cabinet at Wash¬ 
ington. Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, and Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the 
Navy, used their official authority to place the government for a time at the 
mercy of the conspirators. The former sent to arsenals and forts in slave 
states all the arms and ammunition of the United States which he could 
move without attracting too much attention, and dispersed the little army 
to widely distant quarters, where it was not needed, placing at the same 
time officers born in slave states, as far as possible, in command at the most 
important points. Mr. Toucey, a Connecticut tool of the South Carolina 
faction, dismantled many vessels of the navy, and scattered.the remainder 
to the four winds of heaven. 

Under these foreboding circumstances the presidential election of 1860 
took place on the 6th of November; and so complete were the arrangements 
for counting the votes and transmitting the returns to the telegraph stations, 
that on- the morning of the 7th it was known from Maine to Texas, from 
Florida to Iowa, that Mr. Lincoln was elected. Thirty millions of people, 
scattered over an area of more than three millions of square miles, learned 
within a few hours of its occurrence an event more momentous to their 
country than any other which had taken place since its Declaration of Inde¬ 
pendence. Mr. Lincoln’s majority over all his opponents in the electoral 
college proved to be sixty-four; but of the popular vote Mr. Douglas re¬ 
ceived nearly as many as Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Bell did together, and 



■ 


it 



N\y\v 


JOHN B ELT- 


within less than five hundred thousand of as many as were given for Mr. 
Lincoln himself. 2 Indeed, of the popular vote, Mr. Douglas and Mr. Bell 
together had nearly one hundred thousand more than Mr. Lincoln; and the 
majority of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell over Lincoln was nearly a mil¬ 
lion, and the entire electoral votes of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee 
were given for Bell. Let us analyze this vote more carefully; for the South 
Carolina politicians at once began to take measures to bring about an imme¬ 
diate disruption of the Union, on the ground that the election had drawn a' 
geographical line across the country, dividing it into two hostile sections of 
radically different people; and it is necessary to our purpose that we should 
see the audacity (for when impudence and outrage attain large proportions 
they have that name) both of the pretense and of the undertaking founded 
upon it. We must remember that Mr. Breckinridge represented the people 
whose purpose was that slavery should rule or the republic be destroyed; 
the other three candidates, however divergent their principles upon other 


1 The electoral vote was: for Lincoln, 180; for Breckinridge, 72; for Bell, 39; for Douglas, 
12. The popular vote, for Lincoln, 1,857,010; for Douglas, 1,3G5,976; for Breckinridge, 847,953 
(exclusive of South Carolina, where there is no popular vote); for Bell, 590,631. It must be re¬ 
membered, in estimating the popular vote, that every bnllot in the free states represents a citizel 
of the United States, while the ballots in the slave states represent three fifths of the slaves. 










I860.] 


INTRODUCTION. 


21 


subjects, having been, nominated in express opposition to the disunion fac¬ 
tion. Now. the entire popular vote for Breckinridge in the slave states 
was 571,135, while in those very states the vote for Bell and Everett was 



TOWARD EVERETT. 


515,953, and that for Douglas 163,525, so that by adding the 26,430 votes 
which Mr. Lincoln himself received in the five slave states of Virginia, Ken¬ 
tucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, there were 705,908 voters who de¬ 
clared themselves distinctly opposed even to bringing the Calhoun issue 
before the country, while of the 571,135 who in effect declared for it, many, 
it is known, and multitudes, there is reason to believe, gave their votes for 
Mr. Breckinridge without regarding the mere election of Mr. Lincoln, in case 
it should take place, as sufficient cause for an attempt to break up the Union. 
So far, in fact, was the result of this election from showing an absolute divi¬ 
sion of the free and the slave states upon the question at issue, or, in truth, 
upon anv other, that of Mr. Douglas’s 1,365,976 votes, 1,202,451 came from 
the free states and 163,525 from'the slave; and of Mr. Bell’s 590,631 votes, 
515,953 came from the slave states and 74,678 from the free; while in the 
free states Mr. Breckinridge himself received 276,818, or nearly one third 
of his entire number—California giving him 34,334; Connecticut, 14,641; 
Indiana, 12,295; Ohio, 11,405; Pennsylvania, 178,871; and even Massachu¬ 
setts 5939. 

These facts make it plain that, whatever division of feeling or interest 
there was between the mass of the people of the free states on the one side, 
and those of the slave states on the other, Mr. Lincoln’s election was in itself 
no proof or sign of it Still less was there at the time of his election any 
radical or material unlikeness between the masses of the people of those two 
divisions of the country. They were not different nations or peoples, united 
by a mere political bond, as those of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland 
are in the kingdom of Great Britain, but one nation, composed to all intents 
and purposes of but a single element. We have seen that in the beginning 
the people of the United States were English people, and that, as a nation, 
they were distinguished above all others for their homogeneousness. An 
English people they continued to be, with their homogeneousness not mate¬ 
rially impaired in the course of two generations; while of such bonds as 
bind the inhabitants of one country together, not only did those which first 
existed between them still endure, but they had been greatly strengthened 
and multiplied by th'e passage of events, and the development of the national 
character and resources, during more than half a century. The most mobile 
people in the world, and favored in this respect by the natural formation of 
the country, intercourse among them had been more constant and intimate 
than among the people of any other nation. Having equal, or rather iden¬ 
tical, political rights in all parts of the country, vast numbers of them con¬ 
tinually exercised *hose rights, sometimes in one state, at others in another, 


as business, inclination, or necessity caused them to change their places of 
residence. Men born and bred in the free states went into the slave states, 
became slaveholders as merchants or planters, and rose to distinction in the 
professions, in society, and in politics. An enormous and entirely unre¬ 
stricted internal trade caused a constant and assimilating attrition among 
the whole people. As a consequence of this daily intermingling, inter¬ 
marriage was constantly going on, if, indeed, that can be properly called 
intermarriage which is the union of individuals of the same race and the 
same nation. There was no town or considerable neighborhood, no soci¬ 
ety or corporation, no social circle in one of these divisions which was not 
bound by interest, or blood, or close association to some town, or neighbor¬ 
hood, or society, or social circle in the other. The language and the liter¬ 
ature of the several parts of the country could not properly be called like; 
for likeness implies some difference; they were identical; the variations in 
speech and idiom being of such a trifling nature that, unlike the people of 
Switzerland, for instance, where the people of one canton, or those of En¬ 
gland, where those of one county, can not understand those of another, the 
people of this country, even in its rudest and remotest districts, had not two 
dialects of their vernacular tongue. The ties of a common religion stretched 
over the land from north to south and from east to west Not only so, but 
the chief religious and benevolent organizations of the various slightly diver¬ 
gent sects included the whole country in their scope, and derived their sup¬ 
port from its people at large. Since the adoption of the Constitution a 
Spanish and a French province had been added to the country at the South ; 
and of the large immigration, coming chiefly from Ireland and Germany, the 
greater part, but by no means all, had settled in the Northern states. But 
in the case of Louisiana and Florida, the number of citizens of a different 
race which were added to the republic was too insignificant to effect any 
change in the character of the population, except in two or three towns; and 
the same remark is even more true with regard to the influx of immigrants 
into the free states, which, having mainly taken place since 1816, there bad 
not 3 r et been time for it to effect any material change in the native blood of the 
country, even had that been possible. But such an event seems impossible; 
for, owing to intermarriage, and still more to the dominant influence of that 
English race which peopled this country, the immediate descendants of Ger¬ 
mans and Irishmen, born therein, pass at once indistinguisbably into the 
mass of its inhabitants; and, as in the mother country under like circum¬ 
stances they become Anglo-Britons, so here they become Anglo-Americans. 
It was such a nation, thus homogeneous, thus bound together, and the indi¬ 
viduals of which were ceaselessly commingling, as the very soils of the vari¬ 
ous parts of their country were commingled by a system of navigable rivers, 
unlike that which exists in any other country on the globe, and the various 
commonwealths of which were separated, not by natural boundaries, but by 
imaginary lines studiously drawn so as not to make visible separation, estab¬ 
lish lines of defense, or secure exclusive privileges—a nation more marked by 
unity than any other in the world—a nation, those individuals of which who 
had enjoyed a like and moderate advantage of social and intellectual culture, 
could not, in familiar intercourse, be distinguished one from another in man¬ 
ners or in speech by a stranger, although they were born and bred a thou¬ 
sand miles apart—it was such a nation that the political leaders whom the 
election of Mr. Lincoln had unseated undertook to break into hostile frag¬ 
ments, and partly on the ground that the people of the states whose elect¬ 
oral votes had been cast for him were a different people from those of the 
states whose electoral votes had been cast against him. 3 

But with all the likeness, the real identity between the people of the whole 
country, there was a line which divided universal freedom and the elevation 
and intelligence of the mass of the citizens on the one side from the enslave¬ 
ment of an inferior race and the degradation and ignorance of the mass of 
the citizens on the other. In these points of difference and their consequen¬ 
ces consisted the entire difference between the people whom the defeated 
Southern leaders sought to array against each other. To perpetuate the en¬ 
slavement of that race, and to carry slavery into the territory of the Union, 
and with it the degradation of labor and of all citizens not slaveholders, was 
the object of the leaders of the rebellion. And that which made rebellion 
desirable made it also possible; for the ignorance, the poverty, the depend¬ 
ent position, and the blunted sensibilities of the millions of non-slaveholding 
citizens in the slave states, enabled the few thousand slaveholders to deceive 
them as to the issues involved, to excite in them groundless animositv 
against the people of the free states, to cause them to underrate the courage 

3 See, for instance, the following extract from the Louisville (Ky.) CWier, published at Nash¬ 
ville, whither its editor had fled before the advance of the national forces in March, 1862: 

“This has been called a fratricidal war by some, by others an irrepressible conflict between free¬ 
dom and slavery. We respectfully take issue with the authors of both these ideas. We are not 
the brothers of the Yankees, and the slavery question is merely the pretext, not the cause of the 
war. The true irrepressible conflict lies fundamentally in the hereditary hostility, the sacred ani¬ 
mosity, the eternal antagonism between the two races engaged. 

“The Norman cavalier can not brook the vulgar familiarity of the Saxon Yankee, while the 
latter is continually devising some plan to bring down his aristocratic neighbor to his own detested 
level. Thus was the contest waged in the old United States. So long as Dickinson doughfaces 
were to be bought, and Cochrane cowards to bo frightened, so long was the Union tolerable to 
Southern men; but when, owing to divisions in our ranks, the Yankee hirelings placed one of 
their own spawn over us, political connection became unendurable, and separation necessary to 
presene our self-respect. 

“As our Norman kinsmen in England, always a minority, have ruled their Saxon countrymen 
in political vassalage up to the present day, so have we, the ‘slave oligarchs,’ governed the Yankees 
till within a twelvemonth. We framed the Constitution, for seventy years moulded the policy of 
the government, and placed our own men, or ‘Northern men with Southern principles,’ in power* 

“On the 6th of November, 1860, the Puritans emancipated themselves, and are now in violent 
insurrection against their former owners. This insane holiday freak will not last long, however, 
for, dastards in fight, and incapable of self-government, they will inevitably again fall under the 
control of the superior race. A few more Bull Run thrashings will bring them once more under 
the yoke as docile as the most loyal of our Ethiopian ‘ chattels.’ * 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22 


INTRODUCTION. 


1860. 


and the determination of those whom they taught them to hate, and gener¬ 
ally to mislead these poor hoodwinked people and mould them to their own 
selfish purposes. For a whole generation the disunionists had devoted them¬ 
selves to undermining the loyalty of their fellow-citizens to the republic and 
its flag, and inflating them with the petty pride of state sovereignty, to the 
representation of the people of the free states as mean-spirited cowards, who 
were scheming to cheat them of their birthright, and to the exaltation of 
that sort of chivalry which consists in the use of the bowie-knife and the re¬ 
volver. Now the time had arrived when or never all this wicked work was 
to bear its natural fruit. 

The Republican party was somewhat surprised and very exultant over its 
decided victory; but, although the country at large had become used to vi¬ 
olent threats from the political leaders and writers of the slave states, the 
election of a Republican to the presidency was felt on every side to be no or¬ 
dinary political event. Over the whole land there was a pause of expecta¬ 
tion ; the stock-market was troubled, and all eyes were turned southward. 
And first upon South Carolina, whose governor, William H. Gist, only the 
day before the election, had formally recommended secession to the Legisla¬ 
ture of that state “ in event of Abraham Lincoln’s election to the presiden¬ 
cy.” Men were not left long in doubt as to the purposes of the leaders of 
opinion in that fractious and presuming commonwealth. They were bent 
upon the destruction of the Union, and that immediately. The Legislature 
of the state, which was in session, proceeded at once to consider the propri¬ 
ety of calling a convention of the people; and, in spite of some attempts to 
induce delay until there could be a consultation leading to combined action 
among the slave states, took ground in favor of instant and separate state 
action. The United States senators for South Carolina resigned their seats. 
The Grand Jurv of the United States District Court at Charleston declined 
making its usual presentment, on the ground that the election of Mr. Lincoln 
had “ swept away the last hope for the permanence of the federal govern¬ 
ment of these sovereign states;” and Judge Magrath, the United Statesjudge 



JUDGE MAOBATU. 


for the district of South Carolina, formally laid off his robes and resigned his 
office, saying that he felt assured of what would be the action of the state, 
and considered it his duty to prepare to obey its wishes by ceasing to ad¬ 
minister the laws of the United States within the State of South Carolina. 
His example was promptly followed by all the United States officers in 
Charleston, except the postmaster, the officers of the army, and those in the 
revenue service. The inhabitants of the town began to enroll themselves as 
minute-men, and the palmetto flag was hoisted on some of the vessels in the 
harbor. 4 

Georgia, which, in the Convention for the formation of the Constitution, 
had united with South Carolina in insisting that the slave-trade should be 
left open for a term of years, now quickly joined her former colleague in the 
attempt to destroy the government which was then established on their own 
conditions, and which had since been administered in their own interests, 
and chiefly by men of their own choice. The Governor of Georgia also rec¬ 
ommended separate state action.- He did not deem a general convention of 
the slave states practicable. He proposed that Georgia and each other slave 
state should protect itself by imposing, in defiance of the Constitution, heavy 
duties upon the manufactures of Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and other 
“offending” states. He urged the appropriation of a million of dollars for 
putting the state in a condition of defense, and said that to all propositions 
for conference and compromise the "answer should be, “ Argument is ex¬ 
hausted ; we stand to our arms.” A public meeting was held in Savannah, 
at which it was resolved that “ the election of Lincoln and Hamlin ought not 
to be, and will not be submitted to;” and it was recommended to the gov¬ 


ernor to call a convention of the people. Blue cockades, the old sign of 
South Carolina nullification, began to appear in the streets. 

In the other slave states, although there was no little excitement, there 
was not such ardor and precipitancy in the cause of disunion. In North 
Carolina, in Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mis¬ 
souri, the general feeling, in spite of isolated outbursts of wrath and denun¬ 
ciation, was decidedly in favor of waiting, at least, until the President elect 
had assumed office, and made some attack upon the peculiar interest of the 
slave states. Mississippi alone of the other slave states seemed ready to em¬ 
ulate the headlong course of South Carolina and Georgia. The extreme men 
of the South Carolina school in all quarters broke out in denunciation, in in¬ 
citements to resistance, and in frothy declamation; but, in all the slave states 
except these three, there w'ere various opinions expressed; the situation was 
discussed with a greater or less degree of calmness; and the weight of pub¬ 
lic opinion, as shown both by public meetings and the press, was largely and 
decidedly against any violent and unprovoked opposition to the proper re¬ 
sults of a constitutionally conducted election. Thus, although Governor 
Wise, the previous governor of the State of Virginia, had declared before the 
election that, if Mr. Lincoln were chosen, he “ would not remain in the Union 
one hour,” and although some Virginia minute-men at once offered their 
services to South Carolina, a large meeting was held in Rockbridge County, 
in the centre of the state—a county containing a large number o 'slaves, and 
where is the Virginia Military School, and a college endowed b Washing¬ 
ton—at which resolutions were unanimously adopted denying that “Vir¬ 
ginia is so hitched to the Southern states that they can drag her into a com¬ 
mon destiny ;” asserting that “ nine tenths of the people are opposed to re¬ 
sisting the general government so long as it is administered in conformity 
with the Constitution ;” and also that “Virginia owes no duty to the South.” 
These declarations are of value as indications of the state of feeling in cen¬ 
tral and eastern slaveholding Virginia. The vast division of the state which 
lay west of the Shenandoah Valley, containing one quarter of its inhabitants, 
one third of its agricultural wealth, and its chief commercial town, was un¬ 
conditionally and heartily devoted to the Union. Like demonstrations were 
made in Maryland, in North Carolina, in Tennessee, Kentucky, and in Ala¬ 
bama. Thus divided were the people of the slave states upon the issue, as 
it was at first presented; the great majority being directly opposed to an "at¬ 
tempt to break up the government because of the constitutional election of 
a president who not only had made no war upon their interests, but who, 
for four months, would have no more power to do so tnan the humblest of 
his fellow-citizens. It seemed for a day or two—for then days were count¬ 
ed—as if South Carolina would be left to herself, or perhaps to the company 
of Georgia. Nevertheless, she and those whom she had infected with her 
poison kept up their rebellious agitation, availing themselves of the pettiest 
means to foment an anti-Union feeling where none existed, and to magnify 
that which did exist. So, some foolish, loose-tongued, if not loose-lived, med¬ 
ical students in New York, having met and resolved to “ withdraw their pat¬ 
ronage from Northern institutions” and to leave the city for their home's, 
much was made of this silly proceeding. All this and much more like it 
had happened within a week of the election, and on the 12th of November, 
only six days after that event, Lawrence M. Keitt, member of the H »use for 
South Carolina—he who had stood by pistol in hand while his colleague beat 
Senator Sumner senseless in the Senate-chamber—openly declared in a pub¬ 
lic speech at Washington, that President Buchanan “ was pledged ' seces¬ 
sion, and would be held to it,” and that “South Carolina would sh: ••_-r the 
accursed Union;” adding, in that blind, bombastic language, which j ditical 
speakers and writers of his stamp so much affect, that, “ if she coulu \ot ac¬ 
complish it otherwise, she would throw her arms round the pillars of the 
Constitution, and involve all the states in a common ruin.” This o^clara- 
tion of the complicity of President Buchanan in the schemes of the disunion¬ 
ists, which, it will be remembered, had also been made by his own Secretary 
of the Treasury, furnishes a clew to their precipitate action, which subsequent 
events will enable us to follow out to a conclusion shameful to the nation, 
and deeply dishonorable to all who were involved in it. 

The effect of this single week upon the country was itself a disaster. 
Trade was seriously disturbed: stocks fell rapidly; foreign and domestic ex¬ 
changes were embarrassed. The payment of debts to creditors in the free 
states was very generally refused in South Carolina and in Georgia, on the 
ground that they were due to men who might prove enemies. Neverthe¬ 
less, the banks of those states drew on New York and Boston, and had their 
drafts honored in specie, although their own suspension of payment was 
daily expected. The government was powerless for the time. Congress 
was not in session; and therefore the President could not declare the policy 
of his administration during the remainder of its existence, which, brief 
though it was, was big with woe to the nation—to the world. Nothing had 
been done, even in South Carolina, which required executive interference 
or even furnished occasion for a proclamation. The agitation of any sub 
ject, however dangerous, he had neither the right nor the power to restrain, 
and thus far only agitation had been attempted. Had he desired to strength¬ 
en the garrisons of the military posts in the most disturbed districts, he could 
not have done so; for the army was so small, and had been so scattered, 
that he could not have concentrated a sufficient force in time to be of any 
service. The navy was equally out of his reach. He was embarrassed, 
also, by the fact that not only had no overt act been committed, but no au¬ 
thoritative revolutionary declaration had been made; there was only much 
excitement every where, and fierce agitation in some quarters. But the de¬ 
termination of the agitators was clearly seen; and it was seen, too, that, in¬ 
stead of attempting to attain their end by a convention of the people of the 
United States, which, by amending the Constitution or abrogating it, could 


4 The arms of South Carolina are a palmetto-tree. 












































































































24 


INTRODUCTION. 


1860. 


have permitted the peaceable withdrawal of certain states, or have resolved 
the republic again into its elements, they were determined to set the Consti¬ 
tution at naught by the mere exercise of their own will, and thus force the 
alternative of resistance to their action, or the humiliation, and, in fact, the 
extinction of the national government. Gloomy forebodings filled the pub¬ 
lic mind, and a financial panic fell upon the whole country. 

Yet it can not be too clearly or too constantly borne in mind by those who 
would justly appreciate the manner in 'which the rebellion was brought 
about, that thus far South Carolina was the only state in which the move¬ 
ment for secession was so general as to seem virtually unanimous. Even in 
Georgia many meetings were held to denounce the leaders of the movement 
for secession, although in the Legislature resolutions were introduced and 
ordered to be printed, which demanded that, as the Stafes of Massachusetts, 
Vermont, Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Michigan, Wiscon¬ 
sin, and Pennsylvania had “ nullified the Constitution,” they should be re¬ 
garded as no longer constituent parts of the United States of America, and 
that their votes in the electoral college should be thrown out; and instructing 
the members of Congress for Georgia, if this were not done, to resign their 
seats. This those members were ready and anxious enough to do; for at the 
head of the agitators of disunion were Alfred Iverson and Robert Toombs, 
United States Senators from Georgia, the former of whom had not hesi¬ 
tated to suggest, under his own signature, the outlawing and killing of any 
man who should accept office under Mr. Lincoln. Yet on the 4th of Novem¬ 
ber, Alexander H. Stephens, a man whose integrity and ability had justly 
won him the first place among the political leaders of Georgia, which he had 
long represented in the Congress of the United States, addressed, by formal 
invitation, a large concourse in the State Hall of Representatives at Milledge- 
ville on the condition of the country, and took ground, without hesitation or 
qualification, not only against secession, but against the right to secede under 
the circumstances. Upon this, the cardinal, in fact, the only point of the 
issue then presented, he said: “The first question that presents itself is, Shall 
the people of the South secede from the Union in consequence of the elec¬ 
tion of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency of the United States? My country¬ 
men, I tell you frankly, candidly, and earnestly that I do not think that they 
ought. In my judgment, the election of no man, constitutionally chosen to 
that high office, is sufficient cause for any state to separate from the Union. 
It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the Constitution of the 
country. To make a point of resistance to the government, to withdraw 
from it because a man has been constitutionally elected, puts us in the 
wrong.” 5 A slaveholder, an unqualifying advocate of slavery, a politician 

* Speech of A. H. Stephens , delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives of Georgia, 

Nov. 14, 1860. 

Fellow-Citizens, —I appear before you to-night at the request of members of the Legislature 
and others to speak of matters of the deepest interest that can possibly concern us all of an earth¬ 
ly character. There is nothing—no question or subject connected with this life—that concerns a 
free people so intimately as that of the government under which they live. We are now, indeed, 
surrounded by evils. Never, since I entered upon the public stage, has the country been so en¬ 
vironed with difficulties and dangers that threatened the public peace and the very existence of 
society as now. I do not now appear before you at my own instance. It is not to gratify desire 
of mv own that I am here. Had I consulted my own ease and pleasure, I should not be before 
you; but, believing that it is the duty of every good citizen to give his counsels and views when¬ 
ever the country is in danger, as to the best policy to be pursued, I am here. For these reasons, 
and these only, do I bespeak a calm, patient, and attentive hearing. 

My object is not to stir up strife, but to allay it; not to appeal to your passions, but to your 
reason. Good governments can never be built up or sustained by the impulse of passion. I wish 
to address myself to your good sense, to your good judgment; and if, after hearing, you disagree, 
let us agree to disagree, and part as we met, friends. We all have the same object, the same in¬ 
terest. That people should disagree in republican governments upon questions of public policy 
is natural. That men should disagree upon all matters connected with human investigation, 
whether relating to science or human conduct, is natural. Hence, in free governments, parties 
will arise. But a free people should express their different opinions with liberality and charity, 
with no acrimony toward those of their fellows, when honestly and sincerely given. These are 
my feelings to-night. 

Let us, therefore, reasoft together. It is not my purpose to say aught to wound the feelings of 
any individual who may be present; and if, in the ardency with which I shall express my opin¬ 
ions, I shall say any thing which may be deemed too strong, let it be set down to the zeal with 
which I advocate my own convictions. There is with me no intention to irritate or offend. 

The first question’that presents itself is. Shall the people of the South secede from the Union in 
consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency of the United States? My country¬ 
men, / tell you frankly , candidly , and earnestly that I do not think that they ought. In my judgment, 
the election of no man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any state 
to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the Constitution 
of the country. To make a point of resistance to the government, to withdraw from it because a 
man has been constitutionally elected, puts ns in the wrong. We are pledged to maintain the 
Constitution. Many of us have sworn to support it. Can we, therefore, for the mere election of 
a man to the presidency, and that, too, in accordance with the prescribed forms of the Constitu¬ 
tion, make a point of resistance to the government without becoming the breakers of that sacred 
instrument ourselves, withdraw ourselves from it? Would we not be in the wrong? Whatever 
fate is to befall this country, let it never be laid to the charge of the people of the South, and es¬ 
pecially to the people of Georgia, that we were untrue to our national engagements. Let the 
fault and the wrong rest upon others. If all our hopes are to be blasted, if the republic is to go 
down, let us be found to the last moment standing on the deck, with the Constitution of the 
United States waving over our heads. (Applause.) Let the fanatics of the North break the Con¬ 
stitution, if such is their fell purpose. Let the responsibility be upon them. I shall speak pres¬ 
ently more of their acts; but let not the South, let us not be the ones to commit the aggression. 
We went into the election with this people. The result was different from what we wished ; but 
the election has been constitutionally held. Were we to make a point of resistance to the govern¬ 
ment, and go out of the Union on that account, the record would be made up hereafter against us. 

But it is said Mr. Lincoln’s policy and principles are against the Constitution, and that, if he 
carries them out, it will be destructive of our rights. Let us not anticipate a threatened evil. If 
he violates the Constitution, then will come our time to act. Do not let us break it because, for¬ 
sooth, he may. If he does, tjiat is the time for us to strike. (Applause.) I think it would be 
injudicious and unwise to do this sooner. I do not anticipate that Mr. Lincoln will do any thing 
to jeopard our safety or security, whatever may be his spirit to do it; for he is bound by the con¬ 
stitutional checks which arc thrown around him, which at this time renders him powerless to do 
any great mischief. This shows the wisdom of our system. The President of the United States 
is no emperor, no dictator; he is clothed with no absolute power. He can do nothing unless he 
is backed by power in Congress. The House of Representatives is largely in the majority against 
him. 

In the Senate he will also be powerless. There will be a majority of four against him. This, 
after the loss of Bigler, Fitch, and others, by the unfortunate dissensions of the National Demo¬ 
cratic party in their states. Mr. Lincoln can not appoint an officer without the consent of the 
Senate; he can not form a cabinet without the same consent. He will be in the condition of 
Georg-e III. (the embodiment of Toryism), who had to ask the Whigs to appoint his ministers, and 
was compelled to receive a cabinet utterly opposed to his views; and so Mr. Lincoln will be com¬ 
pelled to ask of the Senate to choose for him a cabinet, if the democracy of that body choose to 
put him on such terms. He will be compelled to do this or let the government stop, if the Na¬ 
tional Democratic men—for that is their name at the North—the conservative men in the Senate, 


of long experience and continued success, his estimate of the causes of the 
secession movement are of the highest significance and of the greatest weight; 



should so determine. Then, how can Mr. Lincoln obtain a cabinet which would aid him, or al¬ 
low him to violate the Constitution ? 

Why then, I say, should we disrupt the ties of this Union when his hands are tied, when he can 
do nothing against us? I have heard it mooted that no man in the State of Georgia, who is true 
to her interests, could hold office under Mr. Lincoln. But, I ask, who appoints to office? Not 
the President alone; the Senate has to concur. No man can be appointed without the consent 
of the Senate. Should any man then refuse to hold office that was given to him by a Democratic 
Senate ? [Mr. Toombs interrupted, and said, if the Senate was Democratic, it was for Mr. Breck¬ 
inridge.] Well, then, continued Mr. S., I apprehend no man could be justly considered untrue to 
the interests of Georgia, or incur any disgrace, if the interests of Georgia required it, to hold an 
office which a Breckinridge Senate had given him, even though Mr. Lincoln should be President. 
(Prolonged applause, mingled with interruptions ) 

I trust, my countrymen, you will be still and silent. I am addressing your good sense. I am 
giving you my views in a calm and dispassionate manner, and if any of you differ with me, you 
can, on any other occasion, give your views as I am doing now, and let reason and true patriotism 
decide between us. In my judgment, I say, under such circumstances, there would be no possible 
disgrace for a Southern man to hold office. No man will be suffered to be appointed, I have no 
doubt, who is not true to the Constitution, if Southern senators are true to their trusts, as I can 
not permit myself to doubt that they will be. 

My honorable friend who addressed you last night (Mr. Toombs), and to whom I listened with 
the profoundest attention, asks if we would submit to Black Republican rule. I say to you and 
to him, as a Georgian, I never would submit to any Black Republican aggression upon our consti¬ 
tutional rights. I will never consent myself, as much as I admire this Union for the glories of the 
past, or the blessings of the present, as much as it has done for the people of all these states, as 
much as it has done for civilization, as much as the hopes of the world hang upon it, I would 
never submit to aggression upon my rights to maintain it longer; and if they can not be main¬ 
tained in the Union, standing on the Georgia Platform, where I have stood from the time of its 
adoption, I would be in favor of disrupting every tie which binds the states together. 

I will have equality for Georgia and for the citizens of Georgia in this Union, or I will look for 
new safeguards elsewhere. This is my position. The only question now is, Can they be secured 
in the Union? That is what I am counseling with you to-night about. Can it be secured? In 
my judgment, it may be, but it may not be; but let us do all we can, so that in the future, if the 
worst come, it may never be said we were negligent in doing our duty to the last. 

My countrymen, I am not of those who believe this Union has been a curse up to this time. 
True men, men of integrity, entertain different views from me on this subject. I do not question 
their right to do so, I would not impugn their motives in so doing. Nor will I undertake to say 
that this government of our fathers is perfect. There is nothing perfect in this world of a human 
origin — nothing connected with human nature, from man himself to any of his works. You 
may select the wisest and best men for your judges, and yet how many defects are there in the 
administration of justice? You may select the wisest and best men for your legislators, and yet 
how many defects are apparent in your laws? And it is so in our government. 

But that this government of our fathers, with all its defects, comes nearer the objects of all good 
governments than any other on the face of the earth, is my settled conviction. Contrast it now 
with any on the face of the earth. [England, said Mr. Toombs ] England, my friend says. 
Well, that is the next best, I grant; but I think we have improved upon England. Statesmen 
tried their apprentice hand on the government of England, and then ours was made. Ours sprung 
from that, avoiding many of its defects, taking most of the good and leaving out many of its er¬ 
rors, and from the whole constructing and building up this model republic, the best which the his¬ 
tory of the world gives any account of. 

Compare, my friends, this government with that of Spain, Mexico, the South American repub¬ 
lics, Germany, Ireland—are there any sons of that down-trodden nation here to-night?—Prussia, 
or, if you travel farther East, to Turkey or China. Where will you go, following the sun in its 
circuit round our globe, to find a government that better protects the liberties of its people, and 
secures to them the blessings we enjoy? (Applause.) I think that one of the evils that beset us 
is a surfeit of liberty, an exuberance of the priceless blessings for w hich we are ungrateful. We 
listened to my honorable friend who addressed you last night (Mr. Toombs) as he recounted the 
evils of this government. 

The first was the fishing bounties, paid mostly to the sailors of New England. Our friend 
stated that forty-eight years of our government was under the administration of Southern presi¬ 
dents. Well, these fishing bounties began under the rule of a Southern president, I believe. No 
one of them, during the whole forty-eight years, ever set his administration against the principle 
or policy of them. It is not for me to say whether it was a wise policy in the beginning; it prob¬ 
ably was not, and I have nothing to say in its defense. But the reason given for it was to encour¬ 
age our young men to go to sea and learn to manage ships. We had at the time but a small navy. 
It was thought best to encourage a class of our people to become acquainted with seafaring life, 
to become sailors to man our naval ships. It requires practice to walk the deck of a ship, to pull 
the ropes, to furl the sails, to go aloft, to climb the mast; and it was thought, by offering this 
bounty, a nursery might be formed in which young men would become perfected in these arts, 
and it applied to one section of the country as well as to any other. 























































































































































26 


INTRODUCTION. 


[1860. 


and upon this subject be said: “Some of our public men have failed in their 
aspirations; that is true, and from that comes a great part of our troubles.” 
The feeling of his audience may be gathered from the fact that this state¬ 
ment was received with prolonged applause. Yet in less than three months 
from that night a Georgia Convention had passed an ordinance of secession, 
and Mr. Stephens himself was vice-president of the provisional government 
set up by the insurgents. Some notion of the sort of influence which was 
brought to bear during that interval upon him and others like minded may 
be formed from the fact that, during this long, carefully considered, and sol¬ 
emnly uttered speech, he was constantly interrupted by Mr. Toombs, in a 
tone of sneering menace, on one occasion for the purpose of objecting to Mr. 
Stephens’s suggestion that nothing should be done by Georgia without sub¬ 
mitting the great question of the day to a convention of the people 1 
The persistency and precipitancy of South Carolina offended the border 
states. They even resented it as a wrong done to the common cause. They 
claimed a right to be consulted upon a question of such stupendous import¬ 
ance as the severance of the republic for the cause of slavery. The Vir¬ 


The result of this was, that in the war of 1812, our sailors, many of whom came from this nur¬ 
sery, were equal to any that England brought against us. At any rate, no small part of the glo¬ 
ries of that war were gained bv the veteran tars of America, and the object of these bounties was 
to foster that branch of the national defense. My opinion is that, whatever may have been the 
reason at first, this bounty ought to be discontinued—the reason for it at first no longer exists. A 
bill for this object did pass the Senate the last Congress I was in, to which my honorable friend 
contributed greatly, but it was not reached in the House of Representatives. 1 trust that he will 
yet see that he may with honor continue his connection with the government, and that his elo¬ 
quence, unrivaled in the Senate, may hereafter, as heretofore, be displayed in having this bounty, 
so obnoxious to him, repealed and wiped off from the statute-book. 

The next evil that my friend complained of was the tariff. Well, let us look at that for a mo¬ 
ment. About the time I commenced noticing public matters, this question was agitating the 
country almost as fearfully ns the slave question now is. In 1832, when I was in college, South 
Carolina was ready to nullify or secede from the Union on this account. And what have we seen ? 
The tariff no longer distracts the public councils. Reason has triumphed! The present tariff was 
voted for by Massachusetts and South Carolina. The lion and the lamb lav down together—every 
man in the Senate and House from Massachusetts and South Carolina, I think, voted for it, as did 
mv honorable friend himself. And if it be true, to use the figure of speech of my honorable 
friend, that every man in the North that works in iron, and brass, and wood has his muscle 
strengthened by the protection of the government, that stimulant was given by his vote, and, I be¬ 
lieve, every other Southern man. So we ought not to complain of that. 

Mr. Toombs. The tariff assessed the duties. 

Mr. Stephens. Yes, and Massachusetts with unanimity voted with the South to lessen them, and 
they were made just as low as Southern men asked them to be, and that is the rates they are now 
at. If reason and argument, with experience, produced such changes in the sentiments of Massa¬ 
chusetts from 1832 to 1857, on the subject of the tariff, may not like changes be effected there by 
the same means—reason and argument, and appeals to patriotism on the present vexed question ? 
and who can say that by 1875 or 1890 Massachusetts may not vote with South Carolina and 
Georgia upon all those questions that now distract the country, and threaten its peace and exist¬ 
ence? I believe in the power and efficiency of truth, in the omnipotence of truth, and its ultimate 
triumph when properly wielded. (Applause.) 

Another matter of grievance alluded to by my honorable friend was the navigation laws. This 
policy was also commenced under the administration of one of these Southern presidents who 
ruled so well, and has been continued through all of them since. The gentleman’s views of the 
policy of these laws and my own do not disagree. We occupied the same ground in relation to 
them in Congress. It is not my purpose to defend them now; but it is proper to state some 
matters connected with their origin. 

One of the objects was to build up a commercial American marine by giving American bottoms 
the exclusive carrying trade between our own ports. This is a great arm of national power. 
This object was accomplished. We have now an amount of shipping, not only coastwise, but to 
foreign countries, which puts us in the front rank of the nations of the world. England can no 
longer be styled the Mistress of the Seas. What American is not proud of the result? Whether 
those laws should be continued is another question. But one thing is certain: no president, 
Northern or Southern, has ever yet recommended their repeal. And my friend’s efforts to get 
them repealed were met with hut little favor, North or South. 

These, then, were the true main grievances or grounds of complaint against the general system 
of our government and its workings—I mean the administration of the federal government. As 
to the acts of the federal states, I shall speak presently; but these three were the main ones used 
against the common head. Now, suppose it be admitted that all of these are evils in the system, 
do they overbalance and outweigh the advantages and great good which this same government 
affords in a thousand innumerable ways that can not be estimated ? Have we not at the South, 
as well as the North, grown great, prosperous, and happy under its operation? Has any part of 
the world ever shown such rapid progress in the development of wealth, and all the material re¬ 
sources of national power and greatness, as the Southern states have under the general govern¬ 
ment, notwithstanding all its defects? 

Mr. Toombs. In spite of it. 

Mr. Stephens. My honorable friend says we have, in spite of the general government; that 
without it I suppose he thinks we might have done as well, or perhaps better, than we have done 
this in spite of it. That may be, and it may not be; but the great fact that we have grown great 
and powerful under the government as it exists, there is no conjecture or speculation about that; 
it stands out bold, high, and prominent, like your Stone Mountain, to which the gentleman alluded 
in illustrating home facts in his record—this great fact of our unrivaled prosperity in the Union 
as it is admitted; whether all this is in spite of the government—whether we of the South would 
have been better off without the government—is, to say the least, problematical. On the one side 
we can only put the fact against speculation and conjecture on the other. But even as a question 
of speculation I differ with my distinguished friend. 

What we would have lost in border wars without the Union, or w hat we have gained simply by 
the peace it has secured, no estimate can be made of. Our foreign trade, which is the foundation 
of ail our prosperity, has the protection of the navy, which drove the pirates from the waters near 
our coast, where they had been buccaneering for centuries before, and might have been still had 
it not been for the American navy, unde the command of such spirits as Commodore Porter. 
Now that the coast is clear, that our commerce flows freely outwardly, we can not well estimate 
how it would have been under other circumstances. The influence of the government on us is 
like that of the atmosphere around us. Its benefits arc so silent and unseen that they are seldom 
thought of or appreciated. 

We seldom think of the single element of oxygen in the air we breathe, and yet let this simple, 
unseen, and unfelt agent be withdrawn—this life-giving clement be taken away from this all-per¬ 
vading fluid around us, and what instant and appalling changes would take place in all organic 
creation! 

It may be that we are all that we are in “spite of the general government,’* but it may be that 
without it we should have been far different from what we are now. It is true there is no equal 
part of the earth with natural resources superior perhaps to ours. That portion of this country 
known as the .Southern states, stretching from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande, is fully equal 
to the picture drawn by the honorable and eloquent senator last night, in all natural capacities. 
But how many ages and centuries passed before these capacities were developed to reach this ad¬ 
vanced age of civilization ? There these same hills, rich in ore, same rivers, same valleys and 
plains, are as they have been since they came from the hand of the Creator; uneducated and un¬ 
civilized man roamed over them, for how long no history informs us. 

It was only under our institutions that they could be developed. Their development is the re¬ 
sult of the enterprise of our people under operations of the government and institutions under 
which we have lived. Even our people without these never would have done it. The organiza¬ 
tion of society has much to do with the development of the natural resources of any country or 
any land. The institutions of a people, political and moral, are the matrix in whieh the germ 
of their organic stmeture quickens into life—takes root and develops in form, nature, and char¬ 
acter. Our institutions constitute the basis, the matrix, from which spring all our characteristics 
of development and greatness. Look at Greece. There is the same fertile soil, the same blue 
sky, the same inlets and harbors, the same ^Egean, the same Olympus; there is the same land 
where Homer sung, where Pericles spoke; it is in nature the same old Greece, but it is living 
Greece no more. (Applause.) 

Descendants of the same people inhabit the country; yet what is the reason of this mighty dif¬ 
ference? In the midst of present degradation we see the glorious fragments of ancient works of 
art—temples with ornaments and inscriptions that excite wonder and admiration—the remains 


ginians proposed to South Carolina a convention of the slave states; but 
this South Carolina, with flippant haughtiness, refused to entertain, on the 
ground that Virginia was “completely demoralized” because she had “placed 
the Union above the rights and institutions of the South.” The truth was, 
that the Virginia leaders knew that it was the purpose of South Carolina 
and Georgia to open the slave-trade; and to this they were opposed, because 
the chief wealth of the Virginia planters was in the slaves which they bred. 
This the South Carolina leaders, wise in their generation, saw at once, and 
used now and afterward to their advantage. On the 26th of November the 
Legislature of South Carolina met at Columbia. The governor (Gist), in his 
message, took ground in favor of immediate state action, declared his belief 
that Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas would not 
hesitate to follow South Carolina, which, he said, would be “ wanting in self- 
respect to entertain propositions looking to a continuance of the Union.” It 
was determined that the delegates to the House of Representatives should 
go to Washington and resign, but remain there for consultation with other 
Southern members of Congress; and it was confidently announced that the 


of a once high order of civilization which have outlived the language they spoke—upon them^ll 
Ichabod is written—their glory has departed. Why is this so? I answer, their institutions have 
been destroyed. These were but the fruits of their forms of government, the matrix from which 
their grand development sprung ; and when once the institutions of a people have been destroyed, 
there is no earthly power that can bring back the Promethean spark to kindle them here again 
any more than in that ancient land of eloquence, poetry, and song. (Applause.) 

The same may be said of Italy. Where is Rome, once the mistress of the world ? There are 
the same seven hills now, the same soil, the same natural resources; nature is the same, but what 
a ruin of human greatness meets the eye of the traveler throughout the length and breadth of that 
most downtrodden land ! Why have not the people of that Heaven-favored clime the spirit that 
animated their fathers? Why this sad difference ? 

It is the destruction of her institutions that has caused it; and, my countrymen, if we shall in 
an evil hour rashly pull down and destroy those institutions which the patriotic band of our fathers 
labored so long and so hard to build up, and which have done so much for us and the world, who 
can venture the prediction that similar results will not ensue? Let us avoid it if we can. I trust 
the spirit is among us that will enable us to do it. Let us not rashly try the experiment; for if it 
fails, as it did in Greece and Italy, and in the South American republics, and in every other 
place, wherever liberty is once destroyed, it may never be restored to us again. (Applause.) 

There are defects in our government, errors in administration, and shortcomings of many kinds, 
but, in spite of these defects and errors, Georgia has grown to be a great state. Let us pause here 
a moment. In 1850 there was a great crisis, but not so fearful as this, for of all I have ever passed 
through, this is the most perilous, and requires to be met with the greatest calmness and deliber¬ 
ation. 

There were many among us in 1850 zealous to go at once out of the Union, to disrupt every 
tie that binds us together. Now do you believe, had that policy been carried out at that time, 
we would have been the same great people that we are to-day? It may be that we would, but 
have you any assurance of that fact? Would you have made the same advancement, improve¬ 
ment, and progress in all that constitutes material wealth and prosperity that we have? 

I notice in the Comptroller General’s report that the taxable property of Georgia is $070,000,000 
and upward, an amount not far from double that it was in 1850. I* think I may venture to say 
that for the last ten years the material wealth of the people of Georgia has been nearly, if not quite 
doubled. The same may be said of our advance in education, and every thing that marks our 
civilization. Have we any assurance that, had we regarded the earnest but misguided patriotic 
advice, as I think, of some of that day, and disrupted the ties which bind us to the Union, we 
would have advanced as we have? I think not. Well, then, let us be careful now before we at¬ 
tempt any rash experiment of this sort. 1 know that there are friends, whose patriotism I do not 
intend to question, who think this Union a curse, and that we would be better oft* without it. I 
do not so think ; if we can bring about a correction of these evils which threaten—and I am not 
without hope that this may yet be done—this apjieal to go out, with all the provisions for good 
that accompany it, I look upon as a great, and, I fear, a fatal temptation. 

When f look around and sec our prosperity in every thing, agriculture, commerce, art, science, 
and every department of education, physical and mental, as well as moral advancement, and our 
colleges, I think, in the face of such an exhibition, if we can, without the loss of power, or any 
essential right or interest, remain in the Union, it is our duty to ourselves and to posterity to— 
let us not too readily yield to this temptation—do so. Our first parents, the great progenitors of 
the human race, were not without a like temptation when in the garden of Eden. They were led 
to believe that their condition would be bettered—that their eyes would be opened—and that they 
would become as gods. They in an evil hour yielded; instead of becoming gods they only saw 
their own nakedness. 

I look upon this country, with our instit utions, as the Eden of the world, the paradise of the uni¬ 
verse. It may be that out of it we may become greater and more prosperous, but I am candid 
and sincere in telling you that I fear, if we rashly evince passion, and, without sufficient cause, shall 
take that step, that instead of becoming greater or more peaceful, prosperous, and happy—instead 
of becoming gods, we will become demons, ami at no distant day commence cutting one another's 
throats. This is my apprehension. Let us, therefore, whatever we do, meet these difficulties, 
great as they are, like wise and sensible men, and consider them in the light of all the conse¬ 
quences which may attend our action. Let us sec first clearly where the path of duty leads, and 
then we may not fear to tread therein. 

I come now to the main question put to me, and on which my counsel has been asked. That 
is, What the present Legislature should do in view of the dangers that threaten us, and the wrongs 
that have been done us by several of our confederate states in the Union, by-the acts of their 
Legislatures nullifying the Fugitive Slave Law, and in direct disregard of their constitutional obli¬ 
gations? What I shall say will not be in the spirit of dictation. It will be simply my own judg¬ 
ment, for what it is worth. It proceeds from a strong conviction that, according to it, our rights, 
interests, and honor—our present safety and future security, can be maintained without yet look¬ 
ing to the last resort, the “ ultima ratio regum. ” That should not be looked to until all else fails. 
That may come. On this point I am ho|ieful, but not sanguine. But let us use every patriotic 
effort to prevent it while there is ground for hope. 

If any view that I may present, in your judgment, be inconsistent with the best interests of 
Georgia, I ask you, as patriots, not to regard it. After hearing me and others whom you have 
advised with, act in the premises according to your own conviction of duty as patriots. I speak 
now particularly to the members of the Legislature present. There are, as I have said, great dan¬ 
gers ahead. Great dangers may come from the election I have spoken of. If the policy of Mr. 
Lincoln and his Republican aissociates shall be carried out, or attempted to be carried out, no man 
in Georgia will be more willing or ready than myself to defend our rights, interest, and honor at 
every hazard, and to the last extremity. (Applause.) 

What is this policy ? It is, in the first place, to exclude us by an act of Congress from the Ter¬ 
ritories with our slave property. He is for using the power of the general government against the 
extension of our institutions. Our position on this point is, and ought to be, at all hazards, for 
perfect equality between all the states, and the citizens of nil the states, in the Territories, under 
the Constitution of the United States. If Congress should exercise its power against this, then I 
am for standing where Georgia planted herself in 1850. These were plain propositions which 
were then laid down in her celebrated platform as sufficient for the disruption of the Union if the 
occasion should ever come; on these Georgia has declared that she will go out of the Union ; and 
for these she would be justified by the nations of the earth in so doing. 

I say the same: I said it then ; I say it now, if Mr. Lincoln’s policy should be carried out. I 
have told you that I do not think his bare election sufficient cause; but if his policy should be 
carried out in violation of any of the principles set forth in the Georgia Platform, that would be 
such an act of aggression which ought to be met as therein provided for. If his policy shall be 
carried out in repealing or modifying the Fugitive Slave Law so as to weaken its efficacy, Georgia 
has declared that she will in the last resort disrupt the ties of the Union, and I say so too. I stand 
upon the Georgia Platform, and upon every plank ; and say, if those aggressions therein provided 
for take place, I say to you and to the people of Georgia, keep your powder dry, and let your as¬ 
sailants then have lead, if need be. (Applause.) I would wait for an act of aggression. This 
is my position. 

Now upon another point, and that the most difficult, and deserving vour most serious consider¬ 
ation, I will speak. That is the course which this state should pursue toward these Northern 
states, which by their legislative acts have attempted to nullify the Fugitive Slave Law. I know 
that in some of these states their acts pretend to be based upon the principles set forth in the case 
of Ptfloo against Pennsylvania; that decision did proclaim the doctrine that the state officers are 
not bound to carry out the provisions of a law of Congress—that the federal government can not 
impose duties upon state officials; that they must execute their own laws by their own officers. 













I860.] 


INTRODUCTION. 


27 


state would be “out of the Union" by the 18th of December. In all this 
time there not only had not been a single overt act of treason, but the laws 
of the United States had been scrupulously obeyed. 

The temper and the purposes of the radical Abolitionists were now most 
significantly shown by their choice of this time, of all others, for a public 
apotheosis of John Brown. The 3d of December, the day on which Con¬ 
gress was to assemble, was also the anniversary of his death by execution 
of the law; and this occasion was to have been celebrated at the Tremont 
Temple, in Boston, by various exercises, which were to continue morning, 
afternoon, and evening. But the organizers of so flagrant an affront to pub¬ 
lic decency were doomed to disappointment. At the opening of the doors 
there was a small assemblage of negroes and white men, to the latter class 
of which there were soon large additions, among them the Chief of Police, 
with part of his force. Upon an attempt to organize the meeting for the 
purpose for which it was called, groans and hisses broke out all over the 
house, followed by cheers for the Constitution. Mr. Richard S. Fay, an emi¬ 
nent merchant and a strong anti-Abolitionist, was then nominated from the 


And this may be true. But still it is the duty of the states to deliver fugitive slaves, as well as the 
duty of the general government to see that it is done. 

Northern states, on entering into the federal compact, pledged themselves to surrender such 
fugitives; and it is in disregard of their obligations that they have passed laws which even tend 
to hinder or obstruct the fulfillment of that obligation. They have violated their plighted faith; 
what ought we to do in view of this? That is the question. What is to be done ? By the law 
of nations you would have a right to demand the carrying out of this article of agreement, and I 
do not see that it should be otherwise with respect to the states of this Union ; and in case it be 
not done, we would, by these principles, have the right to commit acts of reprisal on these faith¬ 
less governments, and seize upon their property, or that of their citizens wherever found. The 
states of this Union stand upon the same footing with foreign nations in this respect. But by the 
law of nations we are equally bound, before proceeding to violent measures, to set forth our griev¬ 
ances before the offending government, to give them an opportunity to redress the wrong. Has 
our state yet done this? I think not. 

Suppose it were Great Britain that had violated some compact of agreement with the general 
government, what would be first done? In that case our minister would be directed, in the first 
instance, to bring the matter to the attention of that government, or a commissioner be sent to 
that country to open negotiations with her, ask for redress, and it would only be when argument 
and reason had been exhausted that we should take the last resort of nations. That would be 
the course toward a foreign government, and toward a member of tlTis confederacy I would rec¬ 
ommend the same course. 

Let us, therefore, not act hastily in this matter. Let your Committee on the State of the Re¬ 
public make out a bill of grievances; let it be sent by the governor to those faithless states, and 
if reason and argument shall be tried in vain—all shall fail to induce them to return to their con¬ 
stitutional obligations, I would be for retaliatory measures, such as the governor has suggested to 
you. This mode of resistance in the Union is in our power. It might be effectual, and if in the 
last resort, we would be justified in the eyes of nations not only in separating from them, but by 
using force. 

[Some one said the argument was already exhausted.] 

Mr. Stephens continued : Some friend says that the argument is already exhausted. No, my 
friend, it is not. You have never called the attention of the Legislatures of those states to this 
subject, that I am aware of. Nothing has ever been done before this year. The attention of our 
own people has been called to this subject lately. 

Now, then, my recommendation to you would be this: In view of all these questions of diffi¬ 
culty, let a convention of the people of Georgia be called, to which they may be all referred. Let 
the sovereignty of the people speak. Some think that the election of Mr. Lincoln is cause suffi¬ 
cient to dissolve the Union. Some think those other grievances are sufficient to dissolve the same, 
and that the Legislature has the power thus to act, and ought thus to act. I have no hesitancy 
in saying that the Legislature is not the proper body to sever our federal relations, if that neces¬ 
sity should arise. An honorable and distinguished gentleman the other night (Mr.T. R. R. Cobb) 
advised you to take this course—not to wait to hear from the cross-roads and groceries. I say to 
you, you have no power so to act. You must refer this question to the people, and you must wait 
to hear from the men at the cross-roads and even the groceries; for the people in this country, 
whether at the cross-roads or the groceries, whether in cottages or palaces, are all equal, and they 
are the sovereigns in this country. Sovereignty is not in the Legislature. We, the people, are 
the sovereigns. I am one of them, and have a right to be heard, and so has any other citizen of 
the state. You legislators, I speak it respectfully, are but our servants. You are the servants of 
the people, and not their masters. Power resides with the people in this country. 

The great difference between our country and all others, such as France, and England, and Ire¬ 
land, is, that here there is popular sovereignty, while there sovereignty is exercised by kings and 
favored classes. This principle of popular sovereignty, however much derided lately, is the founda¬ 
tion of our institutions. Constitutions are but the channels through which the popular will may 
be expressed. Our Constitution came from the people. They made it, and they alone can right¬ 
fully unmake it. 

Mr. Toombs. I am afraid of conventions. 

Mr. Stephens. I am not afraid of any convention legally chosen by the people. I know no way 
to decide great questions affecting fundamental laws except by representatives of the people. The 
Constitution of the United States was made by the representatives of the people. The Constitu¬ 
tion of the State of Georgia was made by representatives of the people chosen at the ballot-box. 
But do not let the question which comes before the people be put to them in the language of my 
honorable friend who addressed you last night. Will you submit to abolition rule or resist? 

Mr. Toombs. I do not wish the people to be cheated. 

Mr. Stephens. Now, my friends, how are we going to cheat the people by calling on them to 
elect delegates to a convention to decide all these questions without any dictation or direction ? 
Who proposes to cheat the people by letting them speak their own untrammeled views in the 
choice of their ablest and best men, to determine upon all these matters, involving their peace? 

I think the proposition of my honorable friend had a considerable smack of unfairness, not to 
say cheat. He wished to have no convention, but for the Legislature to submit their vote to the 
people—submission to abolition rule or resistance? Now, who in Georgia would vote “submis¬ 
sion to abolition rule?” (Laughter.) 

Is putting such a question to the people to vote on a fair way of getting an expression of the 
popular will on all these questions? I think not. Now, who in Georgia is going to submit to 
abolition rule ? 

Mr. Toombs. The Convention will. 

Mr. Stephens. No, my friend, Georgia will never do it. The Convention will never secede from 
the Georgia Platform. Under that there can be no abolition rule in the general government. I 
am not afraid to trust the people in convention upon this and all questions. Besides, the Legis¬ 
lature were not elected for such a purpose. They came here to do their duty as legislators. They 
have sworn to support the Constitution of the United States. They did not come here to disrupt 
this government. I am, therefore, for submitting all these questions to a convention of the people. 
Submit the question to the people whether they would submit to abolition rule or resist, and then 
let the Legislature act upon that vote? Such a course would be an insult to the people They 
would have to eat their platform, ignore their past history, blot out their records, and take steps 
backward, if they should do this. I have never eaten my record or words, and never will. 

But how will it be under this arrangement if they should vote to resist, and the Legislature 
should reassemble with this vote as their instruction ? Can any man tell what sort of resistance 
will be meant? One man would say secede; another pass retaliatory measures; these arc meas¬ 
ures of resistance against wrong—legitimate and right—and there would be as many different 
ideas as there are members on this floor. Resistance don’t mean secession—that, in no proper 
sense of the term, is resistance. Believing that the times require action, I am for presenting the 
question fairly to the people; for calling together an untrammeled convention, and presenting all 
the questions to them whether they will go out of the Union, or what course of resistance in the 
Union they may think best, and then let the Legislature pet when the people in their majesty are 
heard; and I tell you now, whatever that convention does, I hope and trust our people will abide 
by. I advise the calling of a convention with the earnest desire to preserve the peace and har¬ 
mony of the state. I should dislike, above all things, to see violent mensures adopted, or a dispo¬ 
sition to take the sword in hand, by individuals, without the authority of law. 

My honorable friend said last night, “ I ask you to give me the sword ; for, if you do not give 
it to me. as God lives, I will take it myself.” 

Mr. Toombs. I will. (Applause on the other side.) 

Mr. Stephens. I have no doubt that my honorable friend feels as he says. It is only his excess¬ 
ive ardor that makes him use such an expression; but this will pass off with the excitement of the 


floor as chairman, and elected by acclamation, to the utter astonishment of 
the John Brown people. Resolutions were adopted strongly denouncing 
John Brown, his aiders, abettors, and admirers, and the meeting adjourned. 
The defeated party attempted forcible resistance, but they were ejected by 
the police and the house was closed—proceedings somewhat irregular, it 
must be confessed, but under the circumstances not quite unjustifiable. 
They gathered together again in the evening in the Negro Baptist Church, 
and were protected by the police during their meeting against a large con¬ 
course of exasperated citizens who surrounded the building. 

On the 3d of December Congress assembled at Washington. The attend¬ 
ance of members was unusually large in both houses. In the lower the 
representatives of South Carolina appeared in their places; but in the Sen¬ 
ate-chamber stood two empty chairs, silent witnesses of her refusal to be 
any longer numbered as one of the states of the Union. On the 4th of De¬ 
cember President Buchanan sent his message to Congress. Never was an 
important state paper more eagerly looked for; never did one more entirely 
disappoint all expectations. The President attributed the attitude of the 


hour. When the people in their majesty shall speak, I have no doubt that he will bow to their 
will, whatever it may be, upon the “sober second thought.” (Applause.) 

Should Georgia determine to go out of the Union, I speak for one, though my views might not 
ngree with them, whatever the result may be, I shall bow to the will of her people. Their cause 
is my cause, and their destiny is my destiny; and I trust this will be the ultimate course of all. 
The greatest curse that can befall a free people is civil war. 

But, as I said, let us call a convention of the people; let all these matters be submitted to it; 
and when the will of a majority of the people has thus been expressed, the whole state will pre¬ 
sent one unanimous voice in favor of whatever may be demanded; for I believe in the power of 
the people to govern themselves when wisdom prevails and passion is silent. 

Look at what has already been done by them for their advancement in all that ennobles man. 
There is nothing like it in the history of the world. Look abroad from one extent of the country 
to the other; contemplate our greatness. We are now among the first nations of the earth. 
Shall it be said, then, that our institutions, founded upon principles of self-government, are a 
failure ? 

Thus far it is a noble example, worthy of imitation. The gentleman, Mr. Cobb, the other 
night, said it had proven a failure. A failure in what? In growth? Look at our expanse in 
national power. Look at our population and increase in all that makes a people great. A failure? 
Why, we are the admiration of the civilized world, and present the brightest hopes of mankind. 

Some of our public men have failed in their aspirations; that is true, and from that comes a 
great part of our troubles. (Prolonged applause.) 

No, there is no failure of this government yet. We have made great advancement under the 
Constitution, and I can not but hope that we shall advance higher still. Let us be true to our 
cause. 

Now, when this convention assembles, if it shall be called, as I hope it may, I would say, in my 
judgment, without dictation, for I am conferring with you freely and frankly, and it is thus that 
I give my views, I should take into consideration all those questions which distract the public mind ; 
should view all the grounds of secession so far as the election of Mr. Lincoln is concerned, and I 
have no doubt they would say that the constitutional election of no man is a sufficient cause to 
break up the Union, but that the state should wait until he at least does some unconstitutional act. 

Mr. Toombs. Commit some overt act. 

Mr. Stephens. No, I did not say that. The word overt is a sort of technical term connected 
with treason, which has come to us from the mother country, and it means an open act of rebel¬ 
lion. I do not see how Mr. Lincoln can do this unless he should levy war upon us. 1 do not, 
therefore, use the word overt. I do not intend to wait for that. But I use the word unconstitu¬ 
tional act, which our people understand much better, and which expresses just what I mean. But 
as long as he conforms to the Constitution he should be left to exercise the duties of his office. 

In giving this advice I am but sustaining the Constitution of my country, and I do not there¬ 
by become a Lincoln aid man either (applause), but a Constitutional aid man. But this matter 
the Convention can determine. 

As to the other matter, I think we have a right to pass retaliatory measures, provided they be 
in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and I think they can be made such. 
But whether it w^uld be wise for this Legislature to do this now is the question. To the Conven¬ 
tion, in my judgment, this matter ought to be referred. Before we commit reprisals on New Eng¬ 
land, we should exhaust ever}' means of bringing about a peaceful solution of the question. 

Thus did General Jackson in the case of the French. lie did not recommend reprisals until 
he had treated with France, and got her to promise to make indemnification, and it was only on 
her refusal to pay the money which she had promised that he recommended reprisals. It was aft¬ 
er negotiation had failed. I do think, therefore, that it would be best, before going to extreme 
measures with our confederate states, to make presentation of our demands, to appeal to their rea¬ 
son and judgment to give us our rights. Then, if reason should not triumph, it will be time 
enough to commit reprisals, and we should be justified in the eyes of a civilized world. At least 
let the states know what your grievances are, and if they refuse, as I said, to give us our rights 
under the Constitution of our country, I should be willing, as a last resort, to sever the ties of this 
Union. (Applause.) 

My own opinion is, that if this course be pursued, and they are informed of the consequences of 
refusal, these states will secede; but if they should not, then let the consequences be with them, 
and let the responsibility of the consequences rest upon them. Another thing I would have that 
convention to do—reaffirm the Georgia Platform, with an additional plank in it. Let that plank 
be the fulfillment of the obligation on the part of those states to repeal these obnoxious laws as a 
condition of our remaining in the Union. Give them time to consider it, and 1 would ask all 
states south to do the same thing. 

I am for exhausting all that patriotism can demand before taking the last step. I would in¬ 
vite, therefore, South Carolina to a conference. I would ask the same of all the other Southern 
states, so that if the evil has got beyond our control, which God, in his mercy, grant may not be 
the case, let us not be divided among ourselves—(cheers)—but, if possible, secure the united co¬ 
operation of all the Southern states; and then, in the face of the civilized world, we may justify 
our action; and, with the wrong all on the other side, we can appeal to the God of battles to aid 
us in our cause. (Loud applause.) But let us not do any thing in which any portion of our peo¬ 
ple may charge us with rash or hasty action. It is certainly a matter of great importance to tear 
this government asunder. You were not sent here for that purpose. I would wish the whole 
South to be united if this is to be done; and I believe, if we pursue the policy which I have indi¬ 
cated, this can be effected. 

In this way our sister Southern states can be induced to act with us, and I have but little doubt 
that the states of New York, and Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and the other Western states, will com¬ 
pel their Legislatures to recede from their hostile attitudes, if the others do not. Then, with 
these, we would go on without New England, if she chose to stay out. 

A voice in the assembly. We will kick them out. 

Mr. Stephens. I would not kick them out; but if they chose to stay out they might. I think, 
moreover, that these Northern states, being principally engaged in manufactures, would find that 
they had as much interest in the Union under the Constitution as we, and that they would return 
to their constitutional duty; this would be my hope. If they should not, and if the Middle states 
and Western states do not join us, we should at least have an undivided South. I am, as you 
clearly perceive, for maintaining the Union as it is, if possible. I will exhaust every means thus 
to maintain it with an equality in it. My principles are these: 

First, the maintenance of the honor, the rights, the equality, the security, and the glory of my 
native state in the Union; but if these can not be maintained in the Union, then I am for their 
maintenance, at all hazards, out of it. Next to the honor and glory of Georgia, the land of my 
birth, I hold the honor and glory of our common country. In Savannah I was made to say by 
the reporters, who very often make me say things which I never did, that I was first for the glory 
of the whole country, and next for that of Georgia. 

I said the exact reverse of this. I am proud of her history, of her present standing. I am 
proud even of her motto, which I would have duly respected at the present time by all her sons— 
Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation. I would have her rights and that of the Southern states main¬ 
tained now upon these principles. Her position now is just what it was in 18f>0 with respect to 
the Southern states. Her platform, then, has been adopted by most, if not all the other Southern 
states. Now 1 would add but one additional plank to that platform, which 1 have stated, and one 
which time has shown to be necessary. 

If all this fails, we shall at least have the satisfaction of knowing that we have done our duty, 
and all that patriotism could require. 

Mr. Stephens continued for some time on other matters, which are omitted, and then took his 
seat amid great applause. 


































































































28 


INTRODUCTION. 


slave states to the fear of servile insurrections; when the planters, on the 
contrary, said, and, as it proved, with reason, they had no fears whatever on 
this score. He placed the responsibility for the disturbed state of the coun¬ 
try entirely upon the shoulders of the anti-slavery party in the free states, 
utterly ignoring the aggressions of the slavery propagandists and the radical 
difference between the principles of the slaveholding founders of the repub¬ 
lic and those of which John C. Calhoun was the great exponent; he declared 
that, in his opinion, unless the personal liberty laws of some of the free states 
were repealed the Union could not be preserved; but he passed no censure 
upon the studiously harsh and insulting provisions of the fugitive slave law 
which provoked their passage, but, on the contrary, he recommended the 
incorporation of that law into the Constitution; he denied the right of a 
state to break up the government merely of its own motion, and he admit¬ 
ted that he was bound to execute the laws of the United States throughout 
all the territory of the United States; but he added that neither the Presi¬ 
dent nor Congress had the power to coerce a state, thus passing by the vital 
point that, according to the Constitution, the executive officers of the United 
States had to do, not with states, but with individual citizens of the United 
States. The message, in fact, said to the country, “ First, in this quarrel the 
free states are all wrong and the slave states all right; next, no state has a 
right to secede; but, finally, if any state choose to do so, no one has any 
right to stop her.” The effect of this pitiably shuffling manifesto was to en¬ 
courage the seceders, to irritate the Republicans, and to dishearten the pub¬ 
lic at large. With the message came another document which deepened the 
despondency now fallen upon the country. The report of the Secretary of 
the Treasury showed the public coffers empty, large and pressing liabilities 
to be met, the national credit failing, and the revenue rapidly diminishing. 
All this in the face of a real wealth and prosperity during the previous year, 
indicated by an export trade of $400,000,000, an import of $362,000,000, 
and the more than sufficiency of the customs duties, $60,000,000, for the 
ordinary expenses of government. ]^>r the change the political condition 
of the country was entirely answerable. Wealth was vanishing, prosperity 
was at an end, for national dissolution seemed impending. The events of 
one month had cast over the future an impenetrable gloom. 

The nation fell "into a pitiable condition of uncertain opinion and vacil¬ 
lating action. A similar crisis in the affairs of a country dependent for 
the direction of affairs upon one central government would have brought 
on the inevitable alternative of anarchy or despotism. But this nation 
was saved by the complete sufficiency of its local governments, sustained as 
these were by the intelligence and the integrity of the mass of the people, 
whom they directly represented. Within the limits of each state, the rela¬ 
tions between man and man, and between the individual and society, were 
undisturbed. 

On the 10th of December the House of Representatives appointed a com¬ 
mittee of thirty-three, one from each commonwealth, on the State of the 
Union. What was the state of the Union thus far we have already seen; 
and a mere recital of the principal events of the few days which intervened 
between the appointment of this committee and the nominal severance of 
the Union will give a better idea than can be conveyed by any other means 
of the confusion which prevailed in political affairs and the distracted condi¬ 
tion of the public mind. A report had been circulated at the South that the 
Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, had said that he would employ the United 
States troops to resist any attempt to seize the United States forts in the 
slave states. This rumor that he would perform his sworn duty he hasten¬ 
ed to deny by telegraph, on the very day of the appointment of the commit¬ 
tee on the State of the Union. At this time it was suggested among some 
of the corrupter politicians of the city of New York, that that city, with 
Brooklyn, Long Island, and Staten Island, should secede from the state, and 
form themselves into an independent commonwealth. But as Brooklyn was 
jealous of New York, and deemed that the two places had conflicting inter¬ 
ests, it was feared that, if secession once began, Brooklyn might secede from 
New York; the inconvenience of which, as most of the inhabitants of the 
former were engaged in business in the latter, was so apparent, that the sug¬ 
gestion, after a little newspaper ventilation, vanished into silence. The ex¬ 
citement in Charleston rose apace, and, on the 8th of December, a guard was 
placed over the United States Arsenal at Charleston to prevent the transfer 
of supplies of ammunition to Fort Moultrie, the United States military post 
in that harbor, which was about four miles from the city. On the 10th, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Cobb, resigned his portfolio, giving as his rea¬ 
sons that the honor and safety of his state, Georgia, were involved in the 
consequences of the presidential election; that his duty to her was para¬ 
mount; and that his views made it improper for him to remain any longer 
a member of the cabinet: decorous scruples, the mere assumption of which 
was not common among those who, having like responsibilities, had like de¬ 
signs. On the 12th, Senator Wigfall, of Texas, a man whose extravagance 
and bombast made him laughed at, and whom we shall meet again under 
circumstances both rueful and ludicrous, made a set speech in the Senate- 
chamber, in which he announced that the Union would be dissolved; that 
“ the eight cotton states” would secede; that they would be followed by 
"Virginia, Tennessee, Maryland, and Kentucky; and that then Washington 
would be the seat of government of the new confederation. He also de¬ 
clared that be owed allegiance, not to the United States, but to his own state; 
a declaration afterward repeated in the same body by Senator Mason, of Vir¬ 
ginia, with regard to his relations to his own state. On the 15th it was an¬ 
nounced that General Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, had resigned, because 
of the President’s determination not to re-enforce Fort Moultrie, and of his 
consequent Conviction that the republic was approaching its dissolution. 
General Cass was one of the oldest and most experienced among the promi- 


[1860. 

neDt politicians of the past generation who kept the field, and he had thus 
far been a strong supporter of what was called “ the Southern Rights Party.” 
The resignation of such a man, for such a cause, however honorable to him- 



LEWIS CA88. 


self, was a most depressing occurrence. It made that painfully clear con¬ 
cerning which before there had been little doubt, that the President was 
about to shrink meanly from the responsibility of his office upon a great oc¬ 
casion. Preparations now were heard of from Louisiana to bring about the 
secession of that state. At the North efforts at conciliation began to be made, 
and a repeal of the Personal Liberty bills was freely talked of. On the 15th 
a private meeting was held of the most influential bankers, merchants, man¬ 
ufacturers, lawyers, and other professional men of conservative politics, for 
the purpose of appointing a committee of conference to urge delay upon the 
states about to secede, and to give assurances that any reasonable conces¬ 
sions for the sake of the preservation of the Union would be made. Such a 
position, taken by such men, seems, as we look back upon it, almost abject; 
but, in the excitement and under the feverous apprehension of the time, it 
appeared to most men the mere putting forth of a brotherly hand of depre¬ 
cation. It failed utterly. An announcement that a committee of conference 
would shortly visit Charleston, met with a rebuff, in which cold-blooded ar¬ 
rogance was thinly concealed beneath the forms of courtesy. Judge Ma- 
grath, who spoke for his state, wrote, that nothing could swerve South Car¬ 
olina from the course she had resolved on; adding, “The presence of any 
persons among us, however respectable,'charged with the task of urging 
upon us a change of purpose, would be unprofitable and unpleasant” On 
the 17th, the South Carolina Convention assembled at Columbia, but, in con¬ 
sequence of the epidemic prevalence of the small-pox there, it adjourned the 
next day to Charleston, where it became immediately apparent that its mem¬ 
bers were bent upon ringleading the disunion movement. Throughout the 
state military drill was constantly kept up by all men capable of bearing 
arms. On the 18th, a bill for arming the State of North Carolina passed the 
Senate by a vote of forty-one to three. On the other hand, the repeal of the 
Massachusetts Personal Liberty Law was urged upon the state in an earnest 
manifesto, signed by numbers of its most respected citizens, headed by ex- 
Chief-justice Shaw, Judge Curtis, of the United States Supreme Court, and 
four ex-governors. On the 18th, Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky, one of 
the oldest, ablest, and most esteemed of the slaveholding members of Con¬ 
gress, brought forward a series of resolutions in that body which he and 
many others hoped would be adopted by both parties as a final settlement 
of the controversy. These resolutions, which were known as the Critten¬ 
den Compromise, after a preamble which stated their object to be that the 
sectional differences then distracting the country might be permanently qui¬ 
eted and settled by constitutional provisions, proposed certain amendments 
to the Constitution. These prohibited slavery north of the line of 36° 30' 
north latitude, and admitted it south of that line; they deprived Congress 
of the power either to abolish slavery in places under its jurisdiction in slave 
states, and (except under certain specified conditions) in the District of Co¬ 
lumbia, or to interdict the transportation of slaves from one slave state to 
another; they provided that, in case of resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law, 
and the rescue of a slave, the United States should pay the owner the value 
of the slave, and have a claim upon the county in which the rescue took 
place, which, in its turn, should recover from individuals. These articles, and 
others upon the same subject in the Constitution, were to be declared unal¬ 
terable. Mr. Crittenden’s compromise was not received with favor by the 
extreme members of the party whose prospective advent to power had oc¬ 
casioned its proposal. But, on the 19th, the General Assembly of Virginia 
passed resolutions inviting the various states to send commissioners to Wash¬ 
ington to adjust the sectional differences of the nation, and recommending 
the Crittenden Compromise as the basis of action. This assembly, thus call¬ 
ed together, obtained the name of “ The Peace Congress.” But this effort 
toward the preservation of the Union met with a sudden and severe rebuff; 
for, on the „„„ uay, the South Carolina Convention formally passed an 







I860.] 


INTRODUCTION. 


29 


ordinance of secession by a unanimous vote. 6 That 20th of December, 
1860, was a sad day in the annals of America and of the world—a day full 
of woes and bitter memories—a day on which disappointed politicians, the 
representatives of an arrogant and selfish oligarchy, essayed the destruction 
of the most beneficent government ever established, and vainly strove to 
stem the tide of human progress, which was about to sweep their petty per¬ 
sonal interests and parish politics into oblivion. But the event itself pro¬ 
duced at the moment a comparatively slight impression. Some guns were 
fired and some meetings held in a few towns in the country lying on the 
Gulf of Mexico; but in the slave states north of Charleston, the taking of the 
final plunge by South Carolina created no more excitement than many of 
the minor incidents which had previously occurred in the sad tragedy then 
beginning to be acted. One reason of the apparent apathy with which this 
secession was regarded was, because it was South Carolina, factious, queru¬ 
lous, headstrong, and loud-mouthed, which had passed with words a verbal 
Rubicon ; another was, that, after what the political leaders of the state had 
said and done, the passage of an ordinance of secession was inevitable, unless 
they wished to stand confessed the merest braggarts and boasters. But the 
chief cause was, that the country had been stunned by the suddenness with 
which its national politics had fallen into disorder, and its national govern¬ 
ment had been brought to a dead lock without violence or even the threat 
of violence from any quarter. Its capacity for excitement seemed to be ex¬ 
hausted ; and when that came which had been apprehended from the first, it 
was taken as a thing of course. South Carolina, however, did not treat the 
matter as one of course, but exhibited to the full that sense of the import¬ 
ance of her own acts which had always made her the subject of remark 
among her sister states, especially by those who were as much her superiors 
in power, and wealth, and general culture, as they were her inferiors in pre- 


8ECESSION ORDINANCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 

A* Ordinance to Dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and other States united 
with her under the compact entitled the Constitution of the United States of America. 

We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain 
and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in Convention, on the 
23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United States of 
America was ratified, and also all acts and parts of arts of the General Assembly of this state 
ratifying the amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, and that the union now 
subsisting between South Carolina and other states under the name of the United States of Amer¬ 
ica is hereby dissolved. 

South Carolina's Declaration of Causes. 

The people of the State of South Carolina in Convention assembled, on the 2d day of April, 
A.D. 1852, declared that the frequent violations of the Constitution of the United States bv the 
federal government, and its encroachments upon the reserved rights of the states, fully justified 
this state in their withdrawal from the federal Union; hut, in deference to the opinions and wish¬ 
es of the other slaveholding states, she forbore at that time to exercise this right. Since that 
time these encroachments have continued to increase, and farther forbearance ceases to be a virtue. 

And now the State of South Carolina, having resumed her separate and equal place among na¬ 
tions, deems it due to herself, to the remaining United States of America, and to the nations of 
the world, that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to this act. 

In the year 1765, that portion of the British Empire embracing Great Britain undertook to 
make laws for the government of that portion composed of the thirteen American colonies. A 
struggle for the right of self-government ensued, which resulted, on the 4th of July, 1776, in a 
declaration, by the colonics. “ that they are, and of right ought to be, free and independent 
states; and that, as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude 
peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independ¬ 
ent states may of right do.” 

They farther solemnly declared that whenever any “form of government becomes destructive 
of the ends for which it was established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to 
institute a new government.” Deeming the government of Great Britain to have become de¬ 
structive of these ends, they declared that the colonies “are absolved from all allegiance to the 
British crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, 
and ought to be, totally dissolved.” 

In pursuance of this Declaration of Independence, each of the thirteen states proceeded to ex¬ 
ercise its separate sovereignty ; adopted for itself a Constitution, and appointed officers for the ad¬ 
ministration of government in all its departments — legislative, executive, and judicial. For 
purposes of defense they united their arms and their counsels; and in 1778 they entered into a 
league known as the Articles of Confederation, whereby they agreed to intrust the administration 
of their external relations to a common agent, known as the Congress of the United States, ex¬ 
pressly declaring, in the first article, “that each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde¬ 
pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not, by this Confederation, expressly 
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.” 

Under this confederation the War of the Revolution was carried on; and on the 3d of Sep¬ 
tember, 1783, the contest ended, and a definite treaty was signed by Great Britain, in which she 
acknowledged the independence of the colonies in the following terms: 

“Article 1. His Britannic majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz.: New Hamp¬ 
shire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Geor¬ 
gia, to be free, sovereign, and indefendent states; that he treats with them as such; and, 
for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety, and ter¬ 
ritorial rights of the same, and every part thereof.” 

Thus were established the two great principles asserted by the colonies, namely, the right of a 
state to govern itself, and the right of a people to abolish a government when it becomes destruct¬ 
ive of the ends for which it was instituted. And concurrent with the establishment of these prin¬ 
ciples was the fact that each colony became and was recognized by the mother country as a free, 
sovereign, and independent state. 

In 1787, deputies were appointed by the states to revise the Articles of Confederation; and on 
the 17th of September, 1787, these deputies recommended, for the adoption of the states, the Arti¬ 
cles of Union known ns the Constitution of the United States. 

The parties to whom this Constitution was- submitted were the several sovereign states; they 
were to agree or disagree; and when nine of them agreed, the compact was to take effect among 
those concurring; and the general government, as the common agent, was then to be invested 
with their authority. 

If only nine of the thirteen states had concurred, the other four would have remained as they 
then were—separate sovereign states, independent of any of the provisions of the Constitution. 
In fact, two of the states did not accede to the Constitution until long after it had gone into oper¬ 
ation among the other eleven, and during that interval they each exercised the functions of an 
independent nation. 

By this Constitution certain duties were imposed upon the several states, and the exercise of 
certain of their powers was restrained, which necessarily impelled their continued existence as 
sovereign states. But, to remove all doubt, an amendment was added, which declared that the 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. On the 23d of May, 1788, South Carolina, 
by a Convention of her people, passed an ordinance assenting to this Constitution, and afterward 
altered her own Constitution to conform herself to the obligations she had undertaken. 

Thus was established, by compact between the states, a government with defined objects and 
powers, limited to the express words of the grant. This limitation left the whole remaining mass 
of power subject to the clause reserving it to the states or the people, and rendered unnecessary 
any specification of reserved rights. We hold that the government thus established is subject to 
the two great principles asserted in the Declaration of Independence; and we hold farther, that 
the mode of its formation subjects it to a third fundamental principle, namely, the law of com¬ 
pact. We maintain that in every compact between two or more parties the obligation is mutual; 
that the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a material part of the agreement en¬ 
tirely releases the obligation of the other; and that, where no arbiter is provided, each party is 
remitted to his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its consequences. 


tension. Immediately upon the passage of the Ordinance of Secession, a dec¬ 
laration of the causes which led to it was issued to the world ; 7 an oath of 
supreme allegiance to the state was prescribed for all officials, the first form 
of which having contained the words “exercise my office,” these were alter¬ 
ed, after grave consideration and debate, to “exercise my high office;” and 
commissioners were appointed to proceed to Washington to treat with the 
United States. Immediately, too—most characteristic fact—the newspapers 
of Charleston headed their letters and the extracts from journals which they 
received from the other parts of the country, “Foreign News,” bringing de¬ 
rision upon themselves far and near by this childishness. On the 24th the 
South Carolina delegates withdrew from the House of Representatives, not 
resigning, but sending a letter to the Speaker, in which they informed the 
House that their state had dissolved their connection with the House; and, 
putting their destructive and debasing doctrine in its most offensive form, 
spoke of their fellow-members as those with whom they had been “ associ¬ 
ated in a common agency.” 8 Thus far had South Carolina politicians been 
led to pervert the truth to gain their little ends. Thus did the state which 
was the first, as we have seen, to propose the formation of a national govern¬ 
ment, and whose leading man in the convention which framed the govern¬ 
ment solemnly pronounced the doctrine that each state was separately and 
individually independent a “political heresy,” did not hesitate to declare 
before the world that George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander 
Hamilton, and their peers had thought and toiled, not to bring about a real 
union of the people of the country into one nation, but only to make a bar¬ 
gain or contract between different corporations, in which, for certain consid¬ 
erations, and upon certain conditions, those corporations agreed to submit to 
a general administration of affairs for certain distinctly specified purposes of 

In the present case that fact is established with certainty. We assert that fourteen of the states 
have deliberately refused for years past to fulfill their constitutionaf obligations, and we refer to 
their own statutes for the proof. 

The Constitution of the United States, in its fourth article, provides as follows: 

“ No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, 
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor' 
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” * 
This stipulation was so material to the compact that without it that compact would not have 
been made. The greater number of the contracting parties held slaves, and they had previously 
evinced their estimate of the value of such a stipulation by making it a condition in the ordinance 
for the government of the territory ceded by Virginia, which obligations, and the laws of the gen¬ 
eral government, have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution. The states of Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illi¬ 
nois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa have enacted laws which either nullify the acts of 
Congress, or render useless any attempt to execute them. In many of these states the fugitive is 
discharged from the service of labor claimed, and in none of them has the state government com¬ 
plied with the stipulation made in the Constitution. The State of New Jersey at an early day 
passed a law in conformity with her constitutional obligation ; but the current of anti-slavery 
feeling has led her more recently to enact laws which render inoperative the remedies provided by 
her own laws and by the laws of Congress. In the State of New York even the right of transit 
for a slave has been denied by her tribunals; and the states of Ohio and Iowa have refused to 
surrender to justice fugitives charged with murder, nnd with inciting servile insurrection m the 
State of Virginia. Thus the constitutional compact has been deliberately broken and disregard¬ 
ed by the non-slaveholding states, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released 
from her obligation. 

The ends for which this Constitution was framed are declared by itself to be “ to form a more 
perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, 
promote, the general welfare, nnd secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves nnd our posterity.” 

These ends it endeavored to accomplish by a federal government, in which each state was rec¬ 
ognized as an equal, and had separate control over its own institutions. The right of property in 
slaves was recognized by giving to free persons distinct political rights; by giving them the right 
to represent, and burdening them with direct raxes for three fifths of their slaves; by authorizing 
the importation of slaves for twenty years; and by stipulating for the rendition of fugitives from 
labor. 

We affirm that these ends for which this government was instituted have been defeated, and the 
government itself has been destructive of them by the action of the non-slaveholding states. Those 
states have assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions, nnd have 
denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the states and recognized by the Constitu¬ 
tion ; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted the open es¬ 
tablishment among them of societies whose avowed object is to disturb the peace of and eloin the 
property of the citizens of other states. They have encouraged nnd assisted thousands of our 
slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain have been incited by emissaries, books, and 
pictures to servile insurrection. 

For twenty-five years this agitation has l>cen steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its 
aid the power of the common government. Observing th a forms of the Constitution, a sectional 
party has found within that article establishing the Executive Department the means of subvert¬ 
ing the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, nnd all the 
states north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the 
United States whose opinions and purposes arc hostile to slavery. He is to be intrusted with the 
administration of the common government because he has dec^red that that “ government can 
not endure permanently half slave, half free,” and that the public mind must rest in the belief that 
slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction. 

This sectional combination for the subversion of the Constitution has been aided in some of the 
states by elevating to citizenship persons who, by the supreme law of the land, are incapable of be¬ 
coming citizens; and their votes have been used to inaugurate a new policy, hostile to the South, 
and destructive of its peace and safety. 

On the 4th of March next this party will take possession of the government. It has announced 
that the South shall be excluded from the common territory, that the judicial tribunal shall be 
made sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the 
United States. 

The guarantees of the Constitution will then no longer exist, the equal rights of the states will 
be lost. The slavcholding states will no longer have the power of self-government or self-protec¬ 
tion, and the federal government will have become their enemy. 

Sectional interest and animosity will deepen the irritation; and all hope of remedy is rendered 
vain by the fact that the public opinion at the North has invested a great political error with the 
sanctions of a more erroneous religious belief. 

We, therefore, the people of South Carolina, by our delegates in Convention assembled, appeal, 
ing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared 
that the union heretofore existing between this state nnd the other states of North America is 
dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the 
world ns a separate and independent state, with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract nl. 
lianccs, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of 
right do. 

9 Letter of South Carolina Members of the IJouse of Representatives. 

Sir, —We avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity since the officinl communication of the in¬ 
telligence, of making known to your honorable body that the people of the State of South Caro¬ 
lina. in their sovereign capacity, have resumed the powers heretofore delegated by them to the 
federal government of the United States, and have thereby dissolved our connection with the House 
of Representatives. In taking leave of those with whom we have been associated in a common 
agency, we, as well ns the people of our commonwealth, desire to do so with a feeling of mutual 
regard and respect for each other, cherishing the hope that in our future relations we may better 
enjoy that peace and harmony essential to the happiness of a free and enlightened people. 

John M‘Queen, 

M. L. Bonham, 

W. W. Boyce, 

Dec. 24. J. D. Ashmore. 

I To the Speaker of the House of Repreaentatlvee. 








30 


INTRODUCTION. 


[ 1860 . 


mere material interest—“ a common agency,” in fact, which was to be re¬ 
garded only as the result of a bargain, and be administered as a bargain, 
with this difference, that any party to it might withdraw from it at pleasure, 
without liability to restraint or punishment. They proclaimed that the na¬ 
tional flag had been only a shop-sign, and the American eagle a mere trade¬ 
mark ; the sign and the mark, too, of a firm which was unworthy of credit, 
because any member of it might abscond whenever he pleased, and take 
with him whatever of the assets he could lay his hands upon. Having with¬ 
drawn from this “ common agency,” and set up on her own account as a na¬ 
tion, South Carolina set about preparations to establish foreign relations and 
create a navy. These, however, did not go very far; for, although it seems 
as if the self-assertion of this little commonwealth would have led her so far 
as to assume at once all the style of an independent nation, it began to be 
but too plain that she would not long be left alone. 

At this very time the people of the free states were shocked by the an¬ 
nouncement of the intended immediate removal of seven ty-eight guns of the 
largest calibre (10-inch columbiads) from the Alleghany Arsenal, opposite 
Pittsburg, in Pennsylvania, to Newport, near Galveston Island, Texas, and 
to Ship Island, in the Gulf of Mexico. At those places there were fortifica¬ 
tions which had never yet been mounted; and the placing of these guns in 
them at this time, when they were not, and could not be garrisoned, seemed 
plainly to indicate a purpose that both the guns and the forts should fall into 
the bands of the men who were rapidly driving the whole South into open 
revolt. The officer in command at the arsenal and he who was to superin¬ 
tend the transportation of the guns were from slave states. There was an 
instant determination manifested in Pittsburg and the country round that 
the guns should not be removed; and the exhibition of feeling was so strong 
and so wide-spread that the order for their removal was countermanded. 

This incident was a»fair exponent of the course of the administration and 
the condition of the country. The former was vacillating and faithless, the 
latter distracted and torn by faction. Mr. Buchanan’s weak policy encour¬ 
aged the seceding faction without satisfying them, while it exasperated and 
humiliated all who were faithful to the republic. The seceders of South 
Carolina came to believe, or at least to the bold declaration of a belief, that 
there would be no attempt to defend the government by force of arms 
against destruction. Coercion of “a sovereign body” was pronounced ab¬ 
surd on general principles, and in the present case impossible; and, at the 
same time, the right of any state to break up the Union for any reason, or 
without any reason, and at any time, was asserted in another dogma, that 
“sovereign” parties to a contract are themselves the only judges whether the 
contract is violated and they absolved from it; a declaration which set ut¬ 
terly at naught the prescribed authority of the Supreme Court to decide 
upon the constitutionality of any state or national law, and which thus 
showed the radically destructive purposes of those who avowed it. The 
seceders also looked to the accomplishment of their purposes with impunity, 
by reason of the support, or at least the protection, of a powerful party— 
the well-disciplined rank and file of the pure Democratic party—in the free 
states. And these expectations were not entirely without reason. Many 
men still looked upon secession as a mere political movement, the last, most 
desperate effort of the slavery propaganda to retain its control of the nation¬ 
al government, the culmination of the great game of bluff and brag which 
that party had so successfully played for so many years. This, indeed, was 
doubtless the original purpose of the greater number of those who took part 
in the secession movement. Indeed, they openly avowed among themselves 
that they proposed to secede, not for the purpose of destroying the Union, 
but to force the free states to amend the Constitution in favor of slavery. 9 
Seeing this, and seeing, too, that without the Southern states the Democratic 
party would practically cease to exist, there were quasi-assurances held out 
privately, and even publicly in newspapers, by those who were blindly or 
corruptly committed to the fortunes of that party, that all in the free states 
who voted for other candidates than Mr. Lincoln (a large proportion, as we 
have seen) would support^the slave states in a contest with the national gov¬ 
ernment. On the other hand, the Abolitionists rejoiced at the prospective 
destruction of the government and extinction of the republic, which they 
had openly labored for fifteen years to bring about; 10 and the leading organ 
of the advanced section of the Republican party—the New York Tribune — 
admitted in terms the absolute right of secession claimed by the insurgents. 1 
And, finally, the Southern leaders believed, or professed to their followers 
to believe, that any attempt of the government to maintain its authority 
would be followed by such an utter derangement of trade, manufactures, 


• The commissioners sent by Mississippi to Maryland, and whom Governor Hicks, of the latter 
state, declined receiving, in the course of an address to the citizens of Baltimore, on the evening of 
December 9th, 1860, said : 

“ Secession is not intended to break up the present government, but to perpetuate it. We do 
not propose to go out by way of breaking up or destroying the Union as our fathers gave it to us, 
but we go out for the purpose of getting farther guarantees and security for our rights, not by a 
convention of all the Southern states, nor by Congressional tricks, which have failed in times past, 
and will fail again. But our plan is for the Southern states to withdraw from the Union for 
the present, to allow amendments to the Constitution to be made guaranteeing our just rights; 
and if the Northern states will not make those amendments, by which these rights shall be secured 
to us, then we must secure them the best way we can. This question of slavery must be settled 
now or never. The country has been agitated seriously by it for the past twenty or thirty years. 
It has been a festering sore upon the body politic; and many remedies having failed, we must try 
amputation, to bring it to a healthy 6tate. We musi, have amendments to the Constitution, and 
if we can not get them we must set up for ourselves.” 

10 “ The abolition enterprise was started in 1831. Until 1846 we thought it was possible to kill 
slavery and save the Union. We then said, over the ruins of the American Church and ihe Union 
is the only way to freedom. From *46 to ’61 we preached that doctrine .”—Wendell Phillips's 
Speech at Music Hall, Boston , July 6, 1862. 

1 “Whenever any considerable section of our Union *»hall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall 
resist all coercive measures designed to keep it in.”— N. Y. Tribune , Nov. 9, 1860. 


and all the public relations of life in the free states, as to bring on starva¬ 
tion and anarchy, and thus render the government powerless for offense, 
if not even to defend itself against the insurgent forces. These views were 
in a measure justified by the deplorable condition into which, in a few 
weeks, commercial affairs at the North fell from a state of remarkable and 
soundly-based prosperity. The South owed the North a sum estimated by 
competent persons at three hundred millions of dollars; and, even suppos¬ 
ing that this was one third too large, the consequences of a refusal to pay, 
or even a temporary withholding so vast a sum, must needs be hopeless de¬ 
rangement and sudden ruin. The secessionists from the beginning looked 
only to success, regardless of the nature of the means they used and the con¬ 
sequences of their conduct, to others; and this sum was in a great measure 
withheld, for the double purpose of crippling those to whom it was due, and 
using it to pay the expense of war with them. Collections of debts in slave 
states by creditors in free states became impossible in most cases, and the 
consequence was wide-spread bankruptcy and ruin at the North. The banks 
of the South had been allowed by law to suspend specie payments, and had 
availed themselves of the privilege; and consequently they had been fol¬ 
lowed in this respect by most of the banks at the North. The New En¬ 
gland mills were either closed or running on half time; and throughout the 
North merchants and retail dealers reduced their force of salesmen, and 
manufacturers their force of workmen, or the time for which they employed 
and paid them. Winter and want were coming rapidly upon hundreds of 
thousands of Northern people who had hitherto lived in comfort if not 
in plenty. This was sad enough, but rumor exaggerated it, and designing 
politicians and corrupt journalists magnified and multiplied the exaggera¬ 
tions of rumor. For these reasons the seceders rested in confidence that no 
attempt would be made at coercion (which was the name they gave to the 
use of the power of the government for the maintenance of the integrity of 
the republic), and that they would be able first to defy the authority of the 
national government, and then, if they chose, to usurp it. 9 But in the free 
states there was a steadily growing conviction that there would be a determ¬ 
ined attempt to detach all the Gulf and cotton-growing states from the 
Union permanently, and with this conviction another, that such a severance 
could not be accomplished, or even attempted, peaceably. Why the North 
believed thus few could have told; but the belief pervaded the community 
as latent electricity the air. The explosion seemed impending, and men be¬ 
gan to look the awful probability of civil war in the face. In the President 
no one placed any trust, and Congress seemed incapable to cope with the 
emergency—capable of nothing except vain babbling of compromise. Com¬ 
mittees on the State of the Union and peace conferences of all grades, public 
and private, came together and.poured out a flood of talk upon each other 
and the country, and then rose and separated, no nearer union or wisdom 
than they were before. Men began to doubt, and to have reason to doubt, 
whether there were patriotism, and virtue, and vigor enough in the land to 
make even a respectable attempt to save the republic from disintegration. 
In the midst of all this trouble, a great cabinet scandal broke forth. It was 
found that $870,000 had been fraudulently abstracted from the Indian Trust 
Fund and acceptances substituted, to which the name of the Secretary of 
War (Mr. Floyd, of Virginia) were attached, and for the benefit of parties 
with whom he had intimate relations. The effect of this shameful discov¬ 
ery—made more shameful by the fact that the custodian of the bonds, the 
Secretary of the Interior, Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, was at this very 
time in North Carolina as a commissioner from his state, working for seces¬ 
sion—was to sap still farther the confidence of the nation in its own integrity. 
What could be hoped of the people or the government when the President’s 
very cabinet was thus rotten and honeycombed with corruption ? The only 
gleam of hope was in the fact that the falsehood, the treachery, and the pec¬ 
ulation were without exception on the part of the enemies of the republic. 
And so loyal men here and there began to take heart, and gird themselves 
up for conflict. 


’ Senator Iverson, of Georgia, speaking in his seat on the Sth of December, 1860, said : “ We 
intend, Mr. President, to go out peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must; but I do not believe, 
with the senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Hale), that there is going to be any war. If five or 
eight states go out, they will necessarily draw all the other Southern states after them. That is 
a consequence that nothing can prevent. If five or eight states go out of this Union, I should 
like to see the man who would propose a declaration of war against them, or attempt to force 
them into obedience to the federal government at the point of the bayonet or the sword. If one 
state alone was to go out, unsustained by her sister states, possibly war might ensue, and there 
might be an attempt made to coerce her, and that would give rise to civil war; but, sir, South 
Carolina is not to go out alone. In my opinion, she will be sustained by all her Southern sisters. 
They may not all go out immediately, but they will, in the end, join South Carolina in this im¬ 
portant movement; and we shall, in the next twelve months, have a confederacy of the Southern 
states, and a government inaugurated and in successful operation, which, in my opinion, will be 
a government of the greatest prosperity and power the world has ever seen.” 

The cool defiance which was thus freely given in the halls of the national capital was support¬ 
ed by such declarations as the following in the leading journals of the slave states: 

“The Northern people have an enemy at their own doors who will do our work for us, if we 
are not insane enough to take their myrmidons off their hands. ‘The winter of their discontent’ 
is but beginning to dawn. They have a long, dark winter, of cold and hunger, impending over 
their heads; 'before it is over they will have millions of operatives without work and without 
bread. 

“In all human probability, before another summer melts their ice-bound hills, blood—human 
blood—will have flowed in their streets. When cold and hnnger begin their work, this deluded 
rabble will ask alms at the doors of the rich with pike nnd firebrand in their hands. Our 
Northern enemies will then find that they have business enough to attend to at their own doors, 
without troubling themselves about keeping forts on Southern soil. ‘They have got the wolf by 
the ears,’ and they have a fair prospect of being bit, unless we are charitable enough to take the 
beast off their hands. If the North can furnish bread for its paupers for the next five months, 
well; if not, their rulers will answer for it in blood. It was simply the want of bread that 
brought Louis XVI. to the guillotine ; and New York, as well as Paris’can furnish her Theroigu 
de Maricourt, who may sing her carmaqnole up Broadway with Seward’s head upon a pike. 

“Our Northern enemies are locked up with their million of operatives for the winter, and how 
they are to be kept quiet no man can tell.”— Charleston Courier . 






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FORT SUMTER. 

Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie.—His Character.—Weakness of his Position.—His Instructions. 
—He- occupies Fort Sumter.—Effect of the Movement throughout the Country.—Authorities 
of Charleston seize the Arsenal, Custom-house, and Revenue Cutter.—Insulting Letter of the 
South Carolina Commissioners to President Buchanan.—Defiant Avowal of Secession Princi¬ 
ples and Purposes in Congress.—The Government begins to assert itself.—Sagacity and Pa¬ 
triotism of Lieutenant General Scott and of General Wool.—Investment of Fort Sumter.—Un¬ 
derhand Attempt to supply and re-enforce it.—The “ Star of the West” fire 1 upon by the Rebel 
Batteries.—Major Anderson calls Governor Pickens to Account.—The first Flag of Truce.— 
Efforts of the Insurgent Leaders.—Seizure of Forts and Arsenals throughout the Gulf States. 
—Events in the Border States.—Formal successive Secession of the Gulf States.—Audacity of 
the Insurgents, mild Measures of the Government, and placid Patriotism of the People.—Seizure 
of Arms on their way to Georgia, and Retaliation of the Governor of Georgia.—Resignation of 
Secretary Thompson.—South Carolina demands the Evacuation of Fort Sumter.—Withdrawal 
of Senators of the seceded States from Congress.—General Dix’s spirited Action and Order.— 
Formation of the “Confederate" Provisional Government.—Adoption of a Provisional Consti¬ 
tution, and Election of Officers.—Jefferson Davis, his Character and Career.—Alexander H. 
Stephens.—Opposition to Secession in Slave States.—Treachery of General Twiggs in Texas. 
— Jefferson Davis’s Threat to expel the National Troops in Texas. — Mr. Lincoln declared 
President elect.—Plots against his Life.—Measures taken to discover and defeat them.—Mr. 
Lincoln’s sudden Appearance at Washington.—Effect upon the Public.—Proposed Compro¬ 
mise Constitutional Amendments,—Inauguration of Mr. Lincoln.—His Inaugural Address.— I 


Its Effect upon the Country.—General Beauregard takes Command at Charleston.—Numerous 
Army and Navy Officers resign their Commissions and take Service with the Insurgents. — 
State Sovereignty their alleged Justification.—Pierre Toutant, who and what.—The “Confed¬ 
erate” Commissioners in Washington.—Can Fort Sumter be re-enforced ?—Fort Pickens can.— 
The Expedition of Relief.—Batteries around Fort Sumter.—Notice: “peaceably if we can, 
forcibly if we must.”—Beauregard ordered to demand an Evacuation. — Major Anderson re¬ 
fuses.—Bombardment and Evacuation of the Fort. 

TTTIIILE all hearts were thus filled with anxiety and sad foreboding; 
T V while loyal men saw only that the great, long-dreaded calamity was 
about to fall upon the country—that the struggle for the nation’s life must 
soon begin, and yet did not confess to themselves in what exact form that 
calamity must come, or conjecture where the first throes of that struggle 
would be felt; while even the men who were bent on the destruction of the 
republic, unless they could usurp the control of it in the interests of their 
class, were certain only of their purpose, uncertain as to the way in which 
they should accomplish it; while doubt and undefined dread thus brooded 
over the land, an almost unknown man was about to take a step in the mere 
exercise of ordinary prudence and the faithful performance of a soldier's 
dutv, which decided in an hour the question whether the seceders were to 
accomplish their purpose without resistance, placed at once the relations of 









































































32 


[ 1860 . 



FORT SUMTER. SEEN FROM THE REAR, AT LOW WATER. 


















































































































































































































































































































































































i860.] 


FOK.T SUMTER 


the government and those who defied it upon a war footing, and fixed the 
spot where one party or the other must assert itself by force or be humili¬ 
ated before the world. Robert Anderson, a major of artillery, was in garri¬ 
son at Fort Moultrie as commander of the United States military post of 
Charleston Harbor. He had graduated with honor at West Point in 1825; 
he had served not only with gallantry, but with distinction, in Florida, and 
afterward in the Mexican war, having been severely wounded in the attack 
on El Molino del Rey; he was the author of the text-book of the United 
States army upon artillery service; and yet, so absorbed had Americans of 
this and the last generation been in the arts and employments of peace, so 
regardless of mere military merit, except in a very few eminent cases, that 
out of the professional circle of the army and that of his own friends and 
acquaintances, Major Anderson’s name was rarely heard. But, wherever 
known, it was spoken as that of a man of bravery, sagacity, determined pur¬ 
pose, and umblemished honor. Upon all these points Major Anderson was 
now about to be tested, with the eyes of all nations upon him and the ver¬ 
dict of posterity before him. A native of one slave state, and connected by 
marriage with the people of another, it was hoped on the one side that he 
might betray his trust, and feared on the other that he might at least resign 
it. But hopes and fears alike proved vain. Thoughtless of the world and 
of posterity, regardless of the ties of family and friendship, he kept a single 
eye upon present duty, sought only to absolve himself of the responsibility 
which had been laid upon him, and so won the undying honors which ever 
fall to faith and firmness shown on great occasions. 

When the secession excitement in South Carolina, and particularly in 
Charleston, had reached its height, but ten days before the State Convention 
had taken a final step, he busied himself in strengthening the defenses of 
Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter to the best of his ability with the small force 
under his command. That force, all told, consisted of nine officers, fifty-five 
men (artillerists), fifteen musicians, and thirty laborers—one hundred and 
nine men, of whom only sixty-three were combatants, one of the officers 
being an assistant surgeon. With this little band, among whom all proved 
true, he determined to defend his flag and maintain his post to the last mo¬ 
ment. He began to be watchful of the approaches to Fort Moultrie, which is 
about four miles from Charleston, upon Sullivan’s Island, where, during a 
generation and a half of peace, a village had sprung up around it. After the 
11th of December no one was admitted within the works unless he was known 
to some officer of the garrison. Events justified this precaution; for within 
a few days military organizations were set on foot in Charleston, the almost 
avowed object of which was the occupation of Forts Moultrie, Sumter, and 
Pinckney. On the 19th of this month Mr. Porcher Miles, in the South Caro¬ 
lina State Convention, said that members might allay any fears which they 
might have had on account of the forts in Charleston Harbor, because a con¬ 
versation with the President had convinced him that the post would not be 
re-enforced, and the garrison of Fort Moultrie was “but seventy or eighty 
men,” while Sumter was an “ empty fortress which they might seize and 
control in a single night.” The next day the Ordinance of Secession was 
passed; and on the 21st, as we have already seen, the Charleston newspa¬ 
pers, with childish precipitancy and petulance about trifles, announced occur¬ 
rences in the Northern states under the heading “foreign news.” Childish 
and petulant although this was, it showed Major Anderson very clearly the 
light in which the community which was equipping and drilling troops with¬ 
in sight of his ramparts were determined to regard him—as the officer of a 
power which they defied, and who held a military position upon their soil 
which might be made the base of operations against them. He felt the dan¬ 
ger and the delicacy of his position. On the 24th of December he wrote a 
private letter in which he set forth the precarious circumstances in which 
he was placed: with a garrison of only sixty effective men, in an indifferent 
work, the walls of which were only fourteen feet high, within one hundred 
yards of sand-hills which commanded the position and afforded covers for 
sharp-shooters, and with numerous houses within pistol-shot, he confessed 
that, “ if attacked in force by any one but a simpleton, there is scarce a pos¬ 
sibility of our being able to hold out long enough for our friends to come to 
our succor.” General Scott, too, saw and declared that the fort could be 
taken from Major Anderson by five hundred men in twenty-four hours. 
Meanwhile volunteer troops began to pour into Charleston, and there was 
much discussion in regard to the policy and possibility of seizing all the 
national forts in the harbor; and, in fact, under the circumstances, the oppor¬ 
tunity was too tempting to warrant a belief that it would be long resisted. 
As to all this Major Anderson was well informed, for intercourse between 
the garrison and the city was kept up as usual. Nevertheless, his duty was 
clear, not only from the general nature of his responsibility to the govern¬ 
ment, but from special instructions sent to him by the Secretary of War— 
instructions so manifestly required in the emergency, that even John B. 
Floyd, false to his country and false to his honor, pould not refrain from 
giving them. They were sent to Major Anderson verbally through Assist¬ 
ant Adjutant General Butler, whose written memorandum was afterward 
made public. According to this memorandum, Major Anderson was in¬ 
structed “ carefully to avoid any act which would needlessly provoke ag¬ 
gression,” and on that reason “ not, without necessity, to take up any posi¬ 
tion which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; 
but,” the order continues, “you are to hold possession of the forts in the 
harbor, and if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. 
The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more 
than one of the three forts, but an attack on, or attempt to take possession 
of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then 
put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper 
to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar 


32 

steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hos¬ 
tile act.” 

Christmas day dawned upon Major Anderson under these circumstances 
and bound by these instructions. It may be supposed that he was not in a 
festive mood; but, whatever his apprehensions or his purposes, he kept them 
to himself, and accepted an invitation to dinner in Charleston. Had his 
entertainers known the already settled determination of their gentle, placid 
guest, he would probably never have been allowed to leave the city, cer¬ 
tainly he would have been prevented from returning to his post. They 
parted for the last time as friends that night, which, indeed, was the last 
occasion on which he set foot in that nest of traitors. Lulled into confidence 
by a belief that under no circumstances would the President take any steps 
whatever to assert the authority of the government or protect the national 
honor in South Carolina, and confirmed in this belief by the manner of Ma¬ 
jor Anderson, the Charlestonians went on with their preparations, and await¬ 
ed their own time for effecting their purposes. . Meantime Mr. Robert W. 
Barnwell, Mr. J. H. Adams, and Mr. James L. Orr were sent as commission¬ 
ers from the “sovereign state” of South Carolina, to “treat with the govern¬ 
ment of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light¬ 
houses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, in South Carolina, and 
also for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other 
property held by the government of the United States as agent of the Con¬ 
federated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member,” etc., etc. 
It may be that this commission was appointed with the notion that it could 
be received by the President; it may be that some of those whom it repre¬ 
sented could not perceive the effrontery of sending such a commission to the 
President of the United States, and actually believed that it would be able 
to open some kind of negotiation with the national government. Mavhap 
some citizen of this newly-hatched “sovereignty” saw in his excited imag¬ 
ination the commissioners returning with the deeds of Forts Sumter and 
Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the arsenal and the light-houses, in their pockets, 
given in return for the promises to pay of the treasury of South Carolina. 
But fancies and visions like these, as well as those of a more modest and 
reasonable character, were very suddenly dispelled without the aid of the 
report of the commissioners; for the good people of Charleston, looking 
seaward on the morning of the 27th of December, saw, instead of the United 
States flag flying from the flag-staff of Fort Moultrie, only a cloud of smoke 
rolling upward; and soon the look-outs brought the news that Major Ander¬ 
son had evacuated and dismantled that fortification, and had retired with his 
little command to Fort Sumter. 



KEY OF Tins FOOT MOULTRIE MAGAZINE. MAJOR ANDEBSO.n's CANDLESTICK. 


The news caused great excitement in Charleston. The rebels saw them¬ 
selves at once defied and baffled. They were thousands, and could soon 
make themselves tens of thousands; yet here a band of one hundred men 
had been placed in a position where they could assert, and, for a time at 
least, maintain the authority of the government, and uphold its flag in the 
very harbor of the chief city of the seceding state. Fort Sumter commanded 
the entrance to the port, and, being a very strong work, stood, as it were, 
sentinel over Charleston, and controlled its commercial exits and entrances. 
But this was not the chief reason of the turmoil in the town. The rebels 
were exasperated at finding that they had been outwitted, and that not only 
was the little garrison which they had calculated upon turning out of Fort 
Moultrie, civilly if they could, but forcibly if they must, placed safely beyond 
their reach, but that the empty fortress which they had taken for granted 
that they could seize and control in a single night, was effectually secured 
against all attempts except those of siege, bombardment, or storm by over¬ 
whelming force. 

Major Anderson had kept his secret well, and done his work thoroughly. 
During the day, the wives and children of the troops were sent away from 
the fort, on the plea that, as an attack might be made upon it, their removal 
was necessary. Three small schooners were hired, and the few inhabitants 
of Sullivan’s Island saw them loaded, as they thought, with beds, furniture, 
trunks, and other luggage of that kind. About nine o’clock in the evening, 
the men were ordered to hold themselves in marching order, with knapsacks 
packed, ready to move at a moment’s notice. No one seemed to know the 
reason of the movement, and probably no one but Major Anderson himself 
and his next in command knew their destination. The little garrison was 
paraded, inspected, and then embarked on boats which headed for Fort Sum¬ 
ter. The schooners bad taken, or then took, all the provisions, garrison fur- 

























BNTBY OF MAJOB AKDERSOn'm COMMAND INTO FORT SCMTER ON CURtSTMAB NIGUT, 1S60. 


niture, and munitions of war which could be carried away on such short no¬ 
tice, and with such slender means of transportation—enough to enable four¬ 
score men to sustain and defend themselves in a strong, sea-girt fortress for 
a long time. What could not be carried away was destroyed. Not a keg 
of powder or a cartridge was left in the magazine; the small-arms and mili¬ 
tary supplies of all kinds were removed; the guns were spiked, the gun-car¬ 
riages burned, and the guns thus dismounted ; partly-finished additions and 
alterations of the work were destroyed; the flag-staff was cut down; and 
nothing, in fact, was left unharmed but the round shot which were too heavy 
to carry off, and which the spiking and dismounting of the guns had made 
useless. The dawn saw Major Anderson safely established with his com- 



MAJOB ANDERSON'S QUARTERS AT FOBT BLMTEB. 


mand in Fort Sumter, secure from immediate attack, though Fort Moultrie 
was occupied only by a corporal’s guard, left there to complete the work of 
destruction. lie saw what a responsibility he had assumed, and fully ap¬ 
preciated the delicacy and the importance of the trust committed to him. 
Perhaps, if he could have looked forward for three months, and foreseen all 
the consequences of his act during that period, he would have remained at 
Fort Moultrie until he was summoned to yield by a force too great for him 


to resist, or until he received orders to yield his post. It is well for the 
country, as well as for his own reputation, that he was tempted into no such 
speculations, but did to the best of his ability the duty which lay before 
him. The step which he took proved of more importance to the permanent 
safety of the republic than any other which he could have determined upon, 
had he spent months in deliberation, with the astutest politicians of the coun¬ 
try as his counselors. A devout man, and impressed with the importance 
of his position, he was desirous of awakening in his officers and men the 
same profound sensations which filled his breast. He marked the occupa¬ 
tion of their new position with a little religious ceremony. The flag which 
they were there to defend as a symbol of their nationality and their govern¬ 
ment was to be raised, and Major Anderson determined that he would raise 
it himself; and ask the blessing of Heaven upon their endeavor. So at noon 
of the 27th of December, all under his command, non-combatants as well as 
combatants, were assembled round the flag-staff. Major Anderson, with the 
halyards in his hand, knelt at its foot, and the officers and men, impressed 
with the solemnity of the occasion, needed no orders to assume a reverential 
position as the chaplain stepped forth in the midst and offered up an earnest 
prayer—a prayer, says one who was present, which was “ such an appeal for 
support, encouragement, and mercy as one would make who felt that 1 man’s 
extremity is God’s opportunity.’ ” After he had ceased, and the earnest 
Amen from manly lips had died away in the hollow casemates, the command¬ 
er hauled up the flag, the band saluted it with “Hail Columbia!” the accents 
of supplication gave way to those of enthusiasm, and cheers broke forth 
from the lips of all present—cheers which proved to be not only cheers of 
exultation and confidence, but of defiance; for just then it happened that a 
boat sent down from Charleston to bring up exact reports of the condition 
of affairs at Moultrie and Sumter approached the latter fortress, and saw the 
national standard rise amid the shouts of those who then vowed in their 
hearts that, while in their hands, it should suffer no dishonor, and who 
through four weary watchful months and two dreadful days kept well their 
vow. 

In their rage the Charlestonians denounced the President as false to his 
word and Major Anderson as a wanton provoker of civil war. The accusa¬ 
tion against the President was based on his avowed determination not to re¬ 
enforce the forts, and on a declaration of four of the representatives of South 
Carolina—Messrs. John M‘Queen, M. L. Bonham, W. W. Boyce, and Law¬ 
rence M. Keitt—that it was their “strong conviction that the people of the 
State of South Carolina would not either attack or molest the forts in Charles¬ 
ton Harbor before negotiating for them, provided no re-enforcements were 
sent to them, and their relative military status was not disturbed. This dec¬ 
laration was made, and, at the President’s suggestion, put in writing on the 
9th of December. This mere announcement of intention on the one part and 
declaration of opinion on the other, the seceders in South Carolina and in 
Washington, both in and out of the cabinet, chose to regard as a pledge—an 
obligation binding upon both parties to it. Mr. War Secretary Floyd im¬ 
mediately, on the 27 th of December, formally asserted in the cabinet that “the 
solemn pledges of the government had been violated by Major Anderson,” 
and as formally demanded permission to withdraw the garrison from the 













































































































































































































































































I860.] 


FORT SUMTER. 


35 


harbor of Charleston, as the only alternative by which to vindicate the honor 
of the government and prevent civil war. Yet this very Secretary of War 
had, on the 11th of December, two days after the declaration by the four 
South Carolina delegates, instructed Major Anderson to put his command 
into either of the forts which he deemed would make it most effective in 
case he should have tangible evidence of a design on the part of the South 
Carolinians to proceed to a hostile act, an attempt to take possession of 
either of the forts being especially indicated. 

The effect of Major Anderson’s change of position was even greater 
throughout the country at large than at Charleston. It flashed the gleam 
of arms upon the eager eyes of the people, and men saw suddenly what be¬ 
fore they had only imagined. Those who had felt strongly, and talked earn¬ 
estly of maintaining the national honor and integrity by the sword, had 
thought vaguely, and perhaps doubtfully, upon the mode in which this 
dreadful issue should be brought about. But here it was done without vio¬ 
lence, without proclamation, at a word, and in the simplest manner. Major 
Anderson’s movement placed the Charlestonians in the attitude of open en¬ 
emies of the national government, with whom intercourse was thereafter to 
be upon a war footing. Unless what he had done was disavowed by the 
President, and he was ordered to retire from Charleston Harbor, or at least 
to return to Fort Moultrie, his occupation of Fort Sumter was an official 
declaration to the seceders that they could accomplish even the first of their 
purposes only by proving too strong in arms for the military force of the 
United States. His movement, but not himself, accomplished this. The 
rebels themselves were alone responsible for the grave significance of the 
fact; for, as commandant of the harbor, he might house his garrison in 
whichever of the forts he thought best, and no one, save the head of the 
War Department, have the right to ask a question. If the transfer of 
fourscore men from one fort to another meant war. it acquired that meaning 
only by reason of what 
had been done and plan¬ 
ned in Charleston. So 
the cry of wrath which 
went up from the rebel 
city was answered by a 
voice of admiration, en¬ 
couragement, and, above 
all, of confidence, from al¬ 
most the entire country 
outside of South Carolina. 

Among the very people 
at the North upon whose 
sympathy the seceders 
had most surely counted 
— even in some of the 
very states at the South 
whose fortunes South 
Carolina believed with 
reason to be indissolubly 
linked with hers—the oc¬ 
cupation of Fort Sumter 
was regarded as the most 
prudent and dignified 
course which could have 
been taken under the cir¬ 
cumstances. It touched 
the national honor and 
awoke the national pride 
wherever patriotism was 
superior to local preju¬ 
dices and class interest. 

It brought the conviction 
home to every citizen 
that he had a country 
and a government to 
which, although he him¬ 
self was part of that gov¬ 
ernment, he owed allegi¬ 
ance and support. The 
man who thus impressed 
a nation became the hero 
of the hour. Major An¬ 
derson’s name and his 
praises were upon all lips 
which did not mutter trea¬ 
son. The most influen¬ 
tial journals among those 
which had opposed the 
party whose success was 
made the occasion of the 
rebellion—even those in 
the states south of the Po¬ 
tomac and the Ohio—the 
political leaders of which 
were not already com¬ 
mitted to the conspiracy 
against the republic, vied 
with their late political 


opponents in approbation of the position which Major Anderson had taken, 
and in showing how important it was to the self-respect of the nation, to 
its position before the world, and to its very existence, that he should be 
sustained by the government at Washington. The sensitive test of the 
money-market indicated the general feeling, and the price of stocks went up. 

The pace of treason, rapid before, was quickened by this movement. On 
the 27th troops were ordered out in Charleston; military aid was proffered 
to South Carolina by Georgia and Alabama; and Governor Magoffin, of 
Kentucky, bent upon secession, called an extra session of the Legislature of 
that state. On this day, too, the rebels obtained through treachery the first 
vessel of their navy. The revenue cutter William Aiken was lying in 
Charleston Harbor, under command of Captain N. L. Coste, of the revenue 
service. Two weeks before he had told his second in command, Lieutenant 
Underwood, that he would not serve under Mr. Lincoln as President; and 
that, in case the expected secession of South Carolina took place, he should 
resign and place the cutter in command of Lieutenant Underwood. But, in 
spite of the passage of the Ordinance of Secession, he remained in command, 
and on the afternoon of the 27th he hauled down the United States revenue 
flag, raised the Palmetto standard of revolt, and placed his vessel as well as 
himself at the disposal of the insurgent authorities. His subordinate officers, 
true to their oaths, reported themselves for duty at Washington. This tri¬ 
fling incident is worthy of notice at the beginning of our sad story, as indic¬ 
ative of the violation of individual trust which marked this stage of the in¬ 
surrection. 

On the 28th the authorities of Charleston determined to assert their newly- 
assumed powers to the extent of their ability. They seized the custom¬ 
house, the post-office, and on the 30th the arsenal, and raised the state flag 
upon them, and sent an armed force to occupy Fort Moultrie and Castle 
Pinckney. The few soldiers at each of those fortifications yielded, of course, 

without any resistance, 
and on those walls also 
the palmetto-tree replaced 
the stars and stripes. 

The President having 
refused to withdraw the 
garrison from Charleston 
Harbor, on the 29th the 
Secretary of War, Mr. 
Floyd, resigned his of¬ 
fice, closing his resigna¬ 
tion with these words: 
“I deeply regret that I 
feel myself under the 
necessity of tendering 
to you my resignation 
as Secretary of War, be¬ 
cause lean no longer hold 
it under my convictions 
of patriotism, nor with 
honor, subjected as I am 
to a violation of sol¬ 
emn pledges and plight¬ 
ed faith.” These fair 
phrases sounded well at 
the end of such a letter; 
but the truth was, that, 
in consequence of Mr. 
Floyd’s connection with 
the Indian Trust Fund 
fraud, for which he was 
afterward indicted, the 
President had intimated 
to him, through a distin¬ 
guished statesman, that 
he deemed it improper 
that he should longer re¬ 
main a member of the 
cabinet. On the twenty- 
ninth of December, also, 
the commissioners from 
South Carolina formally 
addressed the President, 
laid their authority be¬ 
fore him, sent him an of¬ 
ficial copy of the Ordi¬ 
nance of Secession, and 
expressed a desire for 
such negotiation as would 
secure mutual respect, 
general advantage, and a 
future good-will and har¬ 
mony; but added that, as 
Major Anderson, by dis¬ 
mantling one fort and 
occupying another, had 
made important changes 
in the affairs in relation 
to which they had come 
























































BUTLER WOOL 


McCALL ROSECRANS ANDERSON 
McCOOK 


McDOWELL BLENKER McCLELLAN 

SICKELS 


SCOTT 

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6IGEL SPRAGUE MANSFIELD BURNSIDE 
PRENTISS TYLER 


BANKS 


From Harper’s WeekJy. 

CURTIS STONE 


FREMONT LANDER DIX 

HEINTZELMAN 



























to Washington, they were obliged to suspend all discussion until the move¬ 
ment which they referred to had been satisfactorily explained. They styled 
the retention of the government troops in Charleston Harbor a standing 
menace which rendered negotiation impossible, and urged their immedi¬ 
ate withdrawal. Mr. Buchanan refused to receive them in an official ca¬ 
pacity, but on the 30th replied to their letter. He denied that he, or his 
Secretary of War by his order, had given any pledge in regard to the garri¬ 
son of Fort Moultrie, referred the commissioners to a memorandum of the 


1 Correspondence between the South Carolina Commissioners and the President of the United States. 

Washington, December 2 *, 1860. 

Sir, —We have the honor to transmit to you it copy of the full powers from the Convention of 
the people of South Carolina, under which we arc ‘'authorized and empowered to treat with the 
govcrnineut of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light-houses, and other 
real estate, with their appurtenances, in the limits of South Carolina ; ami also for an apportion¬ 
ment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held bv the government of the 
United States, as agent of the Confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a mem¬ 
ber, and generally to negotiate as to all other measures ami arrangements propc* to be made and 
adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between 
this commonwealth and the government at Washington.” 

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we now do, with an official copy 
of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she 
delegated to the government of the Uuited States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and 
independence. 

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with 
you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that 
we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation, with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary 
and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general 
advantage, and a future of good-will and harmony, beneficial to all the parties concerned. 

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came 
here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have 
taken possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that 
we can not doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our ar¬ 
rival here an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without, but against 
your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering to a most important ex¬ 
tent the condition of affairs under which we came. 

Until these circumstances arc explained in a manner which relieves ns of all doubt as to the 
spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to 
any arrangement by which our mutual interests may be amicably adjusted. 

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the 
harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they arc a standing menace which renders 
negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody 
issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment. We have the honor to be, 
very respectfully, your obedient servants, II. W. Barnwell,') 

J. II. Adams, - Commissioners. 

Jas. L. Orr, i 

To the President of the United States. 

The President's Reply. 

Washington City, Dec. 30, I860. 

Gentlemen,—I have had the honor to receive your communication of 28th inst., together with 
a copy of “your full powers from the Convention of the people of South Carolina,” authorizing 
you to treat with the government of the United States on various important subjects therein men¬ 
tioned, and also a copy of the ordinance, bearing date on the 20th inst., declaring that “ the union 
now subsisting between South Carolina and other states, under the name of the United States of 
America, is hereby dissolved." 

In answer to this communication, I have to say that my position os President of the United 
States was clearly defined in the message to Congress on the 3d inst. In that I stated that, 
“apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the executive has no au¬ 
thority to decide what shall be the relations between the federal government and South Carolina. 
He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations 
hitherto existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that state. This 
would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the 
confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign states. It bears no resemblance to the recognition 
of a foreign de facto government, involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, 
on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the 
whole question in all its bearings.” 

Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest 
character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have 
to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It v'as my earnest desire 
that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the 
power, ns to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the posses¬ 
sion of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston ; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your 
opinion, “ the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.” In conclusion, you 
urge upon me “the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating 
that “ under present circumstances, they are a standing menace, which rentiers negotiation impos¬ 
sible, and, as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions 
which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.” 

The reason for this change in your position is, that since your arrival in Washington, “an 
officer of the United States, acting, as we (you) are assured, not only without, but against your 
(my) orders, has dismantled one fort nnd occupied another, thus altering to a most important ex¬ 
tent the condition of affairs under which we (you) came.” You also allege that you came here 
“the representatives of an authority which could, nt any time within the past sixty days, have 
taken possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner 
that we (you) can not doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor rather than to its power.” 

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in whut manner 
they have been observed. In my message of the 3d of December last, 1 stated, in regard to the 
proj>erty of the United States in South Carolina, that it “ has been purchased for a fair equivalent, 
by the consent of the Legislature of the state, for the erection of forts, magazines, arseu tIs, etc., 
and over these the authority ‘to exercise exclusive legislation’ has been expressly granted by the 
Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United 
Stares from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in 
command of 'he forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency 
th- responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants.” This 
b-ing the condition of the parties, on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from 
South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation 
on the subject of these forts, and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties, for 
the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be 
b-st to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday 
morning, the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives 
from South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy: 

To his Excellency JnmPB Buchanan, President of the United States: 

In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, wc now express to you our strong convictions 
that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, 
will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston previously to the 
act of the Convention, and wc hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an ac¬ 
credited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the state 
and the federal government, provided that no re-enforcements shall be sent into these forts, and 
their relative military status shall remain as at present. John M‘Queen, 

M. L. Bonham, 

W. W. Boyce, 
Lawrence M. Keitt. 

Washington, Dec. 9,1860. 

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark, that at the time the paper was presented to me, I 
objected to the word “provided,” as it might be construed into an agreement on my pa r t. which I 
never would make. They said that nothing was farther from their intention—they did not so 
understand it, nnd I should not so consider if. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal 
agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were 
acting in their individual character. I considered it.as nothing more, in effect, than the promise 
of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has 
proven that they have faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line 
from any one of them, or from any member of the Convention on the subject. It is well known 
that it was my determination, nnd this I freely expressed, not to re-enforce the forts in the harbor, 
•nd thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence 


instructions sent by Mr. Floyd to Major Anderson, and positively refused to 
withdraw the troops from Charleston Harbor; adding, “Such an idea was 
never thought of by ine in any possible contingency.” To the President’s 
letter the commissioners the next day sent a rejoinder, polite in terms but so 
insulting in its implications, and so arrogant and insolent in its tone, that it 
was returned to them with the indorsement, “This paper, just presented to 
the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it,” and on 
the 5th of January they went home, having accomplished nothing. 1 

that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it ns a 
happy omen that peace might be still preserved, and that time might be thus given for reflection. 
This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge. 

But I acted in the same manner ns I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal 
agiccmcnt with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been on 
my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible. The world knows that I have never 
sent any re-enforcements to the forts in Charleston Harbor, nnd I have certainly never authorized 
any change to be made “in their relative military status.” Bearing upon this subject, I refer 
you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th instant, to Major Anderson, but not 
brought to my notice until the 21st instant. It is as follows: 

Memorandum of Verbal Instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, commanding Fort Moultrie, 

South Carolina. 

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with 
the people of this state shall be avoided, nnd of his studied determination to pursue a course with 
reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. 
He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force nt this point, or taking any meas¬ 
ures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any 
doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain posses¬ 
sion of the public works, or interfere with their occupancy. 

But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these ex¬ 
pectations of the government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to 
meet so unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me, verbally, to give you such in¬ 
structions. 

You arc carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression, and for 
that reason you arc not, without necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into 
the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold jtossession of the forts in the harbor, and if 
attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not per¬ 
mit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to takq 
possession of cither of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, nnd you may then put your 
command into cither of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resist¬ 
ance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to 
proceed to a hostile act. D. P. Butler, Assistant Adjutant General. 

Fort Moultrie, S. (J., Dec. 11,18G0. 

This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell. 

John B. Floyd, Secretary of War. 

These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort 
Sumter, with a single exception, in regard to a particular which docs not in any degree affect the 
present question. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his owft 
responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to 
proceed to a hostile act” on the part of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still he 
is a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a 
fair hearing. 

Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie and proceeded 
to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, and 
there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This would only have been done 
with any degree of safety to the command by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. 
But before any step could possibly have been taken in this direction, wc received information that 
the “Palmetto Hag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, nnd a large military force went 
over last night (the 27th) to Fort Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without 
waiting or asking for any explanations, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that 
the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders, on the very next day after the night 
when the removal was made, seized by a military force two of the federal forts in the harbor of 
Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag instead of that of the United States. 

At this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very 
day, the 27th instant, that possession of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over 
the federal custom-house and post-office in Charleston, and on the same day every officer of the 
customs — collector, naval officer, surveyor, nnd appraiser—resigned their offices; nnd this, al¬ 
though it was well known from the language of my message that, as an executive officer, I felt my¬ 
self bound to collect the revenue nt the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor 
of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over nil of which the federal flag 
floated only four days ago ; but now, over two of them, this flag has been supplanted, nnd the Pal¬ 
metto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these circumstances that I am urged 
immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, nnd am informed that without 
this negotiation is impossible. This I can not do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never 
thought of by me in any possible contingency. No such allusion bad been made in any commu¬ 
nication between myself nnd any human being. But the inference is that I am hound to with¬ 
draw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor 
of Charleston, because the officer there in command of all of the forts thought proper, without in¬ 
structions, to change his position from one of them to another. 

At this point of writing, I have received information by telegraph from Captain Humphreys, in 
command of the arsenal at Charleston, that “ it has to-day (Sunday, the 30th) been taken by force 
of arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to this arsenal are worth half a mil¬ 
lion of dollars. 

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add, that while it is my duty to 
defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United States, against hostile at¬ 
tacks, from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I possess for this purpose, I do not 
perceive how such a defense can be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston. With 
great personal regard, I remain yours very respectfully, James Buchanan. 

To Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, James II. Adams, James L. Orr. 

Second Letter of the Commissioners to the President. 

Washington, D. C., Jan. 1,1861. 

Sir, —We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, in re¬ 
ply to a note addressed by us to you, on the 28th of the same month, as commissioners from South 
Carolina. 

In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that your “position as Presi¬ 
dent of the United States was already defined in the message to Congress of the 3d instant;” that 
you possess “ no power to change the relations heretofore existing between South Carolina and the 
United States,” “much less to acknowledge the independence of that state,” and that consequent¬ 
ly you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness 
to communicate to Congress any proposition wc might have to make, we deem it only necessary 
to say that the State of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-govern¬ 
ment which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, 
we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude ns to the character in which you might recog¬ 
nize us. Satisfied that the state had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, 
in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional 
scruples might have prevented you from extending. Wc came here, therefore, expecting to be re¬ 
ceived as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you as¬ 
sured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject 
of the independence of the state. The willingness was ample recognition of the condition of pub¬ 
lic affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both 
to the state which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of 
our letter into which you have fallen. 

You say, “ It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject 
by Congress, who alone possess the power, ns to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the 
parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston ; nnd I therefore 
deeply regret that in your opinion the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.” 
We expressed no such opinion; nnd the language which you quote as ours is altered in its sense 
by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was, “ But the events 
of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible.” Place that “assurance,” as 
contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it. 

Again, professing to quote our language, you say, “Thus the authorities of South Carolina, 
without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, 
that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders,” etc. We expressed no such 







FORT SUMTER. 


I860.] 

From the time of Major Anderson’s transfer of his command, Wash¬ 
ington had been in a state of deplorable and even disgraceful excitement. 
The delegates from the states which were ripe for revolt, but which had not 
seceded, retained their seats in Congress, and by their open threats and secret 
intrigues increased the alarm of the country, and crippled the feeble and al¬ 
ready bewildered administration. They sat in the chairs to which they 
were sent for the support of the Constitution of the United States and con¬ 
trived its overthrow; they lived in Washington upon the pay of the repub¬ 
lic while they plotted its destruction; they held their positions only for the 
purpose of insuring the success of their conspiracy—only that they might 
counterbalance the votes of loyal men, and keep at dead-lock all the essen¬ 
tial functions of the government. These are no general phrases, no vague 
deductions. The records of treacherous conspiracy show no page more in¬ 
famous than that written by Senator Yulee, of Florida, in a letter to one of 
his constituents, in which he revealed the counsels of his fellow-conspirators, 
the senators of six states, and said that they had all determined to retain 
their places in the councils of the nation with the deliberate purpose of 
keeping Mr. Buchanan’s hands tied, and depriving Mr. Lincoln, on his ac¬ 
cession to office, of the legitimate powers of government. That not the 
smallest item might be lacking to the sum of its shame and the perfection 
of its perfidy, this letter was secured a swift and free passage to its destina¬ 
tion under the Honorable writer’s senatorial frank. 2 While such was the 
direct course of secret machination, open counsel went darkly groping. 
In both houses the debates were vague, wordy, colloquial, and from the 


opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have 
quoted was applied solely and entirely to our assurances obtained here, and based, us you well 
know, upon your own declaration—a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the au¬ 
thorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, 
we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument. 

Some weeks ago the State of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition 
of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a convention of her people to put 
her declaration in force. The Convention met and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this 
you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered in your Annual Message. 
You declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding state, but that you 
were bound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of the United States with¬ 
in the borders of South Carolina if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early 
that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it 
without collision. You did not re-enforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston. You removed 
a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie because he attempted to 
increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison 
when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the 
oldest and most eminent member of your cabinet rather than allow the garrison to be strength¬ 
ened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter to return immediately to t-he arsenal 
forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the 
most distinguished of our public characters, whose testimony will be placed upon the record when¬ 
ever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willing¬ 
ness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if commissioners should be sent to the govern¬ 
ment, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. \ou received and acted on 
assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no attempt would be made 
to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb 
their existing condition until the commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had 
failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives a written memorandum that 
no such attempt should be made, “provided that no re-enforcements should be sent into those forts, 
and their relative military status shall remain as at present.” And although you attach no force 
to the acceptance of such a paper—although you “considered it as nothing more in effect than the 
promise of highly honorable gentlemen”—as an obligation on one side, without corresponding obli¬ 
gation on thte other—it must be remembered (if we were rightly informed) that you were pledged, 
if you ever did send re-enforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it, before 
you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to fol¬ 
low a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding. Besides all this, you had re¬ 
ceived formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina that we had been appoint¬ 
ed commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under 
which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We 
arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at 3 o’clock, and you appointed an interview with us at 1 
the next day. Early on that day (Thursday) the news was received here of the movement of 
Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our 
meeting until o’clock on Friday, in order that you might consult your cabinet. On Friday we 
saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. Yon could not deny it. With the 
facts* we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact that your Secretary of 
War had resigned his seat in the cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Ma¬ 
jor Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the government, and that, unless the pledge was 
instantly redeemed, he was dishonored, denial was impossible; you did not deny it. You do not 
deny it now, but you seek to escape from its obligation on the grounds, first, that we terminated all 
negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the 
harbor of Charleston ; and, second, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking ex¬ 
planation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property 
of the United States. ’ We will examine both. 

In the first place, we deny positively that we have ever in any way made any such demand. 
Our letter is in your possession ; it will stand by this on record. In it we informed you of the ob¬ 
jects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our read¬ 
iness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions be¬ 
tween us amicably and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance im¬ 
possible. We stated the events, and we said that until some satisfactory explanation of these 
events was given us, we could not proceed; and then, having made this request for explanation, 
we added, “And in conclusion we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops 
from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which 
renders negotiation impossible,” etc. “Under present circumstances!” What circumstances? 
Why, clearly the occupation of Fort Sumter and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major An¬ 
derson, in the face of vour pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is 
nothing in the letter which would, or could, have prevented you from declining to withdraw the 
troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your 
desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and 
this opinion we urged upon you; but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events 
of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotia¬ 
tions should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are 
compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say, “ I his I can 
not do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. 
No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and anv human being.” 

In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that your conversation with us left upon 
our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops 
from Charleston Harbor. And in support of this impression, we would add, that we have the pos¬ 
itive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation and the most unsullied m- 
tegrity—men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievements, place 
their testimony beyond cavil—that such suggestions had been made to and urged upon you by 
them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was, this 
knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it its own wisdom 
and the might of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, 
instead of asking explanations, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took pos¬ 
session of other property of the United States, we would observe: 1. That even if this were so, 
it does not avail vou for defense, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these 
facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday; the news from Major Anderson 
reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day men 
of the highest consideration—men who had striven successfully to lift you to vour great office 
who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration, sought you 
and entreated you to act-to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your posi¬ 
tion. They only asked you to give the assurance that if the facts were so—that if the commander 


37 

purpose. Abstract points were discussed sometimes with acrimony, at 
others jocosely; but no decisive action was proposed for the maintenance 
of the authority of the government and the integrity of the republic. 
The small minority who were already rebels at heart and in purpose, if 
not in act, were defiant and overbearing; their opponents sought only to 
pacify and restrain them by proffered concessions; and between these two 
was a considerable number who waited and watched to trim their course 
according to the current. On the 27th, in the House Committee of Thirty- 
three upon the State of the Union, Mr. Adams, of Massachusetts, proposed 
a resolution, “That it is expedient to propose an amendment to the Con¬ 
stitution to the effect that no future amendments of it in regard to slavery 
shall be made, unless proposed by a slave state and ratified by all the 
states.” This resolution was passed with only three dissenting voices. 
Coming from a representative of Massachusetts, and proposing terms which 
would put the question of slavery in the states absolutely and forever 
out of the reach of the free states, no matter how greatly in the major¬ 
ity, and thus removing the ground of that apprehension for the future 
which was made the excuse of secession, this resolution might have been 
the first step toward the much-sought compromise. It was regarded with 
favor by many delegates from slave states; and after a free conference be¬ 
tween all the members of the committee, even Mr. Cobb, of Alabama, declared 
that the question at issue might now be settled. It might, indeed, bad not 
the politicians of South Carolina, and those of other states, but of their school, 
been bent upon attaining their purpose, in or out of the Union, by defiance 

had acted without and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges—that you would re¬ 
store the status you had pledged your honor to maintain. You refused to decide. Your Secretary 
at War, your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter, waited anxiously for your decis¬ 
ion, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two 
cabinet meetings had adjourned, before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had 
done; and your prompt decision at any moment of that time would havo avoided the subsequent 
complications. But, if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that 
have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty 
days you have had in Charleston Harbor not force enough to hold the forts against an equal ene¬ 
my. Two of them were empty—one of those two the most important in the harbor. It could 
have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man that it would have been 
tnken but for the efturts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were 
threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were with difficulty restrained from securing, 
without blood, the possession of this important fortress After many and reiterated assurances, 
given on your behalf, which we can not believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in 
good faith sent on their commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm—wished 
you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was con¬ 
sistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had these commission¬ 
ers left than Major Anderson waged war. No other words will describe his action. It was not a 
peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense, and only justi¬ 
fied in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, 
spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and 
withdrew, under cover of the night, to a safer position. This was war. No man could have be¬ 
lieved (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, “not only without 
orders, but ugainst orders.” What the state did was in simple self-defense; for this act, wiili all 
its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until 
those commencing it explained their action and disavowed their intention, there was no room for 
delay; and even at this moment while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of 
your letter, that rc-enforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun shall 
be fired, there will have been on your part one continuous, consistent series of actions, commenc¬ 
ing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular re-enforcements, and terminating 
in defeat or victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things 
which you have said, there is one thing you can not say—you have waited anxiously for news from 
the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this 
“tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of South 
Carolina," which is the only justification of Major Anderson you arc fore* d to admit, “has not 
yet been alleged." But you have decided, you have resolved to hold, by force, what you have ob¬ 
tained through our misplaced confidence; and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Ander¬ 
son, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your executive authority. Be 
the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history ns 
a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperish¬ 
able testimony of Carolina faith. 

By your course you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to 
force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is 
the God of Justice as well as the God of Hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies 
before her hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly. 

Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving ns without hope of a 
withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the 
time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to re-enforce the garrison in 
the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we purpose returning to Charleston to¬ 
morrow afternoon. 

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servants, 

R. W. Barnwell, j 

J. H. A dams, > Commissioners. 

James L. Orr, S 

To his Excellency the President of the United States. 

The following is the indorsement upon the document: 

Executive Mansion, 31 o’clock, Wednesday. 

This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to re¬ 
ceive it. 

* The original of this letter was found by the correspondent of the Now York Times among 
some papers whic h fell into the hands of the United States forces upon their sudden occupation 
of Femandina, Florida. It is here (p. 32) reproduced in fac-simile. The resolutions to which it 
refers were not distinguished in any way from the rest of the rebellious resolves of the period. 












38 


[ 1861 . 


of the government and disruption of the republic. With these men seces¬ 
sion was a foregone conclusion, and delay and vacillation on the part of the 
supporters of the government only aided the accomplishment of their de¬ 
signs. This was made plain on the 31st by Senator Benjamin, of Louisiana, 
a state which had not yet taken even the preliminary steps to secession. In 
a speech meant both as a threat and a valedictory, he announced to the Sen¬ 
ate that during the next week Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida would sep¬ 
arate from the Union; that a -week after Georgia would follow them, to be 
followed shortly by Louisiana and Arkansas. He declared that the day of 
adjustment was past, and that when the members of that body parted, they 
would part to meet again as senators in one common council-chamber of 
the nation no more forever; and, announcing it as his belief that there could 
not be peaceable secession, he defied the attempt to subdue the revolted 
people to the authority of the Constitution. Couching this defiance in the 
phraseology adopted by the conspirators, he closed his speech with these 
words: “ What may be the fate of this horrible contest none can foretell; 
but this much I will say—the fortunes of war may be adverse to our arms; 
you may carry desolation into our peaceful land, and with torch and fire¬ 
brand may set our cities in flames; you may even emulate the atrocities of 
those who in the days of our Revolution hounded on the bloodthirsty sav¬ 
age; you may give the protection of your advancing armies to the furious 
fanatics who desire nothing more than to add the horrors of servile insur¬ 
rection to civil war; you may do this and more, but you never can subju¬ 
gate us; you never can subjugate the free sons of the soil into vassals pay¬ 
ing tribute to your power; you can never degrade them into a servile and 
inferior race—never, never, never!” 

This burst of bombastic prophesying, in which, with equal reason, vindic¬ 
tiveness was assumed as the motive, ruthlessness as the means, and servile 
subjection as the and in view of those who insisted that all should submit 
to the Constitution which all had adopted, and all obey the laws which all 
had had a voice in framing, was received with an uproar of applause in the 
galleries, which were filled with the sympathizers with disunion, who swarm¬ 
ed then in Washington and for a long time afterward. The outcries and 
confusion were so disgraceful, that even Mr. Benjamin’s friends on the floor 
of the chamber were ashamed, and Mr. Mason, of Virginia, moved the clear¬ 
ing of the galleries, and the Senate immediately adjourned. Thus the peo¬ 


ple of the United States saw the year close upon them in turmoil, gloom, 
distress, and weakness, which had opened upon them united, happy, pros¬ 
perous, and powerful. 

With the beginning of a new year a new attitude was assumed at Wash¬ 
ington. President Buchanan, no longer daring to stand before the country 
as an accomplice by default in the conspiracy against the republic, at last 
made some show of an attempt to preserve the existence and exert the 
power of the government of which he was the head. It was high time for 
him to do so. The purposes of the conspirators developed themselves rapid¬ 
ly ; and it became clear that they aimed not only at secession, but at usurp¬ 
ation, by the occupation of the national capital, the possession of the archives, 
and the consequent recognition of their faction as the government of the 
United States, to the exclusion of the free states, except such as it should 
suit them to admit to a share of their stolen privileges. 3 -And it should be 
always remembered that they labored constantly under the supposition, at 
first not entirely unfounded, that there was a large, if not a controlling par¬ 
ty in the free states who looked with favor upon their movement, and who 
would give to them a moral, and perhaps a material, support. They threat¬ 
ened that the President elect should never be inaugurated ; and some of them 
even went so far as to avow a belief that they would be able to reconstruct 
the Union m their interest, with the omission of the New England states. 
That they were grievously in error, all their fellow-citizens, except their 
Northern accomplices, knew in their inmost hearts; but few then knew how 
deeply that feeling was rooted, and how strongly nourished, which they sup¬ 
posed would wither away in the first heat of adversity; and in forming 
the plan of a new republic, from which New England should be excluded, 
they must have left out of their calculation the significant fact that New 
England had mostly peopled the Northern states, and had entirely given 
them their moral tone and intellectual character. Such, however, were their 
plans; and Mr. Buchanan found that it was no longer safe for him to fail to 
interpose such checks upon their execution as a decent regard for the duties 
of his high office demanded. Lieutenant General Scott was called into con¬ 
sultation with the cabinet, in which General John A. Dix had replaced Mr. 
Cobb, and Postmaster General Holt, an able, patriotic, and honorable Demo¬ 
crat, had been charged with the functions of the War office. Measures were 
taken for the military protection of the capital by the organization of 

the militia of the District, and the 
concentration of a few regular com¬ 
panies of artillery ; and means were 
sought of increasing the garrisons of 
the principal forts in the slave states, 
and particularly those in the harbor 
of Charleston. But for the latter ob¬ 
ject the time had long passed, and 
even for the former it proved to be 
almost too late. The steam frigate 
Brooklyn, just arrived at Norfolk 
navy yard after a three yedts’ cruise, 
was almost the only national ship of 
any consequence manned and equip¬ 
ped, and within reach of the govern¬ 
ment. She was ordered not to dis¬ 
charge her. crew, and to remain in 
readiness to sail with a smaller ves¬ 
sel at an hour’s notice. The pur 
poses of the government got wind 
immediately, and reached the ears of 
the secessionists. At Norfolk they 
prepared to seize the ships should 
they attempt to sail; at Charleston 
they removed the buoys, obstructed 
the channel, and left the light-house 
darkling. The enterprise was aban¬ 
doned. But the defense of Wash¬ 
ington, and the measures necessary 
to insure the inauguration of Mr. 
Lincoln, went on as rapidly as possi¬ 
ble, under the eye of Captain Charles 
Stone, of the Ordnance corps, to 
whom, at General Scott’s recommend¬ 
ation, was committed the organiza¬ 
tion of the District militia, which, 
though not numerous, was thought 
sufficient for the emergency. A com¬ 
pany of marines was sent to Fort 
Washington, fourteen miles below 
the capital, on the Potomac, and the 


* From the Charleston Courier, Feb. 12/A, 1 SGI. 

“The South might , after uniting, under a new 
confederacy, treat the disorganized and demor¬ 
alized Northern states as insurgents , and deny 
them recognition. But if peaceful division en¬ 
sues, the South, after taking the federal capital 
and archives, and being recognized by all for¬ 
eign powers as the government de facto , can, 
if they see proper, recognize the Northern con¬ 
federacy or confederacies, and enter into treaty 
stipulations with them. Were this not done, it 
would be difficult for the Northern states to take 
a place among nations, and their flag would not 
be respected or recognized.” 





e*-' 



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^ ——-• ( x / a -7 ^4/^6 

-- of c/yrWvvOL. ^ 4r ^ ^* 

wyW ^ — -'C cj ~- 2- X— - 4 ^ 

"/( ** *- - - ^ -- rfcrj J/- 

trf) a—/' tf 1 -f 6'-—- //lc zLk 

os6-(La— 


/ 'Ac. <*** 


Hyl &yisL- 











~~ % 
faosimile of bznatob TtLu's lcttxe (referred toon p.31), 














1861 . 


FORT SUMTER 


39 


volunteer military companies of Washington were paraded, inspected, and 
furnished with ball cartridges. 

General Scott, to whom, for services in peace and war, his country owed 
more than to any other living man, devoted himself to meeting the military 
demands of a crisis which he had foreseen, and for which, if his counsels had 
been regarded, the government would have been fully prepared. There is 
no doubt of this, sad as it is to believe that all the woes which fell upon the 
republic might have been warded off if he had been listened to, who, at such 
a time, had the best right to be heard. The political sagacity and fore¬ 
sight which had made General Scott the great peace-maker, as well as the 
great captain of the republic, had not deserted him in his advancing years; 
and he had, as early as October 29th, 1860, addressed a memorandum to the 
President and the Secretary of War, in which he set forth the almost cer¬ 
tain endeavor to destroy the Union upon the election of Mr. Lincoln ^ among 
whose supporters he was not, but whose election he could not believe would 
be followed by “ any unconstitutional violence or breach of law.” Such vio¬ 
lence or breach he, in bis integrity and love of country, regarded as the only 
justification of armed insurrection; but he knew the men of whom he 
wrote, and he did not believe that they would wait until they had either 
law or right on their side. In this remarkable paper he pointe3 out, with 
singular sagacity, as the event proved, that the Southern people, or those 
who spoke and acted for them, would seize the United States forts within 


* GENERAL SCOTT’S VIEWS. 

Views suggested by the imminent Danger ( October 2'J, 18G0) of a Disruption of the Union by the Seces¬ 
sion of one or more of the Southern States. 

To save time, the right of secession may be conceded, and instantly balanced by the correlative 
right, on the part of the federal government, against an interior state or states, to re-establish by 
force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory.—[Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy, 
last chapter.] 

But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and 
there would be no hope of reuniting the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of the 
sword. To effect such result, the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison 
with ours, sink into mere child's play. 

A smaller evil would be to allow the fragments of the great republic to form themselves into 
new confederacies, probably four. 

All the lines of demarkation between the new Unions can not be accurately drawn in advance, 
but many of them approximately may. Thus, looking to natural boundaries and commercial af¬ 
finities, some of the following frontiers, after many waverings and conflicts, might perhaps become 
acknowledged and fixed: 

1. The Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic. 2. From Maryland, along the 
crest of the Alleghany (perhaps the Blue Ridge) range of mountains, to some point in the coast, 
of Florida. 3. The line from say the head of the Potomac to the west or northwest, which it will 
be most difficult to settle. 4. The crest of the Rocky Mountains. 

The southeast confederacy would, in all human probability, in less than five years after the rup¬ 
ture, find itself bounded by the first and second lines indicated above, the Atlantic and the Gulf 
of Mexico, with its capital at say Columbia, South Carolina. The country between the second, 
third, and fourth of those lines would, beyond a doubt, in about the same time, constitute another 
confederacy, with its capital at probably Alton or Quincy, Illinois. The boundaries of the Pacific 
Union are the most definite of all, and the remaining states would constitute the northeast confed¬ 
eracy, with its capital at Albany. 

It* at the first thought, will be considered strange that seven slaveholding states and parts of 
Virginia and Florida should be placed (above) in a new confederacy with Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
etc.; but when the overwhelming weight of the great Northwest is taken in connection with the 
laws of trade, contiguity of territory, and the comparative indifference to free-soil doctrines on the 
part of Western Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, it is evident that but little, if any 
coercion, beyond moral force, would be needed to embrace them; and I have omitted the tempta¬ 
tion of the unwasted public lands which would fall entire to this confederacy—an appanage (well 
husbanded) sufficient for many generations. As to Missouri, Arkansas, and Mississippi, they 
would not stand out a month. Louisiana would coalesce without much solicitation, and Alabama, 
with West Florida, would be conquered the first winter, from the absolute need of Pensacola for a 
naval dej>ot. 

If I might presume to address the South, and particularly dear Virginia—being “native here 
and to the manor born”—I would affectionately ask, Will not your slaves be less secure, and their 
labor less profitable, under the new order of things than under the old ? Could you employ profit¬ 
ably two hundred slaves in all Nebraska, or five hundfed in all New Mexico? The right, then, to 
take them thither would be a barren right. And is it not wise to 


Rather bear the lUe we have. 

Than fly to others that we know not of?” 

The Declaration of Independence proclaims and consecrates the same maxim : “ Prudence, in¬ 
deed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient 
causes.” And Paley, too, lays down as a fundamental maxim of statesmanship, “ Never to pursue 
national honor as distinct from national interest but adds: “This rule acknowledges that it is 
often necessary to assert the honor of a nation for the sake of its interests.” 

The excitement that threatens secession is caused by the near prospect of a Republican’s elec¬ 
tion to the presidency. From a sense of propriety as a soldier, I have taken no part in the pend¬ 
ing canvass, and, as always heretofore, mean to stay away from the polls. My sympathies, how¬ 
ever, arc with the Bell and Everett ticket. With Mr. Lincoln I have had no communication what- 
ever| direct or indirect, and have no recollection of ever having seen his person; but can not be¬ 
lieve' anv unconstitutional violence, or breach of law, is to be apprehended from his administration 
of the federal government. 

From a knowledge of our Southern population, it is my solemn conviction that there is some 
danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the 
following posts: Forts Jackson and St. Philip, in the Mississippi, below New Orleans, both with¬ 
out garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without a garrison; Forts Pickens and M‘Rea, Pen¬ 
sacola Harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one ; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a gar¬ 
rison ; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston Harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, 
and the latter without anv; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In 
my opinion, all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take 
anv one of them, by surprise or coup-de-main, ridiculous. 

"With the army faithful to its allegiance, and the navy probably equally so, and with a federal 
executive, for the next twelve months, of firmness and moderation, which the country has a right 
to expect— moderation being an element of power not less than frmness —there is good reason to 
hope that the danger of secession may be made to pass away without one conflict of arms, one 
execution, or one arrest for treason. . . . 

In the mean time, it is suggested that exports should remain as free as at present; all duties, 
however, on imports, collected (outside of the cities*), as such receipts would be needed for the na¬ 
tional debt, invalid pensions, etc., and only articles contraband of war be refused admittance. 
But even this refusal would be unnecessary, as the foregoing views eschew the idea of invading a 
seceded state. Winfield iScorc. 

New York, October 29,1860. 


Lieutenant General Scott’s respects to the Secretary of War to say. 

That a copy of his “ Views," etc., was dispatched to the President yesterday in great haste: 
but the copy intended for the Secretary, better transcribed (herewith), was not in time for the 
mail. General Scott would be happy if the latter could be substituted for the former. 

It will be seen that the “Views" only apply to a case of secession that makes a, 170 /) in the pres¬ 
ent Union. The falling off sav of Texas, or of all the Atlantic states, from the Potomac south, 

was not within the scope of General Scott's provisional remedies. 

It is his opinion that instructions should be given at once to the commanders of the Bnrrancas, 
Forts Moultrie and Monroe, to be on their guard against surprises and coups-de-main. As to reg¬ 
ular approaches, nothing can be said or done, at this time, without volunteers. 

There is one (regular) company at Boston, one here (at the Narrows), one at I utsburg, one at 
Augusta, Georgia, and one at Bnton Rouge—in all five companies only, within reach, to garrison 
or re-enforce the forts mentioned in the “ Views. . . . 

General Scott is all solicitude for the safety of the Union. He is, however, not without hope 


• In fort* or on board phlp# of war 
months—to await expected mean ares 
the opposite quarter. 


The great aim and object of thin plan was to gain time—say eight or ten 
of conciliation on the part of the North, and the subsidence of angry feelings in 


their reach even before they had seceded. He recommended the immedi¬ 
ate garrisoning of all these torts, and particularly of Forts Moultrie, Monroe, 
Pickens, and M‘Rea, with such a force as to make any attempt to seize them 
by coup-de-main impossible; and he suggested that, in case of secession, 
commerce should remain unrestricted, but duties be collected on imports by 
forces stationed in forts or ships of war. But, alas! he was obliged to ad¬ 
mit, in this very memorandum, that for the defense of the nine great forts 
which he mentioned, the government had, except the small garrisons of 
Moultrie and Monroe, but five companies of troops within reach, and those 
scattered at five posts separated hundreds of miles from each other; and, 
sadder still, he was obliged to send his patriotic warning and his wise coun¬ 
sels to a President who was supinely faithless to his trust, and to a Secre¬ 
tary of War who was one of the most active conspirators against the very 
government of which he was a member. 4 General Wool, too, one of the 
ablest and most honorable soldiers of the Union, had, as early as the 6th of 
December, addressed General Cass, Secretary of State, a letter, in which he 
set forth the imminent peril of the country', the frightful proportions which 
a civil war, inevitable upon secession, would assume, and pointed out the 
way in which to avoid it, by firm, decided, prompt, and energetic measures. 
Among these he particularly named the immediate increase of the garrison 
of Fort Moultrie. 4 But General Wool’s letter was as little heeded as the 


that all dangers and difficulties will pass away without leaving a scar or painful recollection be¬ 
hind The Secretary’s most obedient servant, W. S. 

October CO, 1860. 

4 General Wool's Letters. 


Troy. December 31,1S60. 

Mr dear Sin,—South Carolina, after twenty-seven years—Mr. Rhett says thirty years—of con¬ 
stant and increasing efforts by her leaders to induce her to secede, has declared h'crsclf out of the 
Union; and this, too, without the slightest wrong or injustice done her people on the part of the 
government of the United States. Although she may have seized the revenue cutter, raised her 
treasonable Palmetto flag over the United States Arsenal, the Custom-house, Post-office, Castle 
Pinckney, and Fort Moultrie, she is not out of the Union, nor beyond the pale of the United 
States. Before she can get out of their jurisdiction or control, a reconstruction of the Constitution 
must be had, or civil war ensue. In the latter case, it would require no prophet to foretell the result. 

It is reported that Mr. Buchanan has received informally the commissioners appointed by the 
rebels of South Carolina to negotiate for the public property in the harbor of Charleston, and for 
other purposes. It is also reported that the President disapproved of the conduct of Major An¬ 
derson, who, being satisfied that he would not be able to defend Fort Moultrie with the few men 
under his command, wisely took possession of Fort Sumter, where he could protect himself and 
the country from the disgrace which might have occurred if he had remained in Fort Moultrie. 
Being the commander in the harbor, he had the right to occupy Fort Sumter, an act which the 
safety of the Union as well as his own honor demanded. It is likewise stated that apprehensions 
are entertained that Major Anderson will be required to abandon Fort Sumter and reoccupy Fort 
Moultrie. There can be no foundation for such apprehensions; for surely the President would 
not surrender the citadel of the harbor of Charleston to rebels. Fort Sumter commands the en¬ 
trance, and in a few hours could demolish Fort Moultrie. So long ns the United States keeps 
possession of this fort, the independence of South Carolina will only be in name, and not in fact. 
If, however, it should be surrendered to South Carolina, which I do not apprehend, the smothered 
indignation of ihe free states would be roused beyond control. It would not be in the power of any 
one to restrain it. In tiventy days two hundied thousand men would be in readiness to take vengeance 
on all who would betray the Union into the hands of its enemies. Be assured that I do not exagger¬ 
ate the feelings of the people. They arc already sufficiently excited at the attempt to dissolve the 
Union for no other reason than that they constitutionally exercised the most precious right con¬ 
ferred on them, of voting for the person whom they considered the most worthy and best qualified 
to fill the office of President. Fort Sumter, therefore, ought not, and, I presume, will not be de¬ 
livered over to South Carolina. 

I am not, however, pleading for the free states, for they arc not in danger, but for the Union 
and the preservation of the cotton states. Those who sow the wind may expect to reap the whirl¬ 
wind. The leaders of South Carolina could not have noticed that wc live in an age of progress, 
and that all Christendom is making rapid strides in the march of civilization and freedom. If 
they had, they would have discovered that the announcement of every victory obtained by the hero 
of the nineteenth century, Garibaldi, in favor of the oppressed of Italy, did not fail to electrify 
every American heart with joy and gladness. “Where liberty dwells there is my country,” was 
the declaration of the illustrious Franklin. This principle is too strongly implanted in the heart 
and inind of every man in the free states to be surrendered because South Carolina desires it in 
order to extend the area of slavery. With all christianized Europe and nearly all the civilized 
world opposed to slavery, arc the Southern states prepared to set aside the barriers which shield 
and protect their institutions under the United States government? Would the separation of the 
South from the North give greater security to slavery than it lias now under the Constitution of 
the Union? What security would they have for the return of runaway slaves? I apprehend 
none; while the number of runaways would be greatly augmented, and the difficulties of which 
slaveholders complain would be increased tenfold. However much individuals might condemn 
slavery, the free states are prepared to sustain and defend it as guaranteed by the Constitution. 

In conclusion, I would avoid the bloody and desolating example of the Mexican states. I am 
now, and forever, in favor of the Union, its preservation, and the rigid maintenance of the rights 
and interests of the states, individually as well ns collectively. Youis, etc., John E. Wool. 


General Wool to General Cass, before the resignation of the latter. 

[Private.] Troy, Dec. 6, 1860. 

My dear General, —Old associations and former friendship induce me to venture to address 
to you a few words on the state of the country. My letter is headed “private” because I am not 
authorized to address you officially. 

I have read with pleasure the President’s Message. Scnh Carolina says she intends to leave 
the Union. Her representatives in Congress say she has already left the Union. It would seem 
that she is neither to be conciliated nor comforted. I command the Eastern Department , which 
includes South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. You know me well. I 
have ever been a firm, decided, faithful, and devoted friend of my country. If I can aid the Pres¬ 
ident to preserve the Union , I hope he will command my services. It will never do for him or you to 
leave Washington without every star in this Union is in its place. Therefore, no time should be lost 
in ad( pting measures to defeat those who arc conspiring against the Union. Hesitancy or delay 
may be no less fatal to the Union than to the President or your own high standing as o statesman. 

It seems to me that troops should be sent to Charleston to man the forts in that harbor. You 
have eight companies at Fort Monroe, Va. Three or four of these companies should be sent, without 
a moment's delay , to Fort Moultrie. It will save the Union and the President much trouble. - It 
is said that to send at this time troops to that harbor would produce great excitement among the 
people. That is nonsense, when the people arc as much excited as they can bo, and the leaders 
are determined to execute their long-meditated purpose of separating the state from the Union. 
So long as you c ommand the entrance to the city of Charleston, South Carolina can not separate 
herself from the Union. I)o not leave the forts in the harbor in a condition to induce an attempt 
to take j>ossc.vsion of them. It might easily be done at this time. If South Carolina should take 
them, it might, ns she anticipates, induce other states to join her. 

Permit me to entreat you to urge the President to send at once three or four companies of artil¬ 
lery to Fort Moultrie. The Union can be preserved, but it requires firm, decided, prompt, and 
energetic measures on the part of the President. He has only to exert the power conferred on 
him by the Constitution and laws of Congress, and all will he safe, and he will prevent a civil war, 
which never fails to call forth all the baser passions of the hitman heart. If a separation should 
take place, you may rest assured blood would flow in torrents, followed by pestilence, famine, and 
desolation, and Senator Sewards irrepressible conflict will be brought to a conclusion much sooner than 
he could jtossib/y have anfici/mted. Let me conjure you to save the Union, and thereby avoid the 
bloody and desolating example of the states of Mexico. A separation of the states will bring with 
it the desolation of the cotton states, whic h arc unprepared for war. Their weakness will be found 
in the nundier of their slaves, with hut few of the essentials to carry on war, while the free states 
will have nil the elements and materials for war, and to a greater extent than any other people on 
the face of the globe. 

Think of these things, my dear general, and save the country, and save the prosperous South 
from pestilence, famine, and desolation. Peaceable secession is not to be thought of. Even if it 
should take place, in three months we would have a bloody war on our hands. Very truly your 

John E. Wool. 

Boo. Lewia Cass, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. 








40 


[ 1861 . 



Lieutenant General’s had been, and the consequences were just what both 
the military patriots had foreseen and foretold. The government would 
now have gladly followed their counsels, but it v.as too late. 

At Charleston, on the contrary, alacrity as well as audacity characterized 
all that was done. The return of the South Carolina commissioners from 
Washington with the announcement that the President had refused to hold 
any farther communication with them, gave a new stimulus to the pride and 
the pugnacity of the secessionists. They affected to regard this refusal as 
an insult, and began to lash themselves into fury, but also to take most vig¬ 
orous measures against the government by which they chose to regard them¬ 
selves as insulted. They hastened the repairs and the armament of Fort 
Moultrie, commenced the erection of batteries upon Sullivan’s Island and 
Morris’s Island, two points which commanded both the entrance to the har¬ 
bor and Fort Sumter; the commander of Castle Pinckney ordered that no 
boat should approach the wharf-head without permission; the city was put 
under the protection of a military patrol, look-out boats were stationed in the 
outer harbor at night, and the telegraph was placed under censorship. All 
the citizens of Charleston liable to military duty were, without exception, 
called to arms. The collector of the port, appointed to his office by the 
United States government, announced that ail vessels from and for ports 
outside of South Carolina must enter and clear at Charleston. The Con¬ 
vention passed an ordinance defining treason against the state, and declar¬ 
ing its punishment, which, with a misunderstanding of an old criminal law- 
phrase, ludicrous in itself, but horrible in the vengeful purpose indicated by 
it, was to be “death without benefit of the clergy.” 1 * * * * 6 Delegates were ap¬ 
pointed to attend a convention of seceding states. An appeal was made by 
the leading newspaper of Charleston to the people of Florida, to seize the 
national forts at Pensacola and Key West, and the capture of the California 
treasure-ships bound northward through the Gulf of Mexico was recom¬ 
mended. This appeal was addressed to the people of a commonwealth 
which had not yet even gone through the form of seceding from the gov¬ 
ernment which had bought and paid for the very soil on which they lived! 
With a similar disregard of the proprietary rights of that government, the 
South Carolina authorities forbade the United States sub-treasurer of 
Charleston to cash any more drafts from Washington. But in this respect 
their dishonest move received one honest counter-check, which provoked 
some merriment; for Governor Pickens, writing to the Secretary of the 
Treasury for a balance of $3000 due upon his salary as United States min¬ 
ister to Russia, received in reply a draft upon the sub-treasury the payments 
of which he had assumed to stop. 

These bold steps were met only by timidity and hesitation on the part of 
the government. If Fort Sumter were to be retained, it must needs be re-en- 
forced. An attempt was therefore made to send supplies and men to Major 

‘ The old penalty of death without benefit of clergy is now, and, from the changed condition of 
things, has been, of necessity, long obsolete. It had no reference to the attendance of a clergyman 
or minister of the Gospel upon the condemned criminal, but was a barbarous sign of the peculiar 
privileges of the clergy of the Roman Church, which asserted and maintained a right to try its 
clergy at its own tribunals. When, therefore, a man was condemned and about to be sentenced, 
he claimed, if he could, that he was a clergyman; and, ns proof, offered to show that he could 
read , then an accomplishment confined to clergymen. But, as learning advanced, it became nec¬ 
essary to do away with this “benefit of clergy." 


Anderson, but in such a shuffling way, and with such a pitiful result, that it 
is a shame to tell the story. A large steam-ship, the Star of the West, was 
chartered, and with a supply of commissary stores and ammunition, and two 
hundred and fifty artillerists and marines, she sailed from New York on the 
5th of January. But, although her destination was Charleston Harbor, she 
cleared for New Orleans and Havana, and she did not take the troops on 
board until she was far down the Bay. The attempted deceit entirely fail¬ 
ed. The Charleston people were fully informed as to the project by some 
of their innumerable spies, who swarmed over the country. The vessel ar¬ 
rived off Charleston Bar in the middle of the night of the 9th. She there 
lay to of necessity; -for the lights in the light-houses were all out, and the 
buoys removed. She put out her own lights, and awaited the dawning. As 
the day began to break she discovered a small steamer just inshore of her, 
which, on making the reciprocal discovery, steamed away for the ship chan¬ 
nel, burning blue and red signals, and sending up rockets as she went. The 
Star of the West followed, with the national flag at her peak, until she was 
within about two miles of both Fort Sumter and Fort Moultrie, when a bat¬ 
tery on Morris’s Island, about half a mile off, not noticed until then, opened 
fire upon her. Another large United States flag was immediately run up 
at the fore, but still the battery continued its fire. Perhaps this surprised 
the officers of the vessel, for before she was headed for the harbor the troops 
were all sent below, so that they could not be seen, no one but the crew 
being allowed on deck; and it really did seem as if the government of the 
United States might be allowed to smuggle two hundred and fifty men into 
one of its own fortresses. But the well-informed seceders thought other¬ 
wise ; and as to the flag of their country, they were but too glad of an op¬ 
portunity for insulting it. So the fire was kept up upon the advancing 
steamer, which soon found herself in a very awkward position. The shot 
were flying over her deck and through her rigging; she had been hit once. 
To reach Fort Sumter, she would be obliged to pass within three quarters of 
a mile of Fort Moultrie, from which already an armed schooner had put off, 
towed by two steam-tugs. Thus cut off, hemmed in, and fired upon, with¬ 
out the means of returning fire, the commander of the Star of the West con¬ 
cluded that, if he persisted, there was no chance of any other event than the 
loss of his vessel and of many lives; and after remaining under fire for ten 
minutes, during which seventeen shots were fired at him from the battery, 
and some from Fort Moultrie, he turned his ship about and headed for New 
York, where he arrived on the 12th, to the great disappointment and hu¬ 
miliation of all true men, who were hardly less disgusted at this skulking 
attempt than chagrined at its failure. 7 

1 Report of the Captain of the Star of the West. 

Steam-ship Star of the West, New York, Saturday, Jan. 12,1861. 

M. O. Roberts, Esq. : Sir, —After leaving the wharf on the 5th inst., at 5 o’clock P.M., we 

proceeded down the Bay, where we hove to, and took on board four officers and two hundred sol¬ 

diers, with their arms, ammunition, etc., and then proceeded to sea, crossing the bar at Sandy 

Hook at 9 P.M. Nothing unusual took place during the passage, which was a pleasant one for 
this season of the year. 

We arrived at Charleston Bar at 1 30 A.M. on the 9th inst., but could find no guiding marks 
for the Bar, as the lights were all out. We proceeded with caution, running very slow and sound¬ 
ing, until about 4 A.M., being then in four and a half fathoms water, when we discovered a 
light through the haze which at that time covered the horizon. Concluding that the lights were 
on Fort Sumter, after getting the bearings of it we steered to the S.W. for the main ship channel, 














FIRING ON THE “STAR OF THE WEST" FROM THE SOUTH CAROLINA BATTERY ON MORRIS'S ISLAND, JANUARY 10, 1861 


1861 .] 


FORT SUMTER. 


41 














































































































































































































































































































42 


[1861 



TUK FIRST FLAG OF TBL'OE. 


But what did Major Anderson under these circumstances? He behaved 
with the judgment and firmness which marked his conduct throughout his 
severe trial. It must be remembered that communication had been cut off 
between Fort Sumter and the main land, and that Major Anderson knew 
nothing of the intention of sending him supplies and re-enforcements. When, 
therefore, the Star of the West hove in sight of his battlements, she was to 
him merely a merchant steamer entering Charleston Harbor, and having no 
special claim on his protection. His orders were strictly to act upon the de¬ 
fensive ; but all the little garrison of the fort were on the alert, and he him¬ 
self stood, glass in hand, upon the ramparts. To his grief, but perhaps not 
to his surprise, he sees the first shot fired from Morris’s Island, and he orders 
his shotted guns which bear upon that battery to be run out. A second 
shot, and up goes another flag at the fore. Is this a signal to him? He can 
not tell. Shall he fire upon the assailants? He longs to give the word; 
but he is not attacked; his orders justify him only in self-defense, and to 
fire begins the horrors of civil war. Still the steamer keeps her course, and 
shot after shot is fired upon her. The men at the guns begin to fret, and 
the captain of one begs, “Do let us give them one, sir.” “Patient—be pa¬ 
tient,” was the calm reply. But the battery keeps up its fire; the steamer 
is hit; Fort Moultrie also opens its guns upon her. It is becoming too 
much even for that firm and prudent man to bear, and he is about to give 
the word, when, all at once, the steamer puts about, and makes way out to sea 
as rapidly as possible, and the puzzled commander’s doubt is settled for him. 
But, although he was relieved from the necessity of opening fire upon the in¬ 
surgents at that time, the occurrence was of so grave a nature that it could 
not be permitted to pass unquestioned, or repeated with impunity. Major 


where we hove to, to await daylight, our lights having all been put out since 12 o’clock, to avoid 
being seen. 

As the day began to break, we discovered a steamer just inshore of us, which, as soon as she saw 
us, burned one blue light and two red lights as signals, and shortly after steamed over the Bar and 
into the ship channel. The soldiers were now all put below, and no one allowed on deck except 
our own crew. As soon us there was light enough to see, we crossed the Bar and proceeded on up 
the channel (the outer-bar buoy having been taken away), the steamer ahead of us sending off 
rockets, and burning lights until after broad daylight, continuing on her course up nearly two 
miles ahead of us. When we arrived about two miles from Fort Moultrie, Fort Sumter being 
about the same distance, a masked battery on Morris’s Island, where there was a red Palmetto flag 
flying, opened fire upon us—distance about five eighths of a mile. We had the American Jlag Jly- 
ing at one flag-staff at the time, and soon after the Jirst shot hoisted a large American ensign at the 
fore. We continued on under the fire of the battery for over ten minutes, several of the shots 
going clear over us. One shot just passed clear of the pilot-house, another passed between the 
smoke-stack and walking-beams of the engine, another struck the ship just abaft the fore-rigging 
and stove in the planking, while another came within an ace of carrying away the rudder. At 
the same time there was a movement of two steamers from near Fort Moultrie, one of them tow¬ 
ing a schooner (I presume an armed schooner), with the intention of cutting us off. Our position 
now became rather critical, as we had to approach Fort Moultrie to within three quarters of a mile 
before we could keep away for Fort Sumter. A steamer approaching us with an armed schooner 
in tow, and the battery on the island firing at us all the time, and having no cannon to defend 
ourselves from the attack of the vessels, we concluded that, to avoid certain capture or destruc¬ 
tion, we would endeavor to get to sea. Consequently we wore round and steered down the chan¬ 
nel, the battery firing upon us until the shot fell short. As it was now strong ebb tide, and the 
water having fallen some three feet, we proceeded with caution, and crossed the Bar safely at 8 50 
A M., and continued on our course for this port, where we arrived this morning, after a boisterous 
passage. A steamer from Charleston followed us for about three hours, watching our movements. 

In justice to the officers anti crews of each department of the ship, I must add that their be¬ 
havior while under the fire of the battery reflected great credit on them. 

Mr. Brewer, the New York pilot, was of very great assistance to me in helping to pilot the ship 
over Charleston Bar, and up and down the channel. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John M‘Gowan, Captain. 


Anderson, therefore, immediately 
addressed a note to the governor of 
South Carolina, asking whether this 
firing upon an unarmed vessel bear¬ 
ing the flag of his government was 
authorized, and informing him that 
if it were not disavowed he should 
regard it as an act of war, and not 
permit any vessel to pass within 
range of the guns of Fort Sumter. 
This letter he sent with a flag of 
truce to Charleston. Under the cir¬ 
cumstances, a flag of truce was per¬ 
haps proper, and even necessary, 
and doubtless, to a military man, 
the proceeding was a mere formal¬ 
ity ; but to the people there were 
gloomy shadows in the folds of that 
white, peaceful token. To send a 
flag of truce confessed a state of war 
—of civil war; it recognized the 
existence of a second power in the 
land; and then what humiliation to 
see an officer of the United States 
army obtaining audience of the gov¬ 
ernor of one of the states, and one 
of the least important of them too, 
only by virtue of a protection, a 
safeguard ! Governor Pickens, in 
reply, assumed the responsibility of 
the firing, informed Major Ander¬ 
son that attempts to re-enforce him 
would be regarded as hostile acts, 
and resisted accordingly, and left 
him to decide whether he would 
fulfill his threat as to firing upon 
vessels coming within range of his 
guns. The situation proved to be 
graver, and the case more compli¬ 
cated, than Major Anderson was prepared to meet without superior orders. 
Of this he informed Governor Pickens, asking permission for the passage of a 
messenger to Washington, which was granted. 8 This incident added greatly 
to the excitement throughout the North, where, however, no violence or 
even vivacity of feeling was yet displayed ; but a gloomy, gnawing, fierce 
unrest pervaded the whole land. It was felt that the government had acted 
pitifully, and had been publicly caught in the act; but that Major Anderson 
had borne himself only as became a brave and prudent soldier. In the first 
sentence of his demand upon the insurgent governor, the words “ the flag of 
my government” touched the sensitive public heart. He had been the first 
to assert the existence of that government among the insurgents and to sup¬ 
port its flag, and he rose higher than before in public favor. 

While the South Carolina insurgents were conducting their affairs with 
such promptitude, such boldness, and such success, and the government was 
moving with such hesitation into such miserable failure, what was the course 
of events in the country at large? In the slave states the self-constituted 
leaders of the insurrection were doing their best, by acts of usurpation with¬ 
out even the shadow or pretense of authority, to bring about a bloody issue. 


Corres/xmdence between Major Anderson and Governor Pickens. 

To his Excellency the Governor of South Carolina: 

Sir, —Two of your batteries fired this morning on an unarmed vessel bearing the flag of my 
government. As I have not been notified that war has been declared by South Carolina against 
the United States, I can not but think this a hostile act committed without your sanction or au¬ 
thority. Under that hope I refrain from opening a fire on your batteries. I have the honor, 
therefore, respectfully to ask whether the above-mentioned act—one which I believe without par¬ 
allel in the history of our country or any other civilized government—was commit ted in obedi¬ 
ence to your instructions, and notify you, if it is not disclaimed, that I regard it as an act of war, 
and I shall not, after reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit any vessel to pass 
within the range of the guns of my fort. In order to save, as far as it is in my power, the shed¬ 
ding of blood, I beg you will take due notification of my decision for the good of all concerned, 
hoping, however, your answer may justify a farther continuance of forbearance on my part. I 
remain, respectfully, Robert Anderson. 

Governor Pickens's Reply. 

Governor Pickens, after stating the position of South Carolina toward the United States, says 
that any attempt to send United States troops into Charleston Harbor, to re-enforce the forts, 
would be regarded as an act of hostility; and, in conclusion, adds that any attempt to re-enforce 
the troops at Fort Sumter, or to retake and resume possession of the forts within the w aters of 
South Carolina, which Major Anderson abandoned, after spiking the cannon and doing other 
damage, can not but be regarded by the authorities of the state as indicative of any other purpose 
than the coercion of the state by the armed force of the government; sjtecial agents, therefore, 
have been off the Bar to warn approaching vessels, armed and unarmed, having troops to re-enforce 
Fort Sumter aboard, not to enter the harbor. Special orders have been given the commanders at 
the forts not to fire on such vessels until a shot across their bows should warn them of the prohibi¬ 
tion of the state. Under these circumstances, the Star of the West, it is understood, this morning 
attempted to enter the harbor with troops, after having been notified she could not enter, and con¬ 
sequently she was fired into. This act is perfectly justified by me. 

In regard to vour threat about vessels in the harbor, it is only necessary for me to say, you must 
be the judge of your responsibility. Your position in the harbor has been tolerated by the author¬ 
ities of the state ; and while the act of which you complain is in perfect consistency with the rights 
and duties of the state, it is not perceived how far the conduct you propose to adopt can find a par¬ 
allel in the history of any country, or be reconciled w ith any other purpose than that of your gov¬ 
ernment imposing on the state the condition of a conquered province. F. W. Pickens. 

Second Communication from Major Anderson. 

To his Excellency Governor Pickens : 

Sir, — I have the honor to acknow ledge the receipt of your communication, and say that, under 
the circumstances, I have deemed it proper to refer the whole matter to my government, and in¬ 
tend deferring the course I indicated in my note this morning until the arrival from Washington 
of such instructions ns I may receive. 

I have the honor also to express the hope that no obstructions will be placed in the way, and 
that you will do me the favor of giving every facility for the departure and return of the bearer, 
Lieut. T. Talbot, who is directed to make the journey. Robert Anderson. 










































FORT SUMTER. 


43 


1861 .] 


On the 2d of January, Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, took possession of 
Fort Macon, at Beaufort, the forts at Wilmington, and the United States 
Arsenal at Fayetteville; and on the same day Fort Pulaski, near Savannah, 
was seized by the order of Governor Brown, of Georgia. At Mobile, the 
Alabama secessionists demanded and received possession of the United States 
Arsenal, thereby securing 1500 barrels of powder, 300,000 cartridges, besides 
arms and other munitions of war. They also seized upon Fort Morgan, at 
the entrance of Mobile Bay, and garrisoned it with two hundred Alabama 
militia. All these forts and arsenals fell into their hands without resistance; 
for so benign and peaceful was the government against which they revolted, 
that its very military posts were left entirely without military protection, 
in the mere keeping of a corporal and his guard. Of this absence of pro¬ 
tective force, the secessionists of North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama avail¬ 
ed themselves; this trust of the whole nation in the honor of all its constitu¬ 
ent parts, they abused before they had even nominally dissolved the bonds 
which bound them to the government of the United States. Of the bor¬ 
der states Virginia alone showed a readiness to swell the ranks of the in¬ 
surgents. At Norfolk, almost within the very precincts of a great govern¬ 
ment naval station, a meeting was held on the 5th of January, at which 
speeches were made and resolutions passed urging resistance to “coercion 
and invasion”—the favorite phrases by which thoroughly disloyal men des¬ 
ignated the maintenance of its power by the government. But this dispo¬ 
sition was not yet general even in the eastern part of the state; and the 
governor, in a message to the Legislature in special session, condemned South 
Carolina, although he defied the United States. 



GOVERNOR PWKEN8. 


The people of the northern tier of slave states, forming the border line 
between freedom and slavery, spoke out strongly for the Union, or remain¬ 
ed in a state of quiet but anxious expectation. In Baltimore five thousand 
substantial citizens addressed a letter to Governor Hicks, approving his re¬ 
fusal to convene the Legislature of Maryland, which measure was advocated 
in the interests of the secessionists; and the governor replied to the com¬ 
missioner from the State of Alabama, who had solicited the co-operation of 
Maryland, that he regarded co-operation between the slave states as an in¬ 
fraction of the Constitution, which he, as Governor of Maryland, swore to 
support. He declared that the people of that state were firm in their friend¬ 
ship for the Union, and would never swerve from it; that they had seen, 
with mortification and regret, the course taken by South Carolina; because, 
in their opinion, it was better to use the Union for the enforcement of their 
rights, than to break it up because of apprehensions that the provisions of 
the Constitution would be disregarded, and they would cling to it until it 
should actually become the instrument of destruction to their rights, and 
peace, and safety. There were then a few secessionists in Maryland at both 
extremes of the social scale; but the great bulk of the thrifty and intelli¬ 
gent people of the state found their feelings and their opinions expressed for 
them in this letter of their governor, who also spoke the convictions, at that 
time, of a large body of conservative men throughout the slave states. A 
like reply was given by the Legislature of Delaware to the commissioner 
from Mississippi, who approached them with like proposals. The condem¬ 
nation of the course of the seceding states by the people of Delaware was 
prompt and unqualified. But around the Gulf seceders were more numer¬ 
ous, and had obtained absolute control of public affairs. In Georgia, in 
Florida, in Alabama, and in Mississippi, the Legislatures, or the Conventions 
which they had called, moved rapidly and steadily on to the business of the 
disruption of the republic; and in the Senate of Missouri, the Committee on 
Federal Relations was instructed to report a bill calling a state convention. 
A series of outrages upon the national military posts and property accom¬ 
panied these more deliberative movements, and illustrated their spirit. In 
North Carolina, Forts Caswell and Johnson were taken possession of by the 


militia and other persons living near them. On the 11th of January a par¬ 
ty of Louisiana militia seized upon the United States Marine Hospital, about 
two miles below New Orleans, which contained over two hundred patients, 
all of whom who could leave their beds were turned out immediately. At 
Pensacola, a body of Florida and Alabama militia appeared before the gate 
of the navy yard, and demanded possession. The officer in command, hav¬ 
ing no force to resist the demand, yielded his post of necessity. Fort Bar¬ 
rancas was also taken possession of in like manner. The navy yard con¬ 
tained over one hundred thousand dollars worth of ordnance stores. The per 
petrators of this outrage had the assurance to send word to the government, 
through their senators, that it was the consequence of the re-enforcement 
of Fort Pickens, and to propose a restoration on both sides of the status quo 
ante helium! The claims of science, beneficently devoted to the interests of 
all mankind, were not recognized as a safeguard, and the United States 
Coast Survey schooner Dana was seized on the 15th, by order of the state 
authorities of Florida. The freedom of commercial intercourse was equally 
disregarded by the Governor of Mississippi, who planted artillery at Vicks¬ 
burg, on the banks of the river, to stop, for examination, all steamers passing 
southward. This arbitrary interruption of the traffic of that great water 
highway of the continent did much to open the eyes of the people of the 
Western and Northwestern country to the consequences of the disruption of 
the Union. At Augusta, the United States Arsenal was surrendered to the 
militia of the place upon the demand of the Governor of Georgia. 

In most of these cases the forcible seizure of the nation’s property on the 
part of states took place before those states had gone through the formality 
of passing an Ordinance of Secession. But it was not long lacking, this home¬ 
made salve for wounded honor. The Mississippi Convention passed the or¬ 
dinance on the 9th of January, Alabama on the 11th, Florida on the 12th, 
Georgia on the 19th, and, to look forward a few days, Louisiana on the 28th, 
and Texas on the 1st of February. In Mississippi there were fifteen dis¬ 
senting voices; in Florida, only seven against sixty-two; but in Alabama 
there were thirty-nine nays to sixty-one yeas; and in Georgia itself, secession 
was openly denounced and voted against by eighty-nine of the delegates, 
among whom were Alexander H. Stevens and Herschel V. Johnson, the Dem¬ 
ocratic candidate for the vice-presidency at the last election, and Judge Lin¬ 
ton Stevens, of the Supreme Court. It is important to observe how large a 
proportion of the people, and what eminent and influential citizens, in some 
of these states, were so earnestly opposed to secession that, in spite of the at¬ 
tempts by social exclusion, browbeating, deceit, and even actual violence, to 
bring about unanimity, they boldly declared themselves against it. Of the 
evidence that the leaders and active instigators of the insurrection would 
not permit that free expression of public opinion through the ballot-box 
which alone could have excused, though it would not have justified their 
acts, some should be placed directly upon the pages in which the story of 
this woeful time will be told with candor, and with as much good feeling 
as comports with justice. There is no lack of it. “It is a notable fact” 
(the “Southern Confederacy,” of Atalanta, Georgia, says this), “that, wher¬ 
ever the ‘Minute-men,’ as they are called, have had an organization” (they 
were armed vigilance committees), “those counties have voted, by large 
majorities, for immediate secession. Those that they could not control by 
persuasion and coaxing, they dragooned and bullied by threats, jeers, and 
sneers. By this means thousands of good citizens were induced to vote the 
immediate secession ticket through timidity. Besides, the towns and cities 
have been flooded with sensation dispatches and inflammatory rumors, man¬ 
ufactured in Washington City for the especial occasion. To be candid, 
there never has been as much lying and bullying practiced, in the same 
length of time, since the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, as has been 
in the recent state campaign.” The doctrine of state sovereignty, which, 
in the face of the solemn teachings of the Southern fathers of the repub¬ 
lic, the Calhoun school had so long and so ceaselessly poured into the 
ears of Southern people, now served the purpose for which it was intend¬ 
ed, and men submitted to a state ordinance which set at naught the Con¬ 
stitution, and sought to destroy the Union, as they would have obeyed 
a law with regard to any minor matter of daily life. Only in this man¬ 
ner was this insurrection made possible. But even under these circum¬ 
stances the leaders of the movement did not dare to submit -the Ordinance 
of Secession to the people for confirmation, except in one state, Texas, which, 
it is worth while to observe, was the only one of the states which had a sov¬ 
ereign independent political existence before it became merged in the Union. 
It is needless to notice farther the forcible appropriation of national forts, 
arsenals, and ships by state authority. But in one instance the exertion of 
“ sovereign” state authority was accompanied by incidents which were mark¬ 
ed with the charactef of the time. To understand this, we must turn our 
eyes northward, and observe what was passing this while in the loyal free 
and slave states. 

The promptitude and vigor of the insurgents was not imitated more by 
the people of the loyal states than by the government with which they kept 
their faith. From the nature of man and man’s institutions, this was to have 
been expected. Revolutionary and destructive forces, unless they fail mis¬ 
erably at the very outset, must always act more quickly and more vigor 
ously than those which protect that which they would overturn and destroy 
For an essential element of established power is a vis inertia, the very dis¬ 
turbance of which, even for the purpose of resistance, is not only the first 
task, but, if accomplished, the first triumph of revolution. Established gov¬ 
ernment rests upon the basis of a strong tranquillity; and revolution, 
which seeks to displace established government, can accomplish its pur¬ 
pose, even if it control^ an equal body, only by adding movement to its 
weight, thus attaining momentum. The loyal people and the government 
































































































44 


of the United States wished to allay disturbance and to prevent a struggle; 
therefore, when they did any thing, they confined themselves to mild, but, 
as they then thought, firm repressive measures. They did not yet see that 
the business before them was not one of restraint, but of extinction; that 
they must destroy the power they feared, or be destroyed by it. So it is 
even in minor matters of police. Half a dozen riotous, reckless, liquor-mad¬ 
dened men will give employment to twice their number of policemen, acting 
under the authority of law and under a sense of responsibility, and, if not 
put down at once by the strong hand, may peril the peace of a neighborhood. 
The insurgents having openly defied the government, seized its forts, its 
arsenals, and its armed vessels, and established themselves in force, the peo¬ 
ple of the loyal states began to think that it was almost time for them to 
begin to think about beginning to do something. So meetings, decorously 
enthusiastic, were held in New York, in Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, 
Chicago, Portland, Trenton in New Jersey, Wilmington in Delaware, and 
elsewhere, at which many laudable patriotic sentiments were uttered, and a 
sense of “ the value of the Union” was strongly expressed (as if the exist¬ 
ence of the nation and the government was a thing or an interest by itself, 
which was to be priced like goods or railway shares), and the administration 
was assured of the willingness of the people to support it against the insur¬ 
gents. On the other hand, that the purposes of the loyal people might not 
be misapprehended, abolition demonstrations were interfered with; as at 
Rochester, in New York, where a meeting of abolitionists was broken up, 
amid cheers for the Union, General Scott, and Major Anderson; and where 
a banner, with the inscription “No compromise with slavery,” had to be taken 
down. In Boston, Mr. Wendell Phillips, the apostle of abolitionism, having 
avowed himself, as he had often done before, “adisunion man,” expressed joy 
at the secession of the Gulf states, and denounced the compromise spirit of 
Mr. Seward and Mr. Charles Francis Adams, was hissed and hooted, and fol¬ 
lowed home by a great crowd of excited people, from whom he was protect¬ 
ed by policemen. The Legislature of New York, by resolutions, denounced 
secession, avowed a determination to support the national government, and 
offered men and money to the President. In the Massachusetts Legislature 
like resolutions were passed, and with them a bill increasing the militia of 
the state. On the 15th of January Major General Sanford offered the serv¬ 
ices of the whole first division of the militia of New York, which was under 
his command, for the support of the authority of the government. But it 
is worthy of note that there was some, though very trifling, objection to this 
offer, and t a the general’s right to make it. 

Thus far, however, though much had been said at the North, nothing had 
been done as a set-off to the activity and audacity of the insurgents at the 
South. When, at last, something was attempted, it was not by the govern¬ 
ment, or even by state authority. The seceders had, from the beginning of 
their movement, busied themselves in buying arms and munitions of war in 
Northern cities as well as in Europe. Muskets, sabres, powder, percussion 
caps, and even cannon, were shipped to them from Northern ports, where 
the traffic in arms was the only branch of trade not paralyzed by the polit¬ 
ical disturbances. With this traffic an officer of police, John A. Kennedy, 
Chief of the Metropolitan District of New York, took the responsibility of 
interfering. He seized and detained several cases of muskets about to be 
shipped to Georgia. Information of the seizure was telegraphed to the con¬ 
signees, and immediately there came back a dispatch from Mr. Toombs to 
Fernando Wood, Mayor of New York, containing a query as to the act 
and a threat as to its consequences. The reply of the mayor was one of 
exculpation and abject submission to the insurgent demagogue, to whom 
he said that if he had the power he would punish Kennedy. 9 Georgia 
at once retaliated, and in a most effective manner. The governor seized 
and held by military possession two barks, two brigs, and a schooner, ly¬ 
ing in the harbor of Savannah, and belonging to residents of New York, 
and sent on word that they would be held until the arms were released. 
The Governor of New York replied that the seizure had been unauthor¬ 
ized, and that the arms should be given up. The vessels were then re- 

* Correspondence between Senator Toombs and Mayor Wood. 

Milledgeville, Jan. 24, 1861. 

To his Honor Mayor Wood: 

Is it true that any arms intended for and consigned to the State of Georgia have been seized 
by public authorities in New York? Your answer is important to us and to New York. Answer 
at once. R. Toombs. 

To this the Mayor returned the following answer: 

Hon. Robert Toombs, Milledgeville, Ga. : 

In reply to your dispatch, I regret to say that arms intended for and consigned to the State of 
Georgia have been seized by the Police of this state, but that the city of New York should in no 
way be made responsible for the outrage. 

As mayor, I have no authority over the Police. If I had the power, I should summarily pun¬ 
ish the authors of this illegal and unjustifiable seizure of private property. Fernando Wood 

«° Speech of Jefferson Davis on leaving the Senate. 

I rise for the purpose of announcing to the Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the 
State of Mississippi, by solemn ordinance in convention assembled, has declared her separation 
from the United States. Under these circumstances, of course, my functions terminate here. It 
has seemed to be proper that I should appear in the Senate and announce that fact, and to say 
something, though very little, upon it. The occasion does not invite me to go into the argument, 
and my physical condition will not permit it, yet something would seem to be necessary on the 
part of the state I here represent, on an occasion like this. It is known to senators who have 
served here that I have for many years advocated, as an essential attribute of state sovereignty, 
the right of a state to secede from the Union. If, therefore, I had not believed there was justi¬ 
fiable cause—if I had thought the state was acting without sufficient provocation—still, under mv 
theory of government, I should have felt bound by her action. I, however, may say I think she 
had justifiable cause, and I approve of her acts. I conferred with the people before that act was 
taken, and counseled them that, if they could not remain, they should take the act. I hope 
none will confound this expression of opinion with the advocacy of the right of a state to remain 
in the Union, and disregard its constitutional obligations by nullification. Nullification and se¬ 
cession arc indeed antagonistic principles. Nullification is the remedy which is to be sought and 
applied within the Union against an agent of the United States when the agent has violated con¬ 
stitutional obligations, and the state assumes to act for itself, and appeals to other states to support 
it. But when the states themselves, and the people of the states, have so acted as to convince us 
that they will not regard our constitutional rights, then, and then for the first time, arises the 
question of secession in its practical application. That great man who now reposes with his fa- 


[ 1861 . 

leased, and made sail quickly from Savannah. But there being some dif¬ 
ficulty and delay in releasing the arms, the Governor of Georgia seized 
three other vessels, a ship, a bark, and a brig, all owned in New York, and 
detained them until the arms were placed again at the disposal of their Geor¬ 
gia consignees. In these relative attitudes we shall always find the parties 
to this struggle: on the side of the insurgents, a determination to gain their 
point by any means, right or wrong, at any cost, and without hesitation; 
and on the part of the government, a reluctance to violent measures unless 
driven to them by sheer necessity. 

At Washington, the House of Representatives, not until ten days had 
gone by, passed a resolution approving of Major Anderson’s change of posi¬ 
tion, and assuring the President of support in.the enforcement of the laws 
and the preservation of the Union, but nothing more momentous was at¬ 
tempted. In the cabinet, Secretary Thompson, of the Interior, on learning 
the attempt to supply and garrison Fort Sumter, resigned his portfolio; and 
on the 15th of January, Colonel Hayne, a commissioner from South Caro¬ 
lina, and attorney general of the state, demanded the withdrawal of the 
troops which were in thd fort. On being requested to submit the demand 
in writing, he sent in a proposal to buy the fort, with the declaration that 
“ if not permitted to purchase it, South Carolina would take it by force of 
arms,” a safe threat against a work already engirdled by batteries, and con¬ 
taining not quite fourscore fighting men. On the 20th of January, the sen¬ 
ators from Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, among whom was Jefferson 
Davis, withdrew from the Senate. The latter made a parting speech, not 
resigning, but taking leave of the senators, on the ground that, as his state 
had passed an Ordinance of Secession, he had no longer a right to sit in his 
seat Looked upon as one of the ablest men of his party, and as a politician 
of determined purpose, and little scruple as to the means of attaining a po¬ 
litical end, his retirement attracted more attention than that of any other se¬ 
ceding member of Congress. His speech was listened to with profound at¬ 
tention, and at the close of it, all the Democratic senators crowded roufcd him 
and the other seceding senators, and shook hands warmly with them. 10 Just 
a week after the withdrawal of the man who was to assume so prominent a 
part in the rebellion, another, also to be heard of again in the annals of the 
period, ex-Secretary of War Floyd, was presented for indictment by the 
grand jury of the District of Columbia on three findings: malversation in 
office, complicity in the abstraction of the Indian Trust Fund Bonds, and 
conspiracy against the government. But he had taken himself well out of 
reach of grand juries and marshals, and he wisely kept so thereafter. The 
original members of Mr. Buchanan’s cabinet, with the exception of General 
Cass, who retired early, and Mr. Attorney General Black, who was honor¬ 
able and loyal, brought disgrace upon themselves, upon his administration, 
and the country; but one of its new ministers, General Dix, Secretary of the 
Treasury, was the first member of the government to assert its authority, in 
a manner which met the expectations and called forth the sympathies of the 
people. The revenue cutters of the United States are, of course, in the keep¬ 
ing of the Secretary of the Treasury, and under his orders. Among those 
which were exposed to the peculiar practices of the insurgents, with regard 
to the property of the “common agency,” were the Lewis Cass, at Mobile, 
and the Robert M'Clelland, at New Orleans. General Dix had not been at 
the head of the Treasury Department four days when he sent a special agent 
to those ports to save those vessels by ordering them to New York. Hav¬ 
ing reached New Orleans, the agent delivered the secretary’s order to Cap¬ 
tain Breshwood, of the M'Clelland, who, after consultation with the collector 
of the port, flatly refused to obey it. Upon this the agent telegraphed for 
instructions to the secretary, who telegraphed back orders for the arrest of 
the captain by the lieutenant of the cutter, and his treatment as a mutineer 
if he offered any resistance, closing the order with the memorable words, 
“ If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the 
spot.” This dispatch was intercepted both at Mobile and New Orleans, 
where the insurgent leaders had already placed the telegraph under super¬ 
vision, and so did not reach the agent of the Treasury Department. The 

there, who has been so often arraigned for want of fealty to the Union, advocated the doctrine of 
nullification because it preserved the Union. It was because of his deep-seated attachment to 
the Union that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of nullification, which he claimed would give 
peace within the limits of the Union, and not disturb it, and only be the means of bringing the 
agent before the proper tribunal of the states for judgment. Secession belongs to a different class 
of rights, and is to be justified upon the basis that the states are sovereign. The time has been, 
and I hope the time will come again, when a better appreciation of our Union will prevent any 
one denying that each state is a sovereign in its own right. Therefore I say I concur in the act 
of my state, and feel bound by it. It is by this confounding of nullification and secession that the 
name of another great man has been invoked to justify the coercion of a seceding state. The 
phrase “to execute the law,” as used by General Jackson, was applied to a state refusing to obey 
the laws and still remaining in the Union. I remember well when Massachusetts was arraigned 
before the Senate. The record of that occasion will show that I said, if Massachusetts, in pursu¬ 
ing the line of steps, takes the last step which separates her from the Union, the right is here, and 
I will neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her, but I will say to her, “God speed!” 
Mr. Davis then proceeded to argue that the equality spoken of in the Declaration of Independence 
was the equality of a class in political rights, referring to the charge against George III. for in¬ 
citing insurrection as proof that it had no reference to the slaves. But we have proclaimed our 
independence. This is done with no hostility or any desire to injure any section of the country, 
nor even for our pecuniary benefit, but from the higli and solid foundation of defending and pro¬ 
tecting the rights we inherited, and transmitting them unshorn to our posterity. I know I feel 
no hostility to you senators here, and am sure there is not one of you, whatever may have been the 
sharp discussion between us, to whom I can not now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you 
well. And such is the feeling, I am sure, the people I represent feel toward those whom you rep¬ 
resent. I therefore feel I but express their desire when I say I hope and they hope for those 
peaceful relations with you, though we must part, that may be mutually beneficial to us in the fu¬ 
ture. There will be peace if you so will it, and you may bring disaster on every part of the coun¬ 
try if you thus will have it. And if you will have it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, 
who delivered them from the paw of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear; and 
thus putting our trust in God, and our own firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate and 
defend the rights we claim. In the course of my long career, I have met with a great v ariety of 
men here, and there have been points of collision between us. Whatever of offense \here has 
been to me, I leave here. I carry no hostile feelings away. Whatever of offense I have given, 
which has not been redressed, I am willing to say to senators in this hour of parting, J offer you 
my apology for any thing I may have done in the Senate ; and I go thus released from obligation, 
remembering no injury I have received, and having discharged what I deem the duty of man, to 
offer the only reparation at this hour for every injury I have ever inflicted. 





1861.] 


FORT SUMTER 


45 



1 Slavery, secession, and state sovereignty could not eradicate this love. An officer of the 
United Stares, taken prisoner after the war had lasted a year, received from a rebel officer, whose 
quarters he visited, the confession that he had no attachment to the confederate colors which float¬ 
ed above them, and that “ the hardest thing about this war was to fire upon the old flag.” This 
incident is known to the writer on private information. 

* Mr. W. Hemphill Jones, the special agent of the Treasury Department, made a report to Sec¬ 
retary Dix, from which the following passages are taken: 

New Orleans, Jan. 29, 1861. 

Sir, —You are hereby directed to get the United States revenue cutter M‘Clelland, now lying 
here, under way immediately, and proceed with her to New York, where you will await the fur¬ 
ther instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury. For my authority to make this order you are 
referred to the letter of the Secretary, dated the 19th inst., and handed you personally by me. 
Very respectfully, Wm. Hemphill Joses, SjtecialAgent . 

To Capt J. G. Breshwood, commanding U. S. Revenue Cutter Robert MHJlelland. 

Breshwood conferred with Collector Hatch, of New Orleans, and then returned the following 
answer, flatly refusing to obey the order: 

U. S. Revenue Cutter Robert McClelland, New Orleans, January 29,1861. 

Sir, —Your letter, with one of the 19th of January from the Hon. Secretary of the Treasury, I 
have duly received, and in reply refuse to obey the order. I am, sir, your obedient servant, 

John G. Breshwood, Captain. 

To Wm. Hemphill Jones, Eaq., Special Agent. 

Believing that Captain Breshwood would not have ventured upon this most positive act of in¬ 
subordination and disobedience of his own volition, I waited upon the collector at the custom¬ 
house, and had with him a full and free conversation upon the whole subject. In the course of it, 
Mr. Hatch admitted to me that he had caused the cutter to be brought to the city of New Orleans 
by an order of his own, dated January 15, so that she might be secured to the State of Louisiana, 
although at that time the state had not only not seceded, but the Convention had not met, and, 
in fact, did not meet until eight days afterward. This, I must confess, seemed to me a singular 
confession for one who at that very time had sworn to do his duty faithfully as an officer of the 
United States; and, on intimating as much to Mr. Hatch, he excused himself on the ground that 
in these revolutions all other things must give way to the force of circumstances. Mr. Hatch like¬ 
wise informed me that the officers of the cutter had long since determined to abandon their alle¬ 
giance to the United States, and cast their fortunes with the independent State of Louisiana. In 
order to test the correctness of this statement, I addressed another communication to Captain 
Breshwood, of the following tenor: 

New Orleans, January 29,1861. 

Sir, —By your note of this date I am informed that you refuse to obey the orders of the Honor¬ 
able Secretary of the Treasury. As. on accepting your commission, you took and subscribed an 
oath faithfully to discharge your duties to the government, and, as you well -know, the law has 
placed the revenue cutters and their officers under the entire control of the Secretary of the Treas¬ 
ury, I request you to advise me whether you consider yourself at this time an officer in the service 
of the United States. Very respectfully, Wm. Hemphill Jones, Special Agent. 

To Captain Breshwood. 


cutters were thus lost to the government; but the 
publication of the intercepted order, a few days after¬ 
ward, sent an awakening thrill through the public 
heart in the loyal states, which, after the dull op¬ 
pression caused by the course of affairs at Washing¬ 
ton thus far, was worth ten times the value of the 
vessels. Dear as his country’s flag is to every true¬ 
hearted man, it is dearest of all to the citizen of the 
United States; for it is not only the symbol of his 
nationality, but the standard under which that na¬ 
tionality was achieved, beneath whose folds the fa¬ 
thers of the Revolution fought, and suffered, and died; 
and besides, it is the only outward and visible sign 
with which he, having no hereditary master, can con¬ 
nect his idea of patriotism, to which he can be loyal; 
it is the representative to him of the government of 
which he forms a part, of the eternal principles of lib¬ 
erty, and justice, and Divine benevolence upon which 
that government is founded, and of the noble land of 
which he ever thinks with love and pride. What 
the crown, the king, and the flag together are to an¬ 
other man, the flag alone is to the citizen of the re¬ 
public. It is the rainbow of hope and promise in his 
sky, and his heart leaps up when he beholds it. 1 So, 
when Secretary Dix’s order was made public, there 
was an outcry of joy all over the land; it was felt 
that the honor of the flag had at last found a defend¬ 
er in the government. A second impulse was given 
to the popular feeling which first broke forth when 
Major Anderson entered Fort Sumter, and which was 
to receive its highest exaltation when he was forced 
to leave it. The shameful fact must needs be record¬ 
ed here, that both these revenue cutters were pur¬ 
posely brought within the power of the authorities of 
Alabama and Louisiana, before their secession, by the 
collectors of Mobile and New Orleans, who were the 
sworn officers and busine^ agents of the government 
of the United States. 2 About the same time the Mint 
and the Sub-treasury of New Orleans, with all the 
public money they contained, together with private 
deposits, were seized by the secessionists of that city. 

The six Gulf states and South Carolina having now 
passed Ordinances of Secession, and seized all the na¬ 
tional forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, and ships 
within their reach, a convention of their representa¬ 
tives was held at Montgomery, the capital of Alabama, 
for the purpose of forming a joint provisional govern¬ 
ment, or “ common agency,” to take the place of that 
from which they had withdrawn themselves and what¬ 
ever was within their reach. Texas passed its Ordi¬ 
nance of Secession on the 1st of February, and on the 
4th the Convention of the seceding states organized it¬ 
self, with Howell Cobb, only a few months before Sec¬ 
retary of the Treasury of the United States, as presi¬ 
dent. In four days they had named themselves “ The 
Confederate States of America,” adopted a Constitu¬ 
tion, and formed a provisional government, of which 
Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, was president, and Alexander H. Stephens, 
of Georgia, vice-president. 


To this letter I never received any reply. I then repaired again on board the cutter, and asked 
for the order of the collector bringing her to New Orleans. The original was placed in my pos¬ 
session, of which the following is a copy. And here it may be proper to observe that the order is 
written and signed by the collector himself: 

Custom-house. New Orleans, Collector's Office, Jan. 15,1861. 

Sir, —You are hereby directed to proceed forthwith under sail to this city, and anchor the ves¬ 
sel under your command opposite the United States Marine Hospital, above Algiers. Very re¬ 
spectfully, your obedient servant, F. H. Hatch, Collector. 

To Captain J. G. Breshwood, United States Revenue Cutter McClelland, Southwest Pass, La. 

Defeated at New Orleans, Mr. Jones then took his way to Mobile, to look after the Lewis Cass. 
Her captain (Morrison) could not be found, but Mr. Jones discovered in the cabin the following 
letter, which explains the surrender of that vessel: 

State of Alabama, Collector's Office, Mobile, January 30,1861. 

Sir, —In obedience to an ordinance recently adopted by a convention of the people of Alabama, 
I have to require you to surrender into my hands, for the use of the state, the revenue cutter Lewis 
Cass, now under your command, together with her armaments, properties, and provisions on board 
the same. I am instructed also to notify you that you have the option to continue in command 
of the said revenue cutter, under the authority of the State of Alabama, in the exercise of the 
same duties that you have hitherto rendered to the United States, and at the same compensation, 
reporting to this office and to the governor of the state. In surrendering the vessel to the state, 
you will furnish me with a detailed inventory of its armaments, provisions, and properties of every 
description. You will receive special instructions from this office in regard to the duties you will 
be required to perform. I await your immediate reply. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

T. Sanford, Collector. 

To J. J. Morrison, Esq , Captain Revenue Cutter Lewis Cass, Mobile, Ala. 

Upon Captain Breshwood’s refusal to obey the order of the Secretary of the Treasury, the fol¬ 
lowing telegraphic correspondence ensued: 

New Orleans, Jan. 29,1861. 

Hon. J. A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury : 

Capt. Breshwood has refused positively, in writing, to obey any instructions of the department. 
In this I am sore he is sustained by the collector, and believe acts bv his advice. What must I 
do ? W. H. Jones, Special Agent. 

To this dispatch Secretary Dix immediately returned the following answer, before published: 

Treasury Department, Jan. 99,1S61. 

W. Hemphill Jones, New Orleans: 

Tell Lieut. Caldwell to arrest Capt. Breshwood, assume command of the cutter, and obey the 
order through you. If Capt. Breshwood, after arrest, undertakes to interfere with the command 
of the cutter, tell Lieut. Caldwell to consider him as a mutineer, and treat him accordingly. If 
any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot. 

John A. Dlx, Secretary of the Treasury. 













46 


Probably no better choice of men for president and vice-president of the 
rebellious confederacy could have been made if as many months as there 
were days had been spent in the selection. Jefferson Davis was not a states¬ 
man, not even a high-toned politician; but he was a cool, astute, adroit po¬ 
litical manager. He was not a man of either great military capacity or ac¬ 
quirement ; but he was a good soldier, and a daring, determined commander. 
His temperament fitted him for such a bad eminence as that to which he 
had been raised, and it seemed as if his whole life had been but a training to 
fit him for its functions. Born in Kentucky in 1808, he had been brought 
up in Mississippi, of which state his father, a planter and a Revolutionary of¬ 
ficer, became a resident while it was yet mere territory of the United States. 
He was thus familiar from his earliest youth with the men of the Southwest, 
where were gathered the most desperate, lawless, loose-lived of the citizens 
of the republic. During his youth, and long after he had entered vigorous 
manhood, New Orleans was the social sink of the Union, and Vicksburg but 
a by-way to the bottomless pit. Toward that corner of the Union, swept 
down by the resistless current of commerce, emigration, and adventure 
flowing between the banks of three mighty rivers, tended all the scum and 
sediment of an ever-moving population, to seethe and fret, in a vitiated trop¬ 
ical atmosphere, into moral pestilence. Parents in the well-ordered, well- 
instructed, God-fearing commonwealths of the North and East, whose sons 
went thither upon commercial ventures, saw not even in rapidly-accumu¬ 
lated wealth a recompense for the contamination of the very few years that 
sufficed to acquire it; and, parting with them, almost gave them up as lost. 
There both life and fortune were held by precarious tenure. There gam¬ 
bling was the general occupation, and bloody assault the social distinction 
of a “gentleman.” There drunkenness, in a greater or less degree, was re¬ 
garded as the normal condition of any creature who had intelligence above 
the brute; though a lapse into sobriety, when palliated by the temptations 
of great gain, was looked upon as venial. There a dialect of ingenious and 
elaborate blasphemy, half-savage slang, and abominable filth was made tol¬ 
erably intelligible to strangers, who were accustomed only to the ordinary 
phraseology of the English race, by the occasional introduction of words of 
whi<;h necessity and the idioms of our language compelled the use. There 
statute law and common law were rarely enforced, except against an op¬ 
pressed and degraded race; but the judgments of Lynch courts were pro¬ 
nounced with incorruptible austerity, and executed with inexorable cer¬ 
tainty and swiftness. Such was the general tone of society in Mississippi 
and the surrounding country during the first thirty or forty years of this 
century ; but above this general level, yet descending occasionally to it and 
resting upon it, was a smalt class of planters, who, with a very few pro¬ 
fessional men, and merchants of the more honorable sort, possessed all the 
little moral worth and intellectual culture of the region; and to this Mr. 
Davis belonged. But in such a community — a community whose moral 
sense was blunted by the presence of a class whom ever}' member of every 
other class might oppress with impunity—even the men whose motives were 
just and whose tastes more or less refined, were obliged to maintain their 
position by a certain conformity to the social habits, and a certain assump¬ 
tion of the defiant bearing, of the men around them. Few men can live 
from early youth to mature manhood among desperadoes without acquiring 
something of their desperation—at least a familiarity with desperate issues. 
Among such a people Jefferson Davis passed his life until he went in 1824 
as a cadet to West Point. Thence he graduated with honor in 1828, and 
was, at his own request, assigned immediately to active service with Colonel 
Zachary Taylor, afterward general and president, but then engaged in fron¬ 
tier warfare at the West. On the rough and adventurous battle-field of the 
borders, the future insurgent leader so quickly distinguished himself that 
upon the formation of a new regiment of cavalry he obtained in it his com¬ 
mission as first lieutenant, in which position he did good service against the 
Indians, and, it is said, made a warm friend of the well-known chief Black 
Hawk while he was held a prisoner of war. After seven years of active 
frontier service Mr. Davis resigned his commission, and in 1835 became a 
cqtton-planter in Mississippi, diversifying the dull routine of Southern agri¬ 
cultural life with political studies. When the Democratic party nominated 
Mr. Polk for president, Mr. Davis canvassed, or “stumped” the state on his 
behalf, was made presidential elector to vote for him, and in 1845 was elect¬ 
ed a member of the House of Representatives, where he soon proved him¬ 
self in debate an active and energetic supporter of the measures of his party. 
He took his place in the front rank of the extreme advocates of slavery and 
state sovereignty. Upon the breaking out of the Mexican war he was elect¬ 
ed colonel of a Mississippi rifle regiment, and resigned his seat in Congress 
for a post of honor in the field. Here he again distinguished himself bv his 
coolness and determination, and at the battle of Buena Vista rendered such 
efficient service at the head of his regiment, where he remained throughout 
the day, though badly wounded, that General Taylor praised his conduct 
highly in his dispatches. His term of service having expired, he returned 
home, but was met on his way by a commission as brigadier general of vol¬ 
unteers, sent to him by President Polk. Almost any other man would have 
at once accepted such an honor. But here was an opportunity for an ex¬ 
hibition of a sort of perverse, pertinacious consistency in pushing the doc¬ 
trine of state sovereignty to the last extreme, and of giving a civil rebuff to 
_the government at Washington. Colonel Davis had been commissioned ns 
a Mississippi volunteer; and, although he was in the service of the United 
States, under command of a general in the regular army of the United 
States, and paid by the United States, he was yet not to be insulted as a 
Mississippian by being made a general of brigade by the President of the 
United States; and so he declined the commission, on the ground that its 
bestowal was an infraction—well meant and pardonable, perhaps, but still 


[ 1861 . 

an infraction—of the sovereignty of the “republic” of Mississippi!—a poor, 
struggling, debt-repudiating commonwealth, created by an act of Congress 
of the United States, and sparsely peopled by such emigrants as could best 
be spared from the older commonwealths of the same great nation. But 
still, ridiculous as it was, Mr. Davis made his point. 

One of Mississippi’s senatorial chairs at Washington being casually vacant 
in 1847, Mr. Davis was appointed by the governor of the state to fill it; and 
this he did so much to the satisfaction of his constituents that he was twice 
re-elected to the same position. In the Senate-chamber he attained the repu¬ 
tation of a ready, dexterous, and fearless debater, and a clear-headed, ener¬ 
getic man of business. His views of the superiority of state authority to 
that of the central government grew stronger as he grew older. It was in 
the nature of the man that they should. His notions of state responsibil¬ 
ity for pecuniary obligation were brought into unpleasant notoriety during 
his senatorsbip by the position which he took in regard to the repudiation 
of her bonds by Mississippi. Tallis he defended, and his sneer at “ the croc¬ 
odile tears which had been shed over ruined creditors” excited sorrow at 
home and indignation abroad. 3 In 1851 he resigned his seat in the Sen¬ 
ate to be nominated Governor of Mississippi as the representative of the 
party in that state which held his principles; but, having been defeated by 
Henry S. Foote, the candidate of the Union party, he retired into private 
life for a year. In 1852 he electioneered for Mr. Pierce, the successful pres¬ 
idential candidate of the Democratic party, who acknowledged his services 
and his capacity by calling him into his cabinet as Secretary of War. In his 
new position he showed great activity and energy. He added to the coast 
defenses, improved the manufacture of arms and ammunition, and intro¬ 
duced the French light infantry tactics—wrongly styled Hardee’s—into the 
army. Leaving the cabinet when Mr. Buchanan entered the White House, 
he returned to the Senate-chamber, where he remained until the Ordinance 
of Secession was passed by Mississippi, when, his doctrines of state sovereign¬ 
ty having accomplished the purpose for which they were devised, in com¬ 
pliance with them, he withdrew. 

Mr. Davis owes his position purely to intellectual ability and to tenacity 
of purpose. He is not, like Toombs, a boaster and a bull}' of the fire-eating 
school; but he has a cool and almost serene audacity, which accomplishes 
his ends at least as. effectually as noisier methods, and in a manner much 
better suited to his taste and his temperament. His nature is not rich, 
his soul not magnanimous, or his mind either strong or subtle. He influ¬ 
ences men neither by convincing nor by winning them. His talent is that 
of clear perception; his power, that of nervous energy; and these are di¬ 
rected by an inflexible will. While other men pause over their scruples, 
and endeavor to reconcile their purpose and their conscience, he strikes di¬ 
rectly at success. Devoid alike of enthusiasm and of sentiment, he yet 
knows the exaltation of entire commitment to a great purpose. His body 
is spare; bis brain large; his face attenuated and purely intellectual in ex¬ 
pression ; his manner placid and precise, but decided. He could not have 
aroused the storm of insurrection, but he is just the man to guide its de¬ 
structive energies. 

In his character and his career, the man who was elected to the second 
place in the insurgent provisional government is very unlike him who holds 
the first. Alexander H. Stephens was born in Georgia in 1812, of parents 
in very humble life. Deprived, alike by the poverty of his family and the 
polity of his state, of the means of obtaining that grammar-school education 
which no child in the free states need ever be without, his career might have 
been obscure (it could not have been dishonorable or mean) had not the 
quickness of his parts attracted the attention of observant friends, who 
kindly supported him at school and at college, and during the first struggles 
of a professional career. He was admitted to the bar, and soon fully justi¬ 
fied the judgment of his benefactors. It was not many years before he "was 
able to gratify that love of home which distinguishes the English race no 
less in America than in Great Britain, and repurchased the small planta¬ 
tion of two hundred and fifty acres on which he was born, and which had 
necessarily been sold on his father’s death. The possessor of such a free¬ 
hold as Mr. Stephens’s father had owned, in almost any other country than 
the slave states of America, would not have been without the means of send¬ 
ing his boy to school; but there, the children of men who, without capital 
either in money or in slaves, till so comparatively small a tract, wander 
about barefooted and bareheaded, and are given up to low associations. 
From 1837 to 1842 Mr. Stephens was a member of the Georgia Legislature, 
and in 1848 he was elected to the House of Representatives as a candidate 
of the old Whig party; but when that party, shaken to its already under¬ 
mined foundation by the early throes of the convulsion which was to up¬ 
heave the nation, fell into ruin, he took refuge in the Union wing of South¬ 
ern Democracy. Of feeble frame, wasted by disease, and with a voice like 
the shrill pipe of an adolescent lad, which, indeed, he almost seemed to be, 
he yet soon attained distinction in Congress as a sound thinker, a skillful 
and eloquent debater, and a clear-headed, hard-working committee-man. 
Ilis character, both as a politician and a man. is above reproach : the purity 
of his motives has never been impeached by friend or foe. It was as a law¬ 
yer, a legislator, and an orator that he won his reputation. He has no ex¬ 
ecutive ability, or power to lead men into action. The cast of his mind is 
deliberative and argumentative. As we have already seen, he resisted se¬ 
cession to the very last; but when his state, or the majority of its residents, 
passed an Ordinance of Secession, he submitted; and, bound hand and foot 
by the doctrine of state sovereignty, was delivered over into the hands of 
the very faction whom he had so ably and so courageously opposed. They 

3 Sec his letter to the Washington Union, and the just animadversions upon it in the London 
Times of July 13th, 1849. 




1861 .] 


EORT SUMTER. 


47 



made him vice-president, and he did not feel at lib¬ 
erty to resist their will. By the election of these two 
men, the insurgent leaders appealed directly to both 
classes of the people whose fortunes they had taken 
into their hands. The election of Jefferson Davis 
satisfied entirely the fire-eaters and uncompromising 
secessionists; and that of Mr. Stephens attracted to 
the new government the men of moderate views, who 
were still attached to the Union. Each man, too, 
was put into his proper place: the former where his 
varied experience of life, his military knowledge, and 
his executive ability would be called into play; the 
latter into a nominally executive office of all but the 
highest rank, but where his duties were really to 
preside over the deliberations of a legislative body. 
Soon after his elevation to this office he delivered 
a speech which was even more remarkable than that 
in which he endeavored to stay the movement toward 
secession, and to which there will be occasion to re¬ 
fer hereafter. Could reason, sanctioned by the char¬ 
acter and upborne by the influence of a blameless and 
beloved man, have checked the madness of secession, 
Mr. Stephens’s first effort would have checked it; 
but that proving impossible, he lent the same mental 
gifts and the same personal beauty of character to 
the support and adornment of a cause which he had 
not at heart. 


4 Constitution oj the Confederated States. 

The Preamble reads as follows: 

“We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent states of South Carolina, Georgia, Flor¬ 
ida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, invoking the favor of Almighty God, do hereby, in be¬ 
half of these states, ordain and establish this Constitution for the provisional government of the 
game, to continue one year from the inauguration of the President, or until a*permancnt constitu¬ 
tion or confederation between the said states shall be put in operation, whichsoever shall first occur." 

The seventh section, first article, is as follows: 

“The importation of African negroes from any foreign country other than the slaveholding 
states of the United States is hereby forbidden, and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall 
effectually prevent the same.” 

Article second: “Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from 
any state not a member of this confederacy.” 

Article fourth of the third clause of the second section says: 

“A slave in one state escaping to another shall be delivered up, on the claim of the party to 
whom said slave may belong, by the executive authority of the state in which such slave may be 
found; and in case of any abduction or forcible rescue, full compensation, including the value of 
the slave, and all costs and expenses, shall be made to the party by the state in which such ab¬ 
duction or rescue shall take place.” 

* INAUGURAL ADDRES8 OP JEFFERSON DAVI8. 

Gentlemen of the Com/ress of the Confederate States of A merica } Friends and Fellow- Citizens : 

Called to the difficult and responsible station of chief executive of the provisional government 
which yon have instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned me with an humble 
distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide 
and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the virtue and patriot¬ 
ism of the people. Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government to 
take the place of this, and which, by its greater moral and physical power, will be better able to 
combat with the many difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of separate nations, I 
enter upon the duties of the office to which I have been chosen with the hope that the beginning 
of our career as a confederacy may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the 
separate existence and independence which we have asserted, and which, with the blessing of 
Providence, we intend to maintain. 

Our present condition, achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations, illustrates 
the American idea that governments rest upon the consent of the governed, and that it is the right 
of the people to alter and abolish governments whenever they become destructive to the ends for 
which they were established. The declared compact of the Union, from which we have with¬ 
drawn, was to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, pro¬ 
mote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; and 
when, in the judgment of the sovereign states now composing this confederacy, it has been pervert¬ 
ed from the purposes for which it w’as ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was 
established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box declared that, so far as they were concerned, the 


With regard to a Constitution, the labors of the 
Convention were light and short: they adopted the 
Constitution of the United States with a very few 
variations. Of these, two only—the admission of ab¬ 
solute state sovereignty, involving the formation of 
the new government by states and not by the whole 
people, and the recognition of slavery as normal 
throughout the confederation—were the only radi¬ 
cal differences between the new Constitution and that 
from which its framers had revolted. 4 And as to the 
last, it worked no practical change, because the abso¬ 
lute inviolability of slavery, as of every other local 
institution not inconsistent with the Constitution of 
the United States, was secured by that instrument 
itself. Thus their very organic law became a wit¬ 
ness forever against those men who had undertaken 
the destruction of that which the vice-president of 
their confederation himself called “the most benefi¬ 
cent government the world ever saw.” It showed 
that the reason of their rebellion was, not that they 
were in danger of losing any political right or per¬ 
sonal privilege, not that they were in danger of be¬ 
coming slaves, or even that their slaves were in dan¬ 
ger of becoming free men, but merely that the inter¬ 
est of slavery had ceased to be dominant in the re¬ 
public. Unanimity of feeling and unity of action 
marked the proceedings of this Convention, and of the 
government which was formed by it, though not of 
the people of whose destinies it had assumed control. 
But the government none the less exhibited immedi¬ 
ately that promptness and decision which had mark¬ 
ed the movements of the insurgent leaders from the very first. On the 
18th of February Jefferson Davis was inaugurated provisional president; 5 


government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the right 
which the Declaration of Independence of 1776 defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occa¬ 
sion of its exercise they, as sovereigns, were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial, en¬ 
lightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He who knows the 
hearts of men will judge of the sincerity w ith which we labored to preserve the government of our 
fathers in its spirit. 

The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the states, and which has been affirmed and reaf¬ 
firmed in the Bills of Rights of the states subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undenia¬ 
bly recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of gov¬ 
ernment. Thus the sovereign states here represented proceeded to form this confederacy; and it 
is by the abuse of language that their act has been denominated revolution. They formed a new 
alliance, but within each state its government has remained. The rights of person and property 
have not teen disturbed. The agent through whom they communicated with foreign nations is 
changed, but this docs not necessarily interrupt their international relations. Sustained by the 
consciousness that the transition from the former Union to the present confederacy has not pro- 
ceedcd from a disregard, on our part, of our just obligations, or any failure to perforin every con¬ 
stitutional duty, moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to culti¬ 
vate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least ex¬ 
pect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified by the ab¬ 
sence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause 
to doubt that the courage and pntr'otism of the people of the Confederate States will be found 
equal to any measures of defense which soon their security may require. 

An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a commodity required in every 
manufacturing country, our true policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will 
permit. It is alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we would sell and from whom we 
would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of com¬ 
modities. There can be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating com¬ 
munity, such as the Northeastern states of the American Union. It must follow, therefore, that 
mutual interest would invite good-w ill and kind offices. If, however, passion or lust of dominion 
should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those states, we must prepare to meet the 
emergency, and maintain by the final arbitrament of the sword the position which we have as¬ 
sumed among the nations of the earth. 

We have entered upon a career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued through 
many years of controversy with our late associates of the Northern states. We have vainly en¬ 
deavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a 
necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our energies 
must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the i* *orpctuity of the confederacy which 
we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our 
separate political career, my most earnest desire w ill-have been fulfilled. But if this De denied 








































48 


[ 1861 . 


and by the 20th he had formed his cabinet, in which Mr. Toombs had the 
Department of State, Mr. Memminger that of the Treasury, and Mr. Pope 
Walker that of War. Thus, in three months and two weeks from the elec¬ 
tion in which the people of these seven states had taken part, they had been 
hurried into secession, had been provided, by the summary process of seiz¬ 
ure, with fifteen forts, an immense amount of arms and ammunition, large 
sums of money and several armed vessels, had drilled thousands of troops, 
had a Constitution and a provisional government bestowed upon them, 
which government had put its administrative machinery in working order. 
In fact, nearly all these things were ready at their hand; they had only, as 
individuals, as states, or through a “ common agency,” to take them. An 
insurrection under like favorable circumstances the world never saw before. 

The insurgent government found itself, however, not only jealously re¬ 
garded by some of the most important slave states, but with a large and out¬ 
spoken opposition in some of the very states by which it had been formed. 
From the small state of Delaware little aid could have been expected, and 
hope of that little was entirety given up on account of that state’s unqualified 
devotion to the republic. Maryland and Kentucky were loyal by very large 
majorities. The former was under loyal rule; and, although the governor 
of the latter (Magoffin) was a secessionist, his hands were so tied by his con¬ 
stituents that he could not yet give any aid to the insurgent cause. At¬ 
tempts to force Tennessee into rebellion had failed; and in the eastern part 
of the state the whole population was devoted to the Union. Of the people 
of Missouri a large majority also were unwavering in their allegiance to the 
Constitution and the flag. Virginia was busying herself to bring about a 
compromise and a restoration of the power of the government by amend¬ 
ments to the Constitution, and to that end she made propositions to South 
Carolina, who spurned them in a series of resolutions, one of which was, 
“ That the separation of South Carolina from the federal Union was final, 
and she has no farther interest in the Constitution of the United States.” 
In South Carolina there appeared to be almost an entire unanimity of feel¬ 
ing. There were many who were still loyal, but they comparatively were 
so few in number that they were quite overborne and practically extin¬ 
guished. Only one man of them felt that his position warranted him in 
speaking out his lojmlty. The name of John S. Pettigru, a venerable and 
much-esteemed resident of Charleston, where he gracefully occupied the 
highest social position, will always be held in honor as the one faithful 
among the many faithless to the republic in that city. The rector of the 
Episcopal church at which he was an attendant having, after the act of se¬ 
cession, omitted the President of the United States from the Collect for 
rulers and all in authority, Mr. Pettigru rose and left the church, thus silently 
protesting in the face of the congregation against the omission. It is said that 
only the veneration in which he was held secured him impunity in this oppo¬ 
sition to the seceding party; but it is much to be deplored that all who were 
like-minded with him throughout the slave states were not, like him, bold 
and constant in their assertion of their loyalty and their love for the republic. 
The course of events would thereby have been greatly changed. But in oth¬ 
er states of the new confederacy there was not only devotion to the Union, 
but speech and action in its support. When, after the Louisiana Convention 
had passed the Ordinance of Secession, her senators, John Slidell and Judah 
P. Benjamin, withdrew from Congress with insult and defiance on their lips, 
one of her delegates to the House of Representatives, John E. Bouligny, de¬ 
clared in his place that he would not withdraw, and that he would live by 
and die for the flag under which he was born. In Frankfort, Alabama, the 
state in which was the capital of the rebel confederacy, a meeting was held 
at which not only was a resolution passed sustaining the delegates of that 
district in their refusal to sign the Ordinance of Secession, but it was declared 
that secession was “inexpedient and unnecessary,” that those present were 
“opposed to it in any form,” and that “the refusal to submit the so-called 
Secession Ordinance to the decision of the people was an outrage upon their 
rights and liberty, and manifested a spirit of assumption, unfairness, and dic¬ 
tatorship.” And, finally, it was resolved, that if the congressional nominee 
of those who took part in these proceedings were elected, he should repre¬ 
sent them “in the United States Congress, and not in the Congress of this 
so-called 1 Southern Confederacy.’ ” 6 In Georgia itself, and in the very cap¬ 
ital of the state, a leading journal, assuming, of course, to speak strongly in 


us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us with 
firm resolve to appeal to arms, and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause. 

As a consequence of our new condition, and with a view to meet anticipated wants, it will be 
necessary to provide a speedy and efficient organization of the branches of the executive depart¬ 
ment having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military affairs, and postal service. 
For purposes of defense the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, relv mainly 
upon their militia; but it is deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there 
should be a well-instructed, disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required on 
a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our harbors and commerce on 
the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects will be required. These necessities have, doubtless, 
engaged the attention of Congress. 

With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers in so far as it is explanatory of their 
well known intent, freed from sectional conflicts, which have interfered with the pursuit of the 
general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that the states from which we have recently part¬ 
ed may seek to unite their fortunes to ours, under the government which we have instituted. For 
this your Constitution makes adequate provision, but beyond this, if I mistake not, the judgment 
and will of the people are, that union with the states from which they have separated is neither 
practicable nor desirable. To increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happi¬ 
ness of the confederacy, it is requisite there should be so much homogeneity that the welfare of 
every portion would be the aim of the whole. Where this does not exist, antagonisms are engen¬ 
dered which must and should result in separation. 

Actuated solely by a desire to preserve our own rights and to promote our own welfare, the sep¬ 
aration of the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by 
no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check, the cultivation of our 
fields progresses as heretofore, and even should we be involved in war there would be no consid¬ 
erable diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our exports, in which 
the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of pro¬ 
ducer and consumer can only be intercepted by an exterior force which should obstruct its trans¬ 
mission to foreign markets, a course of conduct which would be detrimental to manufacturing and 
commercial interests abroad. 


the Southern interest, openly opposed the union of the fortunes of the state 
to “a confederacy of disorganizing charlatans” and “chimerical schemers;” 
admitted that the greatest danger to the new confederacy was threatened, 
not from the North,hut from its own people; and warned its readers that 
indications were daily growing stronger that “ organized, if not armed oppo¬ 
sition to the new order of things might arise in states or parts of Southern 
states not vitally interested in the slavery question.” 1 Other manifestations 
of the same kind appeared in various quarters of the confederacy ; and on 
the floor of Congress, in both houses, many members, chiefly from Virginia, 
Maryland, and Kentucky, uttered boldly their devotion to the fortunes of 
the republic. But in the Legislature of North Carolina, where no Ordi¬ 
nance of Secession had yet been passed, and not even a convention called, 
a most significant resolution was unanimously adopted. It was declared 
that if reconciliation failed, North Carolina would go with the other slave 
states. This was a hardly needed indication of the line of policy to be pur¬ 
sued by the insurgent leaders, if they would strengthen their confederation 
by the accession of all the slave states. So, while within their own states 
intimidation, intrigue, social exclusion, and all possible moral and physical 
forces were brought to bear with increased urgency upon those who opposed 
secession, a belligerent attitude was at once assumed toward the government 
of the United States, in order, as we shall see, to make reconciliation speed¬ 
ily appear impossible, that thus the movement of the halting Northern slave 
states toward secession might be quickened. Enticements of a peculiar kind 
were also spread before the people of those states. The importation of negro 
slaves, except from the slaveholding states in the Union, was forbidden in 
the Constitution, which also, in the next section, gave the Confederate Con¬ 
gress power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a 
member of the confederacy. Thus foreign prejudices were conciliated by 
the forbidding of the African slave-trade, and the old market was still offered 
to Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, for the slaves they bred; 
while, at the same time, the power to exclude any one- of them from that 
market, unless they joined the confederacy, was held up in terror over them. 
The rebel Congress also immediately passed an act declaring the navigation 
of the Mississippi free. This was addressed to Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
Missouri, and to the free states upon the great river and the Ohio, in the 
hope of detaching their interest from that of the Eastern and Middle states, 
and thus weakening the power of the government at Washington. 

Meantime, arming, and the seizing of arms, and the betrayal of forts and 
armed vessels, went on almost as matters of course in the seceded states, and 
in some of those which had not seceded. On the 8th of February the 
United States Arsenal at Little Rock, containing 9000 muskets, 40 cannon, 
and a large supply of ammunition, was seized in the name of the people of 
Arkansas, who had not yet declared their separation from the Union. In 
Texas a more important surrender was accompanied by circumstances much 
more disgraceful to all concerned in it, and to the cause in the interest of 
which it was made. The troops in that state were under the command of 
Brigadier General David E. Twiggs, to whose custody were also committed 
the forts and all the military property of the United States in that depart¬ 
ment. General Twiggs had served creditably in Mexico, but with no par¬ 
ticular distinction, and had attained his rank in the regular course of pro¬ 
motion. He was supposed to be at least a man of personal honor and in¬ 
tegrity; but, availing himself of his position, and the trust which had been 
placed in him, he, not being threatened by an overwhelming force, deliver¬ 
ed all the army posts under his command, together with all the other prop¬ 
erty in his keeping, into the hands of the rebellious authorities of Texas. 
Property worth over a million and a half of dollars, exclusive of the forts 
and public buildings, for which he was responsible as a man, aside from his 
military oath, was by his treachery lost to the United States. He, of course, 
expected his connection with the army of the United States to cease; but 
he was not permitted to resign, as many officers had been before him: an 
order for his ignominious expulsion from the army was issued immediately 
upon the receipt of proper information by the government at Washington. 
But he did not find all his subordinates ready to obey the orders by which 
he betrayed his trust. Captain Hill, who was in command of Fort Brown, 
refused to surrender that post, and made preparations to defend it; but, 
finally, as it appeared that it could not be held by the force under his com- 


Should reason guide the action of the government from which we have separated, a policy so 
detrimental to the civilized world, the Northern states included, could not be dictated by even a 
stronger desire to inflict injury upon us; but if it be otherwise, a terrible responsibility will rest 
upon it, and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our ag¬ 
gressors. In the mean time there will remain to us, besides the ordinary remedies before sug¬ 
gested, the well-known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of an enemy. 

Experience in public stations of a subordinate grade to this which your kindness has conferred 
has taught me that care, and toil, and disappointments are the price of official elevation. You will 
see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate; but you shall not find in me either want 
of zeal or fidelity to the cause that is to me the highest in hope and of most enduring affection. 
Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction, one which I neither sought nor 
desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I rely 
to direct and support me in the performance of the duties required at my hands. 

We have changed the constituent parts, but not the system of our government. The Constitu¬ 
tion formed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the 
judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning. Thus in¬ 
structed as to the just interpretation of that instrument, and ever remembering that all offices are 
but trusts held for the people, and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I will hope, 
by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your expectation, yet 
to retain, when retiring, something of the good-will and confidence which will welcome my en¬ 
trance into office. 

It is joyous in the midst of perilous times to look around upon a people united in heart, when 
one purpose of high resolve animates and actuates the whole, where the sacrifices to be made are 
not weighed in the balance against honor, right, liberty, and equality. Obstacles may retard, but 
they can not long prevent the progress of a movement sanctioned by its justice and sustained by 
a virtuous people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our fathers to guide and protect us in our 
efforts to perpetuate the principles which by His blessing they were able to vindicate, establish, and 
transmit to their posterity; and with a continuance of His favor ever gratefully acknowledged, we 
may hopefully look forward to success, to peace, to prosperity. 

‘ Report in the North Alabamian , Tuscumbia. ’ Augusta Sentinel 







1861 .] 



FORT SUMTER 


DAVID T- TWIGGS. 

mand, he yielded it in a manner entirely honorable to himself both as a 
man and a soldier. The promptness and direct movement toward success 
which marked the rebel administration of affairs was shown in regard to the 
United States soldiers thus left without orders and without barracks in 
Texas. Mr. Davis, hardly well seated in a presidential chair hardly set up, 
wrote through his Secretary of War to the Texas Convention that these 
soldiers should be allowed a reasonable time to leave the territory of the 
confederacy (of which, it should be observed, Texas was not yet a member, 
as her Ordinance of Secession was only to go into effect on the 2d of March, 
after confirmation by the people); but that, should the United States gov¬ 
ernment refuse to withdraw them, “ all the powers of the Southern confed¬ 
eracy should be used to expel them.” 

But it was in another quarter, and under the administration of another 
president of the United States that Mr. Davis was first to use the powers of 
his confederacy to expel the troops and the flag of the United States from 
the borders of a seceded state. The beleaguered, but not yet completely in¬ 
vested fort in Charleston Harbor was still the cynosure of all eves. Mr. 
Buchanan did nothing, and was plainly determined to do nothing for its re¬ 
lief; deeming, apparently, the nation’s honor and his own abundantly sat¬ 
isfied if he could slink awav from Washington while Major Anderson’s flag 
was flying. Major Anderson took care that he should have that satisfac¬ 
tion. But a man was on his way to the capital, all unconscious that his 
way was sore beset, who could not be so easily contented. 

On the 13th of February, in presence of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, assembled in the chamber of the latter body, John C. 
Breckinridge, Vice-president of the United States, after opening and read¬ 
ing before them the certificates of election from all the states of the Union, 
declared that Abraham Lincoln had been duly elected President, and Han¬ 
nibal Hamlin Vice-president of the United States for the term beginning 


March 4th, 1861. Probably no political event ever 
occurred more significant and peculiar in all its cir¬ 
cumstances. The unpracticed politician, and, till 
then, almost unknown man, who was thus declared 
the constitutionally elected chief magistrate of the 
republic, had been raised to that high office by a 
party which owed its very existence to the opposi¬ 
tion awakened by a measure which had been brought 
forward by his principal opponent as his own step¬ 
ping-stone to the highest position in the country. 
By his Kansas Bill Mr. Douglas made Mr. Lincoln 
President of the United States. The man also who, 
in the performance of his duty, declared him consti¬ 
tutionally elected, was his next most powerful oppo¬ 
nent, as the candidate and representative of a faction 
who had predetermined to make that election the oc¬ 
casion of breaking in pieces the government of which 
they had so long had almost absolute control. If Mr. 
Douglas and Mr. Breckinridge met that day, it must 
have been as difficult for them as for two Roman 
augurs to look each other in the face without a smile 
—a smile no less rueful than subdued. 

At this time Mr. Lincoln was in Springfield, Illi¬ 
nois, where his modest and almost humble home had 
become the shrine of political pilgrimage. He was 
beset by cabinet-makers, would-be ministers, office- 
seekers of a lower rank, political meddlers of all 
kinds, and newsmongers of all grades. Unasked ad¬ 
vice was poured out upon him without stint; and 
from some quarters came importunate calls for a dec¬ 
laration of the policy of his coming administration. 
It was thought by many that if he announced a de¬ 
termination not to interfere with slavery, to respect 
the rights of local law and local custom, and to abide 
by the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, the progress of the rebellion would be crip¬ 
pled, if not entirely checked. But these expecta¬ 
tions were not well founded. For, as it afterward 
appeared, such a declaration would have been with¬ 
out effect upon the leaders of secession in the seven 
states which had declared themselves no longer part 
of the republic; and the subsequent accession to their 
force from the remaining slave states was brought 
about, as we shall see, not by any apprehensions that 
the new administration would seek to disturb the re¬ 
lations between the negro slaves and their masters, 
but by a determination to insist upon the extension 
of slavery, and to defend the preposterous principle 
of state sovereignty; 

Mr. Lincoln issued no declaration, but preferred 
that his future should be conjectured from his past. 
He busied himself in preparation for the moment¬ 
ous duties which would be laid upon him in the first 
hour after he had sworn as President to “defend 
the Constitution of the United States.” Meanwhile 
steps were taken with the desperate intention of ex¬ 
cluding him from the presidential chair, at the cost, 
if necessary, of his life and the lives of many others. As the 4th of March 
approached, some of the most violent of the secessionists (who swarmed in 
all the principal cities of the North) said, menacingly, that he would never 
be inaugurated; and bets were offered and accepted that he would never be 
in power at Washington:—accepted freely; for these threats were looked 
upon as empty bluster, the spiteful words of men accustomed to talk without 
restraint, and who were now smarting under a political defeat, and irritated 
by a prospective loss of power and patronage. They were, in fact, entirely 
disregarded, because it was not supposed for a moment that people who had 
declared that they had no connection with the government at Washington, 
and no interest in it, would think of attacking a place in which they- were 
deprived of no rights, and from which they were not threatened. As to any 
other mode of preventing the inauguration, none could be thought of in the 
free states; and the slaveholders sojourning at the North, when asked how 
Mr. Lincoln could be deterred from assuming the office to which he had 
been elected, made no definite answer. They knew more than their querists 
dreamed they did; and the rebellion, still regarded as a passing political tur¬ 
moil by the larger part of the people at the North, had already assumed a des¬ 
perate phase and a bloody purpose, almost beyond the comprehension of the 
peace-loving, law-abiding people against whose constitutional rights and po¬ 
litical interests it was directed. From the beginning, the leaders and princi¬ 
pal actors in the rebellion added to the great advantages gained by base and 
wide-spread treachery, that of an entire readiness, if not a foregone determ¬ 
ination, to do, with an utter recklessness of all consequences, except their 
own success, that which the government and the loyal people did not sup¬ 
pose that they would venture to do, or even think of doing. No one save 
themselves suspected how remorselessly they were in earnest. 

But, although such was the general misapprehension of the spirit and the 
purposes of the rebellion, some men were sufficiently alarmed to take meas¬ 
ures of precaution. The chairman of a railway company, over whose road 
the President elect was sure to pass, was waited upon by a lady who had 












50 


traveled through much of the South on a mission of mercy, and who told 
him that in the course of her journeys she had seen at least twenty thou¬ 
sand men under arms, and that she had become convinced that there was 
a conspiracy to seize upon Washington and prevent Mr. Lincoln’s inaugura¬ 
tion. Listened to with incredulity at first, in spite of the respect which 
her character and experience demanded, her anxiety finally produced such 
an impression upon the gentleman that he sent a proper messenger to Lieu¬ 
tenant General Scott to put him upon his guard, yet was inclined to apolo¬ 
gize for calling his attention to such vague and extravagant apprehensions. 
What was his surprise to learn in reply from General Scott that he had for 
some time been quite sure of the existence of some such conspiracy; that he 
had made the proper representations to President Buchanan and to others, 
but that he was listened to with incredulity, and was absolutely powerless. 
Upon this, measures were at once taken to ferret out the truth. Detectives 
were employed, and placed upon the line of the railway in question near 
Baltimore and Washington. They soon discovered that the soldier’s fears, 
no less than the lady’s, were more than justified. They found volunteer 
military companies drilling at various points along the road, which they 
soon saw were composed entirely of men of the extreme slavery-secession 
faction, although they professed to be strong Union men. To these com¬ 
panies they joined themselves in the assumed character of Southern and 
Southwestern men of like principles and purposes, and then learned that 
the object of their formation was the proffer of their services to the directors 
of the railway as an escort to Mr. Lincoln at some convenient point of the 
road, where, having secured entire control of it for a sufficient time, they 
would kill Mr. Lincoln, and, if necessary, the whole party which accompa¬ 
nied him; they being determined and prepared to destroy, at some bridge 
or other fit place, the whole train in which he was a passenger, should that 
be needful to the attainment of their object. Similar investigations set on 
foot in Baltimore, by other persons whose suspicions had been excited, re¬ 
vealed a similar conspiracy in that city. The detectives were engaged three 
weeks in obtaining a full revelation of the designs of the plotters there. 
But they discovered, and themselves became seemingly a part of, a body of 
men well organized with the fell purpose that if the Presidentelect survived 
to enter Baltimore, he should not leave it alive. They were to mingle with 
the shouting crowd which would be sure to surround his carriage on his 
arrival, to prolong and increase the excitement, and, in the confusion, to 
thrust themselves forward as overeager friends, and thus get near enough 
to put him surely to death with pistols and hand-grenades. In the first 
moments of surprise and alarm they could easily escape, and a vessel was 
to be ready to transport them immediately to safety within the limits of the 
confederacy in whose interests, if not by whose procurement, the diabolical 
scheme was concocted. Of course, the immediate actors in this intended 
slaughter were of the baser sort; but it was discovered that men of wealth, 
and social position, and political influence countenanced and supported it. 
The plot was a good one, and, owing to the informal, democratic, and over¬ 
confident habits of the country, easy of execution, had it not been detected. 

Mr. Lincoln, as unsuspecting as every one of his constituents who was 
not fully informed, left Springfield on the 11th of February for Washing¬ 
ton ; and, after the inevitable series of congratulations and speech-makings 
on the route, arrived at Philadelphia on the 21st of the month. There he 
first learned the designs upon his life from the detective who had been 
principally instrumental in discovering them in Baltimore. Late in the 
evening of the same day a special messenger from General Scott and Mr. 
Seward — Mr. Seward’s son — roused him from his bed with an earnest 
warning. Deeply impressed as Mr. Lincoln was by such monitions, re¬ 
ceived through such channels, he yet refused to abandon an engagement to 
be present at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on the morning of the 
next day—Washington’s birthday—and one to meet the Legislature of 
Pennsylvania at Harrisburg in the afternoon; but, these fulfilled, he con¬ 
sented to abandon his original plan, and go immediately and privately to 
Washington. The day passed off without any incident worthy of remark, 
except that some attention was attracted by Mr. Lincoln’s declaration in his 
speech at Independence Hall that, rather than abandon the principles of 
the Declaration of Independence, he would be “assassinated upon that spot.” 
But this was regarded merely as a strong and not very happily phrased 
asseveration. The interview at Harrisburg with the Legislature of Penn¬ 
sylvania being over, Mr. Lincoln placed himself in the hands of his friends, 
and retired to his hotel, assuming, by advice, an air of extreme fatigue, which 
his constant traveling and speaking made very natural. At about 6 o’clock 
in the evening he was conveyed in a close carriage to a special train, which 
started instantly for Philadelphia, and at the same time all the telegraph 
wires leading from the city were cut. With him the president of the road 
sent a trusty and intelligent confidential agent known as “George,” whose 
authority was recognized by all the servants of the company, and who bore 
with him a large package of “ dispatches,” about which he seemed very 
anxious, and which was the alleged reason of sending the special train. At 
Philadelphia the party took the regular train, which they found waiting, 
and into which they quietly stepped just as it was starting. The detective 
was on the train, but “ George” still considered himself in charge, and was 
astounded and alarmed soon after the train was under way by being ac¬ 
costed reproachfully by the engine-driver for not telling him that “ Lin¬ 
coln was on board.” George instantly saw that his only way was to trust 
his friencf, and replied, “Yes, he is on board.” “Well,” said the other, 
with a look of serious apprehension and determination, “now we have him, 
we must put him through.” His own observation had led him to suspect 
the designs of the people along the road, and he felt that he carried Caesar 
and his fortunes. Oddly enough, however, the man whom he supposed to 


[ 1861 . 

be the President elect was not he, but quite another person. The train 
passed swiftly through the perils prepared for the morrow, and Mr. Lincoln 
arrived at Washington about daybreak on the 23d of February. The tele¬ 
graph wires had been united again, and George sent back the message, 
“ The dispatches have arrived, and are safely delivered.” 8 

Although the knowledge of this conspiracy had been confined to those 
who were concerned in it and those tvho had detected it, the fact that Mary¬ 
land was the only slave state through which Mr. Lincoln was obliged to 
pass on his way to Washington, and the well-known riotous character of 
the baser part of the people of Baltimore, had made his reception in that 
city a subject of special interest. The Republicans of the place were coun¬ 
seled by the authorities to abandon their intention of receiving Mr. Lincoln 
with the honors due to a President elect, which they were told “would cer¬ 
tainly produce a disturbance of the most violent and dangerous character 
to the President and all who wore with him.” They prudently followed the 
advice. On the evening of the 22d a Baltimore newspaper published an 
article calculated to produce an attack on Mr. Lincoln, who was to arrive 
there on the 23d, and the marshal of the city placed an unusually large 
body of the police under orders, to be used both as an escort and a general 
force of observation and restraint. When, therefore, on the day of his ex¬ 
pected arrival at that city, it was announced that he was already in the na¬ 
tional capital, which he had reached in privacy, in darkness, almost by 
flight, there was throughout the country a sensation of the liveliest surprise; 
surprise which was changed to shame and profound humiliation when the 
cause of this surreptitious entry of the seat of government was revealed. 
Except on the part of those who felt it their duty to sustain the successful 
candidate of the Republican party at all hazards, there was a universal and 
indignant expression of unbelief, and the affair became immediately the 
subject of a rueful kind of ridicule. The story was widely regarded, and 
especially in Baltimore and at the South, as trumped up for political effect, 
and the event for a time degraded Mr. Lincoln in the people’s eyes. They 
refused to accept the alleged conspiracy against his life as any excuse for 
the ignominious secrecy with which he, the future chief magistrate of the 
country, made his way through one of its principal cities. They scouted 
the notion that any of their countrymen could seek to repair a political de¬ 
feat by assassination. They resented the accusation brought against these 
Baltimore desperadoes as a national insult. The Anglo-Saxon race, they 
said, are not assassins; least of all are they so in the United States of Amer¬ 
ica. The affair elicted on almost all sides mingled expressions of incredu¬ 
lity, bitterness, and ridicule. From the point of view of the people of the 
free states, this judgment was justified, and this feeling was correct. It may 
be safely said that among their native-born population the formation of 
such a conspiracy would have been morally impossible. But they forgot 
to take into account, as elements of their judgment, the debasing and bru¬ 
talizing influences of slavery as an institution; they did not stop to think 
of the pitiless infliction of torture and death upon rebellious slaves through¬ 
out the South, and of the bloody duels and street-brawls between “gentle¬ 
men” so constantly occurring there; they'forgot for the moment that the 
bowie-knife was strictly a slave-state weapon, and that of the bloody assaults 
and murders committed within their own borders by natives of the United 
States, the large majority were committed by men born and bred under the 
malign influence of the worst form of slavery. 9 And last, and perhaps 
most important omission, they had not yet even begun to conceive that the 
leaders of this insurrection, set on foot among a people so accustomed to 
scenes of blood, and in whom a spirit of arrogant domination was bred by 
the very constitution of their society, were determined, with the determina¬ 
tion of the desperate, to carry their point at every hazard. It was long, 
indeed, before this conviction came effectually home to them. 

The excitement caused by this disgraceful occurrence, however, soon gave 
place to profounder, if less vivid, emotions. On the 28th, the Plan of Adjust¬ 
ment adopted by the Peace Congress was sent to the Senate and the House, 
where they were followed, on the next day, by the report of the Committee 
of Thirty-three. It at once became apparent that they would not command 
the support either of Congress or the mass of the non-slaveholding people, 
and that, consequently, all hopes of harmony and peace which had been 
based upon them must be abandoned. Looking back upon these proposi¬ 
tions, made after such long consultation among men who were practiced pol¬ 
iticians, if not sagacious statesmen, we can but wonder at the failure which 
they exhibit to comprehend the revolutionary nature of the crisis. That 
of the Committee of Thirty-three was in the form of a brief amendment to 
the Constitution, which provided that no amendment should be made to that 
instrument which would give Congress power over the domestic institutions 
of any state. But as this was a m cr e solemn confirmation of a political right 
which no man denied, or ever had denied, to any or to all the states, it was 
therefore of no more consequence than the paper on which it was written. 10 
The proposals of the Peace Congress were embodied in seven sections, of 

8 Statement of Mr. Thurlow Weed in the Albany Keening Journal , and private account of Mr. 
S. M. Felton, president of the Philadelphia and Baltimore Railway Company. 

9 Of the hundreds of cases which I might cite in support of this position, one in which there was 
no bloodshed seems to me very characteristic. A gentleman well known to me, being in the prin¬ 
cipal city of a slave state in 1861, was sitting upon the piazza of the best hotel in the place. Near 
him sat a man, in a dreamy, contemplative mood, having his back turned to the window of a 
barber’s shop which opened with vertical sashes to the floor of the piazza. A light passing gust 
blew one of these sashes to, when instantly this man sprang up, and, drawing a revolver, fired 
five shots directly through the window into the barber’s shop. Fortunately there were few per¬ 
sons in the shop, and he hit neither of them. But it is significant that he thought, of course’, 
that the noise he heard was a pistol-shot; and, of course, that some person had attempted to shoot 
him “on sight;” and that, of course, he had a revolver in his pocket, which he drew, of course, 
and fired recklessly in the direction of the sound which startled him. 

10 “No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give Congress 
power to abolish or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including 
that of persons held to labor or servitude by the laws of said state.” 





1861 .] 


FORT SUMTER 


51 



▲HBAIIAM LINCOLN. 

which the first virtually re-established the Missouri Compromise; the second 
prohibited the acquirement of any territory by the United States “without 
the concurrence of a majority of all the senators from the states which allow 
involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the senators from the states which 
prohibit that relationand the third denied forever to Congress the pow- 

Plan of Adjustment adopted by the Peace Congress. 

Sec. 1. In all the present territory of the United States north of the parallel of thirty-six de¬ 
crees thirty minutes of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is 
prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to sen-ice or 
labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed. Nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the 
Territorial Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from any of the states of 
this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation. But the same 
shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the federal courts, according to the course of the com¬ 
mon law. When any Territory, north or south of said line, with such boundary as Congress may 
prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if 
its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the 
original states, with or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such state may pro¬ 
vide. 

Sec. 2. No territory shall be acquired by the United States, except by discovery, and for naval 
and commercial stations, depots, and transit routes, without the concurrence of a majority of all 
the senators from the states which allow involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the senators 
from the states which prohibit that relation; nor shall territory be acquired by treaty, unless the 
votes of a majority of the senators from each class of states hereinbefore mentioned be cast as a 
part of the two-third majority necessary to the ratification of such treaty. 

Sec. 3. Neither the Constitution nor any amendment thereto shall be construed to give-Oon- 
gress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within any state or territory of the United States, the 
relation established or recognized by the laws thereof touching persons bound to labor or involun¬ 
tary service in the District of Columbia, without the consent of Maryland, and without the con¬ 
sent of the owners, or making the owners who do not consent just compensation ; nor the power 
to interfere with or prohibit representatives and others from bringing with them to the city of 
Washington, retaining, and taking away persons so bound to labor or service; nor the power to 
interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States w-ithin those states and territories where the same is established or recognized ; nor the power 
to prohibit the removal or transportation of persons held to labor or involuntary service in any state 
or territory of the United States to any other state or territory thereof where it is established or rec¬ 
ognized by law or usage ; and the right, during transportation by sea or river, of touching at ports, 
shores, and landings, and of landing in case of distress, but not for sale or traffic, shall exist; nor 
shall Congress have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons held to labor or serv¬ 
ice than on land. The bringing into the District of Columbia of persons held to labor or service 
for sale, or placing them in depots to be afterward transferred to other places for sale as merchan¬ 
dise, is prohibited, and the right of transit through any state or territory against its dissent is pro¬ 
hibited. 

Sec. 4. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth Article of the Constitution shall 
not be construed to prevent any of the states, by appropriate legislation, and through the action 
of their judicial and ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to the 
person to whom such service or labor is due. 


er to regulate, abolish, or control 
slavery in any state or territory of 
the United States, or in the District 
of Columbia, or any other place be¬ 
longing to the United States; to 
prohibit the bringing of slaves into 
the District, or the transfer of them 
from one part of the country to an¬ 
other. The remaining sections for¬ 
ever prohibited the slave-trade, se¬ 
cured a more stringent enforcement 
of the Fugitive Slave Law, and de¬ 
clared that the foregoing sections 
should never be amended or abol¬ 
ished without the consent of all the 
states. * 1 Except in the restoration 
of the line of the Missouri Compro¬ 
mise, this plan placed the republic, 
bound hand and foot, in the power 
of slavery. It could not but fail 
miserably, as it did. The Republi¬ 
cans were against it in a body ; and, 
indeed, they opposed any adjust¬ 
ment other than that which should 
be effected by a Constitutional Con¬ 
vention of the people of the United 
States, which Congress had no pow¬ 
er to convoke. It was plain that 
compromise was at an end, and that 
the government must sustain itself 
under existing conditions, or else 
be utterly destroyed. 

Meantime the 4th of March came 
on apace; and in spite of their bet¬ 
ting and their threatening, the se¬ 
cessionists on that day saw Mr.Lin- 
coin duly invested with the office to 
which their own candidate in the 
contest had declared him constitu¬ 
tionally elected. The provision 
which General Scott had been able 
to make for the preservation of 
order within the District of Colum¬ 
bia, in spite of the small force at 
his disposal for that purpose, was 
sufficient to deter any attempt 
which evil-disposed persons, with¬ 
out as well as within its bounda¬ 
ries, were then prepared for. On 
the appointed day Mr. Lincoln went 
in procession to the Capitol, in com¬ 
pany with President Buchanan, and, 
after visiting the Senate-chamber, 
proceeded to the east front of the 
building, where, in the open air, in presence of both houses of Congress, 
the foreign ministers, and a vast concourse of people, he delivered his in¬ 
augural address, 2 and took the oath of office at the hands of Chief Justice 
Taney. 

President Lincoln’s inaugural address was scanned with even more anx- 


Sec. 5. The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited; and it shall be the duty of Con¬ 
gress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves, coolies, or persons held to service or labor, 
into the United States and the Territories from places beyond the limits thereof. 

Sec. 6 . The first, third, and fifth sections, together with this section six of these amendments, 
and the third paragraph of the second section of the first Article of the Constitution, and the third 
paragraph of the second section of the fourth Article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished 
without the consent of all the states. 

Sec. 7. Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to the owner the full 
value of his fugitives from labor, in all cases where the marshal, or other officer whose duty it was 
to arrest such fugitive, was prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs or riot¬ 
ous assemblages, or when, after arrest, such fugitive was rescued by like violence or intimidation, 
and the owner thereby prevented and obstructed in the pursuit of his remedy for the recovery of 
such fugitive. Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each state the privi¬ 
leges and immunities of the several states. 

* Inaugural Address of President Lincoln. 

Fdlow-cUizens o f the United States : 

In compliance with a custom as old as the government itself, I appear before yon to address 
you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United 
States to be taken by the President before he enters on the execution of his office. 

I do not consider it necessary, at present, for me to discuss those matters of administration 
about which there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems to exist among the 
people of the Southern states that, by the accession of a Republican administration, their property, 
and their peace and personal security, are to be endangered. There has never been any reason¬ 
able cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the 
while existed, and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the public speeches of 
him who now addresses you. I do*but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that “I 
have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states 
where it exists.” I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. 
Those who nominated and elected me did so with the full knowledge that I had made this, and 
made many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they 
placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and 
emphatic resolution which I now read : 

“Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of 
each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment ex¬ 
clusively, is essential to that balance of power on w hich the perfection and endurance of our polity 
ical fabric depend ; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state 
or territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.” 

I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the 
most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security 
of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration. I add, too. 















52 


iety than the message with which Mr. Buchanan, months-before, had so as¬ 
tonished and dissatisfied all men, except the seceders at home and abroad. 
Mr. Lincoln, on the contrary, satisfied all but the same unconditional seces¬ 
sionists, whom no duly qualified President of the United States could con¬ 
tent, except at the cost of treachery. That he expressly disavowed the in¬ 
tention of interfering with slavery, or any other local institution, in the states 
where it then existed, and denied his right of such interference; that he de¬ 
clared that the Fugitive Slave Law, like all other constitutional laws, should 
be enforced; that he avowed respect for the constitutional rights of all parts 
of the Union, and the intention to pursue a peaceful course in his adminis¬ 
tration—this was really of no moment; for he also declared that no state, 
upon its own mere motion, could lawfully go out of the Union; that Ordi¬ 
nances of Secession were void; that resistance to the authority of the United 
States was insurrection; and that his official power should be used to “ hold, 
occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government” 
To the leaders of the secession party, and their active, determined supporters, 

that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will 
be cheerfully given to all the states when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause, as cheerfully to 
one section as to another. 

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The 
clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions: 

“No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, 
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, 
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” 

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaim¬ 
ing of what we call fugitive slaves ; and the intention of the lawgiver is the law. 

All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as 
well as any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of 
this clause “shall be delivered up,” their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the 
effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by 
means of which to keep good that unanimous oath ? 

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by 
•tate authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be sur¬ 
rendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done; 
and should any one, in any case, be content that this oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstan¬ 
tial controversy as to how it shall be kept? 

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in the civ¬ 
ilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so that a free man be not, in any case, surren¬ 
dered as a slave? And might it not be well, at the same time, to provide by law for the enforce¬ 
ment of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that “the citizens of each state shall be 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?" 

I take the official oath to-day with no mental reservations, and with no purpose to construe the 
Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules; and while I do not choose now to specify partic¬ 
ular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, 
both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unre¬ 
pealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be uncon¬ 
stitutional. 

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a president under our national Constitu¬ 
tion. During that period fifteen different and very distinguished citizens have in succession 
administered the executive branch of the government. They have conducted it through many 
perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope for precedent, I now enter upon 
the same task, for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulties. 

A disruption of the federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted. I 
hold that in the contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these states 
is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national gov¬ 
ernments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law 
for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our national Constitu¬ 
tion, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it except by some action 
not provided for in the instrument itself. 

Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an association of states in the na¬ 
ture of a contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties 
who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does it not re¬ 
quire all to lawfully rescind it? Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition 
that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. 

The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of As¬ 
sociation in 1774. It was matured and continued in the Declaration of Independence in 1776. 
It was farther matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen states expressly plighted and engaged 
that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778; and, finally, in 1787, one 
of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was to form a more perfect 
Union. But if the destruction of the Union by one, or by a part only of the states, be lawfully 
possible, the Union is less than before, the Constitution having lost the vital element of per¬ 
petuity. 

It follows from these views that no state, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the 
Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence 
within any state or states against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolu¬ 
tionary, according to circumstances. 

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken, and, 
to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, 
that the laws of the Union shall be faithfully executed in all the states. Doing this, which I deem 
to be only a simple duty on my part, I shall perfectly perform it, so far as is practicable, unless my 
rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold tha requisition, or in some authoritative 
manner direct the contrary. 

I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union 
that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In doing this, there need be no bloodshed 
or violence, and there shall be none unless it is forced upon the national authority. The power 
confided to me will be used to hold, occupy , and possess the property and places belonging to the 
government , and collect the duties and ingtosts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, 
there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people any where. Where hos¬ 
tility to the United States shall be so great and so universal as to prevent competent resident cit¬ 
izens from holding the federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among 
the people that object. While the strict legal right may exist of the government to enforce the 
exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable 
withal, that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices. The mails, unless re¬ 
pelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible, the people ev¬ 
ery where shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and 
reflection. 

The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a 
modification or change to be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be 
exercised according to the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and hope of n peaceful 
solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections. 

That there are persons, in one section or another, who seek to destroy the Union at all events, 
and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny. But if there be such, I need 
address no word to them. 

To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak, before entering upon so grave 
a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes? 
Would it not be well to ascertain why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step, while any 
portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence ? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to 
are greater than all the real ones you fly from? Will you risk the commission of so fearful a 
mistake? All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained. 
Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think 
not. Happily the human mind is so constituted that no party can reach to the audacity of doing 
this. 

Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly-written provision of the Constitution 
has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority 
of any clearly-written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution: 
it certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case. 

All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by af¬ 
firmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions, in the Constitution, that controversies never 
arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically ap¬ 
plicable to every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can antici¬ 


[ 1861 . 

this message was a summons to submission, with the alternative of' war. It 
was susceptible of no other construction. And yet so strangely did a large 
part, it would seem the greater part, of the loyal people throughout the coun¬ 
try mistake the temper and the deliberate purpose of those who were direct¬ 
ing the secession movement, that they regarded the address as significant of 
a peaceful restoration of the Union. This was especially the case with those 
members of the Democratic party in whom party considerations had not 
entirely extinguished love of country, and a reverence for the Constitu¬ 
tion and the laws. Those who spoke for these men cast aside party consid¬ 
erations at once, and sustained the President in the position which he had 
taken. They fondly supposed that the members of their party at the South 
would do the same. How much they overrated the influence of patriotism 
and a devotion to the republic among the leading slaveholders, how incor¬ 
rectly they estimated the relative value of slavery and the existence of the 
republic in the eyes of those men, the sequel sadly showed. 

President Lincoln’s address made little change in the course of events 


pate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. 
Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by state authorities? The Constitution* 
does not expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories ? The Constitution does 
not expressly say. From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we 
divide upon them into majorities and minorities. 

If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the government must cease. There is 
no alternative for continuing the government but acquiescence on the one side or the other. If a 
minority in such a case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which in turn 
will ruin and divide them, for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority 
refuses to be controlled by such a minority. For instance, why not any portion of a new confed¬ 
eracy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union 
now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments arc now being educated to 
the exact temper of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the states to 
compose a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession? Plainly, the 
central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. 

A majority held in restraint by conslitutional check and limitation, and always changing easily 
with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free 
people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is im¬ 
possible ; the rule of a majority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible. S>t> that, 
rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left. 

I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by 
the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the par¬ 
ties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they arc also entitled to very high respect and 
consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the government; and while it is ob¬ 
viously possible that such decision may he erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect follow¬ 
ing it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never 
become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. 

At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon the 
vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court, the instant they are made, as in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, 
the people will have ceased to be their own masters, unless having to that extent practically re¬ 
signed their government into the hunds of that eminent tribunal. 

Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a duty from which 
they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them ; and it is no fault of theirs if 
others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes. One section of our couutry believes 
slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong, and ought not to 
be extended; and this is the only substantial dispute; and the fugitive slave clause of ihe Con¬ 
stitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each ns well enforced, 
perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the j>eoplc imperfectly 
supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both 
cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, can not be perfectly cured, and it would be 
worse in both cases after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave-trade, now 
imjKjrfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived, without restriction, in one section, while fu¬ 
gitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other. 

Physically speaking, we can not separate—we can not remove our respective sections from each 
other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and 
go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other, but the different parts of our country 
can not do this. They can not but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hos¬ 
tile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous 
or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends 
can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among 
friends? Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always; and when, after much loss on both 
sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical questions as to terms of intercourse 
are again upon yon. 

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall 
grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending, 
or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I can not be ignorant of the fact that 
many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the national Constitution amended. 
While I make no recommendation of amendment, I fully recognize the full authority of the people 
over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself, 
and I should, under existing circumstances, favor, rather than oppose, a fair opportuniiy being 
afforded the people to act upon it. 

I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amend¬ 
ments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only ]>ermitting them to take or reject 
proposi ions originated by others not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be 
precisely such us they would wish oil her to accept or refuse. I understand that a proposed amend¬ 
ment to the Constitution (which amendment, however, I have not seen) has passed Congress, to 
the effect that the federal government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of states, 
including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart 
from niy purpose not to speak of particular amendments, so far ns to say that, holding such a pro¬ 
vision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and ir¬ 
revocable. 

The chief magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none 
upon him to fix the terms for the separation of the states. The people themselves, also, can do 
this if they choose, but the executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to admin¬ 
ister the present government ns it came to his hands, and to transmit it unimpaired by him to his 
successor. Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? 
Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences, is either party with¬ 
out faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and 
justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will 
surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people. By the frame of the 
government under which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants but lit¬ 
tle power tor mischief, and have, with equal wisdom, provided for the return of that little to their 
own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no admin¬ 
istration, by any extreme wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the government in the short 
space of four years. 

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable 
can be lost by taking time If there bo an object to hurry any of you, in hot haste, to a step 
which you would never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no 
good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as arc now dissatisfied still have the old Consti¬ 
tution unimpaired, and on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the 
new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admit¬ 
ted that you who arc dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there is still no single reason 
for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has 
never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present 
difficulties. In vour hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous 
issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being 
yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the government, 
while I shall have the most solemn one to “preserve, protect, and defend” it. I am loth to close. 
We are not enemies, but friends We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strain¬ 
ed, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every 
battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will 
yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels 
of our nature. 







FORT SUMTER. 


53 


1861 .] 



toward the point to which they were now surely tending, but that little was 
a quickening of their progress and an increase of their force. Its plump 
denial of the right of secession, and its avowal of a determination to possess 
the national mints, arsenals, and military posts, put those in authority in the 
states which had passed Ordinances of Secession, and appropriated the prop¬ 
erty of the republic to their own use, upon their mettle; while its peaceful 
professions did nothing to mitigate to the advocates of state sovereignty, in 
the slave states which had not seceded, its assertion of the supreme and ab¬ 
solute authority of the central government in all national affairs. In the 
free states, and in the slave states still under loyal control, it made the idea 
of an armed struggle for the support of the government more familiar; and, 
bv awakening the generous glow of patriotism, it softened and sundered the 
rigid bonds by which the Democratic party, the only well-organized and 
well-disciplined body in the country, had been for more than a generation so 
strongly bound together. 

At the South the leaders allowed the people little time for such super¬ 
fluous business as the consideration of a speech which merelv showed that 
there was no ground of apprehension that their interests would suffer under 
the new administration of the United States government. They drove them 
sharply up to the work of rebellion. Military preparation and hostile ac¬ 
tion against the government had gone on vigorously under state authority 
during the three months preceding Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration; and hardly- 
had that event taken place when the confederate president ordered General 
Beauregard to Charleston to take command of the forces which had been 
assembled, and the works which had been erected there, for the investment 
of Fort Sumter. On the 9th of March the confederate Congress passed an 
act for the establishment and organization of an army. On the 14th the 
Legislature of Florida passed an act defining treason, and declaring that, in 
the event of a collision between the troops of the United States and those of 
Florida, the holding office under the government of the former by any res¬ 
ident of the latter should be punished with death! Supplies were cut off 
from the Gulf fleet and from Fort Pickens—an important post, the preser¬ 
vation of which to the government will form an interesting episode in the 
early part of our narrative. The various states under control of the confed¬ 
erate government ratified the Constitution adopted at Montgomery, and were 
called upon to furnish their quota of troops for the defense of the insurgent 
cause. The whole number called for was less than twenty thousand, and 
these, from a population of five millions, an unusually large proportion of 
whom were shifting adventurers or local desperadoes, and accustomed to 
the use of arms upon each other, were soon forthcoming. In certain places 
the young men of the more respectable and cultivated classes also formed 
themselves into military companies, and volunteered their services in the 
insurgent army. The South seemed to be animated with a lively and wide¬ 
spread enthusiasm for the confederate cause. For those whose hearts 
were in it were outspoken, active, and self-asserting; while those who 
preserved their allegiance to the old Constitution, their loyalty to the 
old flag, and their love for the republic, were, with comparatively few 
exceptions, silent and reserved. To officer the troops mustered undei 
this levy there were more than enough of men well qualified. From 
the beginning of the commotion it was manifest that many officers of 
the Uni ted States army, professionally educated, and supported during 
their education by the republic, would, at the bidding of state politi¬ 
cians. disown the flag which they had sworn to defend, and turn their 
swords against the mother who had cherished them. The event sur¬ 
passed anticipation. As state after state passed the Ordinance of Se¬ 
cession, officers of the army and navy, West Point cadets, and mid¬ 
shipmen, resigned in rapid succession, under the convenient plea that 
they were bound to follow the fortunes of their “sovereign” state. So 
overwhelmed were their minds by this shallow doctrine, or by- the 
deep purpose which it was used to veil, that they did not see that un¬ 
der it their allegiance shifted with jheir residence,and could be moved 
about the country from one “sovereignty” to another as easily as a 
peddler moves his pack. Not one in five of them was born and bred 
in the state to whose fortunes he chose to regard himself as bound ; 
and some of them, as we shall see, were (like thousands, if not tens of 
thousands, of the men they were to lead to battle against the flag of 
the republic) natives of free states. So mildly did the government of 
the United States use its powers, even in this extremity, that the res¬ 
ignations of these, its sworn defenders, who deserted it in the hour of 
its peril, were accepted, and they were allowed to retire with nominal 
honor. In this manner more than one hundred of the officers of the 
army and navy threw up their commissions, and offered their swords 
to the insurgent cause before the 4th of March. Let us, however, 
though we caii not justify or even excuse this sad and shameful defec¬ 
tion, consider fairly all the circumstances which palliated it. With 
few exceptions, all these officers had been imbued from their boyhood 
with the doctrine of state sovereignty. They had heard it insisted 
upon by the politicians of their part of the country', in the one-sided 
domestic discussions of the public assembly and the social circle—the 
verv politicians upon whose recommendation they were appointed to 
their cadetships and their midshipmen’s berths. For John C. Calhoun 
and the men of his school, who had obtained, partly by intrigue and 
partly by arrogation, the almost absolute control of the politics of the 
slave states, astutely seeing that the power of those states as units was 
a far more formidable weapon to wield against the advance of freedom 
than the power of the people of those states in mass, made the adop¬ 
tion of this dogma a sine-qua-non to political preferment. That the 
interest of slavery must either control the republic or destroy it was 


foT thirty years as a religion and an aggressive policy to them, and this mon¬ 
ster of state sovereignty was both the fetich of their worship and the bugbear 
of their threats. When men brought up under such teaching saw the govern¬ 
ment at Washington pass into the hands of a party which they styled “ Abo¬ 
litionist”—when they saw their own states secede from the Union — when 
the voice of their elders, the spur of ambition, the hopes of social distinction, 
and the blandishments of women, all incited them to espouse the cause of 
the insurgents—and when to all this was added the consciousness that, if 
they fought under the flag of the republic, they must meet their brothers and 
their friends in battle, what wonder that so many of them, yielding to all these 
influences, resigned their commissions, often soothing their consciences, at 
first, with the self-assurance that they would not take up arms either under 
the old flag or the new one! Nay, considering how men are influenced 
by interest, by- association, and by antagonism, is it not somewhat surprising 
that so many of .them remained faithful to the flag which, if the doctrines 
taught by modern politicians of their part of the country were true, was the 
mere sign of “ a common agency ?” The greater part of the guilt of their 
defection must be laid upon the shoulders of the men who for so many years 
had labored to debauch the patriotism and pervert the judgment of the peo¬ 
ple of the South. To the men of the free states, on the contrary, loyalty to 
the republic, one and indivisible, was a sentiment, almost an instinct. They 
were not taught it any more than they were taught to breathe or to see; 
they debated it no more than they questioned the certain action of the great 
laws of nature. They imbibed it with their mother’s milk, and it became 
a part of their very being. They had no peculiar abnormal institution to 
bias their judgments and debase their sentiments, and both their reason 
and their feelings united in their patriotism. They knew that their states 
had local rights which they prized; and they loved those states as a man 
loves his home, and his neighborhood, and his native town, and whatever is 
nearest to him; but they looked upon all these only as parts of one great 
whole. They gloried in the great republic; in its wise and humane prin¬ 
ciples of government, in its power, its wealth, its beneficent institutions, and 
its marvelous progress; they rejoiced in the prosperity of all parts of it; 
and their desire to wipe out the blot of slavery, which was one of the causes 
of the great rebellion, was due to a generous assumption of responsibility in 
regard to its existence which in no wise belonged to them. As to their 
country, they looked upon themselves only as citizens of the great American 
republic; and thev inwardly smiled with pity upon men who went about 
introducing each other as “of South Carolina” and “of Virginia.” It was 
easier for most of these men to stand by their colors than it was for some 
of those to abandon them. 

Prominent among those who resigned their commissions before the break¬ 
ing out of hostilities was Major Pierre Gustave Toutant, called Beauregard, 



































































54 



[ 1861 . 

whom the confederate president placed in command at Charleston, with the rank of brigadier 
general in the provisional confederate army. This officer, the son of a Louisiana planter, was 
born near New Orleans in 1819. As his name indicates, he is of French descent, his grandfa¬ 
ther having been a French Royalist refugee. The present writer bought at a book-stall, and has 
now in his possession, a copy of a History' of the Life of Louis XVI. of France, with its terrible 
events and tragic ending, by a French writer, which was printed in Hamburg in 1802, nine years 
after that weak, but thoroughly good-hearted monarch died by the guillotine. Upon the portrait 
frontispiece of this volume is written, in a French hand of the last century, “Pierre Toutant a 
6l6 heureux jusque a ’93’ 3 —touching evidence of a mistaken fidelity to the cause of aristocratic 
oppression, which events have shown has descended with the blood and the name of the exiled 
Royalist. In 1834, Pierre Toutant, the grandson, whose mother was an Italian woman, left his 
father’s plantation for the Military Academy at West Point. That plantation, it is said, was 
called Beauregard, and the young cadet, introduced as Pierre Toutant de Beauregard, was mis¬ 
takenly called by the latter name, which, being a territorial designation, gratified his vanity, and 
he retained it. He passed through his cadetship with much credit, graduated in 1838, and re¬ 
ceived his second lieutenant’s commission in the First Artillery. Soon transferred to the Engi-' 
neers, in which corps he was made first lieutenant before the expiration of his second year of serv¬ 
ice, he accompanied the small column of troops at the head of which General Scott, with a daring 
as much greater than of Cortez as the superiority of his enemy in arts and arms to that of the 
half savage and nearly overawed foe encountered by the Spanish conqueror, undertook to pen¬ 
etrate Mexico from its shores to its capital. 4 In this expedition he distinguished himself by gal¬ 
lantry and professional skill. At Contreras and Cherubusco he won a captain’s brevet, and a 
major’s at Chepultepec. In the final assault upon the city of Mexico he was wounded at the 
Belen Gate, and, with Lieutenants Gustavus W. Smith and George B. M'Clellan—of whom, also, 
we are to hear anon — received the honor of a special mention in Geueral Scott’s dispatches. 
Camp stories are told of his quick penetration and excellent judgment, and also of his somewhat 
notable self-reliance; and, although these are probably highly colored, if not exaggerated, there 
can be no doubt of the more than ordinary capacity and acquirements of Beauregard. At the 
close of the Mexican war his services were rewarded by the appointment of chief engineer for 
the building of the Mint and the Custom-house at New Orleans, and also of the important for¬ 
tifications on the Mississippi below that city. Just before the outbreak of the insurrection, Ma¬ 
jor Beauregard was appointed by President Buchanan to the important and honorable post of 
superintendent of the Military Academy at which he received his education. He went to West 
Point, and nominally entered upon the duties of his new position. But he had been in author¬ 
ity less than a week when an order arrived superseding him. The traditions of West Point 
are that he spoke and acted as became a loyal citizen and soldier, and especially that he dis¬ 
suaded the Louisiana cadets from resigning their commissions. But the Secretary of War ad 
interim , Mr. Postmaster Holt, distrusted him becabse of his Louisiana birth, and unwisely, it 
would seem, put him in disgrace. At all events, the temptation to a States Rights man to soothe 
his wounded vanity by yielding to the demands of his “sovereignty” to enter its service proved 
too tempting for him to resist, and he resigned his commission in the United States army. But 
it is more than probable that, sooner or later, in any case, he would have taken this step, influ¬ 
enced thereto by the associations of all his life, and by the prominent part taken in the con¬ 
spiracy for the destruction of the republic by his brother-in-law, ex-Senator John Slidell, of 
New Orleans. Having arrived at Charleston within a few days of the inauguration of Presi¬ 
dent Lincoln, General Beauregard found much already done toward the investment of Fort 
Sumter by the active zeal of the insurgents of South Carolina. Not only had Fort Moultrie, 
Castle Pinckney, and Fort Johnson been strengthened, but batteries had been erected at various 
points which either commanded the water-girdled ramparts from which the flag of the republic 
still floated, or the approaches by which succor could be carried to its defenders. To the com¬ 
pletion and increase of these works, which were already so large as to require six hundred men 
for their garrisons, General Beauregard immediately devoted all his energy and engineering skill. 
But we must turn our eyes from Charleston to Washington, where maimed negotiations were 
halting toward the inevitable issue of civil war. 

The provisional government at Montgomery had been in power but a few days when it ap¬ 
pointed Mr. John Forsyth, former minister of the United States to Mexico; Mr. Martin J. Craw¬ 
ford, late United States senator from Georgia; and Mr. A. B. Rodman, an ex-Governor of Loui¬ 
siana, as its commissioners to the government at Washington, for the purpose of opening nego¬ 
tiations upon all questions growing out of the revolutionary movement, which their appointment 
assumed to have been complete. The cabinet which President Lincoln had formed for the ad¬ 
ministration of the government to which these commissioners were accredited consisted, first, of 
William H. Seward, whom all the world, including himself, had expected to be president, if the 
Republican party were victorious, and who magnanimously accepted from his successful rival 
the appointment of Secretary of State, and thus gave his country, to the extent of his power, the 
advantage of his statesmanship and his experience. Next in importance at that time was the 
Department of War, which had been placed in the hands of Simon Cameron, late United States 
senator from Pennsylvania, who began life as a printer, and who had accumulated a large for¬ 
tune. His reputation for integrity, however unjustly, was not without blemish; and Mr. Lin¬ 
coln, when pressed,before his inauguration, to give him a cabinet office, had made objections on 
this ground, which his friends would seem to have satisfactorily set aside, without the ability, 
however, of preventing their recurrence. Mr. Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, was made Secre¬ 
tary of the Navy; an appointment which he owed rather to the influence of powerful friends 
than to any prominence as a politician or a publicist, or to any reputation as a man of affairs. 
He had been editor of a Hartford paper, and was a Democrat in the administrations of Van 
Buren and Polk. The Treasury was placed under the direction of Salmon P. Chase, a nephew 
of the venerated Bishop Chase, of Ohio and Illinois. A lawyer of eminence in Cincinnati, he 
had distinguished himself in suits which involved constitutional questions in regard to slavery, 
in which he always appeared against the slaveholding interest. As candidate of the Free-soil 
party, he had been elected to the Senate of the United States, and afterward was made Gov¬ 
ernor of Ohio, in which position his sound and wise views of finance at a critical period had 
done the commonwealth much service. For his Attorney General Mr. Lincoln had selected Ed¬ 
ward Bates, a leading lawyer and politician of Missouri, who had done much service to the Re- 


1 “ Pierre Toutant was happy until '03”—the year of Louis XVI.’s death. 

4 Cortez had five hundred Spanish troops, but his Tlascalnn allies were numbered by thousands, and treachery served him 
better than either his own or the native forces. General Scott entered the country at the head of only fifteen thousand men, 
and the whole force under General Taylor was less than six thousand. The Mexicans fought with skill and desperate 
valor. Treachery was enlisted only in the councils of their leader, Santa Anna. And General Scott and his little army 
bore themselves so magnanimously and so wisely, that the Mexicans invited him to remain with them at the head of affairs. 
Happy would it have been for them had he done 60 . 






























































































































































1861 .] 


FORT SUMTER 


55 


publican party, and not a little during the canvass which resulted in Mr. Lin¬ 
coln’s own election. The Department of the Interior was committed td the 
hands of Caleb Smith, of Indiana; and the Post-office to Montgomery Blair, 
of Maryland, a graduate of West Point, whose whole life had been passed in 
the observation, if not in the conduct of public affairs, and who was expected 
to take, and did take, a much more prominent part in the cabinet counsels 
than the office which he accepted would have made necessary. To this cab¬ 
inet the confederate commissioners made their approach almost ere it was 
well formed. They arrived in Washington on the 5th of March; but it was 
not until the 12th that Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth, representing the com¬ 
mission, addressed a note to the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, informing him 
of the character in which they presented themselves at the capital, and asking 
him to appoint an early day on which they might present their credentials 
and proceed to negotiations. Their note was couched in those smooth and 
formal phrases of conventional courtesy with which men of social culture and 
diplomatic experience can cover even the most offensive assertions and the 
most injurious assumptions. They claimed that the seven states which they 
represented had withdrawn from the Union, and formed a confederation, “in 
the exercise of the inherent right of every free people to change or reform 
their political institutions,” when they knew that the inhabitants of only one 
of those states—Texas—ever were, in the political sense of the word, a dis¬ 
tinct people, and that four other states of the seven—Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Florida—were the mere creatures of the government and peo¬ 
ple of the United States, the very soil of two of them—Florida and Louisiana 
—having been bought and paid for out of the United States Treasury. They 
claimed recognition and consideration for their government on the ground 
that it was “endowed with all the means of self-support,” when those means 
consisted largely of the arms, the money, the forts, public buildings, and ves¬ 
sels which it had seized from the very government from whom they demand¬ 
ed recognition. They professed that “ amity and good-will” which diplomatic 
agents always profess until there is an open rupture; and they declared that 
the people whom they claimed to represent did not wish to do any act to in¬ 
jure their late confederates, when they knew that their very presence in that 
capital, as commissioners of part of the Union to a government administered 
by men constitutionally elected to govern the whole, was an evidence that 
their “ late confederates” had already received at their hands the greatest 
injury in their power. Mr. Seward replied to this note on the 15th by a 


memorandum in which he informed them, with the utmost courtesy, that he 
had no authority to recognize them as diplomatic agents, or enter into corre¬ 
spondence with them. The events which had caused their mission to Wash¬ 
ington he regarded, not as a rightful and accomplished revolution, but as a 
perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to an unjustifiable and 
unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and authority vested in the fed¬ 
eral government. The remedy for the deplorable condition of affairs then 
existing he expected to find, not in such irregular negotiations as those upon 
which they desired to enter, but in the regular and considerate action of the 
people whom they professed to represent, and in a constitutional convention 
for the amendment of the organic law of the land. In brief, plain phrase, 
the Secretary of State, speaking for his government, refused to not only rec¬ 
ognize the government under which the commissioners acted, but to admit 
the right to establish it, and told them that they and all their constituents 
were then, as they had been before, citizens of the United States. 

The reply of the insurgent commissioners to this memorandum is one of 
the curiosities of diplomatic literature. Still studiously preserving the hol¬ 
low form of diplomatic courtesy, and making almost evangelical declarations 
of peace and good-will to men, the commissioners, in fact, took a high tone of 
defiance; read the Secretary and the President a presumptuous lecture upon 
the first principles of free government; held the innocence of the insurgent 
government up to the admiration of posterity; and styled the determination 
of the President to keep his solemn oath of office a determination “ to ap¬ 
peal to the sword to reduce the people of the Confederate States to the will 
of the section or party whose president he is”—a most impudent remark, 
whether we consider Mr. Lincoln’s constitutional position, or the distribu¬ 
tion of the popular vote in the election which made him President, or the 
majorities in that by which secession was carried in any state of the confed¬ 
eration except South Carolina. They denied, too, that they had asked the 
government of the United States to recognize the independence of their con¬ 
federation, but merely to adjust with them the relations springing from a 
manifest and accomplished revolution. In other words, they asked the gov¬ 
ernment, by receiving them, to admit the very point in dispute, and they 
declared that the innocence, the peacefulness, and the good-will of the con¬ 
federate government was to endure just so long as it was allowed to have 
its own way, regardless of the interests, the honor, and, in fact, the very ex¬ 
istence of the government in defiance of which it had been set up. 5 


* Correspondence between Mr. Seward and the Confederate Commissioners. 

The following is the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Commissioners from 
the Confederate States: 

Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to Mr. Seward , opening Negotiation and stating the Case. 

Washington City, March 12, 1861. 

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States: 

Sir, —The undersigned have been duly accredited by the government of the Confederate States 
of America as commissioners to the government of the United States, and in pursuance of their 
instructions have now the honor to acquaint you with that fact, and to make known, through yon, 
to the President of the United States, the objects of their presence in this capital. 

Seven states of the late federal Union having, in the exercise of the inherent right of every free 
people to change or reform their political institutions, and through conventions of their people, 
withdrawn from the United States and reassumed the attributes of sovereign power delegated to it, 
have formed a government of their own. The Confederate States constitute an independent nation 
de facto and de.jure , and possess a government perfect in all its parts, and endowed with all the 
means of self-support. 

With a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of this political separation, upon 
such terms of amity and good-will as the respective interests, geographical contiguity, and future 
welfare of the two nations may render necessary, the undersigned are instructed to make to the 
government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the govern¬ 
ment of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States 
earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions; that it is neither their interest nor 
their wish to make any demand which is not founded in strictest justice, nor do any act to injure 
their late confederates. 

The undersigned have now the honor, in obedience to the instructions of their government, to 
request yon to appoint as early a day as possible, in order that they may present to the President 
of the United States the credentials which they bear and the objects of the mission with which they 
are charged. We are, very respectfully, your obedient servants. Joint Forsyth, 

MARTOt J. Crawford. 

The Reply of Mr. Seward. 

[Memorandum.] 

Department of State, Washington, March 15,18C1. 

Mr. John Forsyth, of the State of Alabama, and Mr. Martin J. Crawford, of the State of Georgia, 
on the 11th inst’, through the kind offices of a distinguished senator, submitted to the Secretary 
of State their desire for an unofficial interview. This request was, on the 12th inst., upon exclu¬ 
sively public consideration, respectfully declined. 

On the 13th inst., while the secretary was preoccupied, Mr. A. D. Banks, of Virginia, called at 
this department, and was received by the assistant secretary, to whom he delivered a pealed com¬ 
munication, which he had been charged by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to present the secretary 
in person. 

In that communication Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford inform the Secretary of State that they 
have been duly accredited by the government of the Confederate States of America as commis¬ 
sioners to the government of the United States, and they set forth the objects of their attendance 
at Washington. They observe that seven states of the American Union, in the exercise of a right 
inherent in every free people, have withdrawn, through conventions of their people, from the 
United States, reassumed the attributes of sovereign power, and formed a government of their 
own, and that those Confederate States now constitute an independent nation de facto and dejwe, 
and possess a government perfect in all its parts, and fully endowed with all the means of self- 
support. 

Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, in their aforesaid communication, thereupon proceeded to inform 
the secretary that, with a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of the political 
separation thus assumed, upon such terms of amity and good-will as the respective interests, geo¬ 
graphical contiguity, and the future welfare of the supposed two nations might render necessary, 
thev are instructed’to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of 
negotiations, assuring this government that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate 
States earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions, and that it is neither their in¬ 
terest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in strictest justice, nor do any act 
to injure their late confederates. 

After making these statements Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford close their communication, as 
tbev sav, in obedience to the instructions of their government, by requesting the Secretary of State 
to appoint as earlv a day as possible, in order that they may present to the President of the United 
States the credentials which they bear and the objects’of the mission with which they are charged. 

The Secretarv of State frankly confesses that he understands the events which have recently 
occurred, and the condition of political affairs which actually exists in the heart of the Union to 
which his attention has thus been directed, very differently from the aspect in which they are pre¬ 
sented by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. He sees in them, not a rightful and accomplished revo¬ 
lution and an independent nation, with an established government, but rather a perversion of a 
temporary and partisan excitement to the inconsiderate purposes of an unjustifiable and uncon¬ 
stitutional aggression upon the rights and the authority vested in the federal government, and 
hitherto benignlv exercised, as from their very nature they always must so be exercised, for the 
maintenance of the Union, the preservation of liberty, and the security, peace, welfare, happiness, 
and aggrandizement of the American people. The Secretary of State, therefore, avows to Messrs. 


Forsyth and Crawford that he looks patiently but confidently for the cure of evils which have re¬ 
sulted from proceedings so unnecessary, so unwise, so unusual, and so unnatural, not to irregular 
negotiations having in view new and untried relations, with agencies unknown to and acting in 
derogation of the Constitution and laws but to regular and considerate action of the people at 
those states in co-operation with their brethren in the other states, through the Congress of the 
United States, and such extraordinary conventions if there shall be need thereof, as the federal 
Constitution contemplates and authorizes to be assembled. 

It is, however, the purpose of the Secretary of State, on this occasion, not to invite or engage in 
any discussion of these subjects, but simply to set forth his reasons for declining to comply with 
the request of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. 

On the 4th of March inst., the newly-elected President of the United States, in view of all the 
facts bearing on the present question, assumed the executive administration of the government, 
first delivering, in accordance with an early, honored custom, an inaugural address to the people 
of the United States. The Secretary of State respectfully submits a copy of this address to Messrs. 
Forsyth and Crawford. 

A simple reference to it will be sufficient to satisfy those gentlemen that the Secretary of State, 
guided by the principles therein announced, is prevented altogether from admitting or assuming 
that the states referred to by them have, in law or in fact, withdrawn from the federal Union, or 
that they could do so in the manner described by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, or in any other 
manner than with the consent and concert of the people of the United States, to be given through 
a national convention, to be assembled in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution of the 
United Slates. Of course the Secretary of State can not act upon the assumption, or in any way 
admit that the so-called Confederate States constitute a foreign power, with whom diplomatic re¬ 
lations ought to be established. 

Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State, whose official duties are confined, subject to 
the direction of the President, to the conducting of the foreign relations of the country, and do not 
at all embrace domestic questions, or questions arising between the several states and the federal 
government, is unable to comply with the request of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to appoint a 
day on which they may present the evidences of their authority and the objects of their visit to 
the President of the United States. On the contrary, he is obliged to state to Messrs. Forsyth and 
Crawford that he has no authority, nor is he at liberty to recognize them as diplomatic agents, or 
hold correspondence or other communication with them. 

Finally, the Secretary of State would observe that, although he has supposed that he might safely 
and with propriety have adopted these conclusions without making any reference of the subject to 
the executive, yet, so strong has been his desire to practice entire directness, and to act in a spirit 
of perfect respect and candor toward Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, and that portion of the Union 
in whose name they present themselves before him, that he has cheerfully submitted this paper to 
the President, who coincides generally in the views it expresses, and sanctions the secretary’s de¬ 
cision declining official intercourse with Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. 

Confederate Commissioners' final Letter to Secretary Seward. 

Washington, April 9,186L 

Hoo. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington : 

The “memorandum” dated Department of State, Washington, March 15, 1861, has been re¬ 
ceived through the hands of Mr. J. T. Pickett, secretary to this commission, who, by the instruc- 
j tions of the undersigned, called for it on yesterday at the department. 

In that memorandum you correctly state the purport of the official note addressed to you by the 
undersigned on the 12th ult. Without repeating the contents of that note in full, it is enough to 
sav here that its object was to invite the government of the United States to a friendly considera¬ 
tion of the relation between the United States and the seven states lately of the federal Union, but 
now separated from it by the sovereign will of their people, growing out of the pregnant and un¬ 
deniable fact that those people have rejected the authority of the United States, and established a 
government of their own. Those relations had to be friendly or hostile. The people of the old 
and new governments, occupying contiguous territories, had to stand to each other in the relation 
of good neighbors, each seeking their happiness and pursuing their national destinies in their own 
way, without interference with the other, or they had to be rival and hostile nations. The gov¬ 
ernment of the Confederate States had no hesitation in electing its choice in this alternative. 
Frankly and unreserved, seeking the good of the people who had intrusted them with power, in 
the spirit of humanity, of the Christian civilization of the age, nnd of that Americanism which 
regards the true welfare and happiness of the people, the government of the Confederate States, 
among its first acts, commissioned the undersigned to approach the government of the United 
States with the olive-branch of peace, and to offer to adjust the great questions pending between 
them in the only wny to be justified by the consciences and common sense of good men who had 
nothing but the welfare of the people of the two confederacies at heart. 

Your government has not chosen to meet the undersigned in the conciliatory and peaceful spirit 
in which they are commissioned. Persistently wedded to those fatal theories of construction of the 
federal Constitution always rejected by the statesmen of the South, and adhered to by those of the 
administration school until they have produced their natural and often-predicted result of the de¬ 
struction of the Union, under which we might have continued to live happily and gloriously to¬ 
gether had the spirit of the ancestry who framed the common Constitution animated the hearts 
of all their sons, you now, with a persistence untaught and uncured by the ruin which has been 
wrought, refuse to recognize the great fact presented to you of a complete and successful revolu¬ 
tion ; you close your eyes to the existence of the government founded upon it, and ignore tb' 













56 


Although Secretary Seward’s memorandum was dated March 15th, this 
reply was not written until the 9th of April, the memorandum itself not 
having been sent to the commissioners until the 8th, with their own con¬ 
sent, they having been willing to await the result of negotiations still more 
irregular than those which they themselves had undertaken. These nego¬ 
tiations had reference entirely to the condition of Fort Sumter, and the 
course which the government meant to pursue in regard to it. This, in¬ 
deed, was the material question of the day, the first great problem which 
the government was called upon to solve after the coming in of the new ad¬ 
ministration. On the 5th of March, President Lincoln’s first full day in of¬ 
fice, and the day on which the confederate commissioners arrived in Wash¬ 
ington, he received through the War Department a letter from Major Ander¬ 
son, giving his opinion, and that of all the officers in his command, that re¬ 
enforcements could not be thrown into the fort in time to prevent its capit¬ 
ulation, from want of food, with less than a body of 20,000 good and well- 
disciplined men. After a full examination of the case thus submitted, Gen¬ 
eral Scott and the army officers at Washington coincided with Major An¬ 
derson’s judgment. But no such body of men was at the disposal of the 
government, or could be raised before the garrison at Sumter would be 
starved out. All that could be done, therefore, under the circumstances, 
was either to send provisions to the fort, if that would be allowed, or, if not, 
to evacuate it. But as a peaceful evacuation, unsupported and unexplained 
by any concurrent act of authority, would justly be regarded by the world 
as an admission of the incompetency of the government even to resist its 
own destruction, it was wisely determined to accomplish the re-enforcement 
of the important post of Fort Pickens, that thus it might be seen that, while 
the government was obliged to yield to military necessity on the one hand, 
it none the less asserted its power and maintained its dignity on the other. 
Orders were dispatched (necessarily by sea) for the transfer of troops from 
the frigate Sabine, then lying off Pensacola Harbor, to Fort Pickens; but 
the officer in command, conceiving himself bound by some such sort of 
armistice or agreement on the part of Mr. Buchanan’s administration as was 
claimed to exist with regard to Major Anderson’s force at Fort Moultrie, 
refused to disembark the troops. The news of this strange and untoward 
complication reached Washington at such a late period of the time allotted 
by circumstances for action, that Fort Pickens could not be re-enforced be¬ 
fore the garrison at Fort Sumter would be famished. With regard to that 
garrison, therefore, the problem for the government was either to furnish it 
with supplies, or to get it out of the fort, as soon as possible, without loss of 
honor or virtual abdication of authority. 

It was during this perplexity of the government that the confederate 
commissioners awaited a reply to their note to Secretary Seward. Mean¬ 
time they received assurances from persons of high position, who, to use the 
mildest phrase, availed themselves of their advantages to act as observers and 
go-betweens in the interest of the rebellion (and, sad to relate, an associate 
judge of the Supreme Court was the chief of those who performed these am¬ 
biguous functions)—first, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated, and, next, 
that it would not be supplied or re-enforced without notice to the Governor 
of South Carolina. Seeing that thus the government would be as nearly as 
possible tied hand and foot by its own acts, and placed at the mercy of the 

high duties of moderation and humanity which attach to you in dealing with this great fact. 
Had you met these issues with the frankness and manliness with which the undersigned were in¬ 
structed to present them to you and treat them, the undersigned had not now the melancholy duty 
to return home and tell their government and their countrymen that their earnest and ceaseless 
efforts in behalf of peace had been futile, and that the government of the United States meant to 
subjugate them by force of arms. Whatever may be the result, impartial history will record the 
innocence of the government of the Confederate States, and place the responsibility of the blood 
and mourning that may ensue upon those who have denied the great fundamental doctrine of 
American liberty, that “governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," 
and who have set naval and land armaments in motion to subject the people of one portion of the 
land to the will of another portion. That that can never be done while a freeman survives in the 
Confederate States to wield a weapon, the undersigned appeal to past history to prove. These 
military demonstrations against the people of the seceded states are certainly far from being in 
keeping and consistency with the theory of the Secretary of State, maintained in his memoran¬ 
dum, that these states are still component parts of the late American Union, as the undersigned 
are not aware of any constitutional power in the President of the United States to levy war with¬ 
out the consent of Congress upon a foreign people, much less upon any portion of the people of the 
United States. 

The undersigned, like the Secretary of State, have no purpose to “invite or engage in discus¬ 
sion" of the subject on which their two governments are so irreconcilably at variance. It is this 
variance that has broken up the old Union, the disintegration of which has only begun. It is 
proper, however, to advise you that it were well to dismiss the hopes you seem to entertain that, 
by any of the modes indicated, the people of the Confederate States will ever be brought to sub¬ 
mit to the authority of the government of the United States. You are dealing with delusions, too, 
when you seek to separate our people from our government, and to characterize the deliberate, 
sovereign act of the people ns a “perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement.” If you 
cherish these dreams you will be awakened from them, and find them as unreal and unsubstantial 
as others in which you have recently indulged. The undersigned would omit the perform nee of 
an obvious duty were they to fail to make known to the government of the United States that the 
people of the Confederate States have declared their independence with a full knowledge of all the 
responsibilities of that act, and with as firm a determination to maintain it by all the means with 
which Nature has endowed them as that which sustained their fathers when they threw off the 
authority of the British crown. 

The undersigned clearly understand that you have declined to appoint a day to enable them to 
lay the objects of the mission w ith which they are charged before the President of the United 
States, because so to do would be to recognize the independence and separate nationality of the 
Confederate States. This is the vein of thought that pervades the memorandum before us. The 
truth of history requires that it should distinctly appear upon the record that the undersigned did 
not ask the government of the United States to recognize the independence of the Confederate 
States. They only asked audience to adjust, in a spirit of amity and peace, the new relations 
springing from a manifest and accomplished revolution in the government of the late federal 
Union. Your refusal to entertain these overtures for a peaceful solution, the active naval and 
military preparation of this government, and a formal notice to the commanding general of the 
confederate forces in the harbor of Charleston, that the President intends to provision Fort Sumter 
by forcible means, if necessary, are viewed bv the undersigned, and can only be received by the 
world, as a declaration of war against the Confederate States; for the President of the United 
States knows that Fort Sumter can not be provisioned without the effusion of blood. The under¬ 
signed, in behalf of their government and people, accept the gage of battle thus thrown down to 
them ; and appealing to God and the judgment of mankind for the righteousness of their cause, 
the people of the Confederate States will defend their liberties to th /2 last against this flagrant and 
open attempt at their subjugation to sectional power. 

This communication can not be properly closed without adverting to the date of your memo¬ 
randum. The official note of the undersigned, of the 12th of March, was delivered to the Assist¬ 
ant Secretary of State on the 13th of that month, the gentleman who delivered it informing him 


[ 1861 . 

insurgents, the commissioners were quite willing to leave the Secretary of 
State’s memorandum at the State Department, subject to such modifications 
as this anticipated military course of the government might compel. But 
when they learned on the 7th_that Fort Sumter was to be provisioned and 
Fort Pickens re-enforced, if the government had power to do so, they sent 
their reply to the memorandum, and, solemnly shaking the dust from their 
feet, turned their backs on Washington. 

The expedition for the .relief of Fort Sumter was got under way with all 
possible dispatch; and notice was sent to Governor Pickens, of South Caro¬ 
lina, that a peaceable attempt would be made to provision the fort, and that 
if this were resisted, force would be used. The fleet was not a very impos¬ 
ing one, considering the important occasion of its dispatch. It consisted of 
but three armed vessels, three transport ships, and two steam-tugs. The 
last of these, the Yankee and the Uncle Ben, carried only their ordinary 
crews; the transports (the mail steamers Atlantic, Baltic, and Illinois) bore 
eight hundred men, with provisions; and of the armed ships, the steam 
sloop-of-war Pawnee carried ten guns and a crew of two hundred men ; the 
Powhatan, of like grade, eleven guns and two hundred and seventy-five 
men; while the third was but a steam revenue cutter, the Harriet Lane, 
which had hastily assumed the naval colors, and which carried but five 
small guns and ninety-six men—the military arid naval force, all told, con¬ 
sisting of but 1380 men and twenty-six cannon. Yet even this meagre 
armament was raised with difficulty under pressure of the great emergency. 
But not even all of these vessels left, port with Charleston as their ultimate 
destination. The Atlantic and the Illinois, with eight hundred and fifty 
of the troops, were ordered to Fort Pickens; the armed steamers, the Baltic, 
with one hundred and sixty troops, and the steam-tugs, were instructed to 
rendezvous off Charleston Harbor, the commander having put to sea with 
sealed orders as to his farther operations. Those orders were that unarmed 
boats should be first sent in with provisions to Fort Sumter, and that, if 
these met with resistance, all means should be used to re-enforce as well as 
to supply it. 

Nearly four months had now elapsed since Major Anderson had hastily 
sought the protection of this isolated strong-hold for his little band of fifty- 
five artillerists, nine officers, fifteen musicians, and thirty laborers. When 
he took up that position, it seemed to people generally as if he was abso¬ 
lutely unassailable, except by a fleet and by hunger. The former, it was 
well known, the insurgents were without; and it was supposed that the 
possession of it by the government would deprive them of the assistance of 
the latter. Fort Sumter was regarded as one of the strongest works within 
the limits of the republic. Built upon an artificial island in Charleston Har¬ 
bor, at the cost to the nation of a million of dollars, it had all the advantages 
of inaccessible position, and the highest resources of engineering skill. Its 
pentagonal walls of brick and compact concrete were twelve feet thick at 
the base and eight at the parapet, which rose sixty feet from the foundation. 
On four of its five sides it was pierced for two tiers of guns, to which were 
added a third (called en barbette ), fired from the parapet; but the fifth side, 
looking southward upon Charleston, was almost without defense, and weak¬ 
ened by the sally-ports and the docks; for the strong-holds of the republic, 
like its Constitution, were constructed upon the reasonable supposition that 


that the secretary of this commission would call at 12 o’clock, noon, on the next day, for an an¬ 
swer. At the appointed hour Mr. Pickett did call, and was informed by the Assistant Secretary 
of State that the engagements of the Secretary of State had prevented him from giving the note 
his attention. The Assistant Secretary of State then asked for the address of Messrs. Crawford 
and Forsyth, the members of the commission then present in this city, took note of the address on 
a card, and engaged to send whatever reply might be made to their lodgings. Why this was not 
done it is proper should be here explained. The memorandum is dated March 15, and was not 
delivered until April 8. Why was it withheld during the intervening twenty-three days? In the 
postscript to your memorandum you say it “was delayed, as was understood, with their (Messrs. 
Forsyth and Crawford’s) consent.” This is true; but it is also true that on the 15th of March 
Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford were assured by a person occupying a high official position in the 
government, and who, as they believed, was speaking by authority, that Fort Sumter would be 
evacuated within a very few days, and that no measure changing the existing status prejudicially 
to the Confederate States, as respects Fort Pickens, was then contemplated, and these assurances 
were subsequently repeated, with the addition that any contemplated change as respects Pickens 
would be notified to us. On the 1st of April we were again informed that there might be an at¬ 
tempt to supply Fort Sumter with provisions, but that Governor Pickens should have previous 
notice of this attempt. There was no suggestion of any re-enforcements. The undersigned did 
not hesitate to believe that these assurances expressed the intentions of the administration at the 
time, or, at all events, of prominent members of that administration. This delay was assented 
to for the express purpose of attaining the great end of the mission of the undersigned, to wit: a 
pacific solution of existing complications. The inference dcducible from the date of your memo¬ 
randum, that the undersigned had, of their own volition, and without cause, consented to this long 
hiatus in the grave duties with which they were charged, is, therefore, not consistent with a just 
exposition of the facts of the case. The intervening twenty-three days were employed in active 
unofficial efforts, the object of which was to smooth the path to a pacific solution, the. distinguished 
personage alluded to co-operating with the undersigned; and every step of that effort is recorded 
in writing, and now in possession of the undersigned and of their government. It was only when 
nil these anxious efforts for peace had been exhausted, and it became clear that Mr. Lincoln had 
determined to appeal to the sword to reduce the people of the Confederate States to the will of the 
section or party whose president he is, that the undersigned resumed the official negotiation tem¬ 
porarily suspended, and sent their secretary for a reply to their official note of March 12. 

It is proper to add that, during these twenty-three days, two gentlemen of official distinction as 
high as that of the personage hitherto alluded to, aided the undersigned as intermediaries in these 
unofficial negotiations for peace. 

The undersigned, commissioners of the Confederate States of America, having thus made an¬ 
swer to all they deemed material in the memorandum filed in the department on the 15th of March 
last, have the honor to be, John Forsyth, 

Martin J. Crawford, 

A. B. Roman. 

A true copy of the original by me delivered to Mr. F. W. Seward, Assistant Secretary of State 
of the United States, at 8 o’clock in the evening of April 9, 1861. 

Attest, J. T. Pickett, Secretary, etc., etc. 

Mr. Seward , in Reply to the Commissioners , acknowledt/cs the Receipt of their Letter , but declines to 

Answer it. 

Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1861. 

Messrs. Forsyth, Crawford, and Roman, having been apprised by a memorandum which has been 
delivered to them that the Secretary of State is not at liberty to hold official intercourse with 
them, will, it is presumetl, expect no notice from him of the new communication which they have 
addressed to him under date of the 9th inst., beyond the simple acknowledgment of the receipt 
thereof, which he hereby very cheerfully gives. 

A true copy of the original received by the commissioners of the Confederate States, this 10th 
day of April, 1861. Attest, J. T. Pickett, Secretary, etc., etc. 





1861 .] 


FORT SUMTER. 


57 



INTERIOR OK TUB 8ALLY-l*ORT AT 8UJITRIC 

there would be little occasion fordefense against domestic violence. Charles¬ 
ton, indeed, being three miles and a half from Fort Sumter, was out of reach 
of any ordnance in use at the time when it was built, and, in fact, of any 
among its armament at the time when it was first threatened—threatened by 
the people whom it was built chiefly to protect. Around it, uniting haste, 
determination, and ingenuity, they'had drawn a nearly complete circle of 
heavy batteries. The guns which Major Anderson had left maimed in Fort 
Moultrie had been unspiked; others had been added; the repairs which he 
had begun were nearly completed; and, strengthened with some traverses, 
the old fort, though not so large or so strong as Sumter, was yet a very for¬ 
midable work. It mounted eleven heavy siege-pieces and several mortars, 
and was a little more than a mile from Sumter. At Fort Johnson—the 
name retained by the site of an old and long-abandoned and ruined fortifi¬ 
cation—two large sand batteries had been erected, and armed with heavy 
guns and mortars. These batteries were distant one mile and a quarter 
from Fort Sumter, and were the nearest to the city of all the guns which 
bore upon Major Anderson. Upon Cummings’s Point, the part of Sullivan’s 
Island nearest to Fort Sumter, and only three quarters of a mile distant, a 


singular battery had been built. It was constructed of heavy yel" 
low pine logs, and was protected from shell by a slanting roof of 
the same material. But over the logs was laid a mail armor of rail¬ 
way iron, strongly clamped and dovetailed. The port-boles were 
provided with doors like those of a man-of-war, and these also were 
covered with iron armor, and fell at the recoil of the guns, thus af¬ 
fording complete protection to the men who served the guns, ex¬ 
cept at the moment of aiming and firing. This battery mounted 
three heavy columbiads. Another battery, even more novel and cu¬ 
rious, had been built at Charleston itself with an enterprise and me¬ 
chanical ingenuity altogether unexpected. This was a floating bat¬ 
tery, made, like that on Cummings’s Point, of pine logs, and covered 
with a double layer of railway iron. It was a nondescript struc¬ 
ture, not at all like either a vessel or a fort. It looked like a large 
shed, some hundred feet in length and twenty-five in width, and 
had been much laughed at while it was building. It presented no 
perpendicular face at the point of attack, only sloping surfaces of 
heavy iron. The magazine stretched along in the rear below the 
water-line, and was protected with layers of sand-bags, which help¬ 
ed to balance the weight of the four enormous siege-guns which it 
mounted. A floating hospital was attached to the stern of this gro¬ 
tesque, but, as it proved, really formidable structure. Other bat¬ 
teries of inferior power spotted the sandy shore within cannon or 
mortar range of Sumter; and all this preparation for the destruc¬ 
tion of his post and the humiliation of bis flag Major Anderson had 
been obliged to see going on unchecked within range of his batteries 
for four weary months. Strange, unprecedented, absurd, anomalous 
position ! Sorely-tried major of artillery, found faithful in all things 
—faithful even to what seemed sure-coming death, and what was 
sure-coming surrender—while life and military honor were both to 
be saved by one word from your lips, Fire 1 which would have been 
answered by cheers over half a continent! Standing, not supine, 
not with hands tied, but vigilant, with hands free and full of arms, 
while your enemy dug his pits and set up his engines before your 
face and within your reach, affronting you each morning with some 
new device, which you, each morning, could have blown straight 
into the limbo where all such works deserve to go—will go forever 
where the cause of truth, and right, and universal good-will, for which you 
and your worthy comrades, with patient heroism, endured so much, prevails. 
Your foes did not quite trust your forbearance; for yonder upon Sullivan’s 
Island, behind that brushwood and those slopes of sand, which, even to your 
penetrating glass, seem but the common fringing of a barren beach, is a tre¬ 
mendous battery of siege-guns and mortars, of which you will see nothing 
and hear nothing until you see their fire and hear their roar. 

Such preparation had been made in Charleston Harbor for the reduction 
of Fort Sumter when the news arrived that the mission of the insurgent 
commissioners to Washington had entirely failed, and also that an expedi¬ 
tion for the relief of the fort was about to sail. Immediately there was bus¬ 
tle and excitement of a military sort—the going to and fro of aids-de-camp 
and orderlies, and marching. Not a little of it superfluous, we may honest¬ 
ly believe; but somewhat may be pardoned to the ardor of such very inex¬ 
perienced aids, and orderlies, and soldiers, in virtue of their earnestness; for 
they were in earnest, and actually meant to fight the government of the 
United States, and, what was worse, believed, and not without some reason, 
that they could fight it and live. To man the batteries of the insurgents in 








































58 


[1861 






MAI* 01’ CHARLESTON HARBOR. SHOWING FORT SUMTER AND THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES. 














































FORT SUMTER 


59 


18ul.] 






Charleston Harbor a force of one thousand men would have been more than enough; but about 
seven thousand men were assembled there under the command of General Beauregard, and of 
these, four thousand were sent to the works, the remaining three thousand being held in reserve 
at the city. 

It was on the 8th of April, 1862, that the issue was presented to the insurgents that they 
must allow the government to retain peaceful possession of its own fortress or expel its garrison 
by force. No communication was held with the insurgent administration at Montgomery; but 
on that day a messenger arrived from Washington to the Governor of South Carolina, inform¬ 
ing him that provisions would be sent to Fort Sumter, and that, if they were not permitted to 
reach it peaceably, force would be used. Such had been the nature of the abnormal negotia¬ 
tions, understandings, or what not, between the representatives, authorized and unauthorized, 
open and secret, of the insurgents at Washington and the government, that honor, as well as 
policy, was thought to require the giving of this information. Upon receiving it, General Beau¬ 
regard immediately communicated it by telegraph to Montgomery, where the question which it 
presented was considered for twenty-four hours; and on the 10th the confederate commander 
received an order to demand the evacuation of the fort, and, if this was refused, to commence 
the attack. He made the demand the next day at noon, in courteous phrase, of course, with the 
usual expressions of a desire to avoid the effusion of blood, and with a compliment to the con¬ 
stancy of Major Anderson, which came gracefully from a late companion in arms. The terms 
were the most honorable that could be offered. The abandonment of his post, which they were 
intended to grace, was promptly refused by Major Anderson as inconsistent with his sense of 
honor and his obligations to his government. As he bade General Beauregard’s messengers 
farewell, he said to them that he should be starved out in a few days, unless the fort was pre¬ 
viously brought about his ears by their fire. This casual remark, natural enough to a military 
man under all the circumstances, was reported at once all over the country, and seemed as 
strangely peaceful and superfluous, to say the least, to the multitude, as the good-natured mutual 
admissions of opposing counsel do to their incensed and mutually glowering clients; and it was 
even made the occasion of the impeachment of Major Anderson's loyalty. General Beauregard, 
however, although he did not so misunderstand it, yet immediately telegraphed it, with the re¬ 
fusal, to the confederate government, from whom he as promptly received authority to accept 
from Major Anderson, as an alternative of an attack, an agreement to evacuate the fort within 
a few days, and not to use his guns against the insurgent batteries unless they first opened fire 
on him. Two of General Beauregard’s aids arrived at Fort Sumter about midnight of that day, 
the 11th, with a proposal of this alternative, and the authority to enter at once into the agree¬ 
ment in question. The negotiation was thus hastily pressed through that sleepless night be¬ 
cause the relieving flotilla was known to the insurgents to be already in the offing, though he 
for whose relief it came was ignorant of their presence, and even of the purpose of the govern¬ 
ment; for communication with him had been cut off for four days, and the last messenger from 
Washington—Lieutenant Talbot, one of his own garrison—had not been allowed to return to 
him. In his final summons General Beauregard requested Major Anderson to communicate to 
his aids an open answer, which they awaited. This he did at half past two, offering to evacuate 
the fort on the loth if he did not previously receive controlling instructions or supplies, and 
agreeing, meantime, not to open fire unless in case of hostile demonstration against the fort, or 
against the flag of his government. This offer, which was to go out unless he was ordered to 
remain, and was able to do so, and which secured him the right of defending any vessel which 
entered the harbor under the United States flag, was not at all what General Beauregard re¬ 
quired ; and so, at twenty minutes past three o’clock on the morning of the 12th, the aids-de- 
camp informed Major Anderson that fire would be opened upon him in one hour, and there¬ 
upon took final leave. 6 

‘ The following is the correspondence immediately preceding the hostilities: 

Charleston, April 8. 

L. P. Walker, Secretary of War: 

An authorized messenger from President Lincoln just informed Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent 
Co Fort Sumter peaceably, or otherwise by force. G. T. Beauregard. 

Montgomery, 10th. 

Gen. G. T. Beauregard, Charleston : 

If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the Washington 
government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation, and, if this is refused, proceed in such 
a manner ns you inav determine to reduce it. Answer. L. P. Walker, Secretary of Wat . 

Charleston, April 10. 

L. P. Walker, Secretary of War: 

The demand will be made to-morrow at 12 o'clock. G. T. Beauregard. 

Montgomery, April 10. 

Gen. Beauregard, Charleston : 

Unless there arc especial reasons connected with your own condition, it is considered proper that you should make the 
demand at an early hour. * L. P. Walker, Secretary of War. 

Charleston, April 10. 

L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, Montgomery : 

The reasons are special for 12 o’clock. G. T. Beauregard. 

Head-quarters, Provisional Army, C. S. A., Charleston, S. C., April 11,1961—2 P.M. 

Sir, —The government of the Confederate States has hitherto forborne from any hostile demonstration against Fort Sum¬ 
ter in the hope that the government of the United States, with a view to the amicable adjustment of all questions between 
the two governments, and to avert the calamities of war, would voluntarily evacuate it. There was reason at one time to 
believe that such would be the course pursued by the government of the United States, and under that impression my gov¬ 
ernment has refrained from making any demand for the surrender of the fort. 

But the Confederate States can no longer delay assuming actual possession of a fortification commanding the entrance of 
one of their harbors, and necessary to its defense and security. 

I am ordered by the government of the Confederate States to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aids. Colonel 
Chesnut aad Captain Lee, are authorized to make such demand uf you. All proper facilities will be afforded for the re¬ 
moval of yourself and command, together with company arms and property, and all private property, to any post in the 
United States which you mny elect. The flag which you have upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most 
trytng circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it down. 

Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time, await your answer. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obe¬ 
dient servant, G. T. Beauregard, Brigadier General Commanding. 

Major Robert Anderson, Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C. 

Head-quarters, Fort Sumter, 8. C., April 11th, 1861. 

General, —I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this fort; 
and to sny in reply thereto that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of honor and of my obligations to my gov¬ 
ernment prevent my compliance. 

Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms proposed, and for the high compliment paid me,^ I am, general, 
very respectfully, your obedient servant, Robert Anderson, Major U. S. Army, Commanding. 

To Brigadier General G. T. Beauregard, commanding Provisional Army, C. 8. A. 

Montgomery, April 11. 

Gen. Beauregard, Charleston: . . , ,. 

We do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter, if Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, 
he will evacuate, and agree that, in the mean time, he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should be employed 
against Fort Sumter. You are thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as 
your judgment decides to be most practicable. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War. 

Head-quarters, Provisional Army, C. S. A., Charleston, April 11, ISfll, 11 P.M. 

Major, —In consequence of the verbal observations made by you to my aids, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the 
condition of your supplies, and tl it you would in a few days be starved out if our guns did not batter you to pieces, or words 
to that effect, and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I communicated both the verbal observation and your written an¬ 
swer to my communication to my government. 

If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and agree that, in the mean time, von will not use your 
guns against us unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel 


































































































































































60 


[ 1861 . 


Without a doubt this issue was expected. It at least found General Beau¬ 
regard prepared to keep the appointment of his representatives with suffi¬ 
cient punctuality. The hour went slowly by, and the batteries were silent. 
Five anxious minutes more were counted, and the dark quiet of the night 
was yet unbroken; but hardly were another five completed when the flash 
and the dull roar of a mortar came from the battery on Sullivan’s Island. 
The conscious shell went up shrieking and wailing along its fiery curve, 
and, lingering reluctantly before its downward plunge, burst as it fell di¬ 
rectly over the doomed fortress. No meteor of more direful portent ever 
lit the sky; for this told surely of the beginning of a civil war, compared to 
which all civil wars before it were as squabbles in a corner—a war in which 
millions of men were to be engaged, and which was to scatter ruin and want, 
not only through the country in which it raged, but across the sea, among 
two of the most powerful nations of the world; which was to convert half 
a continent into one great battle-ground, and strew it from east to west with 
the graves of its citizens slaughtered to gratify the base ambition and the 
disappointed pride of a small factious oligarchy, who justified to themselves 
their attempt to destroy a government upon the monstrous assumption of 
the right of one man to own and use another as his property. But to the 
eager neophytes in war who manned the Charleston batteries, this shell was 
merely the signal for the beginning of a bombardment in which they ex¬ 
pected to run some risk and to gain much glory; for they knew well their 
overwhelming superiority both in numbers and in weight of artillery, and 
the}' know how wasted, worn, and weary their handful of opponents were 
with want of food, anxiety, and watching. They expected, too, that after 
a few such contests—enough to show the government and the people of the 
free states that they really meant rebellion, they would attain their purposes, 
and be in a position so to remodel the map of North America as to secure 
the perpetuation of negro slavery throughout the larger part of its temper¬ 
ate climes, and (what was the real object sought by their insurrection) the 
political and social predominance of the slaveholding oligarchy. So mis¬ 
erably had politicians been able to cause the citizens of the republic to 
misunderstand each other! so miserably had some of them deceived them¬ 
selves! After the firing of this signal mortar, the discharge of which was 
fitly committed to the hands of Edmund Ruffin, a Virginian, who had grown 
gray during his until ing efforts to bring about the struggle which he then 
began, there was a short pause of preparation, and then fire was opened 
from the whole crescent of batteries which more than half encircled the 
fort; for the water battery had been towed down two days before, and an¬ 
chored on the undefended side which looked toward Charleston. From this 
time the discharge of shot and shell against the fort was kept up without 
ceasing; but the fort did not reply. The insurgent artillerists could see 
their balls strike against its sides, splintering the parapet and the embrasures, 
and their bombs fall within its inclosure, and hear them explode. An hour 
of this firing passed, and not a shot came back. Time wore on, and the 
bombardment was kept up until those to whom had been committed the 
doubtful honor of opening it grew tired with their unaccustomed task, and 
yielded their places to others, and still the fort was silent. More than two 
hours had thus passed in this one-sided contest. What could it mean? Did 
Major Anderson intend to preserve the inoffensive attitude which he had 
maintained for months, bear without resistance the fierce attacks of the bat¬ 
teries which he had allowed to be constructed around him, and, trusting 
solely to the endurance of his walls and his men, leave to his assailants, al¬ 
ready committed to an inglorious contest, only the contemptible business of 
a fierce onslaught upon men who refused to fight them? Perhaps it would 
have been as well had he added that shame to the meed of their two days’ 
labor; but his duty, of course, prevented his thought of such a purpose. 
He was not politic, he was only prudent. 

Upon the departure of General Beauregard’s aids from the fort the flag 
was raised, the posterns closed, the sentinels withdrawn from the parapet, 
and orders given that the men should not leave the bomb-proofs without 
special orders. At half past six o’clock the shrill notes of “Peas upon a 
trencher,” piercing the uproar of the bombardment, called the garrison, as 
usual, to breakfast, which they ate leisurely and calmly. Major Ander¬ 
son knew that if eighty men (only enough to work nine guns properly) 
were to do any thing against such a fire as had been opened upon him, it 
could only be with the careful husbanding of their strength and nervous 
energy; and therefore he had reserved his fire until he could use his guns 
in broad daylight, and send his men to their work with the support of the 
best breakfast his meagre stores could furnish. He then divided his com¬ 
mand into three reliefs, assigning officers and men as equally as possible to 


Chesnut and Captain Lee are authorized by me to enter into'such an agreement with you. You 
arc therefore requested to communicate to them an open answer. I remain, major, very respect¬ 
fully, your obedient servant, G. T. Beauregard, Brigadier General Commanding. 

Major Robert Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C. 

Hend-i|narters, Fort Sumter, S. G\, 2 30 A.M., April 12,1861 
General,— I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your second communication of the 
11th inst., by Col. Chesnut, and to state, in reply, that, cordially uniting w ith you in the desire to 
avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of 
transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th inst., should I not receive, prior to that 
time, controlling instructions from my government, or additional supplies; and that I will not, in 
the mean time, oj>en my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act 
against this fort, or the flag of my government, by the forces under your command, or by some 
portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part 
against this fort, or the flag it bears. I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant, 

Robert Anderson, Major U. S. A., Commanding. 

To Brigadier General G. T. Beauregard, commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A. 

Fort Sumter, S. C., April 12,1861, 3 20 A.M. 

Sir,—B y authority of Brigadier General Beanregard, commanding the provisional forces of 
the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries 
on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time. We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your 
obedient servants, James Chesnut, Aid-de-carap. 

Stephen D. Lee, Captain C. S. Army and Aid-de-camp. 

M^jor Robert Anderson, United States Army, commanding Fort Sumter. 


each. The great inequality of the contest did not exist only in the numbers 
of men and the weight of metal which were opposed. The fort, though its 
magazines were well stored with powder, had a very small supply of car¬ 
tridges; there were no scales with which to weigh powder, and only six 
needles with which to sew cartridge-bags; and there were neither tangent 
scales, nor breech sides, nor any other instrument for pointing a gun. Bread 
there was none; only salt pork. Under these privations, accurate firing and 
a long defense were equally impossible. The fire which had now been kept 
up for two hours and a half was much severer and more extended even than 
Major Anderson had looked for; for the masked battery of heavy colum- 
biads on Sullivan’s Island, the existence of which he had not suspected, en¬ 
filaded the fort, and was served with great energy and precision. It proved, 
too, that there was only one face of the work which was not seen in reverse 
(that is, open to a fire in the rear) from mortars. It was to such an attack 
that Major Anderson gave the order to reply soon after seven o’clock on 
the morning of Friday, the 12th of April. Captain Doubleday, his second 
in command, fired the first gun, and immediately the fort opened upon all 
the principal assailing batteries. 

IIow unequal the fight was to be was not discovered in Sumter until after 
it had well begun; for it had been decided to use but two of the three tiers 
of guns with which the fort was mounted—those in the lower casemates and 
those upon the parapet; and the embrasures of the second tier were built 
up with earth, and brick, and stone. The parapet, or barbette guns, being 
of the heaviest calibre, capable of crushing even the armor of the iron-plated 
batteries, and also being, on account of their position, those only from which 
shells could be thrown, were most relied upon, and, for the protection of the 
artillerists at these, much labor had been expended since the time when an 
attack seemed imminent. But the vertical fire of shells from the insurgent 
batteries was so copious and well directed that this tier of guns had to be 
abandoned in the very beginning of the contest, and only two or three of 
them were fired surreptitiously by some of the men, whom neither danger 
nor command could deter from yielding to the temptation of using these 
formidable weapons against the enemy. But these stolen delights were 
merely imaginary ; the hasty and careless firing of these great guns proving 
more dangerous to the fort and its defenders than to its assailants. One of 
them was not only thrown from its carriage by its own recoil, but dismount¬ 
ed another near it. Thus, in the very beginning, Major Anderson found 
himself deprived of what he relied upon as his main stay, and confined to 
the use of his lower tier of casemates. The rebel artillerists thus attained 
comparative security during almost the entire bombardment; for while they 
deprived the fort of the service of the only guns which could breach their 
walls, and, what was of more consequence, of the mortars which could have 
made havoc in their crowded open batteries, they themselves were able to 
pour a continuous shower of bursting shells upon every part of the fort 
which was exposed. This they did with notable skill and regularity of 
fire; but their direct fire was not nearly so effective. A large proportion 
of the solid shot missed the fort in the first hours of the bombardment, and 
those which were better aimed scattered themselves all over its sides, and 
thus did little injury of immediate importance. Two of the guns upon the 
parapet were hit, however—one being dismounted, and the other broken; 
and three of the iron cisterns over the hallways were penetrated by shot, 
the water pouring in floods upon the quarters below. The parade, where 
five large columbiads had been arranged for the purpose of throwing shells, 
was made absolutely untenable by the constant explosion of those dreadful 
missiles. It was in the midst of such a fire as this that the first relief in the 
fort went to their work. But they were allowed to fight alone only a very 
short time. No duty of the soldier is so trying as that of bearing an attack 
without resistance. Under such circumstances, raw troops in the field al¬ 
most invariably waver, and, if the trial be continued too long, break and fly: 
only well disciplined veterans can bear the moral strain which such circum¬ 
stances put upon them. In the present case, the whole garrison had been 
wrought up to a high pitch of excitement by a nearly three hours’ bombard¬ 
ment without a shot in reply; and soon after the fort first opened fire they 
broke through the order of the day, and were all engaged heart and soul in 
the fight, with the tacit consent of their commander. Thus for the first four 
hours they kept up such a fire that the assailants were astonished, and be¬ 
lieved that their watchfulness had been outwitted, and that the fort had been 
largely re-enforced. Soon the musicians and the workmen, functionally non- 
combatant, caught the infection. They joined the artillerists in working 
the guns, and, after a little practice as assistants, went off by themselves and 
brought new pieces into action. But, although every man of that small 
band thus did even more than his duty, and did it like a hero, it was soon 
apparent that they could work little harm to their multitudinous and well- 
protected assailants. A gun was silenced for a while in Fort Moultrie, the 
embrasures of which were somewhat injured, and the barracks riddled. One 
shot penetrated the floating battery, and wounded one man; but from the 
mailed side of this battery all the other shot which struck it glanced off 
harmlessly. The much more formidable iron-clad battery on Cummings’s 
Point proved invulnerable to the shot of any piece which could be used 
against it; and, although the embrasures were hit two or three times, no se¬ 
rious injury was done to the guns or those who manned them. The other 
batteries seemed to be almost entirely unharmed. Lack of skill was not the 
cause of this ineffectiveness any more than lack of courage. But it proved 
that the calibre of the guns in the lower tier of casemates, to the use of which 
Major Anderson was confined, was too small to make their fire effective on 
iron-clad batteries, or even on such a strong piece of masonry as Fort Moul¬ 
trie, at the distances at which they stood. 

Four hours had passed since the besieged had opened fire, making, in 




10-iNcn cor.rMnwn mocxted as a mortar at fort sumter. 


1861.] 


FORT SUMTER 


61 





































































































































62 


[ 1861 . 



vain, a better fight than they 
could hope to make again; 
and now the tremendous con¬ 
verging fire of the assailants 
was beginning to tell upon the 
walls and parapet, and their 
shells made the ramparts anj 
the parade untenable. Still 
the garrison were all unharm¬ 
ed, for they kept within the 
casemates as much as possible, 
and look-outs were stationed 
at commanding points, who 
gave warning when a shot was 
about to strike or a shell to 
burst. About twelve o’clock, 
through the port-holes was 
seen the welcome sight of 
armed vessels under the old 
flag. The fleet had arrived 
off the Bar. They dipped 
their flags in token of saluta¬ 
tion and encouragement, and, 
although bombs were pouring 
ceaselessly into the parade of 
the fort, where the flag-staff 
stood, Sumter’s flag was dip¬ 
ped in answer. In fact, men 
could not have behaved with 
more intrepid gallantry than 
was displayed by the few de¬ 
fenders of this fort. During 
the first day of the bombard¬ 
ment, the quarters were set on 
fire three times by the ene¬ 
my’s shells, and put out amid a 
storm of missiles which made 
the escape of any of those who 
thus exposed themselves to it 
seem almost miraculous. The 
fire upon one gun was so con¬ 
stant and so close that it was 
abandoned ; but, ere long, fire 
was renewed from it, and an 
officer, going to the spot, found 
a party of laborers engaged in 
serving it. They had turned 
it upon the floating battery, 
and one of them was still 
watching the effect of the last 
shot, forgetting his danger in 
his delight, as he saw the ball 
take effect in the very middle 
of the battery. 

In the afternoon the fire of 
the rifled guns in the iron-clad 
Cummings’s Point battery be¬ 
came very accurate and se¬ 
vere. It was aimed at the 
embrasures, the masonry of 
which was cut out and scatter¬ 
ed among the artillerists at al¬ 
most every shot, bruising and 
stunning them often, but, for¬ 
tunately, killing none. They 
all kept at their work without 
respite, and had their meals 
served to them at their guns. 
Soon after midday, the num¬ 
ber of cartridges, of which it 
had been possible to prepare 
only seven hundred, had been 
so much reduced, and the abil¬ 
ity to supply them was so 
small, that it became necessary 
to abandon all the guns but 
six. With these, a regular but 
not very formidable fire was 
kept up until darkness fell 
upon the scene, when the port¬ 
holes were closed for the night, 
and the besieged garrison with¬ 
drew to pass the anxious hours 
in brief alternations of rest, 
work, and watching. 

Thus began one of the 
strangest contests known to 
the annals of war—a contest 


strange not only in the circumstances under which it was brought about, 
but in those under which it was carried on. For, thus far, n& war had 
been declared, directly or by implication, between the government of the 
United States and the confederated insurgents at Montgomery, although an 
act of insurrectionary violence had been committed by the residents of 
Charleston in firing upon the Star of the West. Intercourse between all 
parts of the country was still nominally free, and to all the people of the se¬ 
ceding states actually so. The telegraph—that marvelous invention which, 
more than realizing the fairy gifts that dazzle and delight our wondering 
childhood, makes every man an enchanted prince, by bestowing upon him 
eyes that see and ears that hear what is passing at the farthest corners of the 
earth—still kept, though under supervision, all points of the country in com¬ 
munication. Little restraint was placed upon it in Charleston on this day; 
and the inhabitants of that decaying, stiff-necked sea-port, who, women as 
well as men, assembled on its battery-promenade to look at the bombard¬ 
ment, much as similar mixed companies looked in classic days upon blood¬ 
ier contests in the arena, were hardly more immediate spectators of the fight 
than the millions of those throughout the land who, whether loyal or dis¬ 
loyal to the old flag which was then assailed, found their dearest interests 
involved in the issue of that contest. Every stage, every vicissitude of the 
struggle, was reported all over the land with the speed of lightning. The 
daily tasks and pleasures of a great nation were thrown aside, and the whole 
country became one vast amphitheatre, in which the combatants fought out 
their unequal fight with the eyes of thirty millions full upon them. Night 
fell upon the thrilling spectacle with the contest undecided, and sent home 
the spectators of both mclinings, quivering with excitement—the partisans of 
the rebels, however, full of hope and of defiance, those of the soldiers of the 
republic doubtful, depressed, and bitter; yet with their hearts full of an in¬ 
spiring trouble and a noble wrath, born of a love which they had often 
talked about, but the sweet pangs of which few of them had ever felt before. 
Throughout the country on that night there was proportionately almost as 
little sleep as there was within Fort Sumter. The night in Charleston Har¬ 
bor was dark, wet, and stormy. All through it the insurgents kept up a fire 
of mortars upon the fort, which provoked no reply, but accomplished the 
purpose of depriving the weary garrison of any except the most fitful slum¬ 
ber. Expecting both an attack by boats and re-enforcements from the fleet, 
Major Anderson posted guards.at the most exposed points of the fort; but 
his watchfulness proved to have been unneeded. The insurgent command¬ 
er saw that the reduction of the fort by bombardment was sure and speedy, 
and therefore wisely refrained from an assault which must needs be very 
bloody; and the naval forces found themselves entirely unable to move to 
the support of Major Anderson. Only the Pawnee, 10 guns, the Harriet 
Lane, 5 guns, and the transport Baltic, had arrived off the Bar on the 12th, 
the tug-boats having been detained by rough weather. Without these, the 
orders under which the expedition sailed could not be carried out. These 
were, as we have already seen, that unarmed boats should be first sent in 
with stores, and that, if these were fired upon, an attempt should then be 
made to send in both re-enforcements and supplies by force. But the Baltic, 
the only unarmed vessel, was too deep to pass the Bar; and, besides, the fort 
was already under fire. The naval commanders, however, upon consulta¬ 
tion, formed a plan for the relief of Major Anderson, which was to hoist out 
all the boats and launches in the night, load them with the men and stores 
on board the Baltic, tow them in as far as possible, and, in the gray of the 
dawning, let them pull in to the fort, under cover of the guns of the Pawnee 
and the Harriet Lane. A good plan, though a perilous and a daring; but it 
was entirely frustrated by the nature of the harbor, which did the insurgents 
in this place such good service throughout the whole war. The Baltic got 
aground in the night, during the preparations for the disembarking of her 
troops and stores, and the project was necessarily abandoned. Others were 
formed; but, before they could be put into effect, they proved to be un¬ 
availing. 

• The storm subsided, and the sun rose brightly to usher in the final con¬ 
test of Saturday. The bombardment was resumed by the insurgents with 
more vigor than they had shown before; and about nine o’clock the quarters 
and barracks were for the fourth time on fire. The men who were not act¬ 
ually engaged in serving the few guns in use tried to extinguish the flames. 
For a short time they worked like heroes, fighting one fire, and enduring 
another against which they could not fight. Here two non-combatants dis¬ 
tinguished themselves in this their maiden battle—Mr. Hall, a musician, who, 
throughout the whole bombardment, won the admiration of all by his cool¬ 
ness, intrepidity, and energy; and Mr. Peter Hart, a sergeant in the New 
York Metropolitan Police Force, who visited the fort in company with Mrs. 
Anderson, and, on her departure, volunteered to remain there. On this oc¬ 
casion the orders of the commander could hardly restrain him from fruitless 
exposure of his life, and he afterward performed an act of signal daring. 
The efforts to put out the fire proved to be equally vain and perilous, for 
the enemy now poured in a steady fire of red-hot shot; and as fast as the 
flames were extinguished in one place, they broke out in another. The task 
was necessarily abandoned for another, yet more important and more dan¬ 
gerous—the protection of the magazine, and the securing enough powder to 
keep up the fight. Nearly a hundred barrels were taken out amid the roar 
of flames, the crash of falling beams, the flying of red-hot shot, and the ex¬ 
plosion of shells, and were thrown into the sea. Meantime men were mak¬ 
ing cartridges as rapidly as possible in the magazine itself, using for that 
purpose blankets, sheets, and shirts, and all similar material that the fort 
could furnish. The supply obtainable in this manner was, however, soon 
exhausted; and the heat became so great from the blazing quarters and 
barracks that the magazine could no longer be left open with safety. The 

















































































































































































































1861 .] 


FORT SUMTER. 


63 



doors were, therefore, finally closed and locked, and the fight kept up only 
in name, by the occasional irregular discharge of a gun. The situation of 
the garrison, actually desperate from the beginning, was now rapidly ap¬ 
proaching the last extremity. The main gates took fire, and were soon de¬ 
stroyed, leaving the fort open to assault from this quarter by overwhelming 
force. The chassis of the barbette guns were burned upon the gorge. The 
heat became so intense, and diffused itself so widely, that the shells and fixed 
ammunition in the upper service*magazines exploded, scattering ruin and 
threatening death. The fire from all the insurgent batteries increased in 
fury; and the continued thunder of their heavy guns, the roar of the flames 
inside the fort, the crash of falling masonry and timber, the bursting of the 
enemy’s shells, and the explosion of the ammunition in the service maga¬ 
zines, combined to make a scene in which grandeur rivaled peril. The 
great extent of the fort, the small number of men within it, and the care 
with which they were kept inside the casemates, thus far prevented any se¬ 
rious casualties. But it seemed as if the garrison were to escape death by 
shot and shell only to meet it by suffocation. The day was warm and 


sultry, the smoke did not rise freely, and the fort became so filled with it 
that the men could hardly see or breathe. The heat itself grew stifling, 
and increased to such a point that it became necessary to protect all the 
powder left of that which had been taken out of the great magazine—only 
four barrels—with wet blankets and other bedding. The men themselves 
were able to get breath only by lying down upon the floors of the case¬ 
mates, and spreading wet cloths over their faces to exclude the smoke. An 
eddying gust of wind occasionally dispersed the stifling clouds, and relieved 
their distress for lack of air, while it revealed to their sight the terrors of 
their situation. About this time the flag-staff, which, though hit nine times, 
had thus far escaped with slight injury, was shot away near the top. The 
look-out cried, “ The flag is down,” and instantly Mr. Hall sprung out 
into the flaming, shot-raked parade, and brought the flag away. But the 
halliards were so entangled that it could not be righted and raised again. 
What should be done? The flag must float, for, terrible as the situation 
was, no one had yet spoken of surrender. A temporary staff was rigged 
upon the ramparts, and Police-sergeant Hart volunteered to climb it and 












































































































64 


[ 1861 . 



P0LICE-8EBGKANT UABT NAlUNO TUE FLAG TO TUE TKMFORAKY FLAG-STAFF. 


nail the flag fast. This he did while the enemy’s batteries kept up their 
furious fire of shot and shell, in the face of which he accomplished his peril¬ 
ous undertaking, and descended the staff in safety. The enemy, determined 
rebels though they were, could not see unmoved this heroic defense of a 
fortress and a flag for which they felt that only a little while before they 
would have fought with no less gallantry; and at each of the now rare and 
irregular discharges of a single gun, they leaped upon their own ramparts 
and cheered Major Anderson and his men. 

Under these circumstances, when the only four barrels of powder out of 
the magazine were practically inaccessible, when only three more cartridges 
remained, and they were in the guns, when the tragic interest of the day was 
at its height, the comic actor of the occasion entered upon the scene, and af¬ 
fairs took a ludicrous turn toward peace. The fall of the flag had, of course, 
been noticed, and it had been mistaken in one quarter at least for a sign of 
surrender. Soon after Mr. Hart had nailed it in its new position upon the 
outer wall, a man appeared at an embrasure with a handkerchief tied upon 
a sword, symbolic of the semi-military condition of his mind and person in 


other respects, and demanded admission. It was allowed, and he scrambled 
in. He proved to be the Hon. Mr. Wigfall, of Texas, who had been the oc¬ 
casion of much laughter in the Senate-chamber, and who was now volun¬ 
teer-aid to General Beauregard. In a fuss and flurry, which provoked the 
smiles of the smoke-grimed soldiers whom he addressed, he said that he 
came from that officer, and asked for Major Anderson. He had gone to the 
main gate to meet the flag of truce, the approach of which had been ob¬ 
served ; and before he could be summoned, Colonel Wigfall (for such was 
his new title) said, “Your flag is down; you are on fire; let us quit this;” 
and asked to have his extemporized flag of truce displayed from the ram¬ 
parts. He was shown the national flag still flying, and told that if he wished 
his friends to stop firing he must display the flag of truce. This he at once 
did, waving it out of an embrasure, which, nevertheless, was nearly hit by 
two or three shots. As it was his flag, and not that of the fort, a corporal 
was then ordered to relieve him ; but the firing being'still kept up, because 
of the national flag again floating above the fort, the corporal declined to 
continue his useless exposure, and leaped back into the casemate, where the 




































































1861 .] 


FORT SUMTER 


65 



excited aid de-camp soundly rated him for his cowardice. At this point 
Major Anderson came up, and the subsequent colloquy is thus reported by 
an eye-witness to the interview : 

“Wigfall said, ‘I am Colonel Wigfall, and come from General Beauregard, 
who wishes to stop this.’ Major Anderson, rising on his toes, and coming 
down firmly upon his heels, replied, ‘Well, sir.’ ‘Major Anderson,’ said 
Wigfall, ‘you have defended your (lag nobly, sir. You have done all that 
is possible for men to do, and General Beauregard wishes to stop the fight. 
On what terms, Major Anderson, will you evacuate this fort?’ Major An¬ 
derson’s reply w.as, ‘General Beauregard is already acquainted witli my only 
terms.’ ‘ Do I understand that you will evacuate upon the terms proposed 
the other day ?’ ‘ Yes, sir, and on those conditions only,' was the reply 

of the major. ‘Then, sir,’ said Wigfall, ‘I understand, Major Anderson, 
that the fort is to be ours?’ ‘On those conditions only, I repeat.’ ‘Very 
well,’ said Wigfall; ‘ then it is understood that you will evacuate. That is 
all I have to do. Yon military men will arrange every thing else on your 
own terms.’ He then departed, the white flag still waving where he had 
placed it, and the stars and stripes waving from the flag-staff, which had be¬ 
come the target of the rebels.” 

But hardly was he half way to the shore when a more formal and numerous 
deputation from the staff of General Beauregard—Major Lee, Mr. Porcher 
Miles, ex-Senator Chesnut, and Mr. Roger A. Pryor—appeared with a flag 
of truce and asked admission, which, of course, was given. They also said 
that they came from General Beauregard. He had noticed that the flag had 
been down; that the fort was on fire; and he desired to know if he could 
render any assistance. As Major Anderson’s position was the consequence 
of General Beauregard’s own acts, this was, of course, but a delicate way of 
asking a surrender. The beleaguered commander was surprised, as well he 
might be, at this deputation from a man with whom he had a ready agreed 
upon general terms of evacuation, and he replied accordingly, to the great 
discomfiture of the members of the new deputation. These, however, after 
a few minutes’ conference, informed Major Anderson that the extempore 
Texan colonel had not seen the rebel commander-in chief for two days. 
They requested, however, a suspension of hostilities while they bore a writ¬ 
ten memorandum of Major Anderson’s terms to General Beauregard; but, 
in the midst of this embarrassment, yet a third flag of truce arrived, borne 
by Major D. R. Jones, the insurgent general’s chief of staff, offering the same 
terms of evacuation, with a single exception, which had been proposed be¬ 
fore the bombardment—to wit, the departure of the whole command, with 
company arms and property, and all private property, and the privilege of 
saluting and keeping the flag—the exception being the salute to the flag. 
These terms Major Anderson positively refused then to accept without the 
salute, but consented that that point should remain open for consideration. 


•CKHB AJOtJNP A BULLSTUf-UOAftU 


The salute was finally admitted by General Beauregard, who also (with 
equal courtesy, and regard for the condition of a fort which was about to 
pass into his possession) proffered assistance for the extinction of the fire, 
which was declined. The intrepid national commander had no alternative 
as to the course which he should pursue. He had not lost a man; but the 
fort had become untenable, and his means of defense were exhausted. Had 
there been time to let the walls cool so that the magazine might be opened, 
to blow down the parapet and build up the great gates with stones and rub- 
bish, the defense might have been prolonged, as far as the fort itself was 
concerned, until the men were exhausted by a diet of sheer salt pork. But, 
even had these circumstances existed, the lack of cartridges and the means 
of making them would have made effective offensive operations impossible.’ 

It is said that yet another and still more ludicrous incident lightened the 
closing scenes of this eventful day within the fort. Mr. Roger A. Pryor, of 
Virginia, one of the first deputation from General Beauregard (and who 
seems to have been one of that high (but not highest) style of Southern man 
who vaunts his good-breeding and his chivalry, but has not yet attained to 
quiet self-respect and unassuming confidence in himself, united to scrupu¬ 
lous regard for the feelings of others, but maintains his superiority by of¬ 
fensive self-assertion), appeared on this occasion loaded down with arms in¬ 
cisive and explosive, and bore himself in keeping with his personal appear¬ 
ance. Seeing upon a table what appeared to be a glass of brandy, he swal¬ 
lowed it, without pause or ceremony. Surgeon Crawford having caught 
sight of him as he was turning down the dose, approached quickly, and in¬ 
formed him that what he had drank as brandy was iodide of potassium, a 
deadly poison. Instant collapse on the part of the patient followed this 
announcement; but whether it was due to the poison, or only to the an¬ 
nouncement, the Muse of History has not been informed. She records with 
pleasure, however, that the valiant Virginian, having been seized upon by the 
benevolent surgeon, was put instantly through such a course of pumping 
and purgation that his life was saved, to be again, in like manner, devoted 
to the cause which he had espoused. It may be cruel, but it is human, to 
suggest that the surgeon, having failed of a single loyal patient through a 
two da\ s’ bombardment, was determined to have one at least from the rebel 
side, and seized the occasion of an equally thoughtless and harmless drink¬ 
ing to gratify at once his professional craving and his excited patriotism. 

Agitating as this day had been in Charleston Harbor, it was none the less 
so outside the bounds of the insurgent confederacj'. * Throughout the free 
states, and the slave states still under loyal rule, the people rose on that Sat¬ 
urday morning with their souls filled with the one anxiety which had pre¬ 
vented or disturbed their rest. The bombardment and the defense would, of 
course, be renewed; but would Major Anderson be able to hold out until he 
received the re-enforcements and supplies which lay within sight of his ram¬ 
parts? "What of good or ill to the republic would this 
day bring forth? What of honor or dishonor to the 
flag? The excitement was not turbulent; it hardly ruf¬ 
fled the surface of society. It was a strong, deep-seat¬ 
ed trouble; a sad and almost awful apprehension. It 
sank deeper and spread wider as the hourly dispatches 
told how the stirring fight went on. In the great 
centres of population and business the streets were 
filled by eager, anxious people, who spoke nervously 
upon the one great theme; and around the many bul¬ 
letin-boards the crowds were so great as to impede the 
public passage. The announcements successively made 
of the feebleness of Major Anderson’s resistance, of the 
inactivity of the fleet, of the fire, the throwing pow¬ 
der into the water, the explosions, the silencing of the 
fort, the incomprehensible display of the flag of truce 
at the same time with the national standard, were re¬ 
ceived with amazement, indignation, and incredulity. 
The southern end of the telegraph was, of course, in 
the hands of the insurgents; and soon these astonish¬ 
ing, and, as it was thought, absurd reports began to be 
attributed to the malicious perversion of those who 
sent them. The inactivity of the fleet seemed inex¬ 
plicable ; the story that the fort was on fire was scout¬ 
ed as quite incredible. Fort Sumter was believed to be 
an almost impregnable mass of solid masonry, as in¬ 
combustible as the Rock of Gibraltar; and here it was, 
if the truth were told, burning like a tinder-box. Men 
turned away iu scorn; they could not and would not 
believe it. And when, in the afternoon, the final dis¬ 
patch came from Charleston, by way of Augusta, that 
the fort had surrendered; that the confederate flag 
floated over its walls, and that none of the garrison 
or confederate troops were hurt, it was thought that 
this was the cap-sheaf of malicious invention, and that 
it was only sure that the fight had gone on during the 
day with varying fortunes. The effect of the news, 
however, was to work the public mind up to a terri¬ 
ble pitch of excitement; and the most widely-circu¬ 
lated daily paper in the city of New York, having been 
thus far the apologist and the advocate of the secession¬ 
ists, the indignation of the people was so roused against 
it that an attack upon its office was expected, and would 


7 See the “ Engineer Journal of the Bombardment of Fort Sumter," 
by Capt. J. G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., New York, 1861. 











































































































66 


[ 1861 . 


doubtless have been made, except for the prompt and vigorous preventive 
measures taken by the chief of police. 

Little of the next day was given wholly to religions duties, for patriotism 
is an element of piety, not of religion; and the two days’ attack upon the 
national flag was the only subject which really occupied men’s minds—the 
only topic of their conversation. To satisfy the anxiety of the public, the 
principal newspapers, the publication of which, with one exception, was in¬ 
termitted, of course, on Sunday, issued a number on this morning; and thus 
commenced a custom which was continued far into the period of the ensuing 
war. The dispatches of the previous day proved to be substantially true, and 
the people found themselves forced to bear the national humiliation with 
such resignation as they could summon. Here and there a voice was heard 
denouncing Major Anderson, or at least questioning his patriotism or his de¬ 
termination. But these were the views only of the most headstrong and least 
considerate folk ; the mass of the people felt that he had a right to their en¬ 
tire confidence. At this very time he was evacuating the fort upon terms, 
and in a manner, creditable alike to himself and to his opponents in the re¬ 
cent contest. Having packed up all company and personal, property, and 
made preparations for saluting his flag, Major Anderson was waited upon 
by several officers of General Beauregard’s staff, Commander Hartstein, for¬ 
merly of the United States Navy, but who had preferred his state to his 
country, and Captain Gillis, commander of the Pocahontas. The steamer 
Isabel, which the confederate authorities had provided as a transport to the 
vessels outside the Bar, lay at the wharf behind the gorge. The old battle- 
torn flag, which had been displayed four months before, amid prayers appa¬ 
rently unheard and hopes doomed to bitter disappointment, was raised to re¬ 
ceive the honors which showed that it had fallen without disgrace. Fifty 
guns were fired, and it was lowered before solemn faces and tearful eyes. 
But, it would seem, the outraged genius of the republic demanded that some 
sacrifice of blood, even innocent, should atone for this'humiliation, and at 
the seventeenth gun an accidental explosion of fixed ammunition instantly 
killed one of the artillerists, and severely wounded several others, one of 
them mortally. This casualty proved more fatal than the two days’ bom¬ 
bardment to either party; for, in spite of reports long circulated to the con¬ 
trary in regard to the insurgent force, there is no reasonable room for doubt¬ 
ing the assertion that neither side lost a single man, while the wounds re¬ 
ceived were few anil trifling. The salute finished, the victim to the honor 
of his country’s flag, Private David Hough, was buried with military honors 
in the parade of the fort where he had done so gallantly a soldier’s duty; 
and the garrison, in full uniform, were formed in line, and marched out,to 
the air of “Yankee Doodle.” The confederate officers present vied with 
each other in demonstrations of courtesy to their vanquished foes. The flag 
of Fort Sumter, which Major Anderson took away with him, was raised on 
board the Isabel as she put off, so that he and his command were under no 
flag but that of their government from the beginning to the end of the mem¬ 
orable series of events in which they bore so prominent a part. 

Of the insurgent force in this affair little has been, and little need be said. 
They were in overwhelming numbers, and the fire of the fort—restricted as 
Major Anderson proved to be to his guns of smallest calibre—was so inef¬ 
fective that their performance was little more than artillery practice. Their 
numbers, and their guns, and the work they did, have been thus precisely 
stated in an elaborate article written upon the best authority. 8 They had 
fourteen batteries in action, mounting forty-two heavy guns and mortars. 
From these there were thrown, during the two days, two thousand three 

8 Published in the Charleston Mercury of May 2d and 3d, 1861. 


hundred and sixty shot and nine hundred and eighty shells. The number 
of men engaged in the confederate works was certainly over three thou¬ 
sand, and between four and five thousand were held in reserve. Of the of¬ 
ficers who distinguished themselves—with such distinction as was possible 
where the officers on one side were three times as many as the men on the 
other, and no one was hurt—General Beauregard’s report mentions Lieuten¬ 
ant Colonel R. S. Ripley, commanding the batteries on Sullivan’s Island; 
Lieutenant Colonel W. G. De Saussure, commanding those on Morris’s Isl¬ 
and; Major P. F. Stevens, in command of the iron-clad battery at Cum¬ 
mings’s Point: Captain Thomas, who commanded the British rifled cannon 
at this point; and Majors Whiting and Gwin, and Captain Hartstein. Col¬ 
onel Wigfall comes in for a share of commendation; and let us not forget 
that, with all his fluster and flurry, and the absurdity of his false position in 
regard to the capitulation, his motive was a good one, and he showed real 
fortitude in passing from the shore to the fort in an open boat_during a 
heavy fire of shot and shell. Captain Hartstein, having but to superintend 
the patrolling of the harbor and carrying of messages in tug-boats, gained 
more distinction by his courtesy and fraternal kindness after the surrender 
than by the duties which he had performed before. 

It was not to be expected that the official representative of the vaunting 
and insolent politicians and planters of South Carolina would emulate the 
honorable consideration shown by Captain Hartstein and the officers who 
accompanied him to those who had so gallantly defended the flag of the re¬ 
public—the flag which, not long before, they had all been sworn to uphold 
at peril of their lives. .Governor Pickens, in a speech which he made to the 
people of Charleston on the evening of the evacuation, exposed without re¬ 
serve the spiteful, domineering, braggart spirit in w'hich he, and those of his 
constituents who had really any voice in the direction of affairs, had gone 
into their rebellion. Alluding to the vast majority of their fellow-citizens, 
whom they had been told they would find arrayed on the side of the Con¬ 
stitution and the laws, he said: “We have defeated their twenty millions, 
and we have made the proud flag of the stars and stripes, that never was 
lowered before to any nation on this earth, we have lowered it in humility 
before the palmetto and the confederate flags.” The humiliation of the 
national flag, though under circumstances which could bring no honor of 
any kind to its assailants, was too pleasant a theme to be passed over with 
one exulting outburst; and thus again the rebellious demagogue rolled the 
sweet morsel under his tongue: “We have humbled the flag of the United 
States. I can here say to you, it is the first time in the history of this coun¬ 
try that the stars and stripes have been humbled. It has triumphed for 
seventy years; but to-day, on the thirteenth day of April, it has been hum¬ 
bled, and humbled before the glorious little state of South Carolina.” On the 
same occasion, and in the same bombastic strain, he spoke of the independ¬ 
ence of his constituents as already achieved, and as having been “ baptized 
in blood.” Now the twenty millions defeated by the insurgent forces (num¬ 
bering seven thousand, and having in action forty-two heavy guns and mor 
tars) were one hundred and nine half-famished men, including musicians, 
laborers, and the surgeon; and the blood in which the Charlestonian inde¬ 
pendence was baptized was that of four men, slightly wounded. Govemoi 
Pickens’s -speech was received with vociferous applause; and so was one of 
more significance, made in Montgomery, the confederate capital, the day be¬ 
fore, by Mr. Pope Walker, the insurgent Secretary of War: “No man,” he 
said, “can tell where the war this day commenced will end; but I will 
prophesy that the flag which now flaunts the breeze here will float over 
the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the first of May. Let 



Til* GO Bo* Of FOBT bCMILIL 






























































































































































1861 .] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


67 


them try Southern chivalry and test the extent of Southern resources, and 
it may float eventually over Faneuil Hall itself.” 

It was upon a people thus miserably mistaking their countrymen and 
themselves, thus blind with fury, thus bloated with insolence and besotted 
with pride, thus bent upon the humiliation and final destruction of the re¬ 
public in which at last they had ceased to rule, that the heroes of Fort Sum¬ 
ter, defeated but not dishonored, turned their backs, on Sunday, the 14th of 
April, 1861, and sailed northward, under the very flag which they had so 
nobly defended, to tell in simple, modest words the story of their struggle. 9 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


Effect of the Bombardment of Fort Sumter.—War Proclamation of President Lincoln.—Response 
of the Free States; of the Governors of the Border Slave States.—Measures of the Rebel Gov¬ 
ernment.—Seizure of the Navy Yard and Forts Barrancas and M‘Ilca at Pensacola.—Occupa¬ 
tion of Fort Pickens hv Lieutenant Slenuncr.—Insolent Propositions for Truce, anil degrading 
Compliance.—Re-enforcement of Fort Pickens.—Washington in danger.—The Convention of 
Virginia secretly passes a Provisional Ordinance of Secession, and an Ordinance uniting the 
State to the insurgent Confederacy.—Destruction of the Arsenal and Armory at Harper’s Fern', 
and its Occupation by the Insurgents.—Incomplete Destruction of the Portsmouth Navy Yard, 
and its Seizure.—Massachusetts leads the Van.—Reasons for her Promptness.—Attack upon a 
Massachusetts and a Pennsylvania Regiment in Baltimore —March of the New York Seventh. 
—Communication between Washington and the North cut off.—Union Meetings.—The Flag. 
—Badges.—Show your Colors.—Gifts and Appropriations-for the War.—A Blockade.—Rebel 
Privateers.—Neutral Treason.—Condition of Washington Society.—Spies.—Seizure of Tele¬ 
graphic Dispatches.—11 aliens Corpus practically suspended.—Commotion in Missouri.—Ken¬ 
tucky for the Union.—New Proclamation calling for 48,000 Men for three Years.—Military 
Preparations at the South.—Seat of the Rebel Government transferred to Richmond.—Nature 
and Purposes of the impending Conflict. 

T HE depression which followed the bombardment of Fort Sumter was but 
momentary. It did not last a single day. The rebound was instanta¬ 
neous and tremendous. In spite of four months’ warning, the event actually 
came with all the suddenness of surprise. In fact, it was absolutely necessary 
to the arousing of the loyal men of the republic from a state of mingled con¬ 
fidence and bewilderment, which had almost the seeming, and all the effect, 
of stupor. A keen and practiced observer, who had visited man}' parts of 
the world and many scenes of strife in the service of the most influential 
journal of Europe, and who had been sent to the United States to observe 
and report the course of events during the civil troubles, after remaining in 
New York two weeks, wrote, on the 20lb of March, that to his eyes that city 
was “full of divine calm and human phlegm;” that the commercial queen 
of the West, in his opinion, “ would do any thing rather than fight, her desire 
is to eat her bread and honey and count her dollars in peace.” To him, 
judging from what he heard as well as what he saw, the disruption of the 
republic was then already accomplished; for, on the one side, a representa¬ 
tive secessionist said to him, “No concession, no compromise; nothing that 
can be done or suggested shall induce us to join any confederation of which 
the New England states are members;” and, on the other, an equally emi¬ 
nent Republican, of the extreme school, declared to him on the same day, 
“If I could bring back the Southern states by holding up my little finger, 
I should think it criminal to do so.” 10 The swift agency of steam could not 
take the letter containing these statements to London, print it, and send it 
back again, before the conclusion based upon them was entirely falsified. 
The secessionist doubtless stood firm in his rebellious determination; but 
the Abolitionist had found that, whatever might be his feeling upon the sub¬ 
ject, the people of the free states did not regard the question of negro slavery 
in any of its bearings as worthy to be weighed one moment in the scale with 
that of the maintenance of constitutional government and the perpetuity of 
the republic; and the divine calm of the city that would do any thing rath¬ 
er than fight had been swept away by an intensely human excitement which 
strangely united all the heat of fury to all the coolness of resolution. In all 
this there was no sudden gyration of opinion or change of feeling. The na¬ 
tional sentiment of loyal men was not touched to the quick until the bom¬ 
bardment of Fort Sumter The secessionists might have held conventions 

* Major Anderson s Itis/wtck concerning the Bombardment and Evacuation of Fort Sumter. 

Steam-ship Baltic, off Sandy Hook, April 18, 1SC1. 

Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington, T).C. : 

Sir, —Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until the quarters were entirely 
burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge wall seriously injured, the magazine surround¬ 
ed by flames, and its door closed from the effects of the heat, four barrels and three cartridges of 
powder only being available, and no provisions but pork remaining, I accepted terms of evacua¬ 
tion, offered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on the 11th instant, prior to 
the commencement of hostilities, and marched out of the fort Sunday afternoon, the 14th instant, 
with colors flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private property, and saluting 
my flag with fifty guns. Robert Anderson, Major First Artillery. 

10 Correspondence of the London Times, April 17th, 18G1. 

1 Proclamation of President Lincoln . 

Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed, and 
the execution thereof obstructed, in the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida. Mis¬ 
sissippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary 
course of judiciil proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals by law: now, therefore, I, 
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the 
Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of 
the several states of the Union to the aggregate number of 75,000, in order to suppress said com¬ 
binations and to cause the laws to be duly executed. The details for this object will be immedi¬ 
ately communicated to the state authorities through the War Department. I appeal to. all loyal 
citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence 
of our national Union, and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already 
long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby 
called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and projierty which Have been seized 
from the Union ; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects 
aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with property, or any dis¬ 
turbance of peaceful citizens of any part of the country; and I hereby command the persons com¬ 
posing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within 
twenty days from this date. 

Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do 


and passed resolutions until the crack of doom, and it would have been re¬ 
garded as of but little moment. Southern conventions had become a laugh¬ 
ing-stock at the North on account of their wordy folly. They had been held 
for various ostensible objects, but chiefly for that of turning, by preamble 
and resolutions, the tide of commerce from New York, Boston, and Philadel¬ 
phia to Norfolk and Charleston. In this they had not been successful; and 
the discredit which attached to them affected greatly all the preliminary 
steps taken in the more dangerous designs to which they were in part a 
cloak. In fact, much as the country had been disturbed by the outbreak at 
the South upon the election of Mr. Lincoln, it seemed but a continuation or 
expected consequence of the preceding presidential canvass. It was no new 
thing. It did not have a beginning; it was mere]}'a going on. It seemed, 
nay, it was, the last move in the stupendous game of intimidation and brag¬ 
gadocio which had been played for twenty years and more. Much the same 
turmoil had been heard before, when the slavery propaganda had only fear¬ 
ed defeat. What was to be expected upon its actual discomfiture? These 
men had talked so much about secession if a Republican were elected, that, 
unless they were willing to be looked upon as the merest braggarts, they 
must do something to back their words. Their conventions and their ordi¬ 
nances were mere brute thunder, harmful in effect upon the country, but 
harmless against its government. Their refusal to pay their Northern debts 
was regarded as far more injurious, and more indicative of hostile determ¬ 
ination. 

Thus thought and felt too many men throughout the country through the 
gloomy winter of 1860 and 1861; for even the seizure of forts and arms, 
and the very establishment of the insurgent government, were looked upon 
rather as extreme measures of intimidation than as the first steps of a des¬ 
perate rebellion. The firing upon the Star of the West, strange to say, did 
not quite open the eyes of all of those who should have seen that it meant 
absolute defiance. But when, upon the announcement that Fort Sumter was 
to be provisioned, the insurgents bombarded the garrison out of it, then, 
with a sudden shock, the loyal citizens of the republic felt what secession 
really was. Indignation flashed through the astonished land. The whole 
country quivered with a new emotion. Men lived in the open air, that they 
might read in each other’s faces, eye to eye, the noble wrath, the fixed de¬ 
termination, the lofty purpose that ruled the hour. Two could hardly speak 
together in the street above their ordinary tone without being surrounded 
with eager listeners. Every public place was thronged with unbidden 
crowds, intent upon discourse of the momentous situation. A nation of free¬ 
men, each of whom felt, at last, his own responsibility for his country’s safe¬ 
ty and honor, was pierced through brain and heart with the barbed convic¬ 
tion that that safety was in peril and that honor at stake. The strong bar¬ 
riers of party vanished as by magic, and men became so intensely absorbed 
in the present that, forgetful of the past, they saw each other for the first 
time only as fellow-citizens, with one feeling and one purpose. It was a mo¬ 
ment of supreme grandeur in the life of the nation. Patriotism, which had 
been trodden under foot of politicians, which had withered in the arid soil 
of selfishness under the blazing sun of prosperity, which had been choked 
with the thorns of care, and wealth, and pleasure, struck at once its roots to 
the very centre of the nation’s being, and in a single night blossomed into 
fruitfulness. That fruit was a stern resolve to sacrifice life and fortune in 
defense of the republic. 

It was to a people who had passed through this mental experience that 
President Lincoln addressed a proclamation dated upon the day of the evac¬ 
uation of Fort Sumter. * 1 That was Sunday; and on Monday morning the 
President’s appeal, distributed by telegraph, was read throughout the coun¬ 
try. It was remarkably cool and dispassionate. It set forth that the laws of 
the United States had been for some time defied in the seven seceded states 
by combination? too powerful to be dealt with by the officers of the law; it 
called out 75,000 of the militia of the several states for the purpose of sup¬ 
pressing those combinations, and first, if not chiefly, of repossessing the forts 
which had been seized; it especially, and with great care in the use of words, 
disavowed any intention of “devastation, destruction, or interference with 
property in any part of the country.” It commanded the insurgents to dis- 


hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both houses of Congress. 
The senators and representatives are, therefore, summoned to assemble at their respective cham¬ 
bers at 12 o’clock, noon, on Thursday, the 4th day of July next, then and there to consider and 
determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to 
be affixed. 

Done at the City ol Washington, this 15th day of April, in the year of onr Lord one thousand 
eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. 

Abraham Lincoln. 


By the President. 

William II. Seward, Secretary of State. 

The following call on the respective state governors for troops was simultaneously issued through 
the War Department: 

Sir, —Under the act of Congress for calling out the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to 
suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, etc., approved February 28, 1705, I have the honor to re¬ 
quest your excellency to cause to be immediately detailed from the militia of your state the quota 
designated in the table below, to serve as infantry or riflemen for a )>eriod of three months, unless 
sooner discharged Your excellency will please communicate to me the time at about which your 
quota will lie exacted at its rendezvous, as it will be met as soon as practicable bv an officer or offi¬ 
cers to muster it into service and pay of the United States. At the same time the oath of fidelity 
to the United States will be administered to every officer and man. The mustering officers will 
be instructed to receive no man under the rank of commissioned officer who is in years apparently 
over 45 or uuder 18, or who is not in physical strength and vigor. The quota for each state is as 
follows: 


Maine. 1 ' Pennsylvania. 16' Muwvori. 4 

New Hampshire. 1 Delaware. 1 I Ohio. 13 

Vermont. 1 I Tennessee.. 2] Indiana. 6 

Massachusetts. 2 Maryland. 4 Illinois. 6 

Rhode Island. 1 1 Virginia. 3 Michigan. 1 

Connecticut. 1 North Carolina. - Iowa. 1 

New York. 17 Kentucky.. 4 Minnesota. 1 

New Jersey. 4 Arkansas. 1 Wiacon'in... 1 

It is ordered that each regiment shall consist, on an aggregate of officers and men, of 780. The 
total thus to be called out is 73,391. The remainder to constitute the 75,000 men UBder the Pres¬ 
ident's proclamation will be composed of troops in the District of Columbia. 

































68 


perse within twenty days, and summoned a special session of Congress on 
the 4th of July. The command was a matter of form, prescribed by act of 
Congress; the summons, a matter of necessity. On that Monday morning, 
too, the flag of the republic—how dear to those who were true to it, they 
never knew till then—was raised by spontaneous impulse upon every staff 
which stood on loyal ground; and from the Lakes to the Potomac, from the 
shores of the Atlantic to the banks of the Mississippi, the eye could hardly 
turn without meeting the bright banner which symbolized in its stripes the 
union ahd the initial struggle, and in its stars the consequent growth and 
glory of the nation and the government which the insurgents had banded 
themselves together to destroy. 2 

The response of the free states to the proclamation was so unanimous and 
so instantaneous that it seemed to be by acclamation. The official responses 
of the several governors became almost matters of course and of form. They 
were dignified, calm, and resolute messages. The people in Delaware were 
equally prompt and hearty in their devotion to the republic ; and over the 
vast extent of country lying north of the Potomac and the Ohio, its intelli¬ 
gent millions, throughout all grades of the social scale, were at once busied 
in preparing for the coming war, or, at least, in cheering those who were 
thus engaged. President Lincoln doubtless asked for 75,000 men with some 
fear and trembling; for, since the nation came into political existence, it 
had never had half that number of men under arms together. But before 
a day had passed it was manifest that more than twice as many were ready 
at his call. The proclamation, however, was not addressed to the free states 
only; and all those who were not under the control of the insurgent gov¬ 
ernment (except California, Oregon, and Kansas, on account of their remote¬ 
ness) were called upon to furnish their several quotas. From the governors 
of all the slave states except Delaware and Maryland there came a flat, and, 
in some cases, a defiant and an insolent refusal. Governor Letcher, of Vir¬ 
ginia, was content with being decided. Governors Ellis, of North Carolina, 
and Magoffin, of Kentucky, added to their refusal a denunciation of the 
course of the government as “ wicked.” Governor Rector, of Arkansas, stig¬ 
matized the demand as “adding insult to injury,” and talked of defense 
against “ Northern mendacity and usurpation.” Governor Harris, of Ten¬ 
nessee, said he had not a man for coercion, but fifty thousand for the de¬ 
fense of the rights of his Southern, i. e., his slaveholding brothers ; while 
Governor Jackson, of Missouri, poured out his wrath in the words “ille¬ 
gal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical.” 3 The governors 

* The feeling of the time when this spontaneous display of the stars and stripes lit up the face 
of all the North, found a truthful and spirited expression in this fine lyric, which appeared in the 
Boston Transcript: 

THE FLAG. Br Horatio Woodman. 

Why Hashed that flag on Monday morn 
Across the startled sky? 

Why leaped the blood to every check, 

The tears to every eye? 

The hero in our four months’ woe, 

The symbol of our might, 

Together sunk for one brief hour, 

To rise forever bright. 

The mind of Cromwell claimed his own, 

The blood of Naseby streamed 
Through hearts unconscious of the fire, 

Till that torn banner gleamed. 

The seeds of Milton's lofty thoughts, 

All ho|»cless of the spring, 

Broke forth in joy, as through them glowed 
The life great poets sing. 

Old Greece was young, and Homer true, 

And Dante’s burning page 
Flamed in the red along our flag, 

And kindled holy rage. 

God’s Gospel cheered the sacred cause 
In stern, prophetic strain, 

Which makes His rite our covenant, 

His Psalms our deep refrain. 

Oh, sad for him whose light went out 
Before this glory came. 

Who could not live to feel his kin 
To every noble name ! 

And sadder still to miss the joy 
That twenty millions know 
In Human Nature’s holiday 
From all that makes life low. 

* REPLIES FROM THE DISLOYAL GOVERNORS TO THE REQUISITION FOR TROOPS UNDER THE 

president's PROCLAMATION. 

From Governor Letcher , of Virginia. 

“I have only to say, that the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Wash¬ 
ington for any such use or purpose as they have in view'. Your object is to subjugate the South¬ 
ern states, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object, in my judgment, not 
within the purview of the Constitution or the act of 1795—w ill not be complied with. You have 
chosen to inaugurate civil war, and having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as 
the administration has exhibited toward the South.” 

From Governor Ellis , of North Carolina. 

“Your dispatch is received; and, if genuine, which its extraordinary character leads me to 
doubt, I have to say in reply, that I regard the levy of troops made by the administration for the 
purpose of subjugating the states of the South ns in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation 
of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war 
upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina.” 

From Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky. 

“ Your dispatch is received. I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the 
wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states." 

From Governor Harris , of Tennessee. 

“Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the 
defense of our rights, or those of our Southern brethren.” 

From Governor Rector, o f A rkansas. 

“In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas, to subjugate the Southern states, I 
have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury. The peo¬ 
ple of this commonwealth are freemen, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity their hon¬ 
or, lives, and property against Northern mendacity and usurpation.” 

From Governor Jackson, o f Missouri. 

“There can be, I apprehend, no doubt that these men arc intended to make war upon the se¬ 
ceded states. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in 
its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and can not be complied with. Not one man will the State 
of Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy crusade.” 


[ 1861 . 

of Delaware and Maryland (Burton and Hicks) answered with bated breath, 
in the form of proclamation. The former announced that he found himself 
without power to comply with the requisition from the Secretary of War, 
but he recommended the raising of a regiment, which he announced would 
be at liberty to offer its services to the general government. The regiment 
was immediately raised and mustered into service; and before the year was 
out, this small state had furnished two thousand more men to the armies of 
the Union. Governor Hicks’s proclamation was little else than a public 
wringing of the hands and bemoaning himself over the perplexities of his 
situation, which indeed were great and trying; for, although Maryland was 
lo 3 r al by a large majority, the disloyal men were actually numerous, and 
made up by their activity and defiant bearing for their inferiority of num¬ 
bers. Among them, too, were the greater part of the wealthy slaveholders 
in the state, and the people of high social position. Governor Hicks en¬ 
deavored to placate his constituents by assuring them that no troops should 
be sent from Maryland unless for the protection of the national capital, and 
reminding them that a special election would soon give them an opportunity 
of expressing their devotion to the Union, or their desire to see it broken up. 4 * 6 

The first step of the confederate government to meet this condition of af¬ 
fairs beyond their borders was to issue a call for 32,000 more troops. The 
governors of the seceded states thereupon issued flaming proclamations, de¬ 
nouncing, exhorting, commanding, and recommending; and in one instance, 
that of Governor Brown, of Georgia, the command took the needless, but, 
therefore, none the less dishonorable form of an interdiction of payment of 
any debt due to a resident of an anti-slavery state, while the recommenda¬ 
tion shrewdly suggested that these confiscated funds should be paid into the 
treasury of Georgia. 

These were preparations for future movements. But already the govern¬ 
ment of the United States had brought an important military operation to 
the verge of a successful issue. This was the re-enforcement of Fort Pick¬ 
ens—much the strongest fortification at the very important post of Pensacola 
Harbor in Florida, which it in a great measure commanded. At this post 
was a navy yard, which was used as a naval station for Gulf cruisers, and 
which was therefore rich in ammunition and supplies. The bay or harbor 
was defended first by Fort Pickens, a large and formidable stone casemated 
work, which stands on the point of Santa Rosa Island, a long and narrow 
strip of sand which almost closes the bay, and between which and the oppo¬ 
site shore there is a distance of but a mile and a half. Directly opposite 
Fort Pickens is a water-battery known as Fort M‘Rea ; and about two miles 
farther along the shore, and within less than the same distance of Fort Pick¬ 
ens, is a larger work than the former, which is called the Barrancas, or Fort 
San Carlos. The greedy eyes of the insurgents were early turned upon 
these important strong-holds and store-houses; and on the 12th of January 
a band of about five hundred men, led by Captain V. M. Randolph, of the 
United States Navy, and, it is said, by one Colonel Lomax, whose commis¬ 
sion was in the Florida militia, appeared at the gates of the navy yard, and 
demanded its surrender to the State of Florida, which bad that day passed 
its Ordinance of Secession. It was on this day that the Star of the West re¬ 
turned to New York, with the marks of two rebel cannon upon her hull, 
after her miserable attempt to re-enforce Fort Sumter. The scene at Pensa¬ 
cola Navy Yard was more shameful, and incomparably more calamitous. 
There was no attempt at decency on the part of Lieutenants E. Farrand and 
F. B. Renshaw, who were there in authority; and in their presence, and, it 
is asserted, by the command of the latter, the flag of the republic was haul¬ 
ed down amid the jeers of a drunken rabble, and the yard, with all its guns, 
stores, and ammunition, passed at a word into the hands of the insurgents. 3 
On the same day, Commander Armstrong, of the Navy, caused the Barran¬ 
cas to be abandoned; but he had the grace to spike the guns, and remove 
some, at least, of the munitions. Farrand and Renshaw were treacherously 
false to their colors; but Armstrong’s plea was inability to cope with the 
forces which could be brought against him. At little Fort M‘Rea, however, 
was a man of another mould. Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer, a young offi¬ 
cer of artillery, distinguished thus far only by his proficiency in the scien¬ 
tific branches of his profession, was stationed there; and he determined at 
once to do all that a brave and able soldier could to save the key to the po¬ 
sition. The garrison under his command -at Fort M'Rea was very small, 
but he did not despair. Hastily gathering from the Barrancas and the navy 


4 Proclamation of Governor Hicks , of Maryland. 

To the People of Maryland: 

The unfortunate state of affairs now existing in the country has greatly excited the people of 
Maryland. 

In consequence of our peculiar position, it is not to be expected that the people of the state can 
unanimously agree upon the best mode of preserving the honor and integrity of the state, and of 
maintaining within her limits that peace so earnestly desired by all good citizens. 

The emergency is great. The consequences of a rash step will be fearful. It is the imperative 
duty of every true son of Maryland to do all that can tend to arrest the threatened evil. I there¬ 
fore counsel the people, in all earnestness, to withhold their hands from whatever may tend to pre¬ 
cipitate us into the gulf of discord and ruin gaping to receive us. 

I counsel the people to abstain from all heated controversy upon the subject; to avoid all things 
that tend to crimination and recrimination, in order that the origin of our evil day may be for¬ 
gotten now by every patriot in the earnest desire to avert from us its fruit. 

All powers vested in the governor of the state will be strenuously exerted to preserve the peace 
and mnintain inviolate the honor and integrity of Maryland. 

I call upon the people to obey the laws, and to aid the constituted authorities in their endeavors 
to preserve the fair fame of our state untarnished. 

I assure the people that no troops will be sent from Maryland, unless it may be for the defense 
of the national capital. 

It is my intention in the future, as it has been my endeavor in the past, to preserve the people 
of Maryland from civil war; and I invoke the assistance of every true and loyal citizen to aid me 
in this emergency. 

The people of this state will, in a short time, have the opportunity afforded them, in a special 
election of members of Congress of the United States, to express their devotion to the Union, or 
their desire to have it broken up. T. H. Hicks 

Baltimore, April 18,186L 

6 Report of a Select Committee to Congress, Feb. 21, 1861. 






18G1.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 69 



L1KUTKNANT A. -I. hl.KMMEU. 


yard a few troops who had proved faithful among the faithless, and joining 
to these some marines from the war steamer Wyandotte, then at that sta¬ 
tion, he threw himself with his little force, numbering in all but about 
eighty men, into Fort Pickens, where he hoped, and it proved not without 
reason, that he could hold out until re-enforcements should arrive. He se¬ 
cured himself against immediate attack from Fort M'Rea by destroying all 
the ammunition not locked up in the magazine, and by spiking the guns 
and ramming the tampions so firmly into the muzzles that they had to be 
bored out. All the other works were unimportant compared to Fort Pick¬ 
ens, which commanded every gun upon them ; and although the insurgents 
addressed themselves vigorously to the task of strengthening the old forts, 
Lieutenant Slemmer, by his bold and spirited move (in which he was ably 
supported by Lieutenant Gilman), had foiled their main purpose utterly. 



The news of these transactions flew quickly to Washington, for as yet 
there was no attempt at secrecy of movement, and steps were taken which 
resulted in a strategic defeat for the rebels. Their attention and the inter¬ 
est of the whole country was mainly concentrated upon Fort Sumter. As 
a strategical point, this fort was absolutely worthless, owing to the unimport¬ 
ance of the city which it defended, either as a commercial port, a centre of 
population, or a base of operations. The honor of the flag and humanity to 
the garrison were the chief, if not the only questions to be considered in re¬ 
gard to the situation at Charleston Harbor. But Fort Pickens was one of 
the keys of the Gulf of Mexico, and Washington was the capital of the re¬ 
public. While, therefore, the flag of the Union was flying defiantly from 
Fort Sumter, the concentration round it of all the available force of the con¬ 
federated insurgents was enabling the government to secure more easily the 



TUX ha mm it or l'KM6ACOLA. FLORIDA* SUOHIMu TUX FOBTB, WAVY YARD, ITc. 







































70 


[1861 




TUB FLAO-BTAFF BASTION AT FOBT IT C LENS, FLORIDA. 





























































































































1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


71 



FRONT VIEW OF KURT 1MOKF.N8, PENSACOLA, 6UOWINQ TUB HALLY-PORT AND GLACIS. 


immediate safety of the two most important points. On the 24th of Janu¬ 
ary the war steamer Brooklyn was dispatched from Fortress Monroe with 
provisions, military stores, and a company of regular artillery under the 
command of Captain Vodges. The frigate Macedonian, and one or two 
other smaller vessels, were ordered to rendezvous at Santa Rosa Island; 
and these, upon an emergency, could have spared some hundreds of men 
for the defense of the fort. It was feared that this aid would not reach 
Lieutenant Slemmer in time; but, pending this movement, on the 28th of 
January a telegraphic dispatch was received at Washington from ex-Sen- 
ator Mallory, of Florida, not addressed to President Buchanan, but intended 
for his eye, expressing the usual formal desire for peace, and proffering as¬ 
surances that no attack would be made upon the fort if the status quo was 
not disturbed. The proposition was sufficiently insolent; but it suited the 
expectant, temporizing policy of President Buchanan to accept it, in order 
that the Peace Convention, then, as we have seen, in session, might carry 
on, without interruption, deliberations of which it was supposed that nothing 

‘ Extract from Instructions addressed to the Commanders of the Macedonian, Brooklyn, anti other 

Naval Officers in command , and to Lieutenant Slemmer , commanding at Fort Pickens, Florida. 

“In consequence of the assurances received from Mr. Mallory, in a telegram of yesterday to 

Messrs. Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, with a request it should he laid before the President, that Fon 

Pickens would not be assaulted, and an offer of such an assuranc e to the same effect from Colonel 
Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile collision, upon receiving satisfactory assuranc es from 
Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attac ked, you are instructed not to 
land the company on board the Brooklyn unless said fort shall be attacked, or preparations shall 
be made for its attack. The provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will land. The 
Brooklyn and the other vessels of war on the station will remain, and you will’ exercise the utmost 
vigilance, and be prepared at a moments warning to land the company at Fort Pickens, and you 
and they will instantly repel any attack on the fort. The President yesterday sent a spec ial mes¬ 
sage to Congress commending the Virginia resolutions of compromise. 'I'lie commissioners of dif¬ 
ferent states are to meet here on Monday, the 4th of February, and it is important that during their 
session a collision of arms should be avoided, unless an attack should be made, or there should be 
preparations made for such an attack. In either event, the Brooklyn and the other vessels will act 
promptly. 

“ Your right, and that of the other officers in command at Pensacola, freely to communicate with 
the government by special messenger, and its right, in the same manner, to c ommunicate with your¬ 
self and them, will remain intact as the basis on which the present instruction is given.” 

7 Letter from General Scott. 

The following letter from Lieutenant General Scott was published in the Washington National 
Intelligencer of October 21,1862: 

October 30, 1860, I emphatically called the attention of the President to the necessity of strong 
garrisons in all the forts below the principal commercial cities of the Southern states, including, 
by name, the forts in Pensacola Harbor. October 31, I suggested to the Secretary of War that a 
circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had garrisons, to be on the alert against 
surprises and sudden assaults. [See my “ Views," since printed .] 

After a long confinement to my bed in New York, 1 came to this city (Washington) December 
12. Next day I personally urged upon the Secretary of War the same views, viz., strong garri¬ 
sons in Southern forts—those of Charleston and Pensacola Harbor at once; those on Mobile Bay 
and the Mississippi, below New Orleans, next, etc., etc. I again pointed out the organized com¬ 
panies and the recruits at the principal depots available for the purpose. The Secretary did not 
concur in any of my views, when I begged him to procure for me an early interview with the Pres¬ 
ident, that I might make one effort more to save the forts and the Union. 

By appointment, the Secretary accompanied me to the President December 15, when the same 
topics, secessionism, etc., were again pretty fully discussed. There being at the moment (in the 
opinion of the President) no danger of an early secession beyond South Carolina, the President, 
in reply to my arguments for immediately re-enforcing Fort Moultrie, and sending a garrison to 
Fort Sumter, said: 

“The time has not arrived for doing so; that he should wait the action of the Convention of 
South Carolina, in the expeotation that a commission would l>e appointed and sent to negotiate 
with him and Congress respecting the secession of the state and the proj>crty of the United States 
held within its limits; and that if Congress should decide against the secession, then he would 
send a re-enforcement, and telegraph the commanding officer (Major Anderson) of Fort Moultrie 
to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack." 

And the Secretary, with animation, added: 

“We have a vessel of war (the Brooklyn) held in readiness at Norfolk, and he would then send 
three hundred men in her from Fort Monroe to Charleston.” 

To which I replied, first, that so many men could not b? withdrawn from that garrison, but 
oould be taken from New York. Next, that it would then be too late, as the South Carolina 
commissioners would have the game in their own hands by first using and then cutting the wires; 
that as there was not a soldier in Fort Sumter, any handful of armed secessionists might seize 
and occupy it, etc., etc. 

Here the remark may be permitted, that if the Secretary’s three hundred men had then, or 
some time later, been sent to Forts Moultrie and Sumter, both would now have l>een in the pos¬ 
session of the United States, and not a battery below them could have been erected bv the seces¬ 
sionists ; consequently, the access to these forts from the sea would now (the end of March) be 
unobstructed and free. 

The same day, December 15, I wrote the following note: 

“Lieutenant General Scott begs the President to pardon him for supplying in this note what 
he omitted to sav this morning at the interview with which he was honored by the President. 

“Long prior to the Force Bill (March 2, 1833), prior to the issue of his proclamation, and in 
part prior to the passage of the Ordinance of Nullification, President JacksoD, under the act of 


could be hoped if they were disturbed by the clash of an armed collision. * * * * * 6 
For more than two months this little re-enforcement was kept back by the 
singular course of events which wc have heretofore followed at Washington. 
The Brooklyn and her attendant vessels lay wearily off and on the coast at 
the mouth of Pensacola Harbor. Lieutenant Slemmer kept up good heart 
and strict discipline; and, on their side, the insurgents undertook to obtain 
possession of the fort by treachery. A letter was smuggled within the walls 
addressed to a sergeant, offeiirig him two thousand dollars and a commission 
in the rebel army to betray the fort, and to every private who would aid 
him five hundred dollars. The men proved incorruptible, and the sergeant 
was placed under arrest. This attempt was in itself a treacherous violation 
of the truce (but treachery, personal bad faith, had marked the insurrection 
from the very beginning), and would have justified the commander of the 
Brooklyn in throwing his men into Fort Pickens. But he was relieved of 
the consideration of the question by the immediate receipt of orders from 
Washington to effect the landing. 7 This was on the 12th of April; and it 

March 3, 1807, ‘ authorizing the employment of the land and naval forces,’caused rc-enforce- 
men s to be sent to Fort Moultrie, and a sloop of war (the Natchez), with two revenue cutters, to 
be sent to Charleston Harbor, in order, 1, to prevent the seizure of that fort by the nullifiers; 
and, 2, to enforce the execution of the revenue laws. General !Scott himself arrived at Charleston 
the day after the passage of the Ordinance of Nullification, and many of the additional companies 
were then en route for the same destination. 

“ President Jackson familiarly said at the time, ‘ that by the assemblage of those forces for lawful 
purposes he was not making war upon South Carolina; but that, if South Carolina attacked them, 
it would be South Carolina that made war upon the United States.’ 

“General Scott, who received his first instructions (oral) from the President, in the temporary 
absence of the Secretary of War (General Cass), iememl>ers those expressions well. 

“Saturday night, December 15,18tf0." 

I)ecvmber 28. Again, after Major Anderson had gallantly and wisely thrown his handful of 
men from Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter—learning that, on demand of South Carolina, there 
was great danger he might be ordered by the Secretary back to the less tenable work, or out of the 
harbor—I wrote this note : 

“ Lieutenant General Scott (who has had a bad night, and can scarcely hold up his head this 
morning) begs to express the hope to the. Secretary of War—1. That orders may not be given for 
the evacuation of Fort Sumter. 2. That one hundred and fifty recruits may instantly be sent 
from Governor’s Island to re-cnforec that garrison, with ample supplies of ammunition and sul>- 
sistcnce, including fresh vegetables, ns potatoes, onions, turnips; and, 3. That one or two armed 
vessels be sent to support the said fort. 

“Lieutenant General Scott avails himself of this opportunity also to express the hope that the 
recommendations heretofore made by him to the Secretary of War respecting Forts Jackson, St. 
Philip, Morgan, and Pulaski, and particularly in respect to Forts Pickens ami M‘Kca, and the 
Pensacola Navy Yurd, in connection with the last two named works, may be reconsidered by the 
Secretary. 

“Lieutenant General Scott will farther ask the attention of the Secretary to Forts Jefferson and 
Taylor, which are wholly national, being of far greater value even to the most distant ]>oints of the 
Atlantic coast and the jicoplc on the upper waters of the Missouri, Mississippi, and Ohio Rivers 
than to the State of Florida. There is only a feeble company at Key West for the dof. n>c of 
Fort Taylor, anti not a soldier in Fort Jefferson to resist a handful of filibusters or a row-boat of 
pirates; and the Gulf, soon after the beginning of secession or revolutionary troubles in the adja¬ 
cent states, will swarm with such nuisances.”* 

Deceml>cr 30, I addressed the President again ns follows: 

“Lieutenant General Scott begs the President of the United States to pardon the irregularity 
of this communication. It is Sunday, the weather is bad, and General Scott is not well enough 
to go to church. 

“ But matters of the highest national importance seem to forbid a moment’s delay, and, if mis¬ 
led by zeal, lie hopes for the President’s forgiveness. 

“ Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department, and oth¬ 
erwise ns secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York Harbor to re¬ 
enforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence? 

“ It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose as early as 
to-morrow. 

“General Scott will wait upon the President at any moment he may be called for." 

The South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no move¬ 
ment of defense (on the part of the United States) was |>ermittcd. 

I will here close my notice of Fort Sumter by quoting from some of my previous reports. 

It would have been easy to re-enforee this fort down to about the 12th of February. In this 
long delay Fort Moultrie lmd been rearmed and greatly strengthened in every way by the rebels. 
Many powerful new land-batteries (besides a formidable raft) have been constructed. Hulks, too, 
have been sunk in the principal channel, so as to rentier access to Fort Sumter from the sea im¬ 
practicable without first carrying all the lower batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of re¬ 
enforcing has thus been increased ten or twelve fold. First, the late President refused to allow 
any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina commis¬ 
sioners. 

Afterward Secretary Holt and myself endeavored in vain to obtain a ship of war for the pur¬ 
pose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer Star of the West. That vessel, 
but for the hesitation of the master, might, ns is generally believed, have delivered at the fort the 

• It was not till January 4 that, by the aid of Secretary Holt (a strong and loyal man), I obtained permission to 
.«end succor to the feeble gnrrison of Fort Taylor, Key West, and at the same time a company—Major Arnold’s, from 
Iioeton—to occupy Fort Jefferson, Tortugaa Island. If this company had been three days later, the fort would have 
been preoccupied by Floridians. It is known that thp rebels had their eyes upon these powerful forts, which govern 
the commerce of the Mexican Gulf, as Gibraltar and Malta govern that of the Mediterranean. With Forte Jefferson 
and Taylor, the rebels might have purchased an early European recognition. 















72 


was decided to make the attempt that very night. Early in the evening 
the boats were hoisted out, volunteers selected (for, volunteers being called 
for, the whole ship’s crew came forward), the men well armed, and boats also 

men and subsistence on board. This attempt at succor failing, I next verbally submitted to the 
late cabinet either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way by the batteries (increas¬ 
ing in strength daily), or that Major Anderson should be left to ameliorate his condition by the 
muzzles of his guns—that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment and by bringing to merchant ves¬ 
sels, helping himself (giving orders for payment), or, finally, be allowed to evacuate the fort, which, 
in that case, would be inevitable. 

But, before any resolution was taken, the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about 
the want of suitable war vessels, another commissioner front South Carolina arrived, causing far¬ 
ther delay. When this had passed away, Secretaries Holt and Toucey, Captain Ward, of the 
Navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President (Buchanan), settled upon the employment, 
under the captain (who was eager for the expedition), of three or four small steamers belonging to 
the Coast Survey. At that time (late in January), I have but little doubt Captain Ward would 
have reached Fort Sumter with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce 
or armistice (made here), embracing Charleston and Pensacola Harbors, agreed upon between the 
late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc., and this 
truce lasted to the end of that administration. 

That plan and all others, without a squadron of war ships and a considerable army, competent 
to take and hold the many formidable batteries below Fort Sumter, and before the exhaustion of 
its subsistence, having been pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable by Ma¬ 
jor Anderson, Captain Foster (chief engineer), and all the other officers of the fort, as well as by 
Brigadier General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers; and, concurring in that opinion, I did 
not hesitate to advise (March 12) that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the fort, so long 
gallantly held by him and his companions, immediately on procuring suitable transportation to 
take them to New York. His relative weakness had steadily increased in the last eighteen days. 

It was not till January 3 (when theirs/ commissioners from South Carolina withdrew) that the 
permission I had solicited October 31 was obtained to admonish commanders of the few Southern 
forts with garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults. (Major Anderson 
was not among the admonished, being already straitly beleaguered.) 

January 3. To Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding in Pensacola Harbor: 

“ The generul-in-chicf directs that you take measures to do the utmost in your power to prevent 
the seizure of either of the forts in Pensacola Harbor by surprise or assault, consulting first with 
the commander of the navy yard, who will probably have received instructions to co-operate with 
you.” (This order was signed by Aid-de-camp Lay.) 

It was just before the surrender of the Pensacola Navy Yard (January 12) that Lieutenant 
Slemmer, calling upon Commodore Armstrong, obtained the aid of some thirty common seamen 
or laborers (but no marines), which, added to his 4G soldiers, made up his numbers to 76 men, with 
whom this meritorious officer has since held Fort Pickens, and performed, working night and day, 
an immense amount of labor in mounting guns, keeping up a strong guard, etc. 

Early in January I renewed, as lias been seen, my solicitations to be allowed to re-enforce Fort 
Pickens, but a good deal of time was lost in vacillations. First, the President “thought, if no 
movement is made by the United States, Fort M‘Rca will probably not be occupied nor Fort 
Pickens attacked. In case of movements by the United States, which will doubtless be made 
known bv the wires, there will be corresponding local movements, and the attempt to re-enforce 
will be useless’’—( Quotation from a note made by my Aid-de-eamjt Lay, about January 12, of the Pres¬ 
ident's reply to a message from me.) Next, it was doubted whether it would be sufe to send re-en- 
forcemcnts in an unarmed steamer, and the want, as usual , of n suitable naval vessel—the Brook¬ 
lyn being long held in reserve at Norfolk for some purpose unknown to me. Finally, after I had 
kept a body of three hundred recruits in New York Harbor for some time—and they would have 
been sufficient to re-enforce temporarily Fort Pickens and to occupy Fort M l Rea also—the Presi¬ 
dent, about January 18, permitted that the sloop-of-war Brooklyn should take a single company, 
ninety men, from Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, and re-enforce Lieutenant Slemmer in Fort 
Pickens, but without a surplus man for the neighboring fort, M‘Rca. 

The Brooklyn, with Captain Vodges’s company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about 
January 22, and on the 29th, President Buchanan, having entered into a quasi armistice with cer¬ 
tain leading seccdcrs at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, 
in a joint note, the commanders of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieutenant Slemmer, com¬ 
manding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Captain Vodges’s company 
unless that fort should be attacked.* 

[ That joint note I never saw' until March 25, but supposed the armistice was consequent upon 
the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was understood to terminate with it.] 

Hearing, however, of the most active preparations for hostilities on the part of the scccders at 
Pensacola, by the erection of new batteries and arming Fort M‘liea—that had not a gun mounted 
when it was seized—during the Peace Convention and since, I brought the subject to the notice of 
the new administration, when this note, dated Marc h 12, to Captain Vodges, was agreed upon, 
viz. : “ At the first favorable moment you will land with your company, re-cnforce Fort Pickens, 
and hold the same till farther orders.” This order, in duplicate, left New York by two naval ves¬ 
sels about the middle of March, as the mail and the wires could not be trusted, and detached offi¬ 
cers could not be substituted, for two had already been arrested and paroled by the authorities of 
Pensacola, dispatches taken from one of them, and a third, to escape like treatment, forced to turn 
back when near that city. Thus those authorities have not ceased to make war upon the United 
States since the capture by them of the navy yard, January 12. 

Respectfully submitted. Winfield Scott. 

Head-quarters of the Army, Washington, March 30,18G1. 

Tetter from ex- President Buchanan in Reply to General Scott. 

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer: 

On Wednesday last I received the National Intelligencer containing General Scott’s address to 
the public. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of 
the administration in regard to the seven cotton states now in rebellion. From our past relations 
I was greatly surprised at the appearance of such a paper. In one aspect, however, it was highly 
gratifying. It has justified me, nay, it has rendered it absolutely necessary, that I should no 
longer remain silent in respect to charges which have been long vaguely circulating, but arc now 
indorsed by the responsible name of General Scott. 

I. The first and most prominent among these charges is my refusal immediately to garrison 
nine enumerated fortifications, scattered over six of the Southern states, according to the recom¬ 
mendation of General Scott in his “views” addressed to the War Department on the 29th and 
30th of October, 1860; and it has even been alleged that if this had been done it might have pre¬ 
vented the civil war. 

This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd. All my 
cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the 
administration; and certain it is that during the last six months previous to the 29th of Decem¬ 
ber, I860, the day on which he resigned his office, after my request, he exercised less influence on 
the administration than any other member of the cabinet. Mr. Holt was immediately thereafter 
transferred from the Post-office Department to that of War; so that, from this time until the 4th 
of March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the administration, he performed 
the duties of Secretary of War to my entire satisfaction. 

But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications in such a manner, to use the 
language of General Scott, “ as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup- 
de-main ridiculous?” There is one answer, both easy and conclusive, even if other valid rea¬ 
sons did not exist. There were no available troops within reach which could be sent to these 
fortifications. To have attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive by any means 
within the President’s power would hnvc been simply absurd.' Of this General Scott himself 
seems to have been convinced, for on the day after the date of his first “views” he addressed (on 
the 30th of October) supplemental views to the War Department, in which he states, “ There is 
one (regular) company in Boston, one here (at the Narrows), one at Pittsburgh, one at Augusta, Ga ., 
one at Baton Rouge"—in all, Jive companies only within reach to garrison or re-enforce the forts men¬ 
tioned in the “ views.'* 

Five companies—four hundred men—to occupy and re-enforce nine fortifications in six highly- 
excited Southern states! The force “within reach” was so entirely inadequate that nothing 
more need be said on the subject. To have attempted such a military operation with so feeble a 
force, and the presidential election impending, would have been an invitation to collision and se¬ 
cession. Indeed, if the whole American army, consisting then of only 16,000 men, had been 
“within reach,” they would have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want 
of troops that General Scott, believing, in opposition to the opinion of the committee raised in the 
House of Representatives, that the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military 
force, was only able to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th of March, 653 men, rank anil 
file of the array; and, to make up this number, even the sappers and miners were brought from 
West Point. 

But why was there no greater force within reach? This question could be better answered by 
General Scott himself than any other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a 

• It was known at the Navy Department that the Brookl/nu, with Captain Vodges on board, would be obliged. 
In open sea, to stand off and on Fort Picken®, and in rough weather might sometimes be fifty miles off. Indeed, if 
ten miles at sea, the fort might have been attacked aod easily carried before the re-enforcements could have reached 
the beach, in open sea, where alone It could land. 


[ 1861 . 

brought up from the Sabine and the St. Louis. The enemy was expected 
to resist the landing, and was known to have stationed strong coast-guards 
for that purpose. After the moon had set, between ten and eleven o’clock, 

few hundred men, were out of reach, on our remote frontiers, where it had been continuously sta¬ 
tioned for years to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants on their way thither against the at¬ 
tacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and l>oth General Scott and myself had endeavored 
in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regiments for this purpose. In rec¬ 
ommending this augmentation of the army, the general states, in his report to the War Depart¬ 
ment of November, 1857, that “if would not more than furnish the re-enforcemcnts now greatly 
needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington (T.), Kansas, Nebraska, 
Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah.” And again, in his report of November, 1858, he 
says: 

“This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens in distant settlements, including 
emigrants on the plains, can scarcely lie too strongly stated; but I will only add, that as often as 
we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to re-enforce another, the 
weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion.” 

These “views” of General .Scott exhibit the crude notions then prevailing, even among intelli¬ 
gent and patriotic men, on this subject of secession. In the first sentence, the general, while stating 
that, “ to save time, the right of secession may be conceded,” vet immediately says, “ this is instant¬ 
ly balanced by the correlative right on the part of the federal government against an interior state 
or states to re-establish, by force if necessary, its former continuity of territory.” (For this he 
cites Paley's Moral and Political Philosojfhy, last chapter. It may be there, but I have been un¬ 
able to find it.) While it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he renders 
what he did not mean quite clear in his supplementary “views.” In these he says, “It will be 
seen that the ‘ views’ only apply to a case of secession that makes a gap in the present Union.” 
The falling off say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic states from the Potomac south (ihc very case 
which has occurred), was not within the scope of General Scott’s “provisional remedies;” that is 
to say, to establish by force, if necessary, the continuity of our territory. In his “views” he nlso 
states as follows: “But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness 
may contrive, and there would be no hope of reuniting the fragments except by the laceration and 
despotism of the «sword. To effect such result, the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors 
would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child’s play.” In the general’s opinion, “ a smaller 
evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragments of the great republic to form 
themselves into new confederacies, probably four.” He then points out what ought to be the 
boundaries between the new unions, and at the end of each goes so far as even to indicate the 
cities which ought to be the capitals of the three first on this side of the Rocky Mountains, to wit, 
“Columbia, South Carolina;” “Alton or Quincy, Illinois;” and “Albany, New York,” excluding 
Washington City altogether. This indication of capitals contained in the original now in my pos¬ 
session is curiously omitted in the version published in the National Intelligencer. He designates 
no capital for the fourth union on the Pacific. The reader w ill judge w hat encouragement these 
views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have afforded to the secessionists of the 
cotton states. 

I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every mind why I did not, with 
a force of five companies, attempt to re-cnforce Forts Jackson and St.Philip, on the Mississippi; 
Fort Morgan, below Mobile; Forts Pickens and M‘Ren, in Pensacola Harbor; Fort Pulaski, be¬ 
low Savannah; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston Harbor; and Fort Monroe, in Virginia. 

These “ views,” both original and supplementary, were published by General Scott in the Na¬ 
tional Intelligencer of January 18, 1861, at the most important and critical period of the adminis¬ 
tration. Their publication at that time could do no possible good, and might do much harm. To 
have published them without the President’s knowledge or consent was as much in violation of the 
sacred confidence which ought to prevail between the commanding general of the army and the 
commander-in-chief as it would have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents 
without his authority. What is of more importance, their publication was calculated injuriously 
to affect the compromise measures then pending before Congress and the country, and to encour¬ 
age the secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into fragments. From 
the great respect which I then entertained for the general I passed it over in silence. 

It is worthy of remark that, soon after the presidential election, representations of what these 
“views” contained, of more or less correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially through¬ 
out the South. The editors of the National Intelligencer, in assigning a reason for their publica¬ 
tion, state that both in public prints and in public speeches allusions had been made to them, and 
some misapprehensions of their character had got abroad. 

II. and III. General Scott states that he arrived in Washington on the 12th, and, accompanied 
by the Secretary of War, held a conversation with the President on the 15th of December. While 
I have no recollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtless states correctly that I did refuse 
to send three hundred men to re-cnforce Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then re¬ 
moved to Fort Sumter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who recollect the history of 
the time. But twelve days before, in the annual message of the 3d of December, I had urged 
upon Congress the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character with those 
subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the “Crittenden Compromise.” At that time 
high hopes were entertained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Besides, I be¬ 
lieved, and this correctly, ns the event proved, that Major Anderson was then in no danger of at¬ 
tack. Indeed, he and his command were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities 
and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would have 
been only to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke collision, and disappoint the country. 

There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the general’s memory must be 
defective. Ai present I shall specify only one. I could not have stated that on a future contin¬ 
gent occasion 1 would telegraph “Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts (Moultrie 
and Sumter) against attack," because, with prudent precaution, this had already been done several 
days before, through a special messenger sent to Major Anderson for this very purpose. I refer to 
Major Buell, of the army. 

The general’s supplementary note of the same day, presenting to me General Jackson’s conduct 
in 1833, during the period of nullification, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the 
cases were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will 
appear from my annual message. This was, at every hazard, to collect the customs at Charleston, 
and outside of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the existing collector, as I 
had anticipated, resigned his office about the end of December, and immediately thereafter I nom¬ 
inated to the Senate, as his successor, a suitable person, prepared at any personal risk to do his 
duty. That body, however, throughout the entire session, declined to uct on this nomination. 
Thus, without a collector, it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue. 

IV. General Scott’s statement alleges that “the Brooklyn, with Captain Vodges’s company 
alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22, and on the 29th President Bu¬ 
chanan, having entered into a quasi armistice with certain leading speeders nt Pensacola and else¬ 
where, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, in a joint note, the commander of the war- 
vessels off Pensacola, and Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of 
hostility, and not to land Captain Vodgcs’s command unless the fort should be attacked.” He aft¬ 
erward states, within brackets, “That joint note I never saw, but supposed the armistice was con¬ 
sequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was understood to termi¬ 
nate with it.” 

These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part of General Scott. It is scarce¬ 
ly credible that this very joint note, presented in such odious colors, was submitted to General 
Scott on the day it was prepared (January 29), and mot his entire approbation. I would not 
venture to make this assertion if I did not possess conclusive evidence to prove it. On that day 
Secretary Holt addressed me a note, from which the following is an extract: “ I have the satis¬ 
faction of saying that on submitting the pujter to General Scott, he expressed himself satisfied with it 
saying that there could be no objection to the arrangement in a military jtoint of view or otherwise .” 
This requires no comment. That the general had every reason to be satisfied with the arrange¬ 
ment will appear from the following statement: 

A revolutionary outbreak had occurred in Florida; the troops of the United States had been 
expelled from Pensacola and the adjacent navy yard; and Lieutenunt Slemmer, of the artillery, 
with his brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens, where he was in 
imminent danger every moment of being captured by a vastly superior force. Owing to the in¬ 
terruption of regular communications, Secretary Holt did not receive information of these events 
until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter addressed to a third person. 
He instantly informed the President of the fact, and re-enforcements, provisions, and military 
stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a moment’s unnecessary delay. 
She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January. 

Well-founded apprehensions were, however, entertained at the time of her departure that the 
re-enforcements, with the vessels of wnr at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive 
in time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of suspense, and while Lieuten¬ 
ant Slemmer was in extreme peril. Senators Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler received a telegraphic 
dispatch from Senator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola on the 28th of January, with the 
urgent request that they should lay it before the President. This dispatch expressed an earnest 
desire to maintain the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made 
on Fort Pickens if the present status should be preserved. 

This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort and to the un¬ 
happy effect which an actual collision, either at that or any other point, might produce on the 






THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


73 


1861.] 


the Brooklyn got under way, and moved toward the shore as slowly and as 
silently as possible. When the soundings showed but seven fathoms of wa¬ 
ter, she hove to, and the troops were disembarked. Under command of 


Lieutenant Albert N. Smith, they pulled off with swift and steady strokes 
and made for a point three miles from the fort, from which it was the inten¬ 
tion that they should march to their destination. But the surf was found to 


Peace Convention then about to assemble at Washington. The result was, that a joint dispatch 
was carefully prepared by the Secretaries of War And Karr accepting the proposal, with important 
modifications, which was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th of January to Lieutenant Slemmer 
and to the naval commanders near the station. It is too long for transcription; suffice it to say, 
it was carefully guarded at every point for the security of the fort and its free communication 
with Washington. 

The result was highly fortunate. The Brooklyn had a long passage. Although she left For¬ 
tress Monroe on the 24th of January, she did tiot arrive at Pensacola until the 6th of February. 
In the mean time. Fort Pickens, with Lieutenant Slemmer (whose conduct deserves high com¬ 
mendation) and his brave little band, were placed, by virtue of this arrangement, in perfect se¬ 
curity until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our 
possession. Well might General Scott have expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement. The 
general was correct in the supposition that this arrangement was to expire on the termination of 
the Peace Convention. 

V. But we now come to an important period, when dates will be essentially necessary to disen¬ 
tangle the statements of General Scott. The South Carolina commissioners were appointed on 
the 22d, and arrived in Washington on the 27th of December. The day after their arrival it was 
announced that Major Anderson had removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This render¬ 
ed them furious. On the same day they addressed an angry letter to the President, demanding 
the surrender of Fort Sumter. The President answered this letter on the 30th of December with 
a peremptory refusal. This brought forth a reply from the commissioners on the 2d ot January, 
1861, of such an insulting character that the President instantly returned it to them with the fol¬ 
lowing indorsement: “ This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he 
declines to receive it.” From that time forward all friendly, political, and personal intercourse 
finally ceased between the revolutionary senators and the President, and he was severely attacked 
by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had pre¬ 
viously been of the coldest character ever since the President's ami-secession message at the com¬ 
mencement of the session of Congress. 

Under these changed circumstances, General Scott, by note on Sunday, the 30th of December, 
addressed the following inquiry to the President • 

“Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department, and oth¬ 
erwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York Harbor to re¬ 
enforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence ? 
It is hoped that a sloop-of-war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose 4 to-morrow.’ ** 

The general seems not to have then known that Mr. Floyd was out of office. 

Never did a request meet a more prompt compliance. It was received on Sunday evening, 
December 30. On Monday morning I gave instructions to the War and Navy Departments, and 
on Monday evening General Scott came to congratulate me that the secretaries had issued the 
necessarv orders to the army and navy officers, and that they were in his possession. The Brook¬ 
lyn. , with troops, military stores, and provisions, was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe for 
Fort Sumter. I am, therefore, utterly at a loss to imagine why the general, in hb statement, 
should have asserted that “the South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in 
Washington, and no movement ot defense (on the part of the United States) was permitted.” 
These commissioners arrived in Washington on the 27th of December; General Scott’s request 
was made to the President on the 30th ; it was complied with on the 31st, and a single day b all 
that represents the “many days” of the general. 

Again : General Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, that the President refused to allow any 
attempt to be made—to re-enforce Fort Sumter—because be was holding negotiations with the 
South Carolina commissioners. And still again, that “afterward Secretary Holt and myself en¬ 
deavored in vain to obtain a ship-of-war for tbe purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the 
passenger steamer Star of the West.’' Will it be believed that tbe substitution of the Star of ike 
West for the powerful war steamer Brooklyn, of which be now complains, was by ad rice of Gen¬ 
eral Scots himself? I have never heard that doubted until I read the statement. 

At tbe interview already referred to between the general and myself, on the evening of Mon- 
dav, tbe 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Caro¬ 
lina commissioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be con¬ 
sidered an improper act to send the Brooklyn with re-enforcements to Fort Sumter until I had 
received an answer from them to my letter of tbe preceding day; that the delay could not con¬ 
tinue more than forty-eight hours. He promptly concurred in thb suggestion as gentlemanly and 
proper, and the orders were not transmitted to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations 
were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January I received their insolent note, and sent it 
hack to them. In tbe mean time, however, the general had become convinced, by the representa¬ 
tions of a gentleman whom l forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and 
the Navv informed me, to secure secrecy and success, and reach the fort, would be to send a fast 
side-wheel mercantile steamer from New York with tbe re-enforcement. Accordingly, the Star 
ot the. West was selected for this duty. The substitution of this mercantile steamer for tbe Brook¬ 
lyn , which would have been able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by roe 
to the high military judgment of General Scott. 

The change of programme required a brief space of time; but the Star of the West left New 
York for Charleston on the evening of the 5th of January. On the very day. however, when this 
ill-fated steamer left New York, a telegram was dispatched by General Scott to Colonel Scott to 
countermand her departure: bat it did not reach her destination until after she had gone to sea. 
The reason for thb countermand shall be stated in the language of Secretary Holt, to be found 
in a letter addressed bv him to Mr. Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior, on tbe 5th of 
March. 1861, and published in the Sational Intelligencer. Mr. Holt says: 

“The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not more cordially sanctioned by the 
President than it was by General Scott and myself; not because of any dissent from tbe orders on 
the part of the President, but because of a letter received thar day from Major Anderson, stating, 
in effect, that he regarded himself secure in hb position; and yet more from intelligence which 
late on Saturday evening (January 5, 1861) reached the department, that a heavy battery had 
been erected among the sand-hills "at tbe entrance to Charleston Harbor, which would probably 
destrov anv unarmed vessel (and such was the Star of the Wat) which might attempt to make its 
wav to Fort Sumter. This important information satisfied the government that there was no 
present necessity for sending re-enforcements, and that, when sent, they should go, not in a vessel 
of commerce, bat of war. Hence the countermand was dispatched by telegraph to New York ; 
hat tbe vessel had sailed a shott time before it reached the officer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was 
addressed.” 

A statement of these facts, established by dates, proves conclusively that the President was not 
onlr willing, but anxious, in the briefest period, to re-enforce Fort Sumter. 

On the 4th of January, the day before the departure of the Star of the West from New York, as 
General Scott in hb statement admit*, succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key W est, and to Fort Jef¬ 
ferson. Tortugas Island, which reached those points in time for their security. He nevertheless 
•peculates on the consequences which might have followed had tbe re-enforcements not reached 
their destination in doe time; and even expresses the extraordinary opinion^thax. with the pos¬ 
session of these forts, “the rebels might have purchased an early recognition.” 

I shall next advert to the statement that the expedition, under Captain Ward, “of three or four 
small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey,” was kept back by something like a truce or armis¬ 
tice [made here], embracing Charleston and Pensacola Harbors, agreed upon between the late Pres¬ 
ident and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida. Louisiana, etc. And thb truce 
lasted to “ the end of the administration.” Things altogether distinct in their nature are often so 
blended in thb statement that it b difficult to separate them. Such b eminently tbe case in con¬ 
necting the facts relative to Charleston with Pensacola. _ _ 

Having already treated of the charge of haring kept back re-enforcements from Pensacola, I 
have now to sav something of the charge of having also kept them back from Charleston. Neither 
a truce, nor quasi truce, nor any thing like it, was ever concluded between the President and any 
human authority concerning Charleston. On the contrary, the South Carolina commissioners, 
first and last, and all the time, were informed that the President could never surrender Fort Sum¬ 
ter. nor deprive himself of the most entire liberty to send re-enforcements to it whenever it was 
believed to be in danger, or requested br Major Anderson. It b strange that General Scott was 
not apprised of thb well-known fact. It was, then, with some astonishment that I learned from 
the statement of the general that he had. on the 12th of March, 1861, advised that Major Ander¬ 
son shoald be instructed to evacuate the fort as soon as suitable transportation could be procured 
to carrv himself and hb command to New York. A military necessity for a capitulation may have 
existed* in case there shoald be an attack upon the fort, or a demand for its surrender, but surely 
none such could have existed for its voluntary surrender and abandonment. 

Probablv that to which the general means to refer was not the quasi, but the actual truce of arms 
concluded at Charleston on the 11th of January, 1861. between Governor Pickens and Mayor An¬ 
derson, without the knowledge of the President. It was on the 9th of January that the ^lor of 
the West , under the American dag. was fired upon in the harbor of Charleston, by order of Gover¬ 
nor Pickens. Immediately after thb outrage. Major Anderson sent a flag to the governor, stating 
that he presumed the act had been unauthorised, and for that reason be had not opened fire from 
Fort Sumter on tbe adjacent batteries; bet demanding its disavowal, and. if this were not seiat >n a 
reasonable time, he would consider it war, and fire on any vessel that attempted to leave the har¬ 


bor. Two days after thb occurrence, on the 11th of January. Governor Pickens had the audacity 
to demand of Major Anderson the surrender of the fort. In hb answer of the same date the ma¬ 
jor made the following proposition: “Should your excellency deem fit, previous to a resort to 
arms, to refer thb matter to Washington, it would afford me the sincere pleasure to depute one of 
my officers to accompany any messenger yon may deem propei to be the bearer ot your demand.’' 
Thb proposition was promptly accepted by the governor, and, in pursuance thereof, he sent, on hb 
part. Hon. J. W. Wayne, the attorney general of South Carolina, to Washington, while Major An¬ 
derson deputed Lieutenant Hall, of the United States Army, to accompany him. These gentle¬ 
men arrived together in Washington on the evening of the 13th of January, when the President 
obtained tbe first knowledge of the transaction. But it will be recollected that no time intervened 
between the return of the Star tf the West to New York and tbe arrival of the messenger bearing 
a copy of the truce a: Washington within which it would have been possible to send re-enforce¬ 
ments to Fort Sumter. Both events occurred about the same time. 

Thus a truce, or suspension of arms, was concluded between tbe parties, to continue until the 
question of the surrender of tbe fort shoald be decided by the President Until this decision. Ma¬ 
jor Anderson had placed it out of his own power to ask for re-enforcements, and equally out of 
tbe power of tbe government to send them without a violation ot public faith. Thb was what 
writers on public law denominate “a partial truce, under which hostilities are suspended only in 
certain places, as between a town and tbe army besieging it.” It b possible that tbe President, 
under the laws of war, might have annulled this truce upon due notice to the opposite party : but 
neither General Scott nor any other person ever suggested thb expedient. Thb would have been 
to cast a reflection on Major Anderson, who, beyond question, acted from tbe highest and purest 
motives. Did General Scott ever propose to violate thb truce daring its existence? If he did. I 
am not now, and never was, aware of the fact Indeed, I think he would have been one of the last 
men in the world to propose such a measure. 

Colonel Hayne did not deliver the letter which he bore from Governor Pickens, demanding the 
surrender of the fort, to the President until tbe 31st of January. Tbe documents containing the 
reasons for thb worrying delay were communicated to Congress in a special message of the 8th of 
February, to which I refer the reader On the 5th of February, tbe Secretary of War, under the 
instructions ot the President, gave a peremptory refusal to thb demand, in an able and compre¬ 
hensive letter, reviewing the whole subject, explaining and justifying tbe conduct of the President 
throughout. Its concluding sentence b both eloquent and emphatic: 

“If," says Mr.Holt, “with all tbe multiplied proofs which exist of the President’s anxiety fot 
peace, and of tbe earnestness with which he has pursued it, tbe authorities of that state shall as¬ 
sault Fort Sumter, and imperil the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its 
walls, and thus plunge our country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they 
represent must rest the responsibility.” 

The truce was then ended, and General Scott b incorrect in stating “ that it lasted to the end 
of that administration.” 

I An expedition was quietly fitted oat at New York, under tbe supervision of General Scott, to be 
ready for any contingency. He arranged its details, and regarded the re-enforcement? thus pro¬ 
vided for as sufficient. Thb was ready to sail for Fort Sumter on five hours’ notice. It b of thb 
expedition that General Scott thus speaks: 

“At that time, when thb (the truce) had passed away. Secretaries Holt and Tooccy, Captain 
Ward, of tbe Navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President, settled upon the employment, 
under tbe captain, of three or four steamers belonging to tbe Coast Survey, but he was kept back 
by the truce.” 

A strange inconsistency. The truce had expired with Mr. Holt’s letter to Colonel Hayne on 
the 5th of February, and General Scott, in hb statement. says, “it would have been easy to re-en¬ 
force thb fort down to about tbe 12th of February.” Why, then, did not the re-enforce men is pro. 
ceed ? Thb was simply because of communications from Major Anderson. It was moat fortu¬ 
nate that they did not proceed, because the three or four small steamers which were to bear them 
would Dever have reached tbe fort, and in the attempt must have been captured or destroyed. Tbe 
vast inadequacy of tbe force provided to accomplish the object was demonstrated by information 
received from Major Anderson at the War Department on the last day of the administration. 

I purposely forbear at present to say more on thb subject, lest I might, however unintentional¬ 
ly, do injustice to one or more of the parties concerned, in consequence of tbe brevity required b; 
the nature of thb communication. The facts relating to it, with tbe appropriate accompaniments, 
have been fully presented in a historical review, prepared a year ago, which will ere long be pub¬ 
lished. Thb review contains a sketch of the four last months of my administration. It b im¬ 
partial : at least such b my honest conviction. That it has not yet been publbhed has arisen 
solely from an apprehension, no longer entertained, that something therein might be unjustly per¬ 
verted into an interference with the government in a vigorous prosecution of the war for the main¬ 
tenance of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union, which was far, very far, from my in¬ 
tention. 

After a careful retrospect, I can solemnly declare before God and my country that I can not re¬ 
proach myself with any act ot commission or omission since the existing troubles commenced. I 
have never doubted that my countrymen would yet do me justice. In my special message of tbe 
8th of January, 1861, I presented a full and fair exposition of the alarming condition of the coon- 
try, and urged Congress either to adopt measures of compromise, or, failing in thb, to prepare for 
the last alternative. In both aspects my recommendation was disregarded. I shall close thb 
document with a quotation of the last sentences of that message, as follows: 

“ In conclusion, it may be permitted me to remark that I have often warned my countrymen of 
the danger? which now surround us. Thb may be the last time I shall refer to the subject offi¬ 
cially. I feel that my daty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly, performed; and, 
whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the consciousness that I at least meant w ell 
for my country.” Your obedient servant, Jxmcs Bee hax a s . 

WhestUad, near Laceuier, October 2S. 1962. 

Rejoinder oj Lieutenant General Scott. 

To tbe Editor* of tbe Nation*] Inte&geaeer: 

I regret to find myself in a controversy with the venerable ex-President Buchanan. 

Recently (Oct. 21) you publbhed my official report to President Lincoln, dated March 30, 1861, 
giving a summary rtf "my then recent connection with our principal Southern forts, which, I am 
sorry to perceive, has given offense to tbe ex-President. That result, purely incidental, did not 
enter into my purpose in drawing up the paper, but, on reflection, 1 suppose that, under tbe cir¬ 
cumstances, offense was unavoidable. 

Let it be remembered that the new president had a right to demand of me—the immediate com¬ 
mander of the army—how it bad happened that tbe incipient rebels had been allowed to seize 
several of those forts, and from the bad condition of others were likely to gain possession of them 
also. Primarily, the blame rested exclusively on me. Hence, to vindicate my sworn allegiance 
to the Union and professional conduct, tbe report was submitted to President Lincoln at an earh 
day (in hb administration), and recently to tbe worl 

To that short paper ex-President Buchanan publishes a reply, of doable the length, in The /»- 
telLqencer of the 1st instant. My rejoinder, from necessity, if not taste, will be short, for I bold tbe 
pen in a rheumatic hand, and am without aid-de-camp or amanuensis, and without a printed doc 
ament and my own official papers. 

Unable, in my present condition, to make an analysb of the ex-President’s long reply, I avail 
mvself of a substitute furnished by an accidental visitor, who has kindly marked the few points 
which be thinks may require some slight notice at my hands. 

1. To account for "not having garrisoned sufficiently the Southern forts named against anticipated 
’reason and rebellion, according to my many recommendations, beginning Oct. 29, 1860, repeated 
tbe next day, and again, more earnestly, Dec. 13,15, 28, and 30, the ex-President says, “There 
were no available troops within reach.'' 

Now, although it b true that, with or without tbe ex-President’s approbation, the Secretary of 
War had nearly denuded our whole eastern sea-board of troops in order to augment our forces in 
Texas and Utah, I nevertheless pointed out, at several of tbe above dates, the 600 recruits (about) 
which we had in the harbor of New York and at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, nearly all or¬ 
ganized into temporary companies, and tolerably drilled and disciplined—quite equal to tbe pur¬ 
pose in question—besides tbe five companies of regulars near at hand, making about 1000 men. 

These disposable troops would have given (say) two hundred men to the twin forts Jackson and 
St. Philip, below New Orleans; an equal number to Fort Morgan, below Mobile; a re-enforce¬ 
ment of one hundred men to Fort Pickens, Pensacola Harbor; and a garrison of tbe like number 
to tbe twin fort M’Rea; a garrison of one hundred men to Fort Jefferson, Tortngas Island, and 
tbe same to Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, which, like Forts Jackson. St. Philip, Morgan, and 
M’Kea, had not at tbe time a soldier—leaving about two hundred men for the twin forts Moultrie 
and Sumter, Charleston Harbor, where there were two weak companies, making 1ess than ninety 
men. Fortress Monroe had already a garrison of some eight companies, one or two of which 
might, in the earlier period of danger, have been spared till volunteers could have been obtai ned , 
notwithstanding printed handbills were every where posted in Eastern Virginia by an eccentric 

I character, inviting recruits to take that most important work. 

Now I have nowhere said that either of those forts, even with the re-enforcement indicated, 
would have had a tear garrison. Certainly not. My proposition was to put each in a condition 













74 



GUNBOAT "WYANDOTTE.” STORESHIP "SUPPLY.” 


FRIGATE "SABINE.” 


THE UNITED STATES FLJ 






















































■WIN 








































































































































76 


be so heavy that Lieutenant Smith regarded the danger from the elements 
as more to be feared than that from the enemy; and he therefore instantly 
formed the resolution of passing directly up and landing in front of the fort. 
It was accomplished without attack; and he had the satisfaction of seeing 
the gates of the fort close upon the full re-enforcement. The boats returned 
to the ships, and, taking off the marines from the Brooklyn, placed them 
safely too in Fort Pickens, and pulled back past Fort M‘Rea and the Bar¬ 
rancas in broad daylight unharmed. It will be remembered, however, that 
this re-enforcement was only the result of a hasty attempt to meet the great 
emergency of the period immediately succeeding the seizure of the forts, the 
navy yard, and the arsenal by the insurgents, in the early stages of the move¬ 
ment for secession. The disgraceful truce had intervened. A few days 
after the Brooklyn had landed her artillerists, two large transports, the At¬ 
lantic and the Illinois, arrived off Santa Rosa, bringing seven hundred and 
fifty men, under the command of Colonel Brown, horses for a company of 
flying artillery, muskets, other munitions of war, and provisions. Under 
protection of the Sabine, of 50 guns, the Brooklyn, 14 guns, the St. Louis, 22 
guns, the Water-Witch, the Wyandotte, the Crusader, and the Mohawk, of 
10 guns each, to which was added afterward the Powhatan, a powerful steam¬ 
er carrying 12 heavy guns, this important ro-enforcement was landed—the 
troops in a single night; the horses, munitions of war, and provisions in the 
course of three days; and the 20th of April saw Fort Pickens, the most im¬ 
portant post upon the Gulf, amply garrisoned and provisioned, and under the 

as I expressly said, to guard against a surprise or coup-de-main (an oft'-hand attack, one without 
full preparation). 

That these movements of small detachments might easily have been made in November and 
December, 1860, and some of them as late as the following month, can not be doubted. But the 
ex-President sneers at my “weak device" for saving the forts. 

He forgets what the gallant Anderson did with a handful of men in Fort Sumter, and leaves 
out of the account what he might have done with a like handful in Fort Moultrie, even without 
farther augmentation of men to divide between the garrisons. Twin forts, on the opposite sides 
of a channel, not only give a cross-fire on the head of an attack, but the strength of each is more 
than doubled by the Hanking fire of the other. The same remarks apply to the gallant Lieutenant 
Slemmcr, with his handful of brave men, in Fort Pickens. With what contempt might he not 
have looked upon Chase or Bragg in front of him, with varying masses of from 2000 to 6000 men, 
if Fort Pickens and its twin fort, M‘Rea, had had between them only 200 men! 

I have thus shown that small garrisons would, at first, huve sufficed for the other twins, Forts 
Jackson and St. Philip also. Mv object was to save to the Union, by any means at hand, all those 
works, until Congress could have time to organize a cull for volunteers—a call which the Presi¬ 
dent, for such a purpose, might no doubt have made, without any special legislation, with the full 
approbation of every loyal man in the Union. 

2. The ex-President almost loses his amiability in having his neglect of the forts “attributed," 
as he says, “without the least cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd;’’ and he adds, “All my 
cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the 
administration." 

Now, notwithstanding this broad assumption of responsibility, I should be sorry to believe that 
Mr. Buchanan specially consented to the removal by Secretary Floyd of 115.000 extra muskets 
and riHes, with all their implements and ammunition, from Northern repositories to Southern 
atsenals, so that, on the breaking out of the maturing rebellion, they might be found without cost, 
except to the United States, in the most convenient positions for distribution among the insur¬ 
gents. So, too, of the 120 or 140 pieces of heavy artillery which the same secretary ordered from 
Pittsburgh to Ship Island, in Lake Borgne, and Galveston, Texas, for forts not yet erected! Ac¬ 
cidently learning, early in March, that, under this posthumous order, the shipment of these guns 
had commenced, I communicated the fact to Secretary Holt (acting for Secretary Cameron) just 
in time to defeat the robbery. 

But on this point we may hear ex-Secretary Floyd himself. At Richmond he expressly claimed 
the honor of defeating all my plans and solicitations respecting the forts, and received his reward 
—it being there universally admitted that, but for that victory over me, there could have been no 
rebellion! 

3. Mr. Buchanan complains that I published, without permission, January 18, 1861, my views, 
addressed to him and the Secretary of War, October 29 and 30, 1860. But that act was caused, 
as I explained to him at the time, by the misrepresentations of the views in one of the earlier 
speeches of the same ex-secretary after his return to Virginia. 

4. One of my statements, complaining of the joint countermand sent through the Secretaries of 
Wur and Navy to prevent the landing at Fort Pickens of Captain Vodges’s company unless the 
fort should be attacked , is cited by the ex-President to prove a “singular want of memory*’ on my 
part; and a note from Secretary Holt is adduced to show that I had entirely approved of the joint 
countermand the day (Jan. 20) that it was prepared. Few persons are as little liable to make a 
misstatement by accident as Mr. Holt, and no one more incapable of making one by design; yet 
I have not the slightest recollection of any interview with him on this subject. 

I do remember, however, that Mr. Holt, on some matter of business, approached my bedside 
about that time, when I was suffering greatly from an access of pain. Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Holt, 
and myself were all landsmen, and could know but little of the impossibility of landing troops on 
an open sea-beach, with a high wind and surf. Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, with officers 
about him of intelligence and nautical experience, ought to have said plumply that if Vodges 
was not to land except in the case of attack on Fort Pickens, he might as well have remained at 
Fortress Monroe, as the prohibition placed the fort, so far us he was concerned, at the mercy, or 
(as the event showed) on the want of enterprise on the part of the rebel commander at Pensacola. 

Possibly there are other parts of the reply which a superficial reader may think require com¬ 
ment or elucidation ; and, indeed, here is another marked for me by my kind visitor. 

5. The ex-President has brought together a labyrinth of dates respecting the arrival and de¬ 

parture of rebel commissioners, armistices, etc., with which, as I had no official connection, I may 
have made an unimportant mistake or two; but, as I have not by me the means of recovering the 
clew to those windings, I shall not attempt to follow him. Winfield Scott. 

New York, Fifth Avenue Hotel, November 8, 1862. 

Ex-Presulent Buchanan's Rejoinder to General Scott. 

To the Editor of the National Intelligencer: 

With a few remarks I shall close the controversy with General Scott, into which I have been 
most reluctantly forced by his voluntary and unexpected attack. This has, nevertheless, afforded 
me an opportunity of correcting many unfounded reports which I had long borne in patience and 
in silence. In my answer, I have already furnished clear and distinct responses to all the allega¬ 
tions of General Scott; and in his rejoinder he has not called in question any of my statements 
with a single exception. Which of us is correct in this particular depends upon the question 
whether his recollection of an event which occurred more than eighteen months ago, or the state¬ 
ment of Mr. Holt, reduced to writing on the very day, is entitled to the greater credit. 

The general, in the introduction of his rejoinder, assigns as an excuse for the criticism on my 
public conduct, that this was merely incidental to his alleged official report to President Lincoln 
on the condition of our fortifications, and was not primarily intended for myself. From this state¬ 
ment, one would conclude that he had mude such a report. But where is this to be found ? For 
it he refers to the Intelligencer of the 21st of October; but there I discover nothing but his letter 
of four points to Mr. Seward, dated on the 3d of March, 1861, advising the incoming President 
how to guide his administration in the face of the threatened dangers to the country. In the sin¬ 
gle introductory Sentence to this letter he barely refers to his “printed views" (dated in October, 
1860), which had been long before the public; but it contains nothing like an official report on the 
condition of the fortifications. 

Whether the introduction of this letter to the public, without the consent of President Lincoln, 
bv one of the general’s friends, in a political speech during a highly excited gubernatorial canvass, 
had influenced him to prepare his criticism on my conduct, it is not for me to determine. 

At what period did General Scott obtain the six hundred recruits to which he refers in his re¬ 
joinder? This was certainly after the date of his “views," on the 30th of October, 1860 ; bccau.-e 
in these he states emphatically that the forces then at his commancLwere, “ in nil, five companies 
only within reach to garrison or re-enforce the (nine) forts mentioned in the ‘views.’" 

Did he obtain these recruits in November? If so, had he visited Washington, or written and 
explained to me in what manner the military operation could be accomplished by the four hund¬ 
red men in the five companies and the six hundred recruits, I should have given his representa¬ 
tions all the consideration eminently due to his high military reputation. 


[ 1861 . 

command of an officer, Colonel Brown, to whom the firm and gallant Lieu¬ 
tenant Slemmer might cheerfully, both as a soldier and a patriot, yield the 
precedence due to his superior rank. The batteries upon the hostile shores 
were under the command of Colonel Bragg, who had won laurels as an offi¬ 
cer of artillery under the command of General Taylor in Mexico. 

Important as the possession of Fort Pickens was, the position of Washing¬ 
ton awakened a far livelier and more immediate interest throughout the 
country. To attack and gain possession of the national capital was the first 
impulse which found expression among the insurgents, excited almost to 
frenzy by the successful bombardment of Fort Sumter and the war-procla¬ 
mation of the President To secure its safety was the first care of every pa¬ 
triot. The cry, Washington is in danger, flew from lip to lip over the whole 
land; and men went about their necessary business with the ever-present ap¬ 
prehension of hearing at any moment of a bloody struggle upon the very 
steps of the yet unfinished Capitol for its possession. These were no vague 
fears, excited by the sudden peril of the country ; for one of the first effects 
of the proclamation had been to cause the passage of an Ordinance of Seces¬ 
sion in Virginia, and thus virtually to open the way for the march of the in¬ 
surgent forces directly upon Washington. In January, a resolution had been 
passed unanimously in the Senate of Virginia declaring that, if the sectional 
differences of the country could not be reconciled, honor and interest de¬ 
manded that she should unite her fortunes with those of her sister slavehold¬ 
ing states. At the same time, however, a resolution, bringing up the ques¬ 
tion of the policy of secession, was refused to be entertained by a vote of nine- 

But he informs ns he did not arrive in Washington until the 12th of December. His second 
recommendation to garrison these forts must consequently have been made, according to his own 
statement, on the 13th, 15th, 28th, or 30th of December, or on more than one of these days. At 
this period the aspect of public affairs had greatly changed from what it was in October. Con¬ 
gress was now in session, and our relations with the seceding cotton states had been placed before 
them by the President’s Message. Proceedings had been instituted by that body with a view to 
a compromise of the dangerous questions between the North and the South, and the highest hopes 
and warmest aspirations were then entcitaincd for their success. Under these circumstances, it 
was the President’s duty to take a broad view of the condition of the whole country, in all its re¬ 
lations, civil, industrial, and commercial, as well ns military, giving to each its appropriate influ¬ 
ence. It was only from such a combination that lie could frame a policy calculated to preserve 
the peace and to consolidate the strength of the Union. Isolated recommendations proceeding 
from one department, without weighing well their effect upon the general policy, ought to be adopt- 
ed with extreme caution. 

But it seems from the rejoinder that Secretary Floyd, at Richmond, had claimed the honor of 
defeating General Scott’s “plans and solicitations respecting the forts;’’ “it being there," says 
the general, “ universally admitted that, but for that victory over me, there could have been no re¬ 
bellion." This is, in plain English, that the seceessionisis of the cotton states, who have since 
brought into the field hundreds of thousands of undoubtedly brave soldiers, would have abandon¬ 
ed in terror their unlawful nncl rebellious designs, had General Scott distributed among their nu¬ 
merous forts 480 men in October or 1000 men in December! This requires no comment. I have 
never been able to obtain a copy of the speech of Mr. Floyd at Richmond to which I presume Gen¬ 
eral Scott refers; but I learned, both at the time and since, from gentlemen of high respectability, 
that in this same speech he denounced me most bitterly for my determination to stand by and sus¬ 
tain the Union with all the power I possessed under the Constitution and the laws. 

And here permit me to remark tlmt it is due to General Scott, as well as myself, to deny that 
there is any portion of my answer which justifies the allegation that “the ex-President sneers at 
my‘weak device’ (the words ‘weak device’being marked as a quotation) for saving the forts." 
This mistake I must attribute to his “accidental visitor." 

And in this connection I emphatically declare that the general, neither before nor after the pub¬ 
lication of his “views" in the National Intelligencer of the 18th of January, 1861, without my con¬ 
sent, assigned any reason to me for making this publication, or ever even alluded to the subject. 
In this I can not be mistaken from the deep impression which the occurrence made upon my mem¬ 
ory, for the reasons already mentioned in my answer. 

I should have nothing more to add had General Scott, in his rejoinder, confined himself to the 
topics embraced in his original letter. He has extended them, and now for the first time, and in 
a sarcastic and no kindly spirit, refers to the alleged stealing of public arms by Secretary Floyd, 
and their transportation to the South in anticipation of the rebellion. The most conclusive answer 
to this allegation is that, notwithstanding the boasting of Mr. Floyd at Richmond, evidently with 
the view of conciliating his new allies, cited by the general as his authority, no public arms were 
e’ 2 T stolen. This fact is established by the report of the Committee on Military Affairs of the 
House of Representatives, now before me, made by Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, their chairman, on the 
18th of February, 1861, and to be found in the second volume of the Reports of Committees o.'the 
House for the session of 1860-61. This report, and the testimony before the committee, establish, 

1. That the Southern states received in 1860 less instead of more than the quota of arms to 
which they were entitled by law ; and that three of them—North Carolina, Mississippi, and Ken¬ 
tucky—received no arms whatever, and this simply because they did not ask for them. Well may 
Mr. Stanton have said in the House “that there are a good deal of rumors, and speculations, and 
misapprehension as to the true state of facts in regard to this matter." 

2. Secretary Floyd, under suspicious circumstances, on the 22d of December, 1860, and but a few 
days before he left the Department, had, without the knowledge of the President, ordered 113 co- 
lumbiads and 11 32-poundcrs to be transported from Pittsburgh to Ship Island and Galveston, in 
Mississippi and Texas. The fact was brought to the knowledge of the President by a communi¬ 
cation from Pittsburgh ; and Secretary Holt immediately thereafter countermanded the order of 
his predecess*. •, and the cannon were never sent. The promptitude with which we acted elicited 
a vote of thanks, dated the 4th of January, 1861, from the Select and Common Councils of that 
city “ to the President, the Attorney General, and the acting Secretary of War"(Mr. Holt). 

After this statement, how shall we account for the explicit declaration of General Scott that, 
“ accidentally hearing early in March that under this posthumous order (that of Mr. Floyd of tlie 
22d of December) the shipment of these guns had commenced, I communicated the fact to Secre¬ 
tary Holt(actirg for Secretary Cameron) just in time to defeat the robbery?" And this is the 
same Secretary Holt who had countermanded “the posthumous order" in the previous December. 
And, strange to say, these guns, but for the alleged intcr|>OMtion of General Scott, were about to 
be sent so late is March from the loyal states into those over which Jefferson Davis had then for 
some time presided ! 

Had General Scott reflected for a moment, he could not have fallen into this blunder. It is quite 
manifest he was “without a printed document and my (his) own official papers." 

3. The government had on hand in the year 1859 about 500,000 old muskets, which had been 
condemned “ as unsuitable for public service,’’ under the act of the 3d of March, 1825. They were 
of such a character that, although offered both at public and juivate sale for $2 50 each, pur¬ 
chasers could not be obtained at that rate, except for a comparatively small number. On the 30th 
of November, 1859, Secretary Floyd ordered about one fifth of the whole number (105,000) to be 
sent from the Springfield Armory, where they had accumulated, to five Southern arsenals, “in pro¬ 
portion to their respective means of proper storage.” This order was carried into effect by the 
Ordnance Bureau in the usual course of administration and without reference to the President. It 
is but justice to say that, from the testimony before the committee, there is no reason to suspect 
that Secretary Flovd issued this order from any sinister motive. Its date was months before Mr. 
Lincoln’s nomination for the presidency, and nearly a year before his election, and while the sec¬ 
retary was still an avowed opponent of secession. Indeed, the testimony of Colonel Craig and Cap¬ 
tain Maynadier, of the Ordnance, before the committee, is wholly inconsistent with any evil inten¬ 
tion on his part. 

And yet these “condemned muskets," with a few thousand ancient rifles of a calibre then no 
longer used, arc transformed by General Scott into “ 115,000 extra muskets and rifles, with all their 
implements and ammunition." This is the first time I have heard—certainly there was nothing 
of the kind before the committee—that ammunition was sent with these condemned and inferior 
arms to their places of storage—just as though they had been intended, not for sale, but for imme¬ 
diate use in the field. The truth is, that it is impossible to steal arms and transport them from 
one depository to another without the knowledge and active participation of the officers of the Ord¬ 
nance Bureau, both in Washington and at these depositories. It may be observed that Colonel 
Craig, the head of the Bureau at this period, was as correct an officer, and as loyal and as honest 
a man as exists in the country. Yours very respectfully, James Bccuanak. 

Wheatland, near Lancaster, Nov. 17,1862. 








RE-ENFORCEMENT OF FORT PICKENS BY COMPANY A, FIRST ARTILLERY, ON SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 13. 1861. 


r 


1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


77 









































































78 


[1861 



THE SECOND BE-ENFORCEMENT OF FORT PICKENS, ON APRIL 16, 1861. 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


79 


ty-six to thirty-six. A state convention had assembled at Richmond on the 
13th of February, and its deliberations bad continued up to the time of the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter. A very decided majority of this body was 
opposed to any movement toward secession ; and, except with a very small 
minority, there was a purpose and a hope that Virginia should yet act as a 
mediator between the revolted states and the government. But the mem¬ 
bers of the extreme slavery party were indefatigably active. They plied 
the Convention day after.day with resolutions and speeches upon the “in¬ 
jury and oppression” which the sisterhood of slavery had suffered from the 
“federal government,” the duty of resisting “coercion,” the “sovereignty 
of the states,” and the consequent “right of secession.” They procured the 
appointment of a commission to catechise the President upon “the course 
he intended to pursue toward the seceded states.” 8 In this body the dogma 
of state sovereignty' again worked out those logical results so fatal to the 
Union ; for coercion, or, in other words, the assertion and maintenance of a 
supreme government for the execution of the supreme law of the land, was 
the bugbear that disturbed all concert of action against the seceding faction; 
and therefore, when, even after the attack upon Fort Sumter, the President 
called for troops to retake it and the other military posts which had been 
seized, most of the very Union men in this Virginia Convention felt com¬ 
pelled to declare that, “ if the President meant the subjugation of the South,” 
Virginia had but one course to pursue—to make common cause with her 
sister slave states, and resist. And so Governor Letcher having, on the 16th 
of April, as we have already seen, refused to furnish Virginia’s quota of the 
troops called for by the President, and threatened resistance, 9 on the 17th an 
Ordinance of Secession was secretly hurried through the Convention, receiv¬ 
ing, in the excitement of the moment, a vote of eighty-eight against fifty- 
five. Even this, however, was but a provisional ordinance, which was to 
take effect only when ratified by the votes of a majority of the people of the 
state at a poll to be taken on the fourth Thursday of May following. 10 This 
was the first instance in which the insurgent leaders had ventured to submit 
an Ordinance of Secession to the votes of the people. But in this very case 
they pursued their policy of precipitation and usurpation of power with a 
more guilty recklessness than ever before; for, in spite of this special pro¬ 


# The President's Speech to the Virginia Commissioners, Messrs. Preston, Stuart, and Randoljth . 

Gentlemen, —As a committee of the Virginia Convention, now in session, you present me a 
preamble and resolution in these words: 

“Whereas, in the opinion of this Convention, the uncertainty which prevails in the public mind 
as to the policy which the federal executive intends to pursue toward the seceded states is ex¬ 
tremely injurious to the industrial and commercial interests of the country, tends to keep up an 
excitement which is unfavorable to the adjustment of the pending difficulties, and threatens a dis¬ 
turbance of the public peace; therefore, 

“ Resoh'ed, That a committee of three delegates be appointed to wait on the President of the 
United States, present to him this preamble, and respectfully ask him to communicate to this Con¬ 
vention the policy which the federal executive intends to pursue in regard to the Confederate 
States.” 

In answer I have to say, that having, at the beginning of my official term, expressed my intend¬ 
ed policy as plainly as I was able, it is with deep regret and mortification I now learn there is great 
and injurious uncertainty in the public mind as to what that policy is, and what course I intend to 
pursue. Not having as yet seen occasion to change, it is now my purpose to pursue the course 
marked out in the inaugural address. I commend a careful consideration of the whole document 
as the best expression I can give to my purposes. As I then and therein said, I now repeat, “ The 
power confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess property and places belonging to 
the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what is necessary for these ob¬ 
jects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people any where.” By the 
words “property and places belonging to the government,” I chiefly allude to the military posts 
and property which were in possession of the government when it came into my hands. But if, 
as now appears to be true, in pursuit of a purpose to drive the United States authority from these 
places, an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to 
repossess it, if I can, like places which had been seized before the government was devolved upon 
me; and in any event I shall, to the best of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true 
that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall, perhaps, cause the United States mails 
to be withdrawn from all the states which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement 
of actual war against the government justifies and possibly demands it. I scarcely need to say 
that I consider the military posts and property situated within the states which claim to have se¬ 
ceded as yet belonging to the government of the United States as much as they did before the sup¬ 
posed secession. Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not attempt to collect the duties 
and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by this, however, that 

I may not land a force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon the border of the country. From 
the fact that I have quoted a part of the inaugural address, it must not be inferred that I repudi¬ 
ate any other part, the whole of which I reaffirm, except so far as what I now say of the mails may 
be regarded as a modification. 

Proclamation of the Governor of Virginia. 

Whereas seven of the states formerly composing a part of the United States have, bv authority 
of their people, solemnly resumed the powers granted by them to the United States, and have framed 
a constitution and organized a government for themselves, to which the people of those states arc 
yielding willing obedience, and have so notified the President of the United States by all the for¬ 
malities incident to such action, and thereby become to the United States a separate, independent, 
and foreign power; and whereas the Constitution of the United States has invested Congress with 
the sole power “to declare war,” and until such declaration is made the President has no author¬ 
ity to call for an extraordinary force to wage offensive war against any foreign power; and where¬ 
as, on the 15th instant, the President of the Unitod States, in plain violation of the Constitution, 
issued a proclamation calling for a force of seventy-five thousand men to cause the laws of the 
United States to be duly executed over a people who arc no longer a part of the Union, and in 
said proclamation threatens to exert this unusual force to com|>el obedience to his mandates; and 
whereas the General Assembly of Virginia, by a majority approaching to entire unanimity, de¬ 
clared at its last session that the State of Virginia would consider such an exertion of force as a 
virtual declaration of war, to be resisted by all the power at the command of Virginia; and sub¬ 
sequently, the Convention now in session, representing the sovereignty of this state, has reaffirmed 
in substance the same policy, with almost equal unanimity; and whereas the State of Virginia 
deeply sympathizes with the Southern states in the wrongs they have suffered and in the position 
they have assumed, and having made earnest efforts peaceably to compose the differences which 
have severed the Union, and having failed in that attempt, through this unwarranted act on the 
part of the President; and it is believed that the influences which operate to produce this procla¬ 
mation against the seceded states will be brought to bear upon this commonwealth if she should 
exercise her undoubted right to resume the powers granted by her people, and it is due to the 
honor of Virginia that an improper exercise of force against her people should l>c repelled; there¬ 
fore I, John Letcher, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, have thought proper to order 
all armed volunteer regiments or companies within the state forthwith to bold themselves in readi¬ 
ness for immediate orders, and upon the reception of this proclamation to report to the adjutant 
general of the state their organization and numbers, and prepare themselves for efficient service. 
Such companies as are not armed and equipped will report that fact, that they may be properly 
supplied. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Commonwealth to 
be affixed, this 17th day of April, 1861, and in the eighty-fifth year of the Commonwealth. 

John Letcher. 

Ordinance of Secession passed by the Virginia Convention, April \~th, 1861. 

An Ordinance to repeal the Ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America by 
the State of Virginia, and to resume all the Rights and Powers granted under said Constitution: 


vision in the ordinance itself, requiring a vote of the people for its establish¬ 
ment, another ordinance was immediately passed, adopting the Constitution 
of the Confederate States, and a solemn convention was entered into with 
commissioners from the government at Montgomery, by which Virginia be¬ 
came a member of the confederacy, submitted her entire military force and 
military operations to the control of the President of the confederacy, and 
made over to the insurgent government all the public property, naval stores, 
and munitions of war, which, in delicate phrase, she might have “ acquired” 
from the United States. * 1 This ordinance was passed with indecent haste on 
the 17th day of April, and the convention was entered into upon the 25th. 
True, the former was in terms dependent upon the vote to be taken in May 
upon the Ordinance of Secession. But as the state was meantime placed en¬ 
tirely in the military power of the insurgents, this provision was but the hol- 
lowest form of external decency. The effect of this action in Virginia was of 
inestimable advantage to the insurgents. It transferred their frontier from 
the obscure and remote line of the northern boundary of the Gulf states to 
the Potomac River, and placed one end of the Long Bridge, which is the 
southern outlet of Washington, upon hostile soil. 

The temper and purposes of the people who had thus usurped control of 
the most important of the slave states was instantly manifested by hostile 
movements of the most alarming character. Hardly was the conditional 
Ordinance of Secession passed, when the custom-house and the post-office at 
Richmond were seized, and on the evening of the same day, the 18th of 
April, an attack was made upon Ilarper’s Fern'. At this place, famous for 
the bold beauty of the scene, where the Potomac receives the w'aters of the 
Shenandoah,and pushes its way through a sharply-cut gap in the Blue Ridge, 
was one of the largest arsenals of the United States, to which was attached 
a factory of arms of corresponding magnitude. The former usually con¬ 
tained ninety-five thousand stand of arms; and the latter, when in full op¬ 
eration, turned out twenty-five thousand yearly. Here, too, at the outlet of 
the Shenandoah Valley, which pierces the centre of Virginia, was one of the 
principal stations of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, by which the great 
river commerce of the West passed eastward to the sea-coast; and a great 
and well-stored flour-mill, one of the largest in the country. Around these 


The people of Virginia, in the ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America, 
adopted by them in convention, on the 25th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand 
seven hundred and eighty-eight, having declared that the powers granted under the said Consti¬ 
tution were derived from the people of the United States, and might be resumed whensoever the 
same should be perverted to their injury and oppression, and the federal government having per¬ 
verted said powers, not only to the injury of the people of Virginia, but to the oppression of the 
Southern slaveholding states; 

Now, therefore, we, the people of Virginia, do declare and ordain, that the ordinance adopted by 
the people of this state in convention, on the twenty-fifth day of June, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of Amer¬ 
ica was ratified, and all acts of the General Assembly of this state ratifying or adopting amend¬ 
ments to said Constitution, arc hereby repealed and abrogated ; that the union between the State 
of Virginia and the other states under the Constitution aforesaid is hereby dissolved, and that the 
State of Virginia is in the full possession and exercise of all the rights of sovereignty which belong 
and appertain to a free and independent state. And they do farther declare that*said Constitu¬ 
tion of the United States of America is no longer binding on any of the citizens of this state. 

This ordinance shall take effect and be an act of this day, when ratified by a majority of the 
votes of the people of this state, east at a poll to be taken thereon, on the fourth Thursday in May 
next, in pursuance of a schedule hereafter to be enacted. 

Done in convention, in the city of Richmond, on the seventeenth day of April, in the year of our 
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-onc, and in the eighty-fifth year of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia. 

A true copy. Jxo. L. Eubank, Secretary of Convention. 

1 An Ordinance passed by the Virginia Convention for the adoption of the Constitution of the Pro¬ 
visional Government of the Confederate States of America. 

We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, in convention assembled, solemnly impressed by the 
perils which surround the commonwealth, nnd appealing to the Searcher of hearts for the recti¬ 
tude of our intentions in assuming the grave responsibility of this act, do by this ordinance adapt 
and ratify the Constitution of the provisional government of the Confederate States of America, 
ordained and established at Montgomery, Alabama, on the eighth day of February, eighteen hund¬ 
red and sixty-one; provided that this ordinance shall cease to have any legal operation or effect 
if the people of this commonwealth, upon the vote directed to be taken on the Ordinance of Seces¬ 
sion passed by this Convention on the seventeenth day of April, eighteen hundred and sixtv-one, 
shall reject the same. 

A true copy. Jxo. L. Eubank, Secretary. 

Convention between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Confederate States of America. 

The Commonwealth of Virginia, looking to a speedy union of said commonwealth and the other 
slave states with the Confederate States of America, according to the provisions of the Constitution 
for the provisional government of said states, enters into the following temporary convention nnd 
agreement with said states, for the purpose of meeting pressing exigencies affecting the common 
rights, interests, and safety of said commonwealth and said confederacy. 

1. Until the union of said commonwealth with said confederacy shall be perfected, and said 
commonwealth shall become a member of said confederacy, according to the constitutions of Iwth 
powers, the whole military force and military oj>crations, offensive nnd defensive, of said common¬ 
wealth, in the impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief control and di¬ 
rection of the President of said Confederate States, u|»on the same principles, basis, and footing ns 
if said commonwealth were now, and during the interval, a member of said confederacy. 

2. The commonwealth of Virginia will, after the consummation of the union contemplated in 
this convention, and her adoption of the Constitution for a permanent government of the said Con¬ 
federate States, and she shall become a member of said confederacy under said permanent Consti¬ 
tution, if the same occur, turn over to the said Confederate States all the public property, naval 
stores, and munitions of war, etc., she may then be in possession of, acquired from the United 
States, on the same terms and in like manner as the other states of said confederacy have done in 
like cases. 

3. Whatever expenditures of money, if any, said Commonwealth of Virginia shall make before 
the union, under the provisional government ns above contemplated, shall be consummated, shall 
be met and provided for by said Confederate States. 

This convention entered into nnd agreed to, in the city of Richmond, Virginia, on the twenty- 
fourth day of April, 1861, by Alexander H. Stephens, the duly authorized commissioner to act in 
the matter for the said Confederate States, and John Tyler,Wm. Ballard Preston. Samuel M‘D. 
Moore, James P. Holcombe, James C. Bruce, and Lewis B. Ilarvie, parties duly authorized to act 
in like manner for said Commonwealth of Virginia, the whole subject to the approval and ratifi¬ 
cation of the proper authorities of both governments respectively. 

In testimony whereof the parties aforesaid have hereto set their hands and seals, the day and 
year aforesaid, and at the place aforesaid, in duplicate originals. 

Alexander II. Stephens, Commissioner for Confederate States. 
John Tyler, 

Wm. Ballard Preston, 

S. M‘D. Moore, 

James P. Holcombe, 

James C. Bruce, 

Lewis B. Harvie, J 

Approved and ratified by the Convention of Virginia, on the 25th of April, 1861. 

John Jannet, President. 

Jxo. L. Eubank, Secretary. 


1 Commissioners for Virginia. 









50 


[ 1861 , 



GENERAL VIEW OF HARTER'S FERRY AND THE MARYLAND HEIGHTS. 











































































































































































THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


81 


18til.] 



HARPER'S FERRY, VIRGINIA. 

points of attraction there had grown up a manufacturing town of between 
nine and ten thousand inhabitants, which was connected with the Maryland 
shore by a bridge nine hundred feet in length, the alternate possession 
and abandonment, destruction and rebuilding of which played a promi¬ 
nent part in the approaching war. The commanding position of the place, 
and the great value of the arms and the founderies there, made it one 
of the most important internal military posts of the United States. It was 
at this time held by Lieutenant Roger Jones, who had under his imme¬ 
diate command only a small company of about forty men. That the post 
was in danger the government well knew, but there were no means of 
re-enforcing it sufficiently; and Lieutenant Jones had received orders that, 
in case of an attack which could not be successfully resisted, it should 
be destroyed. The peril came sooner than it was expected. But the 
commander was watchful, and he received information, on the 17th, the 
very day on which the Ordinance of Secession was passed within closed 
doors, that preparations were making at Winchester and in the surrounding 
country for an attack upon him in overwhelming force. lie immediately 
prepared the work of destruction by piling the arms in heaps and surround¬ 
ing them with combustible matter, and by mining the work-shops and lay¬ 
ing trains. He was not an hour too soon. Orders were sent down from 
Richmond on the morning of the 18th for the seizure of the place, and three 
thousand men were expected to move upon it. Owing to the suddenness 


of the call, however, only two hundred and fifty infantry assembled at the 
rendezvous, Halltown, a small village about four miles from Harper’s Ferry. 
To these, however, were added a squad of Fauquier County cavalry and a 
piece of artillery; and thus the force was more than amply strong for the pur¬ 
pose, even without the help of the inhabitants of the town, which it was sure 
to receive. About nine o’clock in the evening this force moved swiftly and 
silently upon the Ferry; but they were not able to surprise its little garri¬ 
son. They were challenged by sentry after sentry, until they began to ap¬ 
prehend that more formidable preparations for resistance had been made 
than they were able to encounter, and concluded to send in a flag of truce 
to obtain information from the townspeople. But, while the flag was on 
its way, and the officers were in consultation during the halt, a sudden flash 
broke forth in the direction of the armory; it was followed by others in 
quick succession, accompanied by explosions like the firing of heavy artil¬ 
lery. The cause was instantly suspected, and the cavalry, dashing into the 
village, soon returned with the information that the arsenal and the work¬ 
shops were blown up and on fire, and that the government troops had re¬ 
treated across the Potomac toward Hagerstown in Maryland. Lieutenant 
Jones had been prompt, and ;is thorough as circumstances permitted. With¬ 
in three minutes from the time of firing the trains, the arsenal and the arms 
which it contained were destroyed, and the work-shops were all ablaze. But 
of the arms in the latter many were saved by the insurgents after they had 
put out the fire. Their way lit by the conflagration which they had kin¬ 
dled, Lieutenant Jones and his little band fled across the Potomac bridge, 
pursued by a threatening mob, which, however, they easily kept at bay, and, 
pushing on through the night, arrived, weary and footsore, at Carlisle Bar¬ 
racks, in Pennsylvania, the next afternoon, with the loss of only four men 
by desertion and straggling. Mr. Jones’s faithfulness and his success won 
him commendation and a captaincy. But in what a situation was that coun¬ 
try which esteemed itself fortunate in the escape of its soldiers with their 
lives from an important post, and the destruction of one of its most consid¬ 
erable arsenals and armories, filled with arms and implements which never 
could have been more needed! 

To the loss of Harper’s Ferry there was immediately added another of 
far more consequence, that of the great naval station at Portsmouth, which 
lies upon the Elizabeth River, eight miles from the noble harbor of Hamp¬ 
ton Roads. The great capacity of this harbor, its safety, and its easy access 
to ships of the deepest draught, had early pointed it out as the most desira¬ 
ble place south of New York for the naval purposes to which it was appro¬ 
priated. It was filled with the maritime and military wealth of the nation, 
and within its limits were the most extensive and complete array of shops, 
founderies, ship-yards, mills, and docks in the country; among them a dry 
dock of granite, built at an enormous cost, and capable of the largest vessels. 
Lying at the navy yard, which was at Gosport, a little suburb of the little 



MASCII OF TUB nSGINLANS ON UASTER’8 FERRY, 9 30 T.M., AFR1L 18, 1861. 
























82 


[1861. 



town of Portsmouth, which, with the neighboring city of Norfolk, contain¬ 
ing only about fourteen thousand inhabitants, were literally kept from de¬ 
cay and death by the business thrown into their hands by the government, 
were twelve vessels of war of various sizes, from the Pennsylvania, four- 
decker, of 120 guns, to the brig Dolphin of 4. Most of them were of large 
size; and although all were more or less in need of repairs, or were not 
quite completed/only one was unfit for service. Among them was the 
sloop-of-war Cumberland, Captain Pendergrast, which was in commission as 
the flag-ship of the home squadron, and the Merrimac, a noble steam frig¬ 
ate of 40 guns, which was launched at Charlestown, Massachusetts, in 1855, 
and which, in a voyage over the world, had won universal admiration by 
her union of speed, power, and weight of metal. Both the Cumberland and 
the Merrimac were destined to play, as antagonists, a striking part in the 
coming war; the latter by affording the first example of a new system of 
naval warfare ; the former by a devotion to the flag and a stubborn resist¬ 
ance which threw the brightest halo of heroism over her destruction. In 
addition to these vessels there were in the yard nearly two thousand five 
hundred pieces of heavy ordnance, three hundred of which were Dahlgren 
guns. The quantity of small arms, ammunition, and other munitions of 
war in store here was immense; and at old Fort Norfolk, which was used 
as a magazine, were three hundred thousand pounds of powder, with shot 
and loaded shell in vast amount. The ships, docks, shops, naval stores, 
arms, and ammunition at Gosport Navy Yard and its immediate depend¬ 
encies were worth, at a moderate valuation, thirty-five millions of dollars. 
This great prize was taken without the sacrifice of a drop of blood by the 
promptness and audacity of the insurgents, and lost by the cautious, good- 
natured scruples of the government. The place was entirely without pro¬ 
tection. On the land-side, its space of many acres was inclosed only by a 
low wall, easily scaled or battered down at any point; and as to the ships, 
there were not on the spot seamen enough to man a single one of them. 
Though the station and its inyaluable contents were thus exposed to attack, 
of which, from the very accession of President Lincoln to power there had 
been constant apprehension, no measures, even of prevention, were taken for 
its preservation. The ever-present fear of exciting animosity and provoking 
attack, the never-dying hope that some way, which no one could point out, 
would be found of maintaining the national authority, without asserting it 
by force, and of restoring the Union to its normal condition with the con¬ 
sent of all its parts, prevented any attempt to retain Portsmouth and the 
navy yard securely in the hands of the government. This was openly 
avowed by a member of President Lincoln’s administration, of whose loyal¬ 
ty, and of the faithfulness of whose intentions, there can not be the slightest 
doubt. Secretary Welles, in his report to the President, submitted to Con¬ 
gress in the following July, says: “ Any attempt to withdraw the ships, or 
either of them, without a crew, would, in the then sensitive and disturbed 
condition of the public mind, have betrayed alarm and distrust, and been 
likely to cause difficulty.” 

In this timid and hesitating policy thirtv-seven priceless days were pass¬ 
ed ; and when, at last, in the words of the same officer, he became “ appre¬ 
hensive that action might be necessary,” the action taken was of little more 


effect than the inaction which it followed. Commodore M’Cauley, who was 
in command of the yard, was directed to use “ extreme vigilance and circum¬ 
spection but this vigilance and circumspection seem, by the terms of the 
order, which was dated April 10th, to have been quite as much addressed to 
the avoidance of offense to the disloyal as to the preservation of the nation’s 
property and the maintenance of the authority of the government. He was 
directed “ to put the shipping and public property in condition to be moved 
and placed beyond danger, but in doing this he was warned to take no 
steps that could give needless alarm.” What a warning, to be solemnly ad¬ 
dressed by the representative of the government of a great nation to one of 
its most important officers in such a crisis of its affairs! As at Charleston, so 
here at Portsmouth. Could the Star of the West, with her re-enforcements 
and supplies for Fort Sumter, have been promptly sent to Major Anderson, 
convoyed by the steam frigate Brooklyn, or some other sufficient naval force, 
with orders to demolish any battery that fired a gun upon the national flag, 
the revolt would almost surely have been crushed in its very birth. Strange, 
incomprehensible, that after the lesson in that quarter, and after the insur¬ 
rection had made headway by audacity on the one side and hesitation on 
the other, it was not seen that the way to save Portsmouth and its depend¬ 
encies was not to deal tenderly with disaffection, and avoid giving needless 
alarm, but to lay a frigate or two opposite the place, with orders to open fire 
with shot and shell upon the first attempt at violence 1 But matters went 
on in the same old timid way. At last the engines of the Merrimac were 
reported ready for use, and Commodore M'Cauley received orders from 
Washington to lose no time in getting her armament on board, in loading 
her, the Plymouth, the Dolphin, and the Germantown with the more valua¬ 
ble ordnance and other public property, and in putting these vessels in a 
position to be moved at any moment out of danger. The Cumberland, well 
manned and fully equipped, was placed in a position to command Ports¬ 
mouth, the navy yard, and Norfolk; and orders were issued to repel by force 
all attempts to seize vessels or any other property, by whomsoever made, or 
under whatever pretense of authority. Thus, at the very last moment, the 
government took the measures it should have taken thirty davs before. At 
the last—at the very last; for this was not done until the 17th of April, the 
day on which the Ordinance of Secession was passed in secret conclave at 
Richmond. Yet it might not have been quite too late but for another ex¬ 
hibition of that blind confidence on the one side, and that personal faithless¬ 
ness on the other, which, in the beginning of this rebellion, brought defeat 
to the government and dishonorable success to the insurgents. 

A large number of the officers under Commodore M'Cauley’s command 
were from slave states—many of them from Virginia. He was betrayed 
into trusting the loyalty, and, what is more, the personal good faith of these 
men. They were good officers, and he could not believe that they would at 
once prove false to the country and the flag of which they were the sworn 
defenders ; he could not insult them and degrade his own profession bv act¬ 
ing upon the supposition that a whole body of men would remain in a serv¬ 
ice in which they had grown up only just so long as they could use their 
positions for the purpose of deceiving him and betraying their trust; he felt 
bound to believe that if they meant to abandon the old flag they would do 







THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


S3 


1861.] 

so at once, and openly like men, and that, like men of honor, they would sed¬ 
ulously avoid an ambiguous position, which made them masters of the se¬ 
crets, and gave them measurable control over the affairs of a government 
against which, while wearing its uniform and receiving its pay, they intend¬ 
ed to fight when the time arrived. But they were not contejit with leaving 
him to these conclusions, so natural to an officer and a gentleman. They 
went to him with frequent professions of loyalty upon their lips, saying at 
one time, “ You have no Pensacola officers here, commodore; we’ll never de¬ 
sert you; we will stand by you to the last, even to the death.” 2 Yet these 
words were only uttered to lure him into fatal security, as we shall see in 
the sequel. 

The people of Norfolk, true to the feeling which, according to their own 
journal, required the removal of the bodies of the Northern physicians who 
died while ministering to them in the time of pestilence, 3 were among the 
earliest and bitterest of the secessionists in Eastern Virginia. Their streets 
were filled with murmuring and threatening. They paraded their militia 
companies, and openly declared that if the government attempted to remove 
any of the ships or the munitions of war, or the commander of the yard 
made any preparations to defend it, they would attack it instantly. The 
unreasonableness of such a threat might be a just subject of remark, were it 
not that the men who made it were thinking and acting far outside the pale 
of reason. On the night of the 16th of April a band of these people seized 
two light-ships and sunk them in the shallowest part of the entrance to the 
harbor. On the next day, it will be remembered, the very day on which 
the secret but discreetly disseminated Ordinance of Secession was passed, the 
Merrimac was ready to go to sea; but Mr.Isherwood, the engineer-in-chief, 
who had been sent expressly from Washington to expedite her prepara¬ 
tions, was surprised at receiving the order from Commodore M‘Cauley not to 
get up steam until the day after. On that day the fires were lighted, and 
again the commodore spoke doubtfully about sending the vessel out, and or¬ 
dered a delay of a few hours. A remonstrance from the engineer-in-chief, 
who directed the commodore’s attention to the urgent orders of the Navy 
Department, and the probability that the obstructions in the channel would 
be increased during the night, elicited only a tardy announcement that the 
Merrimac would not go to sea that day, and an order to draw the fires; 
whereupon the engineer started post-haste for Washington. Commodore 
M'Cauley appears, by his own admission, to have allowed his junior officers 
to persuade him that still farther delay would be most prudent. On the 
very morning, the 18th, when he issued the fatal order of procrastination, 
all of those officers who were from slave states, with one or two honorable 
exceptions, resigned their commissions; the greater part of the workmen of 
the yard absented themselves from duty; General Taliaferro, of Virginia, 
arrived at Norfolk to take command of the military forces there, and Com¬ 
modore M'Cauley’s eyes at last were opened. But they were opened only 
to see his imminent peril and his utter helplessness; to see that he could 
not save, but only destroy; and to the work of destruction he at once ad¬ 
dressed himself. lie ordered all the guns to be spiked—an enormous task. 
It was but partly performed; and of the pieces which were spiked, only a 
few were permanently injured. The 19th passed in this and like futile ef¬ 
forts to destroy the property which the commodore had concluded to aban¬ 
don. On the 20th the tumult outside the yard rose yet higher, and at 
twelve o’clock an officer was sent out bearing a flag of truce. Ho was taken 
to General Taliaferro’s quarters, where a consultation was held, the result 
of which was renewed humiliation and disgrace to the national government. 
Commodore M'Cauley promised that none of the vessels should be taken 
from the yard, or a shot fired except in self-defense. But again he decided 
to destroy what he could not remove, and he gave orders—the last which 
he issued as commander of the yard—to scuttle all the vessels except the 
Cumberland. 

Meanwhile measures were taken at Washington to supersede him in his 
command; but they proved to be too late. When the engineer-in-chief re¬ 
ported at the Navy Department the detention of the Merrimac, the secre¬ 
tary saw that the error promised to be well-nigh fatal. Captain Paulding 
was immediately dispatched to Portsmouth with the powerful steam frigate 
Pawnee, on which were placed one hundred marines in addition to her reg¬ 
ular crew, and three hundred and fifty Massachusetts volunteers, under com¬ 
mand of Colonel Wardrop, who were taken on board at Fortress Monroe. 
With this force Captain Paulding arrived at Portsmouth on the evening of 
the 20th, under instructions to take command of all the vessels at that sta¬ 
tion, to repel force by force, and prevent the ships and other property, at all 
hazards, from falling into the hands of the insurgents—most fitting orders, 
but, like all others issued by the government since the breaking out of the 
insurrection (except those in reference to Washington and Fort Pickens), 
withheld until they were of no avail; for Captain Paulding arrived at Ports¬ 
mouth only in time to see the scuttled ships settling down into the water, and 
to witness Commodore M'Cauley’s helpless condition before the now over¬ 
whelming and partly organized force of the insurgents. What might have 
been accomplished with the Cumberland, the Pawnee, and the troops in the 
latter, under such circumstances, we can not, perhaps, rightly judge. It 
seems, indeed, as if such a force, promptly and vigorously used against a 
body of men, however large, who were unprotected by works of any kind, 
and who had little artillery, and that not in position, would have held them 
completely at bay, and, if necessary, dispersed them with great slaughter, 
and with the destruction of the towns of Norfolk and Portsmouth. But 
such an exertion of the strength of the government, it seems, was not to be 


* See the Reply of Commodore M'Cauley to the censure of the Congressional Committee, pub¬ 
lished in the National Intelligencer , May 5, 1862. * See Introduction, page 14. 


put forth; and Captain Paulding used the large discretionary powers with 
which he was clothed only to make as thorough as possible the destruction 
which Commodore M'Cauley had begun. He detailed one hundred men to 
render the heavy ordnance unserviceable by knocking off the trunnions; but 
they worked for an hour with the heaviest sledges, and produced no effect. 
The dry dock, the pride of the station, was mined; combustibles were scat¬ 
tered through the scuttled ships, the ship-houses, and barracks, and trains' 
were laid through them, so that they might all be fired at once. It was 
two o’clock at night before all was reported ready, when all the force, ex¬ 
cept the few who were to light the trains, took ship on the Pawnee and the 
Cumberland. At four o’clock the former took the latter in tow and stood 
down the harbor; and at half past four, a rocket from the Pawnee gave the 
signal, and in a few minutes Gosport Navy Yard was all ablaze. The con¬ 
flagration was an awful one, as may be easily imagined. By its terrible 
splendor the country was lit up for miles around; and the roar of the 
flames, as they devoured the work of years and the wealth of a nation, was 
heard with horror far and wide. The burning of the great four-decker 
Pennsylvania, the largest ship afloat, was in itself a spectacle of destructive 
grandeur worthy of mention in the naval annals of the republic, of whose 
fate her disastrous end might, to superstitious minds, have seemed an omen, 
enhanced as its effect was by the solemn booming of her heavy guns, as the 
fire reached them, at brief intervals. 

While this ruin was going on, its huge proportions and its appalling means 
made it seem far more destructive than it really was; for when the flames 
had subsided, and the excited people, to baffle whom they were lighted, rush¬ 
ed into the yard, and began to save what could be saved, it was found that 
little harm was done except to the ship-houses and to the ships, all of which 
that were sea-worthy might have been removed from the harbor within the 
forty-eight hours previous; and even of these, two, the Plymouth and the 
Merrimac, were afterward raised and made serviceable. But the dry dock, 
all the various founderies and shops, the ordnance buildings, the tools, pro¬ 
visions, and officers’ quarters, were but little injured, and were almost imme¬ 
diately put in use for the manufacture of arms, shot, and shell, and all the 
other military and naval purposes to which such a large establishment was 
adapted. Fort Norfolk, with its immense stores of powder, was taken with¬ 
out resistance. From the whole North there went up a cry of mingled grief 
and wrath at this great loss. The importance of the station for the naval 
purposes of the government in the coming struggle, and, no less,'of the James 
River, the control of which was by this event virtually lost as an avenue of 
approach to the interior, and the immense value of the ships and stores 
which had been destroyed or given up, were instantly appreciated by the 
country. But the real significance of the capture was in the enormous quan¬ 
tity of heavy ordnance, which was not only lost by the government, but 
gained by the rebels. A capture of any thing like its importance in this re¬ 
spect is not recorded in history. As far as regarded heavy artillery, it vir¬ 
tually amounted to the disarming of one side and the arming of the other; 
and, combined with the various seizures which have already been enumer¬ 
ated, it chiefly contributed to produce the result, as we shall see, of an in¬ 
comparable superiority in arms, on the part of the insurgents, upon the be¬ 
ginning of actual hostilities. We are not left without their own testimony 
upon this point. Mr. Peters, a commissioner of the State of Virginia, ap¬ 
pointed to take an inventory of the property thus abandoned by the United 
States and seized by the insurgents, says, in a report published in the Rich¬ 
mond. Enquirer of February 4th, 1862: 11 1 had purposed some remarks upon 
the vast importance to Virginia, and to the entire South, of the timely acqui¬ 
sition of this extensive naval depot, with its immense supplies of munitions 
of war, and to notice briefly the damaging effects of its loss to the govern¬ 
ment at Washington; but I deem it unnecessary, since the presence at al¬ 
most every exposed point on the whole Southern coast, and at numerous in¬ 
land intrenched camps in the several states, of heavy pieces of ordnance, 
with their equipments and fixed ammunition, all supplied from this estab¬ 
lishment, fully attests the one, while the unwillingness of the enemy to at¬ 
tempt demonstrations at any point, from which he is obviously deterred by 
the knowledge of its well-fortified condition, abundant!}' proves the other, 
especially when it is considered that both he and we are wholly indebted for 
our means of resistance to his loss and our acquisition of the Gosport Navy 
Yard.” 4 * * * * * 

Within forty-eight hours after Commodore M'Cauley’s agreement with 
General Taliaferro, troops from Virginia and from Georgia, to the number of 
a thousand men, with fourteen pieces of rifled cannon, had been added to the 
force already at Portsmouth and Norfolk, and the hull of the old frigate 
United States had been sunk in the narrowest part of the entrance to the 
harbor, within easy range of Forts Calhoun and Monroe, which guard the 
approach; and thus the insurgents were placed in complete possession of 
this important station, where they remained unmolested many months, while 
they successfully planned and executed enterprises which had an important 
influence upon the progress of the war. 

Leaving the rebels now virtually masters of the Gulf states and the east¬ 
ern slopes of the Alleghanies south of the Potomac, we must look north¬ 
ward upon scenes not less exciting and far more encouraging to those whose 
interest was bound up in the fortunes of the great republic. We have seen 

4 The authority for this account of the destruction of Harper’s Fern* and the Portsmouth Navy 

Yard will be found in the Richmond and New York newspapers of the day, in the Virginia cor¬ 

respondence of Harpers' Weekly of May 11th, 1861, in the Report of the Select Committee of the 

Senate for investigating the Facts relative to the Loss of the Navy Yard, etc., submitted by Mr. Hale, 

of New Hampshire, April 18,1862, and the Reply of Commodore M'Cauley to the censure of the 

Congressional Committee, published in the Washington National Inldliycnccr , May 6, 1862. 









84 


that among the troops vainly brought by Commodore Paulding to the de¬ 
fense of Portsmouth Navy Yard was part of a Massachusetts regiment, which 
he took on board at Fortress Monroe. This was on the 19th of April. The 
President’s proclamation was issued only on the 15th. The presence of a 
regiment of citizen soldiers at a point five hundred miles from their home's 
in less than four days from the time when the government called for their 
services, is an event characteristic of th’e temper of the people of the North 
at this turning point of the existence of the Union. The President’s war 
proclamation, and the event which called it forth, had stirred the whole 
North not only to the liveliest exhibition of feeling, but to prompt and vig¬ 
orous action. From the Atlantic shore to the banks of the Mississippi there 
was a generous rivalry of effort for the triumph of the republic over those 
who sought its destruction. The state authorities, the town councils, the pub¬ 
lic moneyed institutions, all addressed themselves to the task of providing 
men and money for the great emergency. Citizens formed themselves into 
Union, relief, and vigilance committees. Money was subscribed on all sides 
with a free hand, and volunteers came forward in eager throngs. Within a 
fortnight of the bombardment of Fort Sumter over thirty millions of dollars 
had been given at the North as a free gift in aid of the war from various 
quarters, public and private. New York was asked for 17,000 men for three 
months; the Legislature authorized 30,000 for two years, and a war loan 
of $3,000,000. Pennsylvania and Ohio each appropriated an equal sum. 
The city of New York alone voted $1,000,000 for the same purpose, and the 
sum was instantly advanced by the banks. The spirit of New York was 
but the spirit of the country. The West was not behind the East. The 
state of Indiana voted a million dollars; and Maine, Vermont, and New Jer¬ 
sey did the same. Foremost among the vast multitude which thus sprang 
forward to the support of the national cause and the principles of consti¬ 
tutional liberty were the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
The proclamation had found her citizens and her authorities not unpre¬ 
pared. The inevitable conflict had been more clearly foreseen there than 
in any other part of the country north of the Potomac; and it was looked 
for with the inflexible determination to meet it without swerving or hesita¬ 
tion. Aside from the patriotism, the diffused intelligence, and the hatred 
of slavery for which the people of Massachusetts had been distinguished 
from the earliest days of colonial history, there were particular reasons for 
their ardor and alacrity at this crisis; for the insurrection had broken out 
and was for a long time openly sustained only in South Carolina; and from 
South Carolina Massachusetts had twice received insult and outrage: first, 
when, on sending, in 1844, by vote of her Legislature, Judge Hoar, of her 
Supreme Court, as a commissioner to Charleston, to make respectful in¬ 
quiry as to the reasons for imprisoning certain of her negro residents on 
their arrival at that port in ships, for the purpose of testing the constitu¬ 
tional right of such action before the Supreme Court of the United States, 
her representative was not even allowed to state the object of his mission, 
and, though accompanied by his daughter, was driven out of the city with 
threats of violence if he ventured to remain; next, when, in 1855, Pres¬ 
ton Brooks, member of the House of Representatives from South Carolina, 
aided and abetted by his colleague, Lawrence Keitt, attacked in the Senate 
Chamber, and beat senseless Charles Sumner, senator from Massachusetts. 
These injuries had ever rankled deeply in the breasts of Massachusetts men; 
and now, upon this great and fit occasion, the long-smothered flames of a 
righteous vengeance—if righteous other than almighty vengeance can ever 
be—burst forth on all sides with a fury which had been for years accumu¬ 
lating. To confound for a moment the feeling which thus exhibited itself 
with personal hatred and vindictiveness would be to degrade that which 
was high and almost holy. It was wrath, but wrath the spring of which was 
not self, but country: it was no petty personal resentment of an affront of¬ 
fered to the citizen in his representative, but a vindication of the dignity 
of an ancient and honorable commonwealth; not even the mere execution 
of retributive justice, but the burning desire of the most intelligent and right- 
minded body of freemen in the world to crush forever a power which they 
had had peculiar reason to feel was animated by a deadly and an undying 
hatred to liberty and the vital principles of Christianity, and bent on waging 
savage and remorseless war upon them and their advocates and supporters 
when they opposed its perpetuation and aggrandizement. And this senti¬ 
ment, hard-tempered in the flow of thoughtful years, was whetted to a keen- 
edged purpose by the stern spirit of the old Puritanism, the intolerance of 
which had not yet been quite weeded from the soil to which it had been so 
early transplanted, where it had taken such firm root and grown with such a 
hardy growth. Always earnest, always devoted to the cause of freedom, and 
the prosperity and glory of the republic, and thus goaded by the memory 
of wrongs received at the hands of the men who were now in arms for the 
dismemberment of the Union and the destruction of its government, Mas¬ 
sachusetts moved more promptly to the rescue than any other state. With¬ 
in eighteen hours after the receipt of orders, the sixth regiment of her militia, 
Colonel Edward F. Jones, was on its way, 700 strong, from its head-quarters 
at Lowell, to Boston. Early on the morning of the 18th of April, only three 
days after the President’s call for troops, it passed through New York on its 
wav to Washington, and its march along the streets of the great commercial 
capital was one continued scene of enthusiastic welcome, congratulation, and 
encouragement. Thus, on the very first occasion, the confident predictions 
of the partisans of slavery that the people of the Middle States, and particu¬ 
larly those of the city of New York, would never permit the passage over 
their soil of troops going southward to crush a revolt in the slave states, 
were falsified, and in a manner which must have added to the surprise of the 
prophets a now clearer and surer foresight of the nature of the revolt which 
they had set on foot. The Sixth Massachusetts has the honor of being the 


r 186 i. 

first regiment which mustered and marched to the defense of the capital; 
but its promptness was so successfully emulated throughout that old com¬ 
monwealth that, in less than one week from the day on which the requisition 
of the Secretary of War, which accompanied the proclamation, was received 
by telegraph, the full quota of troops assigned to the state was either in For¬ 
tress Monroe or on the way to Washington. 6 Thus it happened that within 
five days of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Commodore Paulding could 
steam into Portsmouth Harbor with a regiment of Massachusetts men ready 
to defend the navy yard. 

All the Massachusetts trtsops, however, were not to reach their destination 
so quickly or so safely. The regiment first to report for duty, and which 
we have seen marching through the city of New York amid the cheers of 
its inhabitants, was destined to meet a bloody check in Baltimore. Passing 
through Philadelphia, where it was received with welcome, and quickly dis¬ 
patched, by railway, with God-speed, it crossed, in the night, to stormier for¬ 
tune, the boundary which separated slavery from freedom, and arrived at 
the Baltimore station on the morning of the 19th. As, upon the expected 
arrival of Mr. Lincoln himself upon his way to the capital, riotous conduct 
was apprehended by the authorities of Baltimore, so, for like reasons, upon 
this occasion it was feared that the presence of Northern troops, and partic¬ 
ularly of a part of the militia of that state which was justly regarded as the 
leader in the anti-slavery movement, would excite feelings of antagonism, 
which would break forth in violence. I have before observed that the ma¬ 
jority of the people in Maryland, and particularly of those in Baltimore, 
were unswerving in their loyalty to the Constitution and the government 
of the republic—a condition of public feeling in a slave state, which is to 
be attributed less to the geographical position of this one than to the system 
of popular education, which, as the reader of the Introduction to this history 
will remember, distinguished Maryland from the other states of like social and 
political organization. But still the large number of slaves held there, and 
the close relations of the people with those of the farther South, produced a 
division of sentiment so strong that the governor was obliged to recognize it 
in the proclamation which he issued upon the President’s call for troops, and 
the mayor of Baltimore, also, in one which he issued, earnestly invoking all 
the inhabitants of that city to refrain from every act leading to outbreak or 
violence, and to render prompt assistance to the public authorities in their 
efforts to preserve the peace. 6 And here again, as always, the partisans of 
aggressive slavery were active, loud-mouthed, violent, while those who own¬ 
ed a supreme devotion to the republic were almost without exception quiet, 
orderly, unassuming people, who concerned themselves about their own af¬ 
fairs, and gave to social intercourse and intellectual culture the time which 
the others devoted to political intrigue and agitation, or to the coarser di¬ 
versions of low life in a great city notorious throughout the country for the 
almost exceptional license and lawlessness of a certain part of its inhabitants, 
who might almost be classed with the dangerous element in the populations 
of London and Paris. 

Upon the arrival of the long train containing the Massachusetts regiment 
and some other troops, which was at about ten o’clock in the morning, a 
threatening crowd quickly gathered around the station. It grew apace, and 
was plainly bent on mischief. The troops remained in the cars; and, could 
an engine have been at once attached to the train, they might have pass¬ 
ed on unmolested; but a city ordinance required that, within certain lim¬ 
its, the cars should be drawn through the streets by horses, which of course 
separated them from each other; and of this separation and slow move¬ 
ment the mob were quick to take advantage. Threats and curses had 
been heaped upon the militia from their first appearance; but words were 
soon accompanied by deeds. The horses were seized, impediments were 
thrown upon the track, and at last the cars were pelted with paving-stones. 
The police, though in considerable force, were either in such insufficient 
numbers or so lukewarm in their duty (perhaps both conditions may be 
assumed) that the riot met no check ; but the drivers whipped up their 
horses—the momentum of the cars was too great for the crowd to withstand 
—and in this manner nine of the eleven cars occupied by the Massachusetts 
regiment pushed through, and escaped with their freight of quiet, unresist¬ 
ing soldiers. But the mob increased in activity and daring as well as in 
numbers; some heavy anchors near by were dragged up and thrown across 
the track; and the movement of the last two cars, which contained four com¬ 
panies, became so difficult, and their situation so dangerous, that it was de¬ 
termined that the men should alight and march to the Washington station. 
They filed out of the cars and formed amid howls of defiance and derision, 
mingled with cheers for the South, for Jefferson Davis, for South Carolina 
and Secession, and groans for Massachusetts and the President of the United 
States, under the name of Abe Lincoln. The colonel of the regiment was 
with the companies in the advance; and the officers of those thus left be¬ 
hind, holding a hurried consultation, devolved the command of their detach¬ 
ment upon Captain Albert S. Follansbee, of Lowell. He wheeled his men 
into column, and began the march in close order. Stones, bricks, and ev¬ 
ery missile at hand soon flew thick and fast, and men armed with pistols and 
muskets began to appear in the ever-increasing mob. To that which had 
gathered immediately around the station another now was added. A large 
and tumultuous crowd, headed by the insurgent flag, rushed down the street 
in face of the troops, shouting to them to turn back, and threatening death 
to every “ white nigger” of them who should attempt to reach the other sta¬ 
tion. But Captain Follansbee, calling upon the police to lead the way, he 
and his little band kept on their march, steady and unresisting. They had 


* Message of Governor Andrew to the Legislature of Massachusetts. 

‘ Proclamation of George William Brown, mayor of Baltimore, April 17th, 1861. 





FIRST BLOOD.—THE SIXTH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT FIGHTING TIIEIR WAY THROUGH BALTIMORE, ABRIL 19, 1861. 


1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


85 





















































































































































































86 


gone but a short distance when their progress was retarded and their lines 
broken by a small bridge, from which the mob had torn up the planks; but 
the soldiers jumped from timber to timber, and got over, though in confusion. 
Many of them had by this time been severely hurt, and now two were struck 
down and effectually put hors de combat by missiles, which came thicker and 
faster than ever. A shot was at hist fired into their ranks, and Captain Fol- 
lansbee, thinking that the assault had been borne long enough, ordered bis 
men to cap their pieces and defend themselves. The order was instantly 
obeyed, and with deadly effect; but the fire was returned from guns and pis¬ 
tols as well as with paving-stones. The Mayor of Baltimore now placed him¬ 
self at the head of the little column, and endeavored to restrain the rioters by 
a bold exertion of his authority; but the protection which the municipal pow¬ 
er of Baltimore had often before failed to afford to its own citizens it could 
not extend to strangers under these strange circumstances. The mayor’s 
efforts proved futile, his position became dangerous, and he retired baffled, 
though not dismayed. The mob had now become a vast surging mass of in¬ 
furiated men. Its numbers were estimated at from eight to ten thousand; 
but it has been found that in such conjectures numbers are usually exagger¬ 
ated to three times the truth, and this case was not at all likely to be an ex¬ 
ception to the rule. Yet it may be safely assumed that the Massachusetts 
men, who were little more than one hundred strong (the entire body consist¬ 
ed of eight hundred and sixty, rank and file), were now making their way 
through three thousand rioters. They kept together, however, in close 
ranks, opposing obedience and endurance to lawlessness and fury, wheeling 
upon their assailants and firing only when the attack became too severe to 
be borne without resistance; and in this manner they fought their way, with 
patient valor, one mile through the raging throng to the Washington sta¬ 
tion. But they had not yet escaped the perils of Baltimore. They and the 
rest of the regiment which had preceded them were enabled, indeed, by the 
exertions of the police and by their own large and well-armed numbers, to 
take the Washington cars, and the train was detained for some time, in 
hopes that the mob would now disperse; but it still increased, and, as it 
dared not face the muskets of a whole regiment, it turned its energies to the 
destruction of the train. The crowd dashed off upon the track in such 
numbers that, in the words of an eyewitness, for a mile it was black with 
an excited, rushing mass. Great logs and telegraph-poles, which required a 
dozen men to move them, were now thrown upon the rails, and rocks were 
rolled down upon the track from the embankment. Attempts were made 
to tear up the rails, and a cry was raised for pickaxes and crowbars; but 
only one or two could be found so suddenly. The police, now in large 
force, went forward and removed the obstructions, and the train, under a 
discharge of revolvers and stones, steamed slowly after; but the mob kept 
ahead of the police, continuing its destructive efforts. This dreadful scene 
covered a space of a mile and more; and the exertions, though not the fury 
of the rioters, ceased only from physical exhaustion. At last the track was 
clear; and the citizen soldiers, who had so promptly obeyed the orders of 
the elected chief magistrate of the nation, were borne swiftly beyond reach 
of their infuriated countrymen to the defense of their common capital. 

At the same time with the Massachusetts regiment, upon the same road, 

and with the same destination, ar¬ 
rived ten companies of Pennsylvania 
militia. They were unarmed as well 
as ununiformed. But their helpless 
condition and their civil garb failed 
alike to protect them against the ex¬ 
cited passions of the mob. Incapa¬ 
ble of any effectual defense, they re¬ 
mained quietly in their cars, and 
were there stoned unmercifully for 
two hours. The sides of the cars 
afforded them protection : but many 
missiles went through the windows 
and inflicted serious bruises. Some 
attempted to escape; but they were 
attacked furiously, and obliged either 
to return to the cars or seek refuge 
in neighboring houses. After a time, 
the police, aided, it is said, by George 
P. Kane, United States marshal of 
that district, and some bold and loy¬ 
al citizens, succeeded in partly quiet¬ 
ing the tumult, and the Philadelphia 
troops were protected from farther 
injury, but were obliged to abandon 
their journey, and return as they 
came to Philadelphia. Two cars of 
baggage and munitions, which had 
been seized by the mob, were also rescued by the police. 

In this deplorable and disgraceful affair, by which the pro-slavery faction 
of Baltimore gained the bad distinction of spilling the first blood shed in 
the great rebellion, at least thirty-nine men, according to the most trust¬ 
worthy reports, were killed and wounded, in addition to the larger number 
who received unreckoned injuries more or less serious. Of the thirty-nine, 
eight rioters, one unoffending citizen, and two soldiers were killed outright, 
and three rioters and twenty-five soldiers were wounded, one of the last mor¬ 
tally. The three men who thus first gave up their lives in the cause of lib¬ 
erty and the republic were Sumner H. Needham, of Lawrence, and Addison 
0. Whitney and Luther 0. Ladd, of Lowell. Their names will ever live in 


the memory of their countrymen. 1 In Massachusetts their fate and that of 
their wounded comrades excited a profound emotion, in which grief and in¬ 
dignation were tempered, though not abated, by a certain pride that this no¬ 
ble old commonwealth had been the first to offer the blood of her citizens in 
the defense of the liberties of the country, as she had also been the first to 
make the same sacrifice in the struggle by which those liberties were won. 
By a strange, and, it was fondly thought, a significant coincidence, it hap¬ 
pened that the same day of the same month saw the sacrifice on both occa¬ 
sions. The skirmish at Lexington in 1775 and the street-fight at Baltimore, 
eighty-six years afterward, both occurred on the 19th of April. A corre¬ 
spondence by telegraph immediately took place between the Governor of 
Massachusetts and the Mayor of Baltimore as to the disposition of the bodies 
of the dead Massachusetts soldiers and the care for the wounded. On both 
sides it was touching and earnest; on both it showed state pride; but only 
on one, the Southern, that pernicious feeling of state independence, as if the 
state were something outside of rather than within the republic, which not 
even the solemnity of the occasion could repress, and which, no less than the 
fear for the life of slavery, was the cause of the struggle the first blood in 
which had been thus ominously shed. The one put forward the passage of 
armed troops of another state over the soil of his own as a palliation of the 
onslaught, if not an excuse for it; the other, though at the head of one of the 
oldest and most honorable commonwealths of the Union, and the one which 
had originally possessed and exercised the nearest approach to sovereignty, 
saw in the troops which he had sent and in any state over which they pass¬ 
ed only the citizen soldiers and the common soil of the republic. 6 

Not in Massachusetts alone, however, did this attack upon the Massachu¬ 
setts militia incense the people. The whole North burned with fierce re¬ 
sentment. Had the spirit which then animated the inhabitants of the free 
states, and even those of Kentucky and Missouri, who did not place the in¬ 
terests of slavery above those of the country, continued through the war, 
that lack of vindictiveness in them, which was publicly noticed by more than 
one observer and on more than one occiision, would not have softened the 
asperities and prolonged the continuance of the struggle. 9 The very advo¬ 
cates of slavery and apologists of the South, who were so numerous in the 
North, were profoundly moved at this flagitious attempt to stay the peace¬ 
ful march of citizen soldiers through one of the United States at the com¬ 
mand of the chief magistrate of them all. The demand that Baltimore 
should be humbled, and, if necessary to the opening of a safe highway to 
Washington, destroyed, was on every lip. Men whose interests and whose 
family connections were not only at the South, but in South Carolina, de¬ 
clared that, in this respect at least, the majesty of the nation should be as¬ 
serted, and old black Federal cockades, exhumed from recesses where they 
had long been left in oblivion, began to appear on the breasts and hats of 
men whose blood boiled at the outrage upon the republic, but who were the 
very Gallios of slavery. Those who before sneered at the story of the at¬ 
tempt to assassinate Mr. Lincoln now believed it; the city which was the 
scene of the intended crime and of that actually committed was looked upon 
as an offense to the nation, and the cry, Through Baltimore or over it, went 
up over the whole Northern country. There was reason in the demand, 
and honor and justice, though not charity, in the feeling. The road to 
Washington lay through Baltimore; the people of Maryland had not even 
attempted to throw off the authority of the government at the former place; 
and that there was any aggression in the mere passage of their fellow-citi¬ 
zens through their chief town upon the order of their common government 
could not be for a moment pretended. No semblance of a defense was set 
up for them, except that strong municipal pride which causes the inhabitants 
of one place to resent the assertion of authority over them by the armed 
forces of another—an excellent plea in extenuation, if it were pertinent; but 
in this case it was entirely from the purpose. The Massachusetts men were 
in Baltimore, not to assert any authority there, not for the purpose of estab¬ 
lishing relations of any kind with its people; they were merely travel¬ 
ers; and it was so plain as to need no demonstration that the passions of 


7 This account of the Baltimore riot is based upon a published letter of Captain Follansbee, and 
the reports of the affair in the Baltimore newspapers, and in the correspondence of those of New 
York. 

8 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE MAYOR OF 

BALTIMORE. 

Governor Andrew to Mayor Brown. 

I pray you cause the bodies of our Massachusetts soldiers, dead in battle, to be immediately laid 
out, preserved in ice, and tenderly sent forward by express to me. All expenses will be paid by 
this commonwealth. John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts. 

Mayor Brown to Governor Andrew. 

_ L „ _ . . . . _ , „ Baltimore, April 20,1861. 

The Hon. John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts : 

Sir,— No one deplores the sad events of yesterday in this city more deeply than myself, but they 
were inevitable. Our people viewed the passage of armed troops to another state through the 
streets as an invasion of our soil, and could not be restrained. The authorities exerted themselves 
to the best of their ability, but with only partial success. Governor Hicks was present, and con¬ 
curs in all my views as to the proceedings now necessary for our protection. When are these 
scenes to cease ? Arc we to have a war of sections? God forbid. The bodies of the Massachu¬ 
setts soldiers could not be sent out to Boston, as you requested, all communication between this 
city and Philadelphia by railroad, and with Boston by steamers, having ceased ; but thev have 
been placed in cemented coffins, and will be placed with proper funeral ceremonies in the mauso¬ 
leum of Greenmount Cemetery, where they shall lie retained until farther directions are received 
from yon. The wounded are tenderly enred for. 1 appreciate your offer, but Baltimore will claim 
it as her right to pay all expenses incurred. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Geo. W. Brown, Mayor of Baltimore. 

Governor Andrew to Mayor Brown. 

To his Honor George W. Brown, Mayor of Baltimore: 

Dear Sir,—I appreciate your kind attention to our wounded and our dead, and trust that at 
the earliest moment the remains of onr fallen will return to us. I am overwhelmed with surprise 
that a peaceful march of American citizens over the highway to the defense of our common capital 
should be deemed aggressive to Baltimoreans. Through New York the march was triumphal. 

John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts. 

* See particularly a speech delivered by the Hon. Joseph Holt, in New York, September 8d, 
1861, and the letters of the special correspondent of the London Tima. 










1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


87 


the mob which attacked them were excited, not by any feeling of municipal 
pride, but by sympathy with the cause the suppression of which was the ob¬ 
ject of their journey. The New England men were going to sustain a gov¬ 
ernment which the rioters hated because it had fallen under New England 
influence. Their object clearly was the obstruction of the Northern road to 
the capital until it could be seized and held by the insurgent army. 10 In this 
they were foiled by circumstances and the'steadiness of the Northern troops. 

The Massachusetts militia had escaped to Washington, the Pennsylvanians 
to Philadelphia; but the rioters did not abandon their designs. They were 
practically masters of Baltimore. Gun-shops and other stores of arms were 
broken open and pillaged. Places of business were generally closed. A 
public meeting was called for the afternoon, and the militia of the city were 
placed under arms. The preservation of public order was the professed, 
and, indeed, the actual object of these latter measures; but so strong, and 
so apparently pervading was the animosity excited by the events of the 
day, that the municipal and state officers were obliged to seek peace and 
quiet, not by the assertion and maintenance of the local law and the rights 
of the national government, but by placing themselves at the head of the 
insurgents, and giving to their purposes the sanction of constituted authori¬ 
ty. This may have been a wise policy. It is by no means certain that if 
they had directly opposed the turbulent stream of excited popular feeling 
they would not have been swept away by it, or that, by yielding to and go¬ 
ing with it for a while, they did not acquire an influence which enabled them 
to divert its current. And although events took place in the disturbed city 
within a few weeks, and in the state within a few months, which justify the 
belief that the excitement in Baltimore was produced by the sfforts of a com¬ 
paratively small, though energetic and desperate faction, the conclusion is not 
therefore warranted that the course of the mayor and the governor was not 
the wisest (it seems certainly to have been the most politic) that could have 
been pursued. On the afternoon of the collision the Mayor of Baltimore 
sent a telegraphic dispatch, and on the next morning, by special train, a dep¬ 
utation of three eminent citizens, to the President, imploring him neither to 
order nor to permit more troops to pass through the city, and assuring him 
that no more could go through without fighting their way at every step. 
Governor Hicks, whose sincere loyalty to the Constitution and supreme de¬ 
votion to the republic there is no reason to doubt, united with him in this 
request. The President replied instantly, and with tender consideration for 
the distracting position of his petitioners; and, on the suggestion of General 
Scott, he assured them that, although troops must continue to come from the 
North to Washington, they should thenceforward march round Baltimore in¬ 
stead of through it, that thus the people of that city might not find rebellion 
lying in their way, but be compelled to seek it. * 1 But it is sad to relate, and 
it is a most significant evidence of the condition of excitement into which 


10 Extract from a Message of Mayor Brown to the City Council of Baltimore, July 10th, 1861. 

After recapitulating the occurrences of the 19th of April last, in which he agrees with Marshal 
Kane’s account of the affair published on May 4, lie says: 

It is doing bare justice to say that the Board of Police, the Marshal of Police, and the men un¬ 
der his command, exerted themselves bravely, efficiently, skillfully, and in good faith, to preserve 
the peace and protect life. If proper notice had been given of the arrival of the troops, and of the 
number expected, the outbreak might have been prevented entirely ; and but for the timely arrival 
of Marshal Kane with his force, as I have described, the bloodshed would have been great. The 
wounded among the troops received the best care and medical attention at the expense of the city, 
and the bodies of the killed were carefully and respectfully returned to their friends. The facts 
which I witnessed myself, and all that I have since heard, satisfied me that the attack w r as the 
result of a sudden impulse, and not of a premeditated scheme. But the effect on our citizens was 
for a time uncontrollable. In the intense excitement which ensued, which lasted for many days, 
and which was shared by men of all parties, and by our volunteer soldiers as well as citizens, it 
would have been impossible to convey more troops from the North through the city without a se¬ 
vere fight and bloodshed. Such an occurrence would have been fatal to the city; and, accord¬ 
ingly, to prevent it, the bridges on the Northern Central Railroad, and on the Philadelphia, Wil¬ 
mington, and Baltimore Railroad, were, with the consent of the governor, and by my order, with 
the co-operation of the Board of Police—except Mr. Charles I). Hinks, who was absent from the 
city—partially disabled and burned, so as to prevent the immediate approach of troops to the city, 
but with no purpose of hostility to the federal government. This act, with the motive which 
prompted it, has been reported by the Board of Police to the Legislature of the state, and approved 
bv that body, and was also immediately communicated by me in person to the President of the 
United States and his cabinet. 

Dispatch of Secretary Cameron to Governor Hicks. 

War Department, Washington, April 18,1861. 

To his Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland : 

Sir, _The President is informed that threats are made and measures taken, by unlawful com¬ 

binations of misguided citizens of Maryland, to prevent by force the transit of United States 
troops across Maryland, on their way, pursuant to orders, for the defense of this capital. The in¬ 
formation is from such sources, and in such shapes, that the President thinks it his duty to make 
it known to you, so that all loyal and patriotic citizens of our state may be warned in time, and 
that you mav be prepared to take immediate and effective measures against it. 

Such an attempt could have only the most deplorable consequences; and it would be agreeable 
to the President, as it would be to yourself, that it should be prevented or overcome by the loyal 
authorities and citizens of Maryland, rather than averted by any other means. 

I am very respectfully yours, etc., • Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 

1 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND AND THE MAYOR OF BALTIMORE 
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown to President Lincoln. 

Mayor’ll Office, Baltimore, April 19,1861. 

To his Excellency the President of the United States : 

Sir,—A collision between the citizens and the Northern troops has taken place in Baltimore, 
and the excitement is fearful. Send no more troops here. Wc will endeavor to prevent all blood¬ 
shed. 

A public meeting of citizens has been called, and the troops of the state and the city have been 
ordered out to preserve the peace. They will be enough. Respectfully, 

Tuos. H. Hicks, Governor. 
Geo. Wm. Brown, Mayor. 

Mayor’s Office, Baltimore, April 19,1861. 

To his Excellency the President of the United States : 

Sir,— This will be presented to you by the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, Geo. W. Dobbin, and John C. 
Brunc, Esqrs., who will proceed to Washington by an express train, at my request, in order to ex¬ 
plain fully the fearful condition of our affairs in this city. The people arc exasperated to the high¬ 
est degree by the passage of troops, and the citizens arc universally decided in the opinion that no 
more troops should be ordered to come. 

The authorities of the city did their best to-day to protect both strangers and citizens, and to 
prevent a collision, but in vain ; and but for their great efforts a fearful slaughter would have oc¬ 
curred. 

Under these circumstances, it is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible for more 
soldiers to pass through Baltimore unless they fight their way at every step. 


the men of the pro-slavery faction were able to throw a city which, within a 
fortnight, exhibited an entire and spontaneous reaction of sentiment, that 
the authorities themselves took steps, before the receipt of the President’s 
reply, to prevent the passage of troops from the North to the defense of 
Washington. The avenues of approach to the capital from the north and 



east available for the transportation of troops were the Northern and Cen¬ 
tral Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia and Baltimore Railways. These 
crossed several deep streams within the boundaries of Maryland, and, on the 
night of the 19th,'the bridges over them were destroyed by order of the au¬ 
thorities of Baltimore! 2 They also suspended the transmission of the mails 
and the removal of provisions from the city, and detained military stores 
and equipments belonging to the government sufficient for a thousand men. 3 


I therefore hope and trust, and most earnestly request, that no more troops be permitted or or¬ 
dered by the government to pass through the city. If they should attempt it, the responsibility for 
the bloodshed will not rest upon me. 

With great respect, your obedient servant, Geo. Wm. Brown, Mayor. 

I have been in Baltimore since Tuesday evening, and co-operated with Mayor Brown in his un¬ 
tiring efforts to allay and prevent the excitement and suppress the fearful outbreak as indicated 
above, and I fully concur in all that is said by him in the above communication. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Tiios. II. Hicks, Governor of Maryland. 


President Lincoln to Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown. 

Washington, April 20,1661. 

Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown : 

Gentlemen, —Your letter, by Messrs. Bond, Dobbin, and Brunc, is received. I tender you both 
my sincere thanks for your efforts to keep the peace in the trying situation in which you are placed. 
For the future, troops must be brought here, but I make no point of bringing them through Balti¬ 
more. 

Without any military knowledge myself, of course I must leave details to General Scott. He 
hastily said this morning, in the presence of these gentlemen, “March them around Baltimore, and 
not through it.” 

I sincerely hope the general, on fuller reflection, will consider this practical and proper, and that 
you will not object to it. 

By this a collision of the people of Baltimore with the troops will be avoided, unless they go out 
of their way to seek it. I hope you will exert-your influence to prevent this. 

Now and ever I shall do all in my power for peace, consistently with the maintenance of the 
government. Your obedient servant, Abraham Lincoln. 

The governor's agitation was not calmed, however, by the good-natured sympathy of President 
Lincoln and his readiness of concession. On the contrary, each day the disaffected people of 
Maryland became more threatening and their governor more alarmed. He now begged that no 
more troops should be sent not only through Baltimore, but through Maryland, while lie proposed, 
with a strange disregard of the dignity of the government to which he claimed to be loyal, that the 
English embassador at Washington should bo invited to mediate between the United States and 
its rebellious citizens! 

Executive Chamber, Annapolis, April 22, 1861. 

To his Excellency A. Lincoln, President of the United States : 

Sir, — I feel it my duty most respectfully to advise you that no more troops be ordered or al¬ 
lowed to pass through Maryland, and that the troops now off Annapolis be sent elsewhere; and I 
most respectfully urge that a truce be offered by you, so that the effusion of blood may be prevent¬ 
ed. I respectfully suggest that Lord Lyons be requested to act as mediutor between the contend¬ 
ing parties of our country. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Thos. H. Hicks. 

* Proclamation of the Governor of Maryland. 

Frederick, May 11,1861. 

To the People of Maryland: 

A communication from the Mayor of Baltimore to the House of Delegates, published by that 
body yesterday, is designed to implicate me in the destruction of the railroad bridges near Balti¬ 
more on the 19th ultimo; this, too, in face of the fact that I had, in a recent official communica¬ 
tion to the Senate, positively denied any complicity in the matter. If the mayor’s communication 
and accompanying certificates have induced any |>erson to doubt mv true position in the premises, 
I respectfully ask a suspension of judgment until a sufficient time be afforded me to collect the 
necessary proof, and show, as I shall be able to do most conclusively, that the destruction of the 
bridges was a part of the conspiracy of those acting against the government, and was known and 
proclaimed in other parts of the state before the destruction was consummated. Whether Mayor 
Brown did or did not know of this part of the programme, I am unable to say. I am charitable 
enough to believe that, he did not know it. His peculiar surroundings, and agitated condition of 
mind at the time referred to, may reasonably enough account for his assent to the transaction. 
But any person who knows my opinion of George P. Kane and Enoch L. Lowe will at once admit 
that I would be very slow to assent to any proposition emanating from or endorsed by them. 
Their introduction into my chamber at the late hour of the night to urge my consent to the per¬ 
petration of an unlawful act was not calculated to convince me of the propriety or necessity of that 
act. Men do not readily take counsel of their enemies. So soon as the heavy pressure upon my 
time shall have somewhat subsided, I will lay before the public a full refutation of this nefarious 
attempt to involve an innocent person in an unwarranted proceeding. Until that time I request 
a suspension of public opinion. Thomas H. Hickb. 


s Embargo at Baltimore. 

Baltimore, April 22, 1861. 

It is ordered by the Mayor and the Board of Police that no provisions of any kind be transferred 












88 


[ 1861 . 


Not only were the militia of the city and the neighborhood kept under 
arms, but volunteers were enlisted to the number of many thousand men, 
and an attack upon Fort M‘Ilenry, a national work three miles from the 
city, was openly threatened. Governor Hicks was swept along with the 
popular torrent, and on the 22d of April he sent an official advice to the 
President that no more troops should be allowed to pass, not only through 
Baltimore, but over the boundaries of Maryland; and to this unreasonable 
request he added the humiliating recommendation that the President should 
propose a truce to the insurgents, and ask the British minister at Vi ashing- 
ton to act as a mediator between them and the government. This commu¬ 
nication was of such an extraordinary nature that the President placed it in 
the hands of the Secretary of State for formal treatment. Mr. Seward, not 
lowering the government which he represented by a refusal in terms, admin¬ 
istered a dignified and considerate rebuke to Governor Hicks for both his 
proposals, which it was unmistakably, though courteously, intimated could 
not even be taken into consideration. But the secretary gave just ground 
of complaint both to the supporters of the government and to the insurgents 
by telling Governor Hicks that the troops which were coming through 
Maryland were intended for no other service than the defense of Washing¬ 
ton.* The men themselves, and those who sent and contributed to equip 
and provision them, expected that they were to be used to crush the insur¬ 
rection ; and when, not three months after, some of those very troops crossed 
into Virginia to give battle to the rebel army, the pledge of the United States 
cabinet minister to the Maryland governor appeared to have been either un¬ 
authorized or violated. But the commotion and turbulence of the distract¬ 
ed times confused so many sober minds, and deranged so many carefully- 
laid plans, that there was excuse for far graver discrepancies than this. The 
last violent demonstrations on the part of the Baltimoreans against the gov¬ 
ernment were the seizure on the 24th of Relay House, a station on the Bal¬ 
timore and Ohio Railway, which was held by six hundred picked men and 
four field-pieces, the object being to cut off the communication of Pennsyl¬ 
vania with Washington by that route; and, after the removal of about 
twenty-five hundred men, chiefly Pennsylvania militia, from Cockeysville, 
a village on the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railway, seventeen miles from 
the former place, the destruction of all the bridges except one upon that line 



BURNING OF TUB BRIDGE AT CANTON, MARTI.AND, BY THE MOB. 


within the limits of the state. Meanwhile the carriage-roads leading from 
Baltimore were thronged with vehicles filled with households and house¬ 
hold goods, seeking safety in more peaceful places. 

But although Massachusetts, by her promptitude, obtained the post of 
honor and of danger in these early days of the insurrection, the people of 

from the city of Baltimore to any point or place, from this time until farther orders, without spe¬ 
cial permission. 

The execution of this order is intrusted to Colonel I. It. Trimble. 

The following order has been issued: 

It being deemed necessary for the safety and protection of the city that no steam-boat be per¬ 
mitted to leave our harbor without the sanction of the city authorities, I herety, by authority of the 
Mayor and Board of Police, direct that no steam-boat shall leave the harbor without my permit. 

I. R. Trimble, Commanding. 

4 Secretary Seward to Governor Hicks. 

Department of State, April 22,1861. 

To hi* Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland : 

Sir, — I have had the honor to receive your communication of this morning, in which you in¬ 
form me that you have felt it to be your duty to advise the President of the United States to order 
elsewhere the troops then off Annapolis, and also that no more may be sent through Maryland, 
and that you have farther suggested that Lord Lyons be requested to act as mediator between the 
contending parties in our country, to prevent the effusion of blood. 

The President directs me to acknowledge the receipt of that communication, and to assure you 
that he has weighed the counsels which it contains with the respect which he habitually cherishes 
for the chief magistrates of the several states, and especially for yourself. He regrets, ns deeply as 
any magistrate or citizen of the country can, that demonstrations against the safety of the United 
States, with very extensive preparations for the effusion of blood, have made it his duty to call out 
the force to which you allude. 

The force now sought to be brought through Maryland is intended for nothing but the defense 
of this capital. The President has necessarily confided the choice of the national highway which 
that force shall take in coming to this city to the lieutenant general commanding the army of the 
United States, who, like his only predecessor, is not less distinguished for his humanity than for 
his loyalty, patriotism, and distinguished public service. 

The President instructs me to add that the national highway thus selected by the lieutenant gen¬ 
eral has been chosen by him, upon consultation with prominent magistrates and citizens of Mary¬ 
land, as the one which, while a route is absolutely necessary, is farthest removed from the populous 
cities of the state, and with the expectation that it would, therefore, be the least objectionable one. 

The President can not but remember that there has been a time in the history of our country 
when a general of the American Union, with forces designed for the defense of its capital, was not 
unwelcome any where in the State of Maryland, and certainly not at Annapolis, then, as now, the 
capital of that patriotic state, and then* also, one of the capitals of the Union. 

If eighty years could have obliterated nil the other nobler sentiments of that age in Maryland, 
the President would be hopeful, nevertheless, that there is one that would forever remain there 
and every where. That sentiment is that no domestic contention whatever that may arise among 
the parties of this republic ought in any case to be referred to any foreign arbitrament, least of all 
to the arbitrament of a European monarchy. 

I have the honor to be, with distinguished consideration, your excellency’s most obedient serv¬ 
ant, William H. Seward. 


the other loyal states were no laggards, and those of New York strove with 
their brethren of the East in noble emulation. The annals of these days 
can not be silent upon the march of the New York Seventh Regiment, “ Na¬ 
tional Guard,” to Washington, without passing over some of their most in¬ 
teresting incidents. This regiment, which for two generations had repre¬ 
sented, more than any other body of militia, the higher social and intellect¬ 
ual culture of the great commercial metropolis, had early attained and stead¬ 
ily preserved an equal distinction in drill and in discipline. And, unlike 
the other regiments of the same city, its service had not been entirely con¬ 
fined to encountering the perils of Broadway upon parade-days, between 
the Battery and Union Square. It had been called into service at the time 
of the Astor Place Riot, on which occasion, after having distinguished itself 
for hours in the face of the mob by the preservation of discipline, and the 
patient and even good-natured endurance of injuries from showers of paving- 
stones, it had obeyed promptly the command to fire, and by three compact 
and well-delivered volleys had put an end forever to riots in New York. 
The imbecility of the city government, which needlessly allowed this dis¬ 
turbance to grow to such a terrible issue, could bring no reproach upon the 
body of citizen soldiers who bore the brunt of it so manfully, and ended it 
so effectually. At another time, when Fernando Wood, the same mayor of 
New York whom we have seen so ready to meet the demands of the insur¬ 
gents of Georgia for their arms, and to follow their example by proposing a 
secession of the city from the state, forcibly resisted the execution of the 
Metropolitan Police Law, which secured peace and order to the city and 
the surrounding district by removing its police from the influence of par¬ 
ty politics, this regiment exhibited its esprit de corps and its discipline by 
twice instantly facing about to meet the requirements of the Police Commis- 
sionefs, though at the apparent loss of formal and long-prepared festivities 
in honor of the regiment by the citizens of Boston, to join in which it was 
on its march at the receipt of the order; and such was the reliance upon 
this body of men, that although, at the time of the second order, it was in 
Boston, and there were several other regiments in New York, it was sum¬ 
moned by telegraph from the former city. Its reputation, like its name, was 
national, and, in fact, had extended across the ocean. The whole division, 
of which this regiment formed a part, had been placed at the service of the 
government by its major general at a time when there was yet hope that an 
appeal to arms might be avoided; and now, when the seat of the national 
government was in hourly peril, the Seventh at once stepped forward to as¬ 
sume a three months’ service, and to go immediately on to Washington. 
The announcement that it was going begat a sort of confidence in those 
days, when, dark and gloomy though they were, the nature, the extent, and 
the duration of the coming conflict was entirely unforeseen. It was felt that 
the presence of the regiment in Washington, in support of the handful of 
regular troops assembled there, would deter any attack not more formidable 
and thoroughly organized than the insurgents were supposed to have pre¬ 
pared. The excited patriotic feeling of the city concentrated for the mo¬ 
ment upon the movements of this regiment; during the two or three days 
of preparation an eager throng surrounded its head-quarters, where recently- 
recruited members, young men of fortune and fashion, and the highest edu¬ 
cation, were drilling day and night to attain such proficiency as would ad¬ 
mit them as privates to the ranks upon the projected expedition. It was on 
the 19th of April that the Seventh set out for Washington. Its departure 
from the armory had been delayed for some hours, and meantime the news 
had come on by telegraph of the attack upon the Massachusetts men in Bal¬ 
timore. It flew through the city, quickening general apprehension, deepen¬ 
ing the general gloom, and stimulating the military ardor of the departing 
soldiers by the spur of emulation and the hope of distinction. The whole 
city seemed to pour out its population upon the line of march and the point 
of embarkation of this specially favored corps. The ranks were full, and 
more than full; never upon a gala-day had they shown more muskets. The 
moment of departure at last arrived. Pale with suppressed excitement, the 
peace-bred soldiers heard the command which ordered them to begin theii 
march toward the enemy; a thousand feet with steady tread at once respond¬ 
ed, and the regiment moved swiftly onward. Decked in no holiday garb, but 
grimly panoplied in gray and steel, with its colonel marching at its head, its 
serried files wheeled into the great thoroughfare in which its fine discipline 
and soldierly bearing had so often been objects of admiring comment; and 
there a spectacle met the eye never seen before in this country, without a 
doubt never to be seen again. For the occasion gave it its peculiar charac¬ 
ter. Broadway had been before as crowded (for what is full can not be 
fuller), but never with a throng so animated, so admiring, so solicitous, so 
self-sacrificing. The great artery of New York life throbbed and palpitated 
throughout its length with the big emotions of the public heart. As the 
head of the column appeared, a shout burst forth that flashed like the fire 
of a feu-de-joie from lip to lip along the line of march, advancing before the 
regiment and following after, and never ceasing or dying away while a 
musket remained in sight. Not a cheer, or a succession of cheers, but a 
great cry that went up continuously to heaven, and bore up with it the un¬ 
speakable aspirations of the vast multitude. The sound fell strangely and 
never to be forgotten upon the ears of all within its reach, for in its tone 
there was a wild and plaintive yearning which they had never heard be¬ 
fore. The Seventh began its service by a march through two miles of such 
a crowd, uttering ceaseless encouragement and benediction. Thus the great 
city gave up the flower of its young men freely to the country’s cause; 
though, as their bayonets passed out of sight, they flashed the rays of the 
setting sun on manly eyes all dim with unaccustomed moisture. New York 
saw in after times hundreds of thousands of brave men march through her 
streets on like errands and to bloodier business, and gave them all a hearty 







THE SEVENTH REGIMENT MARCHING DOWN BROADWAY TO EMBARK FOR THE WAR. 


1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


89 




























































90 


welcome and God-speed; the Seventh itself was cheered and petted by the 
whole country through which it passed on its way to Washington; but this 
was the firsts and they were felt (though perhaps partially) to be the best; 
and neither the men who went nor the people who sent them ever knew 
again the chivalrous enthusiasm of that day, the tender, solemn rapture of 
that parting. 

It was not until six days afterward that the Guard reached Washington; 
but it will be well to follow them directly to their destination, for their 
progress thither was immediately involved with some of the many signifi¬ 
cant occurrences which throng so thickly along this eventful period. They 
passed swiftly upon the railway through New Jersey, a state which has the 
reputation of being somewhat sluggish in its sympathies, and yet its people 
poured -out along the track in such numbers, that one member of the regi¬ 
ment, who gave an account of its march, said that he “ did not see a rod of 
ground without its man from dusk till dawn, from the Hudson to the Dela¬ 
ware.” 5 Philadelphia welcomed their coming, but could not speed their part¬ 
ing. All communication by railway between that city and Baltimore was 
effectually cut off before they reached it on the 20th ; and for many hours 
they trod with fretful steps the formal streets of the hospitable town, which 
was but to them a station on the road to Baltimore. At last, all other modes 
of transportation proving hopeless, a steam-boat was chartered, and they 
started for Washington by way, not of Baltimore, but of Annapolis, the old 
and drowsy capital of Maryland. In taking this step their colonel (Marshall 
Lefferts) followed the lead of a man whose position and peculiar talents ob¬ 
tained for him a singular prominence in the drama to which the events 
which have been thus far recounted were but a prelude. 

General Butler, an eminent member of the bar, and an officer of the mili¬ 
tia of Massachusetts, had been placed by Governor Andrew in command of 
the Massachusetts regiments which were sent as part of the contingent of 
that state, under the President’s proclamation, to the relief of Washington. 
He was a Democrat of the straitest sect, an active and life-long supporter of 
the party which for years had ruled the country by its alliance with the 
slaveholders of the South. He had been a member of the presidential nom¬ 
inating convention which met at Charleston ; and he had given his hearty 
support, during the subsequent canvass, to Mr. Breckinridge, the candidate 
of the extreme slavery faction. But secession had opened his never very 
closely shut eyes to the policy of the men who ruled that convention, and 
he had declared at once and with the earnestness of a whole-hearted nature 
for the nation against his late political associates. In this he was a repre¬ 
sentative man, and his appearance in the service of the republic against the 
insurgents had for them and for the country at large a very great signifi¬ 
cance. It told more unmistakably, perhaps, than any other single event 
which had taken place, the supreme devotion of the people of the free states 
to the Union. The presence of such a man at the head of a brigade of Mas¬ 
sachusetts troops on the march to put down the slaveholders’ insurrection, 


• Major Theodore Winthrop, in the Atlantic Monthly for June, 1861. 

• General Butler to Governor Hicks. 

Off Annapolis, April 22,1861. 

To his Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland 

In reply to the communication from you on the 21st, I had the honor to inform you of the ne¬ 
cessities of my command, which drew me into the harbor of Annapolis. My circumstances have 
not changed. To that communication I have received no reply. I can not return, if I desire so 
to do, without being furnished with some necessary supplies, for all which the money will be paid. 
I desire of your excellency an immediate reply whether I have the permission of the state au¬ 
thorities of Maryland to land the men under my command, and of passing quickly through the 
state on my way to Washington, respecting private property and paying for what I receive, and 
outraging the rights of none—a duty which I am bound to do in obedience to the requisitions of 
the President of the United States. 

I have received some copies of an informal correspondence between the Mayor of Baltimore 
and the President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and a copy of a note from your excellency, 
inclosing the same to Captain Blake, commandant of the Naval School. These purport to show 
that instructions have been issued by the War Department as to the disposition of the United 
States militia, differing from what I had supposed to be my duty. If these instructions have been 
in fact issued, it would give me great pleasure to obey them. Have I your excellency's permis¬ 
sion, in consideration of these exigencies of the case, to land my men, to supply their wants, and 
to relieve them from the extreme and unhealthy confinement of a transport vessel not fitted to 
receive them ? To convince your excellency of the good faith toward the authorities of the State 
of Maryland with which I am acting, and I am armed only against the disturbers of her peace 
and of the United States, I inclose a copy of an order issued to my command before I had the 


[1861. 

was made yet the more striking by the fact that he was placed in command 
by Governor Andrew, who was prominent among the extreme, or, so-called, 
radical Republicans. 

The news of the attack upon one detachment of his command flying north¬ 
ward, passed General Butler at Philadelphia, where he had arrived with the 
Eighth Massachusetts regiment. With a sagacious perception and prompt 
decision, which showed at the very first step that he was a leader, he saw 
that the consequence of the attack would be the destruction of the bridges 
between Philadelphia and Baltimore, and he determined to move instantly 
upon the latter place by way of Annapolis, occupying and holding the cap¬ 
ital of Maryland; thus, in the words of his dispatch upon the occasion, call¬ 
ing the state to account for the death of Massachusetts men, his friends and 
neighbors. On the evening of the 20th he transported his command to 
Havre de Grace, upon the Susquehanna, and, seizing upon the large and 
powerful ferry-boat Maryland, steamed down the Chesapeake. He arrived 
at Annapolis on the morning of the 21st, and found there the Governor of 
Maryland and a body of insurgents—the one powerless in the hands of the 
other. The disaffected controlled the city 1 -, held the grounds of the United 
States Naval Academy there, and were about to seize upon the school-ship 
“Old Ironsides,” as the superannuated frigate Constitution, the war-worn 
victor of many fights, had, for more than a generation, been fondly named 
General Butler at once called for mariners from his command, and enough 
stepped forward to man the old ship for the nonce. They were placed on 
board, and by their aid and that of the Maryland she was towed out into the 
stream, where her guns were shotted and trained upon the shore; but the 
Maryland herself, -with the troops still on board, ran aground, and remained 
fast until the next day. Meantime the New York Seventh Regiment, which 
had left Philadelphia in the steamer Boston, arrived, and was placed by its 
colonel under the command of General Butler; the Maryland was hauled 
off, and both regiments landed and took possession of the grounds of the 
Naval Academy. Against this landing of “ Northern troops” upon the soil 
of Maryland Governor Hicks sent General Butler a formal protest; but the 
latter persisted—first showing, in reply, that the necessities of his position, 
the health of the men under his command, and the instructions of his gov¬ 
ernment, made it imperative that he should land and march quickly through 
Maryland to Washington, respecting private property, outraging the rights 
of none, but, on the contrary, using his force, if necessary, to preserve the 
peace of Maryland as well as the authority of the national government, and 
having issued strict orders as to the drill and discipline of his soldiers, and 
congratulations upon their saving the Constitution—and the governor could 
not do otherwise than submit. It is worthy of notice that the Massachu¬ 
setts general administered a respectful rebuke to the Maryland governor 
for his “ ill-advised designation” of the troops under the general’s command. 
“ They are,” said he, “ not Northern troops; they are a part of the whole 
militia of the United States, obeying the call of the President.” 6 Thus 


honor of receiving the copy-of your communication through Captain Blake. I trust your excel¬ 
lency will appreciate the necessities of my position and give me an immediate reply, which I await 
with anxiety. 

I would do myself the honor to have a personal interview with yonr excellency, if you so desire. 
I beg leave to call your excellency’s attention to what I hope I may be pardoned for deeming an 
ill-advised designation of the men under my command. They are not Northern troops ; they are 
a part of the whole militia of the United States , obeying the call of the President. 

I have the honor of being your excellency’s obedient servant, 

Benj. F. Butler, Brigadier General in the Militia of the United States. 

P.S.—It occurs to me that our landing on the grounds at the Naval Academy would be entire¬ 
ly proper, and in accordance with your excellency’s wishes. B. F. B. 

Special Brigade Or den-. No. 37. 

Head-quarters Second Division Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, > 
on board Steamer Maryland, off Annapolis, April 2* * * 2,1861. / 

Colonel Munroe is charged with the execution of the following order: At 5 o’clock A.M. the 
troops will be paraded by company, and be drilled in the manual of arms, especially in loading 
at will, firing by file, and in the use of the bayonet; and these specialties will be observed in all 
subsequent drills in the manual. Such drill to continue until 7 o’clock, when all the arms will be 
stacked on the upper deck, great care being taken to instruct the men as to the mode of stacking 
their arms, so that a firm stack, not easily overturned, shall be made. Being obliged to drill at 
times with the weapons loaded, great damage may be done by the overturning of the stack and 
the discharge of the pieces. This is important. Indeed, an accident has already occurred in the 
regiment from this cause, and, although slight in its consequences, yet it warns us to increased 
diligence in this regard. The purpose which could only be hinted at in the orders of yesterday 



RxrcarxrES.— 1. Catholic College.—2. City Hotel. — 3. Battery.—4. Capitol_5. Midshipmen’s Quarters—6. Constitution 7 Recitation Hall.—S. Chapel —9. Observatory.—10. Officers’ Quarters.—11. St. John’s (.Episcopal) College.— 

12. Hospital.—13. Monument—the same that was in front of the Capitol at Washington.—14. Naval Monument. 

GKNK&aL VIZW OF AJOiaPOLIS, with tux “constitution" in tux foreground. 


















































1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


91 



sharply did this question define, and thus continuously present itself in the' 
earlier stages of the conflict of which it was the great issue, though not the 
exciting cause. That cause I shall consider more particularly hereafter. 
But accident furnished General Butler with opportunity of showing how far 
from his intention was the attempt to change, or even the acquiescence in 
any violent attempt to change, the relation between master and slave. An 
insurrection of the slaves around Annapolis was at the time feared, and 
General Butler offered the governor the services of his troops for its sup¬ 
pression, or that of any other resistance to the laws of Maryland. For this 
offer he met with a mild though firm rebuke from his Abolitionist govern¬ 

has been accomplished. The frigate Constitution has lain for a long time at this port substantially 
at the mercy of the armed mob, which sometimes paralyzes the otherwise loyal State of Maryland. 
Deeds of daring, successful contests, and glorious victories had rendered “Old Ironsides” so con¬ 
spicuous in the naval history of the country, that she was fitly chosen as the school-ship in which 
to train the future officers of the navy to like heroic acts. 

It was given to Massachusetts, and Essex County, first to man her; it was reserved for Massa¬ 
chusetts to have the honor to retain her for the service of the Union and the laws. 

This is a sufficient triumph of right, and a sufficient triumph for us. By this the blood of our 
friends shed by the Baltimore mob is in so far avenged. The Eighth Regiment may hereafter 
cheer lustily on all proper occasions, but never without orders. The old Constitution, by their 
efforts, aided untiringly by the United States officers having her in charge, is now safely “pos¬ 
sessed, occupied, and enjoyed” by the government of the United States, and is safe from all her foes. 

We have been joined by the Seventh Regiment of New York, and together we propose peacea¬ 
bly, quickly, and civilly, unless opposed by some mob or other disorderly persons, to march to 
Washington, in obedience to the requisition of the President of the United States. If opposed, we 
shall march steadily forward. 

My next order I hardly know lrnw to express. I can not assume that any of the citizen sol¬ 
diery of Massachusetts or New York could, under any circumstances whatever, commit any out¬ 
rages upon private property in a loyal and friendly state. But, fearing that some improper person 
may have by stealth introduced himself among us, I deem it proper to state that any unauthorized 
interference with private property will be most signally punished, and full reparation therefore 
made to the injured party to the full extent of my power and ability. In so doing I but carry out 
the orders of the War Department. I should have done so without those orders. 

Colonel Munroe will cause these orders to be read at the head of each company before we march. 

Colonel Lefferts’s command not having been originally included in this order, he will be fur¬ 
nished with a copy for his instruction. By order of 

[Signed], B. F. Bdtler, Brigadier General. 

Wm. II. Clemens, Brigade Major. 

State of Maryland, Executive Chamber, Annapolis, April 22,1S61. 

To Brigadier General B. F. Butler: 

Sir, —I am in receipt of your two communications of this date, informing me of your intention 
to land the men under your command at Annapolis, for the purpose of marching thence to the 
city of Washington. I content myself with protesting against this movement, which, in view of 
the excited condition of the people of this state, I can not but consider an unwise step on the part 
of the government. But 1 most earnestly urge upon you that there shall be no halt made by the 
troops in this city. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Th. H. Hicks. 

7 General Butler to Governor Hicks. 

Head-quarters Third Brigade Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, Annapolis, Maryland, April 23,1861. 

To his Excellency Thomas II. Hicks, Governor of the State of Maryland: 

I did myself the honor in my communication of yesterday, wherein I asked permission to land 
the portion of the militia of the United States under mv command, to state that they were armed 
only against the disturbers of the peace of the State of Maryland and of the United States. 

I have understood within the last hour that some apprehensions were entertained of an insur¬ 
rection of the negro population of this neighborhood. I am anxious to convince all classes of 
persons that the forces under my command are not here in any way to interfere with or counte¬ 
nance any interference with the laws of the state. I am, therefore, ready to co-operate with your 
excellency in suppressing most promptly and effectively any insurrection against the laws of Mary¬ 
land. 

T beg, therefore, that you announce publicly that any portion of the forces under my command 


or; but in turn he defended himself with entire success, on the grounds both 
of humanity and policy. * * * * * * 7 

The difficulties in the apparently simple and easy task of landing two 
thousand loyal citizens of the United States, in obedience to the command 
of the President, upon the soil of one of those states which still acknowl¬ 
edged its old allegiance, having been thus overcome, there remained the not 
less serious task of moving across its territory. The insurgents had torn up 
the rails of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railway, of which General Butler 
took possession, and to the repairing of which the men of the Eighth Massa¬ 
chusetts at once addressed themselves. Indeed, the various capacity of this 

is at your excellency’s disposal, to act immediately for the preservation and quietness of the j>eace 
of this community. 

And I have the honor to be your excellency’s obedient servant, 

B. F. Butler, General of the Third Brigade. 

CorresjKtndence between Governor Andrew and General Butler. 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Department, Council Chamber, Boston, April 25, 1861. 

General, —I have received through Major Ames a dispatch transmitted from Perryville, de¬ 
tailing the proceedings at Annapolis from the time of your arrival off that port until the hour 
when Major Ames left you to return to Philadelphia. I wish to repeat the assurance of my en¬ 
tire satisfaction with the action you have taken, with a single exception. If I rightly understood 
the telegraphic dispatch, I think that your action in tendering to Governor Hicks the assistance 
of our Massachusetts troops to suppress a threatened servile insurrection among the hostile people 
of Maryland was unnecessary. I hope that the fuller dispatches, w'hich are on their way from 
you, may show reasons why I should modify my opinion concerning that particular instnnee; but, 
in general, I think that the matter of servile insurrection among a community in arms against the 
federal Union is no longer to be regarded by our troops in a political, but solely in a military point 
of view, and is to be contemplated as one of the inherent weaknesses of the enemy, from the dis¬ 
astrous operations of which we are under no obligation of a military character to guard them, in 
order that they may be enabled to improve the security which our arms would afford so as to pros¬ 
ecute with more energy their traitorous attacks upon the federal government and capital. The 
mode in which such outbreaks are to be considered should depend entirely upon the loyalty or 
disloyalty of the community in which they occur; and in the vicinity of Annapolis, I can, on this 
occasion, perceive no reason of military policy why a force sumpioned to the defense of the federal 
government, at this moment of all others, should be offered to be diverted from its immediate duty 
to help rebels who stand with arms in their hands, obstructing its progress toward the city of Wash¬ 
ington. I entertain no doubt that whenever we shall have an opportunity to interchange our views 
personally on this subject, we shall arrive at entire concordance of opinion. 

Yours faithfully, John A. Andrew. 

To Brigadier General Butler. 

Department of Annapolis, Head-quarters, Annapolis, May 9,1861. 

To his Excellency John A. Andrew, Governor aDd Commandcr-in-Chief: 

Sir, — I have delayed replying to your excellency’s dispatch of the 25th of April in my other dis¬ 
patches, because, as it involved disapprobation of an act done, couched in the kindest language, I 
supposed the interest of the country could not suffer in the delay; and incessant labor up to the 
present moment has prevented me giving full consideration to the topic. Temporary illness, which 
forbids bodily activity, gives me now a moment’s pause. 

The telegraph, with more than usual accuracy, had rightly informed your excellency that I had 
offered the services of the Massachusetts troops under my command to aid the authorities of Ma¬ 
ryland in suppressing a threatened slave insurrection. Fortunately for us all, the rumor of such 
an outbreak was without substantial foundation. Assuming, as your excellency does in your dis¬ 
patch, that I was carrying on military operations in an enemy’s country, when a war a I'outrance 
w'as to be waged, my act might be a matter of discussion. And in that view, acting in the light 
of the Baltimore murderers, and the apparent hostile position of Maryland, your excellency might, 
without mature reflection, have come to the conclusion of disapprobation expressed in your dis¬ 
patch. But the facts, especially as now aided by their results, will entirely justify my act, and re¬ 
instate me in your excellency’s good opinion. 

True, I landed on the soil of Maryland against the formal protest of its governor and of the cor¬ 
porate authorities of Annapolis, but without any armed opposition on their part, and expecting 
opposition only from insurgents assembled in riotous contempt of the laws of the 6tate. Before, 



































































[ 1861 . 


62 

fine body of men, which seemed to be largely composed of skilled artisans, 
was one of the noteworthy features of their march to Washington. As they 
had furnished mariners to work the Constitution, so now, upon call, machin- 
its, engineers, and iron-workers stepped forward in great numbers. The rails 
had not only been torn up, but carried off and hid; but they were unearth¬ 
ed, and even traced to and taken from the bottom of the river as if by in¬ 
stinct. The only engine to be found had been taken to pieces and partly 
destroyed, and, upon inquiry for a man who could put it in running order, 
one of the Beverly Light Guard, recognizing in a piece of the machine his 
own handiwork, promptly and successfully undertook to mend what he had 
made, some of his companions erecting, and others working, the temporary 
forges which were required. Cheerfully and thoroughly they did these tasks 
while they were starving; for, owing to some blunder or accident, few had 
eaten any thing for twenty-four, and some not for thirty hours. The Sev¬ 
enth found this out, and in a moment their own haversacks were opened, 
and the hungry men were filled, and furnished for the morrow. Governor 
Hicks continued to protest—this time against the occupation of the railway, 
on the ground that by this act the members of the Legislature, which was 
about to meet at Annapolis, would be prevented from reaching the seat of 
government. But this plea General Butler extinguished by reminding the 
governor that he himself had objected to the landing of the troops on the 
ground that, as the railway was hopelessly destroyed, they could not leave 
the city by it, and demurely pointing out that, if the troop3 could not pass 
one way, the Legislature could not pass the other; adding, with an irony all 
the keener because its edge was fact, that he only sought means of trans¬ 
portation that he might vacate the capital, and not encumber that “ beautiful 
city” during the session of the Legislature. * * * * * * * 8 

The railway repaired, and the engines and cars sufficient for the sick, the 
small howitzer battery of the Seventh, and the baggage, put in running or¬ 
der, the march to Washington began on the morning of the 24th, and, leav¬ 
ing the good people of Annapolis astonished at the strictly correct behavior, 
the universal courtesy, and even the open-handed generosity of a body of 
men whom the disorganizers had led them to believe were but a well-drilled 
band of ruffians, the Seventh led the column toward the capital. The pic¬ 
ture of their patriotic journey would be incomplete were the gallantry which 
animated them left unillustrated by a declaration made on iheir behalf as to 
some of the foes whom they had reason to believe they would encounter. 
As individuals they had visited residents of Maryland and Virginia, and as 
a body they had enjoyed the hospitality of some of the military companies 
of those commonwealths, where they had friends whom they in turn had 
welcomed and entertained at New York. These men were furious in their 
denunciations of the Seventh in particular, and in their threats of bloody 
vengeance on it; but the members of that regiment, expressing their won¬ 
der at the hostility thus manifested on occasion of their mere march to the 
defense of Washington, said, “If, in the performance of duty, we shall be 
compelled to meet our friends of the Baltimore City Guard and the Rich¬ 
mond Grays in hostile array, we shall receive their first fire with presented 
arms, but on the second we shall be compelled to defend ourselves.” Thus 
implacably malevolent were the self-styled chivalry of the labor-loathing 


by letter, and at the time of landing, by personal interview, I had informed Governor Hicks that 
soldiers of the Union, under my command, were armed only against the insurgents and disturbers 
of the peace of Maryland and of the United States. I received from Governor Hicks assurances 
of the loyalty of the state to the Union—assurances which subsequent events have fully justified. 
The Mayor of Annapolis also informed me that the city authorities would in nowise oppose me, 
but that I was in great danger from the excited and riotous mobs of Baltimore pouring down upon 
me, and in numbers beyond the control of the police. I assured both the governor and the mayor 
that I had no fear of a Baltimore or other mob, and that, supported by the authorities of the state 
and city, I should repress all hostile demonstrations against the laws of Man-land and the United 
States, and that I would protect both myself and the city of Annapolis from any disorderly per¬ 
sons whatsoever. On the morning following my landing I was informed that the city of Annapolis 
and environs were in danger from an insurrection of the slave population, in defiance of the laws 
of the state. What was I to do? I had promised to put down a white mob, and to preserve and 
enforce the laws against that. Ought I to allow a black one any preference in a breach of the 
laws? I understood that I was armed against all infractions of the laws, whether by white or 
black, and upon that understanding I acted, certainly with promptness and efficiency. And your 
excellency’s shadow of disapprobation, arising from a misunderstanding of the facts, has caused 
all the regret I have for that action. The question seemed to me to be neither military nor polit¬ 
ical, and was not to be so treated. It was simply a question of good faith and honesty of purpose. 
The benign effect of my course was instantly seen. The good but timid people of Annapolis, who 
had fled from their houses at our approach, immediately returned; business resumed its accustom¬ 
ed channels; quiet and order prevailed in the city; confidence took the place of distrust, friend¬ 
ship of enmity, brotherly kindness of sectional hate, and I believe to-day there is no city in the 
Union more loyal than the city of Annapolis. I think, therefore, I may safely point to the results 
for my justification. The vote of the neighboring county of Washington, a few days since, for its 
delegate to the Legislature, wherein 4000 out of 5000 votes were thrown for a delegate favorable 
to the Union, is among the many happy fruits of firmness of purpose, efficiency of action, and in¬ 
tegrity of mission. I believe, indeed, that it will not require a personal interchange of views, as 
suggested in your dispatch, to bring our minds in accordance ; a simple statement of the facts will 
suffice. 

But I am to act hereafter, it may be, in an enemy’s country, among a servile population, when 
the question may arise, as it has not yet arisen, as well in a moral and Christian, as in a political 
and military point of view, What shall I do? Will your excellency bear with me a moment 
while this question is discussed ? 

I appreciate fully your excellency’s suggestion as to the inherent weakness of the rebels, arising 
from the preponderance of their serv ile population. The questiefh, then, is, In what manner shall 
we take advantage of that weakness? By allowing, and of course arming, that population to rise 
upon the defenseless women and children of the country, carrying rapine, arson, and murder—all 
the horrors of San Domingo, a million times magnified, among those whom we hope to reunite 
with us as brethren, many of whom are already so, and all who are worth preserving will be, when 
this horrible madness shall have passed away or be thrashed out of them? Would your excel¬ 
lency advise the troops under my command to make war in person upon the defenseless women 
and children of any part of the Union, accompanied with brutalities too horrible to be named? 
You will say, “God forbid!” If we may not do so in person, shall we arm others so to do over 
whom we can have no restraint, exercise no control, and who, when once they have tasted blood, 
may turn the very arms we put in their hands against ourselves, as a part of the oppressing white 
race? The reading of history, so familiar to your excellency, will tell you the bitterest cause of 
complaint which our fathers had against Great Britain in the war of the Revolution was the arm¬ 
ing by the British ministry of the red man with the tomahawk and the scalping-knife against the 
women and children of the colonies, so that the phrase, “May we not use all the means which 
God and Nature have put in our power to subjugate the colonies?” has passed into a legend of in¬ 
famy against the leader of that ministry who used it in Parliament. Shall history teach us in 
vain? Could we justify ourselves to ourselves? Although, with arms in our hamjf, amid the 
savage wildness of camp and field, we may have blunted many of the finer moral sensibilities in 
letting loose four millions of worse than savages upon the homes and hearths of the South, can we 


slave section; and with such high-toned and truly chivalrous bearing, re¬ 
minding us of the elaborate courtesy of the French Guard at Fontenoy, 
were they met by the simple and unpretending citizen soldiers of a common¬ 
wealth whose greatness was based on industry, and whose chief glory was in 
freedom. The march to Washington tried the endurance of the Seventh 
sorely. Begun in the morning, it was continued through the day under a 
blazing sun, over ground on which long stretches of hot and shifting sand 
were varied only by the wooden sleepers of the railway, progress over which 
was extraordinarily fatiguing. The railway was chosen instead of the turn¬ 
pike road because it had been discovered that parties of cavalry had been 
posted along the latter route for the purpose of cutting off the regiment. 
Needful caution and the difficulties of the way made the march a very slow 
one; but the men kept steadily on, with an occasional halt at a station for 
brief rest and refreshment. All suffered greatly from fatigue and heat; and 
a few broke down and increased the sick-list. Night fell upon the slowly ad¬ 
vancing column: it was the fourth which most of them had been obliged to 
give to service instead of to slumber, and they staggered wearily through the 
monotonous obstacles of their march, startled at intervals to life and braced 
to action by the distant dropping shot of an outlying rebel, watching vainly 
for their blood. In this way, scouting the country round and feeling every 
rod of the road, they advanced little more than one mile an hour; and, al¬ 
though the last stages of their progress were easy, it was not until the 25th, 
six days after their departure from New York, that they arrived at the cap¬ 
ital. Before them there were only five hundred raw, undrilled men from 
Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Massachusetts regiment, fresh from its bloody 
initiation into military life at Baltimore. As they marched up the broad 
avenue to the White House, the roll of their drums made loyal hearts leap 
for joy, and sounded like the doom of treachery. But, to look forward, and 
to dismiss this regiment honorably from our sight, the fortunes of the war 
decreed that the New York Seventh should see no active service. They 
remained the full time for which the President’s proclamation summoned 
them, and longer; these New York dandies worked in trenches and lay 
down to rest in mud ; they again returned to the defense of Washington, but 
they never were under fire as a body. So high, however, was the reputa¬ 
tion of the regiment for drill and discipline, that its members, even non¬ 
commissioned officers and privates, were eagerly sought as company and 
field-officers for newly-formed volunteer regiments, and a very large num¬ 
ber thus entered the army and served through the war, in many cases with 
distinction. The composition of the corps, its reputation, the fact that it was 
regarded as representing the peculiarly conservative classes of the commer¬ 
cial metropolis of the country, and the promptness with which it volunteer¬ 
ed to lead what was believed at the time to be the forlorn hope of the re¬ 
public, have entitled it to a more prominent place in the earlier pages of 
this history than can be given hereafter to some bodies of men which dis¬ 
played all its spirit and its patriotism, and which had ten times its numbers. 

While these events were taking place near the capital, which had been so 
suddenly isolated from the loyal millions of the North, they were every 
where assembling to express, in a formal and solemn manner, their determ¬ 
ination to support the government with their lives and their fortunes. 


be justified to the Christian community of Massachusetts? Would such a course be consonant 
with the teachings of our holy religion ? I have a very decided opinion upon the subject, and if 
any one desires, as I know your excellency does not, this unhappy contest to be prosecuted in that 
manner, some instrument other than myself must be found to carry it on. I may not discuss the 
political bearings of this topic. When I went from under the shadow of my roof-tree, I left all 
politics behind me, to be resumed only when every part of the Union is loyal to the flag, and the 
potency of the government through the ballot-box is established. 

Passing the moral and Christian view, let us examine the subject as a military question. Is not 
that state already subjugated which requires the bayonets of those armed in opposition to its rulers 
to preserve it from the horrors of a servile war ? As the least experienced of military men, I would 
have no doubt of the entire subjugation of a state brought to that condition. When, therefore— 
unless I am better advised—any community in the United States, who have met me in honorable 
warfare, or even in the prosecution of a rebellious war in an honorable manner, shall call upon me 
for protection against the nameless horrors of a servile insurrection, they shall have it, and from the 

moment that call is obeyed, I have no doubt we shall be friends, and not enemies. 

The possibilities that dishonorable means of defense are to be taken by the rebels against the 
government I do not now contemplate. If, as has been done in a single instance, my men are to 

be attacked by poison, or, as in another, stricken down by the assassin’s knife, and thus murdered, 

the community using such weapons may be required to be taught that it holds within its own bor¬ 
der a more potent means for deadly purposes and indiscriminate slaughter than any which it can 
administer to us. 

Trusting that these views may meet your excellency’s approval, I have the honor to be, very re¬ 
spectfully, your obedient servant, Benj. F. Butler. 

8 Correspondence between Governor Hicks and General Butler. 

Executive Chamber, Annapolis, Friday, April 23,1861. 

To Bripadier General B. F. Butler: 

Sir, —Having, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution of Maryland, summon¬ 
ed the Legislature of the state to assemble on Friday, the 26th instant, and Annapolis being the 
place in which, according to law, it must assemble; and having been credibly informed that you 
have taken military possession of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad, I deem it my duty to 
protest against this step, because, without at present assigning any other reason, I am informed 
that such occupation of said road will prevent the members of the Legislature from reaching this 
city. Very respectfully yours, Thomas H. Hicks. 

To which General Butler replied as follows: 

Head-quartere United States Militia, Annapoli?, Maryland, April 23,1861. 

To his Excellency Thomas II. Hicks, Governor of Maryland: 

You are credibly informed that I have taken possession of the Annapolis and Flk Ridge Rail¬ 
road. It might have escaped your notice, but at the official meeting which was held between your 
excellency and the Mayor of Annapolis, and the committee of the government and myself, as to 
the landing of my troops, it was expressly stated as the reason why I should not land that my 
troops could not pass the railroad because the company had taken up the rails, and they were pri¬ 
vate property. It is difficult to see how it can be, that if my troops could not pass over the rail¬ 
road one way, the members of the Legislature could pass the other way. I have taken possession 
for the purpose of preventing the execution of the threats of the mob, as officially represented to 
me by the Master of Transportation of the railroad in this city, “ that if my troops passed over the 
railroad, the railroad should be destroyed.” 

If the government of the state had taken possession of the road in any emergency, I should have 
long hesitated before entering upon it; but ns I had the honor to inform your excellency in regard 
to another insurrection against the laws of Maryland, I am here armed to maintain those laws, if 
your excellency desires, and the peace of the United States, against all disorderly persons what¬ 
soever. I am endeavoring to save and not to destroy; to obtain means of transportation, so that 
I can vacate the capital prior to the sitting of the Legislature, and not be under the necessity of 
encumbering your beautiful city while the Legislature is in session. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your excellency’s obedient servant, 

B. F. Butler, Brigadier General. 






1861 .] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


93 



“ Union Meetings,” as they were called, were held at all the cities and prin¬ 
cipal towns of the free states; and at all of them there was an expression of 
the same fervid devotion to the cause of constitutional liberty and the re¬ 
public, varied only, and not too much, in the form of words in which it was 
uttered. Of these meetings, that held at New York on the 20th of April de¬ 
serves notice as of national consequence. The pre-eminence of the place in 
which it was held made it the most important, the distinction and the vari¬ 
ous political views and relations of its managers and speakers the most char¬ 
acteristic, and its numbers the most imposing. The city of New York was, 
of all places in the free states, the one in which there was the least disposi¬ 
tion to resist any demands made in the interests of slavery. No insignifi¬ 
cant proportion of her inhabitants was directly bound by ties of blood and 
intermarriage to the people of the slave states; a still larger number were 
closely connected with them by business relations; and within her walls, 
chiefly by its command of the votes of naturalized Irish emigrants, the Dem¬ 
ocratic party, the ever-faithful ally of the slave power, ruled supreme. And 
in an age and in a country in which commerce, trade, and labor have a so¬ 
cial and political consideration which they never before enjoyed, the city, 
which was at once the great mart, treasure-house, and labor exchange of the 
land, had acquired an influence whose extent was limited only by the bounds 
of civilization, and whose power was diminished little by the effect of dis¬ 
tance. There was no part of the country the prosperity of which was not 
more or less involved in her stability and welfare. The vast crops of the 
West moved to the sea-board upon railways and canals, and those of both 
West and South were borne to Europe in ships, built chiefly by her capital, 
which seemed to have no limit except the demands for its employment. 
Every trader in the country, from the merchant who sold cargoes in the 
quiet of a luxurious office, to the peddler who painfully bore his little stock 
upon his bending back, was directly or indirectly her tributary debtor. To 
her the agriculturist and the manufacturer looked to find at home or make 
abroad a market for the fruits of his labor. The harbors of the Atlantic and 
the Pacific Ocean filled with her ships, and the expanse of the great interior 
seas of the North plowed by keels floated from her harbor through canals, 
showed her the great carrier as well as the great factor and the great nego¬ 
tiator of a continent. Her capital insured the goods and even the lives that 
her commercial enterprise sent out upon these waters. With this position of 
command came a corresponding responsibility. Agriculture may flourish 
upon any field not trodden under foot of hostile armies; but trade thrives 
only amid general stability, and the sails of commerce must be wafted by 
the gales of peace. Therefore from the first mutterings of sectional discord 
the efforts of New York had been to set aside the issue and still the trouble ; 
for she knew that she must provide the bulk of the means for carrying on a 
war which would at once drain her coffers and cripple her clients. En¬ 


thusiasts, men of extreme views, men of reckless purposes, stigmatized her 
endeavors as the fruits of a base disposition to compromise with crime and 
to barter the principles of humanity for the good things of this life; and 
during the fierce debate of years, many were the sneers at the commercial 
patriotism of the so-called Union-savers, whose voices were heard only in 
deprecation. Honest in some cases, in many others this clamor was but a 
manifestation of that subtle hypocrisy by which the human heart seeks 
even to deceive itself. Self-sacrifice, conscious, seems heroic. Nothing high¬ 
er toned, more unselfish, benevolent, patriotic, than to insist on carrying out 
one’s principles without care for consequences. Being jocosely scornful of 
the meanness of looking after gold and silver in preference to the misty 
glories of abstract philanthropy is a grand sort of humor, a pipe the music 
of which costs little to those among whom it finds the readiest, most un¬ 
tiring dancers. For there is this difference between the position of most 
merchants and that of most enthusiasts in philanthropy — that profound 
political agitation threatens the former with present pecuniary loss and 
prospective ruin, while to the latter it generally brings little personal in¬ 
convenience, and often increase, if not of gain, at least of influence. There¬ 
fore, under such circumstances, the ore is always called upon to sacrifice a 
tangible personal good in possession to the possible establishment of an ab¬ 
stract principle in which he has no direct interest; while the other has his 
triumph, gains his glory, sacrifices nothing, and, especially if he is a journal¬ 
ist or a man of letters, perhaps gets money by the very curiosity which he 
has provoked, the very solicitude which he has awakened. To the former, 
therefore, any grave disturbance of society is a very serious matter; it touch¬ 
es with inexorable finger that sensitive spot of almost every civilized mart’s 
organization, the pocket—a region in which the philanthropic agitator is 
often equally callous and flaccid. The penniless traveler knows that he can 
sing before the robber. Nor is the mercantile view of politics, whatever the 
motives and ends of individuals, narrow or selfish in its actual horizon. For 
to the great majority of any people serious political disturbance ushers in a 
troubled present and a cloudy future. It brings anxious days and sleepless 
nights; it darkens the father’s brow with care, and wrings the mother’s 
heart with sorrow ; and it may pinch the whole household with the pangs 
of actual poverty. Without claiming, then, that the commercial scope of 
politics is taken from the sublimest moral plane, and, on the other hand, 
recognizing the existence of times when considerations of present material 
good must be given to the winds, it must be admitted that the merchant 
may justly claim that the philanthropist should respect his scruples and deal 
tenderly with his fears, and that the statesman should remember that there 
may be too great a sacrifice made for an abstraction, or even for a principle, 
Unless national safety or honor is at stake. For such reasons New York 
could afford to bear the reproach of selfishness and timidity so long as the 




















































94 




DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES SHIPS 


UnlHd Bum. 

















































[A, BY FIRE, BY THE UNITED STATES TROOPS, ON APRIL 20, 1861. 



reuuylv&nift. 


>LK NAVY YARD, BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNMENT, 

































































































































































struggle could with any honor be avoided; but when that period was past 
she took her position instantly and without reserve upon the side of consti¬ 
tutional government, and her prompt movement now was all the more im¬ 
posing from her foregone caution and reserve. 

To the meeting at Union Square, where centred the main avenues of the 
city, it seemed as if nearly all the male adult population poured in steady 
streams from an early hour after noon. The vast expanse was packed close 
with people, and the outskirts of the crowd stretched into the tributary 
streets. Five platforms were set up for officers and speakers, and, these prov¬ 
ing insufficient, the people most remote from them were addressed from the 
balconies and steps of houses, the windows and even the roofs of which were 
occupied by ladies drawn thither by the unwonted scene. Major Anderson 
and the other officers of Fort Sumter had arrived, bringing with them the 
tattered flag which they had maintained so long and defended so well, and 
their presence added needless fuel to the patriotic fire which fused into one 
glowing mass the incongruous political elements of this great gathering. For 
the men who took prominent parts on this occasion were the leaders of all 
parties; Democrats and Republicans, Old Whigs and Native Americans, the 
living and the dead organizations, were all represented; and as the speakers 
came not only from the city and the State of New York, but from the East 
and the West, and from the very South, the demonstration assumed a na¬ 
tional as well as a municipal importance. The resolutions at this meeting, 
unlike those passed at meetings in the slave states, were neither defiant nor 
denunciatory. They calmly set forth the occasion of the coming war, and 
declared it the duty of all good citizens to uphold with their fortunes and 
their lives the authority of the government against acts of lawless violence, 
which, if longer'unresisted, would inevitably end in the destruction of the 
institutions established by the fathers of the republic for the protection of 
life, liberty, and property, and involve the country in universal anarchy and 
confusion. 9 Of the many speeches made in support of these resolutions, near¬ 
ly all may be passed by as of no permanent interest, though well adapted to 
the time and the occasion. But three of them were so characteristic of the 
spirit of the people, and so significant, not only in their terms, but in the 
sources whence they came, that without them the record of that day would 
be tame and incomplete. 

Six months before, Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, was perhaps one of 
the very last men in the country, outside the ranks of the raving “fire-eaters,” 
who would have been expected to raise his voice against any movement of 
the slave states, and in support of any act of a Republican president. He 
had been through all his manhood an active, and through much of it a lead¬ 
ing, member of the Democratic party. For six years he had represented 
Mississippi as her senator in Congress. As Secretary of the Treasury, he 
had been one of the most influential of President Polk’s cabinet ministers, 
and had acquired, even among his political opponents, a reputation for sagac¬ 
ity, knowledge of affairs, and administrative ability—three of the chiefest 
qualifications of a statesman. Bound up not only with the Democratic par¬ 
ty, but in the most intimate political and personal relations with the leading 
men of the Gulf states, the defender of their utmost rights, the apologist of 
their very excesses, he was selected by President Buchanan as the fourth 
governor of Kansas Territory; and it is to his enduring honor that he re¬ 
signed that responsible position as soon as he saw that the course marked 
out for him by the administration which he served was flagrantly in viola¬ 
tion of the principles of liberty and justice. Cautious by nature, schooled 
by long experience, and prejudiced only in favor of the men whose insur¬ 
rection was the occasion of his presence, after a brief peroration, he thus 
coolly exposed their pretenses and condemned their action: “The question 
is, Shall this Union be maintained and perpetuated, or shall it be broken and 
dissolved ? No question so important has ever occurred in the history of 
our race. It involves not only the fate of this great country, but the ques¬ 
tion of free institutions throughout the world. The case of self-government 
is now on trial before the forum of our country and of the world. If we 
succeed and maintain the Union, free institutions, under the moral force of 
our example, will ultimately be established throughout the world; but if 
we fail, and our government is overthrown, popular liberty will have made 
its last experiment, and despotism will reign triumphant throughout the 
globe. Our responsibilities are fearful. We have a solemn duty to perform 
—we are this day making history. We are writing a book whose pages can 
never be erased—it is the destiny of our country and of mankind. For 


Resolutions at the Union Meeting , New York, April 20th , 1861. 

Whereas the union of the states, under the puidance of Divine Providence, has been the fruitful 
source of prosperity and domestic peace to the country for nearly three quarters of a century; and 
Whereas the Constitution, framed by our Revolutionary fathers, contains within itself ail need¬ 
ful provisions for the exigencies of the government, and, in the progress of events, for such amend¬ 
ments a9 are necessary to meet new exigencies; and 

Whereas an armed combination has been formed to break up the Union, by throwing off the 
obligations of the Constitution, and has, in several of the states, carried on its criminal purpose, 
and, finally, by assaulting Fort Sumter, a fortress of the United States occupied by a slender but 
heroic garrison, and capturing it by an overwhelming force after a gallant defense, thus setting 
the authority of the government at defiance, and insulting the national flag; and 

Whereas the government of the United States, with an earnest desire to avert the evils of civil 
war, has silently submitted to these aggressions and insults with a patient forbearance unparalleled 
in the annals of history, but has at last deemed it due to the public honor and safety to appeal to 
the people of the Union for the means of maintaining its authority, of enforcing the execution of 
the laws, and of saving our country from dismemberment and our political institutions from de¬ 
struction ; therefore, 

Resolved , That the Declaration of Independence, the war of the Revolution, and the Constitution 
of the United States have given origin to this government, the most equal and beneficent hitherto 
known among men ; that under its protection the wide expansion of our territory, the vast devel¬ 
opment of our wealth, our population, and our power, have built up a nation able to maintain and 
defend before the world the principles of liberty and justice upon which it was founded ; that by 
every sentiment of interest, of honor, of affection and of duty, we are engaged to presen e unbroken 
for our generation, and to transmit to our posterity, the great heritage we have received from he¬ 
roic ancestors; that to the maintenance of this sacred trust we devote whatever we possess, and 
whatever we can do, and in support of that government under which we are happy and proud to 
live, we are prepared to shed our blood and lay down our lives. 


more than seventy years this Union has been maintained, and it has ad¬ 
vanced our country to a prosperity unparalleled in the history of the world. 
The past was great, but the future opened upon prospects beyond the power 
of language to describe. But where are we now? The world looks on 
with scorn and derision. We have, it is said, no government—a mere vol¬ 
untary association of independent states — a debating society, or a moot 
court, without any real power to uphold the laws or maintain the Constitu¬ 
tion. We have no country, no flag, no Union ; but each state at its pleas¬ 
ure, upon its own mere whim or caprice, with or without cause, may secede 
and dissolve the Union. Secession, we are told, is a constitutional right of 
each state, and the Constitution has inscribed its own death-warrant upon its 
face. If this be so, we have indeed no government, and Europe may well 
speak of us with contempt and derision. This is the very question we are 
now to solve—have we a government, and has it power to maintain its ex¬ 
istence ? This question is not for the first time presented to the considera¬ 
tion of the American people. It arose in 1832, when South Carolina nulli¬ 
fied the revenue laws of the Union, and passed her secession ordinance. In 
that contest I took a very active part against the doctrines of nullification 
and secession, and upon that question, after a struggle of three years, I was 
elected by Mississippi as a senator of the United States. A contest so pro¬ 
longed and violent had never before been witnessed in this country. It was 
fought by me in every county of the state under the banner of the Union. 
The sentiments contained in the many speeches then made by me, and then 
published, are the opinions I now entertain. They are all for the Union 
and against secession, and they are now the opinions of thousands of Union 
men of the South and of Mississippi. These opinions are unchanged; and 
deeply as I deplore our present situation, it is my profound conviction that 
the welfare, security, and prosperity of the South can only be restored by 
the re-establishment of the Union. I see, in the permanent overthrow of 
the Union, the utter ruin of the South and the complete prostration of all 
their interests. I have devoted my life to the maintenance of all their con¬ 
stitutional rights, and the promotion of their happiness and welfare; but se¬ 
cession involves them and us in one common ruin. The recognition of such 
a doctrine is fatal to the existence of any government—of the Union : it is 
death—it is national suicide. This is the question now to be decided: Have 
we a Union—have we a flag—are the stars and stripes a reality or a fiction 
—have we a government, and can we enforce its laws, or must the whole 
vanish whenever any one state thinks proper to issue the despotic mandate? 
Is the Union indissoluble, or is it written on the sand, to be swept away by 
the first angry surge of state or sectional passion which may sweep over it? 
It was the declared object of our ancestors to found a perpetual Union. 
The original Articles of Confederation, by all the states, in 1778, declared the 
Union to be ‘ perpetual,’ and South Carolina (with all the states) then plight¬ 
ed her solemn faith that ‘ the union of the states shall be perpetual.’ And 
in modifying these articles by the formation of the Constitution in 1787, the 
declared object of that change was to make 1 the Union more perfect.’ But 
how more perfect, if the Union is indissoluble in 1787,but might at any mo¬ 
ment be destroyed by any one state after the adoption of the Constitution ? 
No, my countrymen, secession is not a constitutional right of any one state. 
It is war—it is revolution—and can only be established on the ruins of the 
Constitution and of the Union. We must resist and subdue it, or our gov¬ 
ernment will be but an organized anarchy, to be surely succeeded, as anar¬ 
chy ever has been, by military despotism. This, then, my fellow-citizens, 
is the last great contest for the liberties of our country and of the world. 
If we are defeated, the last experiment of self-government will have failed, 
and we will have written with our own hands the epitaph of human liberty. 
We will have no flag, we will have no government, no country, and no 
Union; we will cease to be American citizens, and the despots of Europe 
will rejoice in the failure of the great experiment of republican institutions. 
The liberties of our country and of the world will have been intrusted to 
our care, and we shall have dishonored the great trust and proved ourselves 
traitors to the freedom of our country and of mankind. This is not a sec¬ 
tional question; it is not a Northern or a Southern question; it is not a 
question which concerns our country only, but all mankind. It is this: 
Shall we, by a noble and united effort, sustain here republican institutions, 
or shall we have secession and anarchy, to be succeeded by despotism, and 
extinguish forever the hopes of freedom throughout the world ? God grant 
you, my dear countrymen, courage, and energy, and perseverance to main¬ 
tain successfully the great contest. You are fighting the last great decisive 

Resolved , That the founders of the government of the United States have provided, by the insti¬ 
tution of the Supreme Court, a tribunal for the peaceful settlement of all questions arising under 
the Constitution and the laws; that it is the duty of the states to appeal to it for relief from meas¬ 
ures which they believe unauthorized; and that attempts to throw off the obligations of the Con¬ 
stitution, and to obtain redress by an appeal to arms, can be considered in no other light than as 
levying war against the United States. 

Resolved , That the Constitution of the United States, the basis and the safeguard of the federal 
Union, having been framed and ratified by the original states, and accepted by those which subse¬ 
quently became parties to it, is binding upon all; and that any resumption by any one of them of 
the rights delegated to the federal government, without first seeking a release from its obligations 
through the concurrence of the common sovereignty, is unauthorized, unjust to all the others, and 
destructive of all social and political order. 

Resolved , That when the authority of the federal government shall have been re-established, and 
peaceful obedience to the Constitution and laws prevail, we shall be ready to confer and co-operate 
with all loyal citizens throughout the Union, in Congress or in Convention, for the consideration 
of all supposed grievances, the redrew of all wrongs, and the protection of every right, yielding our¬ 
selves, and expecting all others to yield, to the will of the whole people as constitutionally and law¬ 
fully expressed. 

Resolved, That it is the duty of all good citizens, overlooking past differences of opinion, to con¬ 
tribute by all the means in their power to maintain the union of the states, to defend the Constitu¬ 
tion, to preserve the national flag from insult, and uphold the authority of the government against 
acts of lawless violence, which, if longer unresisted, would inevitably end in breaking down all the 
barriers erected by our fathers for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and involve the coun¬ 
try in universal anarchy and confusion. 

Resolved, That a committee of twenty-five, to be nominated by the president, be appointed by 
this meeting to represent the citizens in the collection of funds and the transaction of such other 
business in aid of the movements of the government as the public interests may require. 








THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


97 


1861.] 

battle for the liberties of our country and of mankind; faint not, falter not, 
but move onward in one great column for the maintenance of the Constitu¬ 
tion and the Union. Remember it was a Southern man, a noble son of 
Kentucky, who so gloriously sustained the flag of our country at Fort Sum¬ 
ter, and never surrendered that flag. lie brought it with him to New York, 
and there it is, held in the hands of Washington, in that marble column now 
before us representing the Father of his Country, and whose lips now open 
and urge us, as in his Farewell Address, to maintain the Constitution and 
the Union. And now, while I address you, the news comes that the city 
of Washington, founded by the Father of his Country and bearing his sa¬ 
cred name, is to be seized by the legions of disunion. Never, never must 
or shall this disgrace befall us. That capital must and shall be defended, if 
it requires every Union man in America to march to its defense. And now, 
then, fellow-citizens, a desperate effort is made to make this a party question 
—a question between Democrats and Republicans. Well, fellow-citizens, I 
have been a Democrat all my life, and never scratched a Democratic ticket, 
from Constable up to President, but say to you this is no party question. 
It is a question of a maintenance of the government and the perpetuation of 
the Union. The vessel of state is rushing upon the breakers, and, without 
asking who may be the commander, we must all aid in her rescue from im¬ 
pending disaster. When the safety of my country is involved, I will never 
ask who is President, nor inquire what may be the effect on parties of any 
particular measure. Much as I love my party, I love my country infinitely 
more, and must and will sustain it at all hazards. Indeed, it is due to the 
great occasion here frankly to declare that, notwithstanding my earnest oppo¬ 
sition to the election of Mr. Lincoln, and my disposition most closely to scru¬ 
tinize all his acts, I see thus far nothing to condemn in his efforts to main¬ 
tain the Union. And now, then, my countrymen, one word more before I 
close. I was trained in devotion to the Union by a patriot sire, who fought 
the battles of liberty during the war of the Revolution. My life has been 
given to the support of the Union. I never conceived a thought, or wrote 
or uttered a word, except in its defense. And now let me say that this 
Union must, will, and shall be perpetuated; that not a star shall be dimmed 
or a stripe erased from our banner; that the integrity of the government 
shall be preserved, and that, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the Lakes 
of the North to the Gulf of Mexico, never shall be surrendered a single acre 
of our soil or a drop of its waters.” 

Conclusive, comprehensive, and untemporizing as this speech was,it lack¬ 
ed the fervor which animated the great body of the loyal men in those days, 
and which found expression in the words of others who spoke for and to 
that immense multitude. Among these were two who afterward gave their 
lives in the defense of the republic. Edward Dickinson Baker was born a 
British subject. A native of London, he came to the United States in his 
boyhood, and, going to Illinois nearly forty years before these troublous 
times, be grew to man’s estate in and with the rising West. Ilis mind was 
active and powerful; to his professional reading of the law he added an un¬ 
usual cultivation of letters; and a remarkable energy of character raised him 
steadily to distinction. Attracted to political life, he adhered from the be¬ 
ginning to those principles of freedom which it is the glory of the English 
race on both sides of the Atlantic to have asserted and maintained consist¬ 
ently with the stability of society and the best conditions of human progress; 
the notable and unmistakable exception being those places in which the per¬ 
petuation of slavery produced its inevitable results—oligarchical rule, and 
a society at once controlled and disturbed by violence. Senator Baker had 
followed General Scott as colonel of a volunteer regiment in the Mexican 
war, in which he served with distinction. He lived for some years in the 
chaotic but rapidly self-organizing society of California, and finally settled in 
Oregon, from which state he took his seat as senator in 1859. Believing 
that, although in the states where slavery was already established it was im¬ 
movable except by the action of the people of those states, the future addi¬ 
tions to the great republic should be consecrated to free soil, free speech, and 
free men, he attached himself to the Republican party, and gave it the zeal¬ 
ous and untiring support which sprung from his earnest convictions and en¬ 
ergetic character. With this creed and this experience, and with his ardent 
temperament fired by the outrages at Fort Sumter, Harper’s Ferry, Ports¬ 
mouth Navy Yard, and Baltimore, and his sympathetic nature roused by the 
excitement of the community in which he found himself, he thus broke forth 
in burning words, thus pledged the honor which he well maintained, and the 
life which, ere long, all vainly he gave up: 

“The majesty of the people is here to-day to sustain the majesty of the 
Constitution, and I come, a wanderer from the far Pacific, to record my oath 
along with yours of the great Empire State. The hour for conciliation has 
passed, the gathering for battle is at hand, and the country requires that ev¬ 
ery man shall do his duty. Fellow-citizens, what is that country ? Is it the 
soil on which we tread? Is it the gathering of familiar faces? Is it our 
luxury, and pomp, and pride? Nay, more than these, is it power, and might, 
and majesty alone? No, our country is more, far more than all these. The 
country which demands our love, our courage, our devotion, our heart’s 
blood, is more than all these. Our country is the history of our fathers—our 
country is the tradition of our mothers—our country is past renown—our 
country is present pride and power—our country is future hope and destiny 
—our country is greatness, glory, truth, constitutional liberty—above all, 
freedom forever! These are the watchwords under which we fight; and we 
will shout them out till the stars appear in the sky, in the stormiest hour of 
battle. I have said that the hour for conciliation is past. It may return; 
but not to-morrow, nor next week. It will return when that tattered flag is 
avenged. It will return when rebel traitors are taught obedience and sub¬ 
mission. It will return when the rebellious confederates are taught that the 


North, though peaceable, are not cowardly—though forbearing, are not fear¬ 
ful. That hour of conciliation will come back when again the ensign of the 
republic will stream over every rebellious fort of every confederate state. 
Then, as of old, the ensign of the pride and power, and dignity and majesty, 
and the peace of the republic will return. Young men of New York—young 
men of the United States—you are told this is not to be a war of aggression. 
In one sense that is true; in another, not. We have committed aggression 
upon no man. In all the broad land, in their rebel nest, in their traitors’ 
camp, no truthful man can rise and say that he has ever been disturbed, 
though it be but for a single moment,in life, liberty, estate, character, or hon¬ 
or. The day they began this unnatural, false, wicked, rebellious warfare, 
their lives were more secure, their property more secure, by us—not by them¬ 
selves, but by us—guarded far more securely than any people* ever have had 
their lives and property secured from the beginning of the world. We have 
committed no oppression, have broken no compact, have exercised no un¬ 
holy power; have been loyal, moderate, constitutional, and just. We are a 
majority of the Union, and we will govern our own Union, within our own 
Constitution, in our own way. We are all Democrats. We are all Repub 
licans. We acknowledge the sovereignty of the people within the rule of 
the Constitution, and under that Constitution and beneath that flag let trai¬ 
tors beware. In this sense, then, young men of New York, we are not for a 
war of aggression. But in another sense, speaking for myself as a man who 
has been a soldier, and as one who is a senator, I say, in the same sense, I am 
for a war of aggression. I propose to do now as we did in Mexico—con¬ 
quer peace. I propose to go to Washington and beyond. I do not design 
to remain silent, supine, inactive, nay,fearful, until they gather their battal 
ions and advance their host upon our borders or in our midst. I would 
meet them upon the threshold, and there, in the very state of their power, 
in the very atmosphere of their treason, I propose that the people of this 
Union dictate to these rebels the terms of peace. It may take thirty mil¬ 
lions; it may take three hundred millions. What then? We have it. Loy¬ 
ally, nobly, grandly do the merchants of New York respond to the appeals 
of the government. It may cost us seven thousand men. It may cost us 
seventy-five thousand men in battle; it may cost us seven hundred and fifty 
thousand men. What then? We have them. The blood of every loyal 
citizen of this government is dear to me. My sons, my kinsmen, the young 
men who have grown up beneath my eye and beneath my care, they, are all 
dear to me; but if the country’s destiny, glory, tradition, greatness, freedom, 
government, written constitutional government—the only hope of a free peo¬ 
ple— demand it, let them all go. I am not here now to speak timorons 
words of peace, but to kindle the spirit of manly, determined war. I speak 
in the midst of the Empire State, amid scenes of past suffering and past glo¬ 
ry : the defenses of the Hudson above me, the battle-field of Long Island 
before me, and the statue of Washington in my very face—the battered and 
unconquered flag of Sumter waving in his hands, which I can almost now 
imagine trembles with the excitement of battle. And as I speak, I sav my 
mission here to-day is to kindle the heart of New York for war—short, sud¬ 
den, bold, determined, forward war. The Seventh Regiment has gone; let 
seventy and seven more follow. Of old, said a great historian, beneath the 
banner of the Cross, Europe precipitated itself upon Asia. Beneath the ban¬ 
ner of the Constitution let the men of the Union precipitate themselves upon 
disloyal, rebellious confederate states. A few more words, and I have done. 
Let no man underrate the dangers of this controversy. Civil war, for the 
best of reasons upon the one side and the worst upon the other, is always 
dangerous to liberty, always fearful, always bloody; but, fellow-citizens, 
there are yet worse things than fear, than doubt and dread, and danger and 
blood. Dishonor is worse. Perpetual anarchy is worse. States forever 
commingling and forever severing are worse. Traitors and secessionists are 
worse. To have star after star blotted out—to have stripe after stripe ob¬ 
scured—to have glory after glory dimmed—to have our women weep aud 
our men blush for shame throughout generations yet to come—that and 
these are infinitely worse than blood. People of New York, on the eve of 
battle allow me to speak as a soldier. Few of you know, as my career has 
been distant and obscure, but I may mention it here to-day with a generous 
pride, that it was once my fortune to lead your gallant New York regiment 
in the very shock of battle. I was their leader, and upon the bloody heights 
of Cerro Gordo I know well what New York can do when her blood is up. 
Again, once more, when we march, let us not march for revenge. As yet 
we have nothing to revenge. It is not much that where that tattered flag 
waved, guarded by seventy men against ten thousand—it is not much that 
starvation effected what an enemy could not compel. We have as yet some¬ 
thing to punish, but nothing, or very little, to revenge. The President him¬ 
self, a hero without knowing it—and I speak from knowledge, having known 
him from boyhood—the President says, ‘ There are wrongs to be redressed, 
already long enough endured;’ and we march to battle and to victory be¬ 
cause we do not choose to endure this wrong any longer. They are wrongs 
not merely against us; not against you, Mr.President, not against me, but 
against our sons and against our grandsons that surround us. They are 
wrongs against our ensign; they are wrongs against our Union; they are 
wrongs against our Constitution ; they are wrongs against human hope and 
human freedom; and thus, if it be avenged, still, as Burke says, ‘ it is a wild 
justice at last,’ and we will revenge them. While I speak, following in the 
wake of men so eloquent, so conservative, so eminent, so loyal, so well known 
—even while I speak, the object of your meeting is accomplished ; upon the 
wings of the lightning it goes out throughout the world that New York, the 
very heart of a great city, with her crowded thoroughfares, her merchants, 
her manufacturers, her artists—that New York,by one hundred thousand of 
her people, declares to the country and to the world that she will sustain the 





98 


[ 1861 . 


government to the last dollar in her treasury—to the last drop of your blood. 
The national banners leaning from ten thousand windows in your city to¬ 
day proclaim your affection and reverence for the Union. You will gather 
in battalions, 

“ ‘ Patient of toil, serene amid alarms, 

Inflexible in faith, invincible in arms;’ 

and as you gather, every omen of present concord and ultimate peace will 
surround you. The ministers of religion, the priests of literature, the histo¬ 
rians of the past, the illustrators of the present, capital, science, art, invention, 
discoveries, the works of genius—all these will attend us in our march, and 
we will conquer. And if, from the far Pacific, a voice feebler than the fee¬ 
blest murmur upon its shore may be heard to give you courage and hope in 
the contest, that voice is yours to-day ; and if a man whose hair is gray, who 
is well-nigh worn out in the battle and toil of life, may pledge himself on 
such an occasion and in such an audience, let me say, as my last w r ord, that 
when, amid sheeted fire and flame, I saw and led the hosts of New York as 
they charged in contest upon a foreign soil for the honor of your flag, so 
again, if Providence shall will it, this feeble hand shall draw a sword, never 
yet dishonored, not to fight for distant honor in a foreign land, but to fight 
for country, for home, for law, for government, for Constitution, for right, for 
freedom, for humanity, and in the hope that the banner of my country may 
advance, and wheresoever that banner waves, there glory may pursue and 
freedom be established.” 

Few among the more intelligent and cultivated of the throng that he ad¬ 
dressed did not respect the reputation of Ormsby M'Knight Mitchell; but 
probably no one of them expected from the eminent mathematician and as¬ 
tronomer, the superintendent of the Dudley Observatory, such an impassion¬ 
ed and stirring appeal as he made to them, such an earnest warning, and such 
a demand for instant, energetic action. What he was he told himself. A 
native of one slave state, born of parents who were natives of another, a res¬ 
ident of a free state (like many of his military fellow-students and quondam 
brother officers who had disowned and deserted the flag of the government 
which had bred and fed them), loving kindred and neighbors, and honoring 
the commonwealth of which he was a member, lie yet disavowed any alle¬ 
giance except to the republic, and thus, in his speech and in himself, he was 
a typical man for the times and the occasion. The hearts of all that great 
congregation went with him as he spoke these words: “I am infinitely in¬ 
debted to you for this evidence of your kindness. I know I am a stranger 
among you. 1 have been in your state but a little while; but I am with 
you, heart and soul, and mind and strength, and all that I have and am be¬ 
longs to you and our common country, and to nothing else. I have been 
announced to you as a citizen of Kentucky. Once I was, because I was 
born there. I love my native state as you love your native state. I love 
my adopted state of Ohio as you love your adopted state, if such you have; 
but, my friends, I am not a citizen now of any state. I owe allegiance to no 
state, and never did, and, God helping me, I never will. I owe allegiance 
to the government of the United States. A poor boy, working my way with 
my own hands, at the age of twelve turned out to take care of myself as best 
1 could, and beginning by earning but $4 per month, I worked my way on¬ 
ward until this glorious government gave me a chance at the Military Acad¬ 
emy at West Point. There I landed with a knapsack on my back, and, I 
tell you God’s truth, just a quarter of a dollar in my pocket. There I swore 
allegiance to the government of the United States. I did not abjure the 
love of my own state, nor of my adopted state, but all over that rose proud¬ 
ly triumphant and predominant my love for our common country. And 
now to-day that common country is assailed, and, alas! alas! that I am com¬ 
pelled to say it, it is assailed in some sense by my own countrymen. My 
father and my mother were from Old Virginia, and my brothers and sisters 
from Old Kentucky. I love them all; I love them dearly. I have my 
brothers and friends down in the South now, united to me by the fondest 
ties of love and affection. I would take them in my arms to-day with all 
the love that God has put into this heart; but if I found them in arms, I 
would be compelled to smite them down. You have found officers of the 
army who have been educated by the government—who have drawn their 
support from the government for long years—who, when called upon by their 
country to stand for the Constitution and for the right, have basely, igno- 
miniously, and traitorously either resigned their commissions, or deserted to 
traitors, rebels, and enemies. What means all this? How can it be possi¬ 
ble that men should act in this way? There is no question but one. If we 
ever had a government and Constitution, or if we ever lived under such, have 
we ever recognized the supremacy of right? I say, in God’s name, why not 
recognize it now? Why not to-day ? Why not forever? Suppose those 
friends of ours from old Ireland—suppose he who has made himself one of 
us, when a war should break out against his own country, should say, 1 1 
can not fight against my own countrymen,’ is he a citizen of the United 
States? They are no countrymen longer when war breaks out. The rebels 
and the traitors in the South we must set aside; they are not our friends. 
When they come to their senses, we will receive them with open arms; but 
till that time, while they are trailing our glorious banner in the dust, when 
they scorn it, condemn it, curse it, and trample it under foot, then I must 
smite. In God’s name I will smite, and as long as I have strength I will do 
it. Oh, listen to me, listen to me! I know these men; I know their cour¬ 
age ; I have been among them ; I have been with them ; I have been reared 
with them ; they have courage; and do not you pretend to think they have 
not. I tell you what it is, it is no child’s play you are entering upon. They 
will fight, and with a determination and a power which is irresistible. Make 
up your mind to it. Let every man put his life in his hand, and say, 1 There 
is the altar of my country; there I will sacrifice my life.’ I, for one, will 


lay my life down. It is not mine any longer. Lead me to the conflict. 
Place me where I can do my duty. There I am ready to go, I care not 
where it leads me. * * * * I am ready to fight in the ranks or out of the 
ranks. Having been educated in the Academy; having been in the army 
seven years; having served as commander of a volunteer company for ten 
years, and having served as an adjutant general, I feel I am ready for some¬ 
thing. I only ask to be permitted to act; and, in God’s name, give me some¬ 
thing to do.” The burden which Mitchell solicited was laid upon his shoul¬ 
ders; the sacrifice which he offered was accepted. He died in the service 
of the republic during the coming struggle, but, as we shall hereafter see, 
not before he had led its armies to victory in the very heart of the country 
over which, while he spoke, the rebels, whom he denounced, but whose cour¬ 
age and determination lie sojustly acknowledged, held undisputed sway. If 
that be eloquence which, as has been said, produces the effect desired upon 
those to whom it is addressed, the simple directness of this short speech was 
eloquence itself. It raised all who heard it to such a pitch of enthusiasm 
that they gave vent to their feelings in demonstrations rarely seen in public 
among people of the English race. Tears, sobs, outcries half suppressed, and 
movements showing the deepest agitation, broke forth all around. Such 
moments do not last; our nature could not support them ; and the emotion, 
though not the attention, of the assembly subsided under the discourse of 
speakers less fervid, but perhaps equally patriotic. The presence of certain 
of the men who took an active part on the occasion was justly regarded as 
worthy of special note, for they were known to all as the industrious advo¬ 
cates and apologists of secession hardly more than a week before. One of 
these stands out from among his fellows. The reader has, perhaps, divined 
his name. As Saul was among the prophets, so Fernando Wood appeared 
among the patriots. lie not only appeared, but spoke. What he said was 
in itself of little interest or consequence; but it is noteworthy as indicative 
of the influence of the times upon a man of great sagacity, and boldness, and 
few scruples, who sought to efface by a successful political career the pub¬ 
lished records of a criminal tribunal. He declared it to be his official duty 
to support the Union, the government, the laws, and the flag; as a man, he 
professed that he threw himself into the coming contest with all his power 
and all his might, that the authority of the government and the integrity of 
the republic might be maintained, peaceably if possible, but, if not, forcibly; 
he spontaneously assumed the responsibility of pledging the corporation of 
the city for the sum necessary to fit out a brigade of troops; and, alluding to 
the threats of successful invasion made by the insurgents, lie proclaimed that 
before the confederate flag could fly over Faneuil Hall in Boston, it must be 
carried over the dead bodies of the citizens of New York. 10 Into such a 
well-voiced semblance of patriotism was this man startled by the sight of the 

10 Mayor Wood"s Speech. 

Fellow-Citizens, —The President has announced that Colonel Baker, the gentleman who has 
so eloquently addressed you to-day, proposes to raise a New York brigade, if the state will bear 
the expense of outfit; and here, as mayor of this city, so far as I have the power to speak, I pledge 
for the corporation that sum. When I assumed the duties of the office I have now the honor to 
hold, my official oath was that I would support the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of New York ; and I imply from that that it is not only my duty, as it 
is consistent with my principles and sense of right, to support the Constitution, but the Union, the 
government, the laws, and the flag. And, in the discharge of that duty, I care not what past 
political associations may be severed. I am willing to give up all past prejudices and sympathies 
if in conflict with the honor and interest of my country in this great crisis. I am willing to say 
here that I throw myself entirely into this contest with all my power and with all my might. My 
friends, the greatest man next to Washington that this country has ever produced—"Andrew Jack- 
son—has said that “the Union must and shall be preserved,”and in that connection he has said, 
and it is directly pertinent to the present contest, “the Union must and shall be preserved— 
peaceably if we can, but forcibly if we must.” There arc those of us who have heretofore held 
antagonist positions to what is supposed to be the policy and the principles of this administra¬ 
tion, who are willing to accept that noble declaration of the sacred Jackson as a resort to force 
upon this occasion. Why, gentlemen, what is the nature of your government? Ours is a gov¬ 
ernment of opinion expressed through the laws. The laws, being made bv the people through 
their representatives, are simply the expressions of popular sentiment; and the administrators of 
the laws should be maintained in the exercise of all legal authority. 1 have always advocated a 
strong executive power; because, to be efficient, it requires ample authority, and under our form 
of government, the agent being merely the exponent of the popular will, he should be provided 
with every means to maintain that will. Thus, in maintaining the government, we maintain our¬ 
selves, our inalienable rights, and the basis of free institutions. It is true that individuals retain 
the right of independent criticism, and at the ballot-box have an opportunity to exercise this 
right; yet we arc all bound to abide by the result. These views are pertinent to the occasion, so 
far as the people of the city and state of New York arc concerned. This city is n portion of the 
state, and this state retains its position ns one of the United States of America; therefore we 
must stand by the government, we must obey the laws, we must respect official authority, we 
must respond with alacrity to the calls of patriotism, and, so long as wc may have the strength, 
support the Constitution and the Union. In accordance, then, w ith these views, I have no hesita¬ 
tion in throwing whatever power I may possess in behalf of the pending struggle. If a military 
conflict is necessary, and that military authority can be exercised under the Constitution and con¬ 
sistently with the laws, dreadful ns the alternative may be, we have no recourse except to take up 
arms. In times of great peril great sacrifices are required. When the human frame is upon the 
verge of death, every effort of skill and the most desperate experiments are resorted to to preservo 
life and prevent dissolution. This may be said to be nn apt illustration of the present condition 
of the body politic. In the expression of these views, which I design to be understood as a public 
proclamation in favor of maintaining the authority of government as such, “peaceably if we can, 
but forcibly if wc must,” I desire also to be understood as taking back no sentiment I have ever 
uttered on the political issues of the day. If the Presidential election was to be held over again 
to-morrow, my vote and my sentiments would be unchanged; nor am I to be regarded as coun¬ 
tenancing or justifying mob law or violence. The people themselves have elected or established 
tribunals for the adjudication of offenses against the laws, and all of us are restrained and must 
conform thereto. Every man’s opinion is to be respected ; and he who denies to a fellow-citizen 
the right of independent thought, violates the first principles of republicanism, and strikes a blow 
at the theory of our government. My friends, it has been said here to-day that your flag has been 
insulted. Ay! not only has your flag been insulted, but the late Secretary of War, assuming to 
represent the Confederate States, has said that the confederate flag shall wave over your Capitol 
before the first of May. And, more than that, that the confederate flag shall wave over Faneuil 
Hall in Boston. My friends, before that banner can fly over Faneuil Hall in Boston, it must be 
carried over the dead body of every citizen of New York. In behalf of you I am prepared to say 
here, and, through the press, to our friends of the South, that before that flag shall float over the 
national Capitol, every man, woman, and child would enlist for the war. Gentlemen, I have no 
voice, although the heart, to address you longer. Abler and more eloquent men than myself are 
here. I can only say, therefore, that I am with you in this contest. We know no party now. 
We are for maintaining the integrity of the national Union intact. We are for exhausting every 
power at our command in this great, high, and patriotic struggle; and I call upon every man, 
whatever may have been his position heretofore, whatever may be his individual sympathy now,' 
to make one great phalanx in this struggle, that we may, in the language of the eloquent senator 
who preceded me, proceed to “conquer peace.” My friends, it has been already announced by 
the chairman that the Baltic and other vessels at the foot of Canal Street are ready to take five 
thousand men to-morrow to the capital of Washington. I urge a hearty response to that call, 
that New York may speak trumpet-tongued to the people of the South. 







18611 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


99 



BON. FERNANDO WOOD. 


uprising North. Ere many months had passed events took place which 
tested his sincerity. The excitement of the day on which he appeared in 
such a new character was rendered more profound by the arrival during the 
meeting of news by telegraph that the Seventh Regiment had been attacked 
and cut to pieces in Baltimore. The incident and its effect are noteworthy, 
as showing the disturbed and sensitive state of the public mind, consequent 
chiefly upon the cutting off of the capital and of Baltimore from communi¬ 
cation with the North. The state of apprehension and suspense throughout 
all the region north of the Chesapeake was such that the wildest rumor ob¬ 
tained belief and awoke alarm. The monster meeting did not dissolve, nor 
did the excitement immediately subside upon the adjournment. The peo¬ 
ple clung for a time around the great centre of the day’s impression ; and as 
the shades of evening fell, and they separated toward their homes, the waves 
of popular emotion slowly expanded in widening circles to the remotest 
bounds of the great city, till in the hush of night they gradually subsided. 

But it was not only upon special occasion that awakened patriotism dis¬ 
played itself. The cause of the republic was ever present to men’s minds, 
and they loved to have some symbol of it ever present to their eyes: they 
found that symbol in the flag. The spontaneous raising of the national 
standard immediately after the bombardment of Fort Sumter grandly ush¬ 
ered in the exhibition of the loved emblem in every possible form and 
upon every possible place. Flag-staffs shot up by magic from public 
and private buildings, places of business, and dwelling-houses, tind even 
from the towers and spires of churches, upon some of which the ad¬ 
vance standard of freedom, justice, human progress, and Christian civiliza¬ 
tion appeared supported by the cross that glistened on their highest pinna¬ 
cles. The demand for flags was so great that in one fortnight the price of 
bunting rose one hundred and fifty per cent. The enthusiasm did not stop 
here. Tiny flags were made for badges, and worn as a decoration upon the 
left breast. For a long time hardly a man was seen north of the Poto¬ 
mac and the Ohio without one. The brilliant token of loyalty was easily 
adapted to the flowing lines and varying hues of woman’s costume, and 
the fairer part of the loyal North, with the accustomed tact of the sex, 
moulded the humor of the hour into fashions which gave new piquancy to 


their beauty, and fresh stimulus to the patriotism of their admirers. In this 
fancy they were at once followed, if indeed they had not been preceded, by 
their sisters at the South, who adopted with equal spirit and with almost 
equal unanimity the emblem of rebellion into their costume; so that from 
the great Lakes to the Gulf the entire population were decked in the same 
red, white, and blue, but arranged at the North as to signify devotion to, 
and at the South alienation from, and, in fact, hatred for, the government, 
which, with so much blood and toil, Washington and his compeers had so 
painfully established. Yet throughout the free states, and in the very 
midst of this outburst of patriotic feeling, the well-wishing friends, the 
active partisans, the very paid supporters, spies, and emissaries of the in¬ 
surgents thronged unmolested, and, even when known, almost unheeded. 
The persecutions by which the insurgent party at the South brought about 
an appearance of unanimity in the insurrection will hereafter engage our 
attention; but it may here be appropriately said, once for all, that at the 
North, Southern birth and connection, and even well-known active sym¬ 
pathy with the revolted slaveholders, brought no man barm or even dis¬ 
comfort. Men from the states under control of the insurgents remained at 
the North in the absolute enjoyment of all their rights as citizens of the 
republic. The government at Washington and the people of the North re¬ 
garded the resident of South Carolina and Massachusetts alike as individual 
members of the nation; and they remained alike undisturbed by govern¬ 
ment or people, unless there appeared good reason for believing that they 
were actually engaged in treasonable service against the United States. 
The few acts of violence by the people at the North (and they were so few 
and so trifling as to be almost unworthy of notice) were directed entirely 
against Northern men who affronted the aroused patriotism of their neigh¬ 
bors by an unblushing support of the cause of the insurgents. Two or 
three presses in New England and in Pennsylvania were attacked or threat¬ 
ened, and one man was tarred and feathered and ridden on a rail. To this 
extent only, in a time of war and most intense excitement, did the people 
of the free states emulate the outrages of their fellow-citizens of the slave 
states upon those whose political views were offensive to them—outrages 
committed during a period of thirty years, at intervals of a few days, in some 
part of the extended territory south of Mason and Dixon’s line, sometimes 
perpetrated upon women, and often ending in the maiming and even the 
death of their victims. With this great difference, however, between the 
teacher and the taught, that these few and comparatively unimportant de¬ 
viations from the respect for law and the rights of the citizen, though the 
fruits of such an exceptional public disturbance, were checked by the magis¬ 
trates, and, in one case at least, followed by the trial, condemnation, and pun¬ 
ishment of the offenders, and in all by reparation on the part of the county 
authorities; while the actors in the lynchings and mobbings in the slave 
states, during the peaceful period of thirty years, went about their outrage¬ 
ous business, as all the world well knows, with absolute impunity. But, 
with all this restijaintin the midst of great agitation, there was a strong, and, 
under the circumstances, a not unreasonable determination that people in 
public positions, and particularly the conductors of public journals, should 
exhibit at least an outward loyalty to the government. Most of the newspa¬ 
per offices were surmounted with flag-staffs, and upon these, with few excep¬ 
tions, as upon all others similarly situated, the national colors were raised on 
the Monday after the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The offices at which 
this sign of nationality was not displayed were those of papers in New York 
and Philadelphia, which, during the few months preceding that event, had 
supported the cause of aggressive slavery. Before these offices crowds as¬ 
sembled, and demanded, with no threats of violence, but with good-natured 
determination, that they should show their colors. A few at first refused to 
comply with the demand, but not for many hours. Policy surely counsel¬ 
ed them to yield so trivial a point at such a period; and perhaps fear of 
immediate consequences might have had some effect, though the demand 
was made by laughing and inoffensive throngs, which, in New York at least, 
were surrounded by a police force instructed to preserve order and compe¬ 
tent to restrain violence. 1 A few private persons in the rural districts au¬ 
daciously raised the standard of insurrection, more from a mischievous or a 
party spirit than with any really rebellious purpose. These flags were im¬ 
mediately torn down by the people of the neighborhood when they were 
not taken down by those who raised them; but no injury was done to the 
offenders. Had disaffection been more common it might have provoked a 
warmer resentment; but it was so insignificant that, although the people 
were determined that it should not be openly flaunted, its few displays were 
passed by as of little moment. 

The leaders of the powerful faction which had obtained control of the se¬ 
ceded states having long preceded the government and the people of the 
loyal states in the work of preparation, had given at once the challenge and 
the first blow at Sumter. While these slept, those had worked; and now, 
with the people and the resources of eleven states practically under its con¬ 
trol, and with the larger part of the military material of the republic in its 
possession, the government at Montgomery, upon the appearance of Presi¬ 
dent Lincoln’s war proclamation, had only to maintain the advantage of the 
initiative and proceed at once to active hostilities. To that proclamation 
Mr. Jefferson Davis’s reply was the issuing of proposals to grant letters of 
marque and reprisal against the commerce of the United States. 2 This step 

1 As to the behavior of these crowds in the city of New York I speak from personal observation. 

» Proclamation by Jefferson Davis. 

Where as Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States, has, by proclamation, announced 















100 


did more to provoke the Northern people to wrath than any other which the 
insurgents had yet taken. In the progress of the world toward a more per¬ 
fect humanity, privateering, or the subjecting of private property on the sea 
to capture by any person who for his own advantage chooses to undertake 
the business upon certain conditions, had come to be regarded as little better 
than legalized piracy, a relic of barbarism which should be cast aside with 
the license of pillaging private property upon land, than which it was re¬ 
garded as even less tolerable, because the object of an army is the destruc¬ 
tion of the military power of the enemy, and pillage, even when permitted, 
is but an accidental concomitant of military movements, while it is the sole 
purpose of the privateer. The great powers of Europe had agreed by the 
treaty of Paris to abolish privateering as a means of war, and to this article 
of that treaty the United States had offered to become a party, if those pow¬ 
ers would agree to except all peaceful commerce from the ravages of war. 
But the government of Great Britain was not yet willing to sacrifice to hu¬ 
manity the advantages accruing from the large naval force which it kept up 
in the time of peace; and the government of the United States, having a 
small navy to protect a very large commerce and an extended sea-board, was 
therefore compelled, in self-preservation, to refuse its adherence to this arti¬ 
cle of the treaty. Such being the position of civilized Christendom upon 
this subject, and the people of the United States at the North (where only 
the people could truly be said to exercise a controlling influence upon the 
government) being thus, as ever, in advance of all others upon a question 
of enlarged philanthropy, the assumption by the chief of a junto of rebels 
of the right to license whoever would to rove the seas for the robbery and 
destruction of merchant vessels was looked upon as a monstrous outrage, a 
shameless affront to the intelligence and humanity of the age quite worthy 
of those who, to secure the perpetuity and the extension of slavery, had at¬ 
tempted the destruction of the republic on which rested the hopes of free¬ 
dom for all mankind. The rebel privateers of the future were at once stig¬ 
matized by the universal voice of the free states as pirates; and, sailing un¬ 
der no recognized flag, such, according to the law of nations, they would have 
been, had they put to sea only under circumstances then existing. But 
events were soon to take place, both in America and Europe, which made a 
change in their prospective position. 

Of these events the first was a proclamation, issued on the 19th of April 
by President Lincoln, declaring a blockade of the ports of the seceded states: 
the same act pronounced all privateers in the service of the rebels amenable 
to the laws for the prevention and punishment of piracy. The establish¬ 
ment of a blockade is always a matter of extended international importance, 
as it involves the interests of commerce, and abridges the rights of neutrals. 
In the present case the proclamation proved to be unusually momentous, 
because, according to the code established for themselves by the maritime 
powers of Europe, the right of blockade pertains only to belligerents, bel¬ 
ligerent rights on one side implying the same rights on the other; and there¬ 
fore, according to European dogmas, by this proclamation of blockade the 
government of the United States had at one word raised the insurgents to 
the rank of a belligerent power. It was, indeed, a matter of prime necessity 
to deprive the rebels of the means of replenishing their coffers by the sale 
of their cotton and tobacco to Europe, and to cut off their supplies of arms 
and munitions of war, which end might have been attained, and the inter¬ 
national complications consequent upon an extended blockade avoided, by 
closing the ports of the seceded states to commerce. But the great naval 
and commercial power of Great Britain, acting as ever, even in foreign af¬ 
fairs, with a single eye to its own interests, and limiting its action only by 
its strength, had taken the position that, although in times of tranquillity a 
government may close its ports at pleasure, in time of insurrection it can 
only close ports in the hands of insurgents by effective blockade; 3 or, in 
other words, that while the people of a certain part of any country are obe- 

the intention of invading this confederacy with an armed force, for the purpose of capturing its for¬ 
tresses, and thereby subverting its independence and subjecting the free people thereof to the do¬ 
minion of a foreign power; and whereas it has thus become the duty of this government to repel 
the threatened invasion, and to defend the rights and liberties of the people by all the means which 
the laws of nations and usages of civilized warfare place at its disposal; 

Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, do issue this 
my proclamation, inviting all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high 
seas, to aid this government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application 
for commissions or letters of marque and reprisal, to be issued under the seal of these Confederate 
States. 

And I do further notify all persons applying for letters of marque to make a statement in writ¬ 
ing, giving the name and a suitable description of the character, tonnage, and force of the vessel, 
and the name and place of residence of each owner concerned therein, and the intended number 
of the crew, and to sign said statement, and deliver the same to the Secretary of State or to the 
Collector of any port of entry of these Confederate States, to be by him transmitted to the Secretary 
of State. 

And I do further notify all applicants aforesaid, that before any commission or letter of marque 
is issued to any vessel, the owner or owners thereof, and the commander for the time being, will be 
required to give bond to the Confederate States, with at least two responsible sureties not inter¬ 
ested in such vessel, in the penal sum of five thousand dollars; or if such vessel be provided with 
more than one hundred and fifty men, then in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, with con¬ 
dition that the owners, officers, and crew who shall be employed on board such commissioned ves¬ 
sel shall observe the laws of these Confederate States, and the instructions given to them for the 
regulation of their conduct, that shall satisfy all damages done contrary to the tenor thereof by 
such vessel during her commission, and deliver up the same when revoked by the President of the 
Confederate States. 

And I do further specially enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil and military, under the 
authority of the Confederate States, that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties in¬ 
cident thereto; and I do, moreover, solemnly exhort the good people of these Confederate States, 
as they love their country, as they prize the blessings of free government, as they feel the wrongs 
of the past, and these now threatened in an aggravated form by those whose enmity is more im¬ 
placable, because unprovoked, that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting con¬ 
cord, in maintaining the authority and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating 
all the measures which may be adopted for the common defense, and bv which, under the bless¬ 
ings of Divine Providence, we may hope for a speedy, just, and honorable peace. 

Jn testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Confederate 
States to be affixed, this seventeenth day of April, 1861. 

By the President, (Signed), Jefferson Davis. 

R. Toombs, Secretary of State. 

3 Letter of Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Secretary 
8eward, June 28, 1861. 


[ 1861 . 

dient to their laws and loyal to their government, that government may shut 
them off from commerce, but if those people should defy the law and resist 
the government, it can only exercise this function by a proceeding which 
raises them to the rank of belligerents. By this decision Great Britain, pre¬ 
suming on its naval strength, assumes not only to dictate, in the interests of 
its manufacturers and shipowners, the means by which alone other govern¬ 
ments shall reduce their rebellious citizens to submission, but, in fact, to de¬ 
prive entirely of one means those nations which do not constantly maintain 
a sufficient number of vessels of war to establish an effective blockade of all 
the ports in a rebellious quarter. In such an assumption the government 
of the United States could not acquiesce: the toleration of it in practice by 
any government would be a confession of inability to resist an intrusion 
upon its own sovereign functions; and, to look forward a little, at the extra 
session of Congress which met in July, an act was passed authorizing the 
President to close the ports in the seceded states at his discretion. Ports of 
entry are created in the United States by act of Congress; and the power 
of closing them, like the power of making war, belongs to Congress. But 
President Lincoln, in the emergency of the republic, had assumed the power 
of calling out the militia and commencing hostilities against the rebels; and, 
as far as the internal relations of government were concerned, he might, with 
equal certainty of indemnity, have closed the Southern ports. Had the ports 
been closed, although it was certainly possible that Great Britain might re¬ 
fuse to respect an assumption of power, or even to regard an act of Congress, 
which interfered with the trade of her citizens, yet it may be reasonably 
doubted whether, if the government of the United States had boldly assert¬ 
ed its sovereignty in its own affairs, and made active preparation to main¬ 
tain it, the British government would have defied and insulted that sover¬ 
eignty with the certain prospect of immediate war. But it was thought bet¬ 
ter to avoid this complication of difficulty; a temporizing policy again pre¬ 
vailed ; and instead of a closing of the ports, a blockade was established. 
The privateering and the blockade gave to Great Britain welcome oppor¬ 
tunity of throwing all her moral influence against the preservation of the 
republic, as we shall see hereafter. 

Active hostilities did not immediately commence, and the attention of 
both parties was chiefly turned to the attitude of the border states. With 
a population of five and a half millions, rich, fertile, and extending in a broad 
belt, nearly two hundred miles wide at its narrowest part, between the in- 
surgent slave states and the free, they held in their hands the immediate 
fate of the country. Had they all remained heartily and firmly faithful to 
the cause of the republic, the preponderance of power would have been so 
overwhelming, the advantage of position so great, that the rebellion would 
have had but a short life, and would have been strangled upon the soil which 
gave it birth. They did not take this position; and by their various poli¬ 
cies (various in form, but little divergent in purpose) they swelled the pro¬ 
portions and prolonged the duration of the war, and brought its blood and 
its devastation home to their own fields and firesides. Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri were the debatable 
ground of the first days, and so of the whole war, of the rebellion. Both 
parties appreciated their importance, and both sought to secure them; the 
one, as usual, by a cautious, the other by a daring policy. We have already 
seen how Virginia, if not the most powerful, from her situation the most im¬ 
portant of them all, was, on the first assertion of national authority, and in 
spite of all her previous denunciations oi the course of South Carolina, at 
once thrown into the hands of the insurgents. North Carolina and Ten¬ 
nessee soon followed her. Kentucky and Missouri, distracted between the 
loyalty of the large majority of their people and the strong disaffection of 
their leading politicians, nearly all of whom were heartily in the interests of 
the rebel faction, wavered and temporized, and fell into civil commotion 
within their own borders; and Maryland was saved to the Union and from 
the fate of war only by the patriotism of her governor, and the sagacity and 
decision of his sometimes seeming opponent, but always actual co-worker, 
General Butler. Abandoning Virginia hopelessly to the insurgents, and 
passing her by until the beginning of active hostilities, I follow the imme¬ 
diate fortunes of the insurrection through the other five states upon the 
border. 

The New England general who had so promptly settled the question of 
communication between the North and the national capital by moving di¬ 
rectly upon Annapolis was immediately honored by being placed in com¬ 
mand of a new military department, called the Department of Annapolis, 
which included the country twenty miles on each side of the railway as far 
as Bladensburgh. He established his head-quarters temporarily upon the 
heights commanding the seat of the state government. Whether it was a 
point of honor for the state Legislature not to meet in a town virtually in 
possession of the national authorities, or whether the members were in fear 
that General Butler, who had shown himself to be a man of his word, would 
carry out a threat which he was said to have made, that if they passed an 
Ordinance of Secession he would arrest the whole body, the meeting took 
place on the 27th of April at Frederick City, far westward of the Yankee 
muskets. In his message the governor opposed secession as unprovoked 
and unjustifiable, and advised that the state should array itself on the side 
of Union and peace, that thus it might act as a mediator between the insur¬ 
gents and the government, and transfer the field of battle to other soil. In 
spite of the efforts of an active and disaffected minority, the Legislature de¬ 
cided, by the overwhelming vote of fifty-three to thirteen, that that body had 
not the right to pass an Ordinance of Secession; all efforts to bring about a 
convention of the people, and to place the military affairs of the state in the 







THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


101 


1861.] 


hands of a Board of Safety (both of which measures were pressed by the 
sympathizers with the insurrection), failed; and no more disloyal measure 
was extorted than a strong condemnation of a war of subjugation, and a pro¬ 
test against the military occupation of the state. 4 On the 14th of May the 
Legislature adjourned. In the mean time troops rapidly concentrated under 
the command of General Butler, and on the 5th of May he advanced a force 
within a few miles of Baltimore, and took possession of Relay House, an im- 



BELAY HOU8B. 


portant railway station, which commanded both the passage southward to- 
•ward Washington, and that westward toward Harper’s Ferry.' While here 
he met constant manifestations not only of a rebellious, but of a bloodthirsty 
and vindictive spirit? Two of his officers arrested a man who openly justi¬ 
fied the murderous onset upon the Massachusetts regiment in Baltimore, 
and, according to his official statement, he found well-authenticated evidence 
of an attempt to poison his soldiers by persons who obtained admission to 
his camp in the disguise of pie-peddlers. Upon this discovery, he threatened 
the rebels with the swiftest and most condign punishment for such barbari¬ 
ty ; and he who had, on the score of humanity, withstood the remonstrance 
of his own governor against his offer to put down a threatened insurrection 
of the slaves, reminded his rebellious enemies in a general order that they 
were teaching him a dangerous lesson, and that with a word he could mingle 
death in the food of their every household. 6 His movement toward Balti¬ 
more was the signal for a rapid departure of the rebellious Marylanders of 
that neighborhood westward. They went with such arms as they could 
command; and, at the same time, an attempt was made to send to Harper’s 
Ferry, then in the possession of the insurgents, a steam gun, invented by a 
Mr. Winans, of Baltimore, who expected to effect by it an entire change in 
artillery warfare. But on the 10th General Butler seized this much-talked- 
of weapon on its passage, arrested those who accompanied it, and placed it 
among the less pretending, but, as it proved, more efficient batteries with 
which he commanded the important railway viaduct at what was known as 


the Washington Junction. On the 14th he entered the city of Baltimore 
itself with the Eighth New York Regiment, a detachment of the very Sixth 
Massachusetts which had been attacked three weeks before, and a battery, 
and, marching through the city, undisturbed by the rebellious and cheered 
by the loyal, encamped upon Federal Hill, a high point of ground which 

« Resolution passed in the Maryland Tsyislature, May 10. 

Whereas the war against the Confederate States is unconstitutional and repugnant to civilisa¬ 
tion, and will result in n bloody and shameful overthrow of our institutions; and while recognising 
the obligations of Maryland to the Union, we sympathise with the South in the struggle for their 
rights—for the sake of humanity, we are for peace and reconciliation, and solemnly protest against 
this war, and will take no part in it; 

Resolved , That Maryland implores the President, in the name of God, to cease this unholy war, 
at least until Congress assembles; that Maryland desires and consents to the recognition of the 
independence of the Confederate States. The military occupation of Maryland is unconstitu¬ 
tional, and she protests against it. though the violent interference with the transit of federal troops 
is discountenanced; that the vindication of her rights be left to time and reason, and that a Con¬ 
vention, under existing circumstances, is inexpedient. 

* General Orders, Relay House, May 8,1861. 


commanded both Baltimore and Fort M‘Henry, where he fixed his head¬ 
quarters. Having thus obtained quiet and absolute possession of this im¬ 
portant city, he issued, on the same day, a proclamation, setting forth to the 
Baltimoreans that he was among them to sustain the laws, local as well as 
national; that, preferring to trust to their good faith and loyalty, he had 
come with little more than the guard suited to his rank; that no attempts 
to incite sedition or give aid and comfort to the insurgents would be per¬ 
mitted; and that the formation and drill of bodies of men not part of the 
enrolled militia of the state were forbidden. He invited the citizens to fur¬ 
nish rations for his command at fair prices, and promised that any outrage 
whatever upon person or property by those under his command should be 
visited with rigorous punishment. His tone was forbearing, courteous, and 
kind, but unmistakably firm and earnest. 6 At this proclamation the small 
minority of bitter and desperate secessionists muttered threats and treason 
between their teeth ; but there was general acquiescence, and in some quar¬ 
ters outspoken approbation. The course which it marked out was followed 
with comparative ease; for a great change had taken place in Baltimore and 
its neighborhood since the attack upon the Massachusetts men. In spite of 
the activity, the virulence, and the audacity of the secessionists, the loyal 
citizens found that they were largely in the majority, and that, although the 
greater part of the wealthy and cultivated people, being all slaveholders 
and closely connected with the corresponding class in Eastern Virginia, were 

• General Butler's Proclamation. 

Department of Annapolis, Federal Hill, Baltimore, May 14,1801. 

A detachment of the forces of the federal government under my command have occupied the 
city of Baltimore for the purpose, among other things, of enforcing respect and obedience to the 
laws, as well of the state—if requested thereto by the civil authorities—as of the United States 
laws, which arc being violated within its limits by some malignant and traitorous men, and in 
order to testify the acceptance by the federal government of the fact that the city and all the well- 
intentioned portion of its inhabitants are loyal to the Union and the Constitution, and are to be 
so regarded and treated by all. To the end, therefore, that all misunderstanding of the purpose 
of the government may be prevented, and to set at rest all unfounded, false, and seditious rumors; 
to relieve all apprehensions, if any are felt, by the well-disposed portion of the community, and to 
make it thoroughly understood by all traitors, their aiders and abettors, that rebellious acts must 
cease, I hereby, by the authority vested in me as commander of the Department of Annapolis, of 
which Baltimore forms a part, do now command and make known that no loyal and well-disposed 
citizen will be disturbed in his lawful occupation or business, that private property will not be in¬ 
terfered with by the men under my command, or allowed to be interfered with by others, except 
in so far as it may be used to afford aid and comfort to those in rebellion against the government, 
whether here or elsewhere; all of which property, munitions of war, and that fitted to aid and 
support the rebellion, will be seized and held subject to confiscation, and, therefore, all manufac¬ 
turers of arms and munitions of war are hereby requested to report to me forthwith, so that the 
lawfulness of their occupation may be known and understood, and all misconstruction of their do¬ 
ings be avoided. No transportation from the city to the rebels of articles fitted to aid and support 
troops in the field will be permitted, and the fact of such transportation, after the publication of 
this proclamation, will be taken and received as proof of illegal intention on the part of the con¬ 
signors, and will render the goods liable to seizure and confiscation. 

The government being ready to receive all such stores and supplies, arrangements will be made 
to contract for them immediately, and the owners and manufacturers of such articles of equipment 
and clothing, and munitions of war and provisions, are desired to keep themselves in communica¬ 
tion with the Commissary General, in order that their workshops may be employed for loyal pur¬ 
poses, and the artisans of the city resume and carry on their profitable occupations. 

The acting Assistant Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence of the United States here 
stationed has been instructed to proceed and furnish, at fair prices, 40,000 rations for the use of 
the army of the United States, and farther supplies will be drawn from the city to the full extent 
of its capacity, if the patriotic and loyal men choose so to furnish supplies. 

All assemblages, except the ordinary police, of armed bodies of men, other than those regularly 
organized and commissioned by the State of Maryland, and acting under the orders of the gov¬ 
ernor thereof, for drill and other purposes, are forbidden within the department. 

All officers of the militia of Maryland, having command within the limits of the department, 
are requested to report through their officers forthwith to the general in command, so that he may 
be able to know and distinguish the regularly commissioned and loyal troops of Maryland from 
armed bodies who may claim to be such. 

The ordinary operations of the corporate government of the city of Baltimore and of the civil 

authorities will not be inter¬ 
fered with, but, on the contra¬ 
ry, will be aided by all the 
power at the command of the 
general, upon proper call be¬ 
ing made, and all such author¬ 
ities are cordially invited to 
co-opcrate with the general in 
command to carry out the pur¬ 
poses set forth in the procla- 
mat ion, so that the city of Bal¬ 
timore may be shown to the 
country to be, what she is in 
fact, patriotic and loyal to the 
Union, the Constitution, and 
the laws. 

No flag, banner, ensign, or 
device of the so-called Con¬ 
federate States,oranyof them, 
will be permitted to be raised 
or shown in this department, 
and the exhibition of either 
of them by evil-disposed per¬ 
sons w ill be deemed, and taken 
to be evidence of, a design to 
afford aid and comfort to the 
enemies of the country. To 
make it more apparent that 
the government of the United 
States by far more relies upon 
the loyalty, patriotism, and 
zeal of the good citizens of Baltimore and vicinity than upon any exhibition of force calculated 
to intimidate them into that obedience to the laws which the government doubts not will be paid 
from inherent resect and love of order, the commanding general has brought to the city with him, 
of the many thousand troops in the immediate neighborhood, which might be at once concentrated 
here, scarcely more than An ordinary guard, and, until it fails him, he will continue to rely upon 
that loyalty and patriotism of the citizens of Maryland which have never yet been found wanting 
to the government in time of need. The general in command desires to greet and treat in this 
part of his department all the citizens thereof as friends and brothers, having a common purpose, 
a common loyalty, and a common country. Any infractions of the. laws by the troops under his 
command, or any disorderly, unsoldierlike conduct, or any interference with private property, he 
desires to have immediately reported to him, and pledges himself that if any soldier so far forgets 
himself as to break those laws that he has sworn to defend and enforce, he shall be most rigorous¬ 
ly punished. . 

The general believes that if the suggestions and requests contained m this proclamation are 
faithfully carried out by the co-operation of all good and Union-loving citizens, and peace and 
quiet, and certainty of future pence and quiet arc thus restored, business will resume its accustomed 
channels, trade take the place of dullness and inactivity, efficient labor displace idleness, and Bal¬ 
timore will be in fact, what she is entitled to be, in the* front rank of the commercial cities of the 
nation. 

Given at Baltimore, the day and year herein first above written. 

’ Benj. F. Butler, Brig. General Com. Department of Annapolia. 

E. G. Parrer, Lieutenant Colonel, Aid-de-Camp. 



























102 


[1861 



BAXD-BAQ BATTERY. 



disaffected, a very large and influential minority even of these, including 
men eminent for their talents no less than from their social position, were 
strenuous upholders of the Constitution and the Union. In Western Mary¬ 
land the national flag was raised at Frederick City, at Hagerstown, and else- 


RAISING THE STARS AND STRIPES OVER THE CUSTOM-HOUSE AT BALTIMORE. 


where, with due honors, and loyal defenders thronged around it. On the 
13th of May a train from Philadelphia passed through Baltimore with the 
flag displayed; and the same token of devotion to the undivided republic 
was raised upon many public and private buildings. On the morning of the 

14th, the day of General But¬ 
ler’s arrival, a Pennsylvania reg¬ 
iment, in complete array, passed 
unmolested, and even with some 
tokens of welcome, over the very 
route which three weeks before 
had been the scene of bloody 
conflict. On this day, too, Gov¬ 
ernor Hicks issued his proclama¬ 
tion calling for four regiments 
in compliance with the require¬ 
ment of the President, to serve 
for three months; admitting that 
requirement to be “in the spirit 
and in pursuance of the law,” 
though setting forth, as a salve 
to wounded state pride, the as¬ 
surance of the Secretary of War 
that these troops should serve 
“ within the limits of the State 
of Maryland, or for the defense 
of the capital of the United 
States.” From this day sedition 
and treason gradually, though 
slowly, subsided in Baltimore, 
and lurked in secret places. Vi¬ 
olence was suppressed by law, 
not made for the occasion, though 
supported by a force required by 
circumstances. General Butler, 
who, by his wisdom,his tact, and 
his activity, had so completely 
foiled the plans of the violent se¬ 
cessionists, and sustained a loyal 
state which was in imminent per¬ 
il of being dragooned into seces¬ 
sion, was made a major general, 
and placed in command of a new 
military district, including Vir¬ 
ginia and the two Carolinas, his 
head-quarters being at Fortress 
Monroe; and the Winans steam 
gun, from which so much had 
been hoped on the one side and 
feared on the other, being found 






















































































































1801 .] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


103 



TUE W1NA.NS GUN. 


a harmless monster after all, was fitly sent to Boston—that city so much 
threatened with the visitation of rebellious arms—a trophy. 

At the beginning of the secession movement, hardly le'ss loyal than Ma¬ 
ryland, amid the commotion which followed the issuing of the President’s 
proclamation, Tennessee and North Carolina were swiftly swept into the 
vortex of secession. This was partly because of the larger proportion of 
their slave property, 7 but chiefly because to them were not granted a gov¬ 
ernor like Hicks and a general like Butler. For, at the election which re¬ 
sulted in the choice of President Lincoln, the vote of Tennessee had been 
given for the conservative nominees, John Bell and Edward Everett; and 
although not a ballot had been cast for Lincoln, the people acquiesced in his 
election as the legitimate result of the canvass. But the governor, Isham 
G. Harris, being of the South Carolina school of politicians, at once began 
endeavors to carry the state into the hands of the secessionists. He called 
a special session of the General Assembly, avowedly upon the ground of 
the election of the Republican candidate, and the triumph of a party whose 
bond of union he declared to be uncompromising hostility to the rights and 
institutions of the fifteen Southern States. And here it is well to notice 
that of the fifteen states thus styled Southern, two, Delaware and Maryland, 
being north of the Potomac, belong to the Middle, and one, Missouri, to the 
Western geographical division of the Union. But they were slave states; 
and, in the mouth of slaveholders like Governor Harris, Southern thus used 
meant slave, even when applied to persons. To them a man born upon 
the iciest verge of Maine, if he came to a slave state and sustained slavery, 
was a Southern man ; one born upon the point where Florida pushes itself 
almost within the tropics, if he had doubts as to the wisdom of perpetuating 
and diffusing negro bondage, was no Southerner, but a Yankee abolitionist. 
Governor Harris declared in his message to the Assembly which he had 
called together that these imperiled Southern rights could only be secured 
by the extension of a line to the Pacific, all territory south of which should 
be forever slave territory; by allowing slaveholders to travel and sojourn in 
the free states with their slaves; by the prohibition of the abolition of slav¬ 
ery in the District of Columbia, and all places in slave states under national 
jurisdiction ; and by making these provisions unchangeable, except by con¬ 


sent of all the slave states. Beyond 
these there was only one other demand 
to be made—that the free states should 
adopt slavery and make it perpetual. 
But all the governor’s constituents did 
not think with him. The Legislature 
proved to be strongly conservative, 
and averse to disunion. A Conven¬ 
tion was called, but with sufficient safe¬ 
guards against the juggling or precip¬ 
itation of the state into secession. At 
Nashville a meeting was held in Jan¬ 
uary, at which it was declared by the 
agitators for secession that the “Con¬ 
stitutional Union party,” whose candi¬ 
date Mr. Beil was, had held the doc¬ 
trine that the election of Mr. Lincoln 
would justify the dissolution of the 
Union. Mr. Bell himself, being pres¬ 
ent, rose and denied the charge, and 
his denial called forth cheers from all 
parts of the hall. At the election, on 
the 9th of February, of delegates to 
the Convention, the Union candidates 
were chosen by a majority of more 
than sixty-four thousand; and by a 
majority of nearly twelve thousand 
it was decided that there should not 
even be a Convention. This decision 
was more significant than the very 
majority of four hundred by which 
the Union delegates were elected in 
Memphis, the strong-hold of the aggressive slavery party, because it showed 
an unwillingness on the part of the people even to entertain the question 
of breaking up the Union, or to expose the political fortunes of the state to 
the chances which they must encounter in an assemblage meeting under 
circumstances of great excitement, and liable to be hurried into extreme 
measures, and even diverted from its purpose, by reckless and designing 
men — a disposition which, in the consideration of after-events, it will be¬ 
come us to remember. The President’s proclamation was received with 
general disfavor, and caused such a change in the current of popular feel¬ 
ing that the secessionists, quick to see and to use their advantage, were en¬ 
abled to turn the western tide almost entirely in their favor. We have 
already seen Governor Harris’s defiant refusal to the call for troops. He 
immediately summoned another special session of the Assembly on April 
25th; and an address was at the same time issued to the people of the state 
by some of its most eminent citizens, in which secession was disapproved 
of and the policy of the administration condemned, a refusal of aid to the 
government in its attempt to suppress the rebellion justified, assistance to 
the enemies of the government equally deprecated, and a course of neutral¬ 
ity recommended which should not offend “either party,” but leave to the 
state the grand function of peace-maker between the states of the South and 
the general government. Strange to say, this policy was advocated on the 
ground that any other would transfer the war to the soil of Tennessee, and 
defeat all hopes of reconciliation. 8 The notion that they could assume a 
neutral position, and play the part of mediators between the government 
and the rebellion, took entire possession of such of the leading men of the 
border states as were not at heart with the rebels at the outset. They 
trusted that such a course would lead them safely through the difficulties 
of their position, which, it must be confessed, considering the division of 
their love and interest between slavery and the Union, were great and 
perplexing. It led them only into the very disaster which they sought to 
avoid; and while it brought upon their soil and their people the calami¬ 
ties which they seemed most to dread, it prolonged for the government that 
attitude of timid hesitation which from the beginning had paralyzed its en- 


1 According to the census of 1860, Maryland had a white population of 516,128, and 87,188 
slaves; Tennessee a white population of 826,828, and 275,784 slaves; and North Carolina a 
white population of 631,489, and 331,081 slaves. 

8 Address to the People of Tennessee. 

In the perilous times upon which our country is thrown, we trust it will not be deemed pre¬ 
sumptuous or improper in us to express to our fellow-citizens our united opinion as to the duty of 
the state in this dire emergency. 

We are threatened with a civil war, the dreadful consequences of which, if once fully inaugura¬ 
ted, no language can depict. In view of such consequences, we deem it the duty of every good 
citizen to exert his utmost powers to avert the calamities of such a war. The agitation of the 
slavery question, combined with party spirit and sectional animosity, has at length produced the 
legitimate fruit. The present is no time to discuss the events of the past. The awful presence is 
upon us and the portentous future is hanging over us. There has been a collision, as is known to 
you, at Fort Sumter, between the forces of the seceded states and those of the national govern¬ 
ment, which resulted in the capture of the fort by the army of the Confederate States. In view 
of this event, and of other acts growing out of the secession of seven of the Southern States, the 
President has issued his proclamation calling out the militia of the states of the Union to suppress 
what the proclamation designates a “combination too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary 
course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law.” 

Tennessee is called upon by the President to furnish two regiments, and the state has, through 
her executive, refused to comply with the call. This refusal of our state we fully approve. We 
commend the wisdom, the justice, and the humanity of the refusal. We unqualifiedly disapprove 
of secession, both as a constitutional right and as a remedy for existing evils; we equally condemn 
the policy of the administration in reference to the seceded states. Rut while we, without qualifi¬ 
cation, condemn the policy of coercion as calculated to dissolve the Union forever, and to dissolve 
it in the blood of our fellow-citizens, and regard it as sufficient to justify the state in refusing her 
aid to the government in its attempts to suppress the revolution in the seceded states, we do not 
think it her duty, considering her position in the Union, and in view of the great question of the 
peace of our distracted country, to take sides against the government. Tennessee has wronged no 
state of this Union. She has violated the rights of no state, north or south. She has been loyal 


to all where loyalty was due. She has not brought on this war by any act of hers. She has tried 
every means in her power to prevent it. She now stands ready to do any thing within her reach 
to stop it; and she ought, as we think, to decline joining either party ; for, in so doing, they would 
at once terminate her grand mission of peace-maker between the states of the South and the gen¬ 
eral government. Nay, more; the almost inevitable result would be the transfer of the war with¬ 
in her own borders—the defeat of all hopes of reconciliation, and the deluging of the state with the 
blood of her own people. 

The present duty of Tennessee is to maintain a position of independence—taking sides with the 
Union and the peace of the country against all assailants, whether from the North or South. Her 
position should be to maintain the sanctity of her soil from the hostile tread of any party. 

We do not pretend to foretell the future of Tennessee in connection with the other states or in 
reference to the federal government; we do not pretend to be able to tell the future purposes of 
the President and cabinet in reference to the impending war; but,should a purpose be developed 
by the government of overrunning and subjugating our brethren of the seceded states, we say un¬ 
equivocally that it will be the duty of the state to resist at nil hazards, at any cost, and by arms, 
any such purpose or attempt. And, to meet any and all emergencies, she ought to be fully armed, 
and we would respectfully call upon the authorities of the state to proceed at once to the accom¬ 
plishment of this object. 

Let Tennessee, then, prepare thoroughly and efficicntl for coming events. In the mean time, 
let her, as speedily as she can, hold a conference with her sister slaveholding states yet in the 
Union for the purpose of devising plans for the preservation of the peace of the land. Fellow-cit¬ 
izens of Tennessee, we entreat you to bring yourselves up to the magnitude of the crisis. Look in 
the face impending calamities. Civil war—what is it? The bloodiest and darkest pages of his¬ 
tory answer this question. To avert this, who would not give his time, his talents, his untiring en¬ 
ergy—his all? There may be yet time to accomph\h every thing. Let us not despair. The 
border slave states may prevent this civil war; and why shall they not do it ? 


Nashville, April 18,1861. 


Neil 8. Brown, 
Russell Houston, 
E. H. Ewing, 

C. Johnson, 

John Bell, 

R. J. Meigs, 


S. D. Morgan, 

John S. Brien, 
Andrew Ewing, 
John H. Callender, 
Baillie Peyton. 










































104 


[I86i. 


ergies and developed those of the insurgents. Such neutrality was both 
treason and folly. It was treason, because it sought to disqualify the con¬ 
stitutional government of the republic, the paramount authority in all of its 
affairs, and practically asserted that a commonwealth into which its citizens 
had formed themselves by its consent upon its soil was not an integral part 
of it, but an independent and a sovereign power. For a mediator must be 
independent; a party to a cause can not decide it as a judge; and a declara¬ 
tion of neutrality and the interdiction of the passage of troops are alike the 
attributes only of absolute sovereignty, the admission of the right to which 
would have enabled any state of the Union, at any time and upon any issue, 
to defy with impunity the central authority behind the barrier of a soil de¬ 
clared neutral and impassable by a component part of that very authority. 
Such pretended neutrality, if not making war upon the United States, would 
amply fulfill the constitutional conditions of treason by giving aid and com¬ 
fort to their enemies in the most effective manner, and would make the sup¬ 
pression of insurrection quite impossible. Such neutrality was folly, be¬ 
cause it brought upon the states which adopted it the very calamities which 
they sought to shun. Had the border states, the people of which before the 
fall of Sumter professed, and even showed, a devotion to the Union, declared 
boldly for it, for good or ill, the war, which the vacillation of some and the 
assumed neutrality of others drew inevitably upon their own soil, would in¬ 
stantly have been transferred to that of the Gulf States, to be waged by such 
an overwhelming superiority of force that it would have briefly ended. An 
ambiguous course is always perilous; between two great destructive pow¬ 
ers it is inevitably fatal; and the neutrality of the border states ended in 
such mediation as the neutral grain offers between the upper and the nether 
millstone. In other respects the position assumed by those who first pre¬ 
tended to the direction of these states was no less unreasonable and destruc¬ 
tive. They declared secession to be unjustifiable; and yet, in the same 
breath, denounced the exercise of authority which sought to restrain this 
unjustifiable act as a coercion which they would not endure themselves or 
permit to be applied to others. They demanded that the government should 
wait, and the fate of the nation tremble in the balance, while they debated 
the question in a Border State Convention. They expected that, in any case, 
their terms should be accepted, and in this case they would remain in the 
Union as long as it suited their interests or their inclinations. 

Governor Harris, however, advocated no half-way measures. He recom¬ 
mended to the Assembly the passage of an ordinance declaring Tennessee 
independent of the federal government, and the “ reaffirming” each and every 
function belonging to a separate sovereignty. Thus the governor of a com¬ 
monwealth, whose imperfect political individuality was the mere creature of 
the government and the citizens of the republic, and whose very local Con¬ 
stitution declared that its people had their sovereignty and their right of 
soil only “ so far as is consistent with the Constitution of the United States,” 
could with bare face recommend his constituents to reassume a sovereignty 
which they not only had never possessed, but had never pretended to pos¬ 
sess. Such, however, was the resentment provoked by the forcible assertion 
of its authority by the central government that Governor Harris’s recom¬ 
mendation was followed, and the 8th of June was appointed by the As¬ 
sembly for the vote of the people upon a declaration of independence; but 
long before that time arrived the state had passed out of the control of the 
government at Washington and even of its own people. For, as in Virginia, 


* Resolutions oj a Meeting at Louisville , Kentucky, April 20 th, at which the Hon. James Guthrie 

presided. 

Resolved, 1. That, as the Confederate States have, by overt acts commenced war against the 
United States, without consultation with Kentucky and their sister Southern States, Kentucky re¬ 
serves to herself the right to choose her own position, and that while her natural sympathies are 
with those who have a common interest in the protection of slavery, she still acknowledges her loy¬ 
alty and fealty to the government of the United States, which she will cheerfully render until that 
government becomes aggvessive, tyrannical, and regardless of our rights in slave property. 

2. That the national government should be tried by its acts, and that the several states, as its 
peers in their appropriate spheres, will hold it to a rigid accountability, and require that its acts 
should be fraternal in their efforts to bring back the seceding states, and not sanguinary or coercive. 

3. That, as we oppose the call of the President for volunteers for the purpose of coercing the se¬ 
ceding states, so we oppose the raising of troops in this state to co-operate with the Southern Con¬ 
federacy when the acknowledged intention of the latter is to march upon the City of Washington 
and capture the Capitol, and when, in its march thither, it must pass through states which have 
not yet renounced their allegiance to the Union. 

4. That secession is a remedy for no evil, real or imaginary, but an aggravation and complica¬ 
tion of existing difficulties. 

5. That the memories of the past, the interests of the present, and the solemn convictions of fu¬ 
ture duty and usefulness in the hope of mediation, prevent Kentucky from taking part with the 
seceding states against the general government. 

6. That “the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position, taking 
sides not with the administration, nor with the seceding states, but with the Union against them 
both, declaring her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either, and, if necessary, to make the 
declaration good with her strong right arm.” 

7. That, to the end Kentucky may be prepared for any contingency, “we would have her arm 
herself thoroughly at the earliest practicable moment,” by regular legal action. 

8. That we look to the young men of the Kentucky State Guard as the bulwarks of the safety 
of our commonwealth, and that we conjure them to remember that they are pledged equally to 
fidelity to the United States and Kentucky. 

9. That the Union and the Constitution, being mainly the work of Southern soldiers and states¬ 
men, in our opinion furnish a surer guaranty for “ Southern Rights” than can be found under any 
other system of government yet devised by men. 

10 To the People of Kentucky. 

Having been elected by you ns your delegates to “a Convention of the border slave states and 
such other slave states as have not passed Ordinances of Secession,” with power to meet with del¬ 
egates from other states in convention, “ to consult on the critical condition of the country, and 
agree upon some plan of adjustment;” and having met at Frankfort, on the 27th of May, in pur¬ 
suance of the act, we deem it proper to inform you, briefly, of what was done by us in the Con¬ 
vention. 

It was a matter of regret to us that, while the call for this Convention originated in Virginia, 
and had, apparently, the concurrence of all the border slave states, yet there were delegates in at¬ 
tendance from Kentucky and Missouri only. One representative chosen by the counties of M ‘Minn 
and Sevier, in Tennessee, appeared, and, although not coming with such credentials as were nec¬ 
essary to constitute him a delegate, he was invited to participate in our deliberations. 

After a continuous session from day to day, during which the condition of the country, and the 
various causes that led to it, were maturely considered, it was resolved that the Convention should 
address an appeal to the people of the United States, and the delegates from Kentucky determined 
to present to you a separate address, in which views of your members should be embodied. In the 
discharge of this duty we now attempt to address you. 


there was a league formed with the insurgents through a commissioner from 
them; and the whole military force of the state, and all the property and 
munitions of war which it had “ acquired” from the United States, were 
turned over to the government at Montgomery. Simultaneously with the 
ratification of this league, an act was passed authorizing the governor to raise 
a force of fifty-five thousand men. This he proceeded at once to do; and, 
to look forward a few weeks to the consummation of this scheme, the 8th of 
June saw the whole state filled with the armed emissaries of the insurgent 
government; and, except in East Tennessee, denunciation and intimidation 
had done their work so thoroughly that the very people who had given a 
majority of more than sixty-four thousand against secession, now gave a 
majority of more than fifty-seven thousand for it—or seemed to give; for it 
was openly charged that this result bad been brought about not without 
fraud, and the open acts of those who had obtained control of the state were 
such as to justify this accusation against their secret practices. 

It is needless to follow closely the steps by which North Carolina trod the 
road of treason to the Constitution. Let the names be changed, and the story 
of Tennessee’s defection is substantially hers also. She pursued with some¬ 
what more celerity the same course with her sister slave state upon her 
western border, and by the 20th of May she had thrown herself without re¬ 
serve, for better for worse, into the arms of the insurgent government. Nor 
would the fate of Kentucky and Missouri, in which the emissaries and the 
well-wishers of the rebels played the same part which they had assumed with 
such success in Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, be worthy of par¬ 
ticular attention, were it not that in those states their machinations were un¬ 
successful. Kentucky, though of her eleven hundred thousand inhabitants 
more than two hundred and fifty thousand were negro slaves, and although 
she was bound by strong ties to Virginia, numbered among her people a large 
proportion of noble men who were ready to give themselves and all that 
they then had for the imperiled existence of the republic. It is true that 
the majority of her political leaders, and perhaps even of her citizens, were 
so far infected with the poison of state sovereignty that they condemned a 
policy of coercion, and declared that her duty was to maintain an independ¬ 
ent and neutral position between the contending parties, declaring, as they 
did declare, “her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either, and, if 
necessary, to maintain this neutrality by arms.” * 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 But while they were thus 
distracted by the conflicting claim* of divided duty, even the warmest par¬ 
tisans of state sovereignty and slavery deplored the precipitation, while the 
majority denounced the contumacy, and all resented the arrogance of the 
South Carolina politicians, by whom this distressing dilemma had been pre¬ 
pared. At the election on the 4th of May for delegates to the Border State 
Convention, the Union nominees were chosen by a majority of two to one. 
At the Convention itself, which was held on the 27th of the same month, 
only Kentucky and Missouri were represented, and an address was issued to 
the people of Kentucky by her delegates, headed by the venerable Mr. Crit¬ 
tenden, declaring that the crisis presented the grand commanding question, 
Union or no Union, Government or no Government, Nationality or no Na¬ 
tionality; that the coming war was unnecessary, and resulted from the am¬ 
bition of a few rather than the wrongs done to the people; and that Ken¬ 
tucky would continue loyal to the Constitution, the government, and the 
flag of the United States, and refuse alliance with any who would destroy 
the Union. 1 * On the 30th of June the election for representatives to Con- 


Your state, on a deliberate consideration of her responsibilities—moral, political, and social— 
has determined that the proper course for her to pursue is to take no part in the controversy be¬ 
tween the government and the seceded states but that of mediator and intercessor. She is unwil¬ 
ling to take up arms against her brethren residing either north or south of the geographical line by 
which they are unhappily divided into warring sections. This course was commended to her by 
every consideration of patriotism, and by a proper regard fur her own security. It does not result 
from timidity; on the contrary, it could only have been adopted by a brave people—so brave that 
the least imputation on their courage would be branded as false by their written and traditional 
history. 

Kentucky was right in taking this position, because, from the commencement of this deplorable 
controversy, her voice was for reconciliation, compromise, and peace. i>hc had no cause of com¬ 
plaint against the general government, and made none. The injuries she sustained in her prop¬ 
erty from a failure to execute laws passed for its protection, in consequence of illegal interference 
by wicked and deluded citizens in the free states, she considered as wholly insufficient to justify a 
dismemberment of the Union. That she regarded as no remedy for existing evils, but an aggra¬ 
vation of them all. She witnessed, it is true, with deep concern, the growth of a w ild and frenzied 
fanaticism in one section, and a reckless and defiant spirit in another, both equally threatening 
destruction to the country, and tried earnestly to arrest them, but in vain. We will not stop to 
trace the causes of the unhappy condition in which we are now placed, or to criminate either of 
the sections to the dishonor of the other, but can say that wc believed both to have been wrong, 
and, in their madness and folly, to have inaugurated a war that the Christian world looks upon 
with amazement and sorrow, and that Liberty, Christianity, and Civilization stand appalled at the 
horrors to which it will give rise. 

It is a proud and grand thing for Kentucky to stand up and say, as she can, truthfully, in the 
face of the world, “ We had no hand in this thing ; our skirts are clear.” And, in looking at the 
terrorism that prevails elsewhere—beholding freedom of speech denied to American citizens, their 
homesteads subjected to lawless visitation, their property confiscated, and their persons liable to in¬ 
carceration and search—how grandly does she not loom up, as she proclaims to the oppressed and 
miserable. We offer you a refuge! Here, constitutional law, and respect for individual rights, 
still exist! Here is an asylum where loyalty to the name, nation, and flag of the Union pre¬ 
dominates; and here is the only place, in this lately great republic, where true freedom remains— 
that freedom for which our fathers fought—the citizen being free to speak, write, or publish any 
thing he may wish,'responsible only to the laws, and not controlled by the violence of the mob. 

Is not this an attitude worthy of a great people, and do not her position and safety require her 
to maintain it? If she deviates from it; if she suffers herself, in a moment of excitement, to be 
led off by sympathy with one side or the other—to ally herself with either section—inevitable and 
speedy ruin must fall upon her. What reason can be urged to incline her to such a fatal step? 
She is still, thank God, a member of the Union, owing constitutional allegiance to it—an allegiance 
voluntarily given, long maintained, and from which she has derived countless benefits. Can she, 
by her own act, forfeit this allegiance, and by the exercise of any constitutional power sever her¬ 
self from that government? In our opinion the statement of the projiosition insures its rejection. 
It is of no more rational force than the argument of the suicide to commit self-slaughter. Seces¬ 
sion is not a right. That the right of revolution exists is as true in states ns the right of self- 
defense is true of individuals. It does not exist by virtue of legal ennetment or constitutional 
provision, but is founded in the nature of things—is inalienable and indestructible, and ought to 
be resorted to only when all peaceable remedies fail. Revolution is an extreme remedy, finds its 
justification alone in an escape from intolerable oppression, and, hazarding the consequences of 
failure, as success or defeat makes the movement one of rightful resistance or rebellion, it becomes 
the stern duty of Kentucky to look not only to the motives that might impel her to revolt, but to 
the probable results. She must contemplate her condition in a complex character—national and 
state—and see what must be her fate in the event of a separation. 







THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


105 


1861.] 

gress took place, the issue presented being between Union on the one side, 
and States Rights on the other; when the Union delegates were elected by 
an overwhelming majority, the State Rights men having polled but a few 
more than one quarter of the ballots. 

Leaving Kentucky thus firmly bound to the fortunes of the republic, 
though with her patriotism chilled by the affectation of a cold neutrality’ 
we turn our eyes upon Missouri, the state whose political birth forty yearn 
before had been ushered in by the inauspicious omens of the tremendous 
conflict in which she was now summoned to take a part. Were it not that 
fanaticism, whether in a good cause or a bad, always forgets or disregards 
the obligations and even the teachings of the past, the people of Missouri 
could not for a moment have been led by the delusions of state sovereignty 
into the denial of a paramount allegiance to the constitutional government 
of the republic; for there were men still living within her borders who 
could remember that at the time of her admission as one of the common¬ 
wealths entitled to a voice in that government, it was at Washington, and 
not at St. Louis or at Jackson City, that it was decided whether her Consti¬ 
tution should protect the institution of negro slavery. But a population 
which furnished the border ruffians who undertook to decide, and who, in a 
struggle of four years, so nearly decided, by the bowie-knife and the revolver, 
the political and social future of a neighboring community, could not but 
include a large number of men who would hasten to serve the cause they 
had most at heart, in the company of the great body of its devotees, and to 
dignify their former violence by making it appear the first step in a great 
revolution. These men were not wanting to their faction or to themselves. 
They took the field at once with the spirit and the audacity which had 
marked the movements of the insurgents from the beginning; and Clai¬ 
borne Jackson, governor of the state, was at their head. Governor Jackson 
came into office on the 4th of January ; and in his inaugural message he did 
not hesitate at taking the extreme ground that Missouri must stand by the 
other slave states, whatever course they might pursue. A Convention was 
called; but Union delegates were elected by large majorities; and the usual 
commissioner from the insurgents having pleaded the cause of the rebellion 
before it, he was informed by resolution that Missouri refused to join her 
fortunes with the states represented at Montgomery. In the resolutions, 
which were the result of the deliberations for which the Convention was call¬ 
ed together, it was declared unanimously that the state had no cause for dis¬ 
solving her connection with the Union ; but another was passed by the large 
majority of eighty-nine to six, recommending, as a means of avoiding civil 
war, the withdrawal of the federal forces from the forts where collision with 
the insurgents might be apprehended. * 1 Thus, indeed, might civd war have 


Under the national government, she has a right to the protection of thirty-three great states, 
and with them, thus protected, can defy the world in arms. Under it, she becomes prosperous 
and happy. Deprived of it, she finds herself exposed to imminent danger. She has a border 
front on the Ohio River of near seven hundred miles, with three powerful states on that border. 
She has four hundred miles on the south, by which she is separated from Tennessee by a merely 
conventional line. Her eastern front is on Virginia, and part of her western on Missouri, thus 
making her antagonistic, in the event of collision, to Virginia, which is our mother, and to Mis¬ 
souri, which is our daughter. Hemmed in thus on every side by powers, each one of which is 
equal to her own, her situation, and her sense of loyalty to the Union, imperatively demand of her 
to insist on the integrity of the Union, its Constitution, and government. Pence is of vital conse¬ 
quence to her, and can only be secured to her by preserving the Union inviolate. Kentucky has 
no cause of quarrel with the Constitution, and no wish to quarrel with her neighbors, hut abundant 
reason to love both. Of the great West she was the pioneer, and became the starting-point of 
emigration to all around her. There is not a Western or a Southwestern state in which Kentucky 
families are not settled, and she is bound to all by tics of interest and brotherhood. She has ever 
been loyal to the government, answering to its requisitions and sharing its burdens. At the com¬ 
mand of that government, when war was declared to protect the rights of sailors, although she had 
no vessels to float on the ocean, yet she offered up her blood freely in the common defense from 
the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. Again, when war, growing out of a territorial controversy, far 
from her own borders, was proclaimed, she was among the foremost in the fight, and Monterey nnd 
Buena Vista were made famous in history by the valor of Kentuckians. Never has she faltered in 
her duty to the Union. 

In declining to respond to a call made by the present administration of the government, and one 
that we have reason to believe would not have been made if the administration had been fully ad¬ 
vised of the circumstances by which we were surrounded, Kentucky did not put herself in factions 
opposition to her legitimate obligations; she did not choose to throw herself in hostile collision 
with the slave states of Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, which have not seceded on the one hand, 
nor the slave states which have and arc in process of secession on the other, nnd shed the blood of 
brethren and kindred at the very moment when she was striving to be an apostle of |>eacc. Nature 
herself revolted at the thought, and her conduct in this matter had so much of love to God. nnd 
love to man in it, that it will meet the sanction of an approving world. So far from being de¬ 
nounced for this action, it is every where looked upon as an act of purest patriotism, resulting from 
imperious necessity, and the highest instincts of self-preservation—respected by the very adminis¬ 
tration that alone could have complained of it, and will, we doubt not, be ratified by it, if not in 
terms, at least by its future action. That act did not take her out of the Union. 

Kentucky, in so grave a matter as this, passes by mere legal technicalities nnd a discussion of 
theoretical difficulties of government, poises herself upon her right to do what the necessities of her 
condition imperatively demanded of her, and relics upon the good sense and magnanimity of her 
sister states, seeing that there is no parallel in her condition and theirs to do her justice. 

In all things she is as loyal ns ever to the constitutional administration of the government. She 
will follow the Stars and Stripes to the utmost regions of the earth, and defend them from foreign 
insult. She refuses allegiance with any who would destroy the Union. All she asks is permission 
to keep out of this unnatural strife. When called to take part in it, she believes there is more 
honor in the breach than in the observance of any supposed duty to perform it. 

Feeling that she is clearly right in this, and has announced her intention to refrain from ag¬ 
gression upon others, she must protest against her soil being made the theatre of military opern- 
tions by any belligerent. The war must not be transferred bv the warring sections from their own 
to her borders. Such unfriendly action can not be viewed with indifference by Kentucky. 

Having thus referred to this subject in its general aspects, wc would invite your individual at¬ 
tention to its direct bearings upon yourselves. 

It is not now a question of party politics, although it may be the interest of some to make it so. 
The day of mere party platforms has, we trust, gone forever. It has passed from being a mere 
struggle' for place that may gratify personal ambition, to one for the present and future welfare of 
a whole people, for the safety of homes and firesides. Whatever divisions have heretofore existed 
should now cease. In times past, in our elections, the questions which divided men related to 
mere party differences, and the members of all the parties rivaled each other in their expression 
of devotion to the Union, and were equally clamorous for their rights, in the Union nnd not out 
of it. Now these party differences are passed away nnd forgotten. The direct question is Union 
or no Union—Government or no Government—Nationality or no Nationality. Before this grand 
and commanding question every thing else gives way. 

All can sec that such a state of things can not continue without war, nnd that such a war was 
unnecessary. It resulted from the ambition of men rather than from the wrongs done the people. 
There was a remedy for every thing already provided by the Constitution, which, with wise fore¬ 
sight, provided against the trials to which it might be subjected. There were countervailing [low¬ 
ers to check encroachments, whether by a President or by Congress; ifnd it so happened that at 
this dangerous crisis, when a sectional president had been elected, there was a majority in oppo¬ 
sition to him in both houses of Congress, by which he could have been controlled and the people | 


been avoided; and so might a certain man who went down from Jerusalem 
to Jericho have avoided an unpleasant collision by presenting his purse to 
certain other men among whom he fell upon the road. To yield what is de¬ 
manded, irrespective of the justice of the demand, may be at times the part 
of discretion; it can never be that of honor, of dignity, or of sovereign power. 
There was another resolution, recommending a National Convention for the 
amendment of the Constitution; but on the 27th of the month (it was March) 
the state Legislature passed a resolution that it was inexpedient to take any 
steps toward the National Convention, or toward the amendment of the Con¬ 
stitution of the Union which had been recommended by the state Conven¬ 
tion. The stirring events of the latter half of April failed to produce in 
Missouri the effect which followed them in the other border states, and the 
excitement which they created soon passed away. 

But, although the people of Missouri pronounced thus unhesitatingly, thus 
so decidedly, and by such large majorities for the Union, the restless and 
reckless men, who loved slavery more than the republic, did not cease their 
machinations. A secret association had already been formed for the pur¬ 
pose of forcing the state into the ranks of the insurrection; it numbered 
among its members many influential politicians; and its object, at least, if 
not its means, were approved by the governor himself. He began at once 
the organization of a State Guard, ostensibly for the purpose of keeping the 
peace and protecting the soil of the state against invasion—that term mean¬ 
ing, when so used, the presence of national troops. But the government at 
Washington had favored the formation of a military organization called 
Home Guards, composed of loyal Missourians, which, under spirited and de¬ 
termined leadership, soon checked the development of Governor Jackson’s 
plans and those of his co-workers, who began their movement by seizing the 
United States Arsenal at Liberty, a small town in the extreme western part 
of the state, and distributing the arms to the malcontents in that neighbor¬ 
hood. The same fate threatened the more important arsenal at St. Louis; 
but in command there was Captain Nathaniel Lyon, of the United States 
Army, who had served with honor in Florida and in Mexico, and with dis¬ 
cretion and loyalty in Kansas during her early trial. Ilis force was very 
small, and the Police Commissioners of St. Louis, undertaking to make a 
little war upon the government, required him to confine the exercise of 
his authority to the grounds belonging to the United States. The city 
swarmed with the partisans of the rebels; the governor himself had ordered 
two thousand men down from Jefferson City, whose purpose could only be 
to seize the arms in the arsenal. This a Captain Stokes, also of the army, 
prevented by a daring and energetic movement. Provided by Governor 


protected. It was the duty of the opposition to have stood to their posts till the danger of en¬ 
croachment had passed away. But senators nnd representatives, following the example of their 
states, vacated their seats, and placed a president who would have been in a minority at the head 
of a triumphant majority. It was a great wrong, for which they must answer to posterity. Ken¬ 
tucky remained true to herself, contending with all her might for what were considered to he the 
rights of the people; and although one after another of the states that should have been by her 
side ungenerously deserted her, leaving her almost alone in the field, yet she did not surrender her 
rights under the Constitution, and never will surrender them. She will appear again in the Con¬ 
gress of the United States, not having conceded the least item of power to the government that 
had not heretofore l»cen granted, and retaining every power she had reserved. She will insist upon 
her constitutional rights in the Union, and not out of it. 

Kentucky is grieved to think that any thing should have been done by her sister states that has 
made it neccssury for her to assume the position she now occupies. It is not one of submission, 
as it lias been insultingly called—it is one of the most exalted patriotism ; but, if she had no high¬ 
er or holier motive—if she were not earnestly for pence among her brethren, the great law of self- 
protection |»oints out her course, and she has no alternative. Already one section declares that 
there w ill be no war at home, but that it shall be in Kentucky and Virginia. Already the cannon 
and bayonets of another section arc visible on our most exposed border. Let these hostile armies 
meet on our soil, nnd it will matter but little to us which may succeed, for destruction to us will be 
the inevitable result. Our fields will be laid waste, our houses nnd cities will be burned, our |K*ople 
will Ik; slain, and this goodly land be rebaptized “the land of blood;" and even the institution, to 
preserve or control which this wretched war was undertaken, will be exterminated in the general 
ruin. Such is the evil that others will bring upon us, no matter which side wc take, if this is to be 
the battle-field. But there is danger at home more appalling than nny that comes from beyond. 
People of Kentucky, look well to it that yon do not get to fighting among yourselves, for then, in¬ 
deed, yon will find that it is an ill fight where he that wins has the worst of it. F.ndenvor to be 
of one mind, nnd strive to keep the state steady in her present position. Hold fast to that sheet- 
anchor of republican liberty, that the will of the majority constitutionally and legally expressed 
must govern. You have, in the election by which this Convention was chosen, displayed a una¬ 
nimity unparalleled in your history. May you l»c as unanimous in the future; may your majori¬ 
ties be so decided that a refusal to obey may be justly c alled factious. Trust nnd love one an¬ 
other. Avoid angry strife. Frown upon the petty ambition of demagogues who w ould stir up bad 
passions among you. Consider, as wise men, what is necessary for your own best interest, nnd, in 
bumble submission, trust nnd look to that Almighty Being who has heretofore so signally blessed 
us us a nation for ilis guidance through the gloom and darkness of this hour. 

J. J. Crittenden, President. C. A. Wickliffe, 
James Guthrie, G. W. Dunlap, 

R. K. Williams, C. S. Mokeiiead, 

Arcii'd Dixon, J. F. Robinson, 

F. M. Bristow, John B. Huston, 

Joshua F. Bell, Robt. Richardson. 


1 Resolutions re} tor ted in the Missouri Convention. 

Resolved , That at present there is no adequate cause to impel Missouri to dissolve her connec¬ 
tion with the federal Union, but, on the contrary, she will labor for such an adjustment of the ex¬ 
isting troubles as will secure peace, rights, and equality to all the states. 

Resolved , That the jieoplc of this state are devotedly attached to the institutions of our country, 
nnd earnestly desire that by a fair and amicable adjustment the present causes of disagreement 
may be removed, the Union [>eri>ctunted, nnd pence and harmony be restored between the South 
and North. 

Resolved , That the people of this state deem the amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, proposed by Mr. Crittenden, with the extending of the same to Territories hereafter to be 
acquired, a basis of adjustment which will successfully remove the cuuses of difference forever from 
the arena of national politics. 

Resolved , That the people of Missouri believe that the peace and quiet of the country w ill be 
promoted by ft Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the United States; nnd 
that this Convention urges the Legislature of this state to take steps for calling such Convention. 

Resolved , That, in the opinion of this Convention, the employment of military force by the fed¬ 
eral government to coerce the seceding states, or the employment of force by the seceding states 
to nssuil the government of the United States, will inevitably plunge the country into civil war, 
nnd thereby extinguish all hope of an amicable settlement of the issues now pending. 

Wc therefore earnestly entreat the federal government, as well ns the seceding states, to stay the 
arm of military power, and on no pretense whatever bring upon the nation the horrors of civil w ar. 

Resolved , That, when the Convention adjourns, it adjourn to meet at Jefferson City on the third 
Monday in December. 

Resolved , That a committee be elected, a majority of which shall have power to convene the 
Convention at such time and place prior to the third Monday in December as the exigencies may 
require. 








106 


[1861 



FORTIFICATIONS THROWN UP TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES ARSENAL AT ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI. 









































































































































































































1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


107 



A CORNER SCENE IN ST. LOUIS. 


Yates, of Illinois, with a requisition from the Secretary of War for ten thou¬ 
sand muskets, he went to St. Louis. With the assistance of Captain Lyon, 
he managed to deceive a tumultuous mob which surronnded the arsenal by 
sending off a large quantity of worthless arms in such a manner as to attract 
attention. They were seized by the watchful multitude; and while these 
were triumphing in their success, Captain Stokes got on board a steamer 
not only the ten thousand muskets for which he came, but eleven thousand 
more, with five hundred rifle carbines, as many revolvers, one hundred and 
ten thousand cartridges, and some cannon and accoutrements, leaving only 
seven thousand muskets to arm the St. Louis volunteers. He steamed safe¬ 
ly past a battery which the secessionists had erected near St. Louis, and, ar¬ 
riving at Alton, Illinois, sent his valuable prize to Springfield, in that state, 
thus executing the first successful and important enterprise for the preser¬ 
vation to the government of the material of war of which it was so much in 
need. Success generally begets success. The organization of the Home 
Guard went rapidly on, and soon there were five thousand armed and equip¬ 
ped in the vicinity of St. Louis, under the command of Colonels Francis P. 
Blair and Franz Sigel, the former a brother of President Lincoln's Postmas¬ 
ter General, the latter a German officer who had served with great distinc¬ 
tion in the European troubles which had succeeded the French revolution 
of 1848. On the outskirts of St. Louis a camp of Governor Jackson’s State 
Guards had been established, under the command of General Frost. Cap¬ 
tain Lyon, knowing the object with which this encampment was formed, de¬ 
termined to break it up; and, in spite of a specious protest of loyalty on 
the part of General Frost, on the 10th of May he marched upon him at the 
head of the full commands of Colonels Blair and Sigel, with some pieces of 
artillery. The secessionists took the alarm and poured out after the troops, 
armed with whatever weapons they could seize; and even the townsfolk 
went in crowds to witness the fight. The former were foiled by the mili¬ 
tary dispositions of Captain Lyon ; they could not approach the camp which 
they would so gladly have re-enforced; and General Frost,finding himself 
surrounded by a force four or five times as great as his own, surrendered at 
discretion upon Captain Lyon’s summons. 2 By this prompt movement a 
dangerous nucleus of rebellion was broken up, about seven hundred prison¬ 
ers, inclusive of fifty officers, were taken, and a large quantity of small arms, 
artillery, and ammunition captured. In this camp, which its commanding 
officer, with the effrontery and duplicity which the partisans of the rebellion 
so constantly, and often so successfully, practised, had voluntarily declared 
by letter to Captain Lyon not hostile to the United States, it was found that 
the two main streets were named Davis and Beauregard; that a part of its 
occupants were in the rebel uniform ; and that the command was in great 

3 Captain Lyon, CJ. S. A., to General Frost, Missouri State Guard. 

Head-quarters United States Troops, St. Louis, May 10,1801. 

To General D. M. Frost: 

Sir, —Your command is regarded as evidently hostile toward the government of the United 
States. It is, for the most part, made up of those secessionists who have openly avowed their hos¬ 
tility to the general government, and have been plotting at the seizure of its property and the 
overthrow of its authority. You arc openly in communication with the so-called Southern con¬ 
federacy, which is now at war with the United States, and you are receiving at vour camp from the 
said confederacy, under its flag, large supplies of material of war, most of which is known to Ik? the 
property of the United States. These extraordinary preparations plainly indicate none other than 
the well known purpose of the governor of this state, under whose orders you are acting, and whose 
purpose, recently communicated to the Legislature, has just been responded to bv that body in the 
most unparalleled legislation, having in direct view hostilities to the general government, and co¬ 
operating with the enemy. In view of these considerations, and your failure to disperse in obedi¬ 
ence to the proclamation of the President, and of the eminent necessity of state policy, and the wel¬ 
fare and obligations imposed upon me by instructions from Washington, it is my duty to demand, 
and I do hereby demand of you, an immediate surrender of your command, with no other condi¬ 
tions than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated. 
Believing myself prepared to enforce the demand, one half hour’s time before doing so will be al¬ 
lowed for your compliance therewith. 

N. Lyon, Captain Second Infantry, commanding Troops. 


measure armed with muskets seized by the Louisiana in¬ 
surgents at Baton Rouge, and sent surreptitiously up the 
Mississippi l 3 * The prisoners having refused to take the oath 
of allegiance, the only condition proposed for their release, 
on the ground that they had already taken it, and that to 
take it again would be to admit that they had been in re¬ 
bellion, were marched under guard to the arsenal. While 
they were on the way, preceded and followed by detach¬ 
ments of the Union troops, and shut in on either side by a 
single file, the front ranks of the guard were pressed upon 
by a tumultuous crowd, which, after insulting them with 
the most opprobrious epithets, proceeded to blows, and at 
last attacked them with stones and pistols. Several of the 
soldiers, without orders, fired into the crowd. Fortunately, 
or, as the issue proved, perhaps unfortunately, no person 
was injured, and the soldiers who had fired were immedi¬ 
ately placed under arrest Quiet and order were hardly re¬ 
stored when the tumult broke out afresh. Encouraged by 
their impunity, the mob renewed their attack, now in the 
rear, with stones and pistols. A captain ordered his com¬ 
pany to fire, and twenty-five persons were killed or wound¬ 
ed. In a popular tumult, the innocent and the imprudent 
are always sure to suffer with the guilty, through no fault 
of those in authority. On this occasion a miscellaneous 
crowd, including even some women and children, had fol¬ 
lowed the troops, and it is sad to relate that those who fell 
were mostly citizens, who, however they might have sympa¬ 
thized with the purposes of the rioters, had not joined them 
in their attack. The rage of the secessionists, and the ex¬ 
citement of all the people, was tremendous; throughout the 
night St. Louis was heaving with suppressed tumult. On 
the following day a large body of the Home Guard, chiefly 
Germans, marched into the city from the arsenal, where they had been armed 
and equipped. The streets were thronged with people, through which they 
passed for a time unmolested. But at length hooting and hissing began, and 
finally a revolver was fired from the crowd. A soldier fell dead in the 
ranks. Firing now began from the windows of the houses, when the lead¬ 
ing company of the Germans—not exhibiting the steadiness and self-posses¬ 
sion of the Massachusetts militia-men under like circumstances in Baltimore 
—wheeled and fired down the street with fatal effect. The consternation 
which ensued was overwhelming; but the fury with which it was accompa¬ 
nied was mitigated by the discovery that of the six persons who were killed 
four were soldiers. The Germans, in their bewilderment, had fired into their 
own ranks. The excitement caused by these bloody occurrences was not 
confined to St. Louis. The news flew rapidly to Jackson City, and stimu¬ 
lated the instant passage of a Military Bill, which before was languishing 
through the debates. By this bill a military fund was created for the pur¬ 
pose of arming and equipping the militia; and all the money in the treasury, 
or to be received during the current year, however it had been previously 
appropriated, was devoted to this purpose. Every able-bodied man in the 
state was made subject to military duty; and, most important provision of 
all, this large force was placed under the orders of the governor, and re¬ 
quired to take an oath to obey him alone. 

Meantime General Harney, an army officer of more experience and vigor 
than discretion, had been appointed to the command of the Department of 
the West. He arrived at St.Louis on the 11th, in the midst of the turmoil 
caused by the bloody scenes of the two previous days. He issued first a 
curt soldier’s proclamation, informing the people that he should discharge 
his delicate duties with decision; that he had not the power of disbanding 
the Home Guards, but that he would gratify the prejudices of the Missouri¬ 
ans by putting down riotous demonstrations with the soldiers of the regular 
army.' * 1 On the 14th he issued another proclamation, in which he declared 
the Military Bill an indirect Secession Ordinance, which indeed it was, and 
pronounced it null and void. He pointed out to the Missourians that, what¬ 
ever became of the people around the Gulf, their commonwealth must share 
the destiny of the republic, and that, if necessary, the whole power of the 
government would be used to enforce obedience to the “ supreme law of the 
land,” and to retain Missouri in the Union. 5 General narney soon found 

3 General Harney’s proclamation to the people of Missouri, May 14, 1861. 

• General Harney's Proclamation to the People of the State of Missouri and the City of St. Louis. 

Military Department of the West, St Louis, Mny 11,1861. 

I have just returned to this post, and have assumed the military command of this department. 
No one can more deeply regret the deplorable state of things existing here than myself. The past 
can not be recalled. I can only deal with the present and the future. 

I most anxiously desire to discharge the delicate and onerous duties devolved upon me so as to 
preserve the public peace. I shall carefully abstain from the exercise of any unnecessary powers, 
and from all interference with the pro]ier functions of the public officers of the state and city. I 
therefore call upon the public authorities and the people to aid me in preserving the public peace. 

The military force stationed in this department by the authority of the government, and now 
under my command, will only lie used in the last resort to preserve the peace. I trust I may be 
spared the necessity of resorting to martial law, but the public peace must be preserved, and the 
lives and property of the people protected. Upon a careful review of my instructions, I find I have 
no authority to change the location of ihe “ Home Guards.” 

To avoid all cause of irritation and excitement, if called upon to aid the local authorities in pre¬ 
serving the public |»eacc, I shall, in preference, make use of the regular army. 

I ask the people to pursue their peaceful avocations, and to observe the laws and orders of their 
local authorities, and to abstain from the excitements of public meetings and heated discussions. 
My appeal, I trust, may not be in vain, and I pledge the faith of a soldier to the earnest discharge 
of my duty. William S. Harney, Brigadier General U. S. A., commanding Dcp’t. 

1 General Harney's Second Proclamation. 

Military Department of the West, St. Louif, May 14,1861. 

To the People of the State of Missouri: 

On my return to the duties of the command of this department, I find, greatly to my astonish¬ 
ment and mortification, a most extraordinary state of things existing in this state, deeply affect- 




































108 


[1861 



VOLUNTEERS ATTACKED IN 8T. LOUIS. 


himself involved in negotiations with Sterling Price, a wary and persistent 
man, under whose command, as major general, Governor Jackson had placed 
the forces enlisted under the Military Bill. On the 20th of May General 
Price brought General Harney to an agreement, by which the former pledged 
the whole of the force under his command and the whole power of the state 
to the preservation of order, and the latter consented to make no farther 
military movement in the state. This specious compromise, which tied the 
hands of the government and left those of the secessionists free, and, what 
was of more importance, recognized in effect the right of the state to make 
terms with the nation as to the treatment of rebellious citizens resident in 
Missouri, met with no favor outside the pale of the rebellion and the bound¬ 
aries of Missouri, and with much opposition within the latter. Whether it 
was thought at Washington that General Harney had been for the first time 
in his life too cautious in the discharge of bis duty, or that he had been over¬ 
reached, did not appear in the order which, ten days after this concession, re¬ 
lieved him from the command of the Department of the West, and placed it 
in the hands of Captain, now Brigadier General Lyon. Of Arkansas, hard¬ 
ly a border state, it is only necessary to say that, after once refusing by her 
Convention to secede, she at last was carried over, on the 6th of May, to 
her Southern neighbors. 

From the spectacle of shaken or subverted loyalty in the border states, 


I turn to one yet more unpropitious to the fortunes of the republic—the 
condition of Washington itself. That which should have been the moral 
strong-hold and citadel of the nation, was, by its position, the weakest, and, 
by its political affinities and its social condition, the most disaffected city 
outside of the seceded states—a place which the government had not only 
to protect, but to protect itself against. Among the many advantages gain¬ 
ed by the slave states in the early days of the republic, not the least was the 
establishment of the seat of government on the banks of the Potomac. The 
Eastern and Middle States wished it to be placed on the Susquehanna; 
but they also much desired the passage of a bill by which the government 
should assume the debts of the several states contracted during and because 
of the War of Independence, and thus pay from the common fund an ex¬ 
pense incurred for the common benefit. This the Southern States, the 
people of which owned very few of those debts, opposed. Two causes, of 
what proved to be a sharp contention, were removed by a compromise of 
these two interests. The Southern States agreed to the assumption of the 
debts; the Eastern and Middle States consented to the final establishment 
of the seat of government upon the Potomac. The price which the South¬ 
ern States paid for this advantage was small in comparison with its value; 
for it contributed largely to the preservation of the preponderance which 
they soon obtained and always kept in the general government; and now 
that they sought to destroy the republic, and build up a great slaveholding 


inn the stability of the government of the United States, as well as the governmental and other 
interests of Missouri itself. 

As a citizen of Missouri, owing allegiance to the United States, and having interests in com¬ 
mon with you, I feel it my duty, as well as privilege, to extend a warning voice to my fellow-citi¬ 
zens against the common dangers that threaten us, and to appeal to your patriotism and sense of 
justice to exert all your moral power to avert them. 

It is with regret that I feel it mv duty to call your attention to the recent act of the General As¬ 
sembly of Missouri, known ns the Military Bill, which is the result, no doubt, of the temporary ex¬ 
citement that now pervades the public mind. This bill can not be regarded in any other light 
than an indirect Secession Ordinance, ignoring even the forms resorted to by other states. Manifest Iv 
its most material provisions are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
To this extent it is a nullity , and can not and ought not to be ujtheld or regarded by the good citizens 
of Missouri. There urc obligations and duties resting upon the people of Missouri under the Con¬ 
stitution and laws of the United States which arc paramount, and which I trust you will carefully 
consider and weigh well before you will allow yourselves to he carried out of the Union, under the 
form of yielding obedience to this Military Bill, which is clearly in violation of your duties as citi¬ 
zens of the United States. 

It must be apparent to every one who has taken a proper and unbiased view of the subject, 
that, whatever may be the termination of the unfortunate condition of things in respect to the so- 
called “cotton states,” Missouri must share the destiny of the Union. Her geographical position— 
her soil, productions, and, in short, all her material interests, point to this result. We can not shut 
our eyes against this controlling fact. It is seen, and its force is felt throughout the nation. So 
important is this regarded to the great interests of the country, that I venture t<» express the opin¬ 
ion that the whole power of the government o f the United States, if necessary, will be exerted to main¬ 
tain Missouri in her present jtosihon in the Union. I express to you, in all frankness and sincerity, 
my own deliberate convictions, without assuming to speak for the government of the United States, 
whose authority, here and elsewhere, I shall at all times and under all circumstances endeavor 
faithfully to uphold. 

I desire, above all things, most earnestly to invite my fellow-citizens dispassionately to consider 


their true interests as well as their true relation to the government under which we live, and to 
which we owe so much. 

In this connection, I desire to direct attention to one subject, which no doubt will be made the 
pretext for more or less popular excitement. I allude to the recent transactions at ('amp Jackson, 
near St. Louis. It is not proper for me to comment upon the official conduct of my predecessor in 
command of this department, but it is right and proper for the people of Missouri to know that the 
main avenue of Camp Jackson, recently under command of General Frost, had the name of Davis, 
and a principal street of the same camp that of Beauregard ; and that a body of men had been re¬ 
ceived into that camp by its commander which had been notoriously organized in the interests of 
the secessionists, the men openly wearing the dress and badge distinguishing the army of the so- 
called Southern Confederacy. It is also a notorious fact that a quaintity of arms had been received 
into the camp which were unlawfully taken from the United States Arsenal at Baton Itouge, and 
surreptitiously passed tip the river in boxes marked marble. 

Upon facts like these, and having in view what occurred at Liberty, the people can draw their 
own inferences, and it can not be difficult for any fine to arrive at a correct conclusion ns to th s 
character and ultimate purpose of that encampment. No government in the world would be en¬ 
titled to rcs|«ect that would tolerate for a moment such openly treasonable preparations. 

It is but simple justice, however, that I should state the fact that there were many good anil loyal 
men in the camp, who were in no manner responsible for its treasonable character. 

Disclaiming, as I do, all desire or intention to interfere in any way with the prerogatives of the State 
of Missouri, or with the functions of its executive or other authorities, yet I regard it as my plain 
path of duty to express to the j>cople in respectful, but, at the same time, decided language, that, 
within the field and scope ot my command and authority, the “ supreme law" of the land must and 
shall be maintained, and no subterfuges, whether in the forms of legislative acts or otherwise, can 
be permitted to harass or oppress the good and law-abiding people of Missouri. I shall exert iry 
authority to protect their | ersons and property from violations of every kind, and I shall deem it 
my duty to suppress all unlawful combinations of men, whether formed under pretext of military 
organizations or otherwise. 

William S. IIaknet, Brigadier General United States Army, Commanding. 
















































































































1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


109 


oligarchy upon its ruins, they expected and they found in Washington a 
multitude of co-workers, none the less valuable because they were always 
secret and generally treacherous. Washington—being without commerce, 
without manufactures, not even the chief city of a commonwealth or the 
county town of an agricultural district, not dignified by institutions of sci¬ 
ence and literature, or graced by galleries of art or places of elegant amuse¬ 
ment—was the mere political capital of the country, the place for the trans¬ 
action of the business of the nation. Thus barren of the chief interests 
which fill the daily life of men in the highest civilization, surrounded by 
slave territory and being itself slave ground, it had small attractions and 
many discomforts for the residents of free states. Few of them sought it 
except at the call of political duty, or for some advantage to be obtained 
only through political influence; and those few only in search of recreation 
or to gratify curiosity during the sessions of Congress. The duty perform¬ 
ed, the end attained of profit or of pleasure, the visitor from the North, 
weary of politics in public, politics in society, and slavery in both politics and 
society, gladly turned his face homeward toward tranquillity and freedom. 
But while the residents of the most populous, the wealthiest, and the most cul¬ 
tivated part of the republic were thus strangers, or at most sojourners in its 
capital, the slave states naturally furnished it nearly the whole of its perma¬ 
nent population. In the appointment of clerks and subordinate officers of 
the government, it came gradually to pass that places at Washington were 
mostly given to men from the slave states, and the departments there were 
filled by incumbents who had received their situations at the hands of the 
leaders in the insurrection. The Northern and Western States furnished 
comparatively few men who sought subordinate public employment, except 
as a temporary resort, or as a step to higher position; but the lack of incen¬ 
tive to honorable exertion in commerce or in manufactures, in arts or in let¬ 
ters, in the slave states, and the concentration of land and slaves in the hands 
of a few, had for inevitable consequence the production of a numerous class 
of needy, shiftless, but well-connected men, of a certain degree and kind of 
social culture, who were glad to settle down at the capital as the recipi¬ 
ents of comfortable salaries, which, by the influence of the slave power, they 
were able to retain through the brief and rare periods during which that 
power was not absolutely in the ascendant. In Washington the tone of so¬ 
ciety was given entirely by men and women who had been born and bred 
under the shadow of slavery; and the bankers, the lawyers, and men of 
minor occupations, who, for the sake of business, made it their home, soon 
adopted, if they did not bring with them, a creed and a conduct without 
which gain was difficult and social enjoyment impossible. Thus even the 
annual influx of members of Congress from the North came to be regarded 
much as the Saracens looked upon the stream of unbelieving pilgrims to 

‘ The Capture of Washington.—From the Richmond Examiner of April 23, 1861. 

The capture of Washington City is perfectly within the power of Virginia and Maryland, if 
Virginia will only make the effort by her constituted authorities; nor is there a single moment to 
lose. The entire population pant for the onset; there never was half the unanimity among the 
people before, nor a tithe of the zeal, upon any subject, that is now manifested to take Washing¬ 
ton, and drive from it every Black Republican who is a dweller there. 

From the mountain tops and valleys to the shores of the sea, there is one wild shout of fierce 
resolve to capture Washington City at all and every human hazard. The filthy cage of unclean 
birds must and will assuredly be purified by fire. The people are determined upon it, and arc 
clamorous for a leader to conduct them to the onslaught. That leader will assuredly arise, ay, 
and that right speedily. 

It is not to be endured that this flight of abolition harpies shall come down from the black 
North for their roosts in the heart of the South, to defile and brutalize the land. They come as 
our enemies—they act as our most deadly foes—they promise us bloodshed and fire, and this is the 
onlv promise they have ever redeemed. The fanatical yell for the immediate subjugation of the 
whole South is going up hourly from the united voices of all the North ; and for the purpose of 
making their work sure, they have determined to hold Washington City as the point from whence 
to carry on their brutal warfare. 

Our people can take it—if they will take it—and Scott the arch-traitor, and Lincoln the beast, 
combined, can not prevent it. The just indignation of an outraged and deeply injured people will 
teach the Illinois ape to repeat his race and retrace his journey across the borders of the free negro 


Jerusalem—something to be endured while the visitors paid tribute and suf¬ 
fered indignity, but which was resented and resisted when made in force and 
with a claim to possession. The presence of a president, a vice-president, 
and a cabinet, neither of whom was a slaveholder or even a Democrat, and 
who owed their elevation to the avowed opponents of the slave interest, was 
regarded by the Washingtonians, and particularly by the placemen, with 
mingled disgust and apprehension. They had come to think that the capi¬ 
tal of the nation belonged to them. They trembled alike for their social as¬ 
cendency and their salaries. They scorned the new men; they hated those 
who would replace them; they raged at the sight of abolitionists, and, worst 
of all, abolitionists in power. Many of the new-comers were rustic in ap¬ 
pearance and in manners, and the city placemen felt, or affected to them¬ 
selves to feel, as the Faubourg St. Germain really felt when the bourgeoisie 
entered salons without buckles in their shoes, and began to ask, By what 
right do you misgovern France? In only one direction was there hope for 
them, and they looked southward for deliverance. Their feelings were 
shared by the whole of the ruling faction of the slave states, of which, in 
fact, they were but representatives.. The insurgents shrieked in type (a fig¬ 
ure less violent would not express the truth) over what they pretended to 
regard as the desecration of Washington. In their copious but somewhat 
monotonous vocabulary of abuse—a vocabulary which hardly supported 
their continually asserted claims to superior refinement—they compared it, 
since the 4th of March, to a filthy cage of unclean birds, a wallow of swine, 
a festering sink of iniquity. They called the members of the new adminis¬ 
tration dogs and caitiffs, harpies who had come down to defile and brutalize 
the place; and they clamored frantically for the expulsion of the beast and 
the Illinois ape (these were the names which they gave to the President) 
from the desecrated city of Washington. Such was the cry that went up 
from the press in all quarters of what now in the North had received no 
worse name than “Secessia.” 6 The purpose of attacking Washington, and 
asserting the power of the insurgent government over all the country south 
of Pennsylvania and the Ohio Kiver, was undoubtedly entertained by the 
rebel leaders, but was necessarily abandoned on account of the dispositions 
of General Scott, the course of events in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, 
and especially the tremendous and most unexpected uprising at the North. 
But still the government lived in constant apprehension. From the 19th 
(the day of the attack on the Massachusetts men in Baltimore) to the 25th 
of April, no communication from North or South was received at Washing¬ 
ton, and the loyal and the disaffected alike suffered the torture of suspense. 
The public buildings were guarded, barricaded, and fortified. So lively was 
the apprehension of a sudden raid upon Washington by a force which, 
though not large enough to hold, might yet sack it, and carry off the archives 

states still more rapidly than he came; and Scott, the traitor, will be given an opportunity at the 
same time to try the difference between “ Scott’s tactics” and the Shanghae drill tor quick move¬ 
ments. 

Great cleansing and purification are needed and will be given to that festering sink of iniquity, 
that wallow of Lincoln and Scott—the desecrated City of Washington, and many indeed will be 
the carcasses of dogs and caitiffs that will blacken the air upon the gallows before the great work 
is accomplished. So let it be. 

From the Richmond Whig of May 22,1861. 

We arc not enough in the secrets of our authorities to specify the day on which Jeff. Davis will 
dine at the White House, and Ben. M‘Cullough take his siesta in General Sickles's gilded tent 
We should dislike to produce any disappointment by naming too soon or too early a day; but it 
will save trouble if the gentlemen will keep themselves in readiness to dislodge at a moment’s no¬ 
tice! If they are not smitten, however, with more than judicial blindness, they do not need this 
warning at our hands. They must know that the measure of their iniquities is full, and the pa¬ 
tience of outraged freedom is exhausted. Among all the brave men from the Rio Grande to the 
Potomac, and stretching over into insulted, indignant, and infuriated Maryland, there is but one 
word on every lip—“ Washington and one sentiment on every heart—vengeance on the tyrants 
who pollute the capital of the republic! 

See, also, the Richmond Enquirer , the New Orleans Picayune , the Enfaula (Ala.) / xpress, the 
Goldsborough Tribune , and the Raleigh Standard, and various other slave-state newspapers of the 
same period. 



^ AI.I.KRI KH CNDKli THK 8E.NAIE-CUAMlitU. 


uaaix>-ovx>» c>deb tux oapitou 






































































110 


[1861 




BARRICADE IN THE TREASURY BUILDING. 


THE EIGHTH MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS IN THE ROTUNDA OF TUB CAPITOL 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


Ill 




and the treasure of the nation, that the principal passage-ways of the Treas¬ 
ury and the Capitol were defended by howitzers, which raked their length, 
and by heavy planks, which, stretched across them at short intervals about 
the height of a man’s knee from the floor, made a charge upon the gun im¬ 
possible. The iron plates cast for the dome of the Capitol were set up as 
breast-works between its columns, where they were supported by barrels of 
cement and heaped-up stone and timber. The statuary and the pictures 
were protected by heavy planking; and the basement of the building was 
used as a kitchen. But, when the communication was established, and reg¬ 
iments began to pour in, the public buildings were given as quarters to the 
troops which came to defend them; the basement of the Capitol became 
first a store-house and then a bakery, and the very chambers of the Senate 
and the House were turned into barracks. As the hopes of the loyal rose, 
those of the rebellious fell; and the Washington secessionists, seeing their 
chances of open attack upon the government diminish, turned their thoughts 
and their endeavors to treachery. More disheartening and perplexing cir¬ 
cumstances than those under which President Lincoln assumed the control 
of government can not well be imagined. Entirely without administrative 
experience himself, and arriving at Washington with a cabinet, no member 
of which had any practical knowledge of the routine of his department, or 
any official acquaintance with his subordinates, pursued by an army of office- 
seekers, whose claims demanded at least consideration, and whose preten¬ 
sions were generally great in proportion as their capacities were small, he 
and his ministers were obliged to make themselves familiar with the practi¬ 
cal condition of the machine of administration, and prepare it instantly for 
a kind of service to which, even under the most favorable conditions, it was 
not too well adapted. The new administration was dependent both for in¬ 
formation and assistance upon the subordinate officers of the old, in which 
the very members of the cabinet itself had proved not only politically trai¬ 
torous, but personally perfidious. Nor, had the case been otherwise, would 
it have been prudent to chill the ardor and alienate the interests of the Dem¬ 
ocratic party by a general removal of officers appointed under its auspices. 
Necessity and policy therefore dictated the retention of a large proportion of 
the force which had been left in possession of the public offices by the retiring 
president. Of these, the greater number had declared that they never would 
hold office under a “ Black Republican” administration. But with place¬ 
men the claims of personal interest are rarely waived in favor of abstract 
principles; and in this case, interest was seconded by the hope of serving 
the faction which sought the establishment of a new government in the old 
capital. The result was that spies swarmed not only in the city, but in the 
very departments. True, these men professed to be loyal, and had taken 
the oath of allegiance to the United States; but so had Secretaries Floyd, 
and Cobb, and Thompson, who betrayed the country while they formed a 
part of its government; so had Senator Yulee, who sat in the Senate-cham¬ 
ber, and wrote traitorous counsels to a brother-conspirator, while he and his 
yoke-fellows held their positions, that they might cast down the very power 
which they had sworn to support; so had the naval officers, whose voluntary 
assurances of patriotism and allegiance beguiled Commodore M'Cauley into 
the security which cost the country the Portsmouth Navy Yard; so had Gen¬ 
eral Frost, who, from a camp flaunting the names and penetrated with the 
spirit of Davis and Beauregard, and defended by arms torn by the insurgents 
from a national arsenal, sent like, though not like trusted, assurances to Cap¬ 
tain Lyon at St. Louis. To most of the men who had undertaken the de¬ 
struction of the republic in the interests of slavery, no oath seemed binding, 
no obligation sacred; and so the new administration was surrounded with 
spies and traitors in the very capital. It knew not whom to trust. It could 


not ask a question without fearing the revelation of its needs; it could not 
give an order or send a dispatch without risking the betrayal of its inten¬ 
tions. These apprehensions were fully justified; not only in these early 
days of the rebellion, but throughout the war, the enemies of the govern¬ 
ment received early information of its purposes. And the emissaries of the 
insurgents not only thus filled Washington: as I have before remarked, they 
pervaded the whole country. . While from the states subject to the confed¬ 
erated government, men from the loyal states, and even Union men born on 
the soil, were mercilessly expelled by those in authority, when they were not 
hanged or shot by whomever chose to hang or shoot, at the North citizens 
of all parts of the republic lived as usual, undisturbed and unquestioned, and 
some time had passed before men who were known to be actively engaged 
in treasonable practices were arrested. Thus surrounded, thus mainly filled 
with a hostile population, with the very offices of the government swarming 
with spies, Washington, which its position upon the very southernmost bor¬ 
der of doubtful loyalty would, in any case, have subjected to great and pe¬ 
culiar danger, became a city at once beleaguered and betrayed; and in fact, 
though not in name, the nation’s capital was in the enemy’s country. If 
it could have been immediately abandoned without loss of moral power and 
position before the world, the benefit to the country would have been great 
and instant; could its archives have been safely deposited elsewhere, its de¬ 
struction would have saved enough treasure to rebuild it .thrice in marble. 

To the knowledge that agents and active sympathizers of the rebellion 
were spread over the land, that their communication was constant with 
their fellow-laborers in Washington, and to the rapidly developed fact that 
the rebellion was no sudden outbreak, but the result of a long-conccrted 
scheme, is to be attributed an arbitrary order, by virtue of which officers of 
the government seized copies of telegraphic dispatches kept on file at the 
principal offices. The seizure was made simultaneously throughout the 
country, at 3 P.M. on the 20th of April; and it included all the dispatches 
which had been sent for a year. Those which betrayed purposes hostile to 
the government, or which related to supplies of arms purchased for the 
Southern rebels, were selected and sent to the capital. This measure, un¬ 
warranted by written law, was justified in the eyes of the people by the 
necessities of the*situation. It furnished the government much valuable 
information; it limited somewhat the freedom of action of the rebel emissa¬ 
ries ; and the only excitement which it caused was manifested among those 
who showed their loyalty by the earnestness with which they insisted that 
the rebels should have the full benefit of the Constitution which they had 
set at naught. About the same date citizens in various parts of the coun¬ 
try were arrested simply in virtue of a Secretary of State’s warrant, without 
process of law, and confined in Fort M‘Henry at Baltimore, Fort Lafayette 
at New York, or Fort Warren at Boston. On the issuing of writs of habeas 
corpus on behalf of the persons thus imprisoned, the officers in command of 
those posts refused to produce their prisoners, by the order of the President 
but a spirited officer, Major Morris, of the Artillery, in command at Fort 
M'Henry, had first assumed the responsibility of refusing obedience to the 
writ.’ That the Constitution warranted the suspension of the writ of habeas 

1 Major Morris's Letter to Judge Giles , at Baltimore. 

At the date of issuing your writ, and for two weeks previous, the city in which you live and where 
your court has been held was entirely under the control of revolutionary authorities. Within that 
period United States soldiers, while committing no offense, had been perfidiously attacked and in¬ 
humanly murdered in your streets; no punishment had been awarded, and I believe no arrests had 
been made for these atrocious crimes; supplies of provisions intended for this garrison had been 
stopped; the intention to capture this fort had been boldly proclaimed; your most public thor¬ 
oughfares were daily patrolled by large numbers of troops armed and clothed, at least in part, with 
articles stolen from the United States; and*thc federal flag, while waving over the federal offices, 
was cut down bv some person wearing the uniform of a Maryland soldier. To add to the fore- 



















112 


[ 1861 . 


corpus in time of rebellion the people well knew; and as there was doubt 
only whether the power to do so was vested in the President or in Congress, 
this important step also was taken with general acquiescence. But Chief 
Justice Taney, of the Supreme Court, in a case brought before him, denied 
the right of the President to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus , or to au¬ 
thorize its suspension by any military officer. 8 Against bayonets and can¬ 
non, however, supported by public opinion, the mandates even of a chief 
justice of the Supreme Court were powerless. The arrests went on; and 
the writ, having been several times disregarded, soon ceased to be issued. 

Although neither the government nor the loyal people of the Union yet 
suspected how well matured were the plans and how fixed were the pur¬ 
poses of the insurgent leaders, the President now saw—what, indeed, no man 
of sense could fail to see—that, to cope successfully with the forces which 
the power at Montgomery had brought or was about to bring into the field, 
a larger levy was necessary than he had made, and that a longer and se¬ 
verer contest was impending than he had anticipated at the date of his first 
proclamation. He therefore, on the 3d of May, issued another, by which he 
called into service forty-two thousand volunteers for three years, directed 
the increase of the regular army by twenty-two thousand seven hundred 
men, and added eighteen thousand seamen to the navy. 5 The first procla¬ 
mation called the state militia into service, and for only three months—the 
limit of the period for which their services could be so required; but the 
volunteers were to take service for three years. Such was the enthusiasm 
of the loyal people, and such their readiness tq do battle for the republic, 
that volunteers poured in more rapidly than they could be organized, and 
it was at once apparent that within a few weeks the government would have 
at its disposal a body of one hundred and forty thousand men. The una¬ 
nimity of the people of the free states seemed absolute; their patriotism, 
boundless in its self-sacrifice. Of money as well as men, more was offered 
than could at first be used, and more than in the raw judgment of a peace- 
bred people seemed to be required. The men who staid at home thought 
it their duty to provide in every way for the comfort of those who went into 
the army. Bounties were large; and the families of the volunteers were 
placed bejmnd the reach of suffering. Before the 7th of May, more than 
twenty-three millions of dollars had been contributed for these patriotic pur¬ 
poses. 10 

going, an assemblage elected in defiance of law, but claiming to be the legislative body of vour 
state, and so recognized by the executive of Maryland, was debating the federal compact. If all 
this be not rebellion, I know not what to call it. I certainly regard it as sufficient legal cause for 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Besides, there were certain grounds of expediency on which 
I declined obeying your mandate. 

1st. The writ of habeas corpus in the hands of an unfriendly power might depopulate this forti¬ 
fication, and place it at the mercy of “a Baltimore mob” in much less time than it could be done 
by all the appliances of modern warfare. 

' 2d. The ferocious spirit exhibited by year community toward the United States Army would 
render me very averse from appearing publicly and unprotected in the city of Baltimore to defend 
the interests of the body to which I belong. A few days since a soldier of this command, while 
outside the walls, was attacked bv a fiend or fiends in human shape, almost deprived of life, and 
left unprotected about half a mile from garrison. He was found in this situation and brought in, 
covered with blood. One of your evening prints was quite jocose over this laughable occurrence. 

And now, sir, permit me to say, in conclusion, that no one can regret more than I this conflict 
between the civil and military authorities. If, in an experience of thirty-three years, you have 
never before known the writ of habeas corpus to be disobeyed, it is only because such a contingency 
in political affairs as the present has never before arisen. I claim to be a loyal citizen, and I hope 
my former conduct, both official and private, will justify this pretension. 

In any condition of affairs except that of civil war I would cheerfully obey your order, and as 
soon as the present excitement shall pass away I will hold myself ready not only to produce the 
6oldier, but also to apj>ear in person to answer for my conduct; but, in the existing state of senti¬ 
ment in the city of Baltimore, I think it your duty to sustain the federal military and to strengthen 
their hands, instead of endeavoring to strike them down. I have the honor to be, very respectful¬ 
ly, your obedient servant, W. W. Morris, 

May 14 . Major Fourth United States Artillery, commanding Fort M‘Henry. 

b The Merryman Habeas Corpus. 

In the case of John Merryman, a secessionist arrested in Baltimore and detained a prisoner in 
Fort M‘Henry, a writ of habeas corjais was issued by Judge Taney, made returnable in the United 
States District Court. General Cadwalladcr declined surrendering the prisoner till he heard from 
Washington, and an attachment was issued for General Cadwalladcr. 

General Cadwallader having declined acceding to the demand for the body of Merryman until 
he could hear from Washington, a writ of attachment was issued against him for contempt of 
court. The marshal reported that, on going to Fort M‘Henry to serve the writ, he was refused 
admittance. 

Chief Justice Taney then read the following statement: 

“I ordered the attachment yesterday, because upon the face of the return the detention of the 
prisoner was unlawful, upon two grounds: 

“ First. The President, under the Constitution and law's of the United States, can not suspend 
the privilege of the wTit of habeas corpus, nor authorize any military officer to do so. 

“ Second. A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person, nor subject him to the 
Rules and Articles of War for an offense against the laws of the United States, except in aid of 
the judicial authority, and subject to its control; and if the party is arrested by the military, it is 
the duty of the officer to deliver him over immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt with ac¬ 
cording to law. 

“ I forbore yesterday to state orally the provisions of the Constitution of the United States 
which make these principles the fundamental law of the Union, because an oral statement might 
be misunderstood in some portions of it, and I shall therefore put my opinion in writing, and file 
it in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in the course of this week.” 

The judge added that the military authority was always subordinate to civil; that, under or¬ 
dinary circumstances, it would be the duty of the marshal to proceed with posse comUatus and 
bring the party named in the writ into court; but, from the notoriously superior force that he 
would encounter, this would be impossible. He said the marshal had done all in his power to 
discharge his duty. 

During the week he should prepare his opinion in the premises, and forward it to the President, 
calling upon him to perform his constitutional duty, and see that the laws be faithfully executed, 
and enforce the decrees of this court. 

• A Proclamation by the President of the United States. 

Washington, Friday, May 3,1861. 

Whereas, existing exigencies demand immediate and adequate measures for the protection of 
the national Constitution and the preservation of the national Union by the suppression of the in¬ 
surrectionary combinations now existing in several states for opposing the laws of the Union and 
obstructing the execution thereof, to which end a military force, in addition to that called forth by 
my proclamation of the fifteenth day of April in the present year, appears to be indispensably nec¬ 
essary ; now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and Commander-in- 
Chicf of the Army and Navy thereof, and of the militia of the several states when called into actual 
service, do hereby call into the service of the United States forty-two thousand and thirty-four vol¬ 
unteers, to serve for a period of three years, unless sooner discharged, and to be mustered into serv¬ 
ice as infantry and cavalry. The proportions of each arm, and the details of enrollment and or¬ 
ganization. will be made known through the Department of War; and I also direct that the reg¬ 
ular army of the United States be increased by the addition of eight regiments of infantry, one 
regiment of cavalry, and one regiment of artillery, making altogether a maximum aggregate in- 
erea-sc of 22,714 officers and enlisted men, the details of which increase will als7> be made known 
through the Department of War; and I farther direct the enlistment,for not less than one nor I 


This devotion to the national cause was not manifested only by the men 
who would be obliged to do the fighting, or to pay the expenses as well as 
to bear the losses of a war. The clergy and the women threw themselves 
with all their souls into the enthusiasm of the hour. The former preached 
patriotism, and taught their people, in the pulpit as well as out of it, the les¬ 
son of self-devotion which they were so ready to learn, and showed them 
support in the Scriptures for the cause which they were so anxious to sus¬ 
tain. The latter began to make lint and bandages, and garments needful for 
the sick; they offered themselves as nurses, each one seeing herself the con¬ 
soler and the savior of at least one defender of his country, the recipient of 
his gallantry and his gratitude; and they demanded, with sweet clamor, the 
immediate defeat of General Beauregard and the speedy arrest of Mr. Jeffer¬ 
son Davis. Their simple enthusiasm and their unreasonable expectations, in 
which they were not very far in advance of the cooler and more calculating 
patriots of the sterner sex, should not diminish one jot the credit which is 
due to their devotion. No demonstration could have been more whole¬ 
hearted, more encouraging, or more serviceable. In the seceded states, how¬ 
ever, exactly the same devotion was exhibited; but its spirit was intensified 
and all its features heightened. There rebellion raved both in church and 
parlor: it inspired the prayer at the altar; it was heard in the song by the 
cradle. The very consecrated cup of the communion-table seemed to be 
drunk by men as a pledge of undying hostility; and if the sweet nourish¬ 
ment of infants was not curdled by the gall of bitter hatred, it was because 
the fair and kindred sources whence it should have flowed were closed by 
the dictates of an unnatural fashion, and that to servile arms and swarthy 
breasts was committed the tenderest office of maternity. There women not 
only sighed for the defeat of the armies and the destruction of the govern¬ 
ment of the republic; they longed for Mr. Lincoln’s teeth, and ears, and 
limbs. 1 The inferior clergy, not content with preaching sedition at home or 
in the camp, exchanged the sword of the Spirit for the bowie-knife of the 
flesh; and bishops, rivaling the mail-clad abbots of the Dark Ages, put off the 
mitre and the lawn for the cocked hat and the epaulettes, and, casting aside 
the crosier, went out in arms as God’s ministers charged with seeing that the 
curse was well visited upon Canaan. Although these demonstrations did 
much to heighten the enthusiasm of both sides, they were of little real sig¬ 
nificance on either. It can not be reasonably denied that if the clergy and 
the women had with like unanimity and earnestness opposed the action of 


more than three years, of 18,000 seamen, in addition to the present force, for the naval service of 
the United States. The details of the enlistment and organization will be made known through 
the Department of the Navy. The call for volunteers hereby made, and the direction of the in¬ 
crease of the regular army, and for the enlistment of seamen hereby given, together with the plan 
of organization adopted for the volunteers and for the regular forces hereby authorized, will be 
submitted to Congress as soon as assembled. 

In the mean time, I earnestly invoke the co-operation of all good citizens in the measures hereby 
adopted for the effectual suppression of unlawful violence, for the impartial enforcement of consti¬ 
tutional laws, and for the speediest possible restoration of peace and order, and with those of hap¬ 
piness and prosperity throughout our country. 

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to 
be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand 
eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. 

By the President. Abraham Lincoln. 

William H. Seward, Secretary of State. 


Patriotic Contnbutions to May 7, 1861. 


Abington, Mass. 

Acton, Mass. 

Albany, N. Y. 

Amesbury, Mass. 

Auburn, N. Y. 

Barre, Mass. 

Batavia, N. Y. 

Bath, Me. 

Bedford, Mass. 

Bedford, N. Y. 

Bennington, Ver. 

Binghampton, N. Y. 
Bordentown, N. J.... 

Boston, Mass. 

Bradford, Ver. 

Braintree, Mass. 

Bridgeport, Conn.... 
Bridgetown, N. J— 

Brooklyn, N. Y. 

Brunswick. Me. 

Buffalo, N. Y.. 

Burlington, N. J. 

Burlington, Ver. 

Camden and Amboy ^ 
R.R. Company.... > 
Canandaigua, N. Y.. 

Canton, Mass. 

Cass County, Ind.... 
Charlestown, Mass... 

Chicago, Ill. 

Cincinnati. 

Circleville, Ohio. 

Clinton, Ill. 

Clinton, N. Y. 

Cohasset, Mass. 

Concord, Mass. 

Concord, N. Y. 


$5,000 

f>,000 

46,000 

5,000 

4,000 

2,000 

1,000 

10,000 

2,000 

1,000 

10,000 

10,000 

8,000 

186,000 

2,000 

2,000 

31,000 

1,000 

75,000 

1.000 

110,000 

4,000 

3,000 

10,000 

7,000 

5,000 

6,000 

10,000 

20,000 

280,000 

2,000 

5,000 

1,000 

1,000 

4,000 

10,000 


Connecticut, State... 2,000,000 


Damariscotta, Me.... 

Detroit, Mich. 

Dover, N. H. 

Dunkirk, N. Y. 

Elizabeth. N. J. 

Elkhart, Ind. 

Erie, Pa. 

Evansville, Ind. 

Fall River, Mass. 

Flemington, N. J— 
Fond du Lac, Wis... 

Galena, Ill. 

Georgetown, Mass... 

Glen Falls, N. Y. 

Gloucester, Mass. 


3,000 

50,000 

10,000 

20,000 

11,000 

8,000 

25,000 

15,000 

10,000 

5,000 

4,000 

1,000 


Great Falls, N. H— 

Greensburg, Ind. 

Hamilton, Ohio. 

Harrisburg, Pa. 

Hartford, Conn. 

Hoboken, N. J. 

Hornellsville, N. Y.. 
Hudson, N. Y.. 


$10,000 

2,000 

1,000 

5,000 

64,000 

2,000 

1,000 

4,000 


Ottowa, Ill. $18,000 

Palmyra, N. J. 6,000 

Paterson, N.J. 10.000 

Pennsylvania, State.. 3,500.000 


Philadelphia.. 
Piqua, Ohio.. 
Plymouth, Mass.. 


Illinois, State. 2,000,000 

Indianapolis, Ind. ... 5,000! Princeton, N. J. 

In/llann Qrnfa 1 Arte rtrtrt O XT a.. 


Indiana, State. 1,000,000 


lowarState.. 

Ipswich, Mass. 

Ithaca, N. Y. 

Janesville, Wis. 

Jersey City, N.J. ... 

Keene, N. H. 

Kenton, Ohio. 

Lancaster, Pa. 

Lawrence, Mass. 

Lebanon County, Pa. 

Lock port, N. Y. 

London, Ohio. 

Lowell, Mass. 

Lvnn. Mass. 

Madison, Ind. 

Madison, Wis.. 


100,000 

4,000 

10,000 

6,000 

32,000 

10,000 

2,000 

5,000 

5.000 

10,000 

2,000 

1,000 

8,000 

10,000 

6,000 

9,000 


Maine, State. 1,300,000 


Vermont, State. 1.000,000 


Malden, Mass. 2,000 

Marblehead, Mass... 5,000 

Marlborough, Mass.. 10,000 

Marshfield, Mass. 5,000 

Michigan,various pi’s. 50,000 

Milwaukee, Wis. 31,000 

Morristown, N. J. ... 3,000 

Mount Holly, N. J... 3,000 

Mystic, Conn. 7,000 

Needham, Mass. 3,000 

Newark, N.J. 136,000 

New Brunswick, N.J. 2,000 

Newbury, Mass. 3,000 

Newburyport, Mass.. 4,000 

New' Haven, Conn... 30,000 

New* Jersey, State... 1,000,000 

New London, Conn. 

Newtown, Mass. 

New York, City. 2,173,000 j Wilmington, Ohio.... 


330,000 
20,000 
2,000 

Portland, Me. 31,000 

Poughkeepsie, N. Y.. 10,000 

2,000 
10,000 
500,000 
69,000 
10,000 
3,000 
15,000 
5,000 
2,000 
2,000 
30.000 
3,000 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
2,000 
10,000 
6,000 
4,000 
34,000 
40,000 
5,000 
48,000 
5,000 
20,000 


Quincy, Mass. 

Rhode Island, State.. 

Rochester. 

Rockland, Me. 

Sag Harbor, N. Y. ... 

Salem, Mass. 

Salisbury, Mass. 

Sar. Springs, N. Y. ... 
Schenectady, N. Y.... 
Schuylkill Co., Pa.... 
Seneca Falls, N. Y... 

Shelburne, Ver. 

Southboroug’n, Mass. 
Stockbridge, Mass.... 

Stowe, Mass. 

St. Albans, Ver. 

Sutton, Mass. 

Sycamore, Ill. 

Syracuse, N. Y. 

Taunton, Mass. 

Toledo, Ohio. 

Troy, N. Y. 

Upper Sandusky, O.. 
Utica, N. Y., 


Waltham, Mass. 5,000 

Warsaw, N. Y. 3,000 

Waterford, N. Y. 8,000 

Watertown, Mass. 2,000 

Watertown, N. Y. 3,000 

Waynesville, Ohio.... 2,000 

Webster, Mass. 4,000 

Wcstborough, Mass.. 8,000 

W. Cambridge, Mass. 10,000 

10,000! West Troy, N. Y. 7,000 

8,000, Weymouth, Mass. 5,000 

I W 1 1 m imrtnn nKift J 000 


New York, State. 3,000,000 Wisconsin, Slate. 22S.OOO 


N. Andover, Mass.... 3,000[ Woburn, Mass. 5,000 

Noblesville, Ind. 10,000 Woodbury, Conn. 5,000 

5,000 j Norwich, Conn. 13,000 Woodstock, Ver. 1,000 

lO.onolOhio, State. 3,000,000 j Xenia, Ohio. 14,000 

10,0001 Oswego, N. Y. 13,000|ZanesviIIe, Ohio. 3,000 

Total.$23,277,000 

Mr. William H. Russell's Diary North and South. 







































































































1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


113 


the North or of the South, much would have been effected toward the tri¬ 
umph of the opposing party; but so monstrous a condition of society as 
such a course would have revealed is unheard of in the annals of any nation. 
The occasions are of extremest rarity, if not altogether wanting, on which 
the clergy have withheld their blessings and their prayers from the cause of 
the people who honored their office and furnished their living, or women re¬ 
fused to bestow their cares and their smiles upon the men who were, or might 
hope to be, their husbands. This is right; it is inevitable. Especially is it 
woman’s function to give to those she loves her sympathy and her support 
in time of trial. She will not, she can not question of the cause. Did she 
do so, mankind, divided against itself, would cease to be. Regardless of the 
nature of the issue, she fights, with weak, resistless weapons, her child’s, her 
husband’s, lover’s battle. It is theirs, and that makes it hers. The wife of 
an Italian bandit or a Highland robber acts in this respect upon the same 
heaven-implanted impulse that filled the bosom of a Roman matron. It was 

9 Message of Jefferson Davis, April 29,18G1. 

Gentlemen of Congress: —It is my pleasing duty to announce to you that the Constitution framed 
for the establishment of a permanent government of the Confederate States of America has been 
ratified by the several conventions of each of those states which were referred to to inaugurate the 
said government in its full proportions and upon its own substantial basis of the popular will. It 
only remains that elections should be held for the designation of the officers to administer it. 
There is every reason to believe that at no distant day other states, identical in political principles 
and community of interests with those which you represent, will join this confederacy, giving to its 
typical constellation increased splendor; to its government of free, equal, and sovereign states a 
wider sphere of usefulness; and to the friends of constitutional liberty a greater security for its har¬ 
monious and perpetual existence. 

It was not, however, for the purpose of making this announcement that I have deemed it my 
duty to convoke you at an earlier day than that fixed by yourselves for your meeting. The dec¬ 
laration of war made against this confederacy by Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, 
in his proclamation, issued on the loth day of the present month, renders it necessary, in my judg¬ 
ment, that you should convene at the earliest practicable moment to devise the measures necessary 
for the defense of the country. The occasion is, indeed, an extraordinary one. It justifies me in 
giving a brief review of the relations heretofore existing between us and the states which now unite 
in warfare against us, and a succinct statement of the events which have resulted, to the end that 
mankind may pass intelligent and impartial judgment on our motives and objects. 

During the war waged against Great Britain by her colonies on this continent, a common dan¬ 
ger itn]>ellcd them to a close alliance, and to the formation of a confederation by the terms of 
which the colonics, styling themselves states, entered severally into a firm league of friendship 
with each other for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and gen¬ 
eral welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made 
upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense what¬ 
ever. In order to guard against any misconstruction of their compact, the several states made an 
explicit declaration in a distinct article, that each state retain its sovereignty, freedom, and inde¬ 
pendence, and every power of jurisdiction and right which is not by this said confederation ex¬ 
pressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled under this contract of alliance. 

The war of the Revolution was successfully waged, and resulted in the treaty of peace with Great 
Britain in 1783, by the terms of which the several states were each by name recognized to be in¬ 
dependent. The Articles of Confederation contained a clause whereby all alterations were prohib¬ 
ited, unless confirmed by the Legislatures of every state after being agreed to by the Congress; 
and in obedience to this provision, under the resolution of Congress of the 21st of February, 1787, 
the several states appointed delegates for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and 
reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, 
when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the states, render the federal Constitution adequate 
to the exigencies of the government and the preservation of the Union. 

It was by the delegates chosen by the several states under the resolution just quoted that the 
Constitution of the United States was formed in 1787, and submitted to the several states for rati¬ 
fication, as shown by the seventh article, which is in these words: “The ratification of the conven¬ 
tions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the states 
so ratifying the same.” 

I have italicized certain words in the resolutions just made for the purpose of attracting atten¬ 
tion to the singular and marked caution with which the states endeavored in every possible form 
to exclude the idea that the separate and independent sovereignty of each state was merged into 
one common government or nation; and the earnest desire they evinced to impress on the Con¬ 
stitution its true character—that of a compact between independent states—the Constitution of 
1787, however, admitting the clause already recited from the Articles of Confederation, which pro¬ 
vided in explicit terms that each state reclaimed its sovereignty and indej»cndence. 

Some alarm was felt in the states, when invited to ratify the Constitution, lest this omission 
should be construed into an abandonment of their cherished principles, and they refused to be sat¬ 
isfied until amendments were added to the Constitution placing beyond any pretense of doubt the 
reservation by the states of their sovereign rights and powers not expressly delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution. 

Strange, indeed, must it appear to the impartial observer, but it is none the less true, that all 
these carefully worded clauses proved unavailing to prevent the rise and growth in the Northern 
States of a political school which has persistently claimed that the government is set above and 
over the states; an organization created by the states, to secure the blessings of liberty and inde¬ 
pendence against foreign aggression, has been gradually perverted into a machine for their control 
in their domestic affairs. The creature has been exalted above its creator—the principals have 
been made subordinate to the agent appointed by themselves. 

The people of the Southern States, whose alino'st exclusive occupation was agriculture, early per¬ 
ceived a tendency in the Northern States to render a common government subservient to their own 
purposes bv im|>osing burdens on commerce as protection to their manufacturing and shipping in¬ 
terests. Long and angry controversies grew out of these attempts, often successful, to benefit one 
section of the country at the expense of the other, and the danger of disruption arising from this 
cause was enhanced by the fact that the Northern population was increasing, by emigration and 
other causes, more than the population of the South. By degrees, as the Northern States gamed 
preponderance in the national Congress, self-interest taught their people to yield ready assent to 
any plausible advocacy of their right as majority to govern the minority. Without control, they 
learn to listen with impatience to the suggestion of any constitutional impediment to the exercise 
of their will; and so utterly have the principles of the Constitution been corrupted in the Noi them 
mind, that, in the inaugural address delivered by President Lincoln in March last, he asserts a 
maxim which he plainlv deems to be undeniable, that the theory of the Constitution requires, in 
ull cases, that the majority shall govern. And in another memorable instance the same chief 
magistrate did not hesitate to liken the relations between states and the United States to those 
which exist between the county and the state in which it is situated, and by which it was created. 
This is the lamentable and fundamental error in which rests the policy that has culminated m his 
declaration of war against these Confederate States. ' 

In addition to the long-continued and deep-seated resentment felt by the Southern States at the 
persistent abuse of the powers they had delegated to the Congress for the purpose of enriching the 
manufacturing and shipping classes of the North at the expense of the South, there has existed for 
nearly half a centurv another subject of discord, involving interests of such transcendent magni¬ 
tude as at all times to create the apprehension in the minds of many devoted lovers of the Union 
that its permanence was impossible. 

When the several states delegated certain powers to the United States Congress, a large portion 
of the laboring population were imported into the colonies by the mother country. In twelve out 
of the fifteen states, negro sluvery existed, and the right of pro|>crty existing in slaves was protect¬ 
ed bv law; this property was recognized in the Constitution, and provision was made against us 
]o*>$ by the escape of the slave. The increase in the number of slaves by foreign importation from 
Africa was also secured by a clause forbidding Congress to prohibit the slave-trade antenor to a 
certain date, and in no clause can there be found any delegation of power to the Congress to au¬ 
thorize it in any manner to legislate to the prejudice, detriment, or discouragement of the owners 
of that species of property, or excluding it from the protection of the government. 

The climate and soil of the Northern States soon proved unpropitious to the continuance of slave 
labor, while the reverse being the case at the South, made unrestricted free intercourse between the 
two sections unfriendly. The Northern States consulted their own interests by selling their slaves 
to the South and prohibiting slavery between their limits. The South were willing purchasers of 
property suitable to their wants, and paid the price of the acquisition, without harboring a suspi¬ 
cion that their quiet possession was to be disturbed by those who were not only in want of consti¬ 
tutional authority, but by good faith as vendors, from disquieting a title emanating from them- 

As soon, however, as the Northern States, that prohibited African slavery within their limits, 


not patriotism alone that fired the heart of the bereaved Maid of Saragossa, 
and nerved the arm of Charlotte Corday; nor was it against the cause of the 
men of France that the world saw lifted the bloodless sword of the fanatic 
of Orleans, that noble monster of a heroism female though, not womanly. 
And thus throughout the land women, as ever, proved true women, and loyal 
men and rebels both found cheer and comfort. 


The attitude of the government, and the spirit and unanimity of the peo¬ 
ple of the free states, astonished and alarmed, though it did not intimidate, 
the insurgent slaveholders. Mr. Davis hastily summoned a congress of the 
confederated states, and the delegates met at Montgomery on the 29th of 
April. His message upon the occasion is one of the most important and sig¬ 
nificant documents of the time, and one which, perhaps, more than any oth¬ 
er, exercised a forming influence upon public opinion abroad. 2 To this lat- 


had reached'a number sufficient to give their representation a controlling vote in the Congress, a 
persistent and organized system of hostile measures against the rights of the owners of slaves in 
the Southern States was inaugurated and gradually extended. A series of measures was devised 
and prosecuted for the purpose of rendering insecure the tenure of property in slaves. Fanatical 
organizations, supplied with money by voluntary subscriptions, were assiduously engaged in excit¬ 
ing among the slaves a spirit of discontent and revolt. Means were furnished for their escape from 
their owners, and agents secretly employed to entice them to abscond. The constitutional previ¬ 
sion for their rendition to their owners was first evaded, then o]>enly denounced as a violation of 
conscientious obligation and religious duty. Men were taught that it was a merit to elude, dis¬ 
obey, and violently oppose the execution of the laws enacted to secure the performance of the prom¬ 
ise contained in the constitutional compact. Often owners of slaves were mobbed and even mur¬ 
dered in open day solely for applying to a magistrate for the arrest of a fugitive slave. 

The dogmas of the voluntary organization soon obtained control of the Legislatures of many of 
the Northern States, and laws were passed for the punishment, by ruinous fines, and long-contin¬ 
ued imprisonment in jails and penitentiaries, of citizens of the Southern States It ho should dare ask 
of the officers of the law for the recovery of their projicrty. Emboldened by success, on the the¬ 
atre of agitation and aggression, against the clearly expressed constitutional rights of the Con¬ 
gress, senators and representatives were sent to the common councils of the nation, whose chief 
title to this distinction consisted in the display of a spirit of ultra fanaticism, and whose business 
was not to promote the general welfare or insure domestic tranquillity, but to awaken the bitterest 
hatred again>t the citizens of sister states by violent denunciations of their institutions. 

The transaction of public affairs was imj>eded by repeated efforts to usurp jiowers not delegated 
by the Constitution, for the purpose of impairing the security of property in slaves, and reducing 
those states which held slaves to a condition of inferiority. 

Finally, a great party was organized for the purpose of obtaining the administration of the gov¬ 
ernment, with the avowed object of using its power for the total exclusion of the slave states from 
all participation in the benefits of the public domain acquired by all the states in common, wheth¬ 
er by conquest or purchase, surrounded them entirely by states in which slavery should be pro¬ 
hibited, thus rendering the property in slaves so insecure as to be comparatively worthless, and 
thereby annihilating in effect property worth thousands of millions of dollars. This party, thus 
organized, succeeded in the month of November last in the election of its candidate for the presi¬ 
dency of the United States. 

In*the mean time, under the mild and genial climate of the Southern States, and the increasing 
care for the well-being and comfort of the laboring classes, dictated alike by interest and human¬ 
ity, the African slaves had augmented in number from about six hundred thousand, at the date 
of the adoption of the constitutional compact, to upward of four millions. In a moral and social 
condition they had been elevated from brutal savages into docile, intelligent, and civilized agricul¬ 
tural laborers* and supplied not only with bodily comforts, but with careful religious instruction, 
under the supervision of a superior race. Their labor had been so directed as not only to allow 
a gradual and marked amelioration of their own condition, but to convert hundreds of thousands 
of square miles of the wilderness into cultivated lands covered with a prosperous people. Towns 
and cities had sprung into existence, and it rapidly increased in wealth and population under the 
social system of the South. The white population of the Southern slaveholding states had aug¬ 
mented* from about 1,250,000, at the date of the adoption of the Constitution, to more than 
8,500,000 in 18G0. and the productions of the South in cotton, rice, sugar, and tobacco, for the full 
development and continuance of which the labor of African slaves was and is indispensable, had 
swollen to an amount which formed nearly three fourths of the export of the whole United States, 
and had become absolutely necessary to the wants of civilized man. 

With interests of such overwhelming magnitude imperiled, the people of the Southern States 
were driven by the conduct of the North to the adoption of some course of action to avoid the dan¬ 
gers with which they were openly menaced. With this view, the Legislatures of the several states 
invited the people to select delegates to conventions to be held for the purpose of determining for 
themselves what measures were best to be adopted to meet so alarming a crisis in their history. 

Here it may be proper to observe that, from a period as early as 1798, there had existed in all 
of the states of the Union a party almost uninterruptedly in the majority, based u|»on the creed 
that each state was, in the last resort, the sole judge as well of its wrongs as of the mode and meas¬ 
ures of redress. Indeed, it is obvious that under the law of nations this principle is an axiom as 
applied to the relations of independent sovereign states, such as those which had united themselves 
under the constitutional compact. 

The Democratic party of the United States repeated, in its successful canvass in 1836, the de¬ 
duction made in numerous previous political contests, that it would faithfully abide by, and up¬ 
hold the principles laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia Legislatures of 1799, and that it 
adopts those principles as constituting one of the main foundations of its political creed. 

The principles thus emphatically announced embrace that to which I have already ad\-crted— 
the right of each state to judge of and redress the wrongs of which it complains. Their principles 
were maintained by overwhelming majorities of the people of all the states of the Union at differ¬ 
ent elections, especially in the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1805, Mr. Madison in 1809, and Mr. 
Fierce in 1852. In the exercise of a right so ancient, so well established, and so necessary for 
self-preservation, the jcople of the Confederate States in their conventions determined that the 
wrongs which they had suffered, and the evils with which they were menaced, required that they 
should revoke the delegation of powers to the federal government which they had ratified in their 
several conventions. They consequently passed ordinances resuming all their rights as sovereign 
and independent states, and dissolved their connection with the other states of the Union. Hav¬ 
ing done this, they proceeded to form a new compact among themselves by new Articles of Con¬ 
federation, which have been also ratified by conventions of the several states, with an approach to 
unanimity far exceeding that of the conventions which adopted the Constitutions of 1787. They 
have organized their new government in all its departments. The functions of the executive, leg¬ 
islative, and judicial magistrates are performed in accordance with the will of the people, as dis¬ 
played not merely in a cheerful acquiescence, but in the enthusiastic support of the government 
thus established by themselves; and but for the interference of the government of the United 
States, this legitimate exercise of a people to self-government has been manifested in every possi¬ 
ble form. . 

Scarce had vou assembled in February last, when, prior even to the inauguration of the chief 
magistrate you had elected, you expressed your desire for the ap|>ointmcnt of commis>ioners, and 
for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments ui*on principles 
of right, justice, equity, and good faith. 

It was my pleasure as well as my duty to co-operate with you in this work of peace. Indeed, 
in my address to you on taking the oath of office, and before receiving from you the communica¬ 
tion of this resolution, I had said that “as a necessity, not as a choice, we have resorted to the rem¬ 
edy of separating, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, 
and the perpetuity of the confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual in¬ 
terest shall permit us to peaceably pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will 
then have been fulfilled.” 

It was in furtherance of these accordant views of the Congress and the executive that I made 
choice of three discreet, able, and distinguished citizens, who repaired to Washington. Aided by 
their cordial co-operation and that of the Secretary of State, every effort compatible with self-re¬ 
spect and the dignity of the confederacy w as exhausted before I allowed myself to yield to the 
conviction that the government of the United States was determined to attempt the conquest of 
this people, and that our cherished hopes of peace were unobtainable. 

On the arrival of our commissioners in Washington on the 5th ot March, they post|»oned, at the 
suggestion of a friendly intermediator, doing more than giving informal, notice of their arrival. 
This was done with a view to afford time to the President of the United States, who had just been 
inaugurated, for the discharge of other pressing official duties in the organization of his adminis¬ 
tration, before engaging bis attention in the object ot their mission. It was not until the 12th of 
the month that they officially addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of the purpose of 










114 


ter end, indeed, it was, like all the more important state papers of the insur¬ 
gent leader, in a great measure directed, for he had no little skill in the low¬ 
er arts of state-craft. He could mask an utterly selfish purpose behind a 
seeming magnanimity; pervert the truth with an air of frank simplicity; 
throw a veil of courtesy over the most arrogant assumption; and with a cer¬ 
tain dignity of manner (sometimes too consciously assumed), and a pretense 
of wide philanthropy, appeal without a blush to those baser motives which 

their arrival, and stating, in the language of their instructions, their wish to make to the govern¬ 
ment of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the government of 
the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States desired a 
peaceful solution of these great questions; that it was neither their interest nor their wish to make 
any demand which is not founded on the strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure 
(heir late confederates. 

To this communication no formal reply was received until the 8th of April. During the inter¬ 
val, the commissioners had consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve to avoid 
war if possible. They went so far even as to hold, during that long period, unofficial intercourse 
through an intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the hope of success, and 
through whom constant assurances were received from the government of the United States of its 
peaceful intentions—of its determination to evacuate Fort Sumter; and farther, that no measure 
would be introduced changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate States; that in 
the event of any change in regard to Fort Pickens, notice would be given to the commissioners. 
The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy, in candor, 
and directness, as was the course of the United States government toward our commissioners in 
Washington. For proof of this, I refer to the annexed documents, taken in connection with far¬ 
ther facts which I now proceed to relate. 

Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted to extraordinary preparations 
for an extensive military and naval expedition in New York and other Northern ports. These 
preparations commenced in secrecy, for an expedition whose destination was concealed, and only 
became known when nearly completed; and on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, transports and ves¬ 
sels of war, with troops, munitions, and military supplies, sailed from Northern ports bound south¬ 
ward. 

Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the commissioners requested the delivery of an 
answer to their official communication of the 12th of March, and the reply dated on the loth of 
the previous month^ from which it appears that during the whole interval, while the commissioners 
were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary 
of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse 
with them whatever—to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited 
by the delay created by their own assurances in order to prepare secretly the means for effective 
hostile operations. That these assurances were given has been virtually confessed by the govern¬ 
ment of the United States, by its act of sending a messenger to Charleston to give notice of its 
purpose to use force if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter. No more striking proof 
of the absence of good faith in the confidence of the government of the United States toward the 
confederacy can be required than is contained in the circumstances which accompanied this no¬ 
tice. 

According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels composing the expedition, and designed 
for the relief of Fort Sumter, might be looked for in Charleston Harbor on the 9th of April. Yet 
our commissioners in Washington were detained under assurances that notice should be given of 
any military movement. The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent to 
Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina, and the notice was so given at a late 
hour on the 8th of April, the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to arrive. 
That this manoeuvre failed in its purpose was not the fault of those who controlled it. A heavy 
tempest delayed the arrival of the expedition, and gave time to the commander of our forces at 
Charleston to ask and receive instructions of the government. Even then, under all the provoca¬ 
tion incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen to our commissioners, and the treacherous 
course of the government of the United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of 
blood, and directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had avowed him¬ 
self to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from directing our fire on Fort Sumter 
if he would promise to not open fire on our forces unless first attacked. This proposal was re¬ 
fused. The conclusion was, that the design of the United States w-as to place the besieging force 
at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fort and the fleet. The fort should, of course, 
be at once reduced. This order was executed by General Beauregard with skill and success, 
which were naturally to be expected from the well-known character of that gallant officer; and, 
although the bombardment lasted some thirty-three hours, our flag did not wave over the battered 
walls until after the appearance of the hostile fleet off Charleston. Fortunately, not a life was 
lost on our side, and we were gratified in being prepared. The necessity of a useless effusion of 
blood by the prudent caution of the officers who commanded the fleet, in abstaining from the evi¬ 
dently futile effort to enter the harbor for the relief of Major Anderson, was spared. I refer to the 
report of the Secretary of War, and the papers accompanying it, for farther particulars of this 
brilliant affair. 

In this connection I can not refrain from a well-deserved tribute to the noble state, the eminent¬ 
ly soldierly qualities of whose people were conspicuously displayed. The people of Charleston for 
months had been irritated by the spectacle of a fortress held within their principal harbor as a 
standing menace against their peace and independence—built in part with their own money—its 
custody confided with their long consent to an agent who held no power over them other than such 
as they had themselves delegated for their own benefit, intended to be used by that agent for their 
own protection against foreign attack. How it was held out with persistent tenacity as a means 
of offense against them by the very government which they had established for their own protec¬ 
tion, is well known. They had beleaguered it for months, and felt entire confidence in their pow¬ 
er to capture it, yet yielded to the requirements of discipline, curbed their impatience, submitted 
without complaint to the unaccustomed hardships, labors, and privations of a protracted siege, and 
when at length their patience was relieved by the signal for attack, and success had crowned their 
steady and gallant conduct, even in the very moment of triumph they evinced a chivalrous regard 
for the feelings of the brave but unfortunate officer who had been compelled to lower his flag. 
All manifestations or exultations were checked in his presence. Their commanding general, with 
their cordial approval and the consent of his government, refrained from imposing any terms that 
would wound the sensibility of the commander of the fort. He was permitted to retire with the 
honors of war, to salute his flag, to depart freely with all his command, and was escorted to the 
vessel on which he embarked with the highest marks of respect from those against whom his guns 
had so recently been directed. Not only does every event connected with the siege reflect the 
highest honor on South Carolina, but the forbearance of her people and of this government from 
making any harangue of a victory obtained under circumstances of such peculiar provocation at¬ 
test to the fullest extent the absence of any purpose beyond securing their own tranquillity, and the 
sincere desire to avoid the calamities of war. 

Scarcely had the President of the United States received intelligence of the failure of the scheme 
which he had devised for the rc-enforcement of Fort Sumter, when he issued the declaration of 
war against this confederacy which has prompted me to convoke you. In this extraordinary pro¬ 
duction, that high functionary affects total ignorance of the existence of an independent govern¬ 
ment, which, possessing the entire and enthusiastic devotion of its people, is exercising its functions 
without question over seven sovereign states—over more than five millions of people—and over a 
territory whose area exceeds five hundred thousand square miles. He terms sovereign states 
“combinations too powerful to be suppressed in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by 
the powers vested in the marshals by law.” He calls for an army of seventy-five thousand men to 
act as the posse comitatus in aid of the process of the courts of justice in states where no courts 
exist, whose mandates and decrees are not cheerfully obeyed and respected by a willing people. 
He avows that the first service to be assigned to the forces which have been called out will not be 
to execute the processes of courts, but to capture forts and strong-holds situated within the admit¬ 
ted limits of this confederacy, and garrisoned by its troops, and declares that this effort is intended 
to maintain the perpetuity of popular government. He concludes by commanding the persons 
composing the “combinations” aforesaid, to wit, the five millions of inhabitants of these states, to 
retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days. 

Apparently contradictory as are the terms of this singular document, one point was unmistaka¬ 
bly evident. The President of the United States calls for an army of 75,000 men, whose first 
•ervice was to be to capture our forts. It was a plain declaration of war which I was not at lib¬ 
erty to disregard, because of my knowledge that under the Constitution of the United States the 
President was usurping a power granted exclusively to the Congress. 

He is the sole organ of communication between that country and foreign powers. The law of 
nations did not permit me to question the authority of the executive of a foreign nation to declare 
war against this confederacy. Although I might have refrained from taking active measures for 
our defense if the states of the Union had all imitated the action of Virginia, North Carolina, Ar¬ 
kansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, by denouncing it as an unconstitutional usurpation of 
power to which they refuse to respond, I was not at liberty to disregard the fact that many of the 
states seemed quite content to submit to the exercise of the powers assumed by the President of the 
United States, and were actively engaged in levying troops for the purpose indicated in the proc¬ 
lamation. Deprived of the aid of Congress, at the moment I was under the necessity of confining 


[ 1861 . 

influence nations as well as individuals. What he must and could conceal, 
he concealed adroitly; what he would have concealed, yet must maintain, he 
did not excuse or even vindicate; he boldly proclaimed it good, and put his 
adversaries on their defense. Yet, with all this, he was not personally cor¬ 
rupt or false. He was but a cunning politician, thrusting aside scruples in 
bis public which he might cherish in his private life, and directing his course 
by that immoral law which has too generally been the guide of ruling men 
in all ages and of all nations. He now told Europe—Great Britain and 

my action to a call on the states for volunteers for the common defense, in accordance with the au¬ 
thority you had confided to me before your adjournment. 

I deemed it proper farther to issue a proclamation, inviting applications from persons disposed 
to aid in our defense in private armed vessels on the high seas, to the end that preparations might 
be made for the immediate issue of letters of marque and reprisal, which you alone, under the 
Constitution, have the power to grant. I entertain no doubt that you will concur with me in the 
opinion that, in the absence of an organized navy, it will be eminently expedient to supply their 
place with private armed vessels, so happily styled by the publicists of the United States the mili¬ 
tia of the sea, and so often and justly relied on by them as an efficient and admirable instrument 
of defensive warfare. I earnestly recommend the immediate passage of a law authorizing me to 
accept the numerous proposals already received. 

I can not close this review of the acts of the government of the United States without referring 
to a proclamation issued by their president under date of the 19th inst., in which, afrer declaring 
that an insurrection has broken out in this confederacy against the government of the United 
States, he announces a blockade of all the ports of these states, and threatens to punish as pirates 
all persons who shall molest any vessel of the United States under letters of marque issued by this 
government. Notwithstanding^ authenticity of this proclamation, you will concur with me that 
it is hard to believe that it could have emanated from a President of the United States. Its an¬ 
nouncement of a mere paper blockade is so manifestly a violation of the law of notions, that it 
would seem incredible that it could have been issued by authority; but, conceding this to be the 
case, so far as the executive is concerned, it will be difficult to satisfy the people of these states that 
their late confederates will sanction its declarations—will determine to ignore the usages of civil¬ 
ized nations, and will inaugurate a war of extermination on both sides, by treating as pirates open 
enemies acting under the authority of commissions issued by an organized government. If such 
proclamation was issued, it could only have been published under the sudden influence of passion, 
and we may rest assured that mankind will be spared the horrors of the conflict it seems to invite. 

For the details of the administration of the different departments, I refer to the reports of the 
secretaries of each, which accompany this message. 

The State Department has furnished the necessary instructions for those commissioners who 
have been sent to England, France, Russia, and Belgium, since your adjournment, to ask our rec¬ 
ognition as a member of the family of nations, and to make with each of these powders treaties of 
amity and commerce. Farther steps will be taken to enter into like negotiations with the other 
European powers, in pursuance to resolutions passed at your last session. Sufficient time has not 
yet elapsed since the departure of these commissioners for the receipt of any intelligence from 
them. 

As I deem it desirable that commissioners or other diplomatic agents should also be sent at an 
early period to the independent American powers south of our confederacy, with all of whom it is 
our interest and earnest wish to maintain the most cordial and friendly relations, I suggest the ex¬ 
pediency of making the necessary appropriations for that purpose. Having been officially notified 
by the public authorities of the State of Virginia that she had withdrawn from the Union, and de¬ 
sired to maintain the closest political relations with us which it was possible at this time to es¬ 
tablish, I commissioned the Honorable Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-president of the Confederate 
States, to represent this government at Richmond. I am happy to inform you that he has con¬ 
cluded a convention with the State of Virginia, by which that honored commonwealth, so long and 
justly distinguished among her sister states, and so dear to the hearts of thousands of her children 
in the Confederate States, has united her power and her fortunes with ours, and become one of us. 
This convention, together with the ordinance of Virginia adopting the Provisional Constitution of 
the confederacy, will be laid before you for your constitutional action. 

I have satisfactory assurances from other of our late confederates that they are on the point of 
adopting similar measures; and I can not doubt that, ere you shall have been many weeks in ses¬ 
sion, the whole of the slaveholding states of the late Union will respond to the call of honor and 
affection, and, by uniting their fortune with ours, promote our common interests and secure our 
common safety. * * * * 

The Secretary of War, in his report and accompanying documents, conveys full information 
concerning the forces, regular, volunteer, and provisional, raised and called for under the several 
acts of Congress—their organization and distribution ; also an account of the expenditures already 
made, and the farther estimates for the fiscal year ending on the 18th of February, 1862, render¬ 
ed necessary by recent events. 

I refer to the report, also, for a full history of the occurrences in Charleston Harbor prior to, and 
including the bombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter, and of the measures subsequently taken 
for common defense on receiving the intelligence of the declaration of war against us made by the 
President of the United States. 

There are now in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and 
Pulaski, 19,000 men, and 16,000 are now en route for Virginia. It is proposed to organize and 
hold in readiness for instant action, in view of the present exigencies of the country, an army of 
100,000 men. If further force be needed, the wisdom and patriotism of the Congress will be con¬ 
fidently appealed to for authority to call into the field additional numbers of our noble-spirited 
volunteers, who are constantly tendering their services far in excess of our wants. 

The operations of the Navy Department have been necessarily restricted by the fact that suffi¬ 
cient time has not yet elapsed for the purchase or construction of more than a limited number of 
vessels adapted to the public service. Two vessels have been purchased and manned, the Sumtei 
and M‘Rea, and are now being prepared for sea, at New Orleans, with all possible dispatch. Con¬ 
tracts have also been made at that city with two different establishments for the casting of ord¬ 
nance—cannon, shot, and shell—with the view to encourage the manufacture of these articles, so 
indispensable for our defense, at as many points within our territory as possible. I call your at¬ 
tention to the recommendation of the secretary for the establishment of a magazine and labora¬ 
tory for the preparation of ordnance stores, and the necessary appropriation required for that pur¬ 
pose. Hitherto such stores have been prepared at the navy yards and no appropriation was made 
at your last session for this object. * * * * 

In conclusion, I congratulate you on the fact that in every portion of our country there has been 
exhibited the most patriotic devotion to our common cause. Transportation companies have free¬ 
ly tendered the use of their lines for troops and supplies. The presidents of the railroads of the 
confederacy, in company with others who control lines of communication with states that we hope 
soon to greet as sisters assembled in convention in this city, have not only reduced largely the 
rates heretofore demanded for mail service and conveyance of troops and munitions, but have vol¬ 
untarily proffered to receive their compensation at their reduced rates in the bonds of the confed¬ 
eracy, for the purpose of leaving all the resources of the government at its own disposal for the 
common defense. 

Requisitions for troops have been met with such alacrity that the nnmbers tendering their serv¬ 
ices have in every instance greatly exceeded the demand. Men of the highest official and social 
position are serving as volunteers in the ranks. The gravity of age, the zeal of youth, rival each 
other in the desire to be foremost in the public defense; and though at no other point than the one 
heretofore noticed have they been stimulated by the excitement incident to actual engagement and 
the hope of distinction for individual deportment, they have borne, what for new troops is the most 
severe ordeal, patient toil, constant vigil, and all the exposure and discomfort of active service with 
a resolution and fortitude such as to command the approbation and justify the highest expectation 
of their conduct when active valor shall be required in place of steady endurance. 

A people thus united and resolute can not shrink from any sacrifice which they may be called 
on to make, nor can there be a reasonable doubt of their final success, however long and severe 
may be the test of their determination to maintain their birthright of freedom and equality as a 
trust which it is their first duty to transmit unblemished to their posterity. A bounteous Provi¬ 
dence cheers us with the promise of abundant crops. The fields of grain, which will, within a few 
weeks, be ready for the sickle, give assurance of the amplest supply of food, while the corn, cotton, 
and other staple productions of our soil afford abundant proof that up to this period the season has 
been propitious. 

We feel that our cause is just and holy. We protest solemnly, in the face of mankind, that we 
desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor. In independence we seek no conquest, no ag¬ 
grandizement, no cession of any kind from the states with which we have lately confederated. All 
we ask is to be let alone—that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our sub¬ 
jugation by arms. This we will, we must resist, to the direst extremity. The moment that this 
pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into 
treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be mutually bencficinl. So long as this preten¬ 
sion is maintained, with a firm reliance on that Divine Power vhich covers with its protection the 
just cause, we will continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self- 
government. Jefferson Davis. 

Montgomery, April 29,186L 






1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


116 



MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA: FIRST SEAT OF THE REBEL GOVERNMENT. 


France especially—that the confederate government had been established 
upon the substantial basis of the popular will; but he was silent as to the 
violent and insidious means by which that seeming popular unanimity had 
been brought about. He claimed for his confederacy the sympathy of the 
friends of constitutional liberty; when he knew that according to no mean¬ 
ing attached to those words was the course of his confederates other than 
an outrage on that liberty. He asserted that the free states had endeav¬ 
ored to reduce the slave states to a condition of inferiority; when he knew 
that, from the very construction of the republic, no state could possibly suf¬ 
fer from any other inferiority than that which might be the inevitable con¬ 
sequence of its natural resources, the number and character of its inhabit¬ 
ants, and the nature of its local institutions. He did not hesitate to say 
that the party whose candidate Mr.Lincoln was had been organized with the 
avowed object of excluding the slave states from all participation in the ben¬ 
efits of the public domain; when he knew that no man had ever proposed 
that the people of the slave states should have a single right A possession 
or enjoyment less than those of the free states in the common territory of 
the republic, but that the former had claimed to have a privilege there in 
effect peculiar to themselves. He could not conceal the fact that the insur¬ 
gents were slaveholders, and the loyal men free laborers; but he covered up 
with cloudy words and euphemisms the other fact, that the sole grievance of 
the former was that the latter had refused to allow the farther propagation 
of slavery under the flag and the protection of the republic. He did not 
hesitate to say that the African slaves had been elevated from brutal savages 
into docile, intelligent, and civilized agricultural laborers, supplied with bod¬ 
ily comforts and careful religious instruction; when he knew that not one in 
a thousand of them had ever been in a country more savage than that into 
which they, and their ancestors for two generations, and sometimes for six, 
had been born as slaves; that their docility was a sad and sullen cowering 
under the lash and the revolver; their intelligence—except among those 
whose veins flowed mostly with white blood—not one whit above that of 
their race in Africa; their civilization, with like exceptions, only a compelled 
and stolid submission to the police of a superior people; their bodily com¬ 
forts no more than such bare necessaries, not including wholesome food, as 
enabled them to live and labor for their owners ; 3 and their religious instruc¬ 
tion only such a use of the allurements of heaven and the terrors of hell as 
could be made auxiliary to the whip of the overseer—a religious instruction 
from which the reading of Christ’s Word, and the teaching of the one great 
doctrine upon which Christianity is founded, “Whatsoever ye would that 
men should do to you, do ye even so to them,” were solicitously and of ne¬ 
cessity excluded. The wily leader told his fellow-confederates that the pro- 

J In Cincinnati, the refuse of the immense lard factories is compressed into huge cakes, and 
this loathsome, indigestible mass is sent southward as food for slaves. 


ductions of the South in cotton, rice, sugar, and tobacco had become neces¬ 
sary to the wants of civilized man, and that to the continuance of the supply 
the labor of African slaves was necessary; a statement utterly superfluous 
when made to them at any time, and entirely foreign to the emergency upon 
which he had called them together, but which he put forth as a threat to 
Europe of impending famine and misery, by which the commercial and the 
manufacturing classes might be driven to encourage a rebellion against a con¬ 
stitutional government in support of African slavery and their own interests. 
For already, and before a blow had been struck on the side either of the in¬ 
surgents or the government, the former, as Mr. Davis told the world in this 
message, had sent commissioners to the British, French, Kussian, and Belgian 
governments, to ask recognition and to make treaties. Assumption and self- 
assertion, pushed to the verge 6f absurdity, were weapons upon which the in¬ 
surgent slaveholders much relied for the triumph of their cause, and in which 
their armory, not supplied, in this particular, by “ acquirements” from the 
North, was inexhaustible. But men are too often taken at their own valu¬ 
ation ; an arrogant, active, and unscrupulous pretender will for a time over¬ 
bear and sweep away the claims of him who rests quietly in his conscious¬ 
ness of right; and so, as it appeared ere long, the presuming policy of the 
insurgents accomplished more than they could have expected, if not all that 
they desired. But it was in the closing sentences of this message that Mr. 
Davis assumed the position which most won for the rebels the sympathy of 
which they were so much in need. “In independence,” he said, “we seek 
no conquest, no aggrandizement, no cession of any kind from the states with 
which we have lately confederated. All we ask is to be let alone—that 
those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation 
by force of arms. This we will, this we must resist to the direst extremity. 
The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our 
grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce 
that can not but be mutually beneficial. So long as this pretension is main¬ 
tained, with a firm reliance on that Divine Power which covers with its pro¬ 
tection the just cause, we will continue to struggle for our inherent right to 
freedom, independence, and self-government.” The picture which these 
words presented of an inoffensive, peaceful people seeking but to enjoy 
their own without detriment to others, and driven to resistance only by an 
attempt to deprive them of freedom and self-government, and bring them 
under foreign subjugation, produced a strong impression in Europe, and fur¬ 
nished the ill-wishers of the great republic a welcome text from which to 
preach against the tyrannical aggressiveness of democracy. That men who 
only asked to be let alone should not be awarded that small boon did in¬ 
deed seem wrongful. But at the North, where this change from the insolent 
bravado which claimed Washington and threatened Boston was attributed 
to the right cause—the uprising which had so astounded the insurgents— 





























































































lie 


where it was known that no other subjugation was purposed than the obe¬ 
dience of all to the supreme law enacted by all, and that freedom, independ¬ 
ence, and self-government were insured by the Constitution which the insur¬ 
gents had defied as completely, and by the very same safeguards and provi¬ 
sions, as by that which they had adopted—where it was also known that a 
cession of territory would be an absolute demand, and the conquest of Mex¬ 
ico an ultimate and speedy undertaking on the part of the insurgents if they 
were successful—and where it was felt in men’s inmost hearts that the unre¬ 
sisted and accomplished secession of a single state was national ruin, Mr. Da¬ 
vis’s peaceful professions, and his airs of injured innocence, were met with 
merited derision, and the phrase, “All we ask is to be let alone,” became the 
satirical by-word of the day. 

Other parts of this document were of even more importance than those to 
which the above remarks apply, but I postpone their consideration while I 
recount briefly the events which took place at the South between the meet¬ 
ing and the adjournment of this Congress, and until I attempt to show the 
nature and the purposes of the impending conflict. The Congress itself de¬ 
voted its attention solely to the business of resistance. Letters of marque 
and reprisal were authorized. Authority was also given to Mr. Davis to ac¬ 
cept the services of volunteers without regard to the place of their enlist¬ 
ment. The export of cotton during the blockade, except from the sea-ports 
of the Confederate States and through Mexico, was forbidden under both 
heavy penalty and imprisonment. A bill was passed authorizing the issue 
of fifty millions of dollars in bonds payable in twenty years, with interest 
at eight per cent., or, in lieu of bonds, treasury notes for small sums, with¬ 
out interest, to the amount of twenty millions of dollars. These bonds were 
offered to planters for their cotton—a politic measure, which sought at once 
to recruit the treasury, and to bind the planters to the new government by 
the ties of interest. The payment of debts to any persons or corporations 
in the loyal states was prohibited, and the loan of the money to the confed¬ 
erate treasury was recommended; but from this scandalous enactment the 
slave states of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and the District 
of Columbia, were shrewdly excepted, in the vain hope that the proffered 
bribe might buy a lukewarm patriotism. 



BEBIDENOE Or MB. JEFFERSON DAVIS AT MONTGOMERY, CALLED u THE WHITE HOUSE.” 


• Meantime the people of the seceded states were inflamed with an un¬ 
quenchable military ardor. Having been taught to believe that one South¬ 
ern man was a match for five Northerners, and that the Yankees (as they 
called the inhabitants of all the free states) would be slow to battle, even for 
a cause which they had at heart, the slaveholders, and the mean whites who 
did their bidding, looked for a sudden and an easy victory, and they throng¬ 
ed into the insurgent ranks to share its cheap-bought glory. The bulk of 
the newly-levied army was poured into Virginia, which was threatened by 
the forces rapidly accumulating around Washington. General Robert Lee, 
of Virginia, who had been one of Lieutenant General Scott’s military family, 
and who had grieved the heart of his old chief by deserting for his state the 
cause of the republic, had been placed in command of the Virginia militia. 
To prevent confusion of state and confederate authority, on the 10th of May 
he was directed by the government at Montgomery to take command of all 
the troops in Virginia. Other officers soon superseded him ; but this is the 
first appearance upon our scene of a man who was destined to exercise a 
controlling influence upon the fortunes of the war now about to open. On 
the 22d of May the Congress at Montgomery adjourned to meet on the 20th 
of July at Richmond. The former parted finally with its short-lived dis¬ 
tinction, and the latter became in fact, if not in name, the confederate capital. 


[ 1861 . 

Fort Sumter had been attacked before the government had taken any 
steps for the suppression of the insurrection, and even before the President 
had issued a formal proclamation commanding the obedience of the insur¬ 
gents to the constitutional authorities of the republic. In the bombardment 
of that strong-hold not a life had been lost or a serious wound received on 
the part either of the assailants or the garrison ; and its evacuation was the 
consequence of a lack of food and a conflagration, both brought about by 
the means of batteries, the erection of which under his guns its commander, 
by orders from Washington, had made no effort to prevent. The collis¬ 
ions in Baltimore and St. Louis were produced by mere outbreaks of mob 
violence; and thus far, therefore, the war ushered in by the attack upon 
Fort Sumter may be regarded as not having begun. Before entering upon 
the details of a struggle of which the civil and the moral are far more in¬ 
teresting and significant than the military and the material aspects, it will 
be well to examine into the causes and the purposes of the conflict, and the 
means for its prosecution in the hands of each party at its commencement. 

War, whether civil or between opposing nations, is always the fruit of 
aggression. It is resistance to aggression which produces collision of arms, 
although arms may be first taken up by the aggrieved. Civil wars, when 
they are not wars of races or religions, or between the partisans of rival 
claimants to supreme authority, or the results of two or all of these causes, 
are brought about by the attempts of the party in power to assert or to per¬ 
petuate the right of using that power for its own interests, regardless of the 
principles of justice and of the general good. Thus our ancestors fought 
King Charles at Naseby, at Worcester, and at Marston Moor, because he 
attempted to perpetuate the absolute royal prerogative which he blindly 
thought had come down to him unimpaired from the Tudors, and to rule 
English men as a father rules a family of children. He did not see that the 
nation had come to its majority. Thus, again, they fought King George at 
Bunker Hill, at Saratoga, and at Yorktown, because he and his ministers 
undertook to deny them—they being born on the western side of the At¬ 
lantic—their rights as Englishmen,.and to tax them by the votes of a body 
in which they were not represented. And thus the French people swept 
away, in a storm of blood, the men vjho were banded together to rule France 
in the interests of an aristocratic class, and in utter disregard of the well-being 
of their social inferiors. In the United States there were no distinctions of 
race, of religion, or, properly, of rank or birth, in which might breed the 
germs of internal enmity. The homogeneousness of the nation at the time 
when it came into political existence had been indeed somewhat modified 
during the lapse of seventy years, but so slightly that this circumstance is 
not to be taken into consideration in an examination of the causes of the 
rebellion. For not only were the Irish and German immigrants who poured 
into the country after the year 1816 rapidly absorbed and assimilated by 
the Anglo-American people, among whom in the second generation they 
were lost, but by those of their number who went southward and were sub¬ 
jected to the influences of slavery, the sentiments and prejudices which led 
to the rebellion were adopted with the greatest facility; and among the re¬ 
cently arrived Irish immigrants in the free states the slaveholders’ party 
found its constant supporters and allies. In the first armies which moved 
northward to meet the forces of the republic Irishmen and Germans bore a 
proportion to the whole number about equal to that of their countrymen in 
the opposing ranks; and amid the planters whom they left behind them 
there were no more strenuous advocates of progressive slavery and seces¬ 
sion than those who were of British birth. 4 And it was to the Northwestern 
states, whither had thronged most of the German immigrants, that the insur¬ 
gent planters, ere many months had passed, looked to find aid in forming a 
great confederacy, from which the purely English blooded Eastern states 
were to be excluded. Indeed, from the very beginning, this alliance, and 
that of the Irish-ruled city of New York, had been counted upon as main el¬ 
ements of strength in the attempted revolution. When to these facts there 
is added another, greatly significant, that among the strongest supporters 
and most active agents of the insurrection were a host of men born and 
bred in the free states, but who had political and personal interests involved 
in the success of the party of progressive slavery, and who served as officers 
in the insurgent army, in the civil affairs of the confederacy, or, still more 
effectively, as its emissaries at the North or in Europe, demoralizing public 
opinion at home and perverting it abroad; when of the regular army we 
find thirty officers born and bred in the free states who, in November and 
December of 1861, resigned their commissions and soon afterward entered 
the rebel service, and, on the other hand, one hundred and thirty-three offi¬ 
cers of that army born and bred in slave states remaining true to their colors, 
and under sorely trying circumstances fighting the battles of the republic, 5 
it will be seen how shallow was the pretense of the mouthpieces of the in¬ 
surgent leaders that secession was the consequence of a difference between 
the people of the slave and free states. Some slight difference there was, 
but no such difference. 

Still less were there opportunities for the development of that hatred 
which through so many centuries has shown religion and impiety walking 
hand in hand, inciting Mohammedan to slay Christian, Roman Catholic to 
burn Protestant, Church of England man to persecute Puritan, and Puritan 
to hang Quaker. On the contrary, a Christian faith essentially uniform per¬ 
vaded the land, throughout which nearly all the known sects were harmo¬ 
niously diffused. Even the slight difference in this regard between the two 


* Mr. William Henry Russell’s Diary North and South gives foreign, unbiased, and partly un¬ 
willing support to this statement, which is known to be true by every observant and thoughtful 
man in the United States. 

5 See the extracts from the Army Register in “Are the West Point Graduates Loyal?” by R 
C. Marshall 

























1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


117 


sides of the Potomac which had existed in the early years of the country 
had passed away. A great increase of the Baptists and Methodists in the 
slave states bad deprived the Church of England of its predominance in that 
quarter; while in the free states, and in New England itself, that sect had 
grown rapidly, and with a constantly increasing growth, from a period which 
dated before the War of Independence. Nor were hostile and clashing in¬ 
terests of a normal kind the springs of this rebellion. Various interests, 
truly, had various preponderance in different parts of the country; but there 
must be variety of interest in every nation the people of which are not so 
rude as to have neither commerce, manufactures, arts, nor literature, or the 
territory not so small as to be monotonous. But such varieties of interest 
and occupation, so far from producing discord and division, compensate each 
other, harmonize With each other, and bind together the people among whom 
they obtain, making of them one complex, highly-developed, self-sustaining 
individual, while the nation of a single interest is, like an animal of simple 
organization, a teeble creature ot low grade. The isolation and narrow¬ 
ness of view consequent upon exclusive devotion to one employment causes 
a nation surely to remain in or relapse into a state little above a semi¬ 
barbarism. The variety of normal interests in the United States was no 
greater and no other than comported with the well-being and the progress 
of a great and powerful nation, either as a whole or in regard to its com¬ 
ponent parts. Agriculture prevailed in the South, but nut more than at the 
Northwest; and it was a powerful interest in the Northeast, where manufac¬ 
tures and commerce prevailed, and where the spirit of trade, though pre¬ 
dominant, was not more active than at New Orleans or at Chicago. The 
mariners and the shipwrights of the North, who lived by carrying the cot¬ 
ton, the sugar, and the tobacco of the Southern planter, and the grain and 
pork of the Western farmer, and bringing the produce of other lands within 
their reach, furnished also the naval force which secured them the quiet pos¬ 
session of their fields, and the safe transhipment of their produce. The 
Northern forges and furnaces, which chiefly supplied the mills, the engines, 
and the railways of both South and West, earned whatever the tariff brought 
them in excess of the cost of like manufacture from Europe by furnishing 
also the arms which defended them; and, in case of foreign war, the mills 
of Massachusetts and Rhode Island were able to provide at once a market 
for the raw cotton of the South, and a full and certain supply of the fabrics 
into which it had been converted. So that, in fact, at the time of the at¬ 
tempted disruption of the republic, as at that of its formation (I have before 
remarked the fact, but it can not too constantly be kept in mind), it exhib¬ 
ited a kotnogencousness in every respect far more nearly absolute than that 
of the kingdom of Great Britain—like itself a union, but a union of three 
distinct peoples, ancient, radically diverse, and for centuries inimical—or that 
of France, not to speak of the small republic of Switzerland, the larger em¬ 
pire of Austria, or the vast domain ruled by the autocrat of Russia. Save 
for one single point of difference, there was no nation in the world so homo¬ 
geneous as the great republic; save for one single element of discord, not 
one so stably built, so strongly buttressed into unity. That point of differ¬ 
ence, that element of discord, it is almost superfluous to say, was slavery. 
Yet slavery was not the cause of the rebellion. 

In the introductory part of this history, it has been shown that at the 
adoption of the Constitution the slaveholders obtained political advantages, 
seen to be incidental and supposed to be temporary, to the preservation of 
which as slaveholders they soon began solicitously to devote themselves. It 
has been remarked but a few sentences above that civil wars, when not of 
race, religion, or dynasty, are the fruit of an attempt of men in power to keep 
that power in their own hands for their own selfish interests; and we shall 
now see that the civil war in the United States was not caused by any at¬ 
tack upon slavery, or by the denial of equal rights to slaveholders and free 

• Remarks of Mr. Lincoln vjton a Series of Questions addressed to him by Mr. Dougins during 
their canvass for the. Senatorshijt of Illinois. 

Question 1. I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands pledged, as he did in 1854, in fa¬ 
vor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law? 

Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged in favor of the unconditional repeal of the 
Fugitive Slave Law. 

Q. 2. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the 
admission of any more slave states into the Union, even if the people want them? 

A. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave states 
into the Union. 

Q 3. I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new state into the 
Union with such a Constitution as the people of that state may see fit to make? 

A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new state into the Union with such a 
Constitution as the people of that state may see fit to make. 

Q. 4. I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the Dis¬ 
trict of Columbia? 

A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. 

Q. 5. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade 
between the different states ? 

A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different states. 

Q. G. I desire to know whether he. stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the 
United States north as well as south of the Missouri Compromise line? 

A. I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to pro¬ 
hibit slavery in all the United States’ Territories. 

Q. 7. I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory un¬ 
less shivery is first prohibited therein ? 

A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any given case, I 
would or would not oppose such acquisition, according as I might think such acquisition would or 
would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves. 

Now, mv friends, it will be perceived, upon an examination of these questions and answers, 
that so far I have only answered that I was not pledged to this, that, or the other. The Judge 
has not framed his interrogatories to ask me any thing more than this, and I have answered in 
strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly, that 1 am not pledged at all 
upon any of the points to which I have answered. But I am not disposed to hang upon the ex¬ 
act form of his interrogatory. I am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, 
and state what I really think upon them. 

As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave Law, I have never hesitated to say, and I 
do not now h*sitate to say, that I think, under the Constitution of the United States, the people 
of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave Law. Having said that, I 
have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave Law farther than that I think 
it should have been framed so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain to it, without 
lessening its efficiency. And inasmuch as we are not now in an agitation in regard to an altera- I 


laborers either in the government or in the territory of the republic. We 
shall see, on the contrary, that it was due to the determination of the former 
not to yield the power conferred upon them by the abnprmal social institu¬ 
tion which they had preserved; and to their unwillingness to lapse into the 
condition of simple citizens, having the same rights as their fellow-citizens, 
and no more. This equality the fathers of the republic supposed that they 
would, and intended that they should, assume; but they resolved to perpet¬ 
uate their predominance in the councils of the nation and their oligarchical 
supremacy in their own commonwealths, and to use this predominance for 
the purpose of administering public affairs entirely in the interests of their 
order. Foiled in this by the attitude and the numerical strength of the peo¬ 
ple of the free states, they determined to destroy the republic, with the hope, 
at first, of reconstructing it in such a manner as would inevitably and forever 
secure their object. 

The election of Mr. Lincoln put slavery in no peril. Before he became 
a candidate for the presidency, or had the thought of becoming one, and in 
the course of an address to the people of a free state, he had avowed, in clear, 
decided terms, that, whatever might be his feelings and opinions in regard 
to slavery, he did not believe that the national government had the consti¬ 
tutional power to disturb it where it was established, or to control the local 
action of the people in its regard, or to deny the slaveholders the benefit 
of an effective Fugitive Slave Law. 6 His election found the party of the 
slaveholders in power. The presidential chair was filled by a man who was 
their creature, if he was not their tool; and from it he could not be removed 
for four months. They commanded a majority in the Senate and in the 
House of Representatives. The bench of the Supreme Court was filled by 
judges of their appointment, and who had always ruled in their interest; 
and throughout the country all the executive offices were under their con¬ 
trol. Nor, as I have shown by an examination of the votes cast at the pres¬ 
idential election, did the success of Mr. Lincoln indicate any sectional divi¬ 
sion of the country upon the question of the administration of the national 
government ; 7 while, on the contrary, the divided vote of the slave states, in 
consequence of which he was elected, though a plurality of one million of the 
entire popular vote of the country was given for his opponents collectively, 
did show that in those very states there was at that time a majority of two 
hundred thousand voters ready to maintain the paramount importance of the 
Union. There was, therefore, at the time of the secession of South Carolina, 
not only no impending danger to the interests of the slave states, but, in the 
view of the great body of their people (except in South Carolina itself), no 
such danger threatened in the future as induced them to give their votes in 
favor of a candidate who represented the party of progressive slavery or dis¬ 
union. But the five hundred and seventy thousand slaveholders who did so 
vote, 8 and the leaders of whom immediately set on foot secession, knew well 
that the social institution peculiar to their states was in no peril; they were 
but putting into effect a long-cherished purpose to dissolve the Union when 
they had ceased to rule it. We are not left to infer this purpose from the 
furious and frothy outpourings of their provincial presses; 9 it had been dis¬ 
tinctly avowed, though in private, by their representative man, John C. Cal¬ 
houn. Forty-eight years before the election of Mr. Lincoln, and eight years 
previous to the agitation which resulted in the Missouri Compromise, he 
had confessed to Commodore Charles Stewart, an honored and successful 
commander in the United States Navy, that the leading slaveholders united 
themselves with the Democratic party in the North in defiance of their tastes 
and preferences, and only as a means of obtaining political power; adding 
this memorable declaration: “ When we [the slaveholders] thus cease to 
control this nation through a disjointed democracy, or any material obstacle 
in that party which shall tend to throw us out of that rule and control, we 

tion or modification of that law, I would not be the man to introduce it as a new subject of agita¬ 
tion upon the general question of slavery. 

In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave 
states into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put 
in a position of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that 
there would never be another slave state admitted into the Union; but I must add that, if slavery 
shall be kept out of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and 
then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt the Consti¬ 
tution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual 
presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit 
them into the Union. 

The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to the second, it being, as I conceive, the 
same as the second. 

The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. In relation 
to that, I have my mind very distinctly made up. I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery 
abolished in the District of Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power 
to abolish it. Yet, as a member of Congress, I should not, with my present views, be in favor of 
endeavoring to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be upon these condi¬ 
tions: first , that the abolition should be gradual; second, that it should be on a vote of the ma¬ 
jority of qualified voters in the District; and, third, that compensation should be made to unwil¬ 
ling owners. With these three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress 
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay, “sweep from our 
capital that foul blot upon our nation.” 

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here, that as to the question of the abolition of 
the slave-trade between the diflerent states, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to 
nothing about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that would 
make me feel authorized to state a position so ns to hold myself entirely bound by it. In other 
words, that question has never been prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate 
whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I had sufficient 
time to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject; but I have not done so, nnd I say so 
frankly to you here and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion 
that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade among the different 
states, I should still not be in favor of the exercise of that power unless upon some conservative 
principle, as I conceive it akin to what I have said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the 
District of Columbia. 

Mv answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all the Territories of 
the United States is full and explicit within itself, and can not be made clearer by any comments 
of mine. So I suppose, in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of 
any more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is such that I could add 
nothing by way of illustration, or making myself better understood than the answer which I have 
placed in writing. 7 See the Introduction, p. 17. 

* Deducting from the 874,953 votes cast for Mr. Breckinridge the 276,818 which he received in 
the free states, we have 571,135 as his party in the slave states. 

9 See the extract from the Louisville (Ky.) Courier, Introduction, p. 17. 











118 


shall then resort to the dissolution of the Union.” 10 The time and the oc¬ 
casion supposed by Calhoun had come. Slavery was in no peril; but a dis¬ 
jointed democracy had thrown the slaveholders out of control of the nation, 
and, true to their purpose, that which they ceased to rule they began to ruin. 
It was by the agitation of the question of slavery that the democracy had 
become disjointed. But slavery in itself was no bar to the perpetuity of the 
Union ; for, at its formation, slaves were held in every commonwealth but 
one of those which, under the Constitution, passed from a confederacy into a 
nation. It is true that in six of the remaining twelve slavery was felt to be 
wrongful, and was doomed to speedy extinction by irresistible forces both 
moral and material; but it is no less true that among the majority of the 
people of the other six which retained it there was at that time a similar es¬ 
timate both of its justice and its economy, and that their leading statesmen, 
including those who spoke for them in the formation of the Constitution, ex¬ 
pected and desired its abolition by legislative enactment. Washington wrote 
of slavery, “I can only say that there is not a man living who wishes more 
sincerely than I do to see some plan adopted for the abolition of it; but there 
is only one proper and effectual mode by which this can be accomplished, 
and that is by legislative authority; and this, so far as my suffrage will go, 
shall never be wanting.” 1 Thomas Jefferson predicted, “Nothing is more 
certainly written in the book of fate than that these people [the negroes] are 
to be free.” 2 In the debate in the Constitutional Convention on the ap¬ 
portionment of taxes to population, Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina, 
thought that “slaves should be excluded altogether [from the enumeration 
of taxable inhabitants], as being an encumbrance instead of increasing the 
ability to pay taxes.” 0 Such being throughout the country the feeling of 
the people as to slavery at the time of the formation of the Constitution, it 
was not difficult to effect a compromise upon that subject which safely pro¬ 
vided for the existing condition of affairs in regard to it, and which seemed 
to provide equally well for the future. But, as we have seen, slavery not 
only brought then unimagined wealth to the slaveholder; it conferred upon 
him political power and peculiar privileges. In virtue of his slaves, his 
vote was of more weight than that of his fellow-citizen of the free states; 
and his superiority in this regard became greater as the number of bonds¬ 
men owned by him and his neighbors increased. Slave states became oli¬ 
garchies, and slaveholders a bastard kind of aristocracy. It was this power, 
and not his slaves, which the slaveholder saw slipping from his hands, and 
therefore he rebelled. For power is sweet; and when held by an intelligent 
and determined body of men, whether rightfully or wrongfully, whether for 
good or for evil, for selfish ends or for the benefit of mankind, it will not be 
yielded without a struggle. Most especially is this true of men whose no¬ 
tions of right and wrong have been perverted by the seeking after pleas in 
justification of the holding of an inferior raec in chattel bondage. There 
had been compromise before, but now the slaveholders saw that no compro¬ 
mise which was not absolute concession would restore and preserve their lost 
supremacy. On the other hand, the question of slavery was just the one on 
which the men of the free states could no longer compromise. There the 
feeling that slavery was moral wrong and political ruin, though not univer¬ 
sal, had taken such firm hold of the public mind, that any arrangement 
which looked toward a spread of the evil would not have endured for half 
a generation. The leading slaveholders were wise enough to see this; and, 
therefore, they refused all compromise which was not full concession of 
their claims in perpetuity, accompanied by the power for their enforcement. 
These, then, were the causes of the rebellion. First, the determination of 
the slaveholders to maintain their political supremacy, and not to subside 

10 Extract from a Letter from Commodore Stewart to Mr. G. W. Childs , of Philadelphia. 

HordentowQ, May 4,1861. 

Mv dear Sir, —Agreeably to your request, I now furnish you with the reminiscences of n con¬ 
versation which passed betwen Mr John C.Calhoun and myself in the latter part of December, 
1812, after the declaration of war by the Congress of the United States against Great Britain on 
the 18th of June previous. * * * * 

Mr. Calhoun’s age, I thought, approximated my own, which was thirty-four; and being a man 
of the highest order of talent, and representing a state in our Union which scarce ever permitted 
themselves to be represented by inferior ability in the national councils, I could not have com¬ 
menced my object with one more fitted for the purpose I had in view. He was also a high-mind¬ 
ed and honorable man, kind and friendly, as well as open and confiding to those lie deemed 
worthy. We soon formed an intimacy, and I frequently had long conversations with him on the 
war, the subjects relating thereto, and matters growing out of its existence — the navy being the 
most prominent—the gunboats, the merchants’ bonds then on the tapis in Congress, and other 
matters of political or minor interest. One evening 1 struck on the divided views of our section¬ 
al interests of the war—stated to him that the opposite feelings on this subject had puzzled me 
exceedingly, and asked him how it was that the planting states were so strongly and so decidedly in 
favor of the war, while the commercial states were so much opposed to it. With this latter section 
of our country it seemed to me that the punishment of England, through the medium of war, 
ought to meet their highest approbation and call for their greatest efforts, as they were the great¬ 
est sufferers, through her instrumentality and power over our commercial affairs, since 1792, 
which were so arrogantly urged by plunder and impressment on the highway of nations, while the 
southern portion of the Union had felt but little in comparison. I observed, with great simplicity, 
“ You in the South and Southwest are decidedly the aristocratic portion of this Union ; you are so 
in holding persons in perpetuity in slavery; you are so in every domestic quality; so in every 
habit in your lives, living, and actions; so in habits, customs, intercourse, and manners ; you 
neither work with your hands, heads, nor any machinery, but live and have your living, not in 
accordance with the will of your Creator, but by the sweat of slavery, and yet you assume all the 
attributes, professions, and advantages of democracy.” 

Mr. Calhoun replied : “ I see you speak through the head of a young statesman, and from the 
heart of a patriot, but you lose sight of the politician and the sectional policy of the people. I ad¬ 
mit your conclusions in respect to us Southrons. That we are essentially aristocratic I can not 
deny, but we can and do yield much to democracy. This is our sectional policy ; we are from 
necessity thrown upon and solemnly wedded to that party, however it may occasionally clash with 
our feelings for the conservation of our interests. It is through our affiliation with that party in 
the Middle and Western States that we hold power; but when we cease thus to control this na¬ 
tion through a disjointed democracy, or any material obstacle in that party which shall tend to 
throw us out of that rule and control, we shall then resort to the dissolution of the Union. The 
compromises in the Constitution, under the circumstances, were sufficient for our fathers; but, 
under the altered condition of our country from thnt period, leave to the South no resource but 
dissolution; for no amendments to the Constitution could be reached through a convention of 
the people under their three-fourths rule.” I laughed incredulously, and said, “ Well, Mr. Cal¬ 
houn, ere such can take place, you and I will have been so long non est that we can now laugh at 
its possibility, and leave it with complacency to our children’s children, who will then have the 
watch on deck.” * * * * 

1 Washington’s letter to Robert Morris, April 12th, 1786. Sparks' Washington , vol. ix., p. 159. 

9 Jefferson's Writings , vol. i., p. 48. * Madison Papers. 


[ 1861 . 

into the condition of simple citizens of the republic; second, a radical change 
during the two generations which had passed since the adoption of the Con¬ 
stitution in the attitude of the people, both of the free and the slave states, 
toward slavery. Among the former this change had been effected by the 
progress of humanity and Christian civilization, which was unchecked within 
their borders; among the latter, by the rank-grown lust of riches and of 
power, and by the perverted moral sense of the people. Slavery was thus 
not the cause of the rebellion, but it was its indispensable condition. There 
was one other: the ignorance, the social degradation, and the sordid poverty 
and pride of the mass of the inhabitants of the slave states, which made the 
development among them of jealousy, suspicion, unfounded hate, and arro¬ 
gant defiance of the people of the free states, by the machinations of the 
leading slaveholders, not only possible, but easy. 

Having seen why the faction of progressive slaver}-, though in the minor¬ 
ity in every slave state except South Carolina and perhaps Georgia, brought 
about the secession of eleven of the thirty-three divisions of the republic, 
let us now examine the grounds on which the government, supported by 
the whole people of the free states and a large majority of those in the bor¬ 
der slave states, resisted the movement for the dissolution of the Union. 
Such an inquiry would seem superfluous were it not for the peculiar circum¬ 
stances which distinguish the origin of this civil war from that of any other 
known to history. A nation, though ranking among the four great powers 
of the world, might, indeed, contain the seeds of its own dissolution; the 
statesmen who planned its Constitution might have been, from me - lack of 
wisdom, of foresight, or of honesty, the architects of its ruin ; but that a na¬ 
tion which attained its political independence and its unity by a noble sacri¬ 
fice of blood, and treasure, and of local interest, and the organic law of whose 
existence was not extorted from power by peril, but evolved from circum¬ 
stance and precedent through the cautious and protracted consultation of its 
own best representatives, should have been deliberately constituted so that 
it should die at the caprice of any one or two commonwealths formed out 
of its people and its territory; that its Constitution was purposely so framed 
that it would crumble to dust at the withdrawal of one of the parties to it, 
and that the right so to destroy it was carefully protected by its framers, the 
men who had given their lives to objects which it was intended to secure and 
perpetuate; that this should be, is morally so monstrous, so inconsistent with 
all the laws and the motives of human action, that it is difficult to believe that 
men in their senses could base upon such an assumption a great political and 
social revolution. And yet it was upon this ground that their action was 
defended by the insurgent slaveholders. They denied that they were rebels. 
They claimed that they were not resisting a government and setting at 
naught a Constitution to which they owed allegiance. They admitted that, 
until they passed their Ordinances of Secession, they were bound to obey the 
laws of the republic, and to respect the government at Washington; but they 
asserted that the right of secession belonged to every state; that its just ex¬ 
ercise depended solely upon the will of the people of the state, who alone 
were to be consulted in the matter; and that by the mere passage of an 
Ordinance of Secession they were actually and rightfully absolved from all 
connection with, and responsibility to the government of the Union, and 
themselves became a sovereign, independent nation. The government at 
Washington and the people who were loyal to it looked in vain for the 
foundation of a theory so destructive, of a claim so extraordinary. It was 
not to be found in the Constitution, the organic law by virtue of which the 
nation existed. That instrument contained no clause which could be dis¬ 
torted into a justification of this preposterous plea; but, on the contrary, 
a positive declaration that the Union, even when confined to the states which 
originally entered into it, should be perpetual, and a provision for the pun¬ 
ishment of treason and the putting down of rebellion. Equally vain was 
the search among the records of the debates and consultations which accom¬ 
panied the formation of the Constitution, and in which all the differing 
views of its framers were brought forward, and all the various interests of 
the people whom they represented were urged, and either maintained, or 
yielded in a spirit of compromise. Throughout those protracted discussions 
there was no hint from any quarter of a reserved right of secession; but, on 
the other hand, from all quarters, and particularly from Virginia and South 
Carolina, the manifestation of an anxious desire to provide for the ample 
maintenance of the power of the national government against that of any 
state which might be tempted to deny or to resist it. Mr. Randolph, of Vir¬ 
ginia, in his plan, especially provided that Congress should “call forth the 
force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its 
duty under the articles thereof.” Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, moved 
“ that the national Legislature should have authority to negative all laws of 
state Legislatures which they should judge to be improper;” and Mr. Madi¬ 
son, of Virginia, “could not but regard an indefinite power to negative leg¬ 
islative acts of the states as absolutely necessary to a perfect system.” And 
in the final discussion of the Constitution itself, treason having been defined 
in the third Article as “levying war against the United States or any of 
them,” Mr. Morris, of Pennsylvania, objected that “ in case of a contest be¬ 
tween the United States and a particular state, the people of the latter must, 
according to the disjunctive terms of the clause, be traitor to one or the 
other authority,” this view prevailed at once, and the words “or any of 
them” were stricken out. Thus clearly was it seen by the fathers of the re¬ 
public that national government might be resisted by one or more of the 
states; thus unmistakably intended that in such case the authority of that 
government should be maintained; thus explicitly set forth that such re¬ 
sistance was treason and rebellion, to be put down by the whole force of the 
Union. The pretense of the insurgents that their secession was not resist¬ 
ance was too shallow to deceive the loyal people for a day. The distinction 




1861.] 


THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH. 


119 


between South Carolina’s nullification of a law constitutionally passed which 
displeased her, and her secession upon the constitutional election of a Presi¬ 
dent whom she did not like, was based upon a difference too slight and form¬ 
al to receive even a respectful consideration from the straightforward, prac¬ 
tical common sense of the intelligent and patriotic masses of the free states. 
Both proceedings had one end and aim—to make void the constitutional sov¬ 
ereignty of the republic, the will of the majority of the people lawfully ex¬ 
pressed. 

Peaceful national dismemberment, however, though difficult, is possible, 
and sometimes justifiable. Circumstances might arise under which justice, 
prudence, and humanity would all demand the severance of one part of a 
nation from the other. Did, then, justice, prudence, and humanity, or either 
of them, counsel the dismemberment of the Great Republic at the bidding 
of the controlling faction in eleven of the thirty-four commonwealths of 
which it was composed ? 

To determine the justice of their claim, we have only to consider the na¬ 
ture of the government from which they proposed to absolve themselves by 
their own action, and the organization of the nation which they proposed to 
destroy. Had the power or the nation known as the United States been a 
confederation, there might or might not have been reason in their claim to 
withdraw from it merely of their own motion. But we have seen that this 
was not the nature of the government which was formed in 1789., The 
government which preceded that was a confederacy; but that confederacy 
proving entirely inadequate to the absolute needs of the country, it was de¬ 
liberately superseded by a government or national organization which was, 
and was asserted and recognized to be, not a confederacy, but a Union—a 
Making One—of the elements of the former confederacy—a fusion of them 
into one republic, which, admitting, and in fact preserving, the local inde¬ 
pendence of its various commonwealths in their local affairs, had one su¬ 
preme government in its national affairs—one sovereign ruler, that sovereign 
being the will of the majority of its united people. This union was also (as 
in its very nature a Union—a Making One—must be) not a transient connec¬ 
tion for profit or pleasure, but a merging of separate individuals into one, 
and was, for better for worse, perpetual. 

The dictates of justice are absolute, and should be obeyed whatever ruin 
may ensue; but prudence looks to consequences. What, then, were the in¬ 
evitable results of the division sought by the secessionists? For our pur¬ 
pose it is necessary to consider but one of them, the partition of a territory 
which, from its vastness, its fertility, its means of internal communication, its 
geographical position, and the character of the people by which it was in¬ 
habited, was, and must have remained, the dominant power of a continent, 
and which was united under one benign government, a government hardly 
felt by those who lived under it, or who rather were the government—the 
division of this territory among at least three rival powers, whose clashing 
interests and mutual jealousy must surely produce constant war, or that 
hardly less ruinous and demoralizing evil, a position of armed watchfulness 

4 After referring to a few points in which he argued that the Constitution of the Confederate 
States was an improvement upon that of the United States, Mr. Stephens continued: 

“But, not to be tedious in enumerating the numerous changes for the better, allow me to allude 
to one other—though last, not least: the new Constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating 
questions relating to our peculiar institutions—African slavery as it exists among us—the proper 
status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture 
and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the ‘rock upon which 
the old Union would split.’ He was right. What was conjecture with him is now a realized 
fact; but whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands 
may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the 
time of the formation of the old Constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation 
of the laws of nature ; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an 
evil they knew not well how to deal with; but the general opinion of the men of that day was, 
that, somehow or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass 
away. This idea, though not incorporated in the Constitution, was the prevailing idea at the time. 
The Constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last, 
and hence no argument can be justly used against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, be¬ 
cause of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They 
rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, 
and the idea of a government built upon it—when the ‘storm came and the wind blew, it fell' 

“Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its cor- 
ner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man ; that slavery , subordina¬ 
tion to the superior race , is his natural and moral condition. This, our new government,is the first in 
the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has 
been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of 
science. . . . 

“ As I have stated, the truth of this principle may be slow in development, as all truths arc, and 
ever have been, in the various branches of science. It was so with the principles announced by 
Galileo. It was so with Adam Smith, and his principles of political economy. It was so with 
Harvey, and his theory of the circulation of the blood. It is stated that not a single one of the 
medical profession, living at the time of the announcement of the truths made by him, admitted 
them. Now, they are universally acknowledged. May we not, therefore, look with confidence to 
the ultimate universal acknowledgment of the truths upon which our system rests? It is the first 
government ever instituted upon principles in strict conformity to Nature and the ordination of 
Providence in furnishing the materials of human society. Many governments have been founded 
upon the principles of certain classes; but the classes thus enslaved were of the same race, and in 
violation of the laws of Nature. Our system commits no such violation of Nature’s laws. The 
negro by nature, or by the curse against Canaan, is fitted for that condition which he occupies in 
our system. The architect, in the construction of buildings, lays the foundation with the proper 
material—the granite—then comes the brick or the marble. The substratum of our society is 
made of the material fitted by Nature for it, and by experience we know that it is the best, not 
only for the superior, but for the inferior race, that it should be so. It is, indeed, in conformity 
with the Creator. It is not for us to inquire into the wisdom of His ordinances or to question them. 
Por His own purposes He has made one race to differ from another, as He has made ‘one star to 
differ from another in glory.’ The great objects of humanity are best attained, when conformed 
to his law’s and decrees, in the formation of governments as well as in all things else. Our con¬ 
federacy is founded upon principles in strict conformity with these laws. This stone which was 
rejected by the first builders * l * * is become the chief stone of the corner ’ in our new edifice.” 

How unwillingly Mr. Stephens embarked in the cause of secession is shown by his speeches in 
the Georgia Convention. We have given (ante, p. 19-21) a full report of a speech delivered on 
the 14th of November. We repeat a few of the leading points. He said: 

“That this government of our fathers, with all its defects, comes nearer the objects of all good 
governments than any other on the face of the earth, is my settled conviction. . . Where 

will you go, following the sun in his circuit round the globe, to find a government that better pro¬ 
tects the liberties of its people, and secures to them the blessings that we enjoy? I think that 
one of the evils that beset us is a surfeit of liberty, an exuberance of the priceless blessings for 
which we are ungrateful. . . Have not we at the South as well as the North grown great 

and happy under its operation ? Has any part of the world ever shown such rapid progress in the 


against aggression, or even aggrandizement by neighboring powers. If the 
slave states of the Union were separated from the free states, as the seces¬ 
sionists claimed, and which would have been the sure results of their suc¬ 
cess, the Ohio and the Potomac would have been the southern boundary of 
the free republic, which would thus have been almost bisected by the north¬ 
ernmost county of Virginia, called the “pan-handle;” and even if this strip 
had been ceded to the Northern republic, the bulk of the free states of the 
East and West would have been connected with each other only by the com¬ 
paratively narrow isthmus of the State of Ohio. 

But justice refusing, and prudence failing to sustain the plea first set up 
at Charleston for a dissolution of the Union, perhaps humanity claimed what 
justice did not dictate or prudence counsel. For what reason, then, did the 
insurgents seek to dissolve their connection with the old government, and 
to set up a new one for themselves? For an answer to this question the 
historian is not left to inference, or even to the unauthorized though unmis¬ 
takable statements of private persons, or the indications of a general current 
of events. On the 21st of March, 1861, Alexander II. Stephens, then re¬ 
cently elected vice-president of the insurgent confederacy, delivered at Sa¬ 
vannah, Georgia, a formal and elaborate exposition of the character and pur¬ 
poses of the new government which he and his associates were attempting 
to set up. In that speech he avowed, in very explicit terms, not only that 
slavery was the cause of the revolt, but that the insurgents bad taken their 
position of armed hostility to the government in direct opposition to the 
opinions and the purposes of the founders of the republic, the framers of 
the Constitution, including those from the slave states. He admitted that 
those statesmen whose wisdom, whose force, and whose dignity had compel¬ 
led a reluctant admiration from the Old World, held that the enslavement of 
the negro was in violation of the laws of Nature, and that it was therefore a 
social, moral, and political wrong. This part of the political ethics of the 
framers of the government, however, he, with the approbation of his audi¬ 
ence, pronounced fundamentally fallacious. “Our government,” he declared, 
“ is formed upon exactly opposite ideas.” “ Slavery,” he continued, “ which 
was rejected by the first builders, is become the chief stone of the corner in 
our new edifice.” 4 

His words found their ready echo in every insurgent’s breast throughout 
the whole disaffected region, where more than two years afterward a leading 
organ of public opinion still avowed the rebellion “a protest against the 
mistaken civilization of the age.” Is it to be wondered at that, such being 
the declared purpose of the insurgents, and so clear being their departure 
from the spirit and purpose of the founders of the republic in this regard, 
they were forced to admit this antagonism? Every citizen of the United 
States, in whose breast the love of gain or the love of ease, the lust of power 
or the canker of party spirit had not eaten out all patriotism and all hu¬ 
manity, should have decided, without a second thought, that they were to be 
resisted to the death. Such was the decision announced by the spontaneous 
and almost instantaneous Uprising at the North. 

development of wealth, and all the material resources of power and greatness, as the Southern 
states have under the general government? . . . These [the civilization and institutions of 

Greece and Rome] were but the fruits of their forms of government, the matrix from which their 
grand development sprang; and when once the institutions of a people have been destroyed, there 
is no earthly power that can bring back the Promethean spark to kindle them here again any 
more than in that ancient land of eloquence, poetry, and song. And if we shall in an evil hour 
rashly pull down and destroy those institutions which the patriotic band of our fathers labored so 
long and so hard to build up, and which have done so much for us and the world, who can ven¬ 
ture the prediction that similar results will not e'nsue? Let us avoid it if we can.” . . . 

The same opinions were reiterated by Mr. Stephens on the 18th of January, less than a month 
before he accepted the vice-presidency of the confederacy whose formation he had so persistently 
opposed. In this speech he says: 

“ I am frank to say, that if we are to secede for existing causes, without any farther effort to 
secure our rights under the Constitution in the Union—if a majority of this Convention has lost 
all hope, and look upon secession as the only remedy left—in my opinion, the sooner we secede 
the better. Delay can effect no good. How this Convention stands upon that question I do not 
know. Some claim a large majority for immediate and unconditional secession, while others 
think there is a majority still looking with hope to redress and conciliation. I, for one, am very 
desirous of having this point settled and put to rest in good feeling and harmony among ourselves 
by a test vote. My action hereafter shall be influenced by that vote.My judg¬ 

ment is against secession for existing causes. I have not lost hope of securing our rights in the 
Union and under the Constitution; that judgment on this point is as unshaken as it was when this 
Convention was called. ... I have ever believed, and do now believe, that it is to the interest of 
all the states to be and remain united under the Constitution of the United States, with a faithful perform¬ 
ance by each of all its constitutional obligations; if the Union could be maintained on this basis, and 
on these principles, I think it would be the best for the security, the liberty, happiness, and common pros¬ 
perity of all. I do farther feel confident, if Georgia would now stand firm, and unite with the 
border states, as they are called, in an effort to obtain a redress of those grievances on the part of 
some of their Northern confederates whereof they have such just cause to complain, that complete 
success would attend the effort, our just and reasonable demands would be granted. In this opin¬ 
ion I may be mistaken, but I feel almost as confident of it as I do of my existence. ... If, how¬ 
ever,” he concludes, “on the test vote, a majority shall be against the line of policy I indicate, 
then, sir, upon the point of immediate secession, or a postponement to some future day between 
this and the 4th of March, I am clearly of the opinion that no good can come from any such delay or 
postponement. . . . This is tny view on that point. My judgment, as is well known, is agHinst 
the policy. It can not receive the sanction of my vote ; but if the judgment of a majority of this 
Convention, embodying as it does the sovereignty of Georgia, be against mine—if a majority of her 
delegates in this Convention shall, by their votes, dissolve the compact of union which has connect¬ 
ed her so long with her confederate states, and to which I have been so ardently attached, and 
have made such efforts to continue and perpetuate upon the principles on which it. was founded, 

I shall bow in submission to that decision. I have looked, and do look, upon our present government 

as the best in the world. This, with me, is a strong conviction. I have acted upon it as a great 

truth. But another great truth also presents itself to my mind, and that is, that no government is 

a good one for any people who do not so consider it. The wisdom of all governments consists mainly 
in their adaptation to the habits, the tastes, the feelings, wants, and afif< ction of the peojde. The best 
system of government for our people might be the worse for another. If, therefore, the deliberate 
judgment of the sovereignty of Georgia shall be pronounced that our present government is a bad 
one, and shall be changed to some other better suited to our people, more promotivc of our peace, 
security, happiness, and prosperity, while my individual judgment shall be recorded against it, yet 
mv action shnll conform to the decision made. Nay, more, sir, the cause of the st*te shall be my 
cause, her destiny shall be my destiny. To her support, defense, and maintenance all that I have 
and am shall be pledged. And however widely we of this Convention, as well as the people of the 
state, may have differed, or may now differ, as to the proper line of policy to be uursued at this 
juncture, I trust there will be but one feeling and one sentiment here and throughout our limita 
after the policy shall be adopted, let that be what it may. The cause of Georgia, whether for weal 
or woe, must and will be the cause of us all. Her safety, rights, interests, and honor, whatever 
fortunes await her, must and will be cherished in all our hearts, and defended, if need be, by «£ 
our hands.” 











120 


[ 1861 . 



MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, FEBRUARY 8, 1861. 


THE WAR FOR THE UNION. 


CHAPTER I. 

THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY. 

Design of this History.—Materials.—Secession of seven States.—Formation of the Confederacy. 
—Accession of Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina.—The Ordinances of Seces¬ 
sion.—The free Population of the Union and the Confederacy.—The slave Population.—Its 
military Bearing.—Characteristics of the North and the South.—Towns and Cities.—The 
South better armed at the Outset.—Its Advantages in Position.—King Cotton.—Unanimity 
of the People at the South.—State Sovereignty and the Union.—The public and private Prop¬ 
erty seized by the Confederacy. — Railroad Communication at the South. — The two weak 
Points of the Confederacy.—Opening of Hostilities. 

E have now traced the origin and described the development of the 
Great Conspiracy against the Union, fortifying our statements by a 
copious array of documents. We have shown how, after forty years, it cul¬ 
minated in the Great Rebellion. We have depicted the great Uprising of 
the North to oppose that rebellion. Henceforth it remains for us to tell the 
story of the War for the Union. We are to show how a peaceful people, 
whose armies had for generations numbered only a few thousand men, found 
itself suddenly transformed into two great military nations, equipping and 
bringing into the field the greatest armies of modern times. We shall have 
to tell of many errors and not a few crimes—to speak of living men as free¬ 
ly as though they were dead—to narrate deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice 
on both sides. We shall have to tell of great victories and of great defeats 
—-of opportunities thrown away and of disasters overcome. We shall un¬ 
duly praise no man because he strove for the Right; we shall malign no 
man because he fought for the Wrong. We shall endeavor to anticipate 
the sure verdict of after ages upon events in which we have the deepest per¬ 
sonal interest. Whether we shall in the end have to speak of a nation 
made stronger by the sharp trial through which it passed, or of that nation 
broken and shattered, the future must unfold. 

The materials for our history are abundant. No war was ever before so 
waged in the world’s eye. Many of the commanders have prepared, or pro¬ 
pose to prepare, Commentaries upon their campaigns as minute as those of 
Csesar. There is not a regiment, and hardly a company, which does not 
contain a man capable of describing the events which he saw and a part of 
which he was; and, above all, the Newspaper—the Fourth Estate in our 
modern civilization—has sent its ablest representatives into the field to watch 
and describe events as they occur. The files of any one of our great news¬ 
papers will contain more and better materials for the historian of the Amer¬ 
ican War than were comprised in the libraries from which Gibbon elabo¬ 
rated the story of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, or the dusty 
archives from which Motley wrought out the History of the Rise and Growth 


of the Dutch Republic. From these constantly accumulating materials we 
propose to write the history of the War for the Union. 

We may consider this war to have fairly begun on the 8th of February, 
1861, when the Southern Confederacy was formally inaugurated. All that 
had before been done was the isolated action of disaffected individuals and 
local communities. From that moment these individuals and communities 
became formidable by the league into which they had entered, and by the 
farther accessions upon which they might reasonably count. The die was 
cast when that Confederacy was formed. All previous steps might have 
been retraced; now, nothing was left but to submit the question to the ar¬ 
bitrament of strength, and to abide the consequences. We propose to pass 
in rapid review over the events which resulted in the formation of the Con¬ 
federacy. 

South Carolina formally seceded from the Union on the 20th of Decem¬ 
ber, 1860. In the Convention which gave utterance to the feeling of the 
state there was no dissentient voice. If in the Convention or among the 
people there were any who opposed the measure, they kept discreet silence. 
Charleston, which is to South Carolina more than Paris is to France or Lon¬ 
don to England, was jubilant upon the passage of the ordinance of secession. 
Every man, young or old, exulted that the Palmetto State had overthrown 
a great government. A few wiser men looked farther into the future. 
“We have,” said a delegate in the Convention, “pulled down the temple 
that has been built for three quarters of a century. We must now clear the 
rubbish away and reconstruct another. We are houseless and homeless. 
We must shelter ourselves from storms.” 

A month had hardly elapsed before five other states ranged themselves 
by the side of South Carolina. Three of these did so almost simultaneous¬ 
ly during the second week of January. In Mississippi an effort was made 
to postpone action; but this proving unavailing, all the delegates in Conven¬ 
tion voted for the ordinance of secession on the 9th of the month. In Al¬ 
abama the opposition was more decided. The ordinance of secession was 
passed in secret session by a vote of 61 to 39. The minority had vainly 
striven to have it referred to the people. One delegate affirmed that, unless 
this was done, the northern section of the state would not submit to the ac¬ 
tion of the Convention. The impetuous Yancey denounced the people of 
this section as traitors and rebels who should be forced to submit. The op¬ 
position was overawed ; some of the delegates pledged their constituents tcf 
the support of the ordinance; the others held their peace. In Florida the 
opposition was merely nominal. A resolution affirming the right of the 
state to secede passed by a vote of 62 to 5. Upon the question of the adop¬ 
tion of the ordinance, only 7 out of 69 voted against it. In these three states 











































































































































































1861.] 


THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY. 


121 


the ordinances for secession were hurried through within two or three days 
after the assembling of the Conventions. In Georgia the contest was sharp, 
and for a while the result seemed doubtful. A fortnight before the seces¬ 
sion of South Carolina the Legislature had, by a large majority, passed reso¬ 
lutions declaring that the interests of the slaveholding states were identical, 
and that they must remain one; affirming the right of any state to secede; 
denying the right of the federal government to attempt to coerce a state; 
and pledging Georgia, in case such attempt were made, to support the seced¬ 
ing state.. These resolutions were afterward rescinded by a close vote, but 
were subsequently re-enacted in substance. The Convention met on the 
16th of January. A resolution declaring it to be the duty of the state to 
secede, and appointing a committee to frame an ordinance for that purpose, 
was passed only by a vote of 165 to 130. But the victory was won. The 
ordinance, as drawn up, was passed by 208 to 89, and was subsequently sign¬ 
ed by all the members. How strenuously those who opposed the measure 
struggled against it under the able lead of Mr. Stephens, and how unwilling¬ 
ly he, though voting against it, finally gave it his support as a matter of ne¬ 
cessity, has been already shown in these pages. The Convention of Louisi¬ 
ana met on the 24th of January, and two days afterward passed an ordinance 
of secession by a vote of 113 to 17. 

Delegates from these six states — Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina—met at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th 
of February. The hall in which they assembled was adorned with portraits 
of Washington, Marion, Jackson, and Clay. There was little occasion for 
debate. The states which they represented had decided upon the formation 
of a Southern Confederacy. In four days all preliminary arrangements were 
completed, a Provisional Constitution, almost identical with that of the Unit¬ 
ed States, framed, and Jefferson Davis elected president, and Alexander H. 
Stephens vice-president of the new nation. To the original six states Texas 
should properly be added, as her representatives appeared within a week, 
were admitted to seats, sanctioned all the previous proceedings of the Con¬ 
gress, and took part in those that followed. We have already narrated the 
early measures of this government. We now propose to glance briefly at 
the strength which was absolutely at its disposal, and that upon which it 
might reasonably count from accessions of states which had,not yet seceded 
from the Union. 

By the census of 1860 the entire population of the United States was thir¬ 
ty-one and a half millions, of whom twenty-seven and a half millions were 
free and four millions slaves. 1 The seven seceding states had a little more 
than two and a half millions of free persons, and a little less than that num¬ 
ber of slaves. Leaving the slaves for the present out of view as an element 
of either strength or weakness, two and a half millions had thrown down the 
gage of battle to twenty-five millions. But the contest was not be waged 
against such odds. Arkansas was, in any case, sure to join the Confederacy. 
If war ensued, the accession of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee 
might safely be reckoned upon. The result justified these anticipations. 

Virginia was the first to join the Confederacy. We have already narrated 
the successive steps by which this was accomplished. The ordinance of se¬ 
cession and the ratification of the Provisional Constitution were passed on 
the 17th of April, subject to the decision of the people at an election to be 
held six weeks later; but, in the mean while, a compact had been entered 
into by which the state virtually became at once a member of the Confeder¬ 
acy. The result of the popular vote was a majority of more than a hundred 
thousand in favor of secession. There were, however, no returns sent in 
from thirty-four counties. These, with some others, finally organized them¬ 
selves into the new state of Western Virginia. Virginia became virtually a 
member of the Confederacy on the 24th of April. In Arkansas a Conven- 

1 In the following paragraphs the estimates have been expressed approximately in round num¬ 
bers. The succeeding table presents the exact figures, according to the Census of 1860: 


THE UNION. 

Whitt a. 

Free Colored 

Slaves. 

Total. 

California. 

376,200 

3,816 


380,016 

Connecticut. 

451,609 

8,542 


460,151 

Delaware. 

90,697 

19,723 

1,798 

1 12,218 

Illinois. 

1,704,684 

7,069 


1,711,753 

Indiana. 

1,340,072 

10,869 


1,350,941 

Iowa. 

673,925 

1,023 


674,948 

Kansas. 

106,487 

623 


107,110 

Kentucky. 

920,077 

10,146 

225,490 

1,155,713 

Maine. 

627,081 

1,195 


628,276 

Maryland. 

516,128 

83,718 

87,188 

687,034 

Massachusetts. 

1,221,611 

9.454 


1,231,065 

Michigan. 

742,289 

6,823 


749,112 

Minnesota. 

171,793 

229 


172,022 

Missouri. 

1,064,369 

2,983 

114,965 

1,182,317 

New Hampshire. 

325,622 

450 


326,072 

New Jersey. 

647,084 

24,947 


672,031 

New York. 

3,831.730 

49,005 


3,880,735 

Ohio.. 

2,303,374 

36,225 


2,339,599 

Oregon . 

52,343 

121 


52,464 

Pennsylvania. 

2,849,997 

5G.373 


2,906,370 

Rhode Island. 

170,703 

3,918 


174,621 

Vermont. 

314,534 

682 


315.116 

Wisconsin . 

774,392 

1,481 


775,873 

District of Columbia. 

60,788 

11,107 

3,181 

75,076 

Territories. 

219,781 

299 

63 

220,143 

Total Union. 

21,557,370 

350,721 

432,685 

22,340,776 

TIIE C INTKDERACY. 





Alabama. 

526,534 

2,630 

435,132 

964,296 

Arkansas. 

324,186 

137 

111,104 

435,427 

Florida. 

77,778 

908 

61,753 

140,439 

Georgia. 

591,638 

3,439 

462,232 

1,057,329 

Louisiana. 

357,642 

18,638 

333,010 

709.290 

Mississippi. 

353,969 

731 

436.696 

791,396 

North Carolina. 

631,489 

30,097 

331,081 

992.667 

South Carolina. 

291,623 

9,648 

402,541 

703,812 

Tennessee. 

826,828 

7,235 

275,784 

1,109,847 

Texas. 

421,411 

339 

180,682 

602,432 

Virginia. 

1,047,613 

57,579 

490,887 

1,596,079 

Total Confederacy.... 

5,450,711 

131,401 

3,520,902 

9,103,014 


tion met on the 4th of March. A small majority of the members were 
thought to be opposed to immediate secession. The Convention adjourned 
until the 6th of May without taking any decided action. During this inter¬ 
val an entire change had come over the popular mind, and an ordinance of 
secession was passed almost as soon as the Convention reassembled, with 
only a single dissenting vote, and within a week Arkansas became a mem¬ 
ber of the Confederacy. Tennessee was at first wholly opposed to the pre¬ 
cipitate action of South Carolina. At the presidential election she had voted 
for Mr. Bell, the candidate of a party whose platform was “ the Constitution, 
the Union, and the enforcement of the laws.” But from the moment when 
it was apparent that the extreme Southern states would secede, the govern¬ 
or, Isham G. Harris, undertook to urge Tennessee to follow their example. 
He kept up an active correspondence with the leaders of the secession, and 
called the Legislature together to deliberate upon the state and the federal 
governments. The South, he said, should demand concessions which would 
never be granted. The Legislature were loth to follow the lead of the gov¬ 
ernor. It indeed passed a bill authorizing the election of delegates to a Con¬ 
vention, but at the same time submitting to the people the question whether 
they should meet. Out of 106,000 votes, the disunion candidates received 
only 25,000, and at the same time it was voted by a majority of 12,000 that 
the Convention should not be held. It seemed that the question of seces¬ 
sion was put at rest; but the call of President Lincoln for troops produced 
intense excitement throughout the state. The Legislature had before de¬ 
clared that if any troops were sent to the South, Tennessee would resist at 
all hazards and to the last extremity. To the President’s call the governor 
replied that the state would not furnish a man for the purpose of coercion, 
but would, if.necessary, furnish fifty thousand to aid the South. The Leg¬ 
islature was convened, and the governor recommended the passage of an or¬ 
dinance declaring Tennessee independent of the federal Union, and another 
adopting the Montgomery Constitution. These ordinances were passed on 
the 6th of May by a vote of 66 to 25, to be subject to a vote of the people 
on the 8th of June. On the 7th of May, a compact, entered into by commis¬ 
sioners, was sanctioned, by which the military power of the state was placed 
under the control of the President of the Confederate States. In Eastern 
Tennessee, out of 48,000 votes, 33,000 were against separation; but this ma¬ 
jority was largely overbalanced by the other parts of the state, 104,913 votes 
in all being given for separation, and only 47,700 against it. Tennessee be¬ 
came formally a member of the Confederacy on the 8th of J une; but her real 
adhesion must be dated from the 7th of May, when the Legislature sanction¬ 
ed the compact placing the whole military foroe of the state under the con¬ 
trol of the President of the Confederate States. North Carolina drifted more 
slowly, but not less surely, into the confederate vortex. Early in January 
the forts upon her coast had been seized by mere local authority. The gov¬ 
ernor disavowed the action, and offered to restore them to the possession of 
the United States upon condition that they should remain ungarrisoned. 
This condition was accepted by the feeble Buchanan and his treacherous 
cabinet. The consequence was that they were soon repossessed by the ene¬ 
my, now acting under the authority of the governor. After many delays 
the State Convention assembled, and on the 20th of May passed ordinances 
for withdrawing from the Union and joining the Confederacy. On that same 
day, eighty-six years before, had been put forth the Mecklenberg Declara¬ 
tion of Independence, in virtue of which the State of North Carolina has al¬ 
ways plumed herself upon being the real founder of the United States. 

The eleven states which now composed the Confederacy had a free popu¬ 
lation of five and a half millions, leaving twenty-one and a half millions in 
the Union. But it was confidently believed at the South, and for a time 
feared at the North, that Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri would go with 
the other slaveholding states. This would bring the population of the Con¬ 
federacy up to eight millions, leaving nineteen millions to the Union. These 
anticipations and fears have not been realized, although the confederates 
have received much support from individuals of these states, and Kentucky 
and Missouri have been nominally admitted as members of the Confederacy, 
and are represented in the Congress. 

But, besides the free population, the Confederate States contain three and 
a half millions of slaves. There was room for great difference of opinion as 
to the influence of this class of the population upon the military resources 
of the nation. The North believed that instead of adding strength it was 
an element of positive weakness. Not only was society so constituted that 
from more than three eighths of the able-bodied population not a soldier 
could be raised for the army or a dollar for the revenue, but they were from 
their very condition so hostile to their masters that a large part of the whites 
must remain at home to keep the blacks in subjection. In the war of 1812, 
it was said, a British force of less than 5000 men, so weary' with long con¬ 
finement on shipboard that they hardly deserved the name of an army, had 
marched many miles through a populous country, burned our national Capi¬ 
tol, and retired without meeting any serious opposition. Imagine, it was 
said, 5000 weary and footsore men landing somewhere on the New England 
coast, marching under a fierce August sun to Albany, doing what dam-age 
they pleased, and retiring unmolested. The very women, with their shovels 
and brooms, would have made prisoners of the whole invading force. The 
only explanation was that the masters were afraid of their slaves, and 
thought only of saving their own throats from the knives of their servants. 
In the slaves the British had good friends and sure means of information. 
Like causes would always produce like effects. The march of a Union army 
into the South would be the signal of a general servile uprising. 

The South denied all this. They affirmed that their domestic institution 
gave them power as a military nation altogether beyond their mere popula¬ 
tion. In every state, they said, there must be men who govern, and if need 






























































122 



THE CITY 01 

































































































































































































123 



REBEL FRISSONS ON MAIN, NEAR TWENTY-FIFTH STREET. RICHMOND. 



), VIRGINIA. 













































































































































































































































124 


be fight, and others who hold the place of rulers and legislators. Every 
where else in the civilized world these two classes merge into each other so 
gradually that no one can draw the line between them. With us the line is 
clear and palpable. Every black man knows that he is a laborer, and can 
be nothing more. Every white man feels that he is a ruler to-day, and may 
be called upon to be a soldier to-morrow. So completely under our institu¬ 
tions are the ordinary labors of the day performed by the slaves, that every 
able-bodied white man could take the field at a week’s notice, and every 
thing would go on almost as before. Try this at the North: take three 
fifths of your men of military age from their farms and their workshops, and 
every thing would come to a stand in a month. There is no danger of an 
uprising of the slaves. If they were disposed to rise, they have no means of 
arming themselves or of acting in concert. Besides, they have no disposi¬ 
tion to rise. They have been for generations so trained to obedience, that 
the women, the old men, and the boys, who can not take the field, will be 
amply able to keep them in subjection. 

There was something of truth in both of these representations. For a 
short war, waged abroad, or even upon the frontiers of the country, slavery, 
as the event proved, undoubtedly gave great facilities for raising and equip¬ 
ping an army. There is probably no other nation of eight millions who 
could raise from nothing the armies which the Confederacy has brought into 
and maintained in the field. The habits of the people furnished a basis for 
a military organization. The population was almost entirely rural. New 
Orleans was indeed a great city, with 170,000 inhabitants; next, but at a 
wide interval, came Charleston, Richmond, Montgomery, and Mobile, each 
with 30,000 or 40,000; then came half a dozen cities with from 15,000 to 
25,000; beyond these there was hardly a town with more than 5000. Of 
the rural population every man owned a gun, most of them a horse, and 
there were few who were not to a good degree expert in their use and man¬ 
agement. Men living far apart, with abundant leisure, naturally seek occa¬ 
sions of coming together. These, in the South, were mainly afforded by the 
regular sessions of the courts and by militia musters. The court-houses are 
usually placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the county. The mili¬ 
tia musters were held at the same place. From all the region the people 
thronged to court and muster. The parade of the militia was the least at¬ 
traction at these gatherings; but every man was enrolled in some company, 
and had learned something of discipline. Rude as this militia organization 
was, it formed a basis for something better, and did good service when the 
people were summoned to actual warfare. The South, in a few months, was 
enabled to transform itself into a great military camp, with no serious break¬ 
ing in upon the routine of its daily life. 

At the North, and especially in the East, the case was different. Every 
man was engaged in some regular occupation. A large proportion were 
gathered into cities and towns. Besides New York and Philadelphia, whose 
population exceeded 600,000 each, there were six cities with more than. 
100,000, averaging 150,000; nearly a score with from 40,000 to 80,000, and 
fully fifty more with 10,000 each, besides towns almost without number with 
more than 5000, which were so closely connected with the cities that they 
might be considered suburban. Nearly one half of the people of the North 
lived in cities and large villages; nine tenths of the South lived in the coun¬ 
try. The tendency of the free states was toward an aggregation of popula¬ 
tion ; that of the South toward segregation. With few exceptions, the urban 
population of the North increased more rapidly than the rural; with few 
exceptions, the rural population of the South increased more rapidly than 
the urban. The consequence of this is inevitable. The man in the country 
may need to protect himself and his household, and so provides himself with 
arms; the man in a town is protected by the police, and requires no arms. 
The rule was, therefore, that the Southern man was armed and the Northern 
man was not. Our farmers, mechanics, and laborers undoubtedly furnished 
better materials for an army than the Southern planters and idlers, but it re¬ 
quired more time to transform them into soldiers. 

For the purpose which they had in view, the South had also the advant¬ 
age in position. They contemplated only a defensive war; for their medi¬ 
tated capture of Washington was considered merely taking possession of 
what geographically and politically belonged to them. If the Union would 
consent to be broken up without a contest, there would be no fighting. The 
Union must carry the war, if there was to be war, into the confederate terri¬ 
tory, and could reach no vital point except by long marches. The difficul¬ 
ties in the way of an invading army increase with every mile. The great 
master of war was conquered rather by the space and climate of Russia than 
by her arms. We had equal space to traverse, and a not less unfavorable 
climate to encounter before we could reach any vital point. Indeed, with 
the exception of the three or four ports from which her cotton was shipped, 
the South had no points of such vital importance that a blow reaching any 
one of them would have been of serious consequence. To the blockade of 
her ports and the consequent destruction of her commerce she could for a 
while submit; the more so, as she had plausible reason to believe that the 
great powers of the world could not suffer this to last long. Favored by 
climate, soil, and circumstances, the South had gained the monopoly of an 
article which had come to be a necessity for the world. Europe must have 
cotton, and she could get it only from the South. A quarter of the people 
of England, and a considerable part of those of every other civilized coun¬ 
try, lived by the manufacture of cotton ; without a supply of the raw mate¬ 
rial they must starve. If, therefore, in consequence of the war, this supply 
was cut off, the nations must somehow find a pretext for putting an end to 
the war. Nay, the North itself could not live without cotton. Cotton fed 
the manufactories of Massachusetts, and freighted the ships of New York. 
The woolens from England, the wines from Germany, the silks from France, 


[1861. 

and the teas from China, were paid for by cotton. Without cotton the in¬ 
dustry and commerce of all nations must languish. The world would suf¬ 
fer more from the want of cotton than the South could from the want of an 
open market for it. For every negro prevented by the war and blockade 
from raising cotton, five white men would be doomed to idleness and conse¬ 
quent privation from the want of it to manufacture. “ Cotton is King” pass¬ 
ed into a proverb at the South. 

The Confederacy was strong, also, in the entire unanimity of its people. 
Some of the states hesitated whether they should secede; but, that step once 
taken, there was no perceptible opposition except in Western Virginia and 
Eastern Tennessee. Every man felt bound to go with his state, right or 
wrong. The dogma of the supremacy of the states, inculcated for forty years, 
had become an absolute article of political faith. The federal government 
was only an agent created by the states, to be used or discarded at pleasure. 
A Southerner hardly styled himself an American ; he was a Virginian or a 
Carolinian, a Georgian or a Mississippian. When his state seceded he must 
follow her fortunes. He might have sworn a thousand civil oaths to be 
faithful to the Constitution; he might even have taken the military oath— 
the sacramentum , the most sacred obligation known among men—so sacred, 
that when the founders of our faith needed a term for the obligation which 
bound a Christian to his Lord, they could only borrow this, and designate 
the supreme rites of the Church as “sacraments;” he might, like Lee and 
Davis, like Beauregard and Johnston, have taken this sacramental oath a 
hundred times, and yet it had no binding force when his state chose to ab¬ 
solve him from it. Many of these men sacrificed much in following their 
states. Lee had to abandon Arlington House, the spot next after Mount 
Vernon most closely associated with the memory of the Father of his Coun¬ 
try; the two Johnstons gave up posts of honor and profit which it had cost 
them years to win. There were knaves like Floyd and Thompson, vision¬ 
aries like Stephens and Jackson, schemers like Davis and Wise, adventurers 
like Maffit and Semmes; but we can not deny, what future ages will affirm, 
that not a few of the men who acted prominent parts upon the wrong side 
in this great war were moved by the sternest sense of what they deemed to 
be right. In violating their obligations to the Union they acted in obedi¬ 
ence to what they deemed the higher law of state sovereignty. If men who 
had taken upon themselves such obligations thus violated them, it is no won¬ 
der that the mass of the people were led away. It was as much as a man’s 
social standing was worth to refrain from joining the army. The women 
were even in advance of the men. No man who cared to be received in so¬ 
ciety dared be other than a secessionist. Thus the entire available force of 
the South was from the outset at the disposal of the confederate leaders. 

The North, though vastly superior in numbers and accumulated wealth, 
showed at first no such unanimity. The ties between the great Democratic 
party of the North and the South bad been so close that many believed the 
members of this party would yield every thing to their old associates rather 
than engage in a war to be waged on the platform of their political oppo¬ 
nents. The President was not the first choice of a majority even at the 
North. Many hoped and more feared that he w r ould not be sustained even 
at home. He was new in public affairs—was unacquainted with most of the 
men upon whose support he must rely. He could not know whom to trust 
and whom to suspect. No man ever assumed responsibilities under more 
trying circumstances than Abraham Lincoln. IIow he has discharged these 
responsibilities, the events which we are to relate will show. 

The Confederacy, completed by the accession of the Border States, showed 
a united front. There was every prospect of a Union divided against itself 
to be opposed to it. It was apparently justified in its first arrogant meas¬ 
ures. It could not anticipate the results shown by the great uprising at the 
North, which proved that love for the Union and a determination to uphold 
it were paramount to all party considerations. It could not foresee that 
Democrats would not be behind their old Republican opponents in support¬ 
ing the war. The Confederacy held firm possession of almost every rood of 
territory which it claimed. Fortress Monroe in Virginia, Forts Pickens in 
Florida, Taylor on Key West, and Jefferson on the Tortugas, were all that 
remained to the Union within the bounds of the Confederate States. With 
the exception of the few hundred acres within the walls of these fortresses, 
a narrow strip on the Potomac, and the northwestern corner of Virginia, not 
a rood remained to the Union of the nearly eight hundred thousand square 
miles within the eleven seceding states. These four fortresses were, indeed, 
of inestimable value. Monroe commanded Hampton Roads, the only good 
harbor on the Atlantic coast south of the Delaware; had that fallen into the 
hands of the enemy, we should have had no place on the Southern coast for 
a rendezvous for our naval expeditions. Pickens commanded Pensacola, 
the only good harbor and naval ddpot on the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor and 
Jefferson commanded the throat of the Gulf; every vessel entering or leav¬ 
ing it must pass within sight of both. The other forts, a score in number, 
which had been built by the United States at a cost of ten millions of dol¬ 
lars, and were mounted with more than 1500 guns, had been seized by the 
states in which they were situated and turned over to the Confederacy. Be> 
sides these was the great arsenal at Norfolk, with 2500 great guns in store, 
and various other arsenals containing some hundreds of cannon, and small- 
arms sufficient for 150,000 men. There were also mints, hospitals, and cus¬ 
tom-houses which had cost fully six millions; stores and supplies worth 
many millions, and nearly 150 light-houses along the coast from the capes 
of Virginia to the farther extreme of Texas. Apart from the public lands, 
it is safe to estimate that national property worth a hundred millio'n dollars 
was seized by the Confederacy. The South, moreover, had always been a 
large debtor to the North. Southern merchants and planters made their 
purchases upon the credit of the cotton crop to be brought to market. The 




1861.] , > THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY. 125 

< ^ • l 



BALLOON VIEW OF THE SEAT OF WAR. 



















































[ 1861 . 


1861.1 


THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY. 



PICTORIAL MAP OF PORTIONS OF DELAWARE, MARYLAND, 


VIRGINIA, AND NORTH CAROLINA, WITH THE COAST LINE FROM CAPE HENRY TO FORT PICKENS. 























































SOUTHERN 


MAP OF THE 


INCLUDING 


£A'L ROADS, COU NTY TOWN S, STATE CAP ITALS, COUNTY ROADS, THE SOUTHERN COAST FROM E lLAWARE TO TEXAS, SHOWING THE HA RBORS.INLETS. TORTS AND POSITION OF BLOCKADING SHIPS 


raJnmvKi 


fomursvU/e 


'Winchester 


(umberin' 


JwciS)? 


Westminster 


ka voiworth 


(dirhem me 


\fMorrenv 

(tbortCm^r 


Emgwoot 


trims 


Fairmorrm 




$SeMi .7 nt/slhwl 
Uarimvflle ^ 


Hunter die \fjhrrgt 


Ham/it 


Bowl/m 


i j JSdesthun 

Na shville 

dftoommgtvn 


ch ftwnd 


ia/toem 


'jfcf Grersrsi 
\foUanbuM 


tomney 


J iherty'' 7 ’''. 


Warktrsbnrn West Union 


'./inn an 


'encer 


'tevBALT 


jHiflshnt 


/f-YjT "'per, 
"Lf. £ Charles to w> 


Alfred* 


taourtA 


.tnnl ustd _ 

•Batavia 


Meseerd 


Mcxmgtxm 


( / L-JTarru vilft 
'IkUanflc*-^ 1 ' ' 
iHSUiajicthT ~ 


Marshal]. 


^ndence 


^ Jfeder 71 
d/ntem-dle ' 


-•Sullivan 


ferseypuu 


fCohimbia 


Robinton ■ 


terry 


estport 


erouci 


i.BoomiU'e 


IVexItm 


Gfrertvn 


XSeymotii 


at Royal 


Wloem, fnnu 
J CaittW’lu 

\Ontrt-dta. 


• Ctmml/e 




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tyteniouth 


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Rich My 


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BhrrensBai 


)^*SStX/u7r/fis 

ST.IOUIS, 


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Charleston Som/nn/lt 


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ranhkort 1* 


tear 


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s 


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Goochland 


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Pulaski 


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it Savanna f. 


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brand June. 


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i Greenville 


Monroe 




nansvillc Trenton 


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LITTLE ROC 


Unionvillo 


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iChester 


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Russellville 


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Anderson. 


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iiu cnsvii 


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.( Petersburg 


Marietta 


Lexington.* 


Ashville 


'ifrenec V 


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difuns 


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• n rUrjji/ytan 


yMonroe 


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g*^jnca/ur 

J BastlbmT* 


f\ Fayette 

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\ 1 

C WarroUton 


ivnr 


MonticeUo 


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'rreensboro 


Camak 


eidiiorP 


?tarlcvUle 
ArUsitx 


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yetter ille, 

V 


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^atOTitOTU 

f °nt(ceffd\ 


fo wee. 


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BrrmchviJle 


wnbiagmy 


*Barnwell 


Tuscaloosa. 


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Clinton \milledgeviile 


Louisville/ 


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A\ 


Mahnie. 


fsciusktC 


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e .nna. 


Crawfords 1 ' 


Rockford 


WalterU 


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lad/vdle 


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\ffillsboro | 


Gillisonvillk 


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Marshall . 


Statesboro 




Uhumtotv 


Kum 


Meridian, 


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lOWTMMERy 


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emotv 


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'orest 


fj/^CKSON 


Mb Vernon 


yfcfitwba, Hgymsvtde, 


iWinruloro 


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nd Gulf 


k.VANN, 


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JLlmcsvifle* 


Gal/atip 


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\p%StartksvW.e 


M c Into si 


CtarksviUe 


(rwi/wi 


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\ \'biduster*Bj 


INATCHEZ \ 


'•did JVashihgta/v 


booldiaveaS 


Uadcshear 


Milam 


Waynes V. 


;-Indian B 
%fin l et 


Warcsbo.ro 


TolmesviUe 


\Woodvdh l 


Troupvif/e 


a \ Jeffersonian 

Trade 


T/wmasvUle 


WSBBSi 


JacJofOtt n 

-A lMOBIL 


f£Drt\2uasi 


UeheeAnnciX 


if]mc/e==t 

At rVc I i a I ,- 


. Fcrna/tdi/io. 


Mofi tied Jo 
( Maetisori 


The Ever gj_ad.e^ 


Mississippi 


^ctawhflid,; 


LaJceA'ity\ ^ c ^ nc ? 


Take Charles 


f StAndrew's 


k m 


CapeBonuum 


StMark 


i naldsvm.it 


Gat h van. 


Ridge Station, 


a I u> i 


Slav nanvirtd) Jilatk 


FLORIDA. 

SOUTHERN PART. 


SalmoCgp 


m?JZ 


Cape Sable; 


'rinnxa Jii/it 


Jfoiima 


Dry Tonug gj. -~ ^ 

^hWerson Reys^r&j 


ftrdarKn 


Ahull tiiiV. 


Ri ngs dory S„ 
Mdlon rdlc^X-J 


Pincboro•} 


/ JbiumsvilU 

Melendez) i 




Llockaclm.^ Shijja 
Couaty - Towns 
State 1 Capitals. 


SCALE OF MILES. 


Common 


Bounding States 


», M 

K’CLELLA$. 




TtM 

'fuStrr. 




































































































































































































































































































































































BALLOON VIEW OF FORTRESS MONROE AND HAMPTON 


132 


[1861. 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1861.] 


THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY. 


133 


amount of the debt thus due at the time of secession has been variously es¬ 
timated at from one hundred to three hundred millions of dollars. The 
most reliable estimate is framed on the supposition that the cotton crop was 
in effect mortgaged for half its value. This crop was worth three hundred 
millions. Southern merchants and planters, therefore, owed one hundred 
and fifty millions to the North. This was at once confiscated, and the 
debtors were ordered to pay the amount into the Confederate treasury. 

If war was to be waged, it was clearly for the interest of the cotton states 
that it should be waged on the border. Accordingly, Virginia had hardly 
joined the Confederacy before the seat of government was removed from 
Montgomery to Richmond, which then became for a time the centre from 
which military operations were directed. It was admirably adapted for this 
purpose. It was so far inland that it could be assailed only by a force vast¬ 
ly superior to its defenders. It had large manufactures of arms and provis¬ 
ions. It was connected by a system of railways with the extreme south and 
southwest, which would enable the whole force of the Confederacy to be 
speedily concentrated for its defense. If the system of Southern railways 
had been constructed especially for military purposes, it could hardly have 
been better contrived. One line, commencing in Central Georgia, follows 
the general run of the coast, touches at Savannah and Charleston, then, 
striking into the interior, reaches Richmond. Another line, starting at New 
Orleans, runs northward, parallel with the Mississippi, to the neighborhood 
of Memphis; then, turning almost due east, traverses the very heart of the 
South, through Tennessee and Virginia, to Richmond. These two great 
trunk lines are connected by branches reaching into every portion of the 
Southern States, and from Richmond sending offshoots to the Potomac. 
Thus, if Richmond were threatened, troops and supplies could be hurried by 
rail from the far south and southwest. If Charleston or Mobile were threat¬ 
ened, forces from Virginia, Mississippi, and Tennessee could be concentrated 
there. If Tennessee or Georgia were menaced from Ohio or Kentucky, all 
the available force of the Confederacy could be dispatched by short routes 
to the point assailed. A careful study of the general map of the Southern 
states which we furnish will show that the South had a great advantage in 
position for carrying on a war of defense. It occupied the centre of a cir¬ 
cle, around the circumference of which the North must move. The advant¬ 
age was hardly less for an offensive movement. If our armies on the Poto¬ 
mac were weakened to support those in the Valley of the Mississippi, the 
Confederacy could speedily concentrate its armies in Virginia, and hurl them 

1 THE ORDINANCES OF SECESSION. 

The following are the Ordinances of Secession of the several states, arranged in the order in 
which they were passed. Mere formal expressions and supplementary provisions are omitted or 
abridged; but the essential portions, which are embraced within quotations, are copied textually. 
To her brief Ordinance of Secession South Carolina added an elaborate “Declaration of Causes,” 
which will be found at length on page 23 of this History: 

South Carolina. —“We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, 
do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us 
in Convention on the 23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 1798, whereby the Constitution of 
the United States was ratified, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly of the 
state ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, and the union now 
subsisting between South Carolina and other states, under the name of ‘ The United States of 
America,' is hereby dissolved.”—Passed December 20, 1861. 

Florida. —“ Whereas all hope of preserving the Union, upon terms consistent with the safety 
and honor of the slaveholding states, has been fully dissipated by the recent indications of the 
strength of the anti-slavery sentiment of the free states, therefore be it enacted that it is the un¬ 
doubted right of any state to withdraw from the Union when it pleases, and that Florida should 
now exercise this right; and “the State of Florida hereby withdraws herself from the confeder¬ 
acy of states existing under the name of the United States of America, and from the existing 
government of the said states; and that all political connection between her and the government 
of the said states ought to be, and the same is hereby totally annulled, and said union of states 
dissolved, and the State of Florida is hereby declared a sovereign and independent nation; anil 
that all ordinances heretofore adopted, in so far as they create or recognize said union, are re¬ 
scinded ; and all laws or parts of laws in force in this state, in so far ns they recognize or assent to 
said union, be, and they are hereby repealed.”—Passed January 7, 1861. 

Mississippi —“The people of Mississippi, in Convention assembled, ordain,” etc., “That all 
the laws and ordinances by which the said State of Mississippi became a member of the federal 
Union of the United States of America be, and the same are hereby repealed; and that all obli¬ 
gations on the part of the said state, or the people thereof, be withdrawn; and that the said state 
does hereby resume all the rights, functions, and powers which by any of the said laws and ordi¬ 
nances were conveyed to the government of the said United States, and is absolved from all the 
obligations, restraints, and duties incurred to the said federal Union, and shall henceforth be a 
free, sovereign, and independent state.” The provision of the state Constitution requiring officers 
to swear to support the Constitution of the United States is annulled; and the state consents to 
form a union with other seceding states “upon the basis of the present Constitution of the Unit¬ 
ed States, except such parts thereof as embrace other portions than such seceding states.”— 
Passed January 9, 1861. 

Alabama. —“ Whereas the election of Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin to the offices of 
President and Vice-President of the United States by a sectional party, avowedly hostile to the 
domestic institutions and to the peace and security of the people of the State of Alabama, pre¬ 
ceded by many and dangerous infractions of the Constitution of the United States by many of 
the states and people of the northern section, is a political wrong of so insulting and menacing a 
character as to justify the people of the State of Alabama in the adoption of prompt and decided 
measures for their future peace and security : Therefore be it declared ,” etc., that the State of Ala¬ 
bama now withdraws “from the Union known as ‘The United States of America,’ and hence¬ 
forth ceases to be one of the said United States, and is, and of right ought to be, a sovereign and 
independent state;” and all powers heretofore delegated to the United States are “resumed and 
vested in the people of the State of Alabama.” And as it is the wish of the State of Alabama to 
meet the slaveholding states of the South to form a provisional as well as permanent government, 
the people of these states are requested to meet by delegates at Montgomery on the 4th of Febru¬ 
ary, 1861, for the purpose of securing “concerted and harmonious action in whatever measures 
may be deemed most desirable for our common peace and safety.”—Passed January 11, 1861. 

Georgia.— “We, the people of the State of Georgia, ordain,” etc., “That the ordinance adopt¬ 
ed by the people of Georgia in Convention, in the year 1788, whereby the Constitution of the Unit¬ 
ed States was assented to, ratified, and adopted, and also all acts and parts of acts of the Gener¬ 
al Assembly ratifying and adopting the amendments to the said Constitution, are hereby repeal¬ 
ed, rescinded, and abrogated ; and we do farther declare and ordain that the union now subsisting 
between the State of Georgia and other states, under the name of ‘The United States of Ameri¬ 
ca,’ is hereby dissolved; and that the State of Georgia is in full possession and exercise of all 
th^se rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state. Passed 
January 19, 1861. . . . , 

Texas.— “ Whereas the federal government has failed to accomplish the purposes of the com¬ 
pact of union between these states, in giving protection either to the persons of our people upon 
an exposed frontier or to the property of our citizens; and whereas the action of the Northern 
states is violative of the compact between the states and the guarantees of the Constitution; and 
whereas the recent developments in the federal affairs make it evident that the power of the icder- 
al government is sought to be made a weapon with which to strike down the interests and prop¬ 
erty of the people of Texas and her sister slaveholding states, instead of permitting it to be, as it 
was intended, our shield against outrage and oppression; therefore we the people ordain, etc., 
“That the ordinance adopted by our convention of delegates on the 4th day of July, A. u. 1845, 
and afterward ratified by us, under which the republic of Texas was admitted into the Union with 
other states, and became a party to the compact styled ‘The United States of America,’ be, and is 


in a mass upon Maryland and Pennsylvania. The Union had to maintain 
two great armies, one upon the Potomac, the other upon the Mississippi and 
its great affluents, which must act in a measure independently of each other, 
on account of the long distances which separated them, while the Confeder¬ 
acy could at pleasure throw its whole force upon either. Thus it happened 
that while the armies of the Union in the aggregate far outnumbered those 
of the Confederacy, the latter might be able, as they did, to confront their 
opponents at almost any given point with equal or superior strength. 

The Confederacy thus entered into the contest with a strength altogether 
beyond that indicated by its population. It had, indeed, two weak points 
closely connected with each other. The accumulated capital of the South 
was mainly invested in slaves. If a Southron gained money, he invested it 
in negroes. The value of an ordinary field-hand had trebled in a few years 
in consequence of the regular demand for and high price of cotton. If the 
production of cotton were permanently suspended, slaves would lose their 
value. A long war of necessity involved this result, and the finances of the 
South would become embarrassed. Moreover, the character of property 
which attached to slaves depended upon positive law. If the federal gov¬ 
ernment should pass an act of emancipation, with the power to enforce i s 
execution, the wealth of the slaveholders would be swept away at a blow. 
That the government had a right to do this, if it were necessary as a war 
measure, was undisputed; but the public sentiment of the North was, at the 
outset, wholly opposed to the exercise of this right, and it was long kept in 
abeyance. 

Thus, during the spring of 1861, the Union and the Confederacy stood 
fairly opposed to each other; all attempts at conciliation had failed, and the 
forces of each party were confronting each other. The confederate govern¬ 
ment had established itself at Richmond, and had pushed its outposts so far 
northward that they could see the dome of the federal Capitol across the Po¬ 
tomac. The national capital had been secured from the immediate danger 
which threatened it, but the determination to capture it was the prevailing 
sentiment of the Confederacy. It was commanded by the heights on the 
Virginia side of the Potomac, and the occupation of these by the federal 
forces was absolutely essential to the safety of Washington. Forces were 
also gathering in Western Virginia and Missouri, and were on the point of 
coming into collision. We turn to these three regions, so widely separated 
in space, where the first actual military operations commenced almost simul¬ 
taneously near the close of May, 1861. 1 

hereby repealed and annulled; that all the powers which by the said compact were delegated by 
Texas to the federal government arc resumed ; that Texas is of right absolved ♦ v om all restraints 
and obligations incurred by said compact, and is a sovereign and independent state, and that her 
citizens and people are absolved from all allegiance to the United States and the government 
thereof.”—Passed February 7, 1861. 

Louisiana. —“We, the people of the State of Louisiana, ordain,” etc., “That the ordinance 
passed by us in Convention on the 22d day of November, in the year 1811, whereby the Constitu¬ 
tion of the United States, and the amendments of said Constitution, were adopted, and all laws 
and ordinances by which the State of Louisiana became a member of the federal Union, be, and 
the same are hereby repealed and abrogated; and that the union now subsisting between Louisi¬ 
ana and other states, under the name of‘The United States of America,’ is hereby dissolved. 
That the Stutc of Louisiana hereby resumes all rights and powers heretofore delegated to the gov¬ 
ernment of the United States of America, and that her citizens are absolved from all allegiance 
to said government, and that she is in full possession and exercise of all those rights of sovereignty 
which appertain to a free and independent state.”—Passed January 26,1861. 

Virginia. —“The people of Virginia, in the ratification of the Constitution of the United States 
of America, adopted by them in Convention on the 25 th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1788, 
having declared that the powers granted under the said Constitution were derived from the people 
of the United States, and might be resumed whenever the same should be perverted to their injury 
and oppression; and the federal government having perverted said powers, not only to the injury 
of the people of Virginia, but to the oppression of the Southern slaveholding states,” the people 
of Virginia ordain that “the ordinance adopted by the people of this state in Convention in the 
year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and 
all acts of the General Assembly of this state ratifying or adopting amendments Jo said Constitu¬ 
tion, are hereby repealed and abrogated; that the union between the State of Virginia and the 
other states, under the Constitution aforesaid, is hereby dissolved; and that the State of Virginia 
is in the full possession and exercise of all rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a 
free and independent state. And they do further declare that said Constitution of the United 
States of America is no longer binding on any of the citizens of this state.”—Passed April 17,1861. 

Arkansas. —“ Whereas, in addition to the well-founded causes of complaint set forth by this 
Convention in resolutions adopted on the 11th of March, A.D. 1861, against the sectional party 
now in power in Washington City, headed by Abraham Lincoln, he has, in the face of resolutions 
passed by this Convention, pledging the State of Arkansas to resist to the last extremity any at¬ 
tempt on the part of such power to coerce any state that seceded from the old Union, proclaimed 
to the world that war should be waged against such states until they should be compelled to sub¬ 
mit to their rule, and large forces to accomplish this have by this same power been called out, and 
are now being marshaled to carry out this inhuman design; and to longer submit to such rule, 
or remain in the old Union of the United States, would be disgraceful and ruinous to the State of 
Arkansas: Therefore we, the people of Arkansas, ordain,” etc., “That the ‘Ordinance and Ac¬ 
ceptance of Compact,’ passed by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas on the 18th day 
of October, A.D. 1836 [here follows a minute description of this Compact and other acts], and all 
other laws, and every other law and ordinance, whereby the State of Arkansas became a member 
of the federal Union, be, and the same are hereby in all respects and for every other purpose here¬ 
with consistent repealed, abrogated, and fully set aside; and that the union now subsisting be¬ 
tween the State of Arkansas and the other states, under the name of‘The United States of Amer¬ 
ica,’ is hereby forever dissolved.” Then follows the usual declaration resuming all rights dele¬ 
gated to the federal government, absolving the citizens from allegiance to that government, and 
pronouncing Arkansas a “free and independent state.”—Passed May 6, 1861. 

Tennessee.— “ We, the people of the State of Tennessee, waiving an expression of opinion as 
to the abstract doctrine of secession, but averting the right as a free and independent people to 
alter, reform, or abolish our form of government in such manner as wc think proper, do ordain and 
declare that all the laws and ordinances by which the State of Tennessee became a member of the 
federal Union of the United States of America are hereby abrogated and annulled, and that all 
obligations on our part be withdrawn therefrom, and we do hereby resume all the rights, functions, 
and powers which by any of the said laws and ordinances were conveyed to the government of the 
United States, and absolve ourselves from rll the obligations, restraints, and duties incurred there¬ 
to. and do hereby become henceforth a free, sovereign, and independent state.” The provisions 
of the Constitution of the state requiring civil and military officers to swear to support the Consti¬ 
tution of the United States, making citizenship of the United States a qualification for office, and 
recognizing the Constitution of the United States as the supreme law of the state, are abrogated 
and annulled.—Passed May 6,1861. 

North Carolina. —“Wc, the people of North Carolina, ordain,”-etc., “That the ordinance 
adopted by the State of North Carolina, in the Convention of 1789, whereby the Constitution of the 
United States was ratified and adopted, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assem¬ 
bly ratifying and adopting amendments to the said Constitution, arc hereby repealed, rescinded, 
and abrogated. We do further declare and ordain, that the union now subsisting between the 
State of North Carolina and the other states, under the title of ‘The United States of America,’ 
is hereby dissolved, and that the State of North Carolina is in the full possession and exercise of 
all those rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state.” An¬ 
other ordinance was passed, ratifying the Montgomery Constitution, and declaring that “North 
Carolina will enter into the federal association of states upon the terms therein proposed when admit 
ted by the Congress or any competent authority of the Confederate States.”—Passed May 20,1869s 









BALLOON VIEW OF WASHINGTON, May, 1861. 


134 


[May, 1861. 

















































Mat, 1861.] 


EASTERN VIRGINIA MISSOURI. AND WESTERN VIRGINIA 


135 



M-JA.T A-VD SUWiZS t ACS OP F02ELSSS XOuSSOK. 


CHAPTER II. 

EASTERN VIRGINIA. MISSOURI, AND WESTERN VIRGINIA 

Occopaiktt ^ Akxantiria.—Death of ElLvorth.—Fortress Monroe^—Battle of Big BcthcL— 
Condition of Mivoun.—General Lym’s Measures.—Battle of Boonevillc,—Actiun at Carthage. 
—Govern >r Jat<« deposed, and Gamble appointed.—Battle of Wibon’s Creek.—Death of 
I-yon.—Westers Virginia.—Tbe Mayor of ' _ —McClellan aiyvintol to the Command 

of the Dcjariment of theOhk>.—Skirmi>h at Clarksbarg.—M*OkIlan’> Infraction'.—Grafron. 
— Battle of Philipyii. — L’nk»n C<xi vent ion at Wheeling. — Letcher’s Proclamation.— Rich 
Mountain.—Battle of Garrick's Ford.—Wise’s an . 'npaigns in Western Virginia.— 

Battle of Caraiflx Furry.—McClellan's congratulatory Address. 

' I MIE month of April saw the insurrection extravagant in hope, prodigal 
A in tbe promise of success. The success of its first move had made se¬ 
cession rampant State after state had wheeled into the line. Even Vir¬ 
ginia. that bad for a time hesitated, now stood in the van of that insurgent 
column which looked defiance at the general government which it had par¬ 
alyzed. The attitude of the Confederacy was not that of resistance, but that 
of aggression. It hoped to possess itself, almost without opposition, of such 
commanding positions as would at the outset give it a decided advantage over 
the federal government both in prestige and power. The capture of Wash¬ 
ington. secretly planned by the cautious, was talked of by the indiscreet lead¬ 
ers of tbe confederates. It is |>ossible that all which prevented the realiza- j 
tion of this scheme was the inertness of Virginia in regard to her final de¬ 
cision of the question of secession. The very tune of the attack was fixed 
upon, which was to be between the 17th and 21st of April. It was doubt¬ 
less with this view that the raid had been made upon Ilarjier’s Ferrv, and 
that to embarrass the government still farther, a vert* large number of offi¬ 
cers in the army and navy had suddenly handed in their resignations It 
must be remarked, however, that Governor Letcher—whatever mar have 
been his feeling in tbe matter, declined to sanction the raid upon Harper’s 
Ferry, as also that upon the government property in and near Norfolk. 
These events occurred or were planned before the state bad fully committed 
itself to secession, and therefore Letcher was undecided whether to give them 
his official sanction. Thus the hesitancy of Virginia became the salvation 
of Washington, for without the hearty co-operation of that state it was im¬ 
possible that Washington, already forewarned and partially forearmed, could 
be taken. 

When it is considered that Washington was the seat of the federal gov¬ 
ernment, and that no hint of aggression had as yet issued from the adminis¬ 
tration, and when, indeed, no act of war had taken place, excepting that 
which the insurgents had inaugurated and consummated, it is not difficult to 
see that the revolutionary programme, in its verv earliest movements, con¬ 
templated no less than the destruction of the entire fabric of the republic. 
When Mr. Walker, the rebel Secretary of War, said, on the 12th of April, 
that before the 1st of May the confederate flag would float over the dome 
of the old Capitol, President Lincoln had not yet called for his first quota of 
troops; and when, three days afterward, he did call for seventy-five thou¬ 
sand men, it was for the purpose mainly of protecting the capital against the 
threats of its enemies—threats that were even then on the verge of execu¬ 


tion. Such was the position of the secession leaders in this month of April, 
when the sun shone for their hay-making. 

But the month of May reversed the-pictnre. The hope which had well- 
nigh led secession to triumph, ahd to justify that triumph which it sought, 
was crushed. Tbe North had uprisen, and rushed to the defense of the cap¬ 
ital : and in the middle of May it was seen that the time for taking the old 
seat of government without a desperate struggle had gone bv. Yet it was 
declared that ‘"the fixed and unalterable determination to capture this city 
is the prevailing sentiment of our people, and satisfaction gleams from the 
eye of every soldier whose destination is Washington.” 

The occupation of the “ sacred soil” of Virginia soon became necessary to 
tbe safety of the national capital. It was undertaken in the latter part of 
May. The enthusiasm with which the loyal states had met the crisis of 
danger encouraged the government to push on and punish the aggression 
which had precipitated that crisis. 

With a view of attacking, if possible, but, at anv rate, of strenuously de¬ 
fending its position, the Confederacy held, in considerable force, the whole 
line from the Chesapeake to Edwards's Ferry, 25 or 30 miles above the cap 
ital. With a vigor which would have been afterward repeated with good 
effect, the government decided to take the offensive and to occupy Alex¬ 
andria, about six miles below Washington, and on the opposite side of the 
Potomac. General Mansfield, with about thirteen thousand men, led this im¬ 
portant movement. It was an impressive scene which the night preceding 
tbe attack ushered in. Vague bints bad been given out of a storm about to 
burst forth at a moment’s warning; and. in profound stillness, under a full 
moon, a busy preparation was being made; scouts were sent out in every 
direction; the men were suddenly summoned to the novel business of war, 
their bayonets glittering in the cold light; upon tbe river, steamers were 
being laden with troops and the machinery of strife: then the movement 
was made; and when the citizens of Washington awoke on the morning of 
the 24th of May, the ripe result was announced of operations that had been 
begun and consummated while they were asleep. At about daybreak the 
New York Seventh touched the Virginia soil, landing at tbe Alexandria 
bridge, near which they encamped. A detachment of soldiers, with some 
eavalrv and artillery, crossed the Potomac below Georgetown, and took pos¬ 
session of the London and Hampshire Railroad. The Manassas Gap Rail¬ 
road also, running out of Alexandria, was held by the New York Sixty- 
ninth, and seven hundred passengers were captured and held as hostages. 
Meanwhile Colonel Ellsworth, early in the morning, entered the town with 
his Zouaves, severed its communication with the South both by railroad and 
telegraph, and so completely surprised the rebel troops that a large number 
of them, unable to effect an escape, were captured. Thus was an important 
entrance into Virginia opened to tbe federal army without a battle. One 
single life was lost, that of the brave but imprudent Colonel Ellsworth, who 
was shot by Jackson, the landlord of a hotel, to the roof of which he had in¬ 
cautiously ascended to pull down a confederate flag. “Behold my trophy,” 
said the ardent Ellsworth, as he descended from the trap-door down the 
stairs. “ And behold mine,” replied Jackson, as, springing from his hiding- 
place, he lodged the contents of his gun in Ellsworth’s breast But the se- 































































136 


[June, 1861. 



the fortress, Butler had in the early part of June about 12,000 
men. 

On the 10th of June the battle of Big Bethel was fought. The 
enemy had a strong position at Yorktown, about twenty-five miles 
from Fortress Monroe, and on the opposite side of the Peninsula. 
From this point southward they established outposts, which became 
centres whence cavalry squads were sent all over the country to com¬ 
pel tribute from the inhabitants, and frequent detachments were sent 
forth under cover of the night to harass the federal encampments and 
render their position untenable. The nearest of these outposts was 
situated at Little Bethel, a church which stood at the vertex of an 
equilateral triangle, each side measuring eight miles, and whose base 
is the line connecting Hampton and Newport News. Five miles far¬ 
ther, on the road to Yorktown, was the Great Bethel Church, near 
which the confederate Colonel Magruder was strongly intrenched, 
with a command of about 2000 men. 

Butler determined to break up these two posts. On the 9th of 
June, he had his naval brigade busily engaged all day in learning the 
management of the flat-boats, in which a portion of his troops were 
to be ferried across Hampton Creek that night, to co-operate with an¬ 
other column moving from Newport News against Little Bethel. The 
expedition started secretly, under cover of the darkness, about mid¬ 
night, as it was intended to reach its destination at daybreak. The 
force at Little Bethel was to be attacked simultaneously in front and 
rear by the two separate columns, and, having been routed, was to be 
driven toward Big Bethel and into Magruder’s intrenebments. Fast 
upon their heels, and taking advantage of the entrance that would be 
opened to the fugitives, the federal forces were to rush in and take pos¬ 
session. In case of any failure in effecting this surprise, it was left to 
General Pierce’s discretion whether or not he should attempt an assault 
upon Big Bethel. 

A single miscarriage spoiled the intended surprise. Colonel Dur- 
vea’s regiment was ferried across at one o’clock in the morning, and 
proceeded on the road to Bethel as far as to Newmarket Bridge, hav¬ 
ing crossed which it passed to the rear of the enemy, having captured 
his picket guard. So far all was well; but Colonel Townsend’s reg¬ 
iment was yet to arrive from Hampton to act as support to Duryea. 
The roads from Hampton and from Newport News join just before 
Little Bethel is reached, and no sooner had Duryea’s regiment passed 
this point of junction than the column from Newport News came up 
under Colonel Phelps, who left Colonel Bendix behind with a small 
force and a field-piece, to act as rear guard in case of an attempt being 
made by the enemy to cut off the retreat. But the Third New York 
(Colonel Townsend) was yet due. The arrival of this regiment and 

cessionist quickly paid life for life at the hands of private Brownell. Ells¬ 
worth was looked upon as a noble martyr in the North, and so was Jackson 
in the South. 

Simultaneously with the occupation of Alexandria, the heights command¬ 
ing Washington were taken possession of by the national troops prepara¬ 
tory to a defensive fortification of the city. A few skirmishes and accident¬ 
al collisions with the enemy were the only occurrences upon which the in¬ 
tense popular excitement of the people fed itself until the reverse at Big 
Bethel. This takes us from the Potomac to the Peninsula between the 
James and York Rivers. 

Fortress Monroe is, strictly speaking, the only fortress or fortified inclo¬ 
sure in the United States. It was at first constructed for the protection of 
Gosport Navy Yard, and at the beginning of the war it had cost the govern¬ 
ment two and a half millions of money. Its area embraces about seventy 
acres, and in the centre it has a magnificent parade-ground of twenty-five 
acres, finely shaded with live-oaks. It is a bastioned work, heptagonal in 
form; its walls, which are of granite, rise to the height of thirty-five feet; 
and about the entire work a moat extends, from seventy-five to a hundred 
and fifty feet wide, and faced with dressed granite. On the side facing the 
sea there is a water-battery of forty-two embrasures, the slope of which, cov¬ 
ered with a green turf, affords a favorite promenade. Fortress Monroe has 
been the final head-quarters of all the military and naval expeditions that 
have been sent to the Southern coasts. So completely does its possession 
control the commerce of Virginia, that it almost supersedes the necessity 
for a blockade along the coast of that state. Governor Letcher was, at an 
early period, fully aware of the importance of its capture, but this was an 
undertaking which, like the seizure of Washington, required a stronger force 
than could be marshaled together previous to the secession of Virginia. The 
Confederacy had no navy, and the land approach to the fortress was exceed¬ 
ingly difficult, the only access being by means of a strip of beach not over 
forty rods in width. After Virginia had finally seceded, this strong-hold 
stood in great peril, but was promptly re-enforced. 

On the 22d of May, General Butler, whose decided policy in Maryland had 
saved that state to the Union, arrived at Fortress Monroe, and there assumed 
the command of a new department, the main object of which was a military 
occupation of the Atlantic coast. 

On precisely the same day that Mansfield occupied Alexandria, Butler 
made a rcconnoissance in force toward Hampton, a little village just north of 
Fortress Monroe. The confederate troops stationed there retreated as soon 
as they were aware of his approach, and, having made their escape across 
Hampton Creek into the town, attempted to burn the bridge in their rear, 
which they partially succeeded in doing. General Butler immediately es¬ 
tablished a camp near Hampton, and another eight miles farther west, at 
Newport News: in these two encampments, together with the troops inside 


its junction with Bendix were a part of the programme, therefore it was 
expected, and its arrival promptly followed that of Bendix, who had taken 
position at the crossing of the roads; but, before it could emerge into plain 
sight, it had to ascend a slight elevation in the road. Phelps and Pierce 
were just in advance, and as they appeared above the rising crest alone and 
mouuted, Bendix, in the dim light, conjectured that a cavalry force was ap¬ 
proaching; but no cavalry were in the federal force, so that this body was 
assumed to belong to the enemy. They were fired upon, and ten of Town¬ 
send’s men were wounded. 

Pierce now ordered a retreat of the regiment. Meanwhile the firing 
alarmed the federal forces in advance, who also fell back. It was now broad 
daylight, and the mistake of the last hour was painfully evident, but it was 
too late to retrieve it, for already the enemy at Little Bethel had taken the 
alarm, and had added their strength to the already formidable position of 
Magruder. Pierce determined to try an assault, and sent to the fortress for 
re-onforeements. At first there was some promise of success; the outer line 
of the enemy’s intrenchmcnts was taken; but it was immediately retaken, 
and the bravest advances of the national troops were unavailing against the 
well-sheltered foe, and were repulsed with a loss of about forty men. Two 
of these, Major Winthrop and Lieutenant Grcble, fell under circumstances 
worthy of distinct commemoration. Winthrop was shot by a North Caro- 






























THE ADVANCE GUARD OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES C 


May, 1861 .] EASTERN VIRGINIA, MISSOURI, AND WESTERN VIRGINIA. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































138 


[June, 1801. 



JOHN T. GSBKLK. 


lina drummer-boy wliile standing upon a log and brandishing his sword. 
He was in the act of rallying his men for a fresh encounter. Greble was 
working his gun within two hundred yards of a masked battery; a position 
which he retained until he had lost six out of eleven of his artillerists, dur¬ 
ing which time he had with his single piece repelled a sortie on the part of 
the enemy with great slaughter. lie was falling back himself, when his head 
was taken off his shoulders by a cannon ball. 

This reverse, though not without its value to the federal army, aroused a 
storm of popular indignation in the North. But Butler held his position on 
the Peninsula, which was so strong that Magruder, in spite of his success at 
Big Bethel, soon deemed it prudent to withdraw to Yorktown. 

Leaving Eastern Virginia, penetrated from the north and east by the na¬ 
tional forces, whose advance was as nearly as possible in the form of an arc 
reaching from Washington to Fyrtrcss Monroe, while at Richmond, the cen¬ 
tre of this are, the confederates were marshaling in strength, and from thence 
radiating forth and seizing upon the strongest natural positions, we turn to 
contemporaneous events in the West. 

By a vote of one hundred and thirty-five thousand against thirty thou¬ 
sand, Missouri had, in the presidential election of 1860, decided against the 
extremists of the South. In this state, as in Maryland, there were men de¬ 
termined that Missouri should share the fate and fortunes of the Southern 
confederacy, but they were few. The events which have previously been 
narrated in this history: the President’s call for troops to aid in suppressing 
insurrection, and Jackson’s refusal; the conflict of the Home with the State 
Guards; the raid of the Illinois troops upon the St.Louis Arsenal, and the 
capture of Camp Jackson, near that city, by Lyon; the conflict of United 
States troops with the mob of St. Louis; Lyon’s reversal of the policy adopt¬ 
ed by Harney—a policy which, while it crippled the general government, 
yet allowed Jackson and Price, whom Harney knew to be secessionists at 
heart, to mature the military organizations of the state for purposes of their 
own—all these events had been gradually establishing a line of division on 
the question of state sovereignty as opposed to the sovereignty of the gen¬ 
eral government. That the very idea of state sovereignty, conceived thus 
absolutely, was the root of secession, was not popularly understood. It was 
so regarded by the secession leaders, and by Lyon also, who was persistently 
counteracting their movements. But a large portion of the people blindly 
believed that a state had the right to assume at option and to maintain an 
attitude of independence of the general government. Some states had al¬ 
ready done this. In the opinion of the Missourians that was an unwise pro¬ 
ceeding, but thoroughly legitimate; that is, they justified secession as to the 
principle involved, though they by no means favored its adoption. Missou¬ 
ri, at any rate, did not want it; if South Carolina wanted it, however, she 
had a perfect right to it It was this position which, seemingly so innocent, 
still wrought all the mischief in the border states; for it was impossible that 
a state could hold that position and not advance beyond it. Clearly, any 
opposition by force of arms to secession, on the part of the general govern¬ 
ment, must of necessity array Missouri, and all other states in a similar sit¬ 
uation, upon the one side or the other; for, judged from the stand-point of 
these states, such opposition was unjust and despotic. This judgment, which 
was entertained by a large portion of the people of Missouri, taken in con¬ 
nection with the prevailing sympathy of the state for Southern institutions, 
was sufficient, if not to throw the state over into the confederacy, at least to 
array it against the national government. 

Accordingly, on the lltli of June, Jackson and Price held an interview 
with Lyon and Blair at St. Louis, and demanded of the latter that no more 
United States troops should be quartered in or should pass through the 
state. This was an attempt on the governor’s part to renew with Lyon the 


compact previously made between Price and Harney. In case his requisi¬ 
tion was complied with, he offered, on his part, to disband the State Guards, - 
to nullify the organization of the state militia, which had been going on un¬ 
der the provisions of the Military Bill; to protect the rights of all the citi¬ 
zens of Missouri, and to repel any invasion from without That these offers 
were not made in good faith is evident from the fact that it was the govern¬ 
or himself who had in secret organized the State Guards before the Home 
Guards had any existence ; indeed, these latter were rendered necessary by 
the violence of the former directed against loyal citizens. Moreover, the 
governor knew that what be had offered to do it was utterly impossible for 
him to accomplish. 

But, whether made in good faith or not, these offers could not be met by 
Lyon; for, even assuming JacksoM to have been desirous that Missouri 
should be neutral—and certainly that was all which the great body of his 
supporters desired—yet, in the assumption by any state of a neutral attitude, 
there was involved the right of separation. For Missouri to demand the 
abandonment of the state by the United States troops was no more than for 
South Carolina to demand the national government to evacuate the forts in 
Charleston Harbor; and the same principle which led to the refusal of the 
one demand compelled the rejection of the other. Lyon accordingly refused 
compliance with the terms proposed. The very next day Governor Jack- 
son issued from Jefferson City a proclamation to the people of Missouri, 
making the most of his unsuccessful attempts at compromise ; representing 
that he himself, desirous only of peace, had proposed terms of agreement 
most humiliating to the state, and that even these were rejected ; and, final¬ 
ly, calling for fifty thousand of the state militia to repel the invaders. The 
majority of these “ invaders,” it will be remembered, were loyal Missourians. 

The war was now fairly inaugurated, and the next day, the 13th of June, 
saw Jackson, with all the available troops under his command, retreating 
from the capital, and Lyon on his way to the capital, having started from 
St. Louis with about fifteen hundred men. On the day before, Sigel, with 
the Second Missouri, had been dispatched toward Springfield by the South 
Pacific Railroad for a purpose which will hereafter become evident. 

Jackson, in his retreat, had given orders for the destruction of the Moreau 
bridge, four miles below Jefferson City, on the Missouri, while General Price 
attended to the severing of telegraphic communications. The flight was ex¬ 
ecuted"by means of the railroad, and all the bridges, as soon as passed, were 
burned. As General Lyon proceeded by water, this destruction was of 
course utterly useless. Even the destination of the fugitive executive was 
concealed, though conjecture pointed to Booneville, a strong-hold of seces¬ 
sion some fifty miles up the river. Meanwhile, in the absence of the recre¬ 
ant governor, General Lyon instituted a provisional government, and called 
upon all loyal men to rally to the support of order and legitimate authority. 

Thus far there had been no hostile collision between those representing 
the authority of the United States and Jackson’s forces. But, now that war 
had been unmistakably declared, Lyon did not wait for the enemy to per¬ 
fect his organizations; and, although General Harney had so illy appreci¬ 
ated the importance of a decided policy, yet it can not be denied that the 
federal troops at this crisis held their opponents in the State of Missouri at 
a great disadvantage. A firm course from the first would have held Mis¬ 
souri as strongly to her allegiance as Maryland was held. That had not 
been done. Still, so energetic and prompt were the measures of the nation¬ 
al government, that they elicited praise even from the lips of the enemy. 
“ Energy and promptitude,” says the Charleston Mercury of May 31, “ have 
characterized their movements both in Maryland and St. Louis, and their 
success along the border has so far been complete. They have, in the West, 
obtained and secured the great repository of arms for that section, equipped 
our enemies of St. Louis, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, leaving the resistance- 
men of Missouri poorly provided, Kentucky unarmed and overawed, and 
Tennessee also, with a meagre provision for fighting, dependent on the cot¬ 
ton states for weapons of defense. In all this, the military proceedings of 
the North since the fall of Sumter have been eminently wise.” 

Missouri was favorably situated for the influx, on a large scale, of confed¬ 
erate troops from Kentucky and Tennessee on the east, and from Arkansas 
on the south; and, curiously enough, at the very moment when Jackson was 
so confidently offering to repel all invaders, Ben M'Culloch, a noted Texan 
Ranger, had already crossed the southern border of the state with a force of 
800 men, which rapidly increased as he moved upon Springfield. In view 
of this movement, General Sigel had been sent, on the 12th, in that direction, 
with the Second Missouri. Price was sending on other confederate forces as 
speedily as possible to Booneville and Lexington, and on the western border 
of the state Rains was mustering together still another army. 

While these forces in the various parts of Missouri had not as yet been 
able to concentrate in any .one place, it was evidently Lyon’s opportunity to 
dispose of them in detail. For accomplishing this purpose he had inconsid¬ 
erable means at his disposal. Leaving a force at Jefferson City sufficiently 
large to preserve order, he set out in three steamers and with about 2000 
men for Booneville. This was on the 17th of June. 

A few miles below the town the confederates had posted a battery on a 
bluff commanding the river. Instead, however, of passing this battery— 
which, indeed, he could hardly have effected with safety—Lyon landed his 
troops lower down, and marched along the road running through the bot¬ 
tom-land and parallel to the river. A mile and a half brought them upon 
the enemy’s pickets, and another half mile brought them upon the enemy 
himself, in full force, under Colonel Marmaduke, who was posted in a lane 
running at right angles with the road upon which Lyon was approaching, 
and terminating at the river. A heavy cannonade was opened, driving the 
confederates to an adjacent wood. In order to draw them from this covert, 





July, 1861.] 


EASTERN VIRGINIA, MISSOURI, AND WESTERN VIRGINIA. 


139 



LYO.N'8 WABCU FBOM BOONEVILLE. 


from which they kept up a brisk fire upon the federals, Lyon ordered a 
feigned retreat. The ruse was successful, and the whole force of the artil¬ 
lery was opened on the enemy, who turned and fled in confusion. The en¬ 
emy seem to have been deficient in artillery'-; at least not a single cannon 
was fired by them during the engagement. Marmaduke’s men had insisted 
upon fighting contrary to their colonel’s judgment, who wished to retreat to 
some more tenable position. Jackson is said to have watched the battle 
from a distant hill, and, seeing the disastrous result, to have fled. Price was 
at home. The force of the enemy was inferior to that of the federal army 
making the attack, and was, besides, so indiscreetly managed, that in twenty 
minutes from the firing of the first shot it was in full retreat. 

Every effort was now made by the state forces in Missouri to concentrate. 
There was no hope of their being able to effect this in the northern part of 
the state, but there was a chance in favor of a concentration of the forces re¬ 
treating southward with those of M’Culloch in the southwest. Jackson fled 
from Booneville with only about five hundred men, and Captain Totten fol¬ 
lowed close upon him with a thousand. Rains was hurrying forward in or¬ 
der to join Jackson, pursued by Major Sturgis of the United States regular 
army. Rains, however, by the destruction of the bridge over the Osage at 
Papinsville, put a check upon the pursuit, and Sturgis was obliged to go into 
camp and wait for the high water to subside. Lyon, who had remained be¬ 
hind to get together an additional force, was soon able to join Sturgis on the 
Osage. 

Meantime, on the 23d of June, Sigel arrived at Springfield. Price was 
then encamped at Neosho, a town in the southwest corner of the state, and 
Jackson was speedily moving southward to join him. To prevent this junc¬ 
tion, Sigel advanced rapidly upon Neosho, which he entered without oppo¬ 
sition on the 1st of July, and the next day learned that Price, Jackson, and 
Rains had already united their forces at a point just north of Carthage. In¬ 
forming General Sweeny, who was at Springfield, of this fact, he received or¬ 
ders immediately to attack the confederate position. On the 4th of July he 
set out, and on the 6th came upon the enemy, posted in the open prairie. 
His force was greatly inferior, but he unlimbered his artillery and opened 
fire, to which the confederates briskly replied. A sharp artillery duel was 
kept up across the level prairie until two o’clock in the afternoon, when the 
enemy’s guns had all been dismounted and his ranks broken. The confed¬ 
erate cavalry now attempted to outflank Sigel; but the latter, sending two 
six-pounders to the rear, and changing front, fell steadily back to his bag- 
gage-wagons, which were laboring forward, and, having secured these, he fell 
slowly back to the bridge over Dry Fork Creek, where the road ran between 
two high bluffs. Here, at the opening, were stationed the enemy’s cavalry, 
which, baffled in its attack on the baggage train, sought at this point to cut 
off the retreat. Sigel, dispatching two cannon to the right and two to the 
left, supported by a small portion of his force, drew the enemy out of his 
solid and impregnable position against these his feigned movements, and 
waiting patiently their approach on either side, he opened upon them a ter¬ 
rific cross-fire, and, at the same time, by a sudden movement in front, clear¬ 
ed the bridge. The cavalry were routed, and Sigel moved rapidly to Car¬ 
thage, which, to his surprise, he found occupied by the enemy. The only 
course left was to effect a junction as quickly as possible with a Union force 
stationed at Mount Vernon, midway between him and Springfield. But his 
immediate route, which led through a forest, was disputed by a large force 


of the enemy. Here there was no opportunity for the enemy's cavalry, and, 
though he was largely outnumbered, Sigel, by the superiority of his Minie 
rifles over the old-fashioned arms of his antagonists, was able to contest the 
ground. Here the battle lasted for over two hours, until after sunset, and, 
indeed, was prolonged even into the darkness, when finally the enemy re¬ 
treated, and Sigel, not daring even to rest his tired army, kept up his march 
all night, and the next day reached Mount .Vernon. 

Sigel had seen service in Europe, and in this battle proved both the tem¬ 
per of his courage and his able strategy. His entire loss was reported at 
forty-four, while that of the confederates was much greater, owing to the su¬ 
periority of Sigel’s artillery, that of the enemy being verj' poor and poorly 
managed. 

At this time all the state, except the southwest quarter, was under the con¬ 
trol of the Union forces. North of the Missouri River hostile collisions were 
frequent between the state troops and the small bodies of Illinois volunteers 
that had been stationed at various points. Skirmishes followed one another 
in rapid succession, and a vast amount of property was destroyed. On the 
19th of July General Pope assumed the command of Northern Missouri, 
having under him a force of 7000 men. Meanwhile, on the 16th, Lyon and 
Sturgis had reached Springfield. An expedition under Sweeny was imme¬ 
diately dispatched to break up a secession camp at Forsyth, fifty miles south 
of Springfield, just above the Arkansas border. This was accomplished 
without opposition. 

The situation in Missouri at the latter end of July assumed a very critical 
aspect. General Fremont, who a month previously had returned front Eu¬ 
rope with a large amount of arms for the government, bad just been appoint¬ 
ed to the command of the Western Department. This was no enviable po¬ 
sition. Every thing was in disorder. Forces which ought already to be 
matured were only preparing to be organized; they lacked arms, and even 
the harnesses for the baggage trains were unprovided. The enemy, on the 
other hand, had already prepared himself, and was ready to strike boldly. 
The successes of the confederates in Virginia had wrought up to the highest 
pitch their hopes of a speedy and victorious close to the war. The South¬ 
ern journals of this date exulted in the anticipation of the most splendid suc¬ 
cess in Missouri, and with good reason. Price, and Rains, and Jackson had 
united their forces, and had forced Sigel to retreat. These forces were now 
joined to those of M’Culloch, making an army four times as large as that 
under Lyon. In the southeast, General Pillow had an army at New Madrid 
ready to march against St. Louis. 

In the face of all these unfavorable circumstances, the political movements 
going on in the state were of an encouraging nature. On the 22d the State 
Convention met, and, after a few days’ earnest consultation, declared the 
seats of the governor and his associates in office vacant, and appointed as 
provisional governor Hamilton R. Gamble. An address was also prepared 
for the people, justifying the measures which had been taken. This address 
reprimands in the most scathing terms the efforts which Governor Jackson 
and his lieutenant had made to carry Missouri out of the Union even pre¬ 
viously to any interference on the part of the general government in the at- 
fairs of the state. On the same day that this document was issued, Lieuten¬ 
ant Governor Reynolds put forth a proclamation from New Madrid, which 
was meant as a preface to General Pillow’s advance northward; and in two 
or three more days Governor Gamble issued a proclamation offering protec- 



























no 



NATHANIEL LYON. 


tion to all loyal citizens, and notifying the officers and troops of the Confed¬ 
erate States that their continuance in the state would be considered as an act 
of war. Certainly, so far as proclamations were concerned, the provisional 
government had the best of it, for, besides holding the capital, the proper and 
accustomed seat of the state sovereignty, they were also backed by the pop¬ 
ular convention. But proclamations could neither disarm or discourage a 
confident confederate army like that which now threatened to overrun the 
state from the southwest. 

On the 1st of August, the federal army at Springfield, under Lyon, whose 
principal commands were intrusted to Sweeny, Sigel, and Sturgis, encamped 
at Crane’s Creek, two miles south of Springfield. The next day they re¬ 
sumed their march, and about five o’clock in the afternoon there was a slight 
skirmish with a small force of the enemy at Dug Springs. Having marched 
to Curran, twenty-six miles from Springfield, Lyon fell back again upon the 
latter place. His position was one of great peril. His force was inadequate 
to meet the enemy, and Fremont could spare no re-enforcements from St. 
Louis without weakening his own position, which was of greater importance; 
but, if he retreated, he would leave the inhabitants of Springfield unprotect¬ 
ed, and could not, after all, save himself from a conflict, which must yet take 
place at some point sooner or later. Therefore he determined to make one 
effort to stay the progress of the enemy northward and to maintain his own 
position. Upon this determination followed the battle of Wilson's Creek, 
which, next to Bull Bun, was the severest engagement of the year. 

There is something sublime in the bold march of Lyon, on the night of 
the 9th of August, with a force of 5000 men, to Wilson’s Creek, to encoun¬ 
ter in the morning a force of more than 20,000. The enemy, meanwhile, 
was making elaborate arrangements for attacking him. For some time there 
had been considerable delay in the movements of the confederates toward 
Springfield, owing to a disagreement between the two leading generals, 
Price and M‘Culloch, the former advocating, and the latter opposing an im¬ 
mediate attack upon the federal army. This question had been settled, 
however, by a peremptory order from General Polk to M'Culloch, command¬ 
ing an immediate advance upon Springfield. Then M’Culloch, seemingly 
determined upon a quarrel, insisted upon having the chief command, which 
Price conceded without dispute. 

On the 9th of August the confederate army had reached a point on Wil¬ 
son’s Creek about nine miles south of Springfield. They had determined 
to attack the national forces on four sides at once, when suddenly they were 
aware that they themselves were assailed by two columns—one, under Lyon, 
in front, and another, under Sigel, on their right flank. It was the expecta¬ 
tion of Lyon to fall upon an enemy unprepared, but in this he was disap¬ 
pointed, and all that he had hoped from a surprise was lost. At first the 
powerful batteries of Totten and Dubois told fearfully upon the enemy, and 
it was even doubtful whether the inferiority in numbers, and particularly 
in cavalry, might not be compensated for by the superiority in artillery. 
Against Totten’s battery the enemy directed an overwhelming force, and for 
half an hour the contending lines surged to and fro over the disputed ground, 
neither force giving way to the other. On the left of the battery the enemy 
had gained an advantage; but, in a moment, Lyon led his horse along the 
line to rally the troops. The horse was killed at his side, when, mounting 
another, he led on his men into the thickest of the fight. On our left, the 
enemy, meanwhile, was pressing hard, but there Dubois’s battery held him 
in check. On the right, the First Missouri was being forced back by an 
overwhelming force, when Lyon promptly ordered two regiments to its sup- 


[May, 1861. 

port. Patiently at the brow of the hill they waited the approach of tne en¬ 
emy, until only a few yards separated the combatants, when the simultane¬ 
ous discharge of their Minid rifles poured forth its volume of death against 
the astonished and panic-stricken foe. Lyon now ordered a bayonet charge, 
and himself took the lead of an Iowa regiment which had lost its colonel. 
He fell dead, pierced in that shower of hail; but the regiments stood firm 
and unwavering until the enemy, again baffled, withdrew. 

Major Sturgis, upon whom the command now devolved, stood doubtful 
whether to advance or retreat. The former seemed impossible, and, if the 
latter was concluded upon, there was a dreary march of twelve miles before 
men who since yesterday morning had not tasted water. Sigel was to have 
attacked the rear, but there was no token that he had entered upon the work. 
Once, while this suspense lasted, the federal troops were deceived by the ap¬ 
proach of a confederate column under the Union flag, and, hoping to receive 
their friends, they were mowed down by the fire of the cunning enemy. 
But against every movement, open or treacherous, our troops stood firm, 
and with their artillery drove the enemy back to his own ground. After 
six hours of this unavailing slaughter, Major Sturgis ordered a retreat, and 
having done so, received tidings of Sigel’s rout and withdrawal from the 
rear. The enemy was too severely cut up to molest the leisurely retreat of 
either column. In this battle, as in that at Carthage, the artillery alone 
saved the Union army from utter annihilation. 

No sooner had Virginia, on the 17 th of April, passed the Ordinance of Se¬ 
cession, than Governor Letcher addressed a letter to Andrew Sweeny, Mayor 
of Wheeling, informing him of the fact, and ordering him to seize at once 
upon the Custom-house of that city, the Post-office, and all public buildings 
and documents, in the name of the sovereign State of Virginia. The mayor 
promptly replied: “I have seized upon the Custom-house, the Post-office, 
and all public buildings and documents, in the name of Abraham Lincoln, 
President of the United States, whose property they are.” In this reply, 
Andrew Sweeny represented the whole northwestern portion of the state, 
and the attitude which it assumed toward secession. 

By every natural association, Western Virginia was allied to Ohio and 
Pennsylvania, and therefore to Northern sentiments and institutions. Be¬ 
tween the eastern and western portions of the Old Dominion there was little 
affinity; the low-lying lands of the former invited slavery, while the mount¬ 
ainous tracts of the latter absolutely excluded it. All along, therefore, there 
had been a natural disaffection between the two sections, and this had cer¬ 
tainly not been weakened by the extraordinary exemption from taxation 
which, under the existing state of affairs, the East had always enjoyed. But 
the treason of Richmond furnished abundant occasion to the West to assert 
its dignity and independence. The triumph of secession upon the James 
naturally led to the triumph of loyalty among the mountains; and while 
Governor Letcher was training the state militia for service against the gen¬ 
eral government, Union meetings were held all over the western counties 
for the support of that government. The series of measures which resulted 
in the formation of the State of Western Virginia will hereafter be nar¬ 
rated. We have here only to do with the military events in that portion 
of the state. The topographical features of the region precluded it from be¬ 
coming a permanent arena of warfare. M'Clellan’s short campaign, lasting 
from the middle of May to the middle of July, 1861, comprises the history 
of secession in Western Virginia. 1 

On the 11th of May, the Department of the Ohio, including Ohio, Indiana, 
and the western portions of Pennsylvania and Virginia, was organized, and 
General M’Clellan, who had been invited by Governor Dennison, of Ohio, to 
abandon the presidency of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad for a brigadier 
generalship, was put at its head. M’Clellan’s career as military engineer in 
Mexico had brought him great distinction; but the office which he was now 
to undertake was novel, and accompanied by many difficult trials. An army 
had actually to be created out of undisciplined volunteer forces. To this 
task he proved himself fully competent. One of the prominent objects of 
the department thus instituted was to guard the line of the Ohio River, but, 
as the policy of the general government became more aggressive and de¬ 
termined, this object was lost sight of in view of a bolder purpose. The 
campaign in Western Virginia was in no sense an invasion, and this feature 
distinguished it from the operations that were going on for the occupation 
of the eastern part of the state. Indeed, it was some time before the federal 
army entered Western Virginia even for the purposes of protection. Thus, 
for a long period, this portion of the state had to take care of itself against 
the secessionists. Union companies were formed every where. 


1 As the terms were formerly used, the Blue Ridge was the boundary between Eastern and 
Western Virginia. In 1850, the former contained 401,540 whites, 45,783 free colored persons, 
and 409,703 slaves; the latter, 492,609 whites, 8123 free colored, and 62,233 slaves. The long¬ 
standing dispute between these sections, growing mainly out of the questions of taxation and rep¬ 
resentation, were temporarily compromised by amendments to the Constitution made in 1850, by 
which a mixed basis for representation was adopted, giving to the West a majority in the House, 
and to the East a majority in the Senate. By this compromise, slaves under twelve years of age 
were not subjects of taxation, while upon those above that age $1 20 was levied. The West com¬ 
plained that a large proportion of the property of the Eastern planters, which consisted of slaves, 
was either wholly or in effect free from taxation, while all of theirs was taxed ; and moreover af¬ 
firmed that they derived no benefit from the sums expended for internal improvements. From 
this time many leading men began to pian for a separation between the two sections. Mr. John 
S. Carlisle, in a speech at the Wheeling Convention, said : “There is no difference in opinion be¬ 
tween the advocates of a separation of this state. If I may be allowed, I can claim some credit for 
my sincerity when I say that it has been an object for which I have labored at least since the year 
1850. The Convention which met at Richmond in that year, and adopted our present State Con¬ 
stitution, clearly disclosed to my mind the utter incompatibility consistent with the interests of the 
people of Northwestern Virginia of remaining in connection w ith the eastern portion of the state.’* 
Governor Letcher, in his proclamation to the people of Northwestern Virginia, June 14, 1861. ad¬ 
mits that these complaints were well founded. He says: “There has been a complaint among 
you that the eastern portion of the state has enjoyed an exemption from taxation to your preju¬ 
dice. By a display of magnanimity in the vote just given, the East has, by a large majority, con¬ 
sented to relinquish this exemption, and is ready to share with you all the burdens of government,** 
















THE MOUNTAIN REGION OF WESTERN VIRGINIA. 


June, 1881.] 


EASTERN VIRGINIA, MISSOURI, AND WESTERN VIRGINIA. 


141 




























































































































142 


The first collision between these companies and Governor Letcher’s forces 
occurred at Clarksburg on the 23d of May. Immediately measures were 
taken to organize regiments at Wheeling for the protection of loyal citizens; 
for no sooner had the result of the election in Western Virginia and its unan¬ 
imous declaration of loyalty been made known, than the signal was given 
for the secessionists, whom Governor Letcher bad sent in their midst, to in¬ 
augurate a reign of terror. Union men were treated with violence; bridges 
were burned, and valuable property destroyed. It was now high time that 
the general government should come to the rescue. 

Before the advent of his troops into Western Virginia, M'Clellan issued 
two proclamations, one to his soldiers, and the other to the people whom they 
were sent to protect. The former were commanded to preserve the strictest 
discipline, and to remember that their duty was confined to the protection 
of loyal men against traitors; and the latter were assured of the honest in¬ 
tentions with which the movement was undertaken, and reminded of the 
fact that, while the secessionists had sent their armed forces beforehand to 
terrify and intimidate, the United States had patiently awaited the result of 
their election. They w r ere moreover assured that there would be no inter¬ 
ference with their slaves, but, on the contrary, that they should be protected 
even against any insurrection of the latter. 

The instructions given to M'Clellan were to cross the Ohio, join Colonel 
Kelly, who was in command of the regiment at Wheeling, and, having driven 
out the confederate force, to advance on Harper’s Ferry. His movements 
were hastened by the rapidity with which the secessionists were destroying 
bridges that would be necessary to his line of communication. The first 
point of approach was Grafton, which was the centre of all the railroad lines 
in Northwestern Virginia. Toward this point, on the morning of the 27th, 
Kelly moved with the First Virginia; and immediately afterward Colonel 
Irvine, with the Sixteenth Ohio, crossed the Ohio and followed Kelly’s com¬ 
mand. Another column, consisting of the Fourteenth Ohio, crossed at Ma¬ 
rietta, and moved on ParkersbuTg. The confederates, having been informed 
of this advance, hastily retreated from Grafton at midnight, falling back to 
Philippi, where Colonel Porterfield was stationed with a small force of in¬ 
fantry and cavalry. Porterfield had been sent on by General Lee to recruit 
an army for the rebellion in Western Virginia, but his attempts proving en¬ 
tirely unsuccessful in that loyal section, he was obliged to write a very de¬ 
spondent letter to Lee, asking for re-enforcements in order to enable him 
even to maintain his position. 

The occupation of Grafton had thus been effected without the firing of a 
single gun, and, on the afternoon of June 2d, there were assembled on the 
parade-ground of that place 3000 Union troops, under the command of Colo¬ 
nel Crittenden, of Indiana, to receive orders for a forced march that very 
night against the enemy at Philippi. At 8 o’clock they marched southward. 
It commenced early to rain, and rained all night; but through the wet and 
the mud the federal forces pushed on to their destination, which the most 
of them believed to be Harper’s Ferry. They moved in two separate col¬ 
umns. One column, under Colonel Dumont, proceeded on the Northwest- 
■rn Virginia Railroad to Webster, twelve miles from Philippi, and thence 
marched against the enemy’s front. Kelly, accompanied by Colonel Lan¬ 
der, moved another column eastward to Thornton, from which point they 
marched twenty-two miles, and got in the rear of Porterfield’s force. As 
soon as the column attacking in front was in position, the enemy’s pickets 
commenced firing, and our artillery opened upon the surprised camp and 
threw it immediately into utter confusion. Had not the darkness and the 
storm impeded the movements of the flanking column, the entire confederate 
force at Philippi must have been captured ; but Kelly only arrived in time 
to aid in the pursuit, and himself to meet with a severe wound from a stray 
shot after the enemy had mainly been put to flight. 

But the military opposition to secession was no more decided than was 
the political. On the 11th of June the Union Convention met at Wheeling. 
Forty counties were represented, and each county delegation came forward 
and took the following oath: “We solemnly declare that we will support 
the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance there¬ 
of, as the supreme law of the land, any thing in the ordinance of the Con¬ 
vention which lately met at Richmond to the contrary notwithstanding.” 
The next day a committee of thirteen reported a Bill of Rights, repudiating 
all allegiance to the Southern Confederacy; resolutions were offered to main¬ 
tain the rights of Western Virginia in the Union, and commanding all forces 
in arms against the United States to disband and return to their allegiance; 
and an ordinance was reported providing for the establishment of a provis¬ 
ional government. Frank H. Pierpont was appointed governor; and the 
principle set forth in his inaugural, that to the loyal people belong the gov¬ 
ernment and governmental authority, was the principle that controlled the 
entire proceedings of the Convention. 

On the 14th of June, Governor Letcher, having posted troops at Hattons- 
ville, issued a proclamation, insisting that the majority of the state should 
rule the state, and calling upon Western Virginians, in the name of past 
friendship and historic memories, to co-operate with secession and join the 
Southern army. But this proclamation was as ineffectual as Porterfield’s 
recruiting had been, although the governor offered to redress the wrongs 
which the western part of the state bad so long suffered. 

Returning to the military situation, as w'e find it in the latter part of June, 
we have M'Clellan personally at the head of the Union army in Western 
Virginia, and General Garnett commanding the confederate forces. The for¬ 
mer had about 20,000 men, and his communications open and easy; while 
the confederate general had an inferior force, and, although posted in a posi¬ 
tion highly advantageous so far as fighting was concerned, was yet complete¬ 
ly isolated from any possible basis of military operations. To have held 


[July, 1861. 

this position for a single day after the battle at Philippi, unless it were with 
a force so overwhelming as to make defeat impossible, was simply a military 
blunder. Yet Garnett held it even when he knew that M'Clellan was mov¬ 
ing steadily on, and rapidly increasing in the number of his command. This 
position of the confederates was some twenty or thirty miles southward from 
Philippi, at Rich Mountain, a gap in the Laurel Hill Range, where the Staun¬ 
ton and Weston turnpike crosses it, about four or five miles from Beverly. 
The road which runs along its western slope was the only possible line of 
communication between this position and Garnett’s base. This road ran 
through Beverly, and to hold the latter place was effectually to intercept the 
possibility of the enemy’s retreat. Here, at Rich Mountain, Garnett had post¬ 
ed Colonel Pegram with 3000 men, while he himself, with about 8000, occu¬ 
pied Laurel Hill, fifteen or sixteen miles farther westward. The fortified 
position at this latter point was very strong. Having ordered General Mor¬ 
ris to occupy Garnett’s forces by a direct attack, M'Clellan himself, with the 
main body of his army, passed around by Buckhannon to the rear, that is, 
to the western slope of Rich Mountain. Here he divided his force into two 
columns, and giving one of these to Colonel Rosecrans, he sent the latter to 
the rear of Pegram, while he remained in front, ready to attack simultane¬ 
ously. Rosecrans obtained the rear, sent a courier back to M'Clellan to give 
the signal, and went to work. The messenger missed his way, and passed 
into the encampment of the enemy, thus giving them full information of the 
movement. Meanwhile M'Clellan awaited the signal, and the enemy, ac¬ 
quainted with the peril of his position, made his way toward Laurel Hill. 
Garnett, also, had been warned of the danger, and, hastily leaving his in- 
trenchments, proceeded southward, hoping to reach Beverly before M'Clel¬ 
lan ; but, on his way thither, he met the fugitives of Pegram’s army, and 
learned that Beverly was already in the possession of the Union forces. 
Thus all retreat to the southward was cut off. The only way of escape left 
him was to follow the course of the Cheat River toward the northeast until 
he should find some outlet into the valley of Virginia. Then followed 
M'Clellan’s, or, rather, Morris’s forces, in swift and unrelenting pursuit, Cap¬ 
tain Benham leading the advance. At a bend of the Cheat River, where it 
winds about a bluff of fifty or sixty feet high, the enemy made a stand, and, 
planting a cannon on the top of the bluff, disputed the advance. It was an 
admirable position; but Benham led his men directly under the bluff and 
around to its left, where they could gain the road, and as they appeared upon 
his flank the enemy fled, leaving one of his guns and a number of killed and 
wounded. About a quarter of a mile farther on, where the stream made an¬ 
other turn, Garnett, with a few skirmishers, attempted to make another stand, 
and, while rallying his men, received a Mini4 ball which caused his death. 
This was called the battle of Carrick’s Ford. In the mean time, Pegram’s 
force, finding escape impossible, had surrendered to M'Clellan. 

The federal success was complete. Only a small portion of the enemy 
escaped, and all their material fell into our hands. The immediate and nat¬ 
ural result of this battle was the evacuation of Harper’s Ferry, and the aban¬ 
donment by the enemy of all Western Virginia. 

In the mean time, while General M'Clellan was moving southward from 
the Ohio, along the Alleghany Ridge, and driving the enemy before him, 
General Wise, near the western and southern borders of the state, was gath¬ 
ering together another confederate army. He had just been appointed a 
brigadier general, with orders, first, to clear Western Virginia of federal 
troops and keep it clear, and, secondly, to occupy Wheeling, and disorgan¬ 
ize the Union Legislature. In order to accomplish this in the face of M'Clel¬ 
lan’s rapidly advancing army, he demanded of his government an adequate 
force, and was told that he must raise it himself. With the meagre nucleus 
of an army he advanced to Louisburg, about fifty miles south of Cheat 
Mountain Gap, and from this point moved in a northwesterly direction down 
the Kanawha Valley, his force gradually increasing, until, by the accession of 
Colonel Tompkins’s detachment, already in the valley, it numbered full 4000 
men, with a considerable cavalry force, and three or four battalions of artil¬ 
lery; but he was poorly supplied with ammunition, his recruits were undis¬ 
ciplined, and he was by a long distance removed from his base of supplies, 
which, besides that it might easily be cut off by the enemy, could only be 
reached through a portion of the state which was bitterly hostile to seces¬ 
sion. Plainly, therefore, he must fall back to Charleston. Every conceiv¬ 
able advantage was in favor of the Union arms; every conceivable disad¬ 
vantage frowned upon the confederates. The movements of the federal army 
were controlled by a single mind; its appointments were complete: the con¬ 
federates had two armies, distinct in their organization and operations, and, 
if the most elaborate arrangements had been made to secure the possibility 
of their being conquered in detail, these two armies could not possibly have 
been more conveniently posted for that purpose than they were. The fed¬ 
eral army had at its disposal every desirable means of communication both 
by land and water; the confederates had to communicate across the mount¬ 
ains. It is true that nowhere on the continent could be found positions of 
greater natural strength than those in which Garnett and Wise might forti¬ 
fy themselves at their leisure; but it is also true that, with equal leisure, 
M'Clellan could cut them off, and compel engagement or flight. This was 
pointedly illustrated in the battle at Rich Mountain, the news of which, com¬ 
ing like a thunderbolt upon Wise, precipitated his retreat, which stopped not 
short of Gauley Bridge, and in the course of which a great number of troops 
deserted him. 

Thus ended the month of July, which in the eastern portion of the state 
had proved so disastrous to our arms. It was at this point that M'Clellan as¬ 
sumed command of the army of the Potomac, leaving Rosecrans to take his 
place in Western Virginia. Wise had handed in his resignation to the au¬ 
thorities at Richmond. General Floyd was ordered to re-enforce him, which 





BATTLE OF BICH MOUNTAIN. Jdlt 13, 1861. 


JCLT, 1861-3 


EASTERN VIRGINIA, MISSOURI, AND WESTERN VIRGINIA 


143 







































144 


he did at his own convenience; and after the two generals had come togeth¬ 
er in Greenbrier County, there was a continual hostility between them, aris¬ 
ing, no doubt, from the supercilious airs which Floyd indulged in toward 
Wise; to say the least, we may be sure that no love was lost between them. 
Floyd hesitated to support Wise; and Wise, though more honest in the dis¬ 
charge of his duty, could not help laughing at the blunders of Floyd. The 
latter started from Whiteville with over 3000 men, which force, before it was 
joined to Wise’s legion, dwindled down to less than half that number. 
Floyd appointed as chief of his staff the editor of the Lynchburg Republican , 
for his first aid-de-camp a sub-editor—intending, probably, to have his con¬ 
quests duly set forth in print—and for the leader of his cavalry a farmer, 
whom he seriously promised that horses and men should come out of the 
campaign as safe and sound as they went in; and this gentle general brag¬ 
ged that he would in a single fortnight drive Rosecrans across the Ohio. 
While he planned these large results, he forgot all about his transportation, 
and his baggage trains passed out from Whiteville no less than three times 
before they were fairly on the way for White Sulphur Springs, the place of 
junction. 

From this position, which was more secure than any other, being near to 
the great central route to the eastward, the confederate army, largely re-en¬ 
forced, and having the means at its disposal for carrying on the campaign 
considerably increased, ventured to advance to Sewell Mountain, a short dis¬ 
tance to the west, and thence to Dogwood Gap, where the road from Sum- 
mersville strikes the main turnpike from Louisburg to Charleston. Thus 
far there had been no important engagement in the valley of the Kanawha; 
but on the 10th of September a battle wits fought at Carnifex Ferry. 

General Rosecrans, on the last day of August, had proceeded to gather up 
his scattered army for a brisk autumn campaign against Floyd. Leaving 
Reynolds to keep General Lee in check at Cheat Mountain, he had advanced 
southward over Kreita and Powell Mountains to Summcrsville, driven back 
the enemy’s advanced posts, and pushed on by a forced march of seventeen 
miles and a half toward the Gauley River. It was not until he had nearly 
come up with the enemy that he learned the exact position of the latter, 
which was on the heights overlooking Carnifex Ferry. 

Here Floyd had posted himself, having left Wise at a point farther south¬ 
ward to guard against a rear attack from the federal force at Hawk’s Nest. 
He had expected to find a detachment of General Cox’s division here, but 
the latter had retreated, and, unfortunately for Floyd, had sunk the ferry¬ 
boats. Floyd pushed his men across, and then, for the first time, discovered 
his ludicrously awkward position, with his infantry on one side of the river 
and his artillery on the other; so he posted off on horseback to General 
Henningscn for an engineer to build boats. While he was in this position, 
Colonel Tyler, with a small Union force, attacked him, but was repulsed. 
No sooner had Floyd extricated himself from his difficulty, than Rosecrans 
suddenly came upon him from Summersville. Floyd’s position was natu¬ 
rally one of great strength, protected in the rear both by the river and the 
mountain ridge, and having but one avenue of approach, which was com¬ 
manded by two powerful batteries. Rosecrans’s troops were exhausted by 
a long and weary march ; it was nearly night, too, and nothing could be ac¬ 
complished but a reconnoissance, yet this came as near as possible to being 
a battle. An attempt was made to outflank the enemy on the left, where he 
was driven from his breastworks to the centre, but it was too late to bring 
up a supporting force; and, at the same time, two unsuccessful attempts were 
made in front to take the enemy’s batteries by assault, in which Colonel 
Lytle was wounded and Colonel Lowe killed. Thus the day closed, and in 
the morning it was discovered that the enemy had retreated, and by the de¬ 
struction of the bridge over the Gauley had cut off all pursuit The retreat 
was continued to Meadow Bridge, whither General Wise was invited to fol¬ 
low; but the latter, having secured himself in a strong position in Fayette 
County, declined to fall back. 

General Lee, who had assumed the command of Garnett’s scattered forces 
in the northwest, and who had a considerable force at his disposal, proceed¬ 
ed to take up a position between the two principal positions of Reynolds— 
at Elkwater and at Cheat Mountain summit—and to carry them by a sim¬ 
ultaneous attack, advancing against Elkwater himself, and giving to General 
Jackson the other column. Meeting with a repulse, however, he joined 
Floyd at Meadow Bridge, and after having personally examined Wise’s po¬ 
sition at Camp Defiance, brought to that point the entire confederate force 
(which amounted to about 30,000 men), with the exception of General Jack- 
son, who remained in the vicinity of Cheat Mountain. Here, at Sewell’s 
Mountain, the two main armies confronted one another; but no sooner was 
this the case, than Rosecrans, by a sudden movement, advanced against Jack- 
son, surprising and totally routing his forces, and then returned back as far 
as to Gauley River. 

At this crisis, Lee, Henningsen, and Wise were ordered to report at Rich¬ 
mond, and Floyd, who was left in the chief command, went into winter quar¬ 
ters at Cotton Hill, opposite the mouth of the Gauley, where the latter emp¬ 
ties into the Kanawha. From this position, about the middle of November, 
being attacked suddenly and unexpectedly by a division of Rosecrans’s 
forces under General Benham, he was driven in great confusion to Raleigh, 
through Fayetteville, a distance of thirty miles. Benham’s men were worn 
out by the long march through mud and rain, and were obliged to rest for 
the night. The next morning, when about to continue the pursuit with al¬ 
most a certainty of capturing Raleigh, and with it the entire train, if not the 
whole force of the enemy, he was recalled by an order from General Schenck, 
and Floyd continued his flight without farther molestation. 

A writer in the Lynchburg Virginian gives a full account of the flight of 
Floyd, which ha pronounce* to be “another dark shadow in the campaign 


[November, 1861. 

of Western Virginia.” He says, “ On the evening of November 11 the en¬ 
emy made strong demonstrations, near Cotton Hill, of an attack on the next 
day, and General Floyd ordered tb* army to fall back three miles. Next 
morning it was reported that the enemy were advancing to Faj'etteville, to 
cut off our retreat and surround our brigade. This news caused General 
Floyd to order a retreat, which took place about eight o’clock at night, 
when the brigade retreated back to Fayetteville, two and a half miles, and 
halted to guard the road which the enemy were expected to come in to at¬ 
tempt to cut off our retreat. Here the brigade remained until just daylight, 
without shelter, victuals, or repose, when they were ordered to continue 
their retreat. The brigade continued its retreat ten miles on the 13th, and 
halted for the night. During the whole of the retreat thus far there was a 
great deal of excitement, fear, and especially loss of baggage, property, and 
provisions; and on the night of the 11th they burned about three hundred 
tents, several bales of new blankets and overcoats, and a number of mesa 
chests, camp equipages of all kinds; find flour barrels were burst, contents 
scattered on the ground, and all kinds of provisions wasted and scattered, 
all to prevent the enemy from getting them. Wagoners were compelled to 
take the horses from the wagons, mount them, and fly for safety, leaving 
about fifteen wagons in the hands of the enemy. On the morning of the 
14th the brigade took up their march, and had gone but two miles, when 
it was reported that the enemy were near and rushing on the brigade. At 
this the cavalry, under command of Colonel Croghan, were ordered back to 
scout the country and ascertain the enemy’s distance. When they had gone 
back two miles they met the enemy’s pickets advaneing, when Colonel 
Croghan ordered his men all to dismount, though he did not, when the 
pickets of the enemy fired on him, and he fell mortally wounded. His men 
took him up and carried him some two hundred yards to a house, when 
they discovered that the enemy were closing in, and the colonel told them 
to fly and save themselves, for he was dying. At the moment those who 
were with the colonel discovered that their horses had been taken by the 
Yankee pickets, who had rushed upon them, they turned and fled, and the 
whole cavalry came within five minutes of being all cut off and captured. 
The cavalry then all swept on in abreast until they came up with the rear 
of our infantry, and proclaimed that the enemy were pursuing in double- 
quick time. Then appeared a scene in our army indescribable, and of ter¬ 
rific confusion. At the word 1 the enemy are pursuing,’ all broke off in a 
wild run, some so frightened that they threw away their knapsacks and all 
they had, but gun and knife to defend themselves with. It required great 
effort upon the part of the officers, who were somewhat cool, to prevent a 
perfect rout. After this day the brigade continued its retreat, but with a 
great deal of toil and difficulty, and finally encamped here on the 24th of 
November. This encampment is near Peterstown, in the south edge of 
Monroe County, and it is expected that the brigade will winter near here.” 

Colonel Croghan fell into our hands mortally wounded, and died in a few 
hours. His body was sent by General Benham to the confederate com¬ 
mander, with a note hoping that he would appreciate the desire thus ex¬ 
pressed of mitigating the horrors of war. He was a Kentuckian, the son 
of that George Croghan who, in 1813, with only 160 men, defended Fort 
Stephenson in Ohio against 1000 British regulars and Indians, and who, a 
quarter of a century later, received the thanks of Congress and a medal for 
his gallantry on that occasion, and died as inspector general of the United 
States army. 

This pursuit of Floyd brought to an end the campaign in Western Vir¬ 
ginia. After this there was no engagement—nothing but an unimportant 
though severe skirmish between a confederate force at Camp Alleghany, 
about twenty-five miles from Cheat Mountain summit, and a portion of Rey¬ 
nolds’s division. Floyd was ordered with his brigade to Tennessee, and 
Wise’s legion went to Richmond, from which place it was sent to Roanoke 
Island, where at the proper moment we shall find it, under the general’s son, 
doing battle against the federal troops under General Burnside. 

On the 19th of July M'Clellan had issued an address to his soldiers sum¬ 
ming up the results of his campaign. He said: “You have annihilated 
two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in 
mountain fastnesses, and fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, 
twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, includ¬ 
ing more than forty officers. One of the second commanders of the rebels 
is a prisoner; the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have killed 
more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage 
and camp equipage. All this has been accomplished with the loss of twen¬ 
ty brave men killed and sixty wounded on your part. You have proved 
that Union men, fighting for the preservation of our government, are more 
than a match for our misguided and erring brothers. You have made long 
and arduous marches, with insufficient food, frequently exposed to the in¬ 
clemency of the weather. I have not hesitated to demand this of you, feel¬ 
ing that I could rely upon your endurance, patriotism, and courage. In the 
future I may have still greater demands to make upon you, still greater sac¬ 
rifices for you to offer. I have confidence in you. and I trust you have 
learned to confide in me. Remember that discipline and subordination are 
qualities of equal value with courage.” 

This address of M'Clcllan seems almost prophetic. Two days before it 
was issued our army of the Potomac came in sight of the enemy before Ma¬ 
nassas; two days after it was issued we met with the disaster of Bull Run. 
The greater demands of which M‘Clellan spoke were to be made, the great¬ 
er sacrifices offered; and we had to learn by bitter experience that “disci¬ 
pline and subordination are qualities of equal value with courage.” 

From our triumph in Western Virginia w.e now turn to our great defeat 
at Bull Run. 






June, 1861.] 


THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 


145 



BULL BUN, NEAR UNION MILLS, CROSSED BY TUB OBANGE AND ALEXANDRIA RAILROAD. 


CHAPTER III. 

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 

The Proclamation and VolnLteers.—The opposing Armies.—Popular Impatience.—Forward to 
Richmond.—Determination to Advance.—McDowell’s Appointment.—Forces at his Command. 
—Beauregard and Johnston.—The Situation at Manassas.—Beauregard’s Proclamation.—To¬ 
pography of the Region.—Movements of the Confederates.—The Ambush at Vienna.—John¬ 
ston and Patterson.—Treachery in the Departments.—Patterson out-generaled.—Johnston 
sets out to join Beauregard.—McDowell’s Advance.—The Halt at Fairfax.—Outrages by the 
Soldiers.—McDowell’s Order.—The March to Centreville.—Skirmish at Blackburn’s Ford.— 
McDowell’s First Plan of Operations.—Why abandoned.—His Second Plan.—Johnston and 
Beauregard at Manassas.—Their Plan of Attack.—War and Chess.—Strength of the two Ar¬ 
mies.—The Advance upon Bull Run.—Time lost.—Tyler in Position.—Topography of the 
Battle-field.—General Position of the Confederates.—The Battle of the Morning.—The Con¬ 
federates repulsed.—They fall back to the Plateau.—Jackson’s Stand.—Johnston and Beaure¬ 
gard on the Field.—Reorganization of the Confederates.—Estimate of Forces.—The Battle of 
the Afrernoon.—The Confederate Position.—Rout of the New York Zouaves.—The Zouaves 
and the Black Horse Cavalry.—Keyes’s Movement.—The Fight on the Hill.—The Federal Bat¬ 
teries disabled.—The Fight on the Ridge.—Federal Anticipations of Victory.—Confederate 
Re-enforcements.—The Rout.—Arrival of Jefferson Davis.—Stand of Sykes with the Regu-. 
lars.—The Flight of the Fedcrals.—The Pursuit by the Confederates.'—Civilians on the Field. 
—At Cub Run Bridge.—Miles’s Divison.—Miles and Richardson.—The Halt at Cenireville. 
—The Flight to Washington.—Reports of the Battle.—General Resume.—Object and Means 
of the Expedition.—Causes of its Failure.—Burnside and Schenck.—General Note.—Authori¬ 
ties for the History.—Name of the Battle.—Patterson’s Explanation.—List of Regiments.—The 
New York Zouaves.—Losses on both Sides. 

r I ''HE President’s proclamation of April 15, calling for 75,000 militia for 
A three months, also summoned Congress to meet in extra session on the 
4th of July. Notwithstanding the contemptuous refusal of the governors of 
six states, whose quotas amounted to 12,000 men, more than 80,000 prompt¬ 
ly responded to the call. They saved the national capital from seizure; but 
it soon became evident that this force was wholly inadequate to the task of 
“suppressing the combinations and causing the laws to be duly executed.” 
On the 3d of May another proclamation was put forth by the President call¬ 
ing for 42,000 volunteers for three years, and ordering an increase of 23,000 
men to the regular army, and 18,000 to the navy. The nation uprose to 
the greatness of the occasion rather than to the smallness of the demand. 
In a month five men volunteered for one who had been asked. When Con¬ 
gress met, just two months from the date of the call, it was formally an¬ 
nounced by the Secretary of War that there were in active service 260,000 
men, of whom 153 regiments, with 165,000 men, were volunteers for three 
years, 25,000 regulars, and 80,000 volunteers for three months; besides 
these, fifty-five regiments, 50,000 strong, had been accepted, and would be in 
the field in twenty day*; so that after the three months’ men had withdrawn 
there would remain an army 230,000 strong. Government seemed to doubt 
whether this was a sufficient force. The Secretary of War said, “ It will re¬ 
main for Congress to determine whether the army shall at this time be in¬ 


creased by the addition of a still larger volunteer force.” The President, 
with a deeper but yet inadequate insight into the magnitude of the rebel¬ 
lion, asked that Congress, “in order to make the contest a short and decisive 
one, should place at the control of the government for this work at least 
400,000 men.” 

While the administration was thus in doubt as to the adequacy of the 
force at its disposal for the work to be done, there was now no doubt on the 
part of the people. When men saw regiment after regiment hurrying to 
camp or parading the streets, when they heard of them pouring forward in 
a continuous stream which seemed to block up every approach to the capi¬ 
tal, they were confident that the Confederacy had no power to withstand 
the forces arraying themselves on its borders. Great as were these forces, 
they were exaggerated in popular estimation. A regiment proposed to be 
raised was set down as accepted; one accepted was considered to be in the 
field; one in the field to be ready for immediate service. The people did 
not know, and the government dared not tell them, that there was a fearful 
lack of arms, munitions, and equipments—of every thing necessary to trans¬ 
form a crowd of men into an army. Through the villainy of Floyd, the 
complicity of Toucey, and the imbecility of Buchanan, the loyal states had 
been stripped of arms. Of the three great armories, two had fallen without 
opposition into the hands of the Confederates. Norfolk, with its accumula¬ 
tion of 2000 great guns, was theirs. Harper’s Ferry, with its machinery al¬ 
most uninjured, was theirs, needing only to be transported to a safe place. 
The Union had merely the armory at Springfield, which was then capable 
of turning out only 25,000 muskets a year. The private armories then in 
existence could furnish only a few thousand more. As far as men were con¬ 
cerned, government could create an army by a word; to supply the arms, 
without which in modern warfare there can be no army, was a work of time. 
A few could be furnished by importation from abroad; for the rest, not only 
the arms themselves, but the means of creating them, must be created. The 
enemy was for the time abundantly supplied. The sudden seizure of the 
forts and arsenals from the Chesapeake to the Bio Grande, from Virginia to 
Alabama, had put into his hands more weapons than he could use. Men 
were not wanting on either side; but while the Federal regiments stood idle 
in camp for want of arms, the Confederates had weapons ready for every 
company that could be raised. The Confederates availed themselves of this 
initial advantage. The ink with which the Virginia Ordinance of Secession 
was written was hardly dry before Richmond was chosen as the capital, 
where their Congress was to meet on the 20th of July, and troops from the 
farthest South were pushed to the northern frontiers of the Confederacy, 
within sight of the dome of the Federal Capitol. 

The people of the North could see no sign of a corresponding activity. 
Their forces never moved southward far enough to lose sight of the Poto- 






















































146 


[July, 1861 . 


mac. Day by day they grew more impatient of this delay, for which they 
could see no good reason. Buchanan’s administration had been feeble and 
treacherous; was not that of Lincoln treacherous and feeble ? Twenty thou¬ 
sand men had twelve years before marched from Vera Cruz to Mexico; why 
could not ten times as many, under the same commander, march from Wash¬ 
ington to Richmond or Montgomery? That commander, it was hinted rath¬ 
er than said, was a Southerner by birth. It was acknowledged that for more 
than half a century he had been true and loyal, but were not Davis and Ste¬ 
phens loyal, Twiggs, Lee, and Johnston faithful, and even Floyd, Cobb, and 
Thompson honest, until the time came when they must choose between their 
country and their section? Had the old treason gone out when the new ad¬ 
ministration came in ? 

Such were the questions which all men were asking themselves during the 
months of May and June, and it needed but a word, fitly or unfitly spoken, 
to rouse a storm of indignation against the government. That word was 
supplied by the New York Tribune, a newspaper which, from various causes, 
was at the moment the exponent of popular feeling. For a score of years it 
had, through evil report and through good report, maintained the principles 
of the Republican party, always earnestly, if not always wisely. That party 
had now, after a long and weary contest, triumphed in every free state but 
one. The circulation of the paper was large. It reached every hamlet in 
the North and West; it passed from house to house, from hand to hand, and 
had every week a million of readers, by a large portion of whom it was 
accepted as authority. At length, on the 26th of June, it contained an arti¬ 
cle headed “the Nation’s War-cry,” which in just thirty words gave expres¬ 
sion to the common feeling, and form to the general demand. “Forward to 
Richmond!” it said. “The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet 
there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the na¬ 
tional army.” Day after day these thirty electric words were repeated with¬ 
out change, like the Roman senator’s “Carthage must be destroyed.” Day 
after day this brief text was followed up by an elaborate discourse. Govern¬ 
ment was charged with indifference, if not treachery. The rebels were ready 
to fly at our approach. If the right men were in the right places, the war 
could be virtually ended in three months. If this was not done, it would be 
the fault of incompetent or treacherous leaders; politicians in or out of uni¬ 
form, who did not wish the rebels routed, and in whose official statements 
no reliance was to be placed. If the rebellion was not thoroughly put down 
by spring, it would be because the nation had been betrayed by the govern¬ 
ment; it must acknowledge itself beaten, and recognize the independence 
of the Confederacy. And so on through every form of direct or insinuated 
accusation. 1 

The force of these appeals lay in that they were echoes of the popular 
feeling to which they gave form and expression. It pressed upon govern¬ 
ment with a force which could not be withstood. Members of Congress 
crowded upon the President and General Scott complaining of the inactivity 
of the army, and urging them to heed the cry, “Forward to Richmond!” 
The administration was in a sore strait. If the movement was attempted, 
there was a more than equal chance of its failure; if it was not attempted, 
government would lose the confidence of the country. A lost battle might 
be retrieved; public confidence lost could never be regained. The Presi¬ 
dent, looking mainly at the political aspect of the case, was in favor of the 
movement. The commanding general, looking mainly at the military as¬ 
pect, was opposed to it; but at last, against his judgment, gave a reluctant 
consent. 

The movement having been determined upon, it only remained to make 
the best preparations possible. General Scott could not take the command 
in person. Age and infirmity had come upon him. For three years he had 
been unable to mount a horse; it was with difficulty that he could walk 
a few steps; he was tormented with dropsy and harassed by vertigo. Four 
months later he was compelled to ask to be suffered to Tetire from active 
service. The request was granted, and, full of age and honors, he was re¬ 
leased from the command which he had so long and honorably held. Mean¬ 
while the actual conduct of the enterprise must be intrusted to other hands. 
The choice fell upon General Irvin McDowell. He was in the prime of 
manhood; had graduated twenty-seven years before at the Military Acade¬ 
my with high honor; had served through the Mexican war, and was brevet¬ 
ed as captain for gallant and meritorious conduct in the hard-fought battle 
of Buena Vista. When peace came he relinquished his rank in the line, 
and entered the adjutant general’s department. At the outbreak of the re¬ 
bellion he returned to duty in the field, and was appointed brigadier general 
in the regular army, his commission dating from May 14,1861. To consid- 


1 “THE NATION’S WAR-CRY. — Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The 
Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20 th of July! By that date the place 
must be held by the national army !"— Tribune , June 2G to July 3. 

“ If the rebels arc not virtually whipped when the next spring opens, and if they shall 

meanwhile have steadily confronted our troops without losing ground, we may consider that the 
republic has been betrayed by the folly or incompetence of its trusted leaders, and that disunion 
is a fixed fact.”— The. Same, June 27. 

“ . . . . The war can not much longer be conducted and held in cheek by politicians, whether 

in uniform or out.If the men in Washington wish to convince the public that they have 

really repented, and arc ready to do their duty, let them see to it that the national flag floats over 
Richmond before the 20th of July .”—The Same, June 27. 

“The real question is this: Does General Scott (or whoever it may be) contemjdate the same 
end , and is he animated by tike impulses with the yreat body of the loyal , liberty-loriny people of' the 
country? . . . . Does he want the rebels routed, or would he have them conciliated ? If the nation¬ 
al forces shall be beaten in a fair stand-up fight — which we do not believe possible — the patriot 
millions will acknowledge the corn and the independence of Sece>sia. If our side beats, the rebel 
leaders must abscond .... and we inav just as well determine who is who in three months as 
in thirty .”—The Same, July 1. 

“ . . . . Forward, then, and anticipate the rebel force, which only awaits our approach to flee. 
Forward to Richmond, and place the national foot on the neck of the traitor who already sues 
for peace .”—The Same, July 1. 

. . . Unfortunately, the credit to be given to declarations from the State Department is much 
impaired .”—The Same, july 2. 



IRVIN McDOWKLL. 


erable military experience he joined a personal character beyond reproach, 
and loyalty above suspicion. In selecting bim for the command, govern¬ 
ment made the wisest choice then possible. It had yet to learn who were 
the generals endowed with great military genius. On the 27th of May 
McDowell was appointed to the command of a new military department, 
comprising all Virginia east of the Alleghany Mountains and west of the 
James River, with the exception of Fortress Monroe and its immediate vi¬ 
cinity. He set himself at once to the task of organizing into an army the 
regiments placed under his command. He took up his head-quarters at Ar¬ 
lington House, once the residence of the adopted son of the Father of our 
Country, from whom it had passed by marriage into the hands of General 
Lee, who had forsworn his military oath, thrown up his commission in the 
national army to head the insurgent forces in Virginia, and was soon to be 
appointed to the chief command of the entire Confederate army. 

The force at the disposal of government for the execution of this enter¬ 
prise was far less than was supposed. On the morning of the 27th of June, 
when the nation’s war cry—“ Forward to Richmond”—reached Washington, 
there were in and around Washington 38,600 Federal troops. Of these, 
15,700 were across the Potomac in Virginia, the remainder being in the Dis¬ 
trict. Patterson, with about 18,000 men, was fifty miles away, near Harper’s 
Ferry, watching an equal Confederate force in the Valley of the Shenandoah. 
All that was expected of him was to prevent that army from interfering with 
the march into Virginia. Butler at Fortress Monroe, Banks in Maryland, 
and McClellan in West Virginia, with some 40,000 men in all, could not di¬ 
rectly co-operate. Of the 810,000 men whom the Secretary of War a week 
after announced to be at the disposal of the government, about 100,000 were 
in actual service. Of these, something more than 50,000 could be concen¬ 
trated near the capital, from which, after leaving behind a force to garrison 
Washington and its defenses, McDowell must draw the army which was to 
advance. The 8th of July was fixed upon as the day for the commence¬ 
ment of the movement. But the regiments came up slowly, many of them 
eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and were sent forward without 
ever having been formed into brigades or having been seen by their com¬ 
manders. Time passed on until the 15th, and yet the arrangements were 
far from complete; but the pressure from without was so strong, that orders 
were given for the advance on the following day. The force had been or¬ 
ganized into five divisions. The First Division, under Tyler, consisted of 
eleven volunteer regiments, and three companies of cavalry and artillery. 
The Second Division, under Hunter, seven volunteer regiments, a battalion 
of regulars, a corps of marines, and six companies of cavalry and artillery. 
The Third Division, under Hointzolman, had ten volunteer regiments, and 
three companies of cavalry and artillery. The Fourth Division, under Run¬ 
yon, had seven regiments of New Jersey volunteers. The Fifth Division, 
under Miles, had nine volunteer regiments, with two companies of artillery. 
The entire army numbered 35,000, of whom about 83,000 were volunteers. 
Of these one third were for three months, whose term of service was about 
to expire. About 1000 were regulars from a number of regiments, 500 were 
marines, and the remainder were cavalry and artillery. Of cavalry there 
were but four companies. Though falling fully 20,000 short of the number 
generally attributed to it, this was the largest army ever brought together 
under one command on this continent. 

The Confederates, meanwhile, having resolved to make Virginia the seat 
of war, and having transferred their seat of government from Montgomery 
to Richmond, had pushed forward two considerable armies toward the Po¬ 
tomac. Beauregard’s bloodless capture of Fort Sumter had made him the 
hero of the South, and to him was intrusted the command of the most im¬ 
portant of these armies, that of the Potomac; while to Johnston, his superior 
in rank, was confided the command of the Army of the Shenandoah. The 

















July, 1861.] 


THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 


Army of the Potomac took up a position judiciously chosen, either to threat¬ 
en Washington or to defend Richmond. From Alexandria on the Potomac, 
just below Washington, starts the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, running 
southvvestwardly, and forming the northern link in the great southern chain 
of railways. After traversing the flat Potomac region, it begins to climb 
the. gradual slope of the outlying ranges of the great Alleghany chain. 
Twenty-seven miles from Alexandria it meets the Manassas Gap Railway, 
which, running almost due west for fifty miles, pierces the valley of the 
Shenandoah at Strasburg, thence turning south for a score of miles down 
the valley. These two roads meet on an elevated plateau. The point of 
union is known as Manassas Junction. From this point the railway runs 
southwardly, past Warrenton and Culpepper, fifty miles, to Gordonsville, 
where it connects with the great network of railway which, reaching every 
point in the South, has its focus at Richmond. From Manassas to Washing¬ 
ton is about thirty miles; to Richmond about eighty in a direct line, but 
almost twice as far by the circuitous railway routes. Practically, however, 
it is nearer to Richmond for defensive purposes than to Washington for of¬ 
fensive. Before its military occupation the Junction was an insignificant 
place. It consisted of a low wooden depot, a dingy house for refreshments, 
and half a dozen small cottages scattered about over the bleak plain. 

Beauregard, who had been ordered to the Mississippi, and was actually on 
his way thither when he was recalled, and ordered to take the command of 
the Army of the Potomac, reached Manassas early in June, and on the 5th 
issued a violent and mendacious proclamation addressed to the people of 
the region. “A reckless and unprincipled tyrant,” he said, “has invaded 
your soil. Abraham Lincoln, regardless of all moral, legal, and constitutional 
restraints, has thrown his abolition hosts among you, who are murdering 
and imprisoning your citizens, confiscating and destroying your property, 
and committing other acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolt¬ 
ing to be enumerated. All rules of civilized warfare are abandoned, and 
they proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is 
‘ Beauty and Booty.’ All that is dear to man—your honor and that of your 
wives and daughters—your fortunes and your lives, are involved in this 
momentous contest.” The people were summoned to rally to his camp. 
The neighboring planters responded to his call, partly in person, and more 
freely by sending their slaves, by whom, in a short time, a strong earthwork 
was thrown up, which was named Camp Pickens, in honor of the governor 
of South Carolina. The troops, thus freed from all other labor, could devote 
their time to military drill, and were soon brought into a state of tolerable 
efficiency. 

The position, apart from its fortifications, was by nature a strong one. 
From the foot of the Blue Ridge a plain of about twenty miles in width 
slopes eastward down to the lowland region of the Potomac. This whole 
plain is broken and intricate, sparsely dotted with hamlets, plantations, and 
solitary houses, with patches of woodland, partly forests of considerable size, 
and partly of the scrubby growth of pine and oak which springs up spon¬ 
taneously in the exhausted and abandoned fields of Virginia. It is inter¬ 
sected in every direction by streams, elsewhere denominated creeks, but in 
the local dialect known by the more picturesque name of “runs.” Roads, 
which are hardly more than by-paths, traverse the plain in every direction, 
leading through the fields and woods to the solitary dwellings. The prill-' 
cipal of these streams, which almost claims the rank of a river, is Bull Run. [ 
Pursuing a winding course, with a general direction from northwest to south¬ 
east, it drains a considerable tract of country, and falls into the Occoquan 
about twelve miles from its junction with the Potomac. It has worn a deep 
channel through the limestone strata, and the banks are generally steep and j 
rocky. At intervals of a mile or two these banks are broken down so as to j 
form fords, which are the only places where the stream can be crossed, with 
the exception of two bridges—one a substantial stone structure over which 
passes the Warrenton turnpike, the other a mere wooden bridge at Black¬ 
burn’s Ford, seven miles below, on the direct road from Centreville to Ma¬ 
nassas. A mile or so below this is the bridge by which the Orange and 
Alexandria Railway is carried over the Run. Three miles beyond the Run 
is Manassas Junction, where the Arm)' of the Potomac had intrenched itself. 
The Run itself formed an admirable defensive line, eight miles long, from 
the Stone Bridge to the railroad. It could only be crossed by an army at 
the fords, and such was the nature of the approaches to these that they could 
be maintained against a greatly superior force. There was no necessity for 
fortifications, and with the exception of a strong abattis across the road at 
the Stone Bridge, there were no artificial defenses on the whole line. The 
wooded slopes of the hills furnished masks for batteries better than could 
be provided by art. 

Beauregard, having securely intrenched himself at Manassas, pushed for¬ 
ward detachments toward Washington. An outpost was established at 
Fairfax Court House, ten miles ou the road to Washington, where intrench- 
ments were thrown up. The cavalry and light artillery made dashes to 
within sight of the Federal works at Arlington Heights, and could catch 
glimpses of the dome of the national Capitol, of which they hoped soon to 
have possession. One of the boldest of these dashes was made by Colonel 
Gregg to the north of Washington. He penetrated forty-five miles to the 
Potomac, and returning, on the 17th of June, when at Vienna, on the Lou¬ 
don railway, he ltarned that a train of cars loaded with Federal soldiers was 
at hand. Placing two guns in ambush at a curve of the road, he awaited 
their approach, and as they rounded the curve poured in a well-aimed fire, 
which raked the cars from front to rear, killing a number of the soldiers, 
and scattering the rest. They then hastily pushed back without suffering 
any loss. With this exception, and a few unimportant rencounters between 
small squads of scouts, there had been no active hostilities between the two 













































148 


[July, 1861 


armies of the Potomac. Nor had there been any serious encounters between 
the forces to the north of Washington. 



JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON 


General Joseph E.. Johnston, who had been assigned to the Army of the 
Shenandoah, arrived at Harper’s Ferry on the 23d of May, and assumed the 
command. He found there nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, 
four companies of artillery, with sixteen guns, and about three hundred cav¬ 
alry. He saw at once that the place was untenable against even an equal 
force. It was so completely overlooked that it was more favorable to an at¬ 
tacking than a defending force. Patterson, across the Potomac, was watch¬ 
ing him, ready to cross and advance up the valley from the east, while 
McClellan, after his successes in West Virginia, was expected to come into 
the valley from the west; with these forces in his rear, he would-be cut off 
from giving any aid in case of need to the Army of the Potomac. He there¬ 
fore wished to abandon Harper’s Ferry, and fall back twenty-five miles to 
Winchester, where all the practicable roads from the west and northwest, as 
well as from Manassas, meet the main route from Pennsylvania and Mary¬ 
land. But the military authorities at Richmond overruled him, and directed 
him still to occupy Harper’s Ferry. On the 13th information came that 
Romney, fifty miles to the northwest, had been seized by a strong body of 
Federal troops, who were supposed to be the vanguard of McClellan’s army 
coming down to form a junction with Patterson, and three days later infor¬ 
mation came that Patterson had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and 
was apparently advancing up the valley upon Winchester. Johnston then 
took the responsibility of abandoning Harper’s Ferry, and threw his army 
by a flank movement across Patterson’s presumed line of march. Patterson 
at once recrossed the Potomac, and Johnstou, having received a dispatch 
from Richmond sanctioning the movement which he had already made on 
his own responsibility', resumed his original plan, and fell back to Winches¬ 
ter, where he intrenched himself strongly. Here he could oppose McClel¬ 
lan from the west, Patterson from the northeast, or form a junction with 
Beauregard at Manassas if necessary. On the 23d of June Patterson again 
crossed the Potomac and marched toward Winchester. Johnston slowly' re¬ 
tired, and some skirmishing took place, with no decisive results. 

McDowell’s advance had now been determined upon. In making his es¬ 
timates of the force necessary to accomplish the work before him, he had 
stipulated that Johnston should be so “taken care of” as not to be able to 
come to the assistance of Beauregard. This work was intrusted to General 
Patterson. Johnston’s army had been increased by eight regiments from 
the far South, and about 2500 militia called out from the neighboring coun¬ 
ties in Virginia. As it lav strongly intrenched at Winchester at the middle 
of July, it numbered about 18,000 of all arms. Patterson’s army was of 
about the same strength. They were almost all volunteer regiments whose 
term of service was about to expire; they were dissatisfied with the treat¬ 
ment they had received, and would not stay one hour beyond their time. 
Patterson vastly overrated the strength of the enemy, and dared not attack 
them; he would rather lose the chance of accomplishing something brilliant, 
than, by hazarding his column, endanger the success of the campaign by de¬ 
feat. So he was satisfied with merely watching Johnston, and endeavoring 
to hold him at Winchester. On the 17th of July he received a telegram 
from Washington that McDowell had advanced, and that on the next day 
Manassas Junction would probably be carried. lie believed that Johnston’s 
forces were still before him, and that he had detained them until it was too 
late for them to assist Beauregard. He lay all the 18th awaiting an attack, 
not dreaming that his skillful opponent was then, with all his available force, 
on the way to join the Army of the Potomac; and it was only' on the 20th, 
at the very hour when Johnston was joining Beauregard, that Patterson 
learned that he had been thoroughly out-gcneraled. It was too late to re¬ 
trieve the error, even had he been capable of making a bold movement; and 
so, on the 21st, while the fight at Bull Run was going on, Patterson fell 


quietly back to Harper’s Ferry. While the smart of the great defeat at 
Bull Run was yet fresh, Patterson was charged with gross negligence, if not 
with absolute treachery. A calmer view showed nothing to sustain these 
charges. A task had been imposed upon him beyond his powers, and he 
failed in accomplishing it. He was simply incompetent, not wantonly neg¬ 
ligent, still less treacherous. The decision of the government, by which he 
was honorably discharged from service, was just and proper. 

Treason, however, was rife in every department of the government at 
Washington. For years a system had been growing up under which the 
clerkships in the various departments had been mainly bestowed upon South¬ 
erners. When cabinet ministers and naval and military officers were false, 
it could hardly be expected that civil clerks should be true. By their means 
the Confederate government was fully informed of every’ movement made 
or contemplated at Washington. The most secret dispatches, and the most 
private documents of the government at Washington, were copied and sent 
to the authorities at Richmond. A military map of Eastern Virginia had 
been prepared by government officials. It was thought to be of such im¬ 
portance that it was furnished only to Federal officers of the highest rank; 
yet a copy of it was found on the table of a Confederate captain at Fairfax. 

McDowell's advance was commenced on the morning of the 17th of July. 
Beauregard was notified pf it from “a trusty source” in time to give orders 
in the evening of that day that his advanced brigades should fall back from 
Fairfax. He also sent an aid-de-camp to Johnston at Winchester, calling 
for assistance, and indicating the point to which his march should be direct¬ 
ed. By the time that this message reached Johnston, he had received direct 
communications from Richmond ordering him to go to the support of Beau¬ 
regard. This order was received by Johnston at Winchester at one o’clock 
! on the morning of the 18th. To comply' with this order, Johnston must 
] cither defeat or elude Patterson. He chose the latter course. Leaving his 
i sick, nearly 1700 in number, at Winchester, with the Virginia militia, and 
posting a strong rear-guard to induce Patterson to believe that his whole 
army was still in front, he pushed his whole available force up the Valley 
of the Shenandoah, and thence, through Ashby’s Gap in the Blue Ridge, to 
the line of the Manassas Railway, which brought him by noon of the 20th 
to Manassas Junction, where, in virtue of his superior rank, he assumed the 
command of the entire army. He was at Manassas before Patterson dream¬ 
ed that he had left Winchester, two days’ march away. All that he dared 
hope was that he had gained a day and a half upon Patterson, who, he pre¬ 
sumed, would join McDowell during the 22d. 

McDowell’s advance set out from the camps near Washington on the aft¬ 
ernoon of July 16, but the main body did not commence its march until 
daybreak on the following morning, moving in four columns by roads near¬ 
ly parallel. The advance was slow, for the men were unaccustomed to 
marching, and were incommoded by carrying the loads to be borne in light 
marching order. The roads also had been obstructed, and ambuscades were 
to be expected. Fairfax Court House was reached at about noon. The 
works thrown up here had been deserted, and the place was seized without op¬ 
position, only a few straggling shots being fired, by which three or four men 
were wounded. The greater part of the men had marched only six miles, 
and McDowell wished to push on at once to Centreville, six miles farther, 
but he was told that the men were worn out, not so much by' the distance 
marched as by the more wearying work of waiting on foot. So a halt was 
ordered for the day. The troops were in high spirits. They looked upon 
the falling back of the Confederate forces as the first step in the retreat which 
would not cease until Richmond was reached.. “It is ardently hoped,” 



BOLEBT PATTERSON- 










July, 1861.] 


THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 


149 



ViennaNJ 


Germantown 


'Springy 


SDBU 


Fairfax 

Station 


BATTLE 

GROUND 

SW 1 


VnionMM 


MANASSAS JUNcf] 


J^o hoick 
Church £ 


OccoquariY 


PLANS OF OPERATIONS. 


Tin* map indicate*, in a general way, the operations, actual or proposed, on both side*, previous to the battle of Bull Run.—A A shows McDowell's advance to Centreville.—B Runyon'p division, loft in reserve near Fairfax 
Court House.—C O McDowell at Centreville—D D Confederate brigades across Bull Run.—E E McDowell’s first plan to turn the Confederate right—H H McDowell’s second plan to turn the Confederate left, which brought on 
the battle—K K Beauregard’s original plan of attacking with his right the Federals at Centreville. 


wrote one newspaper correspondent, “that the rascals will make a stand at 
Manassas. But it is greatly feared that they will run again. If Beauregard 
does not give us battle at Manassas, his army will be thus thoroughly de¬ 
moralized, and he is beaten past a ray of hope.” The march was looked 
upon as a picnic excursion; the men gave themselves up to the humors of 
camp life. Some dressed themselves in women’s clothes, and paraded the 
town; one fellow donned an imitation of a clerical gown and band, and 
with an open book in his hands stalked through the street, reading the fu¬ 
neral service of the President of the Southern Confederacy. Some—only a 
few—did not content themselves with these unmilitary displays. They set 
out on predatory excursions to the neighboring houses, and came back 
swinging their plunder upon their bayonets. Several houses were sacked 
and burned, though no personal injury was inflicted. McDowell repressed 
these outrages by a sorrowful and stern order. “ It is with the deepest mor¬ 
tification," he said, “that the commanding general finds it necessary to re¬ 
iterate his orders for the preservation of the property of the inhabitants of 
the district occupied by the troops under his command. It is again ordered 
that no one shall arrest or attempt to arrest any citizen not in arms at the 
time, or search, or attempt to search any house, or even to enter the same, 
without permission. The troops must behave themselves with as much for¬ 
bearance and propriety as if they were at their own homes. They are 
here to fight the enemies of the country, not to judge and punish the un¬ 
armed and defenseless, however guilty they may be.” The severest milita¬ 
ry penalty was threatened for any violation of this order. No more out¬ 
rages were committed. The troops bivouacked under the open sky, the 
general and his staff, like the men, sleeping on the ground. Next morning 
the army resumed its march, and the whole force, with the exception of 
Runyon’s division, which was left at Fairfax, was soon concentrated near 
Centreville. 

Centreville is a village of a score or two of houses, straggling along a ridge 
at the confluence of several roads, about four miles from Bull Run. One 
of these roads—the Warrenton turnpike—goes almost due west, crossing the 
Run at the Stone Bridge. Another, going southwestward, and crossing the 
Run at Blackburn’s Ford, goes directly to Manassas Junction, three miles 
beyond the stream, connecting by cross-roads with the different fords above 
and below. Tyler, whose division now led the advance, reached the village 
early on the 18th, and finding that the enemy had fallen back, pushed for¬ 
ward to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Blackburn’s Ford, taking 
with him four regiments of Richardson’s brigade. They found the enemy 
in considerable force hidden in the woods which bordered the Run. Some 
sharp though random firing from artillery was interchanged for several 
hours. The New York Twelfth was thrown into confusion; Richardson 
wished to charge with the other regiments, and carry the hostile position; 
but Tyler, who knew that it was no part of the commanding general’s plan 
to bring on an action here, refused his consent. A reconnoissance only had 
been inteuded, and this had been made in stronger force than was desirable. 
The troops were accordingly withdrawn. In this skirmish the loss on each 
side was about equal. The Confederates lost 15 killed and 53 wounded, 


several of them mortally—68 in all; the Federals lost 19 killed, 38 wound¬ 
ed, and 26 missing—83 in all. 

McDowell could never have contemplated a march upon Richmond, with 
the army under his command, in face of the force directly opposed to him 
and of the re-enforcements which could be hurried up from Richmond and 
beyond. He did not even intend to assail them directly in the strong posi¬ 
tion at Manassas. His purpose was to gain their rear, and break their rail¬ 
way communication both with the forces at Richmond and in the Valley of 
the Shenandoah. The two armies of the enemy, cut off from communication 
with each other and with Richmond, would be forced to fall back from their 
position threatening the capital, leaving Manassas, the key of the direct' route 
to the south, in his hands. To accomplish this, he proposed to make a sud¬ 
den movement to the left, cross the Occoquan just below its junction with 
Bull Run, and strike a blow at the enemy’s railroad communication in this 
direction. He had not, therefore, accompanied his army in its advance from 
Fairfax to Centreville. He had indeed expected to encounter the army at 
Fairfax, and was disappointed at their abandonment of that place without 
a struggle. The march to Centreville was intended merely as a demonstra¬ 
tion. On the morning of the 18th he set out-on a reconnoissance of the 
country to his left, through which he proposed to advance. He was soon 
convinced that the country in that direction was impracticable for the ad¬ 
vance of his army, and was forced to abandon his first plan and form an¬ 
other. Coming to Centreville, he learned the results of Tyler’s and Rich¬ 
ardson’s reconnoissance to Blackburn’s Ford. This showed that the enemy 
had done wisely in falling back to the line of Bull Run, and that they were 
in too great force there to allow an attempt to force the passage with any 
reasonable hope of success; and even if the passage were forced, he would 
find himself in front of the strong position at Manassas, which was not to be 
desired. Still, something must be done, or the whole expedition would be 
an absolute failure; a failure without even an attempt to strike a blow. 
What was to be done must be done speedjly. A large and the best part of 
his force consisted of three months’ men, whose term of service was about to 
expire. They, at least, had had a few weeks of discipline. The three years’ 
men were all new to military life. In a few days he would have lost ten 
thousand of his best troops. Every day’s delay, while it would probably 
add to the strength of the enemy, would diminish his. The march to the 
left having been found impracticable, and a direct advance in front being 
too dangerous to be risked, the only alternative was to attempt to turn the 
enemy’s position on the right. 

From reconnoissances made and information received on the 19th, he 
learned that the enemy’s extreme left was at the Stone Bridge, directly in 
his front, where the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run; and that some 
two or three miles above was Sudley’s Ford, which was- unguarded, and 
could be reached by an almost unused forest road. The enemy apparently 
expected an attack some miles below; if his feeble left could be turned by 
surprise before he could bring up his force to sustain it, it could be forced 
back, the turnpike seized, and a detachment sent forward by it to cut the 
railroad in the rear of Manassas Junction. This movement, to be success- 




























[July, 1661 . 


150 

ful, must be a surprise; it must be accomplished before the enemy were pre¬ 
pared to resist it; and, moreover, provision must be made that while a con¬ 
siderable part of the Federal force was thus detached to turn the Confeder¬ 
ate left, his own left should not be turned by the enemy from below. 

McDowell’s final plan was based upon these considerations. The 19th 
and 20th of July were devoted to making the requisite arrangements. Ra¬ 
tions for three days were prepared and distributed, and the details of the 
enterprise were arranged. Miles’s division was to be left in reserve near 
Centreville: Richardson’s brigade, temporarily detached from Tyler’s divi¬ 
sion, and attached to that of Miles, was to make a demonstration upon Black¬ 
burn’s Ford, holding the enemy there in check. The remainder of Tyler’s 
division, composed of the brigades of Schenck, Keyes, and Sherman, was to 
march straight down the turnpike, threaten the Stone Bridge, and be ready 
to cross and advance along the turnpike as soon as the bridge was cleared 
of the enemy, meanwhile occupying the forces in their immediate front. 
The main attack was to be made by Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions, 
who were to proceed by the forest road on the right to Sudley’s Ford, cross 
the Run, and then, turning sharply down the opposite bank, force the ene¬ 
my’s left below the bridge, and thus clear the way for Tyler to cross. The 
march was to be begun at half past two on the morning of Sunday, July 
21, Tyler in the advance, going straight down the turnpike to the bridge, 
upon which he was to open a cannonade. Hunter and Hcintzelinan were 
to follow for a couple of miles till they came to the road to the right, where 
they were to turn off and make their way totheir crossing-place at Sudley’s 
Ford. It was supposed that Tyler would be'ready to open fire at the bridge 
by davbreak—a little after four o’clock—and that Hunter and Heintzelman 
would be across the Run at six. 

The enemy, meanwhile, had not been inactive. Johnston, whom McDowell 
had supposed to be detained at Winchester by Patterson, had slipped off un- 
perceived with the whole of his available force, and, preceded and accom¬ 
panied by eight regiments, numbering 6000 men, had, on the preceding day, 
joined Beauregard at Manassas. He had left the remainder of his force be¬ 
hind, for the Manassas Railway was not able to transport the whole at once: 
but he was assured that 5000 more would be sent forward from the Pied¬ 
mont Station in a few hours. Reaching Manassas, in virtue of his superior 
rank he assumed the command of the combined forces. He had assumed 
that Patterson would discover his departure from Winchester, and, hastening 
to join McDowell, would reach him on the 22d, giving him a decided superi¬ 
ority in force; but, in the mean while, if his own expected 5000 came up on 
the'evening of the 20th, he would, for a night and a day, have the greater 
numbers. Beauregard, being thoroughly acquainted with the ground, and 
apprised of the approach of the Army of the Shenandoah, had prepared a 
plan of battle, to which Johnston at once gave his assent. He proposed to 
cross Bull Run below the Stone Bridge with the whole force of the two 
armies, and attack McDowell, whom he expected to find lying at Centreville, 
before the expected re-enforcements from Patterson should join him. The 
Confederate troops were pasted with this view, and orders were given for 
carrying the movement into effect; but the 5000 from Piedmont did not 
come up; the order was countermanded just at daybreak; the Confederates 
remained at their posts on their side of Bull Run without attempting their 
proposed offensive movement on the Federal left. At that same moment the 
Federal army—two hours behind its appointed time—had fairly commenced 
its offensive advance upon the Confederate left. If either commander had 
fathomed the plans of the other, the battle would have been fought on differ¬ 
ent ground, and probably with a different result. 

War has been compared to the game of chess. The parallel fails in many 
important particulars. In chess each piece has a fixed and absolute value, 
and each player may know exactly his own force and that of his opponent. 
He who plays most skillfully must win. In war neither commander knows 
the exact value of his own force, and can only conjecture that of his adver¬ 
sary. Above all, there is the great disturbing element of time. A move¬ 
ment which would insure success if made at the right instant, may be use¬ 
less or fatal an hour later. This element of time modified the whole course 
of the battle of Bull Run, and in the end decided its result. The Confed¬ 
erate re-enfofeements did not come up as was expected, and the order for 
attack was countermanded. The Federal forces made their attack some 
hours later than was designed, and lost the expected advantage of surprise; 
and, finally, when the battle hung in even balance, a Confederate re-enforce¬ 
ment, of which neither side could know, turned the scale. 

The two armies opposed to each other at the dawn of July 21 were al¬ 
most equal. McDowell had set ont with 35,000, of these, Runyon’s division 
of 5000 had been left behind to hold the communications with Washington. 
At Centreville, on the evening of the 20th, he had 30,000; but among these 
were the Pennsylvania Fourth regiment and the battery attached to the New 
York Eighth: their term expired on the 20th, and they insisted upon their 
discharge. ' McDowell vainly tried to induce them to stay a few days longer. 
They refused. They had fulfilled the letter of their enlistment; and, on the 
morning of the 21st, while their comrades were marching forward to battle, 
this recreant Pennsylvania Fourth regiment, with the battery of the New 
York Eighth, slunk back to the rear to the sound of the enemy’s cannon. 
Deducting these dastards, the killed and disabled of the 18th, and the sick 
of the various divisions, the Federal army, on the morning of the 21st, num¬ 
bered, within a few hundreds more or less, 28,000 available men. At that 
same time the Confederate Army of the Potomac numbered about 22,000 
(by the official statement, exactly 21,833) effective men. Of the Army of 
the Shenandoah 6000 had already arrived, making 28,000 in all. During 
the battle other re-enforcements to the Confederates came up, raising the 
Army of the Shenandoah from 6000 to 8334, besides Hill’s Virginia regi- 



DAVID IICNTER. 


ment of 550. The entire force at the command of the Confederate general 
was a little less than 31,000.' What portion of either army were brought 
into action at each stage of the battle will appear hereafter. McDowell, aftei 
the discharge of the battery of the New York Eighth, had forty-nine guns. 
The Confederates had at the commencement of the action precisely the same 
number; another battery of four pieces was brought up by the re-enforce¬ 
ments, making fifty-three in all. The Confederate artillery was generally 
inferior in calibre and range, but as the firing was at close distance, this dis¬ 
advantage was more than made up by the greater case and rapidity with 
which they could be handled and discharged. The organization of the Con¬ 
federate troops was decidedly superior. They had been brought together 
into brigades, under commanders whom they knew, while the greater por¬ 
tion of the Federals had been thus organized only since the march began, 
and were to a great extent unacquainted with their commanding officers. 
In cavalry the Confederates were much the stronger. They had at least 
twelve companies, while the Federals had but four. 

The Federal divisions were set in motion by moonlight, at that stillest hour 
which just precedes the dawn. The time for each movement was careful¬ 
ly designated. Tyler, who lay in front of Centreville, was to lead the way, 
and go straight down the turnpike to the Stone Bridge, which he was to 
threaten. Hunter, who was encamped a mile or two in the rear, was to fol¬ 
low for two or three miles along the turnpike till he came to the forest road 
branching off to the right toward Sudley’s Ford, where he was to cross the 
Run, and then turn sharply down the west bank. Heintzelman was to fol¬ 
low Hunter for about two miles on the forest road, then turn and cross the 
Run below him. All were to move at half past two. It was thought that 
Tyler would be in position to open fire at daybreak, a little after four; that 
Hunter, entering the forest road as soon as daylight enabled him to thread 
its tortuous course, would cross the Run at six, followed closely by Heint¬ 
zelman, so that the whole force would be on the expected battle-ground in 
the cool of the morning. But a night movement is always liable to inter¬ 
ruptions. These occurred at every step. Tyler occupied the turnpike two 
hours longer than was expected, keeping Hunter and Heintzelman so much 
behind their time. Then the road through the Big Forest was longer and 
more difficult than had been supposed, and the passage of the Run was made 
at nine instead of six. Three hours were thus lost when minutes were of 
priceless worth. 

McDowell had anticipated the probability of delay, and wished to move 
his columns a few miles forward the preceding night; but he yielded to the 
wishes of some of his officers, who thought it would be more pleasant to 
make but a single march. For the second time within three days he threw 
away a victory which a more enterprising commander would have grasped. 
If, instead of halting at Fairfax on the 17th, after a march of only six miles, 
he had pushed on at once to Centreville, the battle of Bull Run would have 
been fought two days earlier. The Federals would have gone into action 
two thousand stronger and the Confederates ten thousand weaker on the 

1 Exactly 30.71.">. according to the lowest rendering of General Beauregard’s official report. 
He may have intended to state the total number at from GOO to 2000 greater, his report being 
somewhat obscure on this point. See, on this subject, the note at the end of this chapter. 









July, 1861.] 


BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 


151 



SAMUEL P- liniNTZELMAN. 


19th than on the 21st. With 28,000 against 31,000, the battle was hardly 
lost on Sunday; with 30,000 against 21,000, it might have been won on Fri¬ 
day. So, if but one of the three hours lost on the morning of the 21st had 
been saved by a march on the evening of the 20th, the victory, almost with¬ 
in the.grasp of McDowell, would not have been wrested from him by the un¬ 
expected arrival of the Confederate re-enforcements brought on by Smith. 
But we turn from what might have been to what was. 

At six o’clock, two hours behind time, Tyler’s three brigades were in front 
of the Stone Bridge; Hunter’s two brigades were threading their way, Burn¬ 
side leading, along the forest road; Heintzelman’s two brigades were just 
turning into the forest. They had all crossed Cub Run, a narrow stream 
whose steep banks were spanned by a wooden bridge. They hardly noticed 
it in the morning twilight, but had occasion to remember it before evening. 
McDowell and his staff now rode up. Still apprehensive of a strong attack 
upon his left and rear, he ordered Howard’s brigade, of Heintzelman’s divi¬ 
sion, to remain in reserve, in case it should be necessary to re-enforce Miles 
at Centreville. 

At half past six a shot from Tyler’s 30-pounder announced to the other 
divisions that he was in position. Stationing a scout among the branches 
of a tall tree, which commanded a view of the opposite side of the Run, he 
waited for two hours until Hunter and Heintzelman, coming down on the 
other side, should drive back the enemy, and render it possible for him to 
cross to their direct support. In the mean while, to carry out his feigned 
attack, he sent one brigade a mile down the Run toward the next ford 
guarded by the enemy, upon whom he opened fire, which was vigorously 
returned, with little damage on either side. All this time he kept up a slow 
cannonade without eliciting any reply from the enemy in bis front. They 
had beforehand ascertained that he was beyond the range of their guns, and 
did not care to waste ammunition and disclose their position by useless 
firing. At half past nine Burnside had reached the Run, crossed without 
opposition, followed by Porter’s brigade and Heintzelman’s division, and, 
after a brief halt for rest, pushed down the Run, and found himself confront¬ 
ed by the enemy on the northern slope of what was to be the battle-field 
of the day. 

The course of Bull Run for half a mile above and below the bridge is 
nearly north and south. The turnpike crossing it goes almost due west 
from Centreville. Beyond the bridge it traverses a low wooded bottom 
half a mile broad, mounts a slight ascent, then sinks again down to a little 
hollow, by which a small brook, called Young’s Branch, comes from the 
west, and then, making a short turn to the south, finds its way into Bull 
Run. The road-following the valley of Young’s Branch ascends for a mile 
by an easy slope until it gains the level of the plain about two miles from 
the Run. Here it is crossed by another road winding southward from Sud- 
ley’s Springs. This road formed the western boundary of the battle-field. 
The valley of Young’s Branch is shaped somewhat like a sickle, lying with 
its edge to the south and west. Upon that side the ground rises by a sharp 
ascent about a hundred feet to a plateau of an irregular oval form, contain¬ 
ing about one hundred and fifty acres of cleared land, cut up into small 
fields, with here and there patches of young oaks and pines. Along the 
eastern and southern sides of the plateau was a dense thicket of second- 
growth pines, and across the upper edge of the fields a broad belt of oaks 
upon both sides of the Sudley road. Near the upper edge of the plateau 
was a house occupied by Mrs. Henry, and half a mile below another owned 
by a free negro named Robinson. Both were small wooden buildings dense¬ 
ly embowered in trees, and surrounded by fences. This plateau, a mile long 
from east to west, and half a mile broad from north to south, was the bat¬ 


tle-field of the afternoon, the sharpest fighting being in the oak woods, at 
the two houses, and in front of the pine thicket. The other side of the val¬ 
ley of Young’s Branch slopes gently up to the north in a succession of open, 
undulating fields, covered with grass, and dotted over with groves and thick¬ 
ets. ^ This slope was the scene of the battle in the morning. 

While the Federal army was advancing to the attack, the Confederates 
were in the same position which they had occupied for some days along the 
southwestern side of Bull Run. Ewell’s brigade was at Union Mills Ford, 
on the extreme right. The brigades of Jones, Longstreet, Bonham, and 
Cocke were successively posted close to the Run, in front of the principal 
fords, up to the Stone Bridge, a distance of eight miles. Between these, but 
slightly in their rear, so as to be able to support either of the front brigades 
that might be assailed, were the brigades of Holmes, Early, Jackson, and 
Bee. Beauregard, sanctioned by Johnston, assuming all along that the bat¬ 
tle would be fought on his right, had concentrated his main strength upon 
that wing, leaving his left at the Stone Bridge comparatively weak. The 
front line of brigades consisted wholly of the troops of the Army of the Po¬ 
tomac; those of the Army of the Shenandoah, who were wearied by their 
rapid march from Winchester, being placed in reserve in the rear. But the 
battle being fought upon the left, the main brunt fell upon the Army of 
the Shenandoah. 

Colonel Evans, who held the extreme Confederate left at Stone Bridge, 
deceived by Tyler’s demonstrations, notified Beauregard that a strong attack 
had been commenced on that flank. The Confederate commander, directing 
that position to be held at all hazards, sent orders that a rapid and determ¬ 
ined attack should be made upon the Federal flank and rear at Centreville. 
By this movement they expected to achieve a complete victory by noon. 
Johnston and Beauregard then took a position on a commanding hill in the 
rear of the centre of the Confederate lines, where for two long hours they 
awaited tidings of the battle. They came at last in an unwelcome shape. 
The order for an advance by their right had miscarried, and it was too late 
to renew it. Three hours would be required to effect the movement, and 
minutes were beyond price, for the action opened by the Federals on the left 
had gone sorely against the Confederates. After giving hasty orders coun¬ 
termanding that for an advance of the right, dispatching aids to Manassas 
to hurry up the re-enforcements momentarily expected by railway, and di¬ 
recting the reserve regiments to hasten to the scene of action, Beauregard 
and Johnston galloped to their left, where the roll of musketry and thcTdin 
of artillery announced that a severe conflict was going on. An hour’s sharp 
riding brought them at noon to the plateau in the rear of the Henry and 
Robinson houses. They looked upon a battle to all appearance lost. We 
now turn to that point where the battle had been fought. 

Before nine o’clock, while Hunter and Heintzelman were winding their 
way unseen along the forest road, Evans became convinced that the attack 
on his front was a feint, and suspected that an attempt was making to turn 
his left. He had but fifteen companies at the Bridge. Leaving four in po¬ 
sition there, with the other eleven and two guns he marched across the fields 
and took up a position to check the advance of the enemy, sending word to 
Bee, who commanded the nearest brigade in reserve, to hurry up to the 
scene of action. At half past ten the head of Burnside’s column came in 
sight of Evans, and the action was opened. Bee, a gallant South Carolinian, 
who had been trained at West Point, had fought under Scott in Mexico, had 
been twice breveted for meritorious conduct at Cerro Gordo and Chapulte- 
pec, and who in this his last action gave proof of great military capacity, 
brought on his brigade of four regiments and two companies, with Imbo- 
den’s battery, and drew them up on the edge of the plateau; but, seeing 
Evans sorely pressed by Burnside, he advanced down the slope, across the 
turnpike, over Young’s Branch, and threw himself into the action. Burn¬ 
side was now overmatched, and called for aid. Sykes’s eight companies of 
regulars hurried down from Porter’s column on the right, and restored the 
balance. At this moment, Hunter, whose division comprised the two bri¬ 
gades of Porter and Burnside, was wounded, and borne from the field. The 
command nominally devolved upon Porter, the senior officer; but, as he was 
throughout the action with his own brigade, Burnside was actually in com¬ 
mand on his part of the field. Porter’s column, coming down the Sudley 
road, were now in striking distance, and poured in a heavy fire from the 
right. The Confederate line began to waver, then fell back slowly and sul¬ 
lenly toward the turnpike. Just then, when the fight had continued for 
more than an hour, a fresh column appeared over the low-ridge which sep¬ 
arated Bull Run from the Federal left. This was Sherman’s brigade of Ty¬ 
ler’s division, which had been all the morning on the opposite side waiting 
for an opportunity to cross and take part in the conflict. 

Tyler, warned from his observatory in the tree-top of the progress of the 
real attack, had withdrawn his feigned assault, and had brought up his threq 
brigades in front of the Stone Bridge. Assured that the enemy were in no 
condition to molest him, he had ordered Sherman’s brigade to cross the Run 
above the bridge, and support the forces hotly engaged on the opposite side. 
The crossing was effected without opposition, and just before noon Sherman 
came upon the field. The Confederates, now attacked by Sherman on the 
right, pressed by Burnside and Sykes on their centre, and galled by Porter 
on their left, rushed broken and shattered up the slope of the plateau, and 
half way across it, beyond the Robinson and Henry houses. * Here they met 
support. Jackson, who had been in reserve next behind Bee, had brought 
forward his five regiments, and gain I the eastern edge of the plateau across 
which Bee’s broken, though not routed force was flying. “They are beat¬ 
ing us back,” said Bee to Jackson, as they met. “Sir, we will give them 
the bayonet,” replied Jackson. Bee, encouraged by Jackson’s firm front, 
tried to rally his men. “ Here is Jackson,” he cried, “ standing like a stone 









152 


[July, 1861. 


wall 1” The word fitted the mood of the moment. “ Stonewall 1 Stone¬ 
wall 1” was passed from man to man; from that moment this became a part 
of the name by which the favorite Confederate leader was known. We 
shall have need, in describing the events of the next two years, to speak 
often of “ Stonewall Jackson.” 

It was now past noon. Jackson’s firm stand had gained a breathing-space 
for the Confederates upon the lower, or southeastern brow of the plateau. 
Sherman had joined the rear of Hunter and Heintzelman, who, coming down 
upon the upper margin of the plateau, had fairly outflanked the Confederate 
left. Tyler had brought over Keyes’s brigade directly after Sherman’s, and 
was menacing the lower edge of the plateau, where the Confederates were 
making what seemed their last stand in and in front of the pine thicket. 
Howard’s brigade, detached in the morning from Heintzelman’s division, had 
been ordered forward, and had secured the Run. Burnside’s brigade, which 
had first entered into action, had exhausted its ammunition, and been with¬ 
drawn a little to the rear to replenish it, but could almost immediately be 
brought into action. Eighteen thousand men had now passed the Run, and 
as the Confederates had been driven clear away from the Stone Bridge, there 
was nothing but an undefended abbatis of felled trees to hinder Schenck, 
with Tyler’s remaining brigade, from crossing and adding two thousand 
more to the force actually engaged. 

Johnston and Beauregard now came upon the plateau. The Confederate 
forces there consisted at this moment of Jackson’s five regiments which had 
not yet been engaged, and the shattered remains of Bee’s and Evans’s com¬ 
mands. These in the morning had numbered about 7500 men, but fully 
five hundred had been killed and wounded, so that the Confederate forces on 
the field at that moment were about 7000. Their position was strong. The 
pine thicket and the clumps of trees afforded admirable shelter. Their ar¬ 
tillery, consisting of thirteen guns, was posted so as to play upon the coming 
enemy, and yet so sheltered as to be itself hardly exposed. The first task 
of the Confederate commanders was to reorganize the broken regiments. 
Johnston placed himself by the colors of the Fourth Alabama, which had 
lost all its field-officers, and Bee’s shattered companies rallied around him 
on the right. Beauregard, as he posted the lines on the left, where the first 
onset of the enemy would fall, addressed the men in sharp and decisive 
words. That position was of the last importance; re-enforcements were 
close at hand, but until these came they must hold their posts at all hazards 
and against any odds. Order having been restored, and the forces posted, 
Johnston took his station at a point from which he could overlook the whole 
scene in every direction, and send forward the re-enforcements to the pre¬ 
cise .point where they could be most effective, while Beauregard remained 
in command of the field. Just beyond a ravine which forms the southern 
boundary of the plateau is a commanding elevation, upon which stands a 
house known as the “ Portico," or “ the Lewis House,” overlooking the 
course of the Run above and below, and the field of battle. Here Johnston 
took up his head-quarters. Re-enforcements had begun to come up, and by 
the time that the Federal right was fairly in position for attack, the Confed¬ 
erates had on the field twelve full regiments of infantry, two hundred and 
sixty cavalry, and twenty-two guns, in all about 9500 men, with other re¬ 
enforcements approaching. Against these, upon their left, were advancing 
four brigades of the Federal army, with Ricketts’s, Griffin’s, and Arnold’s 
batteries, sixteen guns. The brigades were those of Porter, of Hunter’s di¬ 
vision; Franklin and Wilcox, of Heintzelman’s; and Sherman’s, of Tyler’s. 
Keyes’s brigade, of Tyler’s division, was engaged far to the left. In all, 



ESA554US D. KEYEA 



TUOMA8 J- JACKSON. 


13,000 men and sixteen guns were fairly in movement against the Confed¬ 
erates on the plateau. 

The Federal right now moved confidently down along the Sudley road 
upon the Confederate left, sorely galled by the fire from the artillery, which 
was admirably served. But they pressed on up the slope, outflanked the 
enemy’s line, and seized upon the upper edge of the plateau. Ricketts’s and 
Griffin’s artillery led, and took up position after position. The enemy’s 
strongest position was on a swell west of the Henry house; a little to the 
south was another hill which commanded this. If that could be gained and 
held, the whole plateau would be commanded. The two batteries were or¬ 
dered here, with the New York Eleventh as their support. Of this regi¬ 
ment, commonly designated as Ellsworth’s Zouaves, high anticipations had 
been formed. Men had heard fabulous stories of the achievements of the 
French Zouaves in Algeria and the Crimea. Ellsworth bad come from the 
West to New York at the head of a company whom he had trained to mar¬ 
velous perfection in the Zouave drill. He had speedily recruited a regiment 
in New York, in a great measure of the class from which the French Zouaves 
were supposed to have been drawn. That they were not, when in camp, 
very pleasant neighbors, even to their friends, was admitted; but that they 
would be still less so to the enemy was sure. No one doubted that in ac¬ 
tion they would stand fire; and, above all, it was thought that every man 
of them was sworn to avenge the slaying of Ellsworth. The Zouaves went 
forward with bravado enough. Some of them had thrown off their gay 
jackets, that they might “ fight freer.” But when they came in sight of a 
Confederate regiment half hidden by a clump of pines, and at the same mo¬ 
ment saw two mounted companies coming down upon them by a road 
through the woods, their courage vanished. They broke in utter confusion, 
and the cavalry rode straight through them, harming scarcely a man. A 
few of the Zouaves kept presence of mind enough to fire random shots at 
the horsemen, killing four, wounding one, and dispersing the whole body. 
But the regiment of Zouaves was scattered. Farnham, their colonel, and 
some of the officers, tried gallantly to stem the rout; many of the men fell 
in with other regiments, and did good service as skirmishers; but as a regi¬ 
ment it was wholly dispersed, not a few of the members heading the flight, 
and being among the first to bring to Washington and New York tidings 
of the rout, with wild stories of their own prowess on the fatal field, where 
they had shown themselves such arrant cowards. 1 * * 

At about the same time, a little past two, Keyes’s brigade of Tyler’s divi- 

1 This is the whole story of the famous charge of the “ Black Horse Cavalry” upon the Zouaves, 
with accounts of which the newspapers of the day were filled. By way of sample, we quote, with 
abridgments, some paragraphs of these reports. One of the lieutenants of the regiment writes : 

“The Zouaves rushed out of the woods only to find themselves the target for another body of 
infantry beyond, while the Black Horse Cavalry were seen charging full upon them. They form¬ 
ed hastily in line, kneeling, semi-kneeling, and standing, that, Ellsworth fashion, they might re¬ 
ceive their enemies with successive volleys. On came the Horse, splendidly mounted. To an early 
discharge from the cavalry the Zouaves made no response, although several of the men were killed, 
but waited patiently until the enemy were almost upon them, when, in quick succession, the three 
ranks fired. The shock to the rebels was great; but they rallied, and attempted a renewal of the 
charge, for which they paid dearly. They were completely shattered, broken up, and swept away. 
Not more than a hundred of them rode off, and as they went their ears were saluted with ‘One, 

two, three, four, five, six, seven, tigah, Zouave !*”.Another Zouave says: “The Black Horse 

Guard came upon the Zouave regiment at a gallop, and were received by the brave firemen upon 
their poised bayonets, followed instantly by a volley, from which they broke and fled. They quick¬ 
ly returned, with their forces doubled—perhaps six or seven hundred—and again dashed, with 
fearful yells, upon the excited Zouaves, and the slaughter commenced. No quarter, no halting, 
no flinching now, marked the rapid and death-dealing blows of our men ns they closed in upon 
the foe in their madness and desperation. Our brave fellows fell; the ranks filled up; the 6abres, 
bowie-knives, and bayonets glistened in the sunlight; horse after horse went down ; platoon after 
platoon disappeared—the rattle of musketry, the screams of the rebels, the shout of 4 Remember 
Ellsworth !’ from the lungs of the Zouaves, and the yells of the wounded and crushed belligerents, 
filled the air, and a terrible carnage succeeded. The gallant Zouaves fought to the death, and 
were sadly cut up; but of those hundreds of Black Horse Guards, not many left that bloody ren¬ 
counter.” 












-J ULY, 1861. 


THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 


153 



A ZOUAVE AT WASHINGTON RELATING UI8 EXPLOITS AT BULL BUN. 


sion, which had come upon the field just at the close of the Confederate re¬ 
pulse in the morning, was ordered forward. Crossing the turnpike, he 
marched straight up the northern slope of the plateau in front of the Rob¬ 
inson house. The Third Connecticut and Second Maine regiments charged 
up the hill, crowned its summit, brushed away the enemy, and for a moment 
held the house and field. Their position was, however, commanded by a 
battery in the rear, which poured in so hot a fire that a few moments’ ex¬ 
posure to it would have annihilated the whole line; as it was, the Maine 
regiment lost fifteen killed and forty wounded. Keyes withdrew below the 
brow of the hill, around which he skirted in search of an opportunity to 
charge; but the light battery of the enemy, shifting front as he changed 
ground, was always in his front, ready to pour in its shot whenever the head 
of a column should appear above the crest. This movement, lasting for 
more than an hour, took Keyes clear around the eastern edge of the plateau, 
out of sight of the battle which was raging two miles to the west. 

The great struggle of the day was going on at the western end of the 
plateau. A Confederate battery of thirteen guns, supported by Jackson’s 
and Bee’s brigades, had been posted in a small open field five hundred yards 
southeast of the Henry house, just below the crest of a low elevation. From 
this shelter it poured in a fierce fire upon the Federal column coming down 
southwardly along the Sudley road. But the column pressed on until its 
head, now the extreme Federal right, had outflanked the batteries, which, 
with their supports, formed the extreme Confederate left. Five hundred 
yards southeast of these—a thousand from the Henry house—a hill rises 
fifty feet above the general level, and half as much above the ridge behind 
which the Confederates were posted. From this hill the Confederate left 
could be completely enfiladed. It was the key of the position. Whoever 
held that hill with artillery, held the plateau. The hill had just been seized 
by the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts, and the Zouaves had been ordered 
up as supports, while the Federal column coming from the north had passed 
the Henry house, and was bearing down upon the Confederate position. It 
was now almost three o’clock. Beauregard, informed that re-enforcements 
were close at hand, pushed forward his whole line to recover the plateau. 
Jackson advanced his “stone wall” against Ricketts and Griffin. The 
Zouaves, catching sight of his line and the two companies of cavalry, broke 
and fled ignominiously. Heintzelman ordered up the First Minnesota, the 
nearest regiment, to take their place. As they emerged from the wooded 
road down which they had come, and passed the crest of the hill, they found 
themselves face to face within fifty yards of a body of troops. The two lines 
had now become so intermingled that from position alone neither could tell 
friend from foe. Gorman, the colonel of the Minnesota regiment, was at a 
loss; Griffin was equally uncertain; some one had told them that this was 
another of Heintzelman’s regiments. Heintzelman, apparently also in doubt, 
dashed between the two regiments, within pistol-shot of either. The enemy 
hesitated in like manner for a few moments. But the pause was brief. Each 
caught sight at the same moment of the colors of the other, and poured in 
a deadly fire. The two Federal batteries offered a conspicuous mark. A ' 
third of the cannoneers and half of the horses were shot down at the first 
volley, and the batteries were disabled. They had played a conspicuous 
part in the action of the day, and now, when they were to be most wanted, 1 


- they were useless. The only question was who should have them. Jack- 
: son dashed forward and seized the guns, trying to drag them from the field. 
• Fresh regiments on each side were brought up; the line wavered to and fro 
! for an hour; the guns were taken and retaken three times, but at the last 
■ remained in the hands of the Federals, who were dragging them away. 

All this time a fierce battle had been going on a little to the left of this 
hill, along the ridge held by the Confederate forces. Griffin’s and Ricketts’s 
batteries, which would have swept the position, were thrown out of service, 
and, though not taken, were rendered useless. A strong Federal column 
was directed upon this ridge. Regiment after regiment was brought up; 
each, one after the other, was hurled back, some in tolerable order, some in 
sheer disorder. In the confused melde of the next hour it is impossible to 
trace clearly the action of each regiment along that short line of barely half 
a mile from the Henry house to the hill. The First Minnesota fell back; 
the First Michigan was brought forward and driven off. The Fourteenth 
New York came on in gallant style, but, coming in sight of the enemy’s line, 
broke and ran. “I considered it,” says Heintzelman, “useless to attempt 
to rally them. The most of the men would run from fifty to several hund¬ 
red yards to the rear, and continue to fire high in the air, compelling those 
in the front to retreat.” The New York Thirty-eighth tried hard to save 
the battery; forced back, they dragged off three of Ricketts’s guns, leaving 
them, as they thought, out of the enemy’s reach. Rallying, they advanced, 
and for a few moments thought themselves in possession of the field; then, 
without knowing how, they found themselves opposed to a superior force, 
swept by musketry and pierced by artillery, from which they fell back in 
sudden panic. “ This,” says their colonel, “ was the last rally made by my 
regiment.” Close by, but a little to the left, the New York Seventy-ninth 
charged up the ridge upon the Confederate batteries. Receiving a severe 
fire, they broke; rallied, and finally broke again, and fell back, leaving their 
colonel, Cameron, brother of the Secretary of War, dead upon the field. The 
New York Sixty-ninth took their place. “ Now, boys, is your time,” shout¬ 
ed Corcoran, their colonel, as they rushed into action. They held the crest 
for barely a quarter of an hour, and then fell back in disorder. 

The advantages gained by the Confederates had been dearly won. Bee 
and Bartow, who had been all day long in the thickest of the fight, fell al¬ 
most side by side near the Henry house; Jackson was wounded,but still 
kept the field; many other of the best officers had been killed or wounded 
in the desperate struggle. In spite of these checks, the Federal generals 
were still confident of victory. “The enemy was evidently disheartened 
and broken,” says McDowell. “ Every thing was in favor of our troops, 
and promising decisive victory,” says Burnside, at four o’clock. “ The pres¬ 
tige of success had thus far attended the efforts of our gallant but inexperi¬ 
enced troops,” says Porter. Single regiments had been sent forward to the 
ridge who had been driven back overmatched; but now a determined as¬ 
sault was to be made by a strong column. The flags of eight regiments, 
though borne somewhat wearily, were pointed to the hill from which the 
disordered masses of the Confederates were seen, or thought to be seen, 
hastily retiring. But before this final and decisive charge was made upon 
the crest near the Henry house, which had now become the centre of the 
field, the whole Federal right came rushing down in utter rout, men, horses, 













































































154 


[July, 1861 . 


and caissons mingled together in the wildest confusion. The instant that 
this hot torrent of fugitives touched a regiment which had before seemed 
solid, it melted away like a snow-bank before a jet of steam. The panic 
spread from regiment to regiment, and in a quarter of an hour the whole 
Federal force was transformed from an army into a frightened crowd. 

To understand whence came the blow which so suddenly shattered the 
Federal right, we must go back to the Lewis house, where Johnston, with 
the whole field before him, was watching the progress of the fight in his 
front and the arrival of re-enforcements from his rear. All day long he had 
been harassed by groundless apprehensions that Patterson was close at hand. 
At ten o’clock he saw a column of dust rising up in the northwest, such as 
might be raised by an army on the march. This may have been a cloud 
blown up by a gust of wind, or have been raised by McDowell’s columns 
near Sudley’s Ford; but Johnston suspected that it indicated the approach 
of Patterson. Again, at two o’clock, an officer galloped up from Manassas 
with the report that a Federal force had reached the railway, and were now 
close upon the position which Beauregard was so stoutly defending. Upon 
the heels of this unwelcome messenger came another with tidings that this 
force was Kirby Smith’s brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah. John¬ 
ston’s course was now clear. An hour or two before he had ordered Cocke 
to bring up his brigade from the edge of Bull Run ; but, learning that this 
position was threatened from across the stream, he had countermanded the 
order. It was now repeated, and Cocke’s brigade, four regiments strong, 
came upon the field. In half an hour Fisher’s North Carolina, and Cash’s 
and Kershaw’s South Carolina regiments, from Bonham’s brigade, came up 
from below, followed almost at the same moment by Kirby Smith from 
Manassas with half of the long-awaited re-enforcements from Piedmont. 
Smith had started at daylight by rail, reaching the Junction at noon with 
four regiments and a battery. Leaving a weak regiment at the Junction, 
with the other three he had hurried across the fields to the Lewis house. 
Early’s three regiments came up from their position down the Run just after 
Smith. 

To the twelve regiments with which Beauregard had for two hours held 
the field, thirteen were now added. The re-enforcements were skillfully di¬ 
rected. A part were sent to strengthen Beauregard’s line, which had just 
begun to advance. Among these were Smith’s division. He himself was 
wounded, and the command devolved upon Elzey. A part made a circuit 
south and west to and beyond the Sudley road, outflanking the Federal 
right, fell upon its flank and rear, and hurled it in wild confusion upon the 
column just ready to assail the Confederate line near the Henry house. In 
fifteen minutes all was lost. The whole Federal force was swept clear off 
the plateau and up the slopes beyond the Sudley road, which swarmed with 
crowds of flying, disorganized troops, through whom dashed riderless horses 
and artillery teams driven at utmost speed. Regiments which a few min¬ 
utes before stood firm, melted away at a touch. Some of the officers strove 
by entreaties and threats to rally their commands; but they would not 
stand even when beyond the reach of the Confederate fire. It was not a 
retreat; it was a flight; a rout as complete as any battle-field ever saw. Yet 
three regiments standing firm for half an hour, and presenting a “stone 
wall” behind which their broken comrades should rally, might even then 
have changed the issue of the day. A decisive victory could hardly have 
been won, but the Confederates could have been repulsed, and the result 
would have been a drawn battle. The odds were indeed at the moment 
against the Federals, but they were less than those against which the Con¬ 
federates had held their ground for hours. McDowell had upon the imme¬ 
diate field 13,000 tflen. In half an hour he could have brought up Burn¬ 
side’s troops, who had been out of action since noon; Keyes’s regiments, 
which were wholly intact; and Schenck’s brigade, which had not been in 
action, but, having cleared away the abattis, were on the point of crossing 
the Stone Bridge—in all 7000 men, which would have given him 20,000. 
To oppose these the Confederates had 19,000. They had brought up every 
man who would be within reach for two hours. But no orders were given 
to bring up the Federal re-enforcements, and scarcely an attempt to present 
a front to the enemy. The New York Sixty-ninth, indeed, formed for a 
short time into an irregular square against a body of cavalry, and repelled 
their charge, but it soon broke and joined in the flight. Its colonel, Cor¬ 
coran, became separated from his men, and was made prisoner. He was, 
by special order of the Confederate government, “confined in a cell appro¬ 
priated to convicted felons,” as hostage for certain privateers who had been 
captured by the Federals and put on trial for piracy. After a year’s cap¬ 
tivity he was exchanged, and was made brigadier general, his commission 
dating from the day of the battle of Bull Run. 

The only real opposition to the pursuit of the Confederates was made by 
Sykes, with his eight companies of regulars, who marched to the right 
straight through the crowds of flying troops, vainly attempting to rally 
them, threw themselves in the way of the advancing enemy, whom they 
held in check until the broken regiments had gained a fair start. They 
then slowly retired, always showing a firm front, and covering the escape 
of those who were fleeing toward Sudley’s and the'fords below. They were 
the last to leave the field, and the only force opposed to the enemy in this 
quarter. 

Jefferson Davis came upon the field just after the victory had been won. 
The Confederate Congress had been “ allowed to meet at Richmond on the 
20th.” On that day the President had delivered his message, and in the 
evening had received tidings of the impending battle. He set out bv rail¬ 
way for Manassas next morning, at the very moment when Tyler’s first gun 
was fired, reached the Junction at four, mounted, and rode to Johnston’s 
head-quarters at the Lewis house, and thence to the battle-field in time to I 



MJOflAEL COBOOBAN. 


see the broken regiments of the Federals flying in the distance. He sent a 
glowing dispatch to Richmond. “ Night,” he said, “ has closed upon a hard- 
fought field. Our forces were victorious. The battle was fought mainly on 
our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy estimated at 35,000.” 
Writing before the smoke of battle had cleared away, it is not strange that 
he doubled the strength of the Federals, and diminished by one third that 
of the Confederates. 

The victors were in no condition to make a vigorous pursuit. One half 
of their infantry had been for hours underfire; the other half were exhaust, 
ed by their rapid march and strenuous assault. A few of the freshest regi¬ 
ments started in pursuit, but were soon recalled; none of them went a mile. 
The artillery, which all day long had played an important part, were, with 
the exception of a few light guns, equally unavailable. The rest, from their 
positions, played upon the fugitives with little effect. The pursuit devolved 
wholly upon the cavalry. Of the dozen companies nearly all were now at 
hand. Stuart, whose charge had scattered the Zouaves, went upon the heels 
of those who were flying toward the upper fords, but the firm line of Sykes’s 
regulars in the rear forbade any serious attack. They picked up many 
stragglers who had fallen out of the line of flight, but accomplished no more. 
Radford, with six companies—barely five hundred men—crossed the Run 
below the Stone Bridge, came upon the turnpike, and pressed upon the rear 
of the Federals. Schenck had just cleared away the abattis at the bridge, 
when he received intelligence of the rout, and that the army was retreating. 
He fell back toward Centreville, leaving the road open for the light battery 
of the Confederates to come on behind. 

By various routes the Federal troops had now crossed the Run and gained 
the turnpike, along which they pressed in one confused mass. Here and 
there a regiment presented something like a military form, but intermingled 
with these was a crowd of officers, soldiers, and civilians, on foot, mounted, 
and in carriages. When the tidings of an impending battle reached Wash¬ 
ington, all the idlers in the capital rushed forward to see the sight. Con¬ 
gressmen, newspaper correspondents, and loungers of every grade besieged 
the livery-stables. The man who had a horse or carriage for hire was 
lucky; he could let it at a war risk. All that long July day a constant 
stream poured out from Washington. Encouraged by the reports of the 
morning’s success, many had ventured beyond Centreville; some had even 
crossed the Run. There was no one to hinder, and they went where they 
listed. This advancing current met the receding one. The opposing streams 
made a whirlpool, the vortex of which was where the road crossed the nar¬ 
row bridge over Cub Run. Just below another human stream had poured 
in down the forest road up which Hunter and Heintzelman had marched in 
the morning. Behind were the Confederate cavalry, their hundreds multi¬ 
plied in apprehension to thousands. An occasional sharp report, and a shot 
dropping here and there, showed that the pursuers had artillery—how many 
guns no man could know. All struggled and fought to pass the narrow 
bridge, beyond which lay safety. The light guns of the pursuers came with¬ 
in long range and opened fire. A shot struck a caisson on the bridge, over 








BRENNER'S BRIGADE COVERING THE RETREAT NEAR CENTREVILLK 


July, 1861.] 


THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 


156 







































156 


[July, 1861. 



THE BATTLE-FI ELD OF BOLL RUN. 


Thw map eliows the topography of the field, and the principal positions during the battle, Bull Run being about half a mile to the east. A A scene of the Confederate repulse in the morning. B B Confederate stand on 
the southern edge of the plateau. C C Burnside withdrawn from the action after the fight of the morning. D D general line of advance of the united columns of Porter, Heintzelman, and Sherman upon the Confederate 
right. E E Keyes’s movement after the separation of his brigade from that of Sherman, of Tyler's division. H H final advance of the Confederates. K K advance of the last Confederate re-enforcemeuts. M hill where 
Griffin’s and Ricketts’s butteries were disabled. N Sykes’s stand with the regulars after the rout. The figures denote the elevation above the level of Bull Run. 


turned it, and blocked up the passage. The artillery horses were cut from 
their traces, and mounted by their drivers. Wagons loaded with ammuni¬ 
tion, ambulances freighted with wounded, guns which had been dragged so 
far, were abandoned. A full third of the lost artillery was left here. The 
Confederate guns poured their shot into the writhing mass. Somehow the 
throng cleared itself; some got over the bridge; some crossed the stream 
above, some below. Once fairly beyond Cub Run, the fugitives found them¬ 
selves in presence of Blenker’s regiment, hastily drawn up in a firm line. 
Through this they were suffered to pass, and were beyond reach of harm. 
Almost twenty thousand men had been driven for miles by scarcely five 
hundred, and had left behind every thing but their lives. Evening had now 
closed in upon the rout. In the gathering darkness some squadrons of 
Confederate cavalry came up to Blenker’s outposts. They were met by a 
fire, and wheeled back. For an hour or two they havered around, and then 
retired across Bull Run. 

Miles’s division, 7000 strong, which had been left in reserve, had not been 
wholly inactive. Blenker’s brigade was left in guard at Centreville. The 
brigades of Davis and Richardson marched down to Blackburn’s Ford, near 
where the skirmish of three days before had been fought. A slow fire was 
opened upon the opposite bank, to which no reply was made, and no enemy 
was visible except at long distances until about eleven o’clock; then sud.- 
denly the opposite bank seemed full of them. They moved back and forth 
in a puzzling way. Now they seemed to be massing themselves as if to 
cross the Run in force; a small body was sent across who drove in the Fed¬ 


eral skirmishers, but were in turn driven back by artillery. Then they ap¬ 
peared to be retreating—-before the attack on their left, as Richardson sup¬ 
posed; Again the tide turned, and st’U larger masses were concentrated 
These troops were the brigades of Jones and Longstreet, who had received 
the order to fall upon the Federal left, and were preparing to execute it, 
when it was countermanded because a similar order sent to Ewell had mis¬ 
carried. The Federal commanders little knew the peril from which they 
had escaped. It was owing to sheer accident that they were not assailed by 
a threefold force, while the rest of the army was miles away, utterly beyond 
reach of giving them support. 

So the day went on till past five o’clock, when an order came to retreat 
upon Centreville and endeavor to hold that position, for the attack upon the 
right had failed, and McDowell was retreating in utter rout. Richardson 
and Davis fell back, and took up a position to protect the retreating regi¬ 
ments from below, while Blenker guarded them in front. 

The conduct of Miles, the commander of the division, had been singular 
all day. Several times he rode over to the posts of Davis and Richardson, 
changed the dispositions which they bad made, countermanded the orders 
which they had given, and then hurried back to his quarters at Centreville. 
Toward evening Richardson had established his defensive line, when, re¬ 
turning to one of the regiments, he found that it had been entirely altered, 
lie inquired by whose orders it had been done, and was told by Stevens, 
the colonel, that it was by express order of Miles. “ Why the change was 
made,” he added, “ I do not know; but I have no confidence in Colonel 







































THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 


157 


Miles, for he is drunk.” Richardson replaced the regiment as before, and 
then reported to McDowell’s aid that he had been interfered with all day in 
the disposition of his troops, and could not carry out the orders of the com¬ 
manding general so long as he was under orders of a drunken man. He was 
directed to take the command. He began placing another regiment, when 
Miles met him and ordered him to form it in a different manner. Richard¬ 
son replied that he should obey no more orders from him. Miles ordered 
him in arrest. Richardson paid no attention, and rode off. McDowell soon 
came up. Miles said the dispositions made were faulty, and asked to be al¬ 
lowed to remain in command of his division. The request was refused. 

By nine o’clock the last of the fugitives from the battle-field were safely 
beyotid the lines at Centreville. Beyond the cavalry chase, no attempt was 
made at pursuit from that quarter. Johnston ordered Longstreet’s and 
Bonham’s brigades to cross the Run below the bridge, and fell upon the 
Federals. They advanced some distance, but night coming on they were 
recalled, without coming near enough to be perceived by the Federal rear¬ 
guard. A brief and informal council was held, and it was resolved that 
Centreville should be abandoned, and the army fall back to Washington. 
But the routed regiments had waited for no orders. They were already far 
in the rear, hurrying forward in the same panic with which they had come 
in. They reached their camps at Vienna and Arlington before daylight the 
next morning. In less than six hours of darkness they had accomplished 
in their flight a distance which it had taken them more than forty hours to 
traverse in their advance. Scarcely a regiment which had been driven from 
the battle-field presented the slightest trace of military order. The regi¬ 
ments of the reserve followed on more leisurely, but long before night they 
were all back in front of Washington. 

The Confederate loss in this battle was 378 killed, 1489 wounded, and 30 
missing—1887 in all. Of these, 1262 were of the Army of the Shenandoah. 
As the re-enforcements brought up last were in action but a short time, the 
greater part of this loss—probably about 1100—fell upon Bee’s and Jack- 
son’s brigades, which went into battle 6000 strong. The whole loss in the 
Army of the Potomac was 630. Not quite half of this army, 22,000 strong, 
was in action at all, and of these only Evans’s half brigade of barely 1500 
men, until afternoon ; fully half the loss of the Army of the Potomac must 
have fallen upon them. Bee’s brigade, 3000 strong, was the only part of the 
Army of the Shenandoah which took part in the bloody repulse of the 
morning; it was also engaged through the afternoon, and thus suffered more 
than Jackson’s; it must have lost 700 men. Of the 4300 men which com¬ 
posed the commands of Bee and Evans, one man in four must have been 
killed or wounded. 

The Federal loss is officially stated at 481 killed, 1011 wounded, and 1460 
missing—3051 in all. This is probably a close approximation to the entire 
loss. But as all the dead were left on the field, and the greater part of those 
who were severely wounded fell into the hands of the enemy, their number 
can be given only by estimate. The estimates are certainly below the truth. 
The Confederate official report states that 1421 prisoners were sent to Rich¬ 
mond, of whom 871 were unwounded. Deducting these from the total loss, 
there remain 2180 killed and wounded. According to the usual ratio of 
casualties in battle, the Federal loss must have been about 550 killed and 
1630 wounded. They lost 27 cannon, of which 10 were captured on the 
field, and the remainder abandoned in various stages of the pursuit—a large 
part of them at the crossing of Cub Run—besides 4000 muskets, 4500 sets 
of accoutrements, and a considerable quantity of ammunition. 

We have described the battle of Bull Run in detail because it presents 
an epitome of the errors which marked the conduct of the Federals during 
the first months of the war. The conception was unwise; the plan faulty; 
the execution imperfect. The conception was unwise, because defeat was 
more than probable, and little real advantage could be gained by entire suc¬ 
cess. All that could be gained was a temporary interruption of railroad 
communications. When the second plan of operations was decided upon, 
which it was supposed would bring on a battle with an enemy presumed to 
be of not inferior force, strongly posted, McDowell still left one fifth of his 
army behind at Fairfax, more than ten miles from the battle-field, where 
they could be of no use. He could not expect to rout the Confederates, 
and either destroy their army or drive them from their strong post at Ma¬ 
nassas. That point was to be carefully avoided in any case. If repulsed 
by surprise at Stone Bridge, the Confederates could at worst fall back be¬ 
hind the guns of Camp Pickens. The only real object sought to be gained 
by the battle of the 21st was to cut the railroad connection near Gainesville, 
ten miles in a straight line from Centreville, and thus break up the commu- 

NOTE ON THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 

Sources and Authorities. —The main sources for the history of the battle of Bull Run arc 
the reports of the commander* on both sides. The newspaper accounts, Northern and Southern, 
are of little value. The system of “War Correspondence," which furnishes abundant anil valu¬ 
able information respecting the later periods of the war, had not vet been fairly organized. The 
current accounts of the day abound in misapprehensions and exaggerations. In the Southern pa¬ 
pers the number of the Federals is stated any where from 50,000 to 135,000, with from 75 to 150 
guns, and regular cavalry by the thousand. The Northern papers were filled with accounts of 
heights stormed, intrenchments carried, and masked batteries encountered. But the battle was 
fought upon ground which neither side had anticipated. Until after ten o’clock in the morning 
there had not been a single soldier upon the plateau, and not a ynrd of intrenchment was thrown 
up, and, with the exception of the abattis at the Stone Bridge, there were no artificial defenses 
nearer than Camp Fickcns, almost ten miles distant. Neither were there any masked batteries. 
The Confederate artillery was, indeed, very judiciously posted, every advantage being taken of the 
natural formation of the ground. Thus Imboden’s battery of four guns was placed by Bee early 
in the day in a ravine running down the slope of the plateau in front of the Henry house, opening 
directly upon the road by which Porter’s brigade and Heintzclman’s division were advancing. 
Across' the mouth of this'ravine was a slight swell, behind the crest of which the guns were shel¬ 
tered, and over which they played upon the Federal columns. When Bee and Evans were driven 
back, their line of retreat took them to the east of this battery, which was left wholly unsupported. 
For more than three hours Imboden never saw a Confederate except those belonging to his own 
battery. All this time lie kept up a fire upon the Federal columns until his guns became so 
heated that it was dangerous to load them. During all this time he was fired upon by Griffin’s 


nication between the enemy’s forces at Manassas and those in the Yalley of 
Virginia. That he was not aware that this communication had already been 
made, and that Jackson, with half of his army, had already joined Beaure¬ 
gard, and that he would be followed by the other half before his detachment 
could by any possibility reach the road, is not to be laid to the charge of 
McDowell. He had every reason to suppose that Patterson was still hold¬ 
ing Johnston in check at Winchester. But the tearing up of a few rods of 
railway by a force which must in any case be withdrawn at once, could only 
hinder, not prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy. In the 
endeavor to accomplish even this McDowell divided his army, leaving one 
third around Centreville, hardly five miles from where he knew the centre 
of the main force of the enemy to be, and stretching the other over ten miles 
of road, with an interval between the wings so wide that either might have 
been crushed without the least possibility of aid from the other. Had the 
Confederate commanders understood the design of McDowell, their wisest 
course would have been to have allowed him to pass the Stone Bridge with¬ 
out opposition, and so separate Tyler, Hunter, and Heintzelman as widely 
as he pleased from Miles. Two courses would then have been open: to 
fall upon Miles and annihilate him; or to march up Bull Run on the pre¬ 
cise route by which their re-enforcements actually were brought up, throw 
themselves between Miles and Tyler, and assail the rear of the latter. The 
advancing columns of the Federals would have been thus cut off by superior 
force from their base of supplies at Centreville. They had set out with ra¬ 
tions for three -days, and only ammunition for a single battle, with no pro¬ 
vision for a renewal. The Federal army having been thus effectually divided 
by its commander, either part might have been attacked and destroyed. 
The Confederate generals, not dreaming that the great movement had so 
small a purpose, assumed that its design was to interpose between Manassas 
and their army lying along Bull Run. They therefore ordered the position 
at the Stone Bridge to be held at all hazards, and brought up their forces to 
repel what they presumed to be the movement upon Manassas. At the same 
time, as the most effective method of relieving their threatened left flank, 
they ordered a determined attack by their right and centre upon the rear 
and left flank of the Federals at Centreville. Had a successful attack been 
made here, as McDowell says, “our whole force would have been irretrieva¬ 
bly cut off and destroyed.” The accidental miscarriage of the order sent to 
Ewell was all that prevented this result. 

The long withdrawal from action of Burnside’s brigade is wholly inex¬ 
plicable. The battle of the morning was over by noon. It had lasted less 
than two hours. Burnside had not suffered severely, and his men were in 
perfect order, and confident of victory. Their ammunition had indeed be¬ 
come well-nigh exhausted, and they were very properly withdrawn a little 
to the rear to replenish it. This was only partially accomplished at half 
past four, when Burnside received orders to protect the retreat. More than 
four hours were thrown away, while a fierce action was going on in plain 
sight at the distance of scarcely a mile. 

Hardly less unaccountable is the long delay of Schenck’s brigade at the 
Stone Bridge. From eight in the morning the passage was only obstructed 
by an abattis, and defended by four companies of infantry with two guns. 
This weakness could not, indeed, be known at once; but before eleven Ty¬ 
ler was assured that the enemy had no force in that quarter, and crossed the 
Run with Sherman’s and Keyes’s brigades. The weak guard at the bridge 
was swept away -by noon, when Bee and Evans fell back, and very soon 
after Keyes marched clear above and beyond the vacant position which it 
had occupied. There was nothing in the way but the abattis, which could 
have been avoided by a slight detour on either side, or removed in a few 
minutes. No attempt to remove it was made for almost four hours, and then 
the removal was made just in time to open the road for a few Confederate 
guns to come down upon the rear of the flying army. 

Keyes’s movement also, though gallantly made, was without significance 
in the general result. Every step after the assault at the Robinson house 
took him farther and farther from the spot where he was wanted, clear out 
of sight of the battle, of the result of which he was ignorant until the order 
reached him to join in the retreat. As it was, he was almost cut off. The 
forces of Burnside, Schenck, and Keyes, or any one of them, at the hill, might 
probably have secured a victory, or, at all events, could have prevented the 
utter rout. 

The Confederate commanders, who had held their position against great 
odds, threw a superior force at the decisive moment upon the decisive point, 
and so won a victory as decisive and complete as is recorded in the annals 
of war. 

and Ricketts’s batteries, but so well was he covered by the slight swell before him that only three 
men were harmed by fragments of exploding shells; and at last, when the Federal column was 
close upon him, by going up the ravine he carried away all his guns except one, which was disabled 
by the accidental breaking of the axle. This was the only semblance of a masked battery upon the 
Held. Neither was there any hand-to-hand fighting. The battle was wholly an affair of artillery 
and musketry. It is doubtful whether, until the rout, there was a bayonet-thrust or a sword-cut 
given on either side. The misstatements of the newspapers have been reproduced and multiplied 
in most of the formal accounts of the battle. Thus a Colonel Estvan, who professes to have been 
with the Confederate army, says that Beauregard had 65,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, including 
“ Kirby Smith’s corps of 30,000 men, which came up a‘ the close of the action.” He also a littlo 
more than doubles the Confederate loss. He brings General Scott on the battle-field, when he 
was never nearer it than Washington; describes the conduct of Ewell’s, Holmes’s, Longstreet’a, 
and Jones’s brigades, none of which were in the action; and narrates an interview on the field be* 
tween Davis, Johnston, and Beauregard, at a moment when the first was half way between Rich¬ 
mond and Manassas, the second at the Lewis house, and only the third on the field. Estvhn’s 
book was first published in England. It is false in every possible particular. Some American 
writers have given accounts hardly less incorrect.—McDowell’s report of the battle itself is vaguo 
and indefinite. The reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders are mainly de¬ 
voted to the special operations of their several commands; but by comparing and collating the 
whole, a fair idea may be gained of the phases of the action on the Federal side.—Johnston’s re¬ 
port is, as far as it goes, clear and intelligible. It is chiefly valuable as affording means of correct¬ 
ing some important misstatements in that of Beauregard.—Beauregard’s report, made out more 
than a month after the battle, is elaborate and minute. He, however, studiously exaggerates the 
force of the Federals at each important moment, and as studiously understates his own. But in 










158 


[July, 1861. 


most cases he unintentionally furnishes the means of correcting his misstatements; and where 
these are wanting, Johnston’s less elaborate report supplies the deficiency. 

Name op the Battle. —The Confederate writers usually call the action of the 21st “the battle 
of Manassas,” styling the skirmish of the 18th “ the battle of Bull Run.” But as the battle of the 
21st wus fought some miles from Manassas, and close by the bank of the Run, the Northern des¬ 
ignation seems the most appropriate.—The title of the battle of “ Blackburn’s Ford," applied to 
the action of the 18th, is really incorrect. The ford near which the action took place is Mitchell’s, 
Blackburn’s being a mile or more lower down the stream. But as the reports all give the name 
of the ford as Blackburn's, it is hardly worth while to correct the error. It is precisely like that 
which has given the name of the “ Battle of Bunker’s Hill" to the fight on Breed’s Hill. This 
skirmisji was wholly unimportant, though at the time much was made of it. The losses on both 
sides are given from officiul sources. Beauregard says that upon “ a cursory examination" of 
one part of the field, “sixty-four corpses” of the Federals “were found and buried." But this 
statement is clearly erroneous. 

Patterson and Johnston. —“About one o’clock on the morning of the 18th I received from 
the government a telegraphic dispatch, informing me that the Northern army was advancing upon 
Manassas. . . . The best service which the Army of the Potomac could render was to prevent the 
defeat of that of the Potomac. To be able to do this, it was necessary, in the first instance, to de¬ 
feat General Patterson or'to elude him. The latter course was most speedy and certain, and 
was therefore adopted. Our sick, nearly 1700 in number, were provided for in Winchester. For 
the defense of that place the militia of Generals Carson and Mcem seemed ample; for I thought 
it certain that General Patterson would follow my movement as soon as he discerned it. Evading 
him by the disposition made of the advance guard under Colonel Stuart, the army moved through 
Ashby’s Gap to Piedmont, a station on the Manassas Gap Railroad. Hence the infantry were 
to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and urtillery were ordered to continue their 
march. I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th.” [Here follows a list of the troops with 
hifti, amounting to a little more than nine regiments, G000 men, as stated by Beauregard.] “The 
president of the railroad company had assured me that the remaining troops" [elsewhere stated 
at 5000 men] “ should arrive during the day. ... I regarded the arrival of the remainder during 
the night as certain, and Patterson’s, with the Grand Army, on the 22d as probable.”— Johnston's 
Report. 

Patterson, at a public dinner on the 16th of November, made a speech, explaining and vindi¬ 
cating his conduct. The following are the essential points, as given in the newspapers of the day. 
On the 12th of July he wrote to General Scott, proposing to go to Harper’s Ferry and Charles¬ 
ton, and asking when Manassas would be attacked; he was informed that the attack would be on 
the 16th. On the 13th he was directed, “If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next 
week, make^demonstrations to detain him in the valley of Winchester.” He made the demon¬ 
strations, and, on the 16th, drove the enemy’s pickets into the intrenchments at Winchester. 
Three days before he had written to General Scott, informing him that Johnston was in a position 
to have his strength doubled, and asked for instructions ; but none came. On the 17th Scott tel¬ 
egraphed, “To-morrow the Junction will probably be carried.” He supposed that he had detained 
Johnston the appointed time, and that the work of his column was done. On the 18th, at half 
past one in the morning, he telegraphed and asked, “ Shall I attack ?” but received no reply. He 
expected to be attacked where he was [Johnston was then on the point of setting out to join 
Beauregard]; and if Manassas was not to be attacked on that day, “he ought to have been or¬ 
dered down forthwith to join in the battle, and the attack delayed until he came. He could have 
been there on the day the battle was fought, and his assistance might have produced a different 
result." On the 20th he heard that Johnston had marched with 35,000 Confederates and a large 
artillery force in a southeasterly direction. [This must have been at about the hour when John¬ 
ston reached Manassas, whither he had marched with a little more than 11,000 men.] He tele¬ 
graphed the information to General Scott, and knew that the message was received the same day. 
In accordance with instructions, he came to Harper’s Ferry on the 21st.—In a letter written on 
that day from Harper’s Ferry, General Patterson states, “ I could have turned Johnston’s position, 
and have attacked him in the rear; but he had received large re-enforcements from Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Georgia, a total force of over 35,000 Confederate troops and 5000 Virginia militia. 
My force is less than 20,000—nineteen regiments, whose terra of service was up, or will be within 
a week. All refused to stay one hour over their time but four. Five regiments have gone home; 
two more go to-day; and three more to-morrow. To avoid being cut oft* 1 fell back and occu¬ 
pied this place.” At the time when Patterson with his 20,000 men was expecting to be attacked 
and cut off, the Confederates had near him only the Virginia militia, about 6000, and the 1700 
sick at Winchester. All the others were then either at or near Manassas. Johnston had thus 
completely deceived Patterson both as to the number and position of his army. 

The Forces. —“McDowell’s army at Ccntreville numbered within a fraction of 30,000, with 
65 pieces of artillery” [of these, six pieces, belonging to the New York Eighth, were thrown out of 
service, leaving 49 pieces.— Report of Major Harry , Chief of Artillery']. “A Pennsylvania regi¬ 
ment and a New York artillery company were discharged on the evening of the 20th, which, with 
the sick, reduced the effectives to about 28,000.”— Report of Major Barnard, Chief of Engineers. 

Beauregard, having mentioned that General Holmes had been directed to push forward his bri¬ 
gade from Fredericksburg, and that Hampton’s legion of six companies of infantry, having ar¬ 
rived that morning by the cars from Richmond, was subsequently, as soon as it arrived, ordered 
forward,” proceeds to give the following summary of his force: “The effective force of all arms 
of the Army of the Potomac on that eventful morning, including the garrison at Camp Pickens, 
did not exceed 21,833, and 29 guns. The Army of the Shenandoah ready for action on the field 
may be set down at 6000 men and 20 guns—that is, when the battle began; Smith's brigade and 
Fisher’s North Carolina came up later, and made the total of the Army of the Shenandoah en¬ 
gaged, of all arms, 8334. Hill’s Virginia regiment, 550, also arrived, but was posted as a reserve 
to the right flank. The brigades of General Holmes mustered 1265 bayonets, 6 guns, and a com¬ 
pany of cavalry about 90 strong.” It is not quite clear, from the foregoing statement, whether 
Beauregard includes Holmes’s and Hampton's forces in the Army of the Potomac. Wc have as¬ 
sumed that they were included, making the entire Confederate force 31,000 effective men. If 
they are not included, the Confederate force would be raised to about 33,000. 

A considerable part of the force on either side was not brought into actual service at any stage 
of the action. The battle presented three distinct periods, the precise time of which can not be 
given with absolute precision. As a general rule, the Confederate reports place them about half 
an hour earlier than those of the Federals. The exact moment is of little consequence. Wc give 
the time only by approximation. These periods are, First, The fight in the morning, from 10£ to 
12, when the Confederates were repulsed. Second, The Confederate stand on the plateau from 
12 to 3. Third, The advance of the Confederates and the rout of the Federals, from 3 to 4. The 
following is a statement of the forces actually engaged at each of these periods, gathered from the 
official reports on both sides. In all cases where actual numbers are furnished in the reports, 
these are given. In other cases, a “ regiment” is assumed to have consisted of 760 effective men, 
and a “company,” whether of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, of 75. Soma were stronger and 
some weaker; but this is the average. The numbers given are those with which the regiments 
went into action; the losses at the several periods were so nearly equal as not materially to vary 
the general result. 

1. The Fight in the Morning. 

The Confederate force actually engaged consisted of Bee’s brigade [“2732 bayonets,” Beaure¬ 
gard, besides officers and artillery], 3000 men, and 11 companies of Evans’s, with artillery, 900 men 
—in all, about 3900. The Federals actually engaged consisted of Burnside’s brigade, four regi¬ 
ments, with two companies of artillery—3200 men in all, and Sykes’s eight companies of regulars, 
600 strong, together making 3800 men. Porter’s artillery had begun to play upon the Confed¬ 
erates; his infantry regiments were also coming upon the field, when the Confederates broke. 
Sherman’s brigade just then appeared, and aided in the repulse, when the Confederates, wholly 
outnumbered, fell back in confusion upon the plateau. 

2. The Confederate Stand on the Phteau. 

The Confederates, consisting of Bee's brigade, 3000 strong, and Evans’s whole half brigade, 
1300, fell back in confusion upon the plateau, where they met Hampton’s legion, six companies, 
and Jackson’s brigade [“2611 strong,” Beauregard, besides artillery], about 2800—in all, about 
7500 men were the forces on the plateau at the moment when Johnston and Beauregard came 
up. They were almost immediately followed by Smith’s battalion of the Virginia Forty-ninth, 
and seven companies from Hunter’s Virginia Eighth, ordered up from Cocke, and two additional 
regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah—Falkner’s Second Mississippi and Fisher’s North Car¬ 
olina—which had just come up, 2500 men in all. The entire force which held the plateau was 
thus about 10,000, from which the losses must be deducted. Beauregard indeed says, after 
having enumerated all these regiments, “ Confronting the enemy at this time my force numbered 
at most not more than 6500 infantry and artillerists, with but thirteen pieces of artillery and two 

companies of cavalry.The enemy’s force, now bearing confidently down on our position, 

consisted of over 20,000 infantry, seven companies of regular cavalry, and 24 pieces of improved 
artillery.” This is but a part of Beauregard’s studious system of understating his own force, and 
overstating that of his opponents. The entire Federal force which crossed the Run was but 
18,000; of these, at that moment, Burnside’s brigade, with the exception of one regiment, was 
withdrawn, and Howard’s brigade had not crossed the Run. These brigades numbered fully 
6000, so that there remain but 13,000 Federals then “bearing down” upon the Confederate posi¬ 
tion ; and these, according to Barnard, “ were in a single column, strung along over several miles 
of road.”—Johnston’s report here furnishes additional means for correcting the error of Beaure¬ 
gard. Speaking of the time before the arrival of Fisher and Falkner, he says : “ We had now 


16 guns and 260 cavalry, and a little above nine regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah, and 
6ix guns and less than the strength of three regiments of that of the Potomac, engaged with about 
35,000 United States troops, umong whom were full 3000 men of the old regular army.” John¬ 
ston here gives the Confederate force accurately, 12 regiments, equal to 9000 men, and 22 guns. 
He, however, more than doubles the Federal force. 

3. The Confederate Advance and the Federal Rout. 

Beauregard says: “By this time, between half past two and three o’clock P.M., our re-enforcc- 
ments, pushed forward and directed by General Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand, 
just ns 1 had ordered forward to a second effort for the recovery of the disputed plateau the whole 
line, including my reserves, which at this crisis of the battle I felt called upon to lend in person. 
The attack was general, and was shared in by every regiment then in the field.” After tnumcr- 
atihg the new re-enforcements, with less particularity than is done by Johnston, whose report we 
follow, he says: “About the same time, at three o’cluck P.M., Brigadier General E. K. Smith, 
with some 1700 infantry of Elzey’s brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah, and Beckham’s bat¬ 
tery, came upon the field from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had nrrivtd by railroad at 
noon." This was the last re-enforcement; and the two reports enable us to give the number of 
the Confederates on the field, all of whom were in action at the time of the rout. These con¬ 
sisted of the 6000 men of the Army of the Shenandoah originally engaged ; Evans’s half brigade, 
1300; Hampton's legion, 400; Kirby Smith’s, 1700—9400 specially enumerated ; with the follow¬ 
ing regiments of infantry, of which the numbers are not stated : Fisher’s North Carolina, Falkner’s 
Mississippi, of the Army of the Shenandoah; Cash’s and Kershaw’s, from Bonham’s brigade; 
Cocke’s whole brigade of five regiments; and Early’s brigade of three regiments—in all, twelve 
regiments, equal to 9000 men, making 18,400 infantry. There is some obscurity in the enumer¬ 
ation of the cavalry and artillery; but at least ten companies arc specially mentioned ns engaged, 
which brings the entire Confederate force actually on the plateau at the time of the rout to a lit¬ 
tle more than 19,000 men. The remaining 11,0*00 (or perhaps 13,000) men not actually engaged 
consisted of Holmes’s, Ewell's, Jones’s, Long.street’s, and a part of Bonham’s brigades. 

The Federal forces engaged, or in a position to be brought into action at the time of the rout, 
consisted, as stated in the text, of the 18,000 who crossed the Run, deducting Keyes’s brigade of 
2500, and an equal number of Burnside’s brigade—5000 iu all, leaving 13,000 at that moment on 
the field. 

The Zouaves.—“T he evanescent courage of the Zouaves prompted them to fire perhaps a 
hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy’s 
cavalry, which took place immediately.”— Porter's Report. “As soon as the Zouaves came up, 

I led them forward against an Alabama regiment partly concealed in a clump of small pines in 
an old field. At the first fire they broke and fled to the rear, keeping up u desultory firing over 
the heads of their comrades in front; at the same moment they were charged by a company of 
secession cavalry on their rear, who came by a road through two strips of wood on our extreme 
right. The fire of the Zouaves killed four and wounded one, dispersing them. The discomfiture 
of this cavalry was completed by a fire from Captain Collum’s company of United States cavalry, 
which killed and wounded several men. Colonel Farnliam, with some of his officers and men, 
behaved gallantly, but the regiment of Zouaves, as a regiment, did not appear again on the field. 
Many of the men joined other regiments, and did good service ns skirmishers. . . . Since the re¬ 
treat more than three fourths of the Zouaves have disappeared."— lleintzelvmn's Rejiort. “The 
new position [of Griffin’s and Ricketts’s batteries] had scarcely been occupied when a troop of the 
enemy’s cavairy, debouching from a piece of wood close upon our right flank, charged down upon 
the New York Eleventh. The Zouaves, catching sight of the cavnlry a few minutes before they 
were upon them, broke ranks to such a degree that the cavalry dashed through them without do¬ 
ing them much harm. The Zouaves gave them a scattering fire as they passed, which emptied 
five saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes afterward a regiment of the enemy’s infantry 
presented itself in line at not more than 60 or 70 yards’ distance, and delivered a volley full upon 
the batteries and their supports. The Eleventh and Fourteenth regiments instantly broke and 
fled in confusion to the rear, and refused to rally and return to the support of the batteries.”— 
Barry's Rcjtort. 

The Rout.—T he completeness of the rout is testified to in almost all the reports of the Federal 
commanders. McDoucU says: “This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no 
remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy’s fire, but 
in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill, and there maintained itself 
until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike. The plain was covered 
with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The 

retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still farther into a panic.I gave the 

necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer at least 

the appearance of organization.Once on the road, and the different corps coming together 

in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost. 
.... In the panic [at the crossing of Cub Run] the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition 
were cut from their traces by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, 
the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered.By sundown most of our men had got be¬ 

yond Ccntreville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a 
stand there. . . . The utter disorganization and demoralization of the mass of the army seemed, 

to all who were near enough to be consulted, to admit no alternative but to fall back.On 

sending the officers of the staff’to the different camps, they found that our decision had been an¬ 
ticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road 
to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing, and hurrying them along.” 

Porter says: “The slopes behind us were swarming with our rctreating’and disorganized forces, 
while riderless horses and artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd. All farther ef¬ 
forts were futile. The words, gestures, and threats of our officers were thrown away upon men 

who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for absence of body.The rear-guard 

[mainly Sykes’s regulars] followed our panic-stricken troops to Ccntreville, resisting the attacks of 
the rebel cavalry and urtillery, and saving them from the inevitable destruction which awaited 
them had not this body been interposed.” 

Ueintzelman says: “ Soon after the firing commenced, the Brooklyn Fourteenth broke and ran. 

I considered it useless to attempt to rally them. The want of discipline in these regiments was 
so great that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards in the rear, and 
continue to fire—fortunately for the braver ones—very high in the air, and compelling those in 
front to retreat. . . . Finding it impossible to rally any of the regiments, we commenced our retreat 
at about half past four P.M. There was a fine position a short distance in the rear, where I 
hoped to make a stand with a section of Arnold’s battery and the United States cavalry, if I could 
rally a few regiments of infantry. In this I utterly failed, and we continued our retreat on the 
road we bad advanced on in the morning. I sent forward my staff officers to rally some troops 
beyond the Run, but not a company would form. . . . Such a rout I never witnessed before. No 
efforts could induce a single regiment to form after the retreat had commenced.” 

McClellan says: “I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Satur¬ 
day, July 27th, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull Run. I found no army to command; a 
mere collection of regiments, cowering on tho banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others 
dispirited by the recent defeat. ... The city was almost in n condition to have been taken by a 
dash of cavalry.” 

The Pursuit.—“E arly’s brigade, etc., pursued the now panic-stricken, fugitive enemy. Stu¬ 
art, with his cavulry, and Beckham, had also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the 
enemy had come upon the field in the morning; but, soon encumbered by prisoners who thronged 
the way, the former was unable to attack the mass of fast-fleeing, fugitive Federalists. Withers’s, 

1 res ton s, Cash s, and Kershaw’s regiments, Hampton’s legion, and Kemper’s battery, also pursued- 
ulong the Warrenton road by the Stone Bridge, the enemy having opportunely opened a way for 
them through the heavy abattis which my troops had made on the west side of the bridge several 
days before; but this pursuit was soon recalled. . . . Colonel Radford, with six companies of Vir¬ 
ginia cavalry, was ordered to cross Bull Run, and attack the enemy from the direction of the Lewis 
house. In the immediate vicinity of the Suspension Bridge [over Cub Run] he charged a battery 
with great gallantry, took Colonel Corcoran, of the 69th New York, prisoner, and captured the 
colors of that regiment.. . . Lieutenant Munford also led some companies of cavalry in hot pur¬ 
suit, and captured prisoners, cannon, etc.,abandoned in the flight.”— Beauregards Report. “ Stu¬ 
art pressed the pursuit of the enemy’s principal line of retreat, the Sudley road. Four companies 
of cavalry, under Radford and Munford, were ordered to cross the stream to reach the turnpike, 
the line of retreat of the enemy’s left. Our cavalry found the roads encumbered with dead and 
wounded (many of whom seemed to have been thrown from wagons), arms, accoutrements, and 
clothing. . . . Instructions were sent to Bonham to march by the quickest route to intercept the 
fugitives; and to Longstrect to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was 
checked by the enemy’s reserve, and by night at Centreville.’’— Johnston's Rejwrt. 

“ The order [to take up a position in front of Centreville] was executed with great difficulty, 
as the road was nearly' choked up by retreating baggage-wagons of several divisions, and by the 
vast number of flying soldiers belonging to various regiments. . . . Nevertheless, 1 was enabled to 
take a position which would prevent the advance of the enemy, and protect the retreat of the 
army. .. . The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers continued until nine o’clock in the even- 
ing, the great majority in wild confusion, and but few in collected bodies. Soon afterward sev¬ 
eral squadrons of the enemy’s cavalry advanced along the road, and appeared before the outposts. 
.... The skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned around, leaving several killed and wounded 
on the spot. Afterward we were several times molested fror to- : the enemy’s cavai¬ 
ry. At about midnight, the command to leave the position ano uau.u ic wu given 

by General McDowell”— Bleaker's Report. 









August, 1861,] 


THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—BALL’S BLUFF. 



OUOBUK U McGI.EL.UAN. 


CHAPTER IV. 

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—BALL’S BLUFF. 

The new Array.—Its Organization.—General McClellan.—Difficulties in his Way.—The Materiel 
of War.—Fortifications about Washington.—Popular impression as to the early close of the 
War.—McClellan’s Memorandum addressed to the President.—His Estimate of the Force 
requisite for an aggressive Campaign.—Operations during the Summer and Autumn.—Rccon- 
noissance toward Lcwinsville.—Evacuation of Munson’s Hill by the Confederates.—Confeder¬ 
ate Batteries at Matthias Point.—Blockade of the Lower Potomac.—Operations on the Upper 
Potomac.—Position of Forces.—Confederate Occupation of Leesburg.—McCall’s Advance to 
Drainesville.—Ashby’s Raid on Harper’s Ferry.—Devens’s Reconnoissance toward Leesburg. 
—The Battle of Ball’s Bluff.—Death of Baker.—The Defeat and Slaughter of the Federal*.— 
Cause of the Disaster.—The Confederate Army in Virginia.—Ord’s Advance to Drainesville. 
—Object of the Movement.—McCall’s Division.—The March.—The Enemy flauked.—His 
Retreat.—Losses. 

T HE battle of Bull Run had been lost. The enemy bad not improved his 
opportunity against our panic-stricken capital; no victory gained in the 
war was more fruitless of benefit to the victors, and to the vanquished there 
could have been no success more fortunate, on the whole, than was their 
defeat. The battle had been a test-battle for a continent that for three gen¬ 
erations had been nursed in peace—a test-battle both for the North and 
South, it is true, but, as usually happens in such a case, the former, whose 
strength had been broken, learned the lesson, while the latter, blinded by 
temporary and easily-won success, became over-confident, and saw in the 
Federal rout of July only a magnificent illustration of the martial superiority 
of Southern chivalry. Thus it happened that while the South relaxed its 
strength, the muscular North contracted and prepared to strike blows. The 
great uprising in April had brought to the capital a vast assemblage of mi¬ 
litia ; and these, not waiting for the mature results of discipline, but pushed 
on by the incessant clamor of people and press, had shouldered arms, to 
which the majority of them were unused, and marched forth of a hot sum¬ 
mer’s day to meet the defiant foe beyond Centreville, very much as the 
same number of men would have gone to a picnic or a fancy tournament, 
and with not half the regularity that would have marked an ordinary train¬ 
ing day; and this mock army had been swept from the field, disorganized 
and useless. Following upon this disaster came a second uprising, which 
gave us, at length, an army of soldiers. 

But this was the work of time, and it was also a work of great difficulty. 
Perhaps the chief obstacle in the way of such a military organization as was 
required was the habitual predisposition of the people to peaceful occupa¬ 
tions. Among the many shrewd sayings of Lord Bacon was this: that a 
nation devoted to the minute operations of mechanism and to lucrative com¬ 
merce is the least likely, of all others, to be martially disposed. In addition 
to this we were a republic, and there was no distinction of classes, as between 
the ruling and the ruled, and thus none of that subserviency of one class to 
another which leads naturally to military subordination and discipline. It 
was an easy matter for Congress to vote and to raise half a million of men. 
But the manner in which recruiting was carried on introduced into this body 
an absolutely worthless element. Officers were appointed at the head of 
regiments as the reward for filling up their ranks, and the motives to decep¬ 
tion were too powerful to be resisted; sometimes one third of a regiment 
which had been mustered into the army was found, upon inspection, to be 
unfit for active service. Here was one difficulty. But if there was a large 
class of •* incapables” among the privates, there was a still larger class in 
proportion among the officers, who, for the most part, had no military knowl¬ 
edge whatever. This was the Kind of army which displaced the armed 


159 

crowd of the summer campaign; this was the army which, at a week’s no¬ 
tice, rushed to the protection of the capital; but it was not the kind of army 
that could carry on a campaign—that could stand reverses or bear success. 
There was not a sufficiently large force of the regular army to form a re¬ 
spectable nucleus about which this crude mass might be gathered and or¬ 
ganized. The army that was needed had to be made , and it must be made 
out of unpromising material. 

But who was to transform this half million of men into good and trust¬ 
worthy soldiers? We had one general — Winfield Scott—who had been 
tried, and in whom the country had great confidence. But he was infirm, 
and had arrived at that period of life when it was beyond his power to en¬ 
dure the fatiguing duties that must inevitably fall upon the commander of 
so large an army. He himself, aware of this, although unwilling wholly to 
disengage himself from the struggle, suggested that another be placed at the 
helm, he himself retaining a general oversight of operations. For this im¬ 
portant office he proposed General George B. McClellan. 

The campaigns in West Virginia in the summer of 1861 contrasted most 
favorably with the operations carried on at the same time in the eastern part 
of the state. The topography of West Virginia presented a very great ob¬ 
stacle to military operations; but these difficulties existed in a greater de¬ 
gree for the Confederates than for ourselves, inasmuch as we had the advan¬ 
tage—in this case a decisive one—of having the surrounding people on our 
side. The attempts, therefore, which were made by Garnett and his fellow- 
officers to occupy this mountainous region were thwarted, without any great 
sacrifice except the labor involved in arduous marches, and somewhat more 
than the ordinary exposure that belongs of necessity to a soldier’s life. 
However strongly the enemy might be fortified, he had always a long line 
of communication to protect, and, by simply cutting this line" he would al¬ 
ways be compelled to risk the chances of battle, in which the advantages 
were mostly in our favor. The campaign was wisely planned in every part, 
and McClellan was unusually fortunate in the vigorous support given him 
by Rosecrans. Nor does the fact that the commander himself was not al¬ 
ways personally present on the field of conflict at all diminish the credit due 
to the military skill which planned and controlled the battle. The good de¬ 
gree of military sagacity developed in these battles, and the rapidity with 
which one victory followed upon the heels of another, at a time when the 
whole country was impatient for activity, brought McClellan into a promi¬ 
nence which he enjoyed without a rival. Another quality, more character¬ 
istic of McClellan than of any other general, and one which was more than 
all others calculated to make him the centre of popular attraction, was his 
extraordinary capability of creating enthusiasm in his army. This enthusi¬ 
asm was of no ordinary character, but rather a sort of inspiration, by which 
the troops became identified with their leader, a part and parcel of his per¬ 
sonal ambition and destiny as well as of his military operations. It was 
not a simple, frank outburst of admiration, but it was personal sympathy, 
fervent devotion. Fortunate beyond the usual estimate put upon them 
were all these characteristics, and they doubtless had great weight with 
General Scott; but with the lieutenant general there was another consid¬ 
eration of at least equal importance—McClellan, having been from the first 
scrupulously jealous of what the Southern states deemed to be their rights, 
would be likely to conciliate the South, if conciliation were yet possible, and 
his appointment would unite the country by bringing even the pro-slavery 
party of the North over to the support of the war, whereas the appointment 
of a member of the Republican party, as it seemed to Scott, would provoke 
the enemy to a more determined resistance and distract our counsels at home. 
But there was a greater danger which was not foreseen, viz., the possibility, 
nay, the almost inevitable certainty of disagreement between a general and 
an administration representing sentiments radically opposite to his own; 
and the jealousies growing out of this opposition in sentiment lost us many 
a battle and many an opportunity of bringing the war to a speedy termina¬ 
tion. These troubles were, however, in the background, and it will not be 
necessary to consider their origin and development until we come to treat 
of the Peninsular Campaign of 1862. 

In the mean time, the difficulties which McClellan had to encounter and 
overcome at the outset, and before any active operations could be attempt¬ 
ed, were very great and numerous. Some of these we have indicated in 
connection with the raw material which was given him to make into an 
army. This particular class of difficulties McClellan looked directly in the 
face, and it is probable that so great a number of men were never in so short 
a space of time organized into an efficient army. In this organization the 
regiment was the unit. Four regiments constituted a brigade, and'three 
brigades a division. Each division had four batteries, three served by vol¬ 
unteers and one by regulars, the captain of the latter commanding the en¬ 
tire artillery of the division. The regulars were not distributed, but were 
kept together in divisions by themselves. In the constitution of this army, 
McClellan’s intimate acquaintance with European tactics became of very 
great value and assistance. The result was perhaps not an equivalent to 
the Southern army in some important respects, for the latter entered more 
naturally into military organization; the officers were men accustomed to 
rule, the men to be ruled, and the existence of slavery in the South had al¬ 
ways necessitated a very near approach to martial law as the ordinary status 
of society. 

But soldiers are only the muscular basis of an army; it is the mechanical 
appliances of war that give an army availability and multiply its power. 
These appliances are of two sorts, offensive and defensive. And here again 
the difficulty did not consist in obtaining the raw material or a sufficient 
supply of money, but in elaborate construction, requiring the tedious labor 
of months. As Congress could vote half a million of men, so it could vote 









160 


[August, 1861 



INTERIOR OK TOE UPPER BATTERY AT CHAIN BRIDGE, WASHINGTON. 


half a thousand millions of dollars; but it could no more easily metamorph¬ 
ose money into muskets, cannon, and pontoon bridges than raw militia into 
soldiers. If we consider merely the amount of food necessary to five hund¬ 
red thousand men, it sums up in the short space of one week to nearly three 
million pounds of meat and four millions of flour, besides three hundred and 
fifty thousand pounds of coffee and five hundred and twenty-five thousand 
pounds of sugar. The systematic regulation of this enormous supply pre¬ 
supposes arrangements the most complicate in advertisement of proposals, in 
shipment and transportation, and finally in distribution. Then the arrange¬ 
ments for equipments and munitions required still more time for their com¬ 
pletion. The number of small arms at the disposal of the government was 
fearfully inadequate. These had either to be manufactured in this country 
or imported. The Springfield armory and that at Harper’s Ferry were the 
principal sources of the home supply at the beginning of the war, and the 
latter of these had been destroyed in April. There were not enough mus¬ 
kets in the North to supply the 75,000 men of the President’s first call. 
Even the Springfield armory could furnish no more than 25,000 per year. 
Evidently, then, new armories had to be set iri operation, and those already 
existing enlarged, while in the mean time the most strenuous efforts were 
made to secure a foreign supply. Not only was the quantity of small arms 
necessary to carry on an extensive campaign slowly produced, but there was 
an equal impediment in the way of promptly furnishing heavy artillery. 

The very tents of the soldiers taxed all the sail-makers of the country to 
the utmost extent of their working powers. Wagons, and harness, and cav¬ 
alry equipments of every sort existed only in the raw material, and slowly 
advanced out of this primitive form under the manufacturer’s busy hand. 
The industrial activity of the North was thoroughly aroused to meet the 


sudden and pressing demand; all that could be done quickly was done. 
But skill is the result of experience; it does not spring up at any moment¬ 
ary emergency; and, therefore, all work requiring a great degree of mechan¬ 
ical elaboration was of slow completion; and the number of laborers fitted 
for such work being insufficient, others must be trained before they could be 
of any efficiency. 

Not only must there be a vast increase of materiel for offensive warfare, 
but the disorganization of the army after its defeat at Bull Bun made it nec¬ 
essary to surround Washington with defensive works of great strength. 
This was partially begun on the occasion of our first advance into Virginia 
and tne occupation of Alexandria, when Forts Eunyon and Corcoran were 
constructed as letes-de-pont to the Long Bridge and the Aqueduct. A fort¬ 
night afterward Fort Albany was laid out, commanding the Columbia and 
the Aqueduct and Alexandria roads. After McClellan assumed command 
of the Army of the Potomac, the interval between Fort Corcoran and Fort 
Albany was filled by a series of works within supporting distance of each 
other; and strong works were built controlling the principal routes leading 
to Washington from the north. Thus was established the basis of an adequate 
fortification for the defense of the capital; but to complete the works so far 
as to justify any great depletion of the army in front of Washington for the 
purposes of an offensive campaign was the work of months. 1 

1 “ The theory of these defenses is that upon which the works of Torres Vedras were based—the 
only one admitted at the present day for defending extensive lines. It is to occupy the command¬ 
ing points within range of each other by field-forts, the fire of which shall sweep all the approaches. 
These forts furnish the secure emplacements of artillery. They also afford cover to bodies of in¬ 
fantry. The works may be connected by lines of light parapets, or the ground (where practicable) 
may be so obstructed that the enemy’s troops can not penetrate the interval without being ex¬ 
posed, for a considerable time, to the destructive effects of the artillery or musketry fire of the fort9. 

“With such a system established, the defense against a powerful attack requires that all tht 













































































































THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—BALL'S BLUFF. 


161 



FOBT COROOUA.N, ARLINGTON HEIGHT*.. 


In the face of all these impediments, it was the popular impression that 
the war would be, by great victories gained on the field,brought to comple¬ 
tion in two or three months. Besides, there were a few who supposed that 
our immense and formidable preparations would intimidate the South, and 
obviate the very necessity of fighting. But the South was not intimidated. 
She herself voted 500,000 men, and brought a large proportion of that num¬ 
ber into the field, partly by volunteering, and in great measure by conscrip¬ 
tion. Then it was apparent to every military eye that the whole strength 
of the two sections must meet, and that the side to yield would be that which 
was more rapidly exhausted. It was also evident that the preliminary prep¬ 
arations in the matter of organization must be thoroughly completed before 
a campaign could be ventured against an enemy whose force, though not 
equal to our own in point of numbers, had a great advantage in position, 
being situated at the centre of an arc along whose circumference it would 
be necessary for us to operate in any aggressive movement. The popular 
impression, however, as to the early termination of the war still remained; 
indeed, a shorter time elapsed before the date which had been set for a final 
settlement than would have sufficed for our army to learn how to build a 
pontoon bridge. 


The season suitable for active operations previous to the winter of 1861 
passed by without any important movement. In a memorandum addressed 
to the President early in August of that year, McClellan expressed his con¬ 
victions in regard to the nature of the coming campaign in the most explicit 
terms. Having stated that the war differed from all others in this respect, 
viz., that in ordinary wars the purpose was simply to conquer a peace and 
make a treaty on advantageous terms, while in this it was necessary to crush 
a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a 
nation, he proceeded to urge the necessity for an overwhelming display of 
physical force. Our foreign relations and financial credit, he said, demanded 
that the military action of the government should be prompt and irresistible. 
The plan of operations which he advised was the following: 

The rebels having made Virginia their main field of operations, it was 
therefore necessary that the great conflict should take place in that state. 
But, to weaken the resistance at this point, movements should be made both 
by land and water in other directions, and especially in the West, upon the 
Mississippi, and, as soon as Kentucky was sufficiently cordial in her loyal¬ 
ty, through that state into Eastern Tennessee. These separate and co-oper¬ 
ative movements would not require a very large force; but for the main 



FORT ALBANY, NEAR ALEXANDRIA. 


army—that of the Potomac—he urged a force of 273,000 men, to be supplied 
with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains and transportation. In di¬ 
rect co-operation with this force, a strong naval armament should be pre¬ 
pared to move against important points along the enemy’s sea-coast As an 
argument in favor of so large an army in the East, he suggested that the cap¬ 
ture of Richmond was only the first step into the enemy’s country; and as 
every successful advance lengthened our line of communications, large de¬ 
tachments of force would be necessary to protect that line, while the enemy, 
at every withdrawal, would be able to make a greater concentration of his 
own forces. 

Undoubtedly, in his proposed distribution of forces, McClellan underrated 
the difficulties of the Western campaign. At least, it soon became evident 

forts shall bp garrisoned; that a certain amount of infantry, cavalry, and movable artillery be 
distributed along the lines sufficient to bold them until reserves can be brought to support; and, 
finally, it requires a movable force held as a reserve, which may be shifted from point to point, to 
meet the enemy’s effort wherever it may be made, and where, aided by the works, they can repel 
superior numbers. 

“ It is evident that without fortifications a place can not be considered secure unless held by 
considerably greater numbers than the enemy can bring to assail it. No less an authority than 
Napoleon says that, aided by fortifications, 50,000 men and 3000 artillerymen can defend a cap¬ 
ital against 300,000 men, and he asserts the necessity of fortifying all national capitals .”—General 
Barnard's Report , p. 12. 


that to subdue the Confederates in Kentucky and Missouri alone required a 
force much larger than McClellan considered necessary for an advance into 
East Tennessee. 

This memorandum was addressed to the President, at bis own request, 
within two weeks after the - battle of Bull Run. Three months afterward, 
in the latter part of October, there being a strong desire on the part of the 
country and the President for an immediate advance of the Army of the 
Potomac, McClellan made another statement to the President, representing 
the force available for an advance movement as only about 76,000 men, 
while that of the enemy behind intrenched fortifications was fully 150,000. 
It is true there was present for duty a force of 147,000 men, but over 13,000 
of these were either unarmed or unequipped. Out of the 134,000 left, 
58,000 must remain to protect Washington, to guard the Potomac, and to 
garrison Baltimore and Annapolis, leaving only 76,000 for the aggressive 
movement against Richmond. 

In order to an advance, McClellan thought that 35,000 men should be left 
to protect Washington, 13,000 to guard the Potomac, 10,000 to garrison 
Baltimore and Annapolis, while there should be a column of 150,000 for 
active operations. This would require an aggregate, present and absent, of 
240,000 men. As to the force of the enemy at Manassas, McClellan was no 
















162 


[October, 1861 



MDNSON'e 111 LI- 


doubt egregiously mistaken.- His information was gathered from unreliable 
sources, and any reports that militated against bis preconceived opinions he 
summarily rejected. There is no good reason to believe that the enemy at 
Manassas numbered over 50,000 men; for even at a later period, when their 
ranks had been re-enforced by conscription, they were estimated at only 
about 80,000. 

Thus so far as the main operations against Richmond were concerned. 
But the army was not idle during the summer. Reconnoitring parties 
were continually scouring the country to within a short distance of the ene¬ 
my’s lines. Frequently these reconnoissances resulted in skirmishes, which 
accustomed the soldiers to being under fire. One of the most important of 
those which occurred during the summer was that made by General Smith, 
on the 25th of September, toward Lewinsville. The general had several 
thousand troops in his command, and, shortly after their arrival at Lewins¬ 
ville, they were attacked by a large force of the Confederates from Falls 
Church. The result of the sharp conflict which ensued was the retreat of 
the enemy and the capture of some of bis stores by General Smith. Two 
days afterward the Confederates abandoned the fortifications on Munson’s 
Hill, which they had held ever since the battle of Bull Run. 

The enemy was active during the summer and autumn chiefly in two di¬ 
rections—to prevent navigation on the Lower Potomac, and to find his way 
across some of the fords of the Upper Potomac into Maryland; and these 
operations on the right and left of McClellan’s army were at the same time 
offensive and defensive, as they not only impeded transportation on the Po¬ 
tomac, and threatened raids into the fertile valleys north of that river and 
against the important line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but also 
guarded either flank of the Confederate army at Manassas. Preparations 
for the blockade of the Lower Potomac were commenced previous to the 
battle of Bull Run. The Secretary of the Navy was not uninformed of 


these movements, and as early as June suggested to the War Department 
the necessity of occupying Matthias Point, the possession of which in force 
would secure the navigation of the river from the threatened interruption, 
and at the same time furnish a foothold on the Virginia shore for operations 
against the enemy’s right flank. The extreme left of the Federal army, in 
the neighborhood of Alexandria, was not more than five or six miles above 
a line run directly east from Manassas Junction, which was distant twenty- 
five miles. From Alexandria the Potomac runs almost directly south to 
the mouth of Acquia Creek, a distance of thirty miles; then it runs directly 
east for fifteen miles, where it rounds Matthias Point—a very prominent 
projection northward into the stream, and almost entirely separated from 
the main land by Gamble’s Creek. It was a point which, at that early pe¬ 
riod of the war, might easily have been held by a small detachment of 
troops. But no measures were taken for its occupation by General Scott. 
His suggestions to the War Department being unheeded, the Secretary of the 
Navy took the matter into his own hands with the best material at his com¬ 
mand. At this time, it must be remembered that the government had no 
gun-boats or iron-clad monitors, and the engagement of batteries by wooden 
ships of war were serious undertakings, in which the batteries had clearly 
the advantage. The United States steamers the Pawnee and the Pocahon¬ 
tas, and a naval flotilla under Commander Ward, with several steam-boats 
under naval officers, constituted the Potomac squadron, whose office it was 
to prevent communication with that part of Virginia which belonged to the 
Confederacy, intercepting supplies, and protecting transports and supply- 
vessels in their passage up and down the river. Commander Ward having 
discovered, by means of a reconnoissance off Matthias Point, that the Con¬ 
federate troops encamped there were about to erect a batter)-, on the 26th 
of June sent up to the Pawnee, at Acquia Creek, for two boats armed and 
equipped. Two small cutters’ crews were dispatched from the Pawnee, 



COIiFSDERAT* BATTBU1K8 AT SYA*tt>OBT. 



























































































Asocst- 1861.] 


TME ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—BALLS BLUFF. 


168 



CO>FE>EZATE JUTTEZ1ES AT KTT»D’s TtXX. T. OS THE POTOMAC. 


which, with a boat s crew from Ward's vessel—the Freeborn—made between 
thirty and forty men. This party effected a landing at the Point the next 
morning, driving in the rebel pickets. They found preparations for erecting 
a battery, and, under cover of the Freeborn’s guns, they proceeded immedi¬ 
ately to throw up a sand-bag breast-work, which thev completed before j 
night, when, leaving their work in order to bring guns from the vessel to 
mount them, they were surprised by a party of the enemv concealed in the 
bushes on the shore; a few of them were taken prisoners, and the rest es¬ 
caped to the steamer. Commander Ward was killed in the engagement 
No Confederate battery, however, was maintained on Matthias Point, it be¬ 
ing beyond supporting distance of the main army. In a few weeks the 
right bank of the Potomac was lined with batteries from High Point to 
Matthias Point, a distance of from thirty to forty miles. After McClellan 
assumed the command of the Army of the Potomac, the subject was again ! 
brought to the attention of the War Department by Secretary Welles. The j 
President was anxious that something should be done, and in this anxiety 
he represented the feelings of the Northern people, who deemed it a humil- 
iation that the Confederates should be able to maintain an efficient blockade \ 
of one of our principal channels of transportation. The Navy Department I 
threw the responsibility upon the military, and, in return, the military shift¬ 
ed it off upon the naval. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy 
on the 12th of August, General McClellan says: 

“ I have to-day received additional information which convinces me that 
it is more than probable that the enemy will, within a very short time, at¬ 
tempt to throw a respectable force from the mouth of Acquia Creek into 
Maryland. This attempt will probably be preceded by the erection of bat¬ 
teries at Matthias and White House Points. Such a movement on the part 
of the enemy, in connection with others probably designed, would place 
Washington in great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the strongest j 
possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Acquia 
Creek, and that the most vigilant watch b$ maintained day and night, so as 
to render such passage of the river absolutely impossible. I recommend 
that the Minnesota, and any other vessels available from Hampton Roads, 
be at once ordered up there, and that a great quantity jf coal be sent to that 
vicinity sufficient for several weeks’ supplv. At least one strong war ves¬ 
sel should be kept at Alexandria: and I again urge the concentration of a 
strong naval force in the Potomac without delay. If the Navy Department 
will render it absolutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river below 
Washington, the security of the capital will be greatlv increased. I can ; 
not too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with these requests.” But I 
the measures urged in this letter only looked to the defensive, and seemed j 
quite unsatisfactory. If there was occasion to fear that the enemy’s auda¬ 
cious operations on the south bank of the Potomac really threatened an ad¬ 
vance into Maryland, which might place Washington in jeopardy, this only 
seemed to furnish an additional argument in favor of an attempt to dislodge . 
the enemy from his positions. From this view of the case, it was only nat¬ 
ural that a great pressure should be brought to bear on McClellan to induce 
him to co-operate in such an attempt, with as strong a force as might be 
necessary to secure its success. Rcallv there was no occasion to fear an ad¬ 
vance of the enemy from the mouth of Acquia Creek into Maryland: no 
movement could have been more unwise on the part of the Confederates: ! 
and, if it had been made, it is far more probable that the invading column ! 
of the enemy would be put in jeopardv than the Federal capital. But there 
teas real occasion to fear that the Potomac might be rendered impassable 
to Federal vessels; and yet, while McClellan recommended “the strong¬ 
est possible naval force” to be stationed in the Potomac to guard against a 
fancied danger, no means were taken to guard against that which was really 
threatened. The attitude of McClellan in respect to this matter was char¬ 
acteristic of his general policy. So formidable did the force of the enemy 
seem to him, that he even feared the event of a battle in which be himself 
should take the defensive, thinking it a matter of doubt, m case General 1 


Johnston should advance against him in front, flanking him at the same 
time by a movement across the Lower Potomac into Maryland, whether he 
might not be overwhelmed bv such superior numbers in his front as to be 
unable to take care of the flanking column of the enemy, which would 
march triumphantly into Washington. If he was apprehensive as to the 
results of an attack, he was naturally far more apprehensive of the result of 
any movement on his own part which might bring on a general engagement 
It was this latter motive which was really the ground of his disinclination to 
co-operate in any undertaking involving a direct assault upon the enemy’s 
works. His idea of a campaign was that complete preparation ought to be 
made before any thing should be accomplished, and then to dispose of the 
enemy by a single decisive victoiy. It was now scarcely a month since the 
battle of Bull Run. Hardly any thing had been done as yet toward the re¬ 
organization of the army. From their previous impatience of inactivity, 
the people had gone over to the opposite extreme, and a rash movement 
now would incur a double measure of condemnation. Without any doubt, 
therefore, McClellan was both consistent and prudent in his determination 
not to tempt a general engagement at this time by a movement against the 
position of the enemy on the right bank of the Potomac. He should also 
have been firm. But so strong was the feeling of the President and the 
Secretary of the Navy in favor of the movement, that he vacillated, and 
made preparations for throwing Hooker’s division across the river to cany 
the Confederate batteries by assault. On one occasion he promised that this 
force should be ready at an appointed time, and the Navy Department pro¬ 
vided the necessary transports, and Captain Craven collected bis flotilla to¬ 
gether; but when the time came McClellan had changed his mind, and the 
troops were not on hand. The disappointment was aggravated by the fact 
that no notification was given that the troops would not be sent The rea¬ 
son given for this .alteration of purpose was, that the troops, according to 
the opinion of McClellan's engineers, could not be landed with safety. It 
was replied that the Navy Department would be responsible on that score, 
and the troops were again promised, and the disappointment was repeated. 
This led to some ill feeling; and Captain Craven gave up his command very 
unwisely, on the ground that be would be held responsible for the blockade 
of the Potomac. McClellan's fault was in his vacillation. He should have 
been steadfast in his refusal so long as the matter was left to his discretion. 
His position was thoroughly supported by his corps of engineers. On the 
27th of September, General Barnard, chief engineer, in company with Cap¬ 
tain Wyman, of the flotilla, made a reconnoissance of the enemy’s batteries 
as far as to Matthias Point In his report he says: “Batteries at High Point 
and Cockpit Point, and thence down to Chopawamsic, can not be prevented. 
We may, indeed, prevent their construction on certain points, but along here, 
somewhere, the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as he 
chooses. Wbat is the remedy? Favorable circumstances, not to be antici¬ 
pated, nor made the basis of any calculations, might justify- and render suc¬ 
cessful the attack of a particular battery. To suppose that we can capture 
all, and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the navigation being molested, 
is verv much the same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own front 
can prevent us building and maintaining field-works to protect Arlington 
and Alexandria, by capturing them, one and all, as fast as they are built” 
In another communication on the subject of crossing troops for the purpose 
of destroying these batteries, he says: "The operation involves the forcing 
of a verv strong line of defense of the enemy, and all that we would have 
to do if we were really opening a campaign against them there. It is true, 
we hope to force this line by turning it at Freestone Point” [a few miles be¬ 
low the mouth of the Occoquan]. “ With reason to believe that this may be 
successful, it can not be denied that it involves a risk of failure. Should we, 
then, considering all the consequences which may be involved, enter into 
the operation merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I think not. Will 
not the Ericsson, assisted by one other gun-boat, capable of keeping along¬ 
side these batteries, so far control their fire as to keep the navigation sufii- 























164 


[October, 1861. 



TOE SEMINOLE AND POOAnONTAS ENGAGING THE CONFEDERATE DATTEBIES AT EVANSrOBT. 


ciently free as long as we require it? Captain Wyman says yes.” In the 
mean time conflicts were every day occurring with the batteries along the 
bank, but never with any decisive results, and'not unfrequently resulting in 
serious injury to the vessels engaged. We need only refer to a single in¬ 
stance of these conflicts—that in which the Seminole and Pocahontas fig¬ 
ured, early in the month of October. These two vessels on this occasion 
engaged the three batteries at Evansport. The action was commenced by 
the Seminole, but her fire was not returned until she came within full range 
of the batteries, which then opened upon her in earnest, striking her in sev¬ 
eral places. A heavy shell exploded close under the bows, throwing the 
water over the forecastle deck. A ball passed through the rails over the 
engine hatch, another through the hammock nettings, and one struck the 
mizzen-mast a few feet above the deck, badly injuring it. It was evident 
that only iron-clad vessels could reduce fortifications of this nature; and in 
this case, as in all others, the attempt had to be given up. No disastrous 
results followed from the erection of the Confederate batteries, nor was either 
the War or the Navy Department responsible for their existence, they hav¬ 
ing been erected at a time when neither of these departments were in a con¬ 
dition to prevent it. After the Potomac flotilla left to co-operate with the 
Port Royal Expedition, the river was effectually closed. Whatever embar¬ 
rassment this may have been to the government, a careful consideration of 
the subject must lead to the conclusion that the difficulty was inevitably in¬ 
cident to the peculiar situation of the opposing armies. But, if the responsi¬ 
bility must rest any where, it should be with the Navy Department, which 
might have sent vessels of sufficient strength to reduce the enemy’s works. 
This, however, was not done, for the very good reason that new batteries 
could be built as rapidly as the old ones were destroyed. Nothing could 
have effectually protected the navigation of the Potomac except the military 
occupation of its entire right bank by our army, and this occupation, clearly 
unadvisable at an early period, did not, at a later epoch, harmonize with 
General McClellan’s plan of operations. What that plan was we shall con¬ 
sider in its appropriate place. 

We now turn to the movements of the enemy on the Upper Potomac, 
which led to the battle of Ball’s Bluff. 

While, in October, the two main armies of Virginia were facing each other 
at Manassas, or rather, through their advanced pickets, at Fairfax Court 
House, each watching the movements of the other and expecting attack, 
considerable activity prevailed on the upper Potomac. General Banks, 
who had superseded Patterson after the battle of Bull Run, had been push¬ 
ing his outposts several miles up the valley from his position at Harper’s 
Ferry. This was in great measure occasioned by the movements of the 
enemy, who, having consumed every thing in the vicinity of Manassas and 
Centreville, found it necessary to make expeditions up the river for pro¬ 
visions, and especially into Loudon county, in the vicinity of Leesburg, 
where, through the numerous fords of the Potomac, raids could be easily 
made into Maryland. Leesburg was about forty miles from Harper’s Ferry. 
Between twenty and thirty miles to the north the Federal troops held a fa¬ 
vorable position on Sugar-loaf Mountain for observing the movements of 
the enemy in this direction. General Stone also had an important command 


at Poolesville, in the vicinity of Edwards’s Ferry. Our pickets lined the riv¬ 
er from Harper’s Ferry to Washington; and to avoid this uninterrupted se¬ 
ries of police, the enemy resorted to the most elaborate manoeuvring. His 
force, which had been detailed to Leesburg, consisted of the brigade of Gen¬ 
eral Evans, or four regiments of soldiers; but this number was supposed by 
the Federal commanders to be much greater, they being misled by the ruse to 
which the enemy resorted, of showing himself at various places at short in¬ 
tervals of time, so as to multiply the apparent number in his command. 
The Federal position was in every way favorable for cutting off and sur¬ 
rounding Evans’s brigade. To the north was General Banks at Harper’s 
Ferry, and Geary at the Sugar-loaf; directly east was Stone at Edwards’s 
Ferry, and sixteen miles farther to the eastward was McCall, with a large 
force at Drainesville. A little to the eastward of Leesburg, Goose Creek 
empties its waters into the Potomac, and across this small stream lies the 
Gum Spring road leading to Manassas. McCall’s position at Drainesville 
bore upon this line of communication. The town of Leesburg itself, in a 
military point of view, was of great value to either army, lying on the rail¬ 
road line from Washington to Winchester, and its possession securing the 
crops both of the Loudon and Shenandoah valleys. It was also a good po¬ 
sition from which to carry on an irregular aggressive campaign against Ma¬ 
ryland. But McClellan was on his guard; every ford was strongly defend¬ 
ed, every movement of the enemy subjected to the strictest examination, 
and fortifications were erected at every available point. The Confederates, 
not being in sufficient force to man a great number of works if they had had 
them, relied not upon intrenchments or fortifications, but upon making a 
sudden attack in some unexpected quarter. They had, therefore, but a sin¬ 
gle battery, which was situated between Leesburg and Edwards’s Ferry. 

At this time the Confederate General Ashby, with his cavalry, was sta¬ 
tioned at Charlestown, in the Shenandoah Valley, whence he continued, by a 
series of raids, to harass our forces at Harper’s Ferry, a few miles to the 
northwest. The Confederates having now undisputed control of the lower 
Potomac, through their batteries at Acquia Creek, were seeking, by the co¬ 
operation of Evans with Ashby, to obtain a similar advantage on the upper 
part of the river. On the 13th of October, Ashby’s troops, with four com¬ 
panies of Evans’s brigade, and two pieces of his artillery’-, made an unusually 
daring expedition to Harper’s Ferry. Taking up his position on the Loudon 
Heights, a severe skirmish occurred between the opposing forces, and some 
of the store-houses and mills in the village of Harper’s Ferry were fired by 
the shells of the enemy. Otherwise no important result was gained, and it 
was with great difficulty that Ashby was able to withdraw from the position 
which he had so boldly taken. 

Evans, in the mean time, in danger of being cut off by McCall, fell back to 
a position on Goose Creek, still holding Leesburg. Besides the danger of 
an attack from the direction of Drainesville, it will be remembered that Gen¬ 
eral Stone threatened Evans’s force from two points on the river, viz., from 
Edwards’s Ferry and Harrison’s Island, both being about five miles from 
Leesburg, and the same distance from each other. At Harrison’s Island 
Colonel Devens was stationed, with a few companies of the 15th Massachu¬ 
setts. Pickets were sent out by Evans in each of these directions. This 

















THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—BALL’S BLUFF. 


165 



CUARLES I*EVENS. 


was the situation on Saturday night, the 19th of October. The next day 
General Stone, having evidently the impression that the main force of the 
enemy was in some other quarter, and that Leesburg was defended by only 
two or three companies, made his arrangements to cross the river and bring 
on an engagement. This determination led to the battle of Ball’s Bluff, 
which has also been called the battle of Leesburg. Considering merely the 
disposition of the Federal forces, and the number of men available for an at¬ 
tack, it seems almost impossible that the combination formed should result 
in a disaster so complete as that which followed, and which we must now 
consider. 

Ball’s Bluff rises to the height of thirty feet from the river’s edge, directly 
opposite and about a hundred yards from Harrison’s Island. A reconnois- 
sance had been made a few days previously from this point by Federal scouts, 
accompanied by engineers, and it was found that only a few companies held 
Leesburg. All the arrangements for attack seem to have pro.ceeded on the 
basis of this reconnoissance. On Sunday at sunset, after furiously attacking 
the enemy’s position from Edwards’s Ferry, and devoting especial attention 
to a battery called Fort Evans, known to be at the right, General Stone 
landed a few of his troops on the Virginia side, but at dusk returned them 
to camp. At evening Colonel Lee, with a battalion of the 20th Massachu¬ 
setts, and the 20th New York, or Tammany regiment, and a section of ar¬ 
tillery, was in position at Conrad’s Ferry, between Edwards’s Ferry and Har¬ 
rison’s Island, ready to act in support of Devens, who had been ordered to 
cross the river to Ball’s Bluff, and, proceeding toward Leesburg, to disperse 
an encampment which scouts had reported as existing a mile north of the 
town. 

Devens had not completed his crossing before sunrise Monday morning, 
so inadequate were the means of transportation. Not long after he had 
crossed, Colonel Edward Baker came upon the island with his 1st California 
regiment, and commenced crossing. Early in the day he reported in per¬ 
son to General Stone, who directed him to cross at the island and take com¬ 
mand of all the forces on the Virginia side. In this interview, according to 
Stone’s report, made a week after the fight, the latter had distinctly intima¬ 
ted to Baker the nature of the situation; he had informed him what means 
of transportation he might have at his disposal; he had distinctly warned 
him that it was impossible to support him directly by a column crossed at 
Edwards’s Ferry on account of the battery (Fort Evans) which interposed; 
he advised him to make no advance except against an inferior force, and to 
take no more artillery across than he had infantry to protect; and distinct¬ 
ly, in his written orders, he left it to the brave colonel’s discretion whether 
to advance or retire, after that he had crossed and reconnoitred. With 
these instructions, Colonel Baker hurried to the field. 

Devens, in the mean time, had accomplished his reconnoissance. He found 
that the scouts had been deceived, mistaking certain openings in the woods 
for white tents; but he encountered a Mississippi regiment on picket duty, 
and had retired fighting all the way to his landing-place, where his retreat 
was covered by Colonel Lee. The position to which he retired was a semi¬ 
circular opening in the forest, stretching out from the bluff; and thither the 
enemy boldly followed him, taking a position under cover of the woods in 
his flank, and pouring upon his men a merciless fire. Random firing was 
thus continually heard by Baker’s regiment as it was crossing the river. 
Gorman’s brigade had crossed in the morning at Edwards’s Ferry, on a re¬ 
connoissance toward Goose Creek, for the purpose of drawing Evans’s atten¬ 
tion from the right; still there was a sufficient force retained at the latter 
point to outnumber Colonel Devens, leaving out of sight the advantage of 
the enemy in the matter of position. 

The California regiment was from seven o’clock in the morning until four 
in the afternoon crossing the river, and in the mean time numbers of them 
fell victims to the concealed fire of the enemy. At first there was no means 
of conveying the men across except an old water-logged scow, carrying about 


forty men; but another scow, capable of holding sixty, was afterward dragged 
up from the canal. This leisurely proceeding plainly indicates that the Fed¬ 
eral commanders had no conception of the number of the enemy on the oth¬ 
er side. The reconnoissances which had been made were notably deficient; 
in each case a picket guard of the Confederates had been encountered, when 
the reconnoitring force had retired, and, beyond the number of the combat¬ 
ants directly met, no information had been gathered. A small cavalry force, 
though it would not have mended the deficiency in boats, would at least have 
obtained the position and numbers of the foe to be encountered, and thus 
have awakened the Federal officers to the peril of making an attack in the 
careless manner in which it was made, both in regard to transportation and 
the number of men detailed. General Stone reports that he sent such a 
force, but his order was disobeyed. 

After having crossed, the men climbed up the steep banks with their artil¬ 
lery, consisting of five pieces; skirmishers were sent out and the line of bat¬ 
tle formed, with 'the California regiment on the left, the 15th Massachusetts 
and the Tammany regiment on the right, and the 20th Massachusetts in the 
centre, making, all told, a force of 1720 men. But in the woods was a much 
superior force. Gorman had retired from Goose Creek without accomplish¬ 
ing any thing more than a temporary diversion, and thus the force of the 
enemy at Ball’s Bluff was continually re-cnforced from the main body op¬ 
posite Edwards’s Ferry. 

Our forces were received with a volley from the enemy; then followed 
random firing, and then again the volley, every fire being preceded by a 
hideous yell. This continued for half an hour, our men being leisurely 
picked off, as in an ambuscade, while the enemy was securely covered by 
the woods both from our musketry and artillery. In the severity of this on¬ 
slaught the Rhode Island artillerists deserted their pieces, which were imme¬ 
diately manned by Colonels Wistar and Coggswell, the former of whom was 
killed and the latter wounded. Every moment the enemy grew bolder and 
more desperate, our men suffering terribly from the incessant fire, and hav¬ 
ing no possible protection except that furnished by a slight elevation of the 
ground. But there was no wavering. For two hours the brave men stood 
their ground thus, every minute telling its quota of murders. Then a coun¬ 
cil of war was held. What was to be done? Evidently three courses lay 
before Colonel Baker, and with him was left the decision between them. 
One was to retreat. But that involved recrossing the river, and, with the 
terrible advantage now held by the enemy, this would necessitate incalcula¬ 
ble loss. Another course which might be taken was for Baker to cut his 
way through the woods to Edwards’s Ferry. But in that case there was a 
considerable force of the enemy to be encountered in front, and a powerful 
battery, besides the overwhelming force which would pursue them from be¬ 
hind ; the way, moreover, led through the woods. The only other course 
left was to remain and await re-enforcements. But how were these to come ? 
Even the scanty supply of boats at hand were scattered, under no command 
or management; indeed, re-enforcements which had been sent could not, on 
this very account, find their way to the field. There seems to have been no 
possible escape from the net in which our forces had been carelessly im- 
meshed. But in this extremity Baker dreams not of surrender. It is re¬ 
ported (and the report is accredited by General Stone) that at this point, and 
just as our officers had decided to hold the field, a mounted Confederate offi¬ 
cer came out from the covert and beckoned our forces to advance, and that 
Colonel Baker, seizing upon this suggestion, led his men in a charge upon 
the enemy’s position in the woods. However it may be as regards the sug. 
gestion, it is true that the colonel did lead his men in an impetuous charge, 
riding himself far in the front; that, with his hand placed in his breast after 
his usual manner, he coolly gave orders to his men, advising them to fire 
lower, and encouraging them with the hope of final success; and that in a 
moment a sheet of flame surrounded him as with the illumination of light¬ 
ning, and he fell at the head of his column, the victim of an ill-advised bat. 
tie. His body was with difficulty recovered. The command devolving upon 
Coggswell, he resolved to cut his way out to Edwards’s Ferry; but this was 
now impossible, as our men in broken ranks were already hastening to cross 
the river. Colonel Devens had deserted his command and crossed the river 
on' horseback. The scow was soon filled with men, when it was swamped, 
and many of the men lost. In utter confusion, the troops rolled over each 
other down the bank; some, attempting to swim across, were drowned, and 
a greater number were shot by the enemy, who never for one moment slack¬ 
ened fire. There was a sufficient force on the island to prevent pursuit, and 
with the retreat of our forces the engagement terminated. The Federal loss 
was 350 killed and wounded, and 500 taken prisoners. Among the wound¬ 
ed was a son of Oliver Wendell Holmes. 

It seems almost a miracle of negligence that, with several thousand men 
available for this very field, and with abundant facilities for procuring suit¬ 
able transportation, so small a force of men should have been placed at the 
mercy of an enemy whose numbers were unknown, and that, too, without ad¬ 
equate means of safe retreat in case of disaster. Nor was this the whole sum 
of the error. Why did Gorman retire from Goose Creek ? His command 
was not very much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, all told, and 
yet he simply exchanges shots with a Mississippi regiment and withdraws. 
If he had held his ground, and hung upon the flanks of Evans, his co-opera¬ 
tion with Baker might have been efficient, and the day have ended with vie 
tory instead of defeat. Whoever may have been responsible for this reverse, 
no blame in connection with it is to be attributed to General McClellan, 
who only ordered Stone to make a feint at crossing, so as to co-operate with 
McCall at Drainesville. 

The success of the enemy led to no important results. Our most serious 
loss was the death of Colonel Baker. His career had been one of unusual 





166 


[October, 1861. 



GENERAL STONE’S DIVISION AT EDWARDS’S FERRY. Octobeb 20, 1861. 






































































December, 1801.] 


THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—BALL'S BLUFF. 


107 



EDWARD l>. IIAKKK. 


brilliance. He was born in London, but bis father, soon after the birth of 
his son, emigrated to Philadelphia, and in a few years went to the West. 
Edward studied law, and rose to a high degree of eminence in that profes¬ 
sion. From his fine address, the impressiveness of his presence, and his ir¬ 
resistible eloquence, he became a general favorite in the West. In Illinois, 
California, and Oregon, he, as resident of those states successively, carried on 
a successful political career. In Oregon he was elected United States sen¬ 
ator in 1859. He was one of the ablest debaters in the Senate. The most 
striking characteristic of the man was that a great occasion inevitably in¬ 
spired him and swayed his course. In the incipiency of any important 
movement he seemed to interpret its full meaning, and clearly to see the 
end from the beginning. This made him both ready and transparent in ut¬ 
terance ; and these elements, added to the fire of eloquence that was in him, 
made hitn one of the best orators of the country. Thousands will remem¬ 
ber, till they cease to remember any thing, his speech at the great Union 
Meeting in New York City when the war first broke out. Every sentence 
was like the full wave of a powerful sea, and carried the whole multitude 
on before it, swaying them and thrilling them like music. Yet there was 
no sentiment nor extravagant verbiage in his rhetoric. No sooner had he 
made that speech than he immediately began the work of recruiting a regi¬ 
ment for the war. He was afterward offered a higher position, even that 
of a major general, but he preferred to serve as colonel of his original regi¬ 
ment. Previous to the battle of Ball’s Bluff he seems to have had a pre¬ 
sentiment of his fate; he hurried to Washington, disposed of all his affairs, 
even to his own burial-place, and then returned to the field to die there do¬ 
ing his duty. This battle, in which one half of the men in the field were 
killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, and the loss of Colonel Baker, awakened 
throughout the country a determination that the officers concerned in the 
management of the affair should be held responsible. 

In the mean time, directly after the engagement, orders were received 
from McClellan to hold the island and the Virginia shore at Edwards’s Ferry 


at all hazards. Re-enforcements were sent, but it was finally deemed best 
to withdraw entirely to the Maryland side of the river. 

The Confederate army in Virginia at this time consisted of three separate 
armies, styled respectively the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Val¬ 
ley, and the Army of the Acquia. The first of these, comprising four divi¬ 
sions, under Dorcn, Longstreet, and the two Smiths (G. W. and Kirby), was 
under the command of Beauregard; Jackson commanded the Army of the 
Valley, and Holmes that of the Acquia. The entire army, with its left 
threatening the upper, and its right the lower Potomac, while its centre rest¬ 
ed on Manassas, covering the direct route to Richmond, was under the 
command of General Johnston. This was the position during the winter. 
On the 20th of December an engagement of some importance occurred near 
Drainesville. General Ord, following instructions from McCall, proceeded 
with five regiments, including Lieutenant Colonel Kane’s regiment, a battery, 
and two squadrons of cavalry, on the Leesburg pike in the direction of 
Drainesville. The purpose of this movement was to drive back the enemy’s 
pickets, which had advanced to within four or five miles of the Federal lines, 
with a reserve force at Drainesville, and to procure forage from the farms 
of disloyal citizens in the vicinity. A few miles to the east of Drainesville 
Difficult Creek crosses the pike. Here General J. F. Reynolds was posted 
with the first brigade ready to support the main column. Brigadier Gen¬ 
eral Meade was also called up with the second brigade for a similar purpose 
Thus McCall’s entire division was involved in the general movement though 
General Ord’s brigade was the only one directly engaged. General McCall’s 
division, immediately after the occupation by our forces of Munson’s Hill 
and Falls Church, had been stationed at the right ot these positions, with its 
encampments stretching away over a beautiful tract of country toward Lew- 
insville, thus forming the right wing of the great Potomac division, securing 
the Chain Bridge, guarding against a flank movement from Leesburg, and, 
in connection with Banks’s division on the upper Potomac, against an inva¬ 
sion of Maryland, or a raid upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The 
Leesburg pike, starting from Chain Bridge, passes through Lewinsville, and, 
ten miles farther on, through Drainesville, running nearly parallel with the 
railroad from Alexandria to Leesburg. This railroad beyond Falls Church 
was occupied by a portion of the Confederate force holding possession of 
Leesburg, and at Hunter’s Mill, a little to the southeast of Lewinsville, in- 
trenohments had been thrown up, with rifle-pits and batteries. Drainesville 
also was threatened, and this being an important position on McCall’s right, 
it was no small part of his duty to keep it clear of the enemy. At the pres¬ 
ent time, as we have already indicated, there was a strong reserve picket of 
the enemy in the neighborhood of Drainesville; there was also a full bri¬ 
gade at Herndon’s Station, about four miles south of the town, and a force 
of five hundred infantry and cavalry at Hunter’s Mill, besides a small in¬ 
fantry detachment, numbering two hundred, between Drainesville and the 
Potomac. The position of these forces, taken in consideration with the fa¬ 
cility with which Confederate re-enforcements might be brought up by the 
road from Centreville, made it necessary that General Ord’s movement 
should be supported by the entire strength of the division. The troops of 
this division were from Pennsylvania. Those selected for the main column 
of the expedition were the third brigade, consisting of the Sixth, Ninth, 
Tenth, and Twelfth regiments, to which was added a regiment of riflemen 
—the “ Bucktails”—under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kane. The 
Easton Battery, consisting of two 24-poundcrs and two 12-pounders, and a 
detachment of Colonel Bayard’s cavalry, made up the entire column which 
started out of camp on Friday morning at six o’clock, with the cavalry and 
the “Bucktails” in the advance. It was a clear, frosty morning; the road 
was rugged, stretching through the woods, whose wintry foliage somewhat 
solemnized the picture. At half past ten a dispatch was sent to General 
McCall, acquainting him with the position of the enemy, which we have al¬ 
ready indicated. The general mounted his horse, and, with his staff and a 
cavalry escort, followed in the road which Ord’s brigade had taken in the 



TKB VILLAS* Or LEWTNSVILLX, TIM 1ST A. 



































168 


[December, 1861 



irill'IM. IICT8 FUR THE A It'IV OF THE POTOMAC- 


morning, arriving on tlic field shortly after the battle commenced. General 
Ord, having dispatched a foraging party to the farms of prominent seces¬ 
sionists between the pike and the river, moved on to Drainesville, where he 
waited for the Tenth, Sixth, and Twelfth to come up. Upon his arrival the 
Confederate cavalry picket was dispersed, and two companies of the “Buck- 
tails,” together with the Ninth regiment, Colonel Jackson, were so disposed, 
in connection with the battery, as to cover the approaches to Drainesville 
from the south. The enemy in the mean time, with four regiments under 
command of General Stuart, advanced along the Centreville road, which 
was skirted by a dense wood on either side. Where the road debouches 
into an open clearing the Sumter battery was stationed, mounting six guns, 
and skirmishers were deployed to the left and right. In front of the ene¬ 
my’s battery, and five hundred yards distant, was the Easton battery; and 
between these two an artillery duel was kept up for half an hour. Then an 
attempt was made by the enemy, who advanced from the cover of the woods, 
to turn our left, which was repulsed by Colonel McCalmont and two or three 
shells from the battery, when it was given up The Confederates were 
strongly flanked on the right by the Ninth and Twelfth, the former of whom 
met the enemy in close quarters. The front was held by the Sixth and by 
the Kane Rifles on opposite sides of the road, which, in its entire length, was 
commanded by our battery. Discovering that the enemy’s guns were in a 
position open to an attack from their right and in the rear, General Ord de¬ 
tached two or three guns from the battery for this purpose, which soon 
poured in their enfilading fire with brilliant effect. It was this feature of 
the attack which most annoyed the Confederates, and finally compelled 
their retreat. So accurate was the fire from our battery, that every shot 
seemed to tell upon the enemy; one of his caissons was blown up; another 
was left behind; gun-carriages were broken, while the road was strewn 
■with other evidences of destruction. The retreating columns of Stuart were 
pursued for a short distance, after which the entire command, having won 
the (lav, returned to camp. The Confederate loss was estimated at over two 
hundred and thirty, while that of the Union troops, all told, wtft no more 
than sixty-nine. This victory’ had no important result, but, as being the 
first important success achieved by the Army of the Potomac, received more 
attention than would otherwise have been given it, and called forth a spe¬ 
cial congratulatory letter from Secretary Cameron. 

The situation in the West differed very materially from that in Virginia. 
In the latter, preparations were necessarily made on a gigantic scale. Here 
was gathered the concentrated strength of both armies—the Federal and the 
Confederate; and upon these, as it seemed, the final issue of the war depend¬ 
ed. But this issue was not to be developed through impetuous and rashly- 
undertaken onsets, as was supposed, but very much through that stationary 
attitude which, by shallow critics on both sides, was sneered at as “ masterly 
inactivity” — through the careful measuring of strength against strength in 
quiet, and the patient waiting for opportunity’. This attitude followed as a 
necessity from a situation in which the advantage could rest with the assail¬ 
ant only on the condition of his having nn available force vastly superior 
to that assailed. Whichever side assumed the offensive must be able to face 
two disadvantages—one, that of marching against a fortified position, and 
the other, that involved in a distant source of supplies. These disadvantages 


could only be overcome by overwhelming odds. And how was this coun¬ 
terbalancing advantage to be gained by either side over an enemy forever 
watchful, and able, at least for a long time to come, to encounter re-enforce¬ 
ment with re-enforcement? So long as this situation remained, it was inevi¬ 
table that whichever of these two armies should advance beyond a certain 
point, and risk an engagement with the other, must, unless there be some 
fatal mistake in the conduct of the defense, be beaten and driven back. If 
our naval force could have been made available in a direct attack upon the 
enemy’s strong-hold, we should have needed no other advantage. But the 
situation did not allow any calculation of our naval resources as a direct ele¬ 
ment. It was impossible, therefore, that the conflict in Virginia should come 
to a decisive crisis until operations elsewhere should have brought one of 
the combatants to the verge of exhaustion, or at least to such an extremity 
as would give the other a decided advantage in the matter of available 
strength. Since it was morally certain that a vigorous series of campaigns 
in the AVest and along the sea-board must in the end bring the South to that 
point, our Army of the Potomac could afford to wait. The magnitude of 
that army was, in this connection, a fortunate circumstance for us; for, al¬ 
though it could not at first materially affect the general situation, yet, when 
the South should begin to be exhausted, it would enable our AVestcrn armies 
to aim rapid and effective blows against points disproportionately weak, or 
compel such a concentration of the Confederate forces as would necessitate 
the abandonment of important positions. The “quiet on the Potomac,” 
therefore, did not diminish the importance of our Virginia army. 

But in the AVest the situation, as we have said, was very different. Here 
what was to be done invited dispatch. AVe started on good vantage ground, 
moreover, inasmuch as we had superior facilities for the transportation of 
troops and supplies, and a more adequate supply of excellent arms; and the 
promptness of our military movements forestalled the enemy both in Missou¬ 
ri and Kentucky. AVhile the Confederate generals in all their offensive op¬ 
erations put themselves at a distance from their supplies both of food or am¬ 
munition, we had the rivers on our side, answering both as avenues of com¬ 
munication and as a means of moving into the heart of the enemy’s country. 
This made our naval resources more available in the AVestern campaign 
than they’ could be in Virginia. The operations of the enemy in the AVest 
always partook of the nature of an extensive raid rather than of a regular 
combination of forces for a sustained effort; and whenever thev erected for¬ 
tifications, they were soon compelled to abandon them, on account of the ease 
with which they were flanked and cut off from their distant base. 

Our operations in the AVest were of course, from the first, mainly flank 
movements in relation to the position in Virginia. The objective point was 
East Tennessee. This was involved in McClellan’s plan, as developed in his 
memorandum addressed on the 4th of August to the President. There 
were, as we shall see hereafter, two plans or routes by which this point 
might be reached But, gained by whatever plan, East Tennessee was even 
then seen to be the very keystone of the Confederate arch. 

The critical situation, as regards popular sentiment, in the border states 
of Missouri and Kentucky’, demanded a prompt and adequate display of 
force in those states, in order to secure the passive loyalty of Southern sym¬ 
pathizers and the active co-operation of Unionists. The progress of events 
in these two states will be the subject of our next chapter. 





































September, 1861. J 


KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI 


169 



CHAPTER V. 

KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI. 

Neutrality of Kentucky.—Her Devotion to the Union.—Governor Magoffin’s Position.—Confed¬ 
erate Occupation of Columbus.—Grant at Paducah.—Proceedings of the Legislature.—Its Ad¬ 
dress to the People of Kentucky.—Zollicoffer’s Invasion.—Buckner’s Operations.—Importance 
of Columbus.—Jeff. Thompson.—BAttle near Fredericktown.—Battle of Belmont.—Object of 
the Battle.—The Retreat.—Losses.—McClernand's Address.—The Situation in Central Ken¬ 
tucky.—Skirmish at Munfbrdsvillc.—Nelson’s Operations in Eastern Kentucky.—Battle at 
Pikeville.— Missouri.—General Fremont’s Department.—Confederate Plans.—McCulloch, Pil¬ 
low, Hardee, and Thompson.—Fremont’s Proclamation.—Skirmishes.—Advance of Price.— 
Siege of Lexington.—Mulligan’s Surrender.—Price’s Retreat and Fremont’s Advance.—Price’s 
Proclamation.—Zagonyi’s Charge.—Fremont’s Removal.— Hunter’s Retreat.—Advance of 
Price to the Osage.—Battle of Milford.—The Confederate Retreat.—The Situation at the close 
of 1861.—McClellan appointed General-in-chief.—Reorganization of the Western Armies.— 
The new Commanders.—McClellan’s Instructions.—His Plans in the West. 

U NTIL the autumn of 1861, Kentucky had quite successfully maintained 
a perfectly neutral position as regards any active participation in the 
war on either side. Her governor, Beriah Magoffin, had curtly replied to 
the President's call for troops in April, that Kentucky would “furnish no 
men for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states;” and 
he had also given the President to understand that no Federal troops were 
desired within the limits of that state. And, as no direct assistance was 
given to the Confederacy, and a like restriction was laid upon the Confed¬ 
erate forces, the general government had, as a matter of policy, respected 
this neutral position. Whatever may have been the secret inclination of 
the governor toward the Confederacy, the people of the state and its Legis¬ 
lature were, in the main, loyal to the Union. In the election of members 
of Congress, called to meet in special session on the 4th of July, 1861, ev¬ 
ery district but one elected strong Union men ; and the election for mem¬ 
bers of the Legislature in August had a similar result. This disposition of 
the state, as soon as it became apparent to the Confederates, aroused their 
indignation, and it was openly proposed in the South to cut off all commer¬ 
cial intercourse with the Kentuckians. The New Orleans Delta of August 
20th declared : “ We will not pay the 1 Blue Grass’ country of Kentucky for 
its loyalty to Lincoln by opening our markets to its hemp fabrics. We 
must discriminate in favor of our gallant ally, Missouri, and give her the 
benefit of our marts in preference to either open foes or insidious neutrals. 
It is the clear duty of our government to declare Kentucky under block¬ 
ade.” This was certainly a very impolitic suggestion; for, at this very 
moment, the government at Washington was considering in what way it 
might completely cut off the Confederacy from the one sole communication 
now open to it from the North, viz., by the Louisville and Nashville Kail- 
road; and it was only by reason of its reluctance to irritate the people of 
Kentucky that the Federal government hesitated to lay its positive embargo 
upon this road, by which the South was every day gaining every thing aud 


losing nothing. It seems strange, therefore, that at this juncture Tennessee 
herself should have put out her hand and shut to the door of her prison- 
house. This stopped the passage of cotton, rice, and turpentine to Louis¬ 
ville; but it also shut out from Tennessee a rich supply of grain and pork, 
which at this time were of the greatest value to the South. 

It became immediately evident that Kentucky muct take an active part 
in the war on one side or the other. The prevailing sentiment of the peo¬ 
ple was in favor of the Union. But the southern portion of the state was 
in great part secessionist, and it was the cherished plan of the Confederacy 
to take advantage of this by throwing a large force into the counties just 
across the border. Measures were taken to carry out this plan, and early 
in August the Confederate Congress had passed an act authorizing enlist¬ 
ments in Kentucky. A Federal force also was being collected together at 
“Camp Dick Robinson,” under General Nelson, for the purpose of insuring 
protection to loyal citizens. This led to a correspondence between the gov¬ 
ernor and the President, the former demanding the removal of this force, 
and the latter refusing to comply with the demand. 

When the Legislature met, on September 5th, the governor, in his mes¬ 
sage, insisted on neutrality, and recommended that a force be raised by the 
state for its own defense, and that all other military bodies should be dis¬ 
banded. But on this same day the Legislature was notified that Confed¬ 
erate troops had invaded the state, occupying and fortifying strong positions 
at Hickman and Chalk Bluffs. The invading force, which was commanded 
by Leonidas Polk, also occupied Columbus, that commander giving as a 
reason for so doing that he was only anticipating the occupation of the 
place by a Federal force, which intended, if not to take direct possession 
of Columbus, at least to plant batteries on the Missouri side of the river 
so as to command the town. Thus the neutrality of Kentucky was ended 
forever. It is a matter of little consequence whether it was a Federal or 
a Confederate force which first entered the state, since the purpose of either 
must have regarded, not Kentucky, but the main issue of the war, which 
had already assumed such proportions that it overleaped all ordinary bound¬ 
aries, and the geographical position of Kentucky made it absolutely neces¬ 
sary that the state should become the most important arena of the coming 
campaign. Two days after the occupation of Columbus, General Grant, ac¬ 
companied by two gun-boats, took possession of Paducah, at the mouth of 
the Tennessee, and a few miles above Cairo; and extensive preparations 
were made by the Federal government to resist the advance northward of 
the Confederates. 

Polk had insisted upon it as a condition of his own withdrawal that the 
Federal forces in the state should likewise be removed. The Legislature, 
however, decided that the very mention of any condition of this nature was 
an insult to Kentucky, and passed a resolution demanding the unconditional 
withdrawal of the Confederate forces. The proceedings of the Legislature 




























































































[September, 1861. 

A month afterward he met with a severe repulse at Camp Wild-cat, in Lau¬ 
rel County. He bad nearly eight thousand men, including two regiments 
of cavalry, which he had determined to bring against Colonel Garrard’s Ken¬ 
tucky regiment; but the latter was speedily re-enforced, and the entire com 
mand given to General Schoepf, who maintained his position, which was one 
of great natural strength, against the repeated assaults of a foe numerically 
superior to his own. At about the same time, General Buckner was oper¬ 
ating on the line of the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, in the 
central portion of Kentucky. On the 21st of September General Anderson 
assumed command both of the state and national forces. 

The Confederate force at Columbus—more formidable than anf other in 
the state—was soon increased to thirteen regiments, with six field and one 
siege battery, and three battalions of cavalry. It had also three steamers 
on the river. This force was concentrated at Columbus, which was strong¬ 
ly fortified, as also was Ilickman, twenty-five miles farther south. The 
strength which was massed at Columbus was not only to be feared for its 
bearings on the campaign in Kentucky, but from the ease with which it 
might exert a decisive influence upon military operations in Missouri. One 
of the strongest motives which led to the Confederate occupation of Ken¬ 
tucky was the desperate state of affairs in Missouri. Arkansas had failed to 
support General Price. 'The battle of Wilson’s Creek, which had been won 
with so great sacrifice and against terrible odds by the Federal forces under 
Lyon and Sigel, had interposed a check against the advance of fhe combined 
armies of the Confederacy from which they could not readily recover. 
McCulloch had withdrawn to Arkansas with his forces, leaving Price to con¬ 
tinue the campaign as best he might. All eyes were turned to Columbus 
for a retrieval of the fortunes of the Confederacy in the West. In the early 
part of November it would have been very practicable for General Polk to 
disturb our military operations on the west of the Mississippi. It was to 
prevent a disturbance of this nature that the battle of Belmont was fought 
early in November. For three weeks Jeff. Thompson had been pushing his 
wav up the river into Missouri. In the middle of October, from his camp 
in St. Francois County, he had issued one of his characteristic proclamations. 

“ Patriots of Washington, Jefferson, Ste. Genevieve, St. Frawjois, and Iron 
Counties!” exclaims he, “ I have thrown myself into your midst to offer you 
an opportunity to cast off the yoke you have unwillingly worn so long. 
Come to me and I will assist you, and drive the invaders from your soil or 
die with you among your native hills. Soldiers from Iowa, Nebraska, and 
Illinois, go home! we want you not here, and we thirst not for your blood. 
We have not invaded your states; we have not polluted your hearthstones; 
therefore leave us, and, after we have wiped out the Hessians and Tories, we 
will be your friendly neighbors if we can not be your brothers!” 

A few days later found him at Fredericktown, a little farther in the inte¬ 
rior of Missouri, with a force of thirty-five hundred men. At Pilot Knob, 
a short distance north of this point, were three or four Federal regiments. 
General Grant immediately formed a combination which in two days com¬ 
pletely routed Thompson, sending him southward at a somewhat brisker 
rate of speed than had marked his advance. This is the proper place to 
speak of this engagement, although it occurred in Missouri, because Thomp¬ 
son’s movements so entirely depended upon co-operation from Columbus. 
A force of fifteen hundred men, under Colonel Plummer, of the 11th Mis¬ 
souri, was dispatched along the road from Jackson to Dallas, to move upon 
Fredericktown in such a manner as to cut off Thompson’s retreat, and, co¬ 
operating with Colonel Carlin at Pilot Knob, to compel an engagemeftt, 
greatly to the disadvantage of the enemy. Upon his approach, Plummer 
sent to Pilot Knob a messenger, with a letter, informing Carlin of his inten¬ 
tion to attack the enemy on Monday, October 21st, and requesting co-oper- 


during tlie rest of the month were honorable both to itself and to the state. 
The State Guard was disarmed; a series of resolutions was passed, request¬ 
ing Major Anderson to take command of the military forces in the state, 
and indicating the stern resolution of the people to repel the invasion upon 
which the Confederates had so daringly entered ; and, upon the veto of these 
resolutions by Governor Magoffin, they were passed by the requisite vote 
over his veto. A bill also was passed authorizing the Military Board to 
borrow three million of dollars, in addition to the million authorized May 
24th. Another bill was passed calling out forty thousand volunteers, and 
one tendering the thanks of the Legislature to Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, 
for prompt and needed assistance in forwarding troops for the defense of the 
state. A resolution was voted demanding the resignation of Senators Breck- 
enridge and Powell; and at the close of the session, an address, memorable 
for its patriotism, was issued to the people of the state. In this latter, the 
condition of the state is briefly summed up in the following terms: 

“Every effort was made for compromise and settlement. The Federal 
government did not insist upon our active aid in furnishing troops, seeming 
content if we obeyed the laws. Those engaged in the rebellion, however, 
planted camps of soldiers all along our southern border, seized by military 
power the stock of our railroad, impudently enlisted soldiers upon our soil, 
made constant raids into this state, robbed us of our property, insulted our 
people, and seized and carried off our citizens. Thus exposed to wrongs, 
with no power to prevent them, some of our citizens formed camps under 
the Federal government for the defense and protection of the state. In this 
condition we found Kentucky when the Legislature met on the first Mon¬ 
day in September. We were assured by the President of the Confederate 
States that our position should be respected; but the ink was scarcely dry 
with which the promise was written when we were startled by the news 
that our soil was invaded, and towns in the southwest of our state occupied 
by Confederate armies. Our warnings to leave were only answered by an¬ 
other invasion in the southeastern portion ot the state. These sudden ir¬ 
ruptions of such magnitude, skillfully directed, show that the assault on 
Kentucky was preconcerted, prepared, and intended long before. Thrice 
have the revolutionists appealed to the ballot-box in this state, and thrice 
have the people expressed by overwhelming majorities their determination 
to stand by the Union and its government. The attempt to destroy the 
union of these States we believe to be a crime not only against Kentucky, 
but against all mankind; but up to this time we have left to others to vin¬ 
dicate by arms the integrity of the government. The Union is not only as¬ 
sailed now, but Kentucky is herself threatened with subjugation. We have 
no choice but action, prompt and decided. Let us show to insolent invaders 
that Kentucky belongs to Kentuckians, and that Kentucky’s valor will vin¬ 
dicate her honor.” 

This position was fully supported by the people. In the mean time, 
while General Polk was invading the western portion of the state, Zollicof- 
fer was operating in the southeast. A slight skirmish took place on the 
17th of September at Barboursville: and, to give notice of his hostile ap¬ 
proach, Zollicoffer, on the same day, telegraphed to the state authorities that 
the safety of Tennessee necessitated his occupation of Cumberland and the 
long mountains of Kentucky, and that he had accordingly taken possession. 


6T£&LD«I PRICE. 
















September, 1861.] 


KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI 


171 



PILOT KNOB, M16BOUKI 


ation in front. This letter was intercepted by the enemy, and Thompson 
fell back about a mile from Fredericktown on the Greenville road, and there 
awaited attack. Through the information thus gained by the enemy an im¬ 
portant advantage had been lost; yet by the re-enforcement which Plummer 
might have from Pilot Knob, and the superior artillery force which was at 
his disposal, the chances of success were yet all on his side. Accordingly, 
on Monday, he advanced against the enemy, who were commanded by 
Thompson and Lowe, attacked them, and, after a spirited fight, in which he 
received very important aid from Major Schofield, of the 1st Missouri Light 
Artillery, he drove the enemy routed from the field. The Confederate Colo¬ 
nel Lowe was killed in the engagement; and of the Federal officers, Major 
Gavitt and Captain Hingham were killed. The pursuit was kept up with 
considerable vigor. To prevent any interference from Columbus with col¬ 
umns sent to continue this pursuit was one of the chief objects of the move¬ 
ment against Belmont. 

Belmont is just opposite Columbus, on the western or Missouri side of the 
river, and at this time was held by a small Confederate force under Colonel 
Tapp,an. Columbus itself was so strongly garrisoned that it would have 
been useless for General Grant, with the force at his disposal, to have at¬ 
tempted either a siege or an assault upon that strong-hold ; and Belmont, be¬ 
ing entirely commanded by the guns of Columbus, was worth nothing as a 
military position without the latter. The movement, then, as is also evident 
from written statements of General Grant previous to the battle, was of the 
nature of a reconnoissance, with the objects already indicated. 

As soon as General Polk had any notice of our approach, he anticipated 
that Columbus would be directly attacked, and General Grant had taken 
special pains to make him think so, by sending General Smith (command¬ 
ing at Paducah) with a considerable force, which marched in two columns, 
the one on Mayfieid, and the other to within a few miles of Columbus; and, 
to help on the effect of this demonstration, a small detachment was ordered 
to Ellicott’s Mills, twelve miles from Columbus, on the Kentucky side. These 
movements were made simply for the purpose of misleading the Confederate 
commander. Grant’s forces, in the mean time, started from Cairo on the 
evening of November 6th. a great part of them being under the immediate 
command of General McClernand, and also landed on the Kentucky side 
of the river, nine miles below Cairo. In this way the enemy was entirely 
put off his guard as to Belmont, the point of direct approach. When, at 
daylight the next morning, Grant and McClernand's forces landed on the 
Missouri side, a short distance from Belmont, then it was that Polk’s atten¬ 
tion was for the first time turned in this direction, and he sent Pillow across 
from Columbus to support Tappan, still supposing, however, that Columbus 
was the main object of attack. 

Pillow had crossed not a moment too soon; for the Federal artny had 


promptly formed their line of battle, and driven in the Confederate outposts 
and sentries, and, having left a battalion in reserve near the transports, com¬ 
panies were thrown out as skirmishers, and in a few minutes the general en¬ 
gagement ensued. Grant’s whole force, with the exception of his reserve, 
was thrown out in skirmishing columns, which led to a useless waste of Ins 
strength ; whereas, if he had known the weakness of the enemy on the field 
at his first arrival, he might have literally crushed him by a sudden onset 
with his full force, and before the arrival of re-enforcements. The Confed¬ 
erates were driven back to their encampment—a strong position, lumber 
having been felled for several hundred yards about it, and an abattis form¬ 
ed. General McClernand, at the onset, attempted to outflank the enemy’s 
right wing, and cut off re-enforcements from Columbus. Here the struggle 
was continued with great severity for half an hour; but Betzhoven’s bat¬ 
tery kept him back, and the attempt failed. Not so, however, in the centre. 
Here the attack was so vigorous that the enemy’s line was almost immedi¬ 
ately broken and the men thrown into confusion. Pillow was obliged to 
bring up his reserve of artillery, consisting of two batteries and a half, with 
which he kept the Federal army in check until he had restored communi¬ 
cation between the two wings of his army. But his efforts to recover him¬ 
self proved unavailing; for he had no sooner made his arrangements for a 
spirited resistance, than it was reported to him that three of his regiments 
and his most important battery were out of ammunition. Only one course 
was left him in this extremity, and that was to keep the battery in position, 
and to make a bayonet charge with the three otherwise defeated regiments, 
trusting to Polk to send him speedily the help which every moment he 
needed. But the commander at Columbus, still believing that his own po¬ 
sition was in jeopardy, hesitated and held back assistance until Pillow had 
sent message after message, and was completely exhausted. Grant, seeing 
how matters stood, pushed his advantage to the utmost, and by furious and 
repeated onsets carried the abattis, and drove the enemy, foot by foot, and 
from tree to tree, pell-mell down the banks of the river, and within protec¬ 
tion of the guns of Columbus. Pillow’s division was so severely cut up that 
not a single company remained intact, and the whole body were crowded 
together in confusion. 

But here the defeated enemy was re-enforced by several thousand fresh 
troops, and Grant was attacked in front, flank, and rear, and wms in danger 
of being cut off from his transports. To prevent this, he retreated, the Con¬ 
federates all the time charging upon his ranks, until lie came up with his 
reserve, when he collected his forces together, and, ordering up fresh regi¬ 
ments and artillery from his reserve, recommenced the contest. Throwing 
his forces with great fury against General Cheatham’s division, which was 
leisurely approaching, he broke the ranks of the latter, and, advancing his 
batteries dose to the banks of the river, opened a, murderous tire upon Pil- 
























































172 



WILLIAM NELSON- 


low’s flank and upon some steamers, which, with re-enforcements, were cross¬ 
ing the river from Columbus. Then the heavy guns of Columbus poured 
in their cannonade upon the battle-field, and were answered by Federal can¬ 
non from Belmont. It soon became evident, however, that so many re-en¬ 
forcements had been sent across that it would be impossible for General 
Grant’s men, who had been engaged from half past ten in the morning until 
five in the afternoon, to successfully hold their ground, and a retreat was 
again ordered. The enemy had been re-enforced to about thirteen thousand 
men, a force nearly three times as large as our own, and closely followed the 
retiring, but really victorious army of General Grant. The latter retreated 
in good order, embarked upon his transports, and left a battle-field which he 
had certainly won, but could not hope to keep. Our loss in killed, wound¬ 
ed, and missing was, according to General Grant’s report, one hundred and 
eighty-four; that of the enemy was, by their own admission, over two thou¬ 
sand. Yet the battle was claimed by the Confederates on the ground that 
Grant was unable to hold the field. 

After the battle, McClernand issued the following address to his soldiers: 

“Few of you had ever seen a battle. You were imperfectly disciplined, 
and had inferior arms; yet you marched upon a concealed enemy superior 
in numbers, and on ground of their own choosing. You drove them stead¬ 
ily for two miles of continued fighting, and forced them to seek shelter un¬ 
der the heavy batteries at Columbus. You drove them from their position 
and destroyed their camp, bringing with you, on retiring, two hundred pris¬ 
oners, two field-pieces, and a large amount of other property. Re-enforced 
from Columbus, they formed in large numbers in your rear to cut you off, 
while the heavy guns of Columbus were playing upon your ranks. Fight¬ 
ing the same ground over again, you drove them a second time. A portion 
of the command, becoming separated from the rest, made a successful and 
well-ordered movement by another route, and returned to the river. After 
a day of fatiguing marches, fighting as you marched, having been nearly six 
hours actually engaged, you re-embarked and returned to your camp.’’ 

Turning from the western to the central portion of the state, we find mil¬ 
itary movements in progress on a very extensive scale, Louisville, on the 
Ohio, being the head-quarters of the Union Department. When General 
Anderson assumed the command of this department, September 21, General 
Buckner was at Bowling Green, on the railroad between Louisville and 
Nashville, about seventy-one miles from the latter. This was an important 
military position, being at the junction of two roads leading into Tennessee. 
Buckner had been led to believe that, if he should come to Louisville, or 
even to Bowling Green, with a competent force, he would receive re-enforce- 
ments by thousands; but he hardly got a regiment, and kept very close to 
Bowling Green, in the southern part of Kentucky, though he had made a 
boast that he would winter in Louisville. 

In the month of November great accumulations of Federal troops were 
collecting together from the states north of the Ohio River; and by the 1st 
of December there was in Kentucky alone an army of seventy thousand 
men, of which twenty thousand were citizens of the state. About four thou¬ 
sand of these were located at “Camp Dick Robinson,” in Garrard County. 
This vast force bad nothing between it and Nashville, and therefore notb- 


[November,' lSCl. 

ing between it and the virtual occupation of the State of Tennessee, except 
the army of Buckner, numbering thirty thousand men. No hostile collision 
between these two opposing forces occurred with the exception of an unim¬ 
portant, though uncommonly severe skirmish at Munfordsville, on the Green 
River, and a few miles north of Bowling Green, on the road to Louisville. 
This action took place on the 17th of December, on the south bank of the 
river; but only a few companies were engaged, and the result had no bear¬ 
ings upon the general issue. 

lu the southeast, Zollicoffcr, whom we left at Barboursville after his re¬ 
pulse at Camp Wild-cat, advanced, on the 10th of December, with strong 
force toward Somerset, compelling Schoepf, who occupied that town with a 
Federal division, to retire. The Confederate commander then encamped at 
Mill Spring, where he fortified his position, and remained until his over¬ 
whelming defeat at that place early in 1862. 

General Nelson was in command of a small Federal force which he had 
been organizing in the eastern portion of the state, on the A irginia border. 
On the 2d of November he occupied Prestonburg, on the west fork of the 
Big Sand}'. From Prestonburg lie moved upon Pikeville in two columns, 
one of which, under Colonel Sill, was sent by a circuitous route to attack 
Colonel Williams in the rear, while Nelson, with the other, took the direct 
river route. Williams, who occupied Pikeville with about a thousand troops, 
made every preparation to offer a vigorous resistance. Two hundred of his 
men waited in ambush for General Nelson’s advance (under Colonel Mar¬ 
shall) about twelve miles down the river from Pikeville. The I'ederal 
troops had had a very difficult march through the mud and rain, and, be¬ 
sides this, were living on half rations; but their resistance was successful, 
and the next day the Confederate force made an unconditional surrender. 
This short campaign of General Nelson, lasting only twenty days, drove the 
rebels from the eastern part of Kentucky. 

Thus closed the year’s campaign in Kentucky. General Anderson, on 
account of ill health, had resigned his command; and Sherman, his success¬ 
or, for the same reason, gave way to Buell, who, with his head-quarters at 
Louisville, took command of the new army that was accumulating at the 
close of the year. 

After the death of Lyon, who had given his life to wrest Missouri from 
the tightening grasp of the Confederacy, the burden, not only of responsi¬ 
bility, but of active duty in the field, rested upon Fremont, who assumed 
the command of the West a short time before the battle of Wilson’s Creek. 
General John C. Fremont, a native of Georgia, of French descent, reared and 
educated in South Carolina, and afterward distinguished as an engineer and 
explorer, was appointed colonel of the United States Army in 1846, and 
commanded a battalion in the Mexican War. He was the first candidate 
of the Republican party for the presidency, but failed of being elected. At 
the breaking out of the war in 1861, Fremont was in Paris, but, receiving 
information of the events of April, he immediately purchased a large quan¬ 
tity of arms for the government, and returned to his native country in June. 
In July he received his commission as major general with the following 
order: “ The State of Illinois, and the states and territories west of the Mis¬ 
sissippi and on this side of the Rocky Mountains, including New Mexico, 
will in future constitute a separate command, to be known as the Western 
Department, under the command of Major General Fremont, of the United 
States Army, head-quarters at St. Louis.” We have previously stated the 



.♦on o raacfocrx- 



























September, 1861.] 


KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI. 


173 



llk.v MvCCLLOCn. 


difficulties incident to this command, which were verv much heightened by 
the necessities of the Eastern Department. It was under these difficulties 
that the hard-contested battle of Wilson’s Creek had been fought. This bat¬ 
tle, however, so severely punished the Confederate army that it did not ven¬ 
ture any farther advance; and as forces were rapidly accumulating under 
the President’s new call, every month’s delay was favorable to our army in 
the West. 

In the mean time, large bodies of Confederate troops were collecting in 
the southeastern part of the state, threatening Cairo. The western portion 
of Missouri had furnished a great number of recruits, which were accumu¬ 
lated together at points most available for a contemplated advance against 
Cairo and St. Louis. McCulloch, after the battle of Wilson’s Creek, had re¬ 
turned to Arkansas, and was recruiting his wasted strength from the border 
counties. Pillow was at New Madrid, on the Mississippi, with an army of 
about thirty thousand men; while Hardee occupied Greenville, east from 
Cairo, on the St. Francis River, with five thousand men; and Thompson, still 
nearer Cairo, was collecting a large, force of disloj-al Missourians. With 
this combination of forces, the Confederate generals were confident of their 
ability to drive our forces north of the Missouri River before the end of 
August. 

It was under these circumstances that Fremont issued a proclamation de¬ 
claring Missouri under martial law, and ordering that all persons taken with 
arms in their hands within the lines of his army—lines extending from 
Leavenworth, by way of the posts of Jefferson City, Rolla, and Ironton, to 
Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi—should be tried by court-martial, and, 
if found guilty, should be shot; also that the property, real and personal, 
of all persons in the stqje, who should take up arms against the United 
States, or who should be directly proven to have taken active part with 
their enemies in the field, should be confiscated to the public use, and their 
slaves, if they had any, should be declared free. This proclamation, so far 
as it related to slavery, was afterward modified by President Lincoln to suit 
the provisions of the Confiscation Act, passed by Congress August 6th, 1861. 

This proclamation of Fremont called forth a counter-proclamation from 
Jeff. Thompson at Camp Hunter, wherein the latter most solemnly promised 
that for every member of the Missouri State Guard, or soldier in alliance 
with them, who should be put to death in pursuance of Fremont’s order, he 
would hang, draw , and quarter a Union man in retaliation. Fremont’s meas¬ 
ure, in its main features, seemed to be necessary to restore quiet in the state. 
Neither life nor property were secure from violence: murders were com¬ 
mitted by the wholesale; bridges were ruthlessly destroyed; and every 
where indiscriminate plunder and outrage attempted to shelter itself under 
the Confederate flag, and to claim privileges not even accorded to regularly 
organized combatants. 

The month of September was for the most part a month of preparation 
on the Federal side. There was considerable skirmishing. Thus, during 
the first week of the month, Colonel Williams, with about eleven hundred 
national troops—Kansas and Iowa Third—was compelled to retreat from 
Shelbina, in Northern Missouri, before a superior force commanded by Mar¬ 
tin Green, a self-appointed Confederate officer. This force of Green’s, how¬ 
ever, after having been increased to about three thousand men, was in a very 
few days effectually dispersed bv Pope, who captured his baggage and pro¬ 
visions. Another skirmish, in which the Third Iowa also figured, on the 
12th of the month, was one of uncommon severity, five hundred Union 
troops having been attacked by about four thousand rebels. After the 
struggle had lasted for an hour, and a hundred and twenty of our men had 
been disabled, their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Scott, ordered a retreat. 
A short time afterward, Colonel Smith’s command, with four pieces of can¬ 


non, met the enemy by another road, and, engaging them as they were about 
to cross the Missouri River, severely punished and routed them. 

As a precaution, and in order that he might be able to use the greater 
portion of his army for a movement which he was planning against Price 
in the southwestern part of the state, Fremont, at some expense, fortified St. 
Louis. 

In the mean time, Price, who had found an able ally in General Harris, 
marched northward, and joined his forces with those of the latter. As they 
were about to encamp, at the beginning of September, they received infor¬ 
mation that some moneys, amounting to a hundred thousand dollars, were 
at that very time on the point of being conveyed by a detachment of Fed¬ 
eral troops to Lexington from Warrensburg. Although the Confederate 
troops were wearied with long marches when this communication was made 
to them, the prospect of securing so valuable a prize was an incentive not 
to be withstood. They marched at double-quick upon Warrensburg, but, 
upon their arrival there, found that they had been anticipated by the Fed¬ 
eral troops. Their indignation was not at all mollified by certain carica¬ 
tures which the German soldiers of our army had sketched on the walls in 
charcoal drawings, representing in a rude but vivid manner the disappoint¬ 
ment of the Confederates in finding the money-boxes empty. After halting 
at Warrensburg for two days, Price moved upon Lexington, on the south 
bank of the Missouri River, whither the money had been conveyed. The 
Federal force at Lexington, consisting of about half a regiment of Home 
Guards, was strongly intrenched, and gave the enemy a severe repulse. 
Colonel Mulligan, with his Irish brigade, was sent to re-enforce Lexington. 
Price, too, found no difficulty in obtaining a vast number of recruits; for it 
was generally.known that victory would bring with it the coveted gold. 
The Federal force had been increased to 2500 men, and the fortifications 
greatly extended and strengthened. On the 12th of September, scouts and 
advanced pickets, driven in, reported the approach of the enemy. The at¬ 
tack was at first concentrated upon the college, which had been strong^ for¬ 
tified ; but the fire was so briskly answered by our troops that a retreat was 
ordered to Fair Ground until Price’s supplies of ammunition should come 
up. In six days the attack was renewed. General Rains took up a posi¬ 
tion on the east and northeast of the town, while General Parsons attacked 
from the southwest, all the guns in front firing upon Colonel Mulligan's 
works at the same time. Affairs with the garrison soon began to assume a 
critical position, for sharpshooters had been detached which had cut them 
off from their supplies of water. Messengers had been sent by Mulligan to 
Jefferson City urging on re-enforcements, but they were captured by the en 
emy. So, too, small detachments of force dispatched to his assistance were 
cut off in detail, and defeated or captured. While matters were at this pass, 
a steamer came down the river bringing clothes, provisions, and ammuni¬ 
tion ; but these also fell into the hands of the enemy, who, indeed, stood in 
immediate need of the last two articles. At the same time, the hills north 
of the town were taken by Harris’s and McBride’s troops. Against these 
Colonel Mulligan made a sortie to drive them from the position, but his force 
was insufficient. This important point was protected by the Confederates 
by means of extensive movable breast-works constructed from hempen 
bales. About two o’clock of the 20th, after fifty-two hours of uninterrupted 
fighting, his troops and the means of defense having been entirely exhausted, 
Mulligan displayed the white flag, and surrendered his brave garrison as 
prisoners of war. Besides a great number of stands of arms, a considerable 
quantity of ammunition, and a vast amount of commissary stores, nine hund¬ 
red thousaud dollars in hard cash was also captured. 

Fortunately for us, Price, for want of sufficient ammunition, was unable to 
follow up his victory with that decisive movement for which his success 
opened the way. Fremont, in alarm, hastened to Jefferson City, and hur¬ 
ried up his preparations to attack Price, who, upon the concentration of the 



Jmi A. MTLL14Ak 










174 


[September, 18(U. 



THE DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON- 























































































































KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI. 


175 



November, 1861 .] 

Union troops at Jefferson City, retired to Springfield, thus bringing himself 
into easy communication with Arkansas, and tempting Fremont to a dis¬ 
tance from his source of supplies. 

The Federal advance into Southwestern Missouri was made in five divi¬ 
sions, under Hunter, Pope, Sigel, Asboth, and McKinstry. This advance 
followed closely upon Price’s retreat. The latter arrived at Neosho, in the 
southwest corner of the state, just in time to be present at the meeting of the 
State Legislature, and to celebrate the secession of Missouri with a salvo of 
one hundred guns. Here he joined McCulloch, but the meeting between 
the two was far from cordial. 

Price’s proclamation, issued at Neosho shortly afterward, indicates very 
forcibly the critical situation of the Confederate affairs in Missouri. “ In 
the month of June last,” he says, “I was called to the command of a hand¬ 
ful of Missourians. . . . When peace and protection could no longer be en¬ 
joyed but at the price of honor and liberty, your chief magistrate called for 
fifty thousand men to drive the ruthless invaders from a soil made fruitful 
by your labors and consecrated by your homes; and to that call less than 
five thousand responded out of a male population exceeding two hundred 
thousand men. Some allowances are to be made on the face of the want of 
military organization, a supposed want of arms, the necessary retreat of the 
army southward, the blockade of the river, and the presence of an armed 
and organized foe. But nearly six months have now elapsed. The army 
of Missouri, organized and equipped, fought its way to the river. And 
where now are the fifty thousand? Had fifty thousand men flocked to our 
standard, with their shot-guns in their hands, there would now be no Feder¬ 
al hirelings in the state to pollute our soil. Where are those fifty thousand 
men ? A few men have fought your battles. A few have dared the dan¬ 
gers of the field. Come to us, brave sons of the Missouri Yalley. I must 
have fifty thousand men. I call upon you, in the name of your country, for 
fifty thousand men. Where are our Southern Bights friends? We must 
drive the oppressors from the land. I must have fifty thousand men. Num¬ 
bers give strength. Numbers intimidate the foe. Numbers make our arms 
irresistible. Numbers command universal respect and insure confidence. 
We must have fifty thousand men 1 Come with your guns of any descrip¬ 
tion that can be made to bring down a foe. If you have no arms, come 


without them. We must have fifty thousand men. Give me these men, 
and,by the help of God, I will drive the hireling thieves and marauders 
from the state. Be yours the office to choose between a free country and a 
just government and the bondage of your children. I, at least, will never 
see the chains fastened upon my country. I will ask for six and a half feet 
of Missouri soil on which to repose, for I will not see my people enslaved. 
Come on, my brave fifty thousand heroes—gallant, unconquerable Southern 
men 1 We await your coming.” 

Fremont arrived in Springfield on the 27th of October. He had sent 
Sigel forward to the south of Springfield, toward Wilson’s Creek, whoj com¬ 
ing up with the rear of the enemy just as the latter was about to retreat, 
made a spirited attack upon him. And here it was that Major Zagonyi, 
commander of Fremont’s body-guard, made his brilliant and ever-memora- 
ble charge, leading his men up a steep hill in the face of the most murder¬ 
ous fire, and driving the enemy through the town. 

Just at this crisis the order came from Washington for the removal of 
Fremont, who was succeeded by Hunter. The latter in a few days aban¬ 
doned Springfield and moved toward Rolla, thus allowing Price to recover 
the ground from which he had just been driven by Fremont. General Fre¬ 
mont had created a-great degree of enthusiasm in the West, and, without 
any doubt, every secessionist was delighted at his removal. As he had just 
begun his campaign when he was superseded, it is impossible to criticise his 
generalship, whether favorable or unfavorable. 

As soon as Hunter began to recede, Price again advanced, moving in 
three divisions toward Kansas, with the intention of making that his field 
of operations. He had under his command about 20,000 men; and on the 
last day of November he was at Monticello with his centre, his right wing 
resting on Stockton, and his left on Nevada. Ilis plan was to reach Kansas, 
and then, having supplied his troops with arms, to destroy the track of the 
Northern Railroad, and cut off communication with St. Louis. But General 
Halleck, who had superseded Hunter on the 18th of November, had, ere a 
month was passed, completely upset Price’s project by more deeply-laid 
strategy of his own. Instead of succeeding in cutting off St. Louis, Price 
found himself, at Christmas, compelled to look out for his own communica¬ 
tions, which, so far as Northern Missouri was concerned, were entirely cut 


pftEUONT'8 BRIDGE ACROSS THE OSAGE- 























\76 


[December, 1861. 



8PIUN0FIKI.D, MI880CRL 


off by Halleck’s operations between the Missouri and the Osage Rivers. 
This was accomplished by a movement of General Pope from Sedalia on 
the 15th of December, which cut off Price’s army on the Osage from a large 
body of recruits then on their way to its support from the counties north 
of the river, and at the same time from its northern base of supplies. Price 
was deceived by a feint movement against Warsaw on the Osage, while 
Pope, after moving about eleven miles in that direction, turned suddenly 
into Henry County toward a point farther west, placing bis force, number¬ 
ing four thousand, between the main body of the enemy and the squads of 
recruits scattered about at different points on the north side of the river. 
Most of these bodies—one of which was 2200 strong, encamped six miles 
north of Chilhouse—were dispersed by Pope’s pursuing cavalry, and return¬ 
ed to their homes; and at the mouth of Clear Creek, near Milford, a force 
of the enemy numbering over 1500 were surrounded and captured on the 
18th, together with a large amount of ammunition and subsistence, and a 
thousand stand of arms. In these movements Pope had guarded against 
an attack on his flank by stationing a considerable force at Clinton to in¬ 
tercept any columns which Price might dispatch from Osceola. Thus cut 
off from supplies of men and food, the position of the enemy, at any moment 
open to attack, was no longer tenable, and he was forced to retreat from his 
camp on Sac River, in St.Clair County, to Springfield, where General Price 
received considerable supplies of clothing and camp equipage, and prepared 
to go into winter quarters. Here also he gained three or four thousand re¬ 
cruits. But these were of no avail against the force which Halleck was 
preparing to hurl against him. Therefore, in the latter part of January, 
when this force was concentrating at Rolla, he fell back from Springfield to 
Arkansas, where, from his camp on Cove Creek, he reported to self-exiled 
ex-Governor Jackson. He had failed to get his fifty thousand men. 

The fall and winter campaign of Price in Missouri was of critical import¬ 
ance, yet it seems not to have been appreciated by the Confederate author¬ 
ities. General Price held throughout the year, from the commencement of 
his operations in Missouri, an independent position, acting quite entirely on 
his own responsibility. He was neither supplied with men nor with the 
material of war. Even in the fight at Wilson’s Creek, where he had so vast 
a superiority in point of numbers, his old rifles and his miserable artillery 
put him at a decided disadvantage. At that time he had McCulloch with 
him; but the two officers were always at variance, and after that battle he 
was left entirely alone. Meantime our forces were daily increasing in num¬ 
bers, and threatened, in a short time, merely by numerical superiority, to 
drive the entire Confederate force from the state. If, after the capture of 
Mulligan, Price had been abundantly supplied with ammunition, he would, 
without any dcubt, have attacked General Fremont before the latter could 
have had time to concentrate his army; but, when Lexington surrendered, 
it is said that he had only two thousand percussion-caps in his whole com¬ 
mand. Had his situation been otherwise, it is difficult to say what might 
have been the result, but it is certain that he would have held important ad¬ 
vantages over Fremont, which might have entirely reversed the actual events 
of the year. By reason of the deficiencies in Price’s commissary and am¬ 
munition, Fremont was allowed sufficient time to concentrate his own forces 
and to compel the retreat of the enemy. When the indefatigable Confeder¬ 
ate leader again advanced, he was driven back, as we have seen, before Hal¬ 
leck’s superior strategy and an overwhelming superiority of numbers. And 
here, in connection with the difficulties which all along followed Price in 
his operations during the year, the reader will allow us again to allude to 
the importance of the battle fought by General Grant at Belmont, which, 

1 It is not meant to be indicated here that Fremont was removed solely at the instigation of 
McClellan, nor, if that were the case, is any fault meant to be found with the order, which, 
under the circumstances, was perfectly justifiable. The difficulties and jealousies growing out 
of political differences between the prominent actors engaged in the suppression of the Southern 
insurrection were already becoming only too painfully evident. The three of these actors who 
were most prominently representative were the President and Generals McClellan and Fremont. 
The latter two had each of them a preconceived bias of opinion, which controlled their respective 
policies in regard to the conduct of the war McClellan’s sympathies determined in favor of the 
South and its institutions; Fremont’s in exactly the opposite direction. And as in each case the 
bias of opinion ruled the practical policy of these men, it is fair to call the disposition in each a 
partisan one. The President had also his bias of opinion, which was in favor of Northern insti¬ 
tutions; but he was no partisan, inasmuch as his conduct was regulated solely by the Constitu¬ 
tion, his interpretation and administration of which was affected only by imperative circumstance. 
No domestic institution of the South was touohed by his hand until it became evident that the in- 


although it availed nothing toward the reduction of the strong-hold of Co¬ 
lumbus, yet entirely cut off General Polk from any possible opportunity of 
co-operating with the Confederate forces in Missouri. It was upon this co¬ 
operation that the prospects of Confederate success in Missouri chiefly de¬ 
pended. When Polk and Pillow occupied Columbus, Jeff. Thompson, at 
the same time, established himself on the opposite side of the river; but 
when the latter attempted to operate in the interior and keep up his con¬ 
nection with Columbus, Grant came promptly upon the field between him 
and his base, thus, by the engagement at Belmont, cutting off both him and 
Price from their most important centre of support. In this way the vast 
combination of forces which the Confederates had prepared in the southeast¬ 
ern portion of Missouri, along the line of the Mississippi, with the view of 
an advance against Cairo and St. Louis, was baffled. This combination had 
been in preparation since July. At first it assumed the most threatening 
aspect. Fremont, however, had kept the enemy in check by a display of 
naval force on the Mississippi which deceived the enemy as to his ability to 
defend Cairo. Then the battle of Wilson’s Creek was fought, and the force 
of the enemy very much weakened. In a month or two they again begun 
to hold up their heads; Columbus was occupied by Polk and Pillow; then 
followed the defeat of Thompson and the battle of Belmont. And thus the 
year closed, but not without hope to the Federal army in Missouri; for 
the enemy had been defeated in the western part of the state; Pope held 
the north securely by his small but active force; the Confederates in the 
southeast had lost more than they had gained, and were powerless to ad¬ 
vance; and, finally, re-enforcements were daily bringing the Union army 
nearer to a position favorable for aggressive movements in the coming spring, 
that should forever clear the state of the Confederate armies. 

The retirement of General Scott in October immediately affected the sit¬ 
uation in the West. On the 81st of October he addressed a letter to the 
Secretary of War, requesting that his name might be placed on the list of 
army officers retired from service. For three years, he said, he had been 
unable to mount a horse, or even to walk without difficulty. On the after¬ 
noon of the day in which the letter was received by the secretary, the Pres¬ 
ident, accompanied by his cabinet, visited the lieutenant general at his resi¬ 
dence, and read him the official order carrying out his request, and placing 
him upon the list of retired officers, without any reduction of his current 
pay, subsistence, or allowances—this latter provision having been specially 
made in his behalf by Congress on the 5th of August, in anticipation of his 
early withdrawal from active service. The interview was an affecting one. 
The last great officer of the old school of military tactics thus disappeared 
from the stage, retaining his well-earned laurels as the veteran hero of two 
important wars. 

An order was immediately issued by which George B. McClellan became 
commander-in-chief, under the President, of all the armies of the United 
States. Two days after assuming this command, McClellan, in a brief speech 
made at Philadelphia, said, “ It is for the future to determine whether I shall 
realize the expectations and hopes that have been centred in me. The war 
can not last long. It may be desperate. I ask in the future forbearance, 
patience, and confidence. With these we can accomplish all.” McClellan’s 
mind, largely speculative, had looked inevitably upon the whole field, even 
when he was in command of only the Army of the Potomac. The com¬ 
mand of all the armies in the field gave full scope for the execution of his 
comprehensive plans. The Department of the West bad now to be entirely 
reorganized. The next day after McClellan was made general-in-chief, Fre¬ 
mont was relieved of his command, 1 and about the middle of November his 

terfercnce became either an absolute necessity, or at least an important means in order to preserve 
the integrity of the national government. Apart from the peculiar attitude of the border states, 
there was no doubt as to the expediency of striking directly at slavery as the chief support of the 
insurrection. In order to secure Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, the blow was postponed. 
It was the necessary policy of government, during the period when these states were trembling in 
the balance between loyalty and treason, to desist from any interference with slavery unless some 
greater gain could come to the nation from the opposite policy. It was during this period that 
Fremont had command in Missouri. Without authority, he adopted a political policy which ex¬ 
cited the opposition of those who, though desirous that the military authority of the nation should 
prevail in the state, were yet determined that the constitutional rights of the state should remain 
inviolate. This exercise of authority was at the time both arbitrary and unwise, and could easily 
have been avoided. The opposition to Fremont in the border states was a sufficient reason for 
his removal; and when McClellan was placed at the head of the entire field, that step became 
necessary to prevent political jealousy and rivalry from impeding the onward movement of the war. 



























December, 1861.] 


KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI. 


177 



DON CARLOS BCELL. 


department was subdivided into three: first,New Mexico, which was as¬ 
signed to Colonel Canby; second, the Kansas Department, the command of 
which was given to General Hunter, including Kansas, part of the Indian 
Territory, Nebraska, Colorado, and Dacotah; and, third, the Department of 
Missouri, under Halleck, including, besides that state, Iowa, Minnesota, Wis¬ 
consin, Illinois, Arkansas, and all of Kentucky west of the Cumberland Riv¬ 
er. The Department of the Ohio, including the portion of Kentucky not 
under Halleck’s command, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Tennessee, was 
given to General Buell. The Department of West Virginia, under Rose- 
crans, and that of the Potomac, continued the northern lines of occupation to 
the Atlantic. There could hardly have been a greater change than McClel¬ 
lan’s new position produced in the military prospect of the Western armies. 
New commanders took the place of the old in every important field. General 
Hunter, a graduate of West Point, had commanded the second division at 
the battle of Bull Run, and on the removal of Fremont had assumed the 
command in Missouri until Halleck’s arrival. The latter, from California, 
was also a graduate of West Point, was at one time a professor in the insti¬ 
tution, and was the author of several well-known military works. He had 
served with distinction in Mexico, and entered the civil war with the rank 
of major general. Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Ohio Department, 
had served in the Mexican war, where he had twice been promoted by bre¬ 
vet. At the beginning of the war he had received a command on the Po¬ 
tomac, with the rank of brigadier general. 

These new commanders in the West were appointed at McClellan’s sug¬ 
gestion, with the approval of the President. They were to act under McClel¬ 
lan’s instructions; and what the tenor of these instructions were we gather 
from the letters addressed to them at this time by the general-in-chief In 
regard to the Department of Missouri, the general had evidently the impres¬ 
sion that every thing had gone wrong under Fremont’s administration. In 
his letter to Halleck, dated November 11th, he expressed his dissatisfaction 
in the strongest terms. He said that Halleck would have extraordinary 
duties, apart from those devolving upon him as a military commander, to 
perform. Chaos must be reduced to order; the personnel of the staff of the 
department would have to be changed, and a system of reckless expenditure, 
and fraud perhaps unheard of before in the history of the world, would have 
to be reduced to the limits of an economy consistent with the interests and 
necessities of the state. Contracts would have to be overhauled: and it was 
to be very carefully considered whether the existing organization of the 
troops were perfectly legal. In regard to military operations, he advised 
that Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points should be held in considerable 
strength, while the main army should be concentrated on the Mississippi. 
His instructions to General Buell intimated that he considered the Depart¬ 
ment of Ohio second only to his own in importance. “It is possible,” he 
said, “that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more import¬ 
ant than that of our military operations. The military problem would be 
a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences; such 

In regard to the other charges made against Fremont—those made by Frank Blair, and par¬ 
tially reiterated in McClellan’s instructions to Halleck—they were simply puerile. The expenses 
incident to Fremont’s administration were no greater in proportion than those of any other depart¬ 
ment. His fortification of St. Louis was imperatively demanded by the condition of his own 
command, and the threatened advance of an enemy superior in numbers; and as to Western con¬ 
tracts, it is yet to be discovered that they were any more fraudulent or unsatisfactory than those 
made nearer Washington. The charge that Fremont was inaccessible to those seeking his pres¬ 
ence for the purposes of business is wholly without foundation. 


is not the case. Were the population among which you are to operate 
wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your 
first and principal objective point. It so happens that a large majority of 
the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union; it therefore 
seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from 
Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of jmur forces, by rapid 
marches, by Cumberland Gap, or Walker’s Gap, on Knoxville, in order to 
occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the citizens of Eastern 
Tennessee to use, while you at the same time cut off, the railway communi¬ 
cation between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi.” This letter was ad¬ 
dressed to Buell on the 7th. Five days afterward he wrote again, urging 
an advance into Eastern Tennessee as soon as it could be made with a "rea¬ 
son able prospect of success. In the mean time, all the avenues by which 
Kentucky lay open to invasion were to be carefully guarded. Previous to 
McClellan’s appointment there had been no carefully elaborated plan com¬ 
prehending the entire field of military operations in the East and West. 
In the East, McClellan, upon whose army the safety of the capital so entirely 
depended, had been able to gather together a large army—not so large as 
he desired, but still large enough to secure him against successful attack— 
thus giving him ample opportunities for fortification and extensive organi¬ 
zation and discipline. In the West, the Federal generals had been com¬ 
pelled to fight at the very outset; to fight battles, moreover, in which they 
had terrible odds to encounter, without hope of support or re-enforcement 
I from the government. There was no time for preparation, nor was there 
an opportunity for extensive organization. There was a force barely suffi¬ 
cient to meet the enemy in the field, and there could be found no reserve 
to prepare and to organize in camps and by means of camp drills. What 
troops there were in the West had an organization by which they managed 
somehow to hold the enemy in check, whether it was a legal organization 
or not; but they had been reduced to a minimum, in order to supply the 
Army of the Potomac. But, now that the Western field had come under 
his own command, McClellan began to appreciate its importance and its ne¬ 
cessities. In August he advised the smallest possible force in this field, 
estimating that, if Kentucky took the right position—and she did—there 
would be no more than 20,000 needed, together with those which could be 
raised in that state and Eastern Tennessee, “ to secure the latter region and 
its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville.” In October he 
had said that it was a matter of regret to him that it had not been deemed 
expedient by the national government to concentrate the forces of the na¬ 
tion in his then special field on the Potomac, but that some amends for this 
oversight might still be made by transferring from all the other armies their 
superfluous strength, thus re-enforcing his “ main army.” With this same 
end in view he recommended that all the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast 
as procured, be sent to this army; that the Western armies should be put 
entirely on the defensive, in order to allow his to assume the offensive; and 
that no more outside expeditions be attempted until he had fought the great 
battle in front. It was less than four days after he made these important 
suggestions that he was made general-in-chief. Thus placed at the head of 
the entire field, his estimate of the necessities of the West was materially 
different from what it had been when that section had been under Fremont’s 
administration. For the first time it was discovered that a new order of 
things must be inaugurated in the West. “I soon found,” says McClellan, 

“ that the labor of preparation and organization had to be performed there; 
transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline, all were wanting." Now, 
instead of giving the Army of the Potomac the initiative, he purposed to 
make the advance into East Tennessee a preliminary movement, after which 
his Virginia army would come in with a coup de main, and end the struggle. 
Nashville and Richmond would be captured by a simultaneous attack, and 
the Confederate line of defense would be thrown southward within the lim¬ 
its of the cotton states. From Richmond the Potomac army would ad¬ 
vance to Charleston, where it would be met by a naval expedition; Buell 
would be pushed forward to Montgomery, or meet the Potomac army in 
Georgia; while Halleck would meet another naval expedition in New Or¬ 
leans, and the occupation of the Southern sea-ports would render all farther 
resistance to the national government as useless as it would be desperate. 
The plan was brilliant and comprehensive, and showed that the general-in¬ 
chief had great powers of speculative combination. But we allude to it in 
this connection merely to show the importance which McClellan attached to 
the Western armies the moment they passed out of other hands into his own. 

It was a matter, therefore, for national congratulation that the West and-the 
East had been thus included within a single command, since, within the 
short space of a single week, so remarkable a change had been effected, by 
which armies hitherto reduced in force, crippled in every appliance of war, 
and undervalued as to their comparative importance, were now to be made 
as efficient as they were worthy, and to be allotted their full share of the 
glories as well as the hardships of future campaigns. In the last week of 
October, McClellan expresses to the Secretary of War his regret that there 
has not been such a concentration of forces in Virginia as to allow the Army 
of the Potomac to enter upon an aggressive campaign before the season for 
such a campaign should be past. The very next week, all the armies of 
the West as well as of the East are placed at his disposal; but we find no 
longer an inclination on his part to withdraw any portion of the Western 
armies into Virginia. Indeed, his reason for delaying the campaign is now 
no longer the one given a week ago, viz., the inferiority of the Potomac army 
in respect of numbers, but the neglect from which the Western army has it¬ 
self been suffering all along — its lack of preparation and organization. 
Henceforth he waits, not to fill up the ranks of the Virginia army, but to 
make preparations in the West. 









[March, 1861. 


178 



THE DEBTRIIOTION OF THE NASHVILLE UY THE IRON-CLAD MONITOR MONTACtf. 


CHAPTER VI. 

NAVAL OPERATIONS. 

The Blockaue of Southern Ports.—Naval Superiority of the North.—The New England Fisheries. 
—Condition of the United States Navy at the beginning of the War.—The Proclamation of the 
Blockade by President Lincoln.—Vessels recalled from Service in Foreign Waters.—Blockad¬ 
ing Squadrons.—Jefferson Davis grants Letters of Marque.—Confederate Privateers.—Fort¬ 
ress Monroe.—The Hatteras and Port Royal Expeditions.—Confederate Attack on Santa Rosa. 
—Bombardment of Fort McRea.—Hollins’s Confederate Fleet on the Mississippi. 

N a war whose successful termination depended upon the exhaustion of 
the South, the blockade of the Southern ports constituted of necessity an 
important feature. Herein it was that the naval superiority of the North 
was chiefly available. There were undoubtedly certain disadvantages aris¬ 
ing out of the commercial character of the Northern people. Nor were 
these slight in a war like that waged between the North and the South, 
where it was precisely the case of an elaborate network of civilization, as 
vulnerable as it was complex and extensive, liable to be deranged by the 
minutest fluctuations even of a peaceful time, and much more by the violent 
changes incident to a period of civil strife, pitted against a feudal status of 
social life, the very atmosphere of which is martial aspiration. Yet these 
disadvantages were more than compensated for by our power to cut the 
Southern States almost entirely off from all foreign supply and re-enforce¬ 
ment. At the first outbreak of hostilities, however, the successful blockade 
of a coast measuring more than three thousand miles in length seemed ut¬ 
terly out of the reach of the national government, and was, doubtless, not 
even calculated upon by the Southern leaders as a possible event, since the 
cotton states, dependent upon their exports for their very wealth, were finan¬ 
cially ruined the moment the gates of the sea were closed against them. 
Knowing this, they would never have ventured the chances of a war on 
such unfavorable conditions; and, indeed, it seemed a task, requiring some 
miracle to be performed in order to its accomplishment, for a nation which 
on the 1st of January, 1861, had but a single war-steamer available for the 
defense of its entire Atlantic coast, to proclaim a blockade whose regulations 
extended over the coast of half a continent. But this aspect of the case was 
essentially a delusive view. The inlets and harbors of our coast were not 
crowded with fleets, it is true; but the essential basis of a navy consists not 
in ships, but in trained seamen. The basis of a substantial navy had been 
firmly established for the North, not only through the ordinary channels of 
commerce, but more especially through the extensive New England fisheries. 

The first commercial link connecting America with the Old World was 
established by means of the fisheries off Newfoundland. Not long after¬ 
ward the Cape Cod fisheries came into prominence, and formed the basis of 
New England commerce. As in the case of ancient Attica, New England, 
on account of the sterility of her soil, impelled her sons, by the pressure of 
necessity, to devote a great measure of their activity to fisheries and com¬ 
merce. About the middle of the seventeenth century it was the habit of 
Virginia planters to speak of the sterility of New England and of her fish¬ 
eries with ridicule; it was sometimes even hinted that the Puritans would 
have shown a larger wisdom in settling the Bahamas than in sticking so 
closely to Plymouth Rock. Strangely enough, just two centuries later we 
find New England, in spite of her sterility, in advance of her more fruitful 


sisters of the South in all material as well as moral prosperity, and able, 
through her naval power, to blockade the entire Southern coast; and this 
naval power, which, though chiefly resident in New England, is, through her 
steadfast loyalty, a national possession, is due mainly to her fisheries. The 
only seasofi of the year in which the fisheries can be carried on with success 
is that which of all others is the most tempestuous, and only the most cour¬ 
ageous and hardy men could face its dangers and endure its hardships. It 
is from men trained in this school that the navies of great nations are nour¬ 
ished. The naval service, while it demands and exhausts hardy seamen, is 
incapable of producing them; and both France and England have always 
looked to their fisheries to supply the demand for fresh material. The 
great Italian cities, at the height of their commercial prosperity, acknowl¬ 
edged their obligation to fishermen, and at Venice there was a yearly festi¬ 
val established to commemorate this obligation. In view of the national 
importance of our fisheries, the measures relating to them, and which formed 
a part of the Reciprocity Treaty between the United States and Great Brit¬ 
ain, were held to be of momentous interest. These articles of the treaty al¬ 
lowed the citizens of either nation, under certain specified restrictions, to 
carry on fisheries in the waters of the other, thus extending for each nation 
its field for the training of seamen. 

But, notwithstanding that there were about 20,000 men directly engaged 
in our fisheries, besides the great number of seamen engaged in commerce 
available for naval use, there were still great impediments to be removed be¬ 
fore an actual navy could grow out of the resources at hand. The naval es¬ 
tablishment of the United States at the beginning of the war, in regard to 
the number of vessels and the quantity of ordnance at its disposal, was ex¬ 
ceedingly weak. This nation had always pursued a policy in regard to for¬ 
eign powers which, while securing herself against attack from abroad, made 
it unnecessary to maintain an army and navy establishment proportioned to 
her comparative power. In March, 1861, the number of vessels of all class¬ 
es belonging to the navy was only ninety, of which not more than forty-two 
were in commission, these latter mounting between five and six hundred 
guns. Nearly all of those in commission were on foreign stations, the Home 
Squadron consisting only of twelve vessels, mounting one hundred and 
■eighty-seven guns; and only four of these were in Northern ports, the re¬ 
mainder being for the most part in the Gulf of Mexico. The complement 
of these vessels was about 2000 men. The number of naval officers disaf¬ 
fected to the government was very large. In the four months from March 
4th to July 4th there were on this account two hundred and fifty-nine res¬ 
ignations. The destruction of the Norfolk Navy Yard had been chiefly in¬ 
jurious on account of the large amount of ordnance sacrificed, a large quan¬ 
tity of which fell into the hands of the enemy. The Cumberland, which was 
the only vessel of the yard in commission, fortunately escaped. 

Such was the inadequate force at the disposal of the government when 
the war began. But the President promptly issued his proclamation, laying 
an embargo on the ports of the seven states then belonging to the Confeder¬ 
acy. This was on the 19th of April. On the 27th he included within the 
limits of his proclamation the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. To 
carry into effect these two proclamations, Flag-officer Pendergrast, in com¬ 
mand of the Home Squadron, was sent, with all the ships available ior the 













Mat, 1861.] 


NAVAL OPERATIONS. 


179 


purpose, to establish non-intercourse, and to notify foreigners of the embar¬ 
go, giving them fifteen days in which to complete their preparations for de¬ 
parture. Seventeen more vessels were put in commission, and the com¬ 
mandants of the navy yards in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were 
directed to purchase and equip suitable steamers, in order to render the 
blockade as effective as possible. In the mean while vessels were continu¬ 
ally arriving from foreign waters. The Niagara reached Boston from Japan 
on the 24th, and was immediately dispatched to Charleston Harbor. Short¬ 
ly afterward she was removed to the Gulf, to intercept shipments of arms 
and munitions of war said to be on their way to Mobile and New Orleans. 
The East India, Mediterranean, Brazil, and African Squadrons were recalled, 
adding to the navy a force of 200 guns and 2500 men. Twelve steamers 
were purchased by the government, and nine more were chartered; and sev¬ 
eral small vessels which had been captured were taken into the service. 

Thus, before July 4th, the blockade had been rendered so effective that 
foreign nations could not evade it, and were obliged to recognize its legality. 
The duties of the blockade were divided between two squadrons—the At¬ 
lantic Squadron, under the command of Flag-officer S. H. Stringham, and 
the Squadron of the Gulf, under Flag-officer Mervine: the former consisted 
of 22 vessels, 296 guns, and 3300 men; the latter of 21 vessels, 282 guns, 
and 3500 men. There were, in addition to these, the Potomac Squadron, 
under Commander Ward, the squadron in the Pacific, under Flag-officer 
John B. Montgomery, consisting of 6 vessels, 82 guns, and 1000 men, and 
the West India Squadron, which was assigned to Pendergrast. 



TUE SAVANNAH. 


It was understood that transports secured on the spur of the moment 
could be of only temporary use, and accordingly, to secure vessels available 
in all weathers and for all sorts of service, the Navy Department contracted 
for the building of twenty-three gun-boats of about five hundred tons bur¬ 
den. The eight sloops-of-war which had been ordered by Congress in its 
previous session were being built as rapidly as the demand for vessels im¬ 
mediately needed would allow. Arrangements were also being made for 
the construction of larger and fleeter vessels, to be used not only on block¬ 
ade, but also for the pursuit and destruction of privateers. 

It was only through privateering that the Confederacy bad the means of 
carrying on the war upon the seas. As soon as the President’s proclama¬ 
tion calling out the militia was made known at the Confederate capital, Da¬ 
vis issued a proclamation inviting applications for letters of marque and re¬ 
prisal, those applying to make a written statement, being required to give a 
suitable description of the character, force, and tonnage of the vessel to be 
employed, and the number of its proposed crew. Before receiving their 
commissions, all applicants w-ere compelled to give bonds to the amount of 
$5000 or $10,000 that the laws of the Confederate States should be ob¬ 
served, that all damages done contrary to those laws should be satisfied, and 
that the commission should be surrendered when revoked by the President. 
Early in May this measure of President Davis was sanctioned by the Con¬ 
federate Congress, and it was farther provided that prizes should be distrib¬ 
uted among the owners, officers, and crews of the capturing vessels; but that 
these must first be carried into some port of the Confederacy, or of some 
friendly state, to be condemned by a competent tribunal. A bounty of $20 
was offered for each person on board any armed ship belonging to the 
United States which should be burnt, sunk, or destroyed, and one ol $25 for 
each person captured and brought into port. 

There were two difficulties in the way of successfully carrying out this 
scheme. One was the blockade, which, in the first instance, impeded the 
egress of privateers, and after their escape prevented their return with cap¬ 
tured vessels to Confederate ports; the other was the refusal of neutral 
powers to allow these armed vessels to bring prizes into any of their ports. 
Unless, therefore, privateers should be able to elude the blockade, both in 
their egress from Confederate ports and in their return to the same, the en¬ 
tire value of the prizes captured would be lost to the captors. It was inev¬ 
itable, however, that some of these cruisers would get out to sea; and this 
once accomplished, it became absolutely impossible for the Federal govern¬ 
ment to maintain so effective a police as to secure our commerce against the 
threatened danger. There was an advantage gained by that government 


even in this, inasmuch as the partial annihilation of our commerce diverted 
the activity and capital hitherto directed into that channel to the develop 
ment of our naval resources against the Confederacy. 

At the beginning of May, 1861, the Confederacy had purchased two ves¬ 
sels— Sumter and McRae —which were then being rapidly prepared for sea 
at New Orleans. The first privateer which eluded the blockade was the 
Savannah, which was also the first to be captured. This vessel was by no 
means a formidable one, her burden being only fifty tons, and at a little dis¬ 
tance could not have been distinguished from an ordinary pilot-boat. She 
was fitted out at Charleston, where she took in a crew of twenty men, and 
carried an 18-pounder, mounted on a swivel amidships. She escaped on 
Sunday, the 2d of June, while the United States frigate Minnesota , on duty 
off Charleston, was in pursuit of a suspicious craft cruising to the southward. 
The next day she captured the brig Joseph, with a cargo of sugar, from Cuba. 
The same day, about 5 P.M., the brig Perry came in sight, and the Savannah 
gave chase, expecting to take another prize. Unfortunately for the priva¬ 
teer, the brig Perry was a United States man-of-war, and she caught a Tar¬ 
tar! The tables were turned; the chase was reversed, and at 11 o’clock the 
next morning the Savannah, with her officers and crew, were captured and 
brought to the port of New York. 

A month later, the Sumter, mounting five guns, escaped from New Or¬ 
leans, with a crew of sixty-five men and twenty marines, under the com¬ 
mand of Raphael Semmes. This vessel was the old Marques de la Hahana, 
which had been captured by the United States fleet off Vera Cruz in 1860, 
and taken as a prize to New Orleans. After her escape, which she effected 
while the Brooklyn was pursuing an English vessel attempting to run the 
blockade, the Sumter captured several brigs, which she carried as prizes to 
Cienfuegos, Cuba, where they were released by the Spanish government and 
sent to New York. On the 26th of July the Sumter was at Venezuela, hav¬ 
ing captured on her way from Cuba the A Liny Bradford, which was sent to 
New Orleans with Scmmes’s first dispatch. After having captured and 
burned several valuable vessels, the Sumter reached Cadiz early in Febru¬ 
ary, 1862. Here her career was virtually ended, as the Tuscarora, lying off 
Gibraltar, kept her under embargo, until Semmes finally, after waiting two 
months to effect an escape, discharged his crew and sold the ship. The ca¬ 
reer of the Jeff. Davis, which escaped from Charleston about the same time 
that the Sumter ran out from New Orleans, was far less fortunate than that 
of the latter vessel. She captured and burned a number of American ves¬ 
sels, but about the middle of August was wrecked near St. Augustine, Flor¬ 
ida. In October, 1861, the Nashville, commanded by Lieutenant Pegram, es¬ 
caped from Charleston. The next January she was at Southampton, Eng¬ 
land, which port she was ordered to quit on the 4th of February. At this 
time she was closely blockaded by the Tuscarora; but the latter was not 
permitted to pursue until after the expiration of twenty-four hours, which 
gave the privateer every chance of escape. The Nashville ran the blockade 
at Beaufort, and anchored safely in a Confederate port on the 1st of March, 
bringing with her $3,000,000 worth of stores, but no arms. Just one year 
from her arrival at Beaufort she was destroyed by the Federal iron-clads in 
the Great Ogeechee River, and under the guns of Fort McAllister. The Mon- 
tauk (Captain Worden) led in the attack. She had grounded in that part of 
the river known as the Seven Miles’ Reach, when the fleet approached to 
within twelve hundred yards, and opened fire both on the ship and the bat¬ 
tery. The Nashville soon caught fire, and her magazine exploded. The at¬ 
tempts made by the Confederacy to build up its navy in foreign ship-yards 
will be considered in some future chapter. 



TUE bUUTKB. 


Apart from the measures taken to secure an effective blockade, the naval 
arm of the service, like the military, during the year 1861 was engaged only 






























180 


[August, 1861 , 



in detached operations. Two important expeditions were planned and car¬ 
ried out, having for their object the seizure of points on the Southern coast, 
and a diversion of the enemy’s forces from Virginia, in view of a possible ad¬ 
vance by McClellan’s army in the autumn. Besides the Hatteras and Port 
Royal Expeditions, our occupation of Ship Island in September, and the at¬ 
tack made by the rebels on Santa Rosa Island in October, were the only 
events of interest worthy of note in the record of naval operations for the 
year. 

Nothing of any importance occurred in General Butler’s department dur¬ 
ing the month of July; but the Confederate General Magruder still had a 
large force on the Peninsula, which, shortly after the battle of Bull Run, sig¬ 
nalized itself by burning the little village of Hampton. On the 7th of Au¬ 
gust Magruder had posted a force of seven thousand men, with eight pieces 
of artillery, on Black River, three miles from the village, with the intention 
of forcing an engagement upon our soldiers at Newport News or at Hamp¬ 
ton, or at least of destroying the latter place, and thus preventing its being 
used by Butler’s men for winter quarters. But these men already, as will 
presently appear, had their eye upon a sunnier clime, and would, therefore, 
hardly realize the injury which had been intended. The circumstances in¬ 
cident to the conflagration were every way disgraceful to the Confederate 
commander. No warning was given, and helpless non-combatants were 
aroused from their beds at midnight to look upon the destruction of their 
homes. Nothing, however, was accomplished by the enemy beyond this 
conflagration, as our forces were prepared to meet him, and with the chances 
of victory on their side. 

On the 18th of August General Butler turned over his command at For¬ 
tress Monroe to General Wool, having been at the head of the department 
of Virginia for nearly three months. Assigned to no other post, he reported 
to General Wool for orders, and received quietly the command of the vol¬ 
unteer forces outside the fortress, viz., at Camps Butler and Hamilton, serv¬ 
ing as a subordinate where he had, almost from the beginning of the war, 
been accustomed to the supreme command. But it was not long before 
work of great moment was intrusted to him for execution. The resources 
of the fortress had up to this time been used chiefly with a view to secure 
it from the possibility of capture; that security had now been fully gained, 
and henceforth Fortress Monroe was to become the centre from which the 
naval strength of the nation might be hurled against the trembling and al¬ 
most defenseless coasts of the Southern Atlantic. In a single day the full 
importance of the possession of the fortress to our government flashed like 
an illumination upon the popular mind; it was the day when the expedi¬ 
tion to Hatteras Inlet was brought to light as an accomplished result. 

The Confederacy had not been without its serious apprehensions as to the 
vulnerability of its coast defenses; indeed, it was the sorest of anticipated 
evils, and the more the boasting in relation to heroic defenses against these 
daily-expected raids upon their coast, the greater their apprehension of ruin 
which must inevitably result from them. Within but a day or two of the 


landing of our forces at Hatteras, the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel gave 
the following reasons for immediately organizing a coast defense: 

“ 1. Because there are many places where the enemy might commit raids 
and do us damage before we could organize and drive them off. Beaufort 
District, opposite to Savannah, has several fine ports and inlets, navigable 
for large vessels, wholly unprotected. This district has five black to one 
white inhabitant. Several inlets on our coast, which our enemies know like 
a book, from surveys in their possession, are equally unprotected. 

“ 2. In two months more they will not fear our climate. By that time 
they might be ready to make a sudden descent and find us unprepared. 

“3. A small force might eject them if ready to go at once; when, if we 
have to wait, a much larger one will be necessary. 

“4. By organizing and drilling infantry and guerrillas at home, there will 
be no need to call upon the President for troops, and a feint from the ene¬ 
my would not injure our Virginia operations.” 

Hardly had this note of alarm been sounded before the blow was struck 
and the danger illustrated. The point of attack was not that which would 
have been conjectured by the enemy; apparently no position along the coast, 
with the exception of cities, was better protected than Hatteras Inlet. This 
point was chosen by Butler himself, who both originated and planned the 
expedition, aided, however, in the execution of his scheme by Commodore 
S. H. Stringham, of the Navy. The first suggestion leading to this under, 
taking was furnished by a Union man who had been wrecked and detained 
as a prisoner at the Inlet, and who brought home the important information 
that through that opening in the sand-reef which lines the North Carolina 
coast, blockade runners were continually gaining access to the main land. 
This was before Butler had been relieved of his command; and when General 
Wool arrived at the fortress, he found that preparations were already being 
made, by order of General Scott, for an expedition whose object should be 
to block up the Inlet and reduce the forts in the vicinity. There were two 
of these fortifications—Forts Hatteras and Clark—which the Confederates 
had for the last three months been erecting upon the point north of the In¬ 
let, one of them mounting ten and the other seven guns. These earthworks 
were constructed of sand, turfed over; were twenty-five feet in thickness, and 
contained bomb-proofs. The position of Fort Hatteras was one of great 
strength, being nearly surrounded by water, and accessible only by a cir¬ 
cuitous march of five hundred yards over a neck of sand, and then over a 
narrow causeway commanded by two 32-pounders. Its bomb-proof shelter¬ 
ed four hundred men. Fort Clark, seven hundred yards farther north, 
was smaller, and less formidable in its armament. 

General Butler volunteered to command the expedition, which started 
out from Hampton Roads a little after noon on Monday, August 26th, and 
which consisted of two frigates—the Minnesota and Wabash, the sloop-of- 
war Pawnee, and three war steamers—the Monticello, Harriet Lane, and 
Quaker City, together with two transport steamers—the George Peabody 
and the Adelaide, and the steam-tug Fanny, besides some surf-boats, and an 

































































































NAVAL OPERATIONS. 


August, 1861.] 



e. H- STRING HAM. 


old schooner which it was proposed to sink in the bulk-head. The Cum¬ 
berland and the Susquehanna were expected to be on hand in time to join 
in the attack. Nine hundred troops made up the small military detachment 
of the expedition. 

By two o’clock on Tuesday the fleet arrived off Hatteras, and the Monti- 
eello was dispatched to reconnoitre the position and to look out a suitable 
landing-place. The next morning the troops were landed two and a half 
miles north of the forts, under cover of the gun-boats. Upon the voyage, 
every thing had gone on pleasantly; but just now there was a heavy sea, 
and it was with great difficulty that a small portion of the force was landed, 
and all farther attempts at disembarkation were given up. In the mean 
time the fleet opened fire upon the forts, particularly upon Fort Clark. The 
return fire fell short, amid the contemptuous laughter of our blue-jackets. 
This was the first instance in the war of an assault by gun-boats, and the 
excitement was intense. Every soldier was promptly at his post. One of 
the spongers, dropping his sponge overboard, jumped over after it and recov¬ 
ered his place before there was time even to reprimand him for his offense. 
After a heavy bombardment, lasting from nine o’clock in the morning until 
night, Fort Clark was evacuated; the flag on Fort Hatteras also was hauled 
down, and our victory seemed secure. The Monticello steamed into the 
Inlet to within six hundred yards of the fort, when suddenly the heavy guns 
of the latter opened upon her with such terrible effect that she was in dan¬ 
ger of sinking. But she escaped, though considerably injured; and the 
other boats reopened the attack, which was continued until dark, appar¬ 
ently with little effect. Things began to look despondently, and there was 
among the men a dim conjecture of failure; and, to complete the discourage¬ 
ment, the weather threatened serious work ahead. The vessels stationed 
near the shore to protect our troops were compelled during the night, for 
their own safety, to retire. The number of men landed were insufficient to 
resist attack, and, fortunately, no attack was made by the enemy. 

On Thursday morning the assault upon Fort Hatteras was renewed, and, 
after a few hours of rapid firing, the white flag was displayed above the 
fort, and the Confederate flag-officer, Commodore Barron, offered to surren¬ 
der the position to General Butler if the garrison might be permitted to re¬ 
tire with all the honors of war, stating, moreover, that he had in the fort 
seven hundred men, and fifteen hundred within call. Butler returned his 
compliments, and assured the Confederate commander that no terms were 
admissible save those of an unconditional surrender—terms which Barron 
was compelled to accept; and, giving himself up as prisoner, he had the ad¬ 
ditional humiliation of having to pass directly under the guns of the Wabash, 
which, six months before, he had himself commanded with honor. 

At the very moment when the terms of capitulation were under consid¬ 
eration by the enemy, the Adelaide and the Harriet Lane were grounded in 
attempting to pass the bar, and both of them were under the guns of the 
fort. What if Barron, seeing his advantage, should renew the attack? It 
was a critical moment; but the terms were accepted, and the object of the 
expedition was accomplished. Instead, however, of destroying the port, as 
originally proposed, Butler thought it of great importance that it should be 
retained, and, in order to present this view of the case to General Scott, re 
turned to Washington. The government, convinced of the wisdom of his 
proposition, determined to hold the place, and immediately provisioned the 
garrison for that purpose. The importance of this particular victory, con¬ 
sidered alone and by itself, was no doubt extravagantly overrated by the 
people; but it must be remembered that it was preceded by a summer of 
disaster, and furnished the first glimpse of the possibilities for victory that 


181 

were involved in our naval resources; and it lifted from Butler’s shoulders 
the heavy burden of the reverse at Great Bethel. 

These events were soon followed by the occupation of Ship Island in the 
Mississippi Sound. The Confederates evacuated the island September 16th, 
and our forces, under Commander Smith, immediately took possession. 

The importance of Hatteras Inlet to the government was in a very short 
time fully illustrated: first, by the great number of prizes taken—five 
schooners having been captured in a single day—and, secondly, by the op¬ 
portunities offered for aggressive action in the immediate vicinity, an in¬ 
stance of which occurred within three weeks of the capture of Fort Hatteras, 
in the expedition against Fort Ocracoke, situated off an inlet of the same 
name, on the seaward face of Beacon Island. The expedition proceeded 
under the leadership of Lieutenants Maxwell and Eastman, and was a com¬ 
plete success, resulting in the destruction of the fort, which was deserted, 
and the capture of twenty-two guns. At Portsmouth, on the opposite side, 
there had been a camp, which the Confederate troops abandoned at the ap¬ 
proach of the Fanny, to whom was intrusted the execution of the enterprise. 

The success which attended General Butler in his descent upon the coast 
of North Carolina, gaining for our government not merely the key to the 
entire coast of that state, but also such a foothold on the main land as to 
furnish a nucleus for future movements in the interior as time should pre¬ 
pare the way for them, encouraged the Naval Department to fit out a sec¬ 
ond expedition, on a larger scale, to operate in waters farther south. The 
expedition, under the joint command of General Sherman and Commodore 
Dupont, and consisting of fifty vessels including transports, sailed from For¬ 
tress Monroe on Tuesday, the 29th of October, under sealed orders, the spe¬ 
cific object of attack being left, in great measure, to the discretion of the 
officers commanding. The time that transpired between the sailing of the 
expedition and its arrival at its destination was a period of great suspense 
to the whole country—to the curiosity of the North and to the apprehen¬ 
sion of the South. The entire uncertainty as to where the uplifted arm of 
the national power w^ to fall completely bewildered the states along the 
sea-board; every probable point of attack was fortified; Charleston, in par¬ 
ticular, waited anxiously, expecting daily to see the menacing fleet across 
the bar of her harbor. ’The tenor of General Sherman’s orders, of which 
some report in a Northern newspaper fell into the hands of the Confederates, 
indicating that considerable resistance might be expected on the part of the 
enemy, led the South to suppose that some strong point was to be assailed 
—Charleston, for instance, or Savannah, or New Orleans. But this was not 
the case. The leaders of the expedition, after careful deliberation, determ¬ 
ined to take possession of Port Royal Harbor, on the coast of South Caro¬ 
lina. It was supposed that in five days the voyage would be completed; 
but on Friday, the 1st of November, rough weather set in, with a high south¬ 
easter, so that the fleet was dispersed and placed in a perilous situation. One 
of the ships had to throw a powerful battery overboard in order to save her 
crew, and some transports were lost. On the fourth of November the fleet 
arrived at Port Royal bar. 

It was originally intended that the military forces should co-operate with 
the naval; but this, upon a consideration of the distance—which was five 
or six miles—over which the troops would have to be conveyed to the near¬ 
est point of landing, and by reason of a considerable loss, in the recent storm, 
of a greater portion of the means of disembarkment, was found to be a plan 
quite impossible of execution, and therefore the navy alone was involved 
in the engagement. The bar of Port Royal is ten miles seaward. After 
crossing this, the channel leads between St. Philip’s Island and Hilton Head 
into the harbor. Upon each side of the channel, or Broad River, were sit¬ 
uated batteries of considerable strength, viz., on Hilton Head, Fort Walker, 
mounting twenty-three guns; and on St.Philip’s Island,Fort Beauregard, 
mounting fifteen guns; and at the left of the latter, a battery of four guns 
behind earthworks. Fort Walker was a formidable strong-hold, but those 
on the opposite side were less elaborate. There wa3 no protection afforded 
by either of the forts from shells or bombs, as they had been hastily erected 
to meet a possible emergency of this nature. The Confederate forces on 
Hilton Head were under the command of General Drayton. 

The attack, on account of unfavorable weather, was postponed until the 
7th of November. The day was clear and beautiful, without a cloud, and 
in every way favorable to the operations of the fleet. A reconnoissance had 
been made three or four days previously, in which the strength and position 
of the batteries was ascertained. The attack was made at an early hour of 
the day. The transports being left in the rear, the most formidable steam¬ 
ers of the fleet, to the number of thirteen, with the Wabash, the flag-ship of 
Commodore Dupont, in the van, swept in with open ports: and all was si¬ 
lence until the Minnesota came directly opposite Fort Walker, when every 
gun of the fort fired simultaneously upon the frigate. There was no reply 
from the fleet. The batteries of Fort Beauregard poured in their fire, but 
still there was no answer. Then the second steamer in the line came with¬ 
in range, was fired upon from both sides at once, when, from the first three 
vessels, seventy-five guns delivered their terrible broadsides upon Fort 
Walker. From this moment the bombardment ceased not for four hours. 
In single file, as they had commenced, the steamers moved on until nine of 
them had passed out of range up toward the harbor; then they returned, 
describing an ellipse, and saluted Fort Beauregard. After sailing around 
this circle several times, another and far more successful plan was adopted— 
that of enfilading the batteries in either direction with our fire, while an at¬ 
tack was at the same time made from the front. Very soon nearly every 
gun was dismounted. A ljttle after eleven the batteries on St. Philip’s Island 






182 


were silenced, Fort Walker maintaining its fire only for two hours longer. 
The battering of the fort was terrible, the guns were scattered in every di¬ 
rection, surrounded by the dead and the dying. In this extremity it was 
determined to abandon the fort. Back of this work there was an open space 
of a mile, over which the defeated troops ran in a panic, subject every mo¬ 
ment to the fire of the fleet. They found shelter in the woods, through 
which they made their way across the peninsula to the main land. The 
ground over which they fled was covered with their muskets and knapsacks. 

Upon the arrival of the fleet the harbor was guarded, in addition to the 
fortifications, by a squadron of Confederate steamers under Commodore Tat- 
nall; but this miniature navy was of no avail, and at the first onset was 
driven away. Forty-three guns were captured, and possession was taken of 
Hilton Head, which has since been an important centre of naval operations. 
Situated midway between Charleston and Savannah, and commanding easi¬ 
ly the railroad connecting those two cities, this military position was of very 
great value. 

Previous to the sailing of the Port Royal expedition occurred the attack 
on Santa Rosa Island. 


The Atlantic and Gulf coasts are almost entirely walled in from the 
open violence of the sea by long, narrow islands or reefs of sand, between 
which and the main land are inclosurcs of water, sometimes large enough to 
be called bays, that find or make an outlet through the before-mentioned 
reefs. Santa Rosa Island is a sand-reef of this character opposite Florida, 
on the Gulf coast, inclosing the Pensacola Harbor, which was the finest in 
the Gulf. On the Gulf side there are three or four sand-ridges parallel to 
the coast, running along the island, and on the opposite or harbor side the 
ground is low and swampy, covered with a few bushes'and trees. On the 
lower or western extremity of the island Fort Pickens is situated, directly 
opposite Fort McRea. The Confederate authorities were keenly alive to the 
importance of Fort Pickens. As early as March, 1861, a month previous to 
the actual commencement of hostilities, Major General Bragg, commanding 
the Confederate forces at Pensacola, had issued an order prohibiting all traf¬ 
fic or communication with the fort, which was shortly afterward strongly 
re-enforced, and assumed a threatening attitude, whereupon formidable prep¬ 
arations for its assault began to be made at Pensacola. The coast fronting 
Fort Pickens takes the form of a semicircle, stretching from the navy yard 
to Fort McRea, a distance of two and one half miles, along which was con¬ 
structed an uninterrupted line of redoubts and batteries, together with a 
water-battery beyond Fort McRea. Bragg had over six thousand men in 
his command, who, inflamed by the success at Sumter, were eager to repeat 
it against Pickens, at that time under the command of Lieutenant Slemmer, 
whose conduct during these eventful days this history has recorded in the 
proper place. He was succeeded in command by Colonel Harvey Brown. 
On the 13th of June the celebrated Sixth New York Regiment, Zouaves, 
commanded by Colonel William Wilson, who was one of the very first to 
offer his services to the government on the breaking out of the war, took its 
departure for Santa Rosa Island, where it encamped about a mile eastward 
from the fort. The island at this point is three fourths of a mile in width. 

As a matter of course, there was the usual jealousy and bickering between 
the regulars in the fort and the volunteer Zouaves. But, so far as the ene¬ 
my was concerned, “ Billy Wilson” was the foremost man on the island; and 
although the prospect of taking the fort had long been despaired of, yet it 



[October, 18G1. 

seemed to them to be no unworthy object to break up the Zouave encamp 
ment. It was'to accomplish this object that on the evening of the 8th of 
October a force of between twelve hundred and two thousand Confederates, 
transported by two steamers and a few launches, under the command of 
Brigadier General Anderson, effected a landing on the island four miles 
above the camp. Except for a short distance beyond the camp in that di¬ 
rection there was no guard posted, although there was every reason to ap¬ 
prehend an early attack, on account of the strength of Bragg’s army on the 
other side. The camp could hardly have been less favorably situated to 
repel an assault. Colonel Wilson’s regiment had been depleted of quite 
four fifths of its number, having hardly two hundred men able to take the 
field. 

The enemy, having landed without opposition, marched down the island 
in three columns, one down the centre of the island, and the other two along 
either coast. In this order they came upon the picket-guard, which alto¬ 
gether consisted of seventy men variously disposed. Here the attack com¬ 
menced just as the Confederates came over the back hill of the beach ; but 
the close ranks of the attacking columns received a destructive fire from the 
squads of men opposed to them, and were even thrown into considerable dis¬ 
order. So persistently did the pickets hold their ground, retreating only 
step by step, delivering all the time a continuous fire into the enemj 7 ’s ranks, 
that all the results calculated upon through a surprise of the camp were lost, 
the uninterrupted firing having completely alarmed the Zouaves and brought 
them promptly into line. There was even time given to send a dispatch to 
the fort, notifying Colonel Brown of the attack. So many false alarms had 
been given that this was received incredulously; but the heavy volley-firing, 
as the engagement became more general, aroused the regulars to an appreci¬ 
ation of the situation. In the mean time, Colonel Wilson and Lieutenant 
Colonel Creighton encountered the centre column of the enemy; but only a 
small force was left to receive the attack of this column, the greater number 
of men having been detached for the purpose of preventing the flank move¬ 
ment which was being effected by the enemy’s left column. The main por¬ 
tion of the Confederate force was already in the very midst of the camp, to 
which they were setting fire, having completely plundered it of clothing, 
money, and baggage. From the fort a company of about thirty men, under 
Major Vogdes, marched toward the left of the field, and the major, being in 
advance of his men, was surrounded and taken prisoner. His men, how¬ 
ever, made objections to surrendering, and bravely stood their ground. If 
the enemy had not become very much dispersed for the purposes of plunder 
and destruction, and had not thus also given time to the federal troops to 
gather themselves together for an attack, matters would have assumed a 
much more serious aspect. Supposing, from the severity of the fire, that the 
force upon the island was very much larger than they had counted upon, 
and fearing lest they might be cut off from their transports, the Confederates 
soon commenced a retreat, and were closely followed by the Zouaves and 
the force from the fort. This force attacked them as they were re-embark- 
ing, and fired upon them with terrible effect. The Confederate loss at this 
point was great, particularly as the swampy ground very much impeded 
their operations. 

The expedition, though in some measure successful, was far from being 
thoroughly fortunate. In the first place, it did not accomplish what with so 
great a force might have been reasonably expected. The darkness of the 
night, and the dissipation among the men consequent upon their indiscrimi¬ 
nate plunder, led to a great deal of confusion, and many of the troops were 
killed by men in their own ranks. And, again, whatever punishment they 
inflicted upon our men in the destruction of their camp and in robbing them 
of their personal effects, certainly in the more serious matter of the fight, 
namely, the loss of life, they were much the greater sufferers. 

As to the conduct of Wilson’s Zouaves, it must be remembered that it 
was their first battle, and that very little precaution had been taken against 
an attack. The disparity in numbers was terribly against them, and, to com¬ 
plete their embarrassment, Lieutenant Colonel Creighton had, through a mis¬ 
taken order at an early period in the fight, retired with his men to the fort. 
The bravery of the guard was almost marvelous, and it was this that saved 
the regiment from destruction. 

Fort Pickens, surrounded by a cordon of Confederate batteries, was threat¬ 
ened with the fate of Sumter, beleaguered as it was by a force ten times as 
large as its own. Partly in retaliation for the night attack on Santa Rosa 
Island, and partly because some active measures must be adopted to reduce 
the enemy’s fortifications, Colonel Brown, on the morning of the 22d of No¬ 
vember, assisted by Flag-officer McKean, with the Niagara, Richmond, and 
Montgomery, commenced the bombardment of the enemy’s batteries, which, 
as we have said, stretched in a continuous line from Fort McRea on the left 
to the navy yard on the right. On this line, at the right of Fort McRea, 
was Fort Barrancas. These forts were mounted with some of the heaviest 
guns in the country. There were, besides, fourteen batteries, mounting 
from one to four guns. Conjointly with the attack from Fort Pickens, the 
fire from three batteries on the island was also directed against the enemy’s 
works. The fire was returned with great accuracy and vigor. It was hard¬ 
ly noon, however, when the guns of Fort McRea were all silenced but one. 
Pickens was originally intended to resist an attack from the sea, and not 
from the coast; but sand-bag traverses and similar precautions prevented 
any serious injury of the works. The fire of Barrancas, and that from the 
navy yard, was perceptibly reduced during the afternoon. The next day 
Colonel Brown reopened the bombardment, but, owing to the shallowness 
of the water, the frigates were obliged to withdraw from the contest. They 
could, however, have availed nothing against the rifled guns of the enemy. 
Fort McRea was silent all day, and in the afternoon the village of Warring- 


KILLY tV’lLBOX 












January, 1862.] 


NAVAL OPERATIONS. 


183 



MRD'8-EYE VIEW OF FORT PICKENS DURING TUE HOMIJARDMENT, NOVEMBER 22, 1861. 


ton, in the rear of the Confederate batteries, was set on fire from our shells 
and almost entirely destroyed. On the 1st of January, 1862, the bombard¬ 
ment was again opened. The firing was continued into the night, and the 
splendor of the illumination was visible for forty miles out at sea. At 
midnight the bombardment ceased. No important results were gained on 
either side, the casualties to either force not exceeding a dozen men killed 
and wounded. But it was proved that the batteries in the vicinity of Pensa¬ 
cola were harmless against Fort Pickens, and Bragg’s mission a useless one. 

The next week after the fight on Santa Rosa, our fleet lying at anchor in¬ 
side the Southwest Pass of the Mississippi, and consisting of the steamers 
Richmond, Huntsville, Water-witch, and the two sloops-of-war Preble and 
Vincennes, was suddenly attacked by the Manassas, a Confederate battering- 
ram, under the command of Captain Hollins. The onset was made on the 
night of the 12th by a charge of the ram against the sides of the Richmond, 
knocking a hole in her timbers below water-mark, but doing only a trifling 
damage, though the steamer was struck with such violence as to be torn 
from her fastenings. The crew, however, were on their guard, and deliver¬ 


ed a broadside into the Manassas, one of whose engines would no longer 
work, and by the severity of their fire compelled Hollins to haul off his ram, 
and to signal for support. At the given signal a new danger became immi¬ 
nent to our vessels, for a row of fire-ships at that moment appeared moving 
down the river, and threatening complete destruction to the fleet. To avoid 
this calamity, the fear of which was enhanced by the approach of gun-boats 
down the river, the Federal ships of war fell down the Pass one after anoth¬ 
er, but, unfortunately, both the Richmond and the Vincennes got aground 
in attempting to pass the bar. The former, however, was in a favorable po¬ 
sition to give full effect to her heavy guns, having her broadside up the 
stream, and thus the entire fleet was enabled to escape. 

The motive which incited the Confederates to this attack was to break up 
the blockade, which had ruined the prospects of the Crescent City. For this 
purpose several gun-boats had been constructed during the summer, and tho 
more formidable Manassas had been built at Algiers, just opposite New Or¬ 
leans, and armed with a 64-pound Dahlgren. But the long-contemplated 
assault resulted in little immediate damage, and accomplished absolutely 
nothing in its attempt to break up the blockade. 































184 


[July, 1861. 



years after the corner-stone of the original capital had 
been laid by the hands of Washington, the corner¬ 
stone of the edifice in which Congress was now assem¬ 
bled had been laid by the President. Daniel Web¬ 
ster delivered an oration, in which he declared that 
the distinctive nature of American liberty, as distin¬ 
guished from that of Greece, Rome, and modern Eu¬ 
rope, was the capacity for self-government, giving to 
the will of the majority, fairly expressed through its 
representatives, the binding force of law, and the for¬ 
mation of a written constitution, founded upon the 
will of the people. Under that corner-stone he de¬ 
posited a document, written by his own hand, setting 
forth, in his own massive diction, that on this day the 
Union of the United States stood firm ; the Constitu¬ 
tion was unimpaired, and growing every day stronger 
in the affections of the American people, and attract¬ 
ing more and more the admiration of the world. 1 


WILLIAM II. 8EWARP. 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE POLICY OF T1IF. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 

Opening of the Extra Session.—The Fourth of July.—Changes in the House.—Election of Speak¬ 
er.—Galusha A. Grow.—Changes in the Senate.—Former Preponderance of the South.—Want 
of a Leader.—William H. Seward.—Salmon P. Chase.—Stephen A. Douglas.—Henry Wil¬ 
son.—John C. Breckinridge.—.Jesse D. Bright.—Expulsion of Breckinridge, Bright, Polk, and 
Johnson.—The President’s Message.—The Army and the Navy.—War Bills proposed in the 
Senate.—Resolution to approve the President's Acts.—The Debates.—Expulsion of Senators. 
—The Army Bill.—The Crittenden and Johnson Resolution.—McClemand’s Resolution.— 
Military Laws of the Session.—Financial Measures.—The Confiscation Bill.—Receipts and Ex¬ 
penditures.—Foreign Relations.—Instructions to Ministers.—Privateering.—Confederate Com¬ 
missioners.—British, French, and Spanish Decrees of Neutrality.—The Affair of the Trent.— 
Views of the British and American Governments.—First regular Session of Congress.—Presi¬ 
dent’s Message.—Number and Constitution of the Army.—Mr. Stanton appointed Secretary 
of War.—The Navy.—Receipts and Expenditures.—Plan of the Secretary of the Treasury.— 
Change of Views in Congress.—Peace Propositions laid aside.—War Measures.—Appropria¬ 
tions.—Financial Measures adopted.—Paper Money a Legal Tender.—The Argument for and 
against it. 

I T is proposed in this and the following chapter to describe the domestic 
and foreign policy of the Federal government from the opening of the 
extra session of Congress, July 4,1861, to the close of the first regular ses¬ 
sion, July 17,1862. 

Congress met in extra session at the call of the President on the 4th of 
July. That day is memorable in American history. On that day, eighty- 
five years before, the delegates of the thirteen United States had formally 
put forth the declaration claiming a place among the sovereign and inde¬ 
pendent nations of the earth. Now delegates from thirteen states (for Ken- 
Uucky and Missouri were nominally represented in the Confederate Con¬ 
gress) were preparing to convene at Richmond to complete the destruction 
of the Union. Three of the five successive presidents who had borne a part 
in the struggle for national existence had died on the 4th of July. On that 
day, thirty-five years before, just half a century after the signing of the Dec¬ 
laration, Jefferson, its author, and Adams, its most eloquent advocate, had 
died. On that day, thirty years before, Monroe, the last of the Revolution¬ 
ary presidents, had died. On that day, ten years before, just fifty-eight 


The Thirty-seventh Congress, thus convened in ex¬ 
tra session five months before its regular time of meet¬ 
ing, would hardly have been recognized by one who 
had known the capital in former days. In the House 
of Representatives 159 members answered to their 
names at roll-call. When all the seats claimed were 
filled there were 178 members of the House. In the 
preceding Congress, whose term had closed four 
months before, there were 237 representatives. Of 
the 66 members to which the eleven seceding states 
were entitled, only six appeared. Five of these were 
from Virginia, chosen at an election of somewhat 
doubtful validity, and one from Tennessee. The nine 
teen free states sent 149 representatives; the four bor¬ 
der states, which still adhered to the Union, sent 23. 
In no preceding Congress within the memory of living 
men had there been so large a proportion of new mem¬ 
bers. Barely one third of the representatives had been 
members of the preceding Congress. Some states 
changed their delegation entirely; some changed a 
majority. From Maine every representative was a 
new man; of the thirty-three members from New 
York, only eight had held seats in the last Congress; 
of the five representatives from New Jersey, th ree were 
new men. Two thirds of the entire delegation in the 
House consisted of men who bad never before held 
seats in Congress. This great change of persons did 
not, however, involve a corresponding change in par¬ 
ties. The elections had been held before the plans of 
the Secessionists had been fully developed, and so be¬ 
fore the great uprising of the North, which for a time 
swept away' all the old party distinctions. In the pre¬ 
vious Congress, out of 237 representatives, 109 were 
Republicans, 101 Democrats, while 27, mainly from the 
border states, who held the balance of power, main¬ 
tained a position independent of either party. It had 
only been after a violent contest of two months that 
a Republican speaker was elected by a bare majority. In the present Con¬ 
gress the Republicans had 106 members, having actually lost three mem¬ 
bers; but the defection of the South gave the Republicans a majority of 
three to two, and there were, besides, about 30 members who, without be¬ 
longing to the party, sustained the administration in its leading measures 
for the prosecution of the war. 

Three members, Grow, of Pennsylvania, Blair, of Missouri, and Colfax, of 
Indiana, were prominently named as the Republican candidates for speaker. 
Colfax, whose chances of success stood high, and who was chosen speaker 
of the next Congress, peremptorily declined. He would not,by being a can¬ 
didate, delay the organization of the House. The first ballot stood 71 for 
Grow and 40 for Blair; but, before the result was announced, Blair with¬ 
drew, asking his friends to change their votes. Most of them voted for 
Grow, giving him 99 votes out of 159. The remaining votes were scatter¬ 
ed; of these, 12 were cast for Mr. Crittenden, who, having been superseded 
as senator from Kentucky by Mr. Breckinridge, had been chosen a member 
of the House. Several more were cast for other Union men, leaving the 
actual strength of the Opposition about 40. 

Galusha A. Grow, the new speaker, though barely thirty-eight years of 
age, had been a member of the House for ten years. He had first taken his 
seat in 1850, being the youngest member. He soon gave evidence of de¬ 
cided ability, and was at successive sessions appointed chairman of several 
important committees. He ranked originally among the Democrats, but 
when the great disruption of parties began, he took his place in the new or¬ 
ganization among the Republicans. In 1857 he was the candidate of that 

* “If, therefore, it shall hereafter be the will of God that this structure shall fall from its base, 
that its foundations shall be upturned, and the deposit beneath this stone brought to the eyes of 
men, be it then known that on this day the Union of the United States of America stands firm, 
that their Constitution still exists unimpaired, and with all its original usefulness and glory, grow¬ 
ing every day stronger and stronger in the affections of the great body of the American people, 
and attracting more and more the admiration of the world. And all here assembled, whether 
belonging to puhlic or to private life, with hearts devoutly thankful to Almighty God for the pres¬ 
ervation of the liberty and happiness of the country, unite in sincere and fervent prayers that thi9 
deposit, and the walls and arches, the domes and towers, the columns and entablatures, now to be 
erected over it, may endure forever. God save the United States of America!” 

























THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 


185 


July, 1861.] 



party for speaker, but was defeated by Mr. Orr, of 
South Carolina, the candidate of the Democratic par¬ 
ty, who had then a majority of fully three to two. 

Before the speaker had been chosen several mem¬ 
bers of the Opposition party gave significant indi¬ 
cations of the course which they were to pursue. 

When the names of the members from Virginia were 
called, Cox, of Ohio, and Burnett, of Kentucky, ob¬ 
jected to their reception. Some members had been 
sworn into the military service of the United States; 

Vallandigham, of Ohio, moved that they were there¬ 
by disqualified from holding seats in Congress. Of 
Cox and Vallandigham we shall have occasion to 
speak hereafter. Burnett, after strenuously opposing 
every measure of the government, went over to the 
Confederacy, was formally expelled from his seat in 
Congress, and was subsequently appointed, by the 
body claiming to be the Council of State of Ken¬ 
tucky, a representative in the Confederate Congress 
at Kichmond. 

The change in the Senate was as notable as that 
in the House. The South had long since abandoned 
the hope of maintaining an equality in the popular 
branch of Congress. The population of the North 
increased more rapidly than that of the South. Its 
majority in the House was augmented with each suc¬ 
cessive apportionment. A united North was consol¬ 
idating to oppose a united South, already consoli¬ 
dated. In the House, also, the members from the 
South had long been, as a whole, inferior in charac¬ 
ter and ability to those from the North. The law¬ 
less voters of Arkansas and Mississippi, the ignorant 
denizens of the sand-hills of Georgia and North Car¬ 
olina, had sent members of their own class. “Fire- 
eaters,” bullies, and demagogues had found constitu¬ 
ents in various districts of other states. That there 
were many men in the House of ability, culture, and 
education from the Southern states is true; but, as 
a body, they were types of a low class of Southern 
society. 

With the Senate it was different. There the South 
was nearly equal in numbers to the North; and as 
it was united on all sectional questions, and was al¬ 
ways in close affiliation with a large party in the 
North, it had always a practical majority in the Sen¬ 
ate. The South had always sedulously cared for its 
representation in this body of the national Legisla¬ 
ture. The selection of senators was not determined 
by mere local or personal influences. Any rude dis¬ 
trict might send an incapable representative to the 
House, but a whole state would rarely agree upon 
any one incapable man. In the choice of senators, 
therefore, the combined intellect and culture of each 
state bad the predominance. Now and then, indeed, 
in the complication of partisan politics, an incompe¬ 
tent man found his way to the Senate from a South¬ 
ern state. But these cases were exceptional; as a 
general rule, the South sent its strongest men to the 

Senate, and kept them there. This long service added to their prominence. 
Of late years, also, Southern senators had gained an influence beyond that 
growing out of their individual talents and services. They were a com¬ 
pact body. When one acted or spoke he spoke and acted as a represent¬ 
ative of all, and practically as the representative of all the Northern men 
of Southern principles. So long as the South controlled the Senate it con¬ 
trolled the government. Without its consent no law could be passed; with¬ 
out its sanction no officer could be appointed to execute a law.. 

The domination of the South in the Senate was never more absolute than 
during the session which closed with the termination of Buchanan’s admin¬ 
istration. The Democratic party, Southern and Northern, had a clear ma¬ 
jority of three to two.' This gave them the control of all the standing com¬ 
mittees; for, according to established usage, the dominant party in the Sen¬ 
ate assembled in caucus and settled the constitution of all the committees. 
They apportioned among themselves the chairmanship and the majority of 
every important committee. The list was formally presented to the Senate 
for acceptance. It had been previously agreed upon by the majority in a 
private caucus from which the minority were excluded. The adoption of 
the list thus made out was certain. The minority had only to accept it, 
which they usually did without opposition, for opposition would have been 
unavailing. 

The construction of the standing committees was a matter of great im¬ 
portance. Except in cases where a special committee was ordered—when 
the senator who proposed the committee was usually appointed its chairman 
by courtesy—these standing committees gave shape and form to the action 
of the Senate. Of the twenty-two regular committees, the control of sixteen 
was given to the slave states. These embraced every important committee. 
Mason, of Virginia, was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations; 


QALrSUA A. GROW. 


1 The exact numbers given in the Congressional Globe were: Democrats, 37; Republicans, 24; 
Americans, 2; Vacancies. 3; in all, 66 members in a full Senate. 


Hunter, of the same state, had that on Finance; Clay, of Alabama, had Com 
mercc; Jefferson Davis had Military Affairs; Mallory, of Florida, had Naval 
Affairs; Bayard, of Delaware, had the Judiciary; Yulee, of Florida, the Post- 
office ; Johnson, of Arkansas, had Public Lands; Benjamin, of Louisiana, 
had Public Land Claims; Brown, of Mississippi, had the District of Colum¬ 
bia; and to Green, of Missouri, was assigned the lead in the Committee on 
Territories, so long accorded to Douglas, whose recently promulgated doc¬ 
trine of popular sovereignty had rendered him obnoxious to the oligarchy 
of the South. The six committees confided to senators from the free states 
had to do only with mere routine business. They were the Committees on 
Pensions, Patents, Public Buildings, Printing, Engrossed Bills, and Enrolled 
Bills. Even Bright, of Indiana, the facile tool of the South, and its mouth¬ 
piece when any communication was to be intrusted to a Northern man, was 
put off with the chairmanship of the Committee on Public Buildings. 

The conspiracy against the Union was organized and directed in the 
Senate of the United States, if it did not originate there. Early in 1861, 
when South Carolina only had seceded, a meeting of Southern senators was 
convened, in which Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, 
Florida, and Texas were represented. Resolutions were passed in favor of 
the simultaneous secession of all the Southern states, and the establishment 
of a Southern Confederacy. The conspiring senators, however, resolved still 
to retain their seats until the inauguration of the new administration ; for, 
if thev left, “ force, loan, and volunteer bills might be passed, which would 
put Mr. Lincoln in immediate condition for hostility;’ whereas, if they re¬ 
mained in their places until the 4th of March, they “could keep the hands 
of Mr. Buchanan tied, and disable the Republicans from effecting any legis 
lation which would strengthen the hands of the incoming administration.’’ 
A committee was appointed to carry out the objects of this meeting. Its 
members were Jefferson Davis, then United States senator from Mississippi, 
chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, soon to be President of the 


























186 


Southern Confederacy; Stephen R. Mallory, then United States senator from 
Florida, chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, soon to be Secretary 
of the Navy for the Confederacy; and John Slidell, a native of New York, 
then United States senator from Louisiana, soon to be the Confederate En¬ 
voy to the court of France. 1 Some of these conspirators abandoned their 
seats before the specified day, others retained them beyond that time; but 
enough remained to prevent the passage of any bills for strengthening the 
military or naval power of the government. Scarcely a regiment of soldiers, 
scarcely a vessel of war, scarcely a dollar in the treasury was at the dis¬ 
posal of the new administration when it came into office on the 4th of March. 

The Senate which convened on the 4th of July consisted of but 47 mem¬ 
bers. 2 Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, was the only one who appeared from 
the seceding states, and he had made his way to the national capital with 
a price upon his head. The seceding senators embodied their full propor¬ 
tion of the ability, and more than their proportion of the notability of the 
Senate. Half of them were in their second and third terms. Their aver¬ 
age service had already been eight years; the remaining senators averaged 
but four. To gain position in the Senate is usually a work of time. The 
new members had yet to acquire a national reputation. Of the senators 
now assembled thirty-one were Republicans; five others, though not be¬ 
longing to that party, now supported the administration ; two held an inde¬ 
terminate position,but generally acted with the Opposition; the remaining 
nine persistently opposed every military or financial measure which implied 
the exercise of force for the maintenance of the Union. Of these nine four 
were within a few months formally expelled from the Senate for open com¬ 
plicity with the insurgents, and another subsequently resigned because the 
Senate demanded of its members an oath of fealty to the Constitution and 
government. 

Although there were many able men in Congress, there was no one who 
oould be considered a leader of the dominant party. That position had 
long been conceded to Mr. SeWard. Even while in a meagre minority, he 
had for years exercised a personal influence greater than that of any other 
senator. He possessed many of the highest attributes of a statesman. He 
was ambitious, but in a noble way, for he was always ready to sacrifice 
present popularity to future renown. He never frittered away his influence 
or wasted his strength upon trifles. He took no part in mere Congressional 
skirmishing, and never condescended to reply to personal attacks. Hjj spoke 
much, but only upon important subjects, and after full preparation. In ev¬ 
ery separate attribute of an orator he was excelled by some other senator. 
Hale could deliver a keener retort, Sumner pronounce a more scathing phil¬ 
ippic ; Douglas was a more skillful debater, Davis a more persuasive plead¬ 
er. The two famous .phrases, “ the higher law” and “ the irrepressible con¬ 
flict,” seem to have fallen from his lips by accident, without his imagining 
that they would be caught up and denounced on the one hand, and accepted 
on the other as symbols of a political faith. 3 He lacked that personal mag¬ 
netism by which a leader sometimes binds the members of his party to him¬ 
self. Strong men wept like children when the last chances of the election 
of Clay and Webster to the presidency were lost; the hold of Calhoun and 
Douglas upon their parties was quite as much personal as political. When 
Mr. Seward failed to receive the nomination, his supporters evinced no bit¬ 
ter regret. He was, in their view, the best exponent of the principles of 
the party; but if another man could secure a larger vote, they were content 
that he should be nominated. Mr. Seward was, however, conceded to be 
the foremost statesman of his time and country, the nearest representative 
of the great men of the last generation. That he was the representative 
man of his party was acknowledged, and it was a foregone conclusion with 
friends and foes that he would receive the nomination for the presidency. 
His vote on the first ballot, though not a majority, far exceeded that given 
for any other; but the second ballot showed that influences were at work 
which would prevent a majority from being concentrated upon him, and 
upon the third trial Mr. Lincoln was nominated. Mr. Seward then resolved 
to retire from public life; but, at the earnest request of his successful com¬ 
petitor, he consented to accept the position of Secretary of State. It was 
honorable to both men that such an offer should be made and accepted; but 
it would probably have been more for the interest of the country had he re¬ 
mained in his former position as leader of his party in the national Legis¬ 
lature. 

Salmon P. Chase had risen rapidly into a leading position in the party. 
He had entered into public life as a Democrat, and as such had served for 


1 For a fac-simile of the letter describing this conspiracy, written and franked by David L. 
Yulcc, then United States senator from Florida, and chairman of the Committee on the Post-office, 
see this History, page 32. 

* Shortly afterward two senators were admitted representing the State of Virginia, and subse¬ 
quently two others representing the newly-formed state of West Virginia. 

9 The phrase “the higher law” occurs in a speech delivered in the Senate, March II, 1850, 
upon the admission of California into the Union. The following is the context: 

“It is title, indeed, that the national domain is ours. It is true it was acquired by the valor 
ami with the wealth of the whole nation. But we hold, nevertheless, no arbitrary power over it. 
We hold no arbitrary authority over any thing, whether acquired lawfully or seized by usurpation. 
The Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Constitution devotes the domain to union, to 
justice, to defense, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution, 
which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The 
Territory is a part, and no inconsiderable part, of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed 
upon them by the Creator of the universe. We are his stewards, and must so discharge our trust 
as to secure in the highest attainable degree their happiness.” 

The phrase “ irrepressible conflict” is found in a sj>ecch delivered at Rochester, October 25, 
1858, in the following connection : 

“ It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces. It means that the United 
States must and will, sooner or later, become entirely a slavcholding nation or entirely a free- 
labor nation. Either the cotton and rice fields of South Carolina and the sugar plantations of 
Louisiana will be ultimately tilled by free labor, and Charleston and New Orleans become marts 
for legitimate merchandise alone, or else the rye-fields and wheat-fields of Massachusetts and 
New York must again be surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of 
slaves, and Boston and New York become once more markets for trade in the bodies aud souls of 
men.” 


[July, 7861. 

one term as senator. When the great disruption took place in that party, 
he joined the Republicans, was twice chosen Governor of Ohio, and was a 
prominent candidate for the presidential nomination. He was chosen as 
senator for the Congress which had now convened; and had he taken his 
place as such, the position of leader must have fallen to him. But he had 
previously resigned his seat and accepted the office of Secretary of the 
Treasury. In this position he was to undertake heavier responsibilities than 
had ever before fallen to the lot of a financial minister. It is worthy of 
note that the four leading competitors of Mr. Lincoln for the presidential 
nomination accepted seats in his cabinet. 1 

There was one senator to whom, until within a month, men’s eyes had 
been turned as likely' to be the Congressional leader of the great Union 
party. Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, hafl for fifteen years been a determ¬ 
ined opponent of the Whig or Republican party. He early foresaw the dan¬ 
ger which threatened the Union from the controversy growing out of the 
agitation of the question of slavery. He perceived that there was but one 
principle upon which a union between free and slave states could be main¬ 
tained, and that was the denial of the right of the general government to 
act in any way upon the permission or prohibition of slavery. It was ad¬ 
mitted on all hands that this was true so far as the states were concerned: 
that South Carolina might any day abolish slavery, or Vermont establish 
it, within their limits, without question from any other state or from the 
Federal government. This principle was affirmed by the Compromise Act 
of 1850. The question was thus narrowed down to the Territories. Mr. 
Douglas maintained that the same principle should apply there also. In 
his view this involved the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The emi¬ 
grants to Kansas and Nebraska he considered to have the same rights in 
this matter which had been conceded to inhabitants of Utah and New Mex¬ 
ico. His doctrine on this point was finally wrought out and elaborated in 
his famous paper on the “ Dividing Line between State and Federal Author¬ 
ity.” This he regarded as the crowning act of his political life. “I be¬ 
lieve it to be my mission,” he said to the writer of these pages, “ to settle 
forever the question of slavery; and I believe that it will be settled on the 
principles which I have here laid down.” The essential points of this elab¬ 
orate paper may be stated in a few words: Every distinct political com¬ 
munity, loyal to the Constitution and the Union, is entitled to all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of self-government in respect to their local con¬ 
cerns and internal polity, subject only to the Constitution of the United 
States; every Territory of the United States, when duly organized under a 
legal Territorial government, is a distinct political community; and slavery 
is a matter of local concern and internal polity; therefore the Territories, 
each for itself, have the sole right, under the Constitution, to legislate upon 
the subject of slavery. The Southern leaders would not assent to this doc¬ 
trine. The nominating Convention of the Democratic party met at Charles¬ 
ton, April 23, 1860. The dividing line between the Northern and South¬ 
ern branches of the party was then sharply run. The South demanded that 
the party should affirm not only that Congress should have no power to 
abolish slavery in the Territories, but that the Territorial Legislatures had'no 
power to abolish slavery, or to prohibit the introduction of slaves, or to ex¬ 
clude slavery, or in any way to impair the right of property in slaves; and 
that it was the duty of the Federal government to protect slave property in 
the Territories. The North was willing to submit the question to the deci¬ 
sion of the Supreme Court. More than half of the votes for President were 
cast for Mr. Douglas, but he lacked 50 of the 202 votes which, under the 
two thirds rule, were required for a nomination. The Convention broke up 
without making any nomination, and reassembled at Baltimore on the 18th 
of June. Here a schism took place, resulting in two Conventions. Mr. 
Douglas was nominated by one, and Mr. Breckinridge by the other. Had 
Douglas been nominated unanimously either at Charleston or Baltimore, his 
election was certain; but the disruption of these Conventions, making it 
sure that the vote of the South would be against him, drove hundreds of 
thousands of Northern Democrats over to Mr. Lincoln. An attempt to stay 
this popular current was made by nominating Mr. Bell as a “ Union” candi¬ 
date; but the nomination came too late. Mr. Lincoln received 180 electoral 
votes, being, all from the free states except three from New Jersey. Mr. 
Breckinridge,received 72 votes, being the whole from the strictly Southern 
states, together with those of Maryland and Delaware. The votes of Vir¬ 
ginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 39 in all, were cast for Mr. Bell; while Mr. 
Douglas received only 9 votes from Missouri and 3 from New Jersey. The 
popular vote, indeed, showed a very different result. For Lincoln were cast, 
in round numbers, 1,850,000 votes; for Douglas, 1,360,000; for Breck¬ 
inridge, 840,000; and for Bell, 590,000. Douglas, therefore, retained his 
place in the Senate as the representative of nearly one third of the peo¬ 
ple of the United States, who, while opposed to the Republican party, 
were still more opposed to every scheme of secession. His first effort was 
to secure the passage of the Crittenden Proposition. It was not, indeed, in 
accordance with his own cherished views, but be was eager to accept it in 
order to save the Union. This last hope failing, and the line having been 
clearly drawn, he saw that there was no way remaining by which a loyal 
citizen could show his devotion to his country except by ignoring all party 
politics, and sustaining the flag, the Constitution, and the Union under any 
administration, against all assailants at home and abroad. It was noted that, 
when Mr. Lincoln pronounced his inaugural address on the 4th of March, 
Douglas was by the side of his old personal opponent, holding his hat while 
he spoke; and that during the festivities which followed in the evening ho 
was assiduous in his courtesies to the wife of the President. These acts, 

1 Tin; votes in the Convention on the first ballot were: for Seward, 173; Lincoln, 102; Came¬ 

ron, 50; Chase, 40; Bates, 48. The remaining 48 votes were scattered among seven candidates. 






THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 


187 



July, 1861 .] 


which under ordinary circumstances would have been 
mere personal courtesies shown to a distinguished cit¬ 
izen of his own state, were accepted on all sides as sig¬ 
nificant indications of his political course. During the 
brief executive session of the Senate which followed, 
he took decided ground in favor of the line of policy 
indicated in the inaugural, accepting it, as it was in¬ 
tended, as a pledge that the aim of the administration 
was a peaceful solution of our national difficulties. 
But when the hostile measures of the Confederates ren¬ 
dered such a solution impossible, he remained firm in 
his resolution to uphold the Union by supporting the 
administration. His last public act was to dictate a 
letter to the chairman of the Democratic Committee 
of his own state, explaining and defending the course 
upon which he had resolved. This letter was dictated 
from a bed of sickness from which he was never to 


rise. Shortly after it was written, just one month be¬ 
fore the meeting of the extra session of Congress, he 
was a corpse. He died at the age of forty-eight years, 
in the prime of manhood, at a moment when a career 
was opening before him nobler than has been present¬ 
ed to any American since the Father of his Country. 

He was more or less delirious during the closing days 
of his life. But his own impending death gave him 
no concern. The salvation of the republic was fore¬ 
most in his thoughts; his last coherent words, before 
his farewell to his wife and bis parting message to his 
absent children, breathed an ardent wish that the hon¬ 
or and safety of his country might be secured by the 
overthrow of her enemies.' 

In the Senate the most important committee was 
now that on Military Affairs. Mr. Wilson, of Massa¬ 
chusetts, was appointed chairman of this committee, 
ami was thus recognized as the leader of the dominant 
party in the Senate. His early life was spent on a 
farm. At twenty-two he learned the trade of a shoe¬ 
maker, and soon after commenced business as a man¬ 
ufacturer of shoes. He entered warmly into politics 
and military affairs. At the age of forty he had al¬ 
ready served eight years in the Legislature of Massa¬ 
chusetts, having twice been chosen President of the 
state Senate, and risen to the rank of brigadier gen¬ 
eral in the militia. In 1855 he was elected to the 
Senate of the United States, where he soon assumed a 
leading place. Earnest, fearless, and fluent, thorough¬ 
ly appreciating the magnitude of the crisis, he was un¬ 
doubtedly the best man for the position assigned to 
him. As all financial bills must originate in the 
House, the Committee of Ways and Means is the most 
important in that body. Thaddeus Stevens, of Penn¬ 
sylvania was appointed chairman of that committee, 
involving the lead of the House. 

The lead of the Opposition in the Senate was ac¬ 
corded to Mr. Breckinridge. He had served for four 
years as Vice-president of the United States, and con¬ 
sequently as President of the Senate. He had been nominated for the 
presidency, with a fair chance of success if the election could be thrown 
into the House of Representatives. When this scheme failed, lie had been 
chosen senator from Kentucky in place of Mr. Crittenden, who had labored 


1 The following are extracts from the last letter of Douglas: 

“ It seems that some of my friends are unable to comprehend the difference between arguments 
used in favor of an equitable compromise, with the ho|«e of averting the horrors of war, and those 
urged in support of the government and flag of our country when war is being waged against the 
United States with the avowed purpose of producing a permanent disruption of the Union and a 
total destruction of its government. All hope of a compromise with the cotton states wa« abandon- 
ed when they assumed the position that the separation of the Union was complete and final, and 
that they would never consent to a reconstruction on any contingency, not even if we would pre¬ 
sent them with a blank sheet of paper, and permit them to inscribe their own terms. Still the 
hope was cherished that reasonable and satisfactory terms of adjustment could be agreed upon 
with Tennessee, North Carolina, and the border states, and that whatever terms would prove sat¬ 
isfactory to these loyal states would create a Union party in the cotton states which would be 
powerful enough at the ballot-box to destroy the revolutionary government, and bring those states 
back into the Union by the voice of their own people. This hope was cherished bv Union men 
North and South, and was never abandoned until actual war was levied at Charleston, and the 
authoritative announcement made by the revolutionary government at Montgomery that the se¬ 
cession flag should be planted upon the walls of the Capitol at Washington, and a proclamation 

issued inviting the pirates of the world to prey upon the commerce of the United States. 

In view of this state of facts, there was but one path of duty left to patriotic men. It was not a 
party question, nor a question involving partisan policy; it was a question of government or no 
government, country or no country: and hence it became the imperative duty of every Union 
man, every friend of constitutional liberty, to rally to the support of our common country, its gov¬ 
ernment and flag, as the only means of checking the progress of revolution, and of preserving the 

union of the states.I am neither the supporter of the partisan policy nor the apologist 

for the errors of the administration. My previous relations to them remain unchanged. But I 
trust the time will never cotne when I shall not he willing to make any needful sacrifice of |icr- 
sonal feeling and party policy for the honor and integrity of my country. I know of no mode hy 
which a loyal citiz -n may so well demonstrate bis devotion to his country- as by sustaining the 
flag, the Constitution, and the Union, under nil circumstances, and under every administration, 
regardless of party politic*, against all assailants at home and abroad. The course of Clay ami 
Webster toward the administration of General Jackson in the days of nullification present*: a n<»- 

ble and worthy example for all true patriot*.The gulf which separated party leaders in 

those days was quite a< broad and deep as that which now separates the Democracy from the Re¬ 
publicans. But the moment an enemy ro«c in our midst, plotting the destruction of the govern¬ 
ment, the voice of party strife was hushed in patriotic silence. One of the brightest chapter* in 
the history of our conntrv will record the fact that, during this eventful period, the great leaders 
of the Opposition, sinking the partisan in the patriot, rushed to the support of the government, and 
became its ablest and bravest defenders against all assailants, until the conspiracy was crushed 
and abandoned, when they resumed their former positions as party leaders upon political issues.” 


HEXBY WILSOX. 

so earnestly to bring about a compromise. In presenting the credentials of 
bis successor, Mr. Crittenden bad said, “ He succeeds to a place of great dif¬ 
ficulty and high duties. I have no doubt that he will, and I hope that he 
may, occupy bis seat more successfully than I have done for the good of 
our common country.” Mr. Breckinridge had presided over the Senate 
with marked acceptance. His fine person, commanding address, courteous 
manners, and quick perception fitted him for that position. Just four months 
before the meeting of the extra session be had been thanked by the Senate 
for his conduct as its presiding officer. He had warmly supported the Crit¬ 
tenden Proposition. He bad taken no part in the conspiracy against the 
Union. It cost him much to take the first steps against that Union over 
which he had hoped to preside. While the struggle was going on men 
marked his worn and haggard aspect: but, the steps once taken, he had nei¬ 
ther the wish nor the power to retrace them. He took his seat as senator 
on the 4th of March in the executive session which followed the regular 
close of Congress. He then made a formal speech, urging the Senate to ad¬ 
vise the President to withdraw all troops from the Confederate States, and 
to collect no large forces in any of the other Southern states. “The seven 
states which have gone out,” he said, “are a protest against force in any 
form. From the eight Southern states which remain, making fifteen in all, 
there is also a protest against force.” If force was used against any state 
which had seceded, or which might hereafter secede, he affirmed that his 
own state of Kentucky would “turn to her Southern sisters, with whom she 
was identified by geographical position, and hy the ties of friendship, of in¬ 
tercourse, of commerce, and by common wrongs. She will unite with them 
to found a noble republic, and invite beneath its stainless banner such other 
states as know how to keep the faith of compacts, and to respect the con¬ 
stitutional obligations and the comity of the Confederacy.” Thus, while 
under the sanction of his oath as senator of the United States, he avowed 
himself the advocate of those who had endeavored, or who should thereafter 
endeavor, to destroy the Union. Thus pledged to treason, he took his place 
as senator at the extra session. Henceforth his course was consistent. He 















188 


opposed every measure looking to the strengthening of the Union or the 
weakening of the Confederacy. At the close of the session he returned to 
his home, threw up his office as senator, and joined the Confederates who 
were then invading Kentucky. They received him with open arms, and 
gave him a commission as brigadier general in their service. On the 4th 
of December, just nine months from the day when he had received the 
thanks of <he Senate, he was formally expelled from that body without a 
single opposing vote. 

Jesse D. Bright, of Indiana, was the only senator from a free state who 
took his place among the thorough opponents of the administration. lie 
had been elected for three successive terms, and had now held his seat longer 
than any other member. He had always been a strict partisan. Though 
born in one free state and elected from another, there was no Southern man 
more entirely Southron than he. Other Northern members of his party 
sometimes hesitated to yield to the demands of their Southern colleagues— 
Bright never. He could be counted upon as surely as Davis or Mason. 
Though an indifferent speaker, he was a shrewd and dexterous party man¬ 
ager. He was placed on important committees, and had frequently been 
chosen temporary president of the Senate. He had taken no part in the 
great conspiracy. Facile tool as he was, that secret was not to be trusted 
to him. He urged his Southern colleagues to retain their places after the 
election of Lincoln. They did so as long as it suited their plan of prevent¬ 
ing the passage of any bills which might strengthen the hands of the new 
administration. In these efforts they found a ready coadjutor in Mr. Bright. 
When the war finally broke out, he deliberately took the position of hostil¬ 
ity to “the entire coercive policy of the administration.” He was willing 
to furnish means to defend the capital then threatened by the Confederates, 
but would not give men or money to carry on the war against the states 
which had declared themselves out of the Union. During the extra session 
he spoke but little, for oratory was not his forte; but in his votes he fol¬ 
lowed Breckinridge like his shadow. In every division, important or un¬ 
important, the name of Bright was sure to follow that of Breckinridge. That 
he misrepresented his constituents, opposed his country, and gave practical 
aid and comfort to the enemy was true; yet in his official capacity he only 
exercised his constitutional right of opposition, and furnished no grounds 
for parliamentary censure. But in a careless moment he had forged a 
weapon that could fairly be used against him. 

A quarter of a century before he had a client, named Thomas Lincoln, 
who at length failed in business and emigrated to Texas. The connection 
had been a profitable one for Bright. After the annexation of Texas, Lin¬ 
coln made his appearance at Washington in the character of schemer and 
speculator. Now he had a railroad scheme to urge upon Congress; then it 
was a machine for raising heavy weights which he wished to have employ¬ 
ed in the erection of the public buildings at Washington. His last project 
was an alleged improvement in fire-arms. Bright was always ready to serve 
his old friend and client. He gave him letters of recommendation wherever 
they could be of use. He commended his fire-arms to Mr. Floyd, then Sec¬ 
retary of War, who seems to have been too busy in his treasonable projects 
to take any notice of it At length, on the first of March, three weeks after 
the organization of the Confederate government, three weeks after Texas 
had formally seceded, and while the Confederate States were individually 
and collectively waging war against the Union, Mr. Bright wrote a letter 
introducing this Texan, with his improvement in fire-arms, to the President 
of the Confederacy.' What became of Lincoln for the next few months is 
unknown; but in August he was arrested in Ohio on charge of treason, 
and this letter was found upon him. Shortly after the meeting of Congress 
in December, a resolution was offered for the expulsion of Mr. Bl ight. He 
did not deny the genuineness of the letter; he had no recollection of having 
written it, but if Lincoln said that he wrote it he undoubtedly did so. The 
resolution was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, who reported 
that the facts were not sufficient to warrant the expulsion of Mr. Bright 
from the Senate. This report was not accepted, and a long debate ensued. 
It was contended by Mr. Bright and his friends that it was a mere note of 
introduction; that in addressing Jefferson Davis as “ His Excellency, the 
President of the Confederacy of States,” the writer used only the usual form 
of courtesy, designating the person addressed by the title which he claimed: 
that at the time when the letter was written there was no war, and no prob¬ 
ability of one until after the fall of Sumter. On the other side it was urged 
that the letter recommending an inventor of improved fire-arms to the no¬ 
tice of the leader in the insurrection was an evidence of the thorough dis¬ 
loyalty of the writer, for such a weapon could be wanted only for hostilities 
against the United States; and, moreover, some months later, while the 
country was actually engaged in a gigantic war, he bad written another let¬ 
ter avowing that he “ had opposed, and should continue to oppose, the entire 
coercive policy of the government.” The resolution of expulsion passed by 
a vote of 32 to 14. Among those who voted against it were, besides the 
whole remaining body of Opposition senators, several Democrats who sup¬ 
ported the administration, and two Republicans. These last took the 
ground that, however objectionable might be the general course of Mr. 
Bright, this letter, considering the circumstances in which it was written, 
did not necessarily imply a treasonable intent, which was necessary to war- 


1 Jesse D. Bright to Jefferson Davis. 

“Washington, March 1,1S61. 

“My dear Sir, —Allow me to introduce to your acquaintance ray friend Thomas B. Lincoln, 
of Texas. He visits your capital mainly to dispose of what he regards as a great improvement 
in fire-arms. I recommend him to your favorable consideration as a gentleman of the first re¬ 
spectability, and reliable in every respect. 

“ Very truly yours, Jesse D. Bright. 

“ To His Excellency Jarrmson Davu, President of the Con/ederaoy 0/ Slates." 


["July, 1861. 

rant his expulsion. If treason, in its strict sense, were the only ground for 
expulsion, they were correct in their view, for upon this letter no jury could 
ever have convicted the writer of that crime. But there may be disloyalty 
which, falling short of actual treason, still disqualifies a man from acting as 
a legislator. In this sense the senator from Indiana was disloyal; but, to 
warrant expulsion, this disloyalty must be evinced by overt act. He had a 
right to the protection of law; but if there was any act of his which brought 
him fairly in opposition to the strictest law, that law should have been 
brought to bear with all its force against him. This letter would clearly 
have warranted his arrest and detention in a military prison; and surely no 
man who might rightly have been consigned to Fort Lafayette should have 
been allowed to retain a seat in the Senate of the United States. 

Two other senators, Polk and Johnson, from Missouri, who sat in this ex¬ 
tra session, were likewise expelled at the subsequent one. Both had gone 
to their homes and taken open ground in favor of the secession of their 
state; both had failed to claim their seats; and both were credibly reported 
to have made their way to the Confederate States. The case was so clear 
against them that there was no voice against the resolution for their expul¬ 
sion. Even Bright, Powell, and Bayard voted for it. 

The organization of Congress was completed on the first day of the ses¬ 
sion. The President's Message was transmitted on the following day. It 
opened with a summary of the events of the four months of his administra¬ 
tion, and a statement and defense of the policy which he had adopted. In 
six states the functions of the government were suspended; forts and arse¬ 
nals had been seized; the Confederacy had been organized, and was invok¬ 
ing recognition and aid from foreign powers. The administration had to 
prevent, if possible, the dissolution of the Federal Union. The policy de¬ 
cided upon was announced in the inaugural address. It looked to the ex¬ 
haustion of all peaceful measures before proceeding to stronger ones. It 
sought only to hold the public places not already wrested from the govern¬ 
ment, and to collect the revenue. Every thing was forborne without which 
it was possible to keep the government on foot. Fort Suinter was to be 
provisioned, in order that the authority of the nation might be visibly main¬ 
tained. It was assailed and reduced in order to destroy the visible author¬ 
ity of the Union. The assailants began the conflict while no force, imme¬ 
diate or in expectancy, menaced them, and thus forced upon the country 
the distinct issue of immediate dissolution or blood. No choice was then 
left but to call out the war power of the government, and so to resist the 
force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation. The Mes¬ 
sage closed with an argument against the constitutional right of any state 
or number of states to secede. This argument, though conclusive, was use¬ 
less ; the time for argument had passed; the question must be decided by 
arms. 

But the essential points of the Message were contained in four brief para 
graphs.' The first touched upon the position of “ armed neutrality” which a 

* The following is the text of the most important portions of the Message: 

THE ISSUE. 

“The assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense upon 
the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no ]>ossibility 
commit aggression upon them. They knew—they were expressly notified—that the giving of 
bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be 
attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this 
government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but to maintain visible pos¬ 
session, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution; and they assailed 
and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object—to drive out the visible authority of the Fed¬ 
eral Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution.Then and thereby the assailants 

of the government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight or in expectancy to return 
their fire, save only the few in the fort, sent to that harbor years before for their own protection, 
and still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, 
they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, ‘immediate dissolution or blood.’ And this 
issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the w hole family of man 
the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the 
same people—can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It 
presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control administra¬ 
tion, according to organic law, in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or 
on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily, without any pretense, break up their government, and thus 
practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask, ‘Is there, in all re¬ 
publics, this inherent and fatal weakness?’ ‘Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for 
the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”’ 

THE BORDER STATES. 

“ In the border states, so-called—in fact, the Middle States—there are those w ho favor a poli¬ 
cy which they call ‘armed neutrality’—that is,an arming of those states to prevent the Union 
forces passing one way, or the Disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion com¬ 
pleted. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an impassable wall along the line of 
separation; and yet not quite an impassable one, for, under the guise of neutrality, it would tie 
the hands of Union men, and freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which 
it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands of se¬ 
cession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the Disunionists 
that which of all things they most desire—feed them well, and give them disunion without a strug¬ 
gle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the 
Unioij; and while very many who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens, it is, nevertheless, 
very injurious in effect.’* 

CALLING OUT TROOPS. 

“Recurring to the action of the government, it may be stated that at first a call was made for 
75,000 militia; and, rapidly following this, a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the 
insurrectionary districts by proceedings in the nature of a blockade. $0 far all was believed to 
be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists announced their purpose to enter upon the 
practice of privateering. Other calls were made for volunteers to sene for three years, unless 
sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and navy. These measures, 
whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand 
and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would ratify them. It is believed 
that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.” 

SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 

“Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the commanding 
general, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to‘suspend the privilege of the w rit of habeas 
corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms 
of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the pnblic safety.’ This authority has 
purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has 
been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the propo¬ 
sition that one who has sw’orn to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ should not him¬ 
self violate them. Of course, some consideration was given to the question of power and propri¬ 
ety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faith¬ 
fully executed were being resisted, and failing of execution in nearly one third of the states. Must 
they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the 






JtJLT, 1861.] 


THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 


189 


considerable part of the people of Kentucky and Missouri wished to assume. 
They wished their states to arm in order to prevent the Union troops from 
passing one way, or the Disunion troops the other way, over their soil. This 
project was condemned in a few brief and emphatic words. 

The second important paragraph recited briefly the war measures adopt¬ 
ed by the administration. A call had been made for 75,000 militia; the 
ports in the insurrectionary districts had been blockaded; farther calls had 
been made for volunteers for three years; and large additions had been 
made to the regular army and navy. It was assumed that in some or all 
of these measures the executive had exceeded the strict legal bounds of its 
authority; but they had been ventured upon under what appeared to be a 
popular demand and a public necessity, believing that they would be rati¬ 
fied by Congress. 

The third paragraph related to the suspension of the writ of habeas cor¬ 
pus in certain cases. The facts were succinctly stated, and the opinion was 
expressed that in this case the executive had not gone beyond the power 
conferred upon it by the Constitution. But it was maintained by some that 
the authority to suspend this writ was vested in Congress; and to the judg¬ 
ment of the national Legislature the President submitted the question 
whether there should be any legislation upon this subject. 

The fourth paragraph recommended that, in order to make the contest a 
short and decisive one, Congress should place at the disposal of government \ 
400,000 men and $400,000,000, affirming that the country could sustain the 
burden; that the people were ready to bear it; and that the end to be at¬ 
tained was worth the sacrifice. 

means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citi¬ 
zen’s liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should, to a very 
limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly: Are all the laws but one to go 
unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a 
case, would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown, when it was 
believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that 
this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of 
the Constitution that 4 the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless 
when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,’ is equivalent to a provi¬ 
sion—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the 
public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was author¬ 
ized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this pow¬ 
er. But the Constitution it>elf is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the 
provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it can not be believed the framers of the 
instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be 
called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this ease, by 
the rebellion. No more extended argument is now offered, as an opinion, at some length, will 
probably be presented by the attorney general. Whether there shall be any legislation on the 
Bubject, and, if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress.” 

MEASURES RECOMMENDED. 

“ It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and 
decisive one; that you place at the cqntrol of the government, for the work, at least 400,000 men 
and $400,000,000.' That number of men is about one tenth of those of proper ages within the 
regions where, apparently, all are willing to engage; and the sum is less than a twenty-third 
part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of 
$600,000,000 now is a less sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out 
of that struggle, and the money value in the country now bears even a greater proportion to 
what it was then than does the population. Surely each man has as strong a motive now to pre¬ 
serve our liberties as each had then to establish them. A right result, at this time, will be worth 
more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us 
from the country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it needs 
only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction, and the hand of the executive to give it prac¬ 
tical shape and efficiency. One of the greatest perplexities of tl^ government is to avoid receiv¬ 
ing troops faster than it can provide for them. In a word, the people will save their government, 
if the government itself will do its part only indifferently well.” 

THE RIGHT OF SECESSION. 

« This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole, of its currency from the assumption that there 
is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertaining to a state—to each state of our Federal 
Union. Our states have neither more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by 
the Constitution—no one of them ever having been a state out of the Union. The original ones 
passed into the Union even before they cast off their British colonial dependence; and the new 
ones each came into the Union directly from a condition of dependence, excepting Texas. And 
even Texas, in its temporary independence, was never designated a state. The new ones only 
took the designation of states on coming into the Union, while that name was first adopted by the 
old ones in and by the Declaration of Independence. Therein the 4 United colonies’ were de¬ 
clared to be * free and independent statesbut even then, the object plainly was not to declare 
their independence of one another or of the Union, but directly the contrary, as their mutual 

pledge and their mutual action before, at the time, and afterward, abundantly show.No 

one of our states, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty; and even Texas gave up the character 
on coming into the Union, by which act she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States, 
and the laws and treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, to be for 
her the supreme law of the land. The states have their status in the Union, and they have no 
other legal status. If they break from this, they can only do so against law and bv revolution. 
The Union, and not themselves separately, procured their independence and their liberty. By 
conquest or purchase the Union gave each of them whatever of independence or liberty it has. 
The Union is older than any of the states, and, in fact, it created them as states.” 

“Again: if one state may secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded, none is 
left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of 
ours when we borrowed their money? If we now recognize this doctrine by allowing the se- 
ceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others choose to go, or to extort terras 
upon which they will promise to remain.” 

“ If all the states save one should assert the power to drive that one out of the Union, it is pre¬ 
sumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power, and denounce the act 
as the greatest outrage upon state rights. But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of be¬ 
ing called ‘driving the one out,’ should be called ‘the seceding of the others from that one, it 
would be exactly what the seceders claim to do; unless, indeed, they make the point that the one, 
because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because they arc a majority, may not 
rightfully do.” 

FUTURE POLICY. 

“Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of 
the government toward the Southern states after the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the 
executive deems it proper to say it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitu¬ 
tion and the laws; and that he* probably will have no different understanding of the powers and 
duties of the Federal Government relat'ively to the rights of the states and the people under the 
Constitution than that expressed in the inaugural address. He desires to preserve the govern¬ 
ment, that it may be administered for all as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal 
citizens every where have the right to claim this of their government, nnd the government has no 
right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that in giving it there is any coercion, any 
conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of those terms.” ... 

“As a private citizen the executive could not have consented that these institutions shall per¬ 
ish ; much less could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people have 
confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, or even to count the chances of 
his own life, in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility he has so far done 
what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. 
He sincerely hopes that your views nnd vonr action may so accord with his ns to assure all faith¬ 
ful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy restoration to them, 
under the Constitution and the laws. And having thus chosen our course, without guile and with 
pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts. 



HANNIBAL HAMLIN. 


The report of the Secretary of War presented only a general abstract of 
the operations of that department. The President’s call of April 15 for 
75,000 volunteers for three months had been responded to by more than 
80,000 men. The proclamation of May 3 called for 42,000 volunteers for 
three years. Under this call 208 regiments had been accepted, of whom 
153 were in actual service, and the remainder would be in the field within 
twenty days. These regiments, including the three months volunteers, 
numbered 285,000 men; besides these, the new regimf nts of the regular 
army numbered 25,000 men, making 310,000 in all. Deducting from these 
the 80,000 three months volunteers whose term of service was about to ex¬ 
pire, there would remain an available force of 230,000 men, volunteers and 
regulars. The secretary submitted to Congress the question whether this 
force should be farther increased. 

The report of the Secretary of the Navy showed that under the adminis¬ 
tration of Mr. Buchanan this department had not only been neglected, but 
such disposition had been made of the vessels as to render the navy power¬ 
less for immediate operations against the Confederacy. Nominally our navy, 
on the 4th of March, consisted of 90 vessels, carrying 2415 guns. But 21 
vessels, with 1069 guns, were unfinished or unseaworthy, leaving 69 vessels, 
with 1346 guns, at all available. Of these, 21 vessels, with 791 guns, were 
dismantled or laid up in ordinary, so that we had actually in commission 
only 42 vessels, with 555 guns. Two of these vessels were 50-gun frigates, 
the remainder were sloops and steamers. The steam navy comprised only 
26 vessels of all classes, with 216 guns. The fleet seems to have been post¬ 
ed with the express design of rendering it useless in the present emergency. 
Nearly all of the vessels were on foreign stations. The home squadron con¬ 
sisted of but 12 vessels, with 187 guns, and about 2000 men; and of these 
only 4 small vessels, carrying 25 guns and 280 men, were in Northern ports 
Of the 69 serviceable vessels, which on the 4th of March were supposed to 
be available, one was lost in the Pacific, another was soon seized at Pensa¬ 
cola, and four were burned at Norfolk; there were four more which could 
not be put into commission for a considerable time. Thus, when all the 
vessels should be recalled from foreign service, there would remain 58 ves¬ 
sels of the former navy, with 1021 guns. Treachery was rife among the 
officers of the navy. Many of those occupying the most responsible posi¬ 
tions were faithless. Among these was Matthew F. Maury, to whom had 
been for years intrusted the charge of the National Observatory. Only a 
few months before he had protested vehemently against the action of the 
I examining board, which had retired him from the line of promotion, con¬ 
tinuing him in his honorable and responsible scientific position. Without 
note or warning, he abandoned his post and went over to the enemy. In 
all, between the 4th of March and the 1st of July, 259 naval officers had re¬ 
signed their commissions or been dismissed. Hardly a seaman followed 
their example of treachery. Thus, while the United States claimed to be 
and was considered one of the great maritime powers, their actual naval 

























190 


force was less than that of any second-rate power. So patent was the in¬ 
sufficiency of the navy that the late administration had recommended the 
building of seven steam sloops-of-war, of light draught and heavy arma¬ 
ment. The last Congress had authorized the construction of these vessels 
in spite of the vehement opposition of the Southern members who still re¬ 
tained their seats. “If these steamers are built,’’ said Mr. Mason, “they 
will be part of the naval armament of the Confederation, to be used for any 
military purposes that the public exigencies may require. Until we know 
whether the arm of the government is to be raised against the states which 
have seceded, by no vote of mine shall there be any addition to the naval 
or military service of the country.” These vessels were now in course of 
construction at the public navy yards, and the present administration had 
also contracted for twenty-three gun-boats, and had made preliminary ar¬ 
rangements for several larger and fleeter vessels. But the building of these 
was a work of time, and the demands of the service were pressing. A num¬ 
ber of steamers had been purchased or chartered, so that on the 1st of July 
the government had in commission 82 vessels of war, carrying 1100 guns, 
with 13,000 men, besides officers and marines. 

Congress determined from the outset to devote itself to the work for 
which it had been called together. The House voted to consider only bills 
and resolutions concerning military and naval operations, and financial and 
judicial matters therewith connected. In the Senate Mr. Wilson gave no¬ 
tice of a series of bills: First, To confirm certain acts of the President for 
the suppression of insurrection and rebellion. Second, To authorize the 
employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting pub¬ 
lic property. Third, To increase the present military establishment of the 
United States. Fourth, For the better organization of' the military estab¬ 
lishment. Fifth, For the organization of a volunteer militia force to be 
called the National Guard of the United States. Sixth, To promote the 
efficiency of the army. Mr. Chandler gave notice of a bill to confiscate the 
property of civil and military officers who should be guilty of treason or of 
aiding and abetting it, and disqualifying them from holding any office of 
trust and emolument. These bills, more or less modified, together with the 
financial measures originating in the House, gave shape to the proceedings 
of the session. 

The proposition to confirm the acts of the President was presented as a 
joint resolution. It recited that under extraordinary exigencies the Presi¬ 
dent had exercised certain powers and adopted certain measures for the 
preservation of the government. He had (1.) called for 75,000 volunteers. 
He had (2.) set on foot a blockade of the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. He had (3.) block¬ 
aded the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. He had (4) authorized the 
commanding generaTto suspend the writ of habeas corpus on the military 
line between Philadelphia and Washington. He had (5.) issued a proc¬ 
lamation calling into the service of the United States 42,000 volunteers, in¬ 
creasing the regular army by 22,700 men, and the navy by 18,000 seamen. 
He had (6.) authorized the commander of the forces in Florida to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus if necessary. The resolution provided that all of 
these extraordinary acts should be approved, and declared as legal and valid 
as if they had been performed under the express authority and sanction of 
Congress. 

After some preliminary discussion, which showed that there was among 
the Republicans a strong disinclination to sanction any permanent increase 
of the regular army, the debate was opened by Mr. Polk in opposition to 
the resolution. He said that Congress only has the right to make war, yet 
the President had, of his own motion and by his own wrong, brought on 
war. Secession was an accomplished fact before the close of the last Con¬ 
gress, yet that body had refused to pass any bills for the purpose of coer¬ 
cion. Provision was made by the Constitution for the enforcement of the 
laws when resisted by an individual or any number of individuals; but 
when a state or a number of states withdrew from the Union and denied 
the binding force of its laws, there was no provision for compelling their 
obedience. So the calling out of the militia was unconstitutional. Then, 
after seven states had seceded, the President, assuming them to be still in 
the Union, had ordered a blockade of their ports; and subsequently, when 
North Carolina and Virginia had resolved not to submit to the coercion of 
their sister states, he had ordered a blockade of their ports, in defiance of the 
provision of the Constitution that no preference should be given to the 
ports of one state over those of another. The Constitution provides that 
Congress shall have the power of regulating commerce with foreign nations 
and between the states. The President had undertaken to regulate com¬ 
merce with the seceding states. The fact of their secession does not affect 
the case. If this secession was legal, they are foreign states; if illegal, they 
are still members of the Union. In either case the Constitution had been 
violated. The President had also, in acknowledged violation of the law, 
increased the force of the army and of the navy. He had also, in suspend¬ 
ing the writ of habeas corpus, assumed a power which the sovereign of 
Great Britain dared not arrogate, and, in consequence, John Merryman had, 
in Maryland, been seized by the mere warrant of a military officer, and been 
shut up in Fort McHenry. * 1 Thus the President had usurped the military 

1 This case, which was most frequently dwelt upon in the debates, derives its special import¬ 
ance from the action of Chief Justice Taney in relation to it. Merryman, who resided near Bal¬ 
timore, was arrested on the 25th of May, by order of the military commander, on charge of hold¬ 
ing a commission as lieutenant in a company having in their possession arms belonging to the 
United States, and avowing his purpose of armed hostility against the government. He was 
taken to Fort McHenry, then commanded by General Cadwalader. He applied to Mr. Taney, 
Chief Justice of the United States, for a writ of habeas corpus. This was duly issued. General 
Cadwalader, through one of his officers, declined to produce Mr. Mem-man, and asked the court 
to postpone farther action until instructions could be received from the President. Judge Taney 
issued an order of attachment against General Cadwalader for contempt of court. The marshal 


[July, 1861. 

power of the government by making war and raising armies; he had usurp¬ 
ed the commercial power by regulating trade and commerce; he had usurp¬ 
ed the judicial power by setting aside the writ of habeas corpus. From 
these general charges Mr. Polk proceeded to specific allegations of abuses 
committed in his own state, the general purport of which was to justify all 
the acts of Governor Jackson, and to condemn all those of the Federal gov¬ 
ernment. He closed by declaring that no measure which had for its object 
the prosecution of the war should ever command his vote. 

Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, followed upon the same side, recapitulating in 
substance the points made by Mr. Polk. “If,” he added, “ the people justly 
appreciated the liberties given them by their fathers, and intended to be se¬ 
cured to them by the Constitution, the officer who had committed these 
usurpations would be arraigned at the bar of the Senate, and be upon trial 
under impeachment.” In reply to a definite question, he declared that he 
approved of the action of the governor of his state in refusing to send vol¬ 
unteers for the defense of the national capital. 

Mr. Breckinridge followed. His speech was made on the 16th of July, 
at the moment when the army was setting out on its disastrous expedition 
to Bull Run. He recapitulated in better form the arguments of Polk and 
Powell; denied that one branch of the government could indemnify anoth¬ 
er for a violation of the Constitution or laws, and declared that, so far from 
his acts being approved, the President should be rebuked by a vote of both 
houses of Congress. 

Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, continued the discussion. His speech was de¬ 
livered on the 19th of July, while the two armies were confronting each 
other at Bull Run. He thought the only alternative was an assent to seces¬ 
sion or civil war. The secession of a state was indeed a revolutionary act. 
If a single state should secede, restriction and coercion, not to the extent of 
arms, might be employed, and this, coupled with conciliation, might bring 
the state back. But the power to coerce a state by arms had not been given 
to the general government. We could only make war upon the seceding 
states for a breach of compact, or make peace with them, and recognize the 
government which they had founded. He preferred peaceful separation to 
civil war. Congress had indeed the power to make war; but revolutions 
must be treated according to their magnitude, and a revolution by eleven 
states could not be met by war if its object was the restoration of the Union, 
and its preservation as a representative republic. He was therefore in fa¬ 
vor of an armistice and negotiations. If compromise could restore these 
states to the Union, he would compromise; if not, he would part with them 
in peace on a just and equitable settlement. If their terms were unjust 
they should be rejected. Passing over the war measures of the President, 
which he conceded had been substantially endorsed by the subsequent ac 
tion of Congress in passing war bills, Mr. Bayard went on to argue at length 
against sanctioning the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. If that 
was done, the liberties of the country would be prostrated, and the rights of 
free citizens destroyed. 

Among the supporters of the administration there was at first a wide dif¬ 
ference of opinion in respect to this resolution. Some approved of every 
one of the specified acts; others objected to a part, and approved of the re¬ 
mainder. Mr. Trumbull»would sustain or excuse all that had been done, 
but would not pronounce all the acts to have been legal. Mr. Sherman ap¬ 
proved of all the acts as a matter of necessity, but would not as a senator 
vote that, in increasing the army and navy, and in suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus, the President had acted according to law. Mr. Howe would 
approve and sanction all these acts for the very reason that they had been 
done without direct sanction of law. Had there been law for them, the 
President would simply have done his duty and nothing more. As it was, 
he had taken upon himself the responsibility of saving the country without 
the sanction of express law, and in so doing he had acted more than well: 
he had acted bravely. 

The debates on this resolution commenced near the beginning of the ses¬ 
sion, and were continued at intervals till the close. At first the opposition 
to the increase of the regular army and of the navy had been general, and 
amendments had been proposed providing that this increase should be only 
temporary. But the result of the battle of Bull Run, and the position of 
the Confederate forces almost in sight of the capital, convinced all Union 
men that a permanent addition to the army was a matter of necessity, and 
laws were accordingly passed sanctioning it. The theoretical objection to 
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus still existed in many minds, 
but just now this was of no practical importance, and was tacitly dropped. 
The proposition to approve all the other specified acts of the President was 
at the last moment appended as an additional section to the act which pass¬ 
ed both houses increasing the pay of privates in the army. 1 

The measures proposed from time to time furnished occasion for debating 
every aspect of the insurrection and of the policy of the government. A 
resolution was offered to expel the senators from the seceding states who 
had not withdrawn at the last session, and whose names still appeared on 

to whom this order was given reported that he was not permitted to enter the fort, and so could 
not serve the order The judge said that if the general could he brought before him he should 
punish him by fine and imprisonment; but as it was beyond the power of the posse comitptus to 
enforce the order, all that he could do was to place upon record a formal report of his proceedings, 
and to call upon the President to perform his constitutional duty by enforcing the process of the 
court. 

1 Public Acts of the 37th Congress, chap. Ixiii.—“An Act to increase the pay of the privates in 
the regular army and of the volunteers in the service of the United States, and for other purposes : w 
Section 1 fixes the pay at $13 a month. Section 2 provides that the pay shall commence from 
the day when they were organized and accepted by the governors of their respective states. Sec¬ 
tion 3, “All the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States, after the 
4th of March, respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to 
the militia or volunteers from the states, are in all respects legalized and made valid to the same 
intent, and with the same effect, as if they had been issued and done under the previous express 
authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.'* 





191 


THE POLICY OP the federal government. 


July, 1861.] 

the roll of the Senate, on the ground that they had engaged in a conspiracy 
against the Union. Mr. Bayard opposed this. He knew of no conspiracy 
on the part of these senators. They claimed that states had a right to secede, 
and acted openly with their states. Supposing them to be wrong in their 
view, should senators be expelled for an error in point of law? Should 
they be condemned individually for the action of their states? It was suf¬ 
ficient to declare their seats vacant. Mr. Latham would vote for striking 
their names from the roll, but not for expulsion, for that implied a stain upon 
the personal character of the .individual. He knew that at least two.of these 
senators did not endorse the right of secession, but they did not think they 
should remain in the Senate of the United States after their state had seceded. 
The senators, ten in number, were expelled by a vote of 32 to 10. Mr. 
Bayard also opposed the admission of Willey and Carlisle, who claimed the 
seats from Virginia vacated by Mason and Hunter. By admitting them, he 
said, a government would be recognized for that state which was not the 
regular government. The term of Mr. Letcher as governor had not expired. 
If he was in rebellion, that did not authorize a portion of the people of Vir¬ 
ginia to form a Legislature and to elect senators. There was no authority 
to create a new state out of a part of an existing one. To do so would be 
to abandon the whole form of our government, and recognize insurrection 
in a state for the purpose of overthrowing the government of that state by 
a very small minority of its people. The members were admitted, only five 
senators voting in the negative. 

In advocating the approval of the acts of the President, the impetuous 
Baker, who was soon to seal his faith with his blood, had said, “ I propose 
to lend the whole power of the country, arms, men, money, and place them 
in the hands of the President. He has asked for $400,000,000; we propose 
to give him $500,000,000. He has asked for 400,000 men ; we propose to 
give him 500,000. Tf the emergency be still greater, I will cheerfully add 
a cipher to either of these figures. I do that as a measure of war; but I 
look forward to returning peace. Bayonets are sharp remedies, but they 
are very powerful. I believe that the Union sentiment will yet prevail in 
the Southern states. But it may be that, instead of finding within a year 
loyal states sending members to Congress and replacing their senators on 
this floor, we may have to reduce them to the condition of Territories, and 
send from Massachusetts or Illinois governors to control them. If need 
come, I would be willing to do it. I would risk even the stigma of being 
despotic and oppressive rather than risk the perpetuity of the union of these 
states. Fight the war through; accomplish a peace; make it so permanent 
that a boy may preserve it; and when you have done that, you have no 
more need of a standing army.” 

Senator Powell moved as an amendment to the Army Bill that no part 
of the army or navy should be used to subject or hold as a conquered prov¬ 
ince any state now or lately one of the United States, or in abolishing or in¬ 
terfering with slavery in any of the states. Sherman opposed the amend¬ 
ment as out of place, but he declared that there was no purpose in con¬ 
ducting the war to subjugate a state or to free a slave. Its purpose was to 
preserve the Union, to maintain the Constitution in all its clauses and guar¬ 
antees, without change or limitation. Dixon said that if, in the progress of 
the war, it should turn out that either the government or slavery should be 
destroyed, then let slavery perish. Lane, of Kansas, affirmed that we would 
have stood by the compromises of the Constitution, and permitted slavery 
to exist where it was planted; but the struggle has been forced upon us, and 
he was willing that it should be followed to its logical conclusion, believing 
that the institution of slavery would not in any state survive the march of 
the Union armies. Browning, the successor of Douglas, avowed that the war 
was one of subjugation. Where all the authorities of a state were disloyal, 
and banded in treasonable confederation against the government, be was for 
subjugation, it mattered not whether it was called subjugation of a state or 
of its people. If the issue was forced upon us, he was for the government 
against slavery, and would vote for sweeping that last vestige of barbarism 
from the face of the earth. 

In the House, on the 22d of July, the day after the battle of Bull Run, 
Mr. Crittenden offered a resolution declaring that the war had been forced 
upon the country by Southern Disunionists; that it was not waged by the 
Union for the purpose of conquest or subjugation, or for interfering with 
the institutions of the states, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitu¬ 
tion and to preserve the Union, without impairing the equality and rights 
of the states; and that when these objects were attained, the war ought to 
cease. It passed with scarcely a show of opposition, only two votes being 
cast against it. 1 This resolution, in precisely the same words, was presented 
to the Senate by Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee. Mr. Polk proposed to 
amend it so as to read that “ the war had been forced upon the country by 
the Disunionists of the Southern and Northern states.” This was rejected 
by a vote of 33 to 4. This again brought up the question of subjugation. 
Mr. Trumbull disliked the use of that word in this connection. It had never 
been the purpose of the United States to subjugate or coerce states, but it 
was proposed to subjugate citizens who are standing out in defiance of the 
laws of the Union, and to coerce them into obedience to the laws of the 
Union. If the resolution meant that the war was not for this purpose, he 
was opposed to it. Mr. Fessenden said that the war was not carried on for 

1 “ Resolved, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the Dis¬ 
unionists of the Southern states, now in revolt against the constitutional government and in arms 
around the capital; that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of mere pas¬ 
sion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not prose¬ 
cuted upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering 
with the rights or established institutions of those states, but to defend and maintain the suprem¬ 
acy of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof, and to preserve the Union, with 
all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several states unimpaired; and that as soon as these ob¬ 
jects are accomplished the war ought to cease.” 



JOHN J CRITTENDEN. 


the purpose of subjugating the people of any state; but we had the definite 
purpose of defending the Constitution and the laws, and of putting down 
the revolt at any hazard, and it was for the South to say whether it was 
necessary to subjugate them in order to do it. If it were done, he would 
keep them subjugated no longer than was necessary for that purpose. Thus 
far it must go, and no farther. 

Mr. Willey, of Virginia, said that there was a fear in his state that the de¬ 
sign of the war was subjugation, to reduce the Old Dominion into a prov¬ 
ince. He did not believe that such was the object, and he was instructed 
and prepared to vote for every necessary measure and for every necessary 
man to carry on the war until the Constitution was vindicated and restored 
to its legitimate supremacy, and the Union re-established on a basis never 
to be overthrown. But if it was avowed that this was to be a war upon the 
domestic institutions of the South, and upon the rights of private property, 
every loyal arm on the soil of the Old Dominion would be instantly para¬ 
lyzed. Pass the resolution, and vigor would be given to every loyal arm 
in the Old Dominion, and the friends of the Union would be multiplied by 
thousands. 

Mr. Breckinridge would not vote for the resolution because he did not 
agree with the statement of facts contained in it. He believed there were 
errors on both sides. The present condition of affairs was owing to the re¬ 
fusal of the Senate to agree to any proposition of adjustment The war was 
now prosecuted for objects of subjugation; and unless those states which 
had seceded would lay down their arms and surrender at discretion, the ma¬ 
jority in Congress would listen to no terms of settlement. 

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 30 to 5, Mr. Trumbull being 
the only Republican voting against it. On this question he found himself 
for once, though from very different reasons, voting with Breckinridge and 
Waldo Johnson ; with Polk and Powell. This joint resolution, passing both 
houses of Congress almost unanimously, was accepted as an authoritative 
definition of the objects and limits of the war. Members on both sides had, 
in the heat of debate, loosely used the word subjugation; but, when it was 
fairly explained, it was found that by it those who supported the govern¬ 
ment meant merely bringing the revolted states under subjection to the rec¬ 
ognized law's of the land, A small band in the Senate, most of whom were 
soon to take their proper place among the Confederates, refused to assent to 
this. In the popular branch of Congress, the Opposition members either 
voted for the proposition, or declined to vote at all. The two votes cast 
against it were from the Republican side. 

In the House the debates took the same general turn as in the Senate. 
The same positions were taken, and enforced by similar arguments usually 
less elaborately presented. The attention of the House was mainly devoted 
to bills and resolutions pertaining to military and naval appropriations. The 
key-note to the predominant feeling in that body was struck by Mr. McCler- 
nand, a Democrat from Illinois, who offered a resolution that “this House 
hereby pledges itself to vote for any amount of money and any number of 
men which may be necessary to insure a speedy and effectual suppression 
of-the rebellion, and the permanent restoration of the Federal authority ev¬ 
ery where within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States.” This 
was adopted by a vote of 121 to 5. Taken in connection with the Critten¬ 
den resolution and the declarations embodied in the President’s Message, it 
clearly defined the policy which all branches of the government, with rare 
unanimity, had at this time marked out in respect to the conduct of the 
war. 




192 


[July, 1861. 



6AI.MO.N P. CHASE 

The extra session of Congress closed on the 6th of August, having lasted 
only thirty-three days. In it were passed many laws of the highest import¬ 
ance. All the military acts and orders of the President were approved and 
legalized. 1 The President was authorized to accept the services of 500,000 
volunteers for a term of not less than six months or more than three years, 
but to be disbanded at the close of the war. 2 A farther increase of eleven 
regiments was made to the regular army during the rebellion; the whole 
army to be reduced at its close to 25,000 men, unless otherwise ordered. 3 
The pay of private soldiers, regulars and volunteers, was raised to thirteen 
dollars a month.* Provision was made for the increase of the navy. The 
secretary was authorized to hire, purchase, or contract for, and to furnish 
and arm, as many vessels as were necessary. 5 The construction of iron-clad 
ships and floating batteries was directed, and a committee appointed to in¬ 
vestigate plans for such structures. From the report of this committee in 
favor of the “ Monitor” grew up the whole class of turreted vessels which 
constitute the distinctive feature of our iron-clad navy. 6 The duties were 
remitted upon all arms imported by states. 7 Ten millions of dollars were 
appropriated for the purchase of arms; 8 and two millions for transporting 
arms and munitions to loyal citizens in insurgent states. 9 The states were 
indemnified for all expenses incurred by them in raising, transporting, pay¬ 
ing, and subsisting troops. 10 

The entire appropriations made amounted to $313,260,000, of which 
$227,938,000 were for the army, and $42,938,000 for the navy. To meet 
these expenditures recourse was had to an increase of the tariff, to direct 
taxes, to loans, and to the issue of treasury notes and bonds. An impost of 
15 cents a pound was levied upon tea, and 4 cents upon coffee; these had 
hitherto been free. The duty on sugar was raised from three fourths of a 


cent to 2 cents; that on silks, wines, and liquors was 
increased from 10 to 25 per cent.; upon most other 
articles the increase was about 10 percent A direct 
tax of $20,000,000 was levied upon the states, besides 
a tax of 3 per cent, upon all incomes in excess of $800 
a year. 1 . The Secretary of the Treasury was author¬ 
ized to borrow $250,000,000, issuing therefor, at dis¬ 
cretion, bonds at 7 per cent, interest, payable in twen¬ 
ty years; or treasury notes of not less than $50, at 
7fV per cent., payable in three years; or treasury 
notes of $5 and upward, payable on demand without 
interest; or similar notes at 3-n£j per cent, payable 
in one year. 2 

The President was also authorized, in cases where 
the revenue laws could not be executed at a port of 
entry, to remove the custom-house to any secure place 
in the district, on land or on shipboard; or, if neces¬ 
sary, to close the ports of entry in any district. He 
might also, by proclamation, declare any state or part 
of a state in insurrection, and prohibit commercial in¬ 
tercourse with it, or license it upon such terms as 
might be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treas¬ 
ury. 3 A confiscation act was passed, providing that 
during the present or any future insurrection, after 
due proclamation by the President, all property used 
or intended to be used by the owner for aiding the 
insurrection should be lawful subject of capture and 
prize, and that it should be seized, confiscated, and 
condemned. This law specially provided that any 
owner of a slave, or any person having a legal claim 
to his services, who should require or permit such 
slave to take up arms against, or be in any way em¬ 
ployed in military or naval service against the United 
States, should thereby forfeit all claim to him, any 
law of a state or of the United States to the contrary 
notwithstanding.* 

This last provision, which met with strenuous op¬ 
position, and finally passed in the House only by a 
vote of 60 to 48, embodied the only direct action 
taken by Congress during the extra session upon the 
subject of slavery. The question, indeed, frequently 
came up incidentally in the course of debate, and 
members of both houses expressed their individual 
opinions upon it; but there was a manifest determ¬ 
ination on the part of the administration and its sup¬ 
porters to take at this time no definite ground in re¬ 
lation to it. It will be the object of the next chapter 
to show how the government was subsequently forced 
from this position, and to set forth its whole course 
of action upon the question of slavery, which finally 
resulted in the proclamation for universal emancipa¬ 
tion throughout the revolting states. 

Congress thus placed the whole power of the na¬ 
tion at the disposal of the President for the suppres¬ 
sion of the rebellion. The events of the last few 
months had proved that men would not be wanting, 
but the financial prospect gave occasion for the grav¬ 
est apprehensions. The administration of Buchanan 
had left the treasury almost empty, and the credit of the government dubi 
ous. In December $5,000,000 of government notes were put into market 
at the lowest rates of interest offered. There were offers at 24 and 36 per 
cent.; only half a million was bid for it as low as 12 per cent.; all above 
that were rejected. But the money was needed to pay the interest on pub¬ 
lic stocks, and banks and bankers took a million and a half more at that 
rate on condition that it should be used only for this purpose. In January 
$5,000,000 more was borrowed at a little less than 11 per cent. In Febru- 
ary $8,000,000 of six per cent, stock was sold, averaging 90 per cent. The 
tariff bill of March, and the hopes of peace inspired by the President’s in¬ 
augural, raised the credit of government somewhat, and Mr. Chase, now Sec¬ 
retary of the Treasury, was able to dispose of $3,000,000 at 94 per cent. 
The attack upon Sumter brought down stocks again, and United States sixes 
sold at 83, while money could with difficulty be placed at 4 per cent.; 
$5,000,000 in treasury notes, made receivable for customs, was at .length, by 
great exertions, sold to banks and bankers at par, which enabled the admin¬ 
istration to go on a few weeks. Then, at the close of May, a new loan was 
offered, and $9,000,000 was secured at from 85 to 93 per cent. Just before 
the meeting of Congress $5,000,000 more was borrowed for 60 days on 
pledge of government notes. When Congress met, Mr. Chase estimated the 
probable expenditures of the year at about $320,000,000. To meet this he 
proposed to raise $80,000,000 by imposts and direct taxation, and the re¬ 
maining $240,000,000 by loan. Congress passed the necessary bills, and the 
loan was thrown into the market. The banks of the three great commer¬ 
cial cities agreed to take, between August and December, $150,000,000. 
This would enable the treasury to meet the demands upon it until Congress 
should again assemble. 

Our foreign relations meanwhile were a subject of uneasiness. The Con- 


1 Laws of the 37th Congress, Extra Session, chap. xlv. 
3 Ibid., chaps, iii., xxxi. 4 Ibid., chap. lx. 


' Laws of the 37th Congress, Extra Session, chap. Ixiii. 

3 Ibid., chap. xxiv. 4 Ibid., chap. Ixiii. 4 Ibid., chaps, xiii.. liii. 
’ Ibid., chap. i. * Ibid., chap. xl. * Ibid., chap, xxviii. 


3 Ibid., chap. viii. 
a Ibid., chap, xxxviii. 
10 Ibid., chap. xxi. 


* Ibid., chaps. v. t xlvi. 










THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 


193 


July, 1861 .] 

federates had confidently relied upon a prompt recognition of their inde¬ 
pendence by the great powers of Europe, and upon their armed intervention, 
if necessary, to put an end to the blockade. They believed that in their 
monopoly of the production of cotton they possessed the means compelling 
this action. The Federal government, on the other hand, directed its min¬ 
isters to urge upon the governments to which they were accredited that the 
present disturbances had their origin only in popular passions excited under 
novel circumstances, and of a transient character; that it was for the inter¬ 
est of the world that our political system should remain unaltered; that any 
advantage which any foreign nation might derive from a connection with 
any discontented portion of our people would be ephemeral, overbalanced 
by the evils which it would suffer from a disseverance of the Union, whose 
policy had always been, and must hereafter be, to maintain peace, liberal 
commerce, and cordial amity with all other nations, and to favor the estab¬ 
lishment of well-ordered government over the whole American continent; 
and that any thing which should induce discord or anarchy among us would 
tend to disturb the existing systems of government in other parts of the 
world, and arrest the progress of improvement and civilization. Our min¬ 
isters were especially instructed to assure the governments to which they 
were sent that no foreign interference would be admitted in this or in any 
other controversy in which the government of the United States might be 
engaged with any. portion of the American people; that foreign interven¬ 
tion would oblige us to treat as enemies those who should undertake it as 
allies of the insurrectionary party, and all the more so if such intervention 
should be undertaken by a combination of several European states; that 
the people of the United States deemed the Union, which would then be at 
stake, worth all the sacrifices of a contest with the world in arms, should 
such a contest prove inevitable. 

Our ministers were also instructed to agree to the declaration of the Paris 
Conference of 1856, and enter into treaties in accordance with it. This dec¬ 
laration set forth, on the part of all the powers entering into it, that “Pri¬ 
vateering is and remains abolished. The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, 
with the exception of contraband of war. Neutral goods, with the excep¬ 
tion of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy’s flag. 
Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, main¬ 
tained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the ene¬ 
my.” The non-maritime powers deferred their action to that of Great Brit¬ 
ain and France. The preliminary negotiations opened in May. On the 
18th of July Lord John Russell wrote to our minister, Mr. Adams, that her 
majesty’s ministers would advise the queen to conclude such a treaty with 
the United States as soon as a similar one had been agreed upon by them 
with the Emperor of the French, so that the two might be signed simul¬ 
taneously. Ten days later, upon learning that negotiations with the French 
government were completed, Russell renewed his declaration, adding paren¬ 
thetically that the agreement must be wholly prospective. This proviso 
was subsequently explained to mean that the British government would un¬ 
dertake nothing which “should have any bearing, direct or indirect, upon 
the internal differences prevailing in the United States.” The reasons given 
for this reservation were that the Confederates had been recognized as bel¬ 
ligerents, and so that, by the general law of nations, they might arm priva¬ 
teers; the Federal government had designated such privateers as pirates, 
and any nation which had signed a coiTvention with the United States de¬ 
claring that privateering was abolished, might be called upon to treat Con¬ 
federate privateers as pirates. To accept this condition would be to sacri¬ 
fice the very object for which we had consented to recede from our former 
refusal to agree to the declaration of the Paris Congress. We had refused 
to accede to the abolition of privateering on the ground that it was hot our 
policy to maintain large armies and navies. When we went to war, it was 
urged, we depended on our people for defense on land, and on our ship¬ 
owners for defense on the water. England and France maintained vast 
fleets of public vessels to destroy the property of their enemies, which was 
precisely the work done by the vessels which we licensed as privateers. 
Why ask us to abandon our system of offense and defense while they main¬ 
tained theirs ? If they would make private property exempt from capture at 
sea by national vessels, we would consent to give up privateering. France, 
Russia, and the other powers of Europe were in favor of this modification 
of maritime law, but Great Britain would not accede to it, and the United 
States refused to become a party in the convention abolishing privateering. 
Now, in order to protect our commerce from Confederate privateers, we were 
disposed to accede to the treaty; but the British government insisted upon 
a proviso which expressly legalized Confederate privateers. To assent to 
this would also be to permit a foreign power to take cognizance of and ad¬ 
just its relations upon internal and domestic differences assumed to exist 
among us. The proviso would, moreover, be unequal in its operation. 
Great Britain could modify her obligations to us on account of our internal 
difficulties, while our obligations to her would not be affected by any inter¬ 
nal difficulties which might arise in any part of the British empire. Ireland 
might rise, India revolt, Canada or Australia secede from England, and our 
obligations to Britain would remain unchanged. The proviso was clearly 
inadmissible, and the negotiations were abandoned. 

The Confederates had sent to Europe three commissioners, Yancey, 
Mann, and Rost, to endeavor to effect the recognition of their government. 
P. A. Rost was a judge in Louisiana, and had taken no prominent part in 
general politics. Dudley Mann bad formerly been employed as diplomatic 
agent in Europe of the Federal government, and had of late years been en¬ 
gaged in unsuccessful efforts to open a direct trade between Virginia and 
Europe. William L. Yancey, of Alabama, was one of the earliest advocates 
of disunion. Earnest and eloquent, thoroughly sincere in his attachment to 



WILLIAM L. YANCEY. 

what he conceived the interests and rights of his section, and with a private 
character beyond reproach, no man out of the Senate of the United States 
had done so much to prepare the Southern mind for secession. In the pres¬ 
idential election of 1860 he took the lead in his state of the supporters of 
Mr. Breckinridge, who carried Alabama by a majority of 8000 over both Bell 
and Douglas. When a portion of the delegates in the Convention which 
passed the Ordinance of Secession declared that their constituents would not 
yield to it unless it was submitted to the popular vote, he denounced them 
as traitors and rebels who should be coerced into submission. On the 4th 
of May these commissioners waited upon Lord John Russell, the British 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to lay before him a statement of the causes 
which had led to secession, and to urge the recognition of the Confederacy 
by Great Britain. The minister refused to communicate with them in his 
official capacity, but received them unofficially. Mr. Dallas, at that time our 
minister to Great Britain, was instructed,in case this unofficial intercourse 
was continued, to desist from any intercourse, official or unofficial, with the 
British government The commissioners, at intervals, sent letters to the 
British government, but received only the briefest replies, and a final notice 
that no official communications would be entered into with them. 

The British and French governments agreed to act together in regard to 
our affairs, with the expectation that all the other nations of Europe would 
concur in whatever measures they should adopt on the subject of recogni¬ 
tion. They decided to recognize the Confederate States as a belligerent en¬ 
titled to all the rights of war, and to maintain a strict neutrality between the 
contending parties. The queen's proclamation of neutrality was issued on 
the 13th of May. It commenced by reciting that, “Whereas hostilities have 
unhappily commenced between the government of the United States of 
America and certain states styling themselves 1 the Confederate States of 
America;’ and whereas we, being at peace with the government of the Unit¬ 
ed States, have declared our royal determination to maintain a strict and 
impartial neutrality in the contest between the said contending parties,” 
therefore all British subjects are warned “ to abstain from violating or con¬ 
travening either the laws and statutes of the realm in this behalf, or the laws 
of nations in relation thereto, as they will answer to the contrary at their 
peril.” The laws of the realm in this respect are embodied in the Foreign 
Enlistment Act of 1819. This was quoted at length. In verbose and clumsy 
legal phraseology, 1 it provides, in substance, that any British subject who, 

1 As an illustration of the verbosity of this act, take the following sentence, which is repeated 
in substance seven times: “If any natural born subject of his majesty,his heirs and successors, 
without the leave or license of his majesty, his heirs or successors, for that purj>ose first had anti 
obtained under the sign manual of his majesty, his beirs or successors, or signified by Order in 
Council or by proclamation of his majesty, bis heirs or successors, shall take or acceptor shall 
agree to take or accept any military commission, or shall otherwise enter into the military service 
as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer, or shall enlist or enter himself to enlist, or shall 
agree to enlist or to enter himself to serve ns a soldier, or to be employed, or shall serve in any 
warlike or military operation in the service, of, or for, or under, or in aid of any foreign prince, 
state, potentate, colony, province or part of any province or people, or of any |>erson or persons 
exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, col¬ 
ony, province, or part of any province or people, either as an officer or soldier or in any other mil¬ 
itary capacity,” etc., “he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and u|*>n being convicted 
thereof, upon any information or indictment, shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or ei¬ 
ther of them, at the discretion of the court before which such offender shall be convicted.” 





























194 


[November, 1861. 


without royal license, shall enter or engage to enter the military service of 
any foreign ruler or nation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be 
punished by fine and imprisonment. That no person within the British do¬ 
minions shall, without royal license, equip, fit out, or arm any vessel to be 
employed for hostile purposes by any foreign ruler or nation ; the offender 
to be punishable by fine and imprisonment, and the vessel, with all its ap¬ 
purtenances, to be seized and forfeited. That no person within the British 
dominions shall, without royal license, in any wav augment the warlike force 
of any vessel of war belonging to any foreign ruler or people, under like 
penalty. Any person committing any of these offenses, or endeavoring to 
break any lawful blockade, or conveying articles contraband of war to either 
belligerent, is liable to the penalties prescribed in this statute, and also to 
those imposed by the law of nations. Any persons who commit these of¬ 
fenses are warned that they “do so at their peril and of their own wrong, 
and that they will in no wise obtain any protection from us against any li¬ 
ability or penal consequences, but will, on the contrary, incur our high dis¬ 
pleasure by such misconduct.” How this enactment and the proclamation 
based upon it was evaded will appear hereafter. This proclamation was 
followed by a circular to the governors of the different colonies, stating that, 
in order to give full effect to this principle of neutrality, her majesty had 
been pleased to interdict the armed ships, and also the privateers of both 
parties, from carrying prizes made by them into the ports or waters of the 
kingdom or its colonies. 

The French proclamation was sharp and decisive. The Emperor, it said, 
“ taking into consideration the state of peace which exists between France 
and the United States, has resolved to observe a strict neutrality in the 
struggle between the government of the Union and the states which propose 
to form a separate confederation.” No vessel of war or privateer of either 
belligerent would be permitted to enter or stay with prizes in any F'rench 
port for more than twenty-four hours, except in case of absolute necessity; 
no sale of prize goods would be allowed in F’rench ports or roadsteads; ev¬ 
ery Frenchman was prohibited from accepting a commission from either 
party to arm vessels of war, to accept letters of marque, or to assist in any 
way in equipping or arming any vessel of war or privateer for either party; 
every Frenchman, whether residing at home or abroad, was prohibited from 
entering into the naval or military service of either belligerent; every 
Frenchman must abstain from any act in violation of French or internation¬ 
al law which might be considered hostile to either party, and contrary to 
the neutrality which the Emperor had resolved to maintain. No French¬ 
man contravening the present enactment would have any claim to protec¬ 
tion from his government against any acts or measures, whatever they 
might be, which the belligerents might exercise or decree. 

The decree of the Spanish government was to the same effect, with the 
additional provisos that “ transportation under the Spanish flag of all arti¬ 
cles of commerce is guaranteed, except when they are directed to blockaded 
ports,” and “ the transportation of effects of war is forbidden, as well as the 
carrying of papers or communications for belligerents.” The Portuguese 
decree was of the same tenor. 

With the exception of the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, 
the position of the European powers toward the United States during the 
first months of the war was not unfriendly. Some minor questions sprung 
up with Great Britain growing out of the blockade, but they were adjusted 
without much difficulty. But in November an affair occurred which threat¬ 
ened to involve us in actual war with Great Britain. The defeat at Bull 
Run, the inactivity of the Federal forces which ensued, and the increasing 
stringency of the blockade, which began to cause great uneasiness in Europe 
in relation to the supply of cotton, led the Confederate government to hope 
that there was a prospect of securing its recognition by Great Britain and 



France, and thereby, in the end, to obtain foreign interposition in their favor. 
For this purpose it was determined to send commissioners of higher rank 
and wider reputation than those already on the ground. The choice fell 
upon James M. Mason, of Virginia, who was accredited to Great Britain, and 
John Slidell, of Louisiana, to France. Mason had been a member of the 
Senate of the United States since 1847, and had been for some years chair¬ 
man of the Committee on Foreign Relations. This position gave him a 
kind of superintendence over the proceedings of the State Department. In 
1857 he visited the East, where he was received with high honor. Upon 
occasion of the inauguration of the statue of Warren upon Bunker Hill, 
he was introduced by Mr. Winthrop as “a senator from the Old Dominion 
whose name is associated in more than one generation with eminent service 
in his native state and in the national councils.” In reply he said, “ I shall 
tell it in Old Virginia, when I return to her hallowed land, that I found the 
spirit of Massachusetts as buoyant, as patriotic, as completely filled with the 
emotions that should govern patriotism, when I visited Bunker Hill, as it 
was when that battle was fought.” Thoroughly devoted to the dogma of 
state supremacy, he was yet among the last finally to resolve to abandon the 
Union. He retained his seat in the Senate to the close of Buchanan’s ad¬ 
ministration, and during the executive session which followed Lincoln’s ac¬ 
cession; but during these months he strenuously opposed every measure 
looking toward strengthening the national government for the impending 
struggle. When his state at last seceded he went with her, and, failing to 
appear at the extra session, he was among the senators who were formally 
expelled. Slidell, though born in New York, had early taken up his resi¬ 
dence in Louisiana. He represented that state in Congress in 1843, and 
was subsequently appointed minister to Mexico. He was elected to the 
Senate in 1853, and was a member when Louisiana seceded. His long resi¬ 
dence in New Orleans, and the acquaintance thereby gained with the French 
language and character, fitted him for the position to which he was now ap¬ 
pointed as commissioner to France. 

Mason and Slidell, with their secretaries McFarland and Eustis, with sev¬ 
eral women of their families, embarked at Charleston late in October. 
Eluding the blockade, they reached Cardenas, in Cuba, and thence proceed¬ 
ed to Havana, where they were received with great consideration. Here 
they awaited the arrival of the British merchant-steamer Trent, plying be¬ 
tween Southampton and the West India Islands, and carrying the British 
mails. They embarked on the morning of the 7th of November. The 
next day the Trent was intercepted by the American steamer San Jacinto, 
commanded by Captain Wilkes, and brought to by a shot across her bow. 
Boats were sent from the San Jacinto to the Trent, demanding the surrender 
of the commissioners and their secretaries. The commander of the Trent 
and the British mail agent protested against this. Mason and Slidell de¬ 
clared that they would not leave the Trent unless compelled to do so by 
force. A scene of confusion ensued. A daughter of Slidell struck one of 
the American officers in the face. They persisted in carrying out their or¬ 
ders. The commander of the Trent would not give up the men, nor would 
they give themselves up except to force. The force required was merely 
technical. It consisted in the display of strength, and the determination to 
use it, which would render resistance unavailing. This was at hand, and 
after a stormy scene of two hours’ duration, the commissioners and secreta¬ 
ries, with their baggage, were transferred to the San Jacinto. Their fami¬ 
lies, declining to accompany them, were left on board the Trent, which pur¬ 
sued her voyage to England. The San Jacinto proceeded to the United 
States with the prisoners, who were placed in Fort Warren, near Boston. 

The intelligence of the capture of these men was received with great re¬ 
joicing in the United States. The Secretary of the Navy wrote to the cap¬ 
tain of the San Jacinto approving of his course, and in his report reiterated 



JAMES M. MASON. 


JOHN trr mwi i. 









December, 1861.] 


THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 


195 



CIIABLE8 WtLKF.9. 


the approval, saying that “ the prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes 
on this occasion merited and received the emphatic approval of the Depart¬ 
ment,” and that if he exhibited a too generous forbearance in not also cap¬ 
turing the Trent, it might be excused, but must not constitute a precedent 
for similar cases in the future. In the House of Representatives a resolu¬ 
tion was adopted at the opening of the session, tendering the thanks of Con¬ 
gress to Captain Wilkes “for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct,”and 
resolutions were adopted requesting the President of the United States to 
order Mason and Slidell to be confined in cells as convicted felons, in return 
for the similar treatment inflicted on Colonels Corcoran and Wood, captured 
at Bull Run, who had been so confined by the Confederate government as 
hostages for the crew of a privateer who had been thus shut up on charge 
of piracy. In the Senate’the vote of thanks w-as referred to the Naval Com¬ 
mittee, and received no farther action. A fortnight afterward, in the House, 
Mr. Yallandigham, who before and after was among the foremost opponents 
of the administration, offered a resolution declaring that it was the duty of 
the President to maintain the stand taken by the House; but circumstances 
had in the mean while arisen which changed the aspect of the case, and this 
resolution was referred to a committee, by whom it was never called up. 

In Europe the seizure of these men was looked upon in a very different 
light. It was considered as alike an affront to the British flag and a viola¬ 
tion of the law of nations. Our government foresaw from the beginning 
that the British government would not acquiesce in this proceeding. On 
the 30th of November the Secretary of State wrote to Mr. Adams, our min¬ 
ister at London, instructing him that Captain Wilkes had acted without in¬ 
structions from the government, and that therefore the subject was free from 
the embarrassment which would have resulted had the act been specially 
directed. On the same day the British foreign minister, now become Earl 
Russell, forwarded a dispatch to Lord Lyons, minister at Washington, ex¬ 
pressing the belief that the officer who committed the aggression had either 
misconceived his instructions or had acted wholly upon his own responsi¬ 
bility; but, in either case, the British government could not allow such an 
affront to pass without full reparation, and that the only satisfactory redress 
would be the liberation of the four prisoners, their delivery into the hands 
of Lord Lyons, that they might again be placed under British protection, 
and a suitable apology for the aggression which had been committed. This 
dispatch was to be communicated to the American government; but accom¬ 
panying it was a private note to Lord Lyons, instructing him, in case a de¬ 
lay should be asked by the American government in order that the matter 
might be deliberately considered, to consent to wait ten days; but if, at the 
end of that time, the demands of the British government were not complied 
with, the minister was directed to leave Washington and repair to London 
with all the members and archives of the legation. This private instruc¬ 
tion was not probably communicated to our government; but the official 
demand, though cautiously worded, was.clearly an ultimatum of the British 
government, who meanwhile, by dispatching troops to Canada, and strength¬ 
ening its naval force in the West Indies, made preparations looking to war. 
The French government agreed with the British, and M. Mereier, the French 
minister at Washington, was instructed to lay its opinion before the govern¬ 
ment of the United States, as one in which all neutrals were deeply con¬ 
cerned. The President and Secretary of State saw clearly that the demand 
must be complied with, or we must become involved in a war with Great 
Britain, and probably also with France; for, in case of war, the Confederate 
government would be recognized at once by Great Britain, and the two 
powers had agreed to act in concert. 

Fortunate! v, the government of the United States had not committed it¬ 
self in the matter, and was thus free to act in any manner without deroga¬ 
tion from its honor and dignity. The question turned upon the provision 
of international law that vessels of neutrals conveying any thing contraband 


of war belonging to a belligerent forfeit their character of neutrality and 
render themselves liable to seizure and condemnation It has never been 
definitely settled what things are contraband of war. Arms, munitions of 
war, and soldiers are acknowledged to be so in all cases; provisions and 
articles which are used both in war and peace, such as materials for ship¬ 
building and coal, are considered contraband only when directly designed 
for the naval or military service of a belligerent The question as to per¬ 
sons other than soldiers, and dispatches of the belligerent governments, has 
never been authoritatively settled. The decree of the Spanish government 
expressly forbade the carrying of papers or communications from belliger¬ 
ents. The orders of the Confederate government to the privateers which it 
authorized say that “neutral vessels conveying enemies' dispatches forfeit 
their neutral character, and are liable to capture and condemnation; but this 
rule does not apply to neutral vessels bearing dispatches from the public 
ministers of the enemy residing in neutral countries.” The decision of our 
government was given in a long and elaborate dispatch from Mr. Seward, 
in which he maintained that ministers and their dispatches, as well as sol¬ 
diers, were contraband; that Captain Wilkes had a right to search ihe 
Trent and capture these persons and their dispatches; but that all these pro¬ 
ceedings must be conducted in a manner allowed and recognized by the law 
of nations. This law does not permit the captor to judge of the rights of 
the case; he must send the vessel which he charges to have forfeited its 
neutrality before a prize court for judicial examination. Captain Wilkes 
failed to do this, and permitted the Trent to proceed on her voyage, and by 
so doing effectually prevented the judicial examination which might have 
resulted in her release, including that of his prisoners. By this omission he 
vitiated the whole transaction, and for this error the British government had 
a right to expect the same reparation which we should have expected in a 
similar case. In coming to this conclusion, Mr. Seward said that he was 
really maintaining, not an exclusively British interest, but an old, honored, 
and cherished American cause. The principles were laid down in 1804 by 
James Madison, then Secretary of State, in instructions given to James Mon¬ 
roe, our minister to England. If he decided this case in favor of the Amer¬ 
ican government, he must reverse its essential policy; if he maintained 
the principles and adhered to the policy, he must surrender the case itself. 
The American government could not deny the justice of the claim pre¬ 
sented to it. The four persons held in custody would be cheerfully liber¬ 
ated, and Lord Lyons was requested to indicate a place and time for receiv¬ 
ing them. It had previously been stated that Captain Wilkes had acted 
without the orders or knowledge of the government, which had neither med¬ 
itated, nor practiced, nor approved any deliberate wrong. 

The British minister accordingly dispatched a steamer to the neighbor¬ 
hood of Boston ; Mason and Slidell, with their secretaries, were placed on 
board and formally delivered to the British government, and the steamer 
conveyed them to England. 

But, while accepting the unconditional liberation of the prisoners and the 
accompanying explanation of the American government as the reparation 
which the British government had a right to demand, Earl Russell differed 
from Mr. Seward in his exposition of many points of international law, and 
in a paper equally elaborate with that of Mr. Seward proceeded to state 



CUAALKS FBAN01B JlVAM*. 










196 


[December, 1861. 



LORD LYONS. 


M. MERCIES. 


wherein those differences consisted. It must be admitted that in view of 
positive law, so far as it is definitely settled, of the deductions fairly to be 
drawn in respect to other cases not specifically provided for, and of the gen¬ 
eral welfare of nations, to subserve which is the aim of international law, 
the general interpretation of Earl Russell must be accepted in preference to 
that of Mr. Seward. 1 

The affair of the Trent having been thus adjusted, the relations between 
the United States and Great Britain continued on a friendly footing. The 
British government, having occasion shortly after to send troops to Canada, 
asked permission to land them at Portland, and thence transport them by 
railway across the State of Maine. This was granted, and the British troops 
were saved from the risk and suffering of a wintry voyage up the St. Law¬ 
rence. Some few minor questions arose, but none of sufficient importance 

1 The following, in a greatly abridged form, gives the essential points of these two elaborate pa¬ 
pers : 

Mr. Seward argues: Persons as well as property may become contraband, since the word 
means “contrary to proclamation, illegal, unlawful." It is agreed on all hands that persons in 
the naval or military service of the enemy are contrabands. Vattcl says, “War allows us to cut 
off from the enemy all his resources, and to hinder him from sending ministers to solicit assist¬ 
ance ;’’ and Sir William Scott says, “You may stop the embassador of your enemy on his pas¬ 
sage;" and, “ Dispatches are not less clearly contraband, and the bearers or couriers who under¬ 
take to carry them fall under the same condemnation." 

Earl Russell rejoins : The neutral country has a light to preserve its relations with the enemy, 
and you arc not at liberty to conclude that any communication between them can partake in any 
degree of the.nature of hostility against you. The interests of the neutral state may require that 
the intercourse of correspondence should not be altogether interdicted. That might amount to a 
declaration that an embassador from nn enemy shall not reside in a neutral state; for to what 
useful purpose could he reside there if he had no opportunities of communicating with his ow r n 
government? Hence the practice of nations has allowed neutral states to receive ministers from 
belligerents and the means of immediate negotiations with them. Thus Sir William Scott, when 
England and France were at w ar, dec ided in the case of an American vessel—the Caroline—that 
the carrying of dispatches from the French minister in America to the French government was 
not a violation of neutrality, and that such dispatches were not contraband of war; and these 
principles must extend to embassadors and agents as well as to dispatches. Mr. Seward, he says, 
misapprehends the quotations which he makes from Sir William .Scott, whose sole object was to 
explain the extent and limits of the doctrine of the inviolability of embassadors in virtue of that 
character. You may stop the embassador of the enemy when on his passage, but when he has 
reached his destination and taken upon him the functions of his office he is entitled to peculiar priv¬ 
ileges. He indeed says that civil functionaries, if sent for a purpose intimately connected with 
hostile operations, may fall under the same rule with persons whose employment is directly mili¬ 
tary. The dictum of Vattcl is in these words: “You may, moreover, nttack and arrest the |>eo- 
ple of the enemy wherever you have the right to exercise acts of hostility. Not merely may you 
lawfully refuse passage to the ministers whom the enemy sends to other sovereigns, but you may 
even arrest them if they undertake to pass secretly and without permission into the places of 
w hich you arc master," citing, bv way of example, the seizure of the French embassador to Prus¬ 
sia when, France being at war with England, lie attempted to pass through Hanover, which was 
then ruled by the King of England. The rule, ns laid down by Earl Russell, is that “you may 
stop an enemy’s embassador in any place of which you yourself arc the master, or in any other 
place where you have a right to exercise acts of hostility. Your own territory or ships of your 
country are places of which you arc yourself the master. The enemy’s territory or the enemy’s 
ship* are places in which you have a right to exercise acts of hostility. Neutral vessels guilty of 
no violation of the laws of neutrality are places w here you have no right to exercise acts of hostil¬ 
ity." The doctrine that embassadors are contraband being denied, tlio conclusion is “that an 
embassador sent to a neutral power is inviolable on the high seas and in neutral waters while un¬ 
der the protection of the neutral flag." 

Mr. Seward, proceeding from the point tliut dispatches and embassadors arc contraband, as¬ 
sumes that “the circumstance that the Trent was proceeding from one neutral port to another 


to interrupt the harmony between the two nations. The American govern¬ 
ment tacitly withdrew its demand that the British minister should hold no 
intercourse, even unofficial, with the Confederate commissioners: and the 
British government endeavored in good faith to maintain its position of neu¬ 
trality between those whom it had recognized as belligerents. It, however, 
declined to pass any new laws bearing upon the case, and the existing laws 
were so clumsily framed that the Confederates were subsequently able, by 
evading them, to fit out several cruisers in British ports to prey upon Amer¬ 
ican commerce. 

Congress convened in regular session on the 2d of December. The Pres¬ 
ident’s Message was devoted to a review of the condition of the country and 
the progress of the war. Our foreign relations had occasioned deep solici- 

neutral port docs not modify the right of the belligerent captor," and that consequently Captain 
Wilkes bad the right, by the law of nations, to detain and search the Trent. 

Earl Russell controverts this absolutely. He says, “It is of the very essence of the definition 
of contraband that the goods [or person.-] should have a hostile and not a neutral destination. 
The articles must be taken in the actual prosecution of the voyage to an enemy’s port.” If in¬ 
deed the real destination of the vessel be to an enemy’s port, the pretense that it is to a neutral 
one will not protect her in conveying contraband articles; but in this case the Trent was bona Jide 
on a voyage from one neutral port to another, and, therefore, had she on board articles in them¬ 
selves contraband of war, she was not liable to capture. He points out at some length the injuri¬ 
ous consequences which would result from the doctrines advocated by Mr. Seward. Thus: If, 
during the late war w ith Russia, a Russian minister to America was in an American ship bound 
from Hamburg to New York, the vessel might have been captured, taken to Portsmouth, and con¬ 
demned ; or a neutral packet, plying between Dover and Calais, with a Confederate agent on 
board, might be captured by a Federal cruiser and sent to New York; or a Cunard steamer, on 
its way from Halifax to Liverpool, with dispatches on board from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, 
might be arrested by a Confederate privateer.* 

The essential point of Mr. Seward's dispatch is that the seizure of Mason and Slidell was viti¬ 
ated only by the failure of Captain Wilkes to seize the vessel also and send her before a prize 
court, and that if this had been done the transaction would have been strictly legal. 

Earl Russell replies to this, that, “in view of the erroneous principles asserted by Mr. Seward, 
and the consequences they involve, her majesty’s government think it necessary to declare that 
they would not acquiesce in the capture of any British merchant-ship under circumstances simi¬ 
lar to those of the Trent; and that the fact of its being brought before a prize court, though it 
would alter the character, would not diminish the gravity of the offense against the law of nations 
which would thereby be committed.’’ 

Mr. Seward closed his argument by adding : “ In coming to my conclusion [to liberate the four 
prisoners], I have not forgotten that if the safety of this Union required the detention of the cap¬ 
tured persons, it would l»e the right and duty of this government to detain them; but the effect¬ 
ual chock and waning proportions of the existing insurrection, as well ns the comparative unim¬ 
portance of the captured persons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, happily forbid me 
from resorting to that defense.” 

F^nrl Russell replies to this: “ Mr. Seward docs not here*assert any right founded on internation¬ 
al law, however inconvenient or irritating to neutral nations; he entirely loses sight of the vast 
difference w hich exists between the exercise of an extreme right and the commission of an un¬ 
questionable wrong. His frankness comjtels me to be equally open, and to inform him that Great 
Britain could not have submitted to the perpetration of that wrong, however flourishing might 
have been the insurrection at the South, and however important the persons captured might have 
been. Happily, all danger of hostile collision on this subject has been avoided. It is the earnest 
hope of her majesty’s government that similar dangers, if they should arise, may be averted by 
peaceful negotiations conducted in the spirit which befits the organs of two great nations.” 

• Such a capture would have been in accordance with the rule quoted above in the text, laid down by the Confed¬ 
erate government for its privateers. According to this, a neutral vessel renders herself liable to capture and con- 
dcnmaiion if -he carries di-patches from an memy, except in the case of those /rum u minister residing in a neutral 
state—those sent to him by hie government being contraband. 

























THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 


197 


December, 18G1.] 

tude. A nation divided at home is exposed to disrespect from abroad; one 
party or the other was sure to invoke foreign intervention, and other nations 
were likely to accept the invitation. But the disloyal citizens of the United 
States had met with less encouragement than they expected. Even had 
foreign nations been disposed to act solely for the restoration of commerce, 
and especially for the acquisition of cotton, they had not been convinced 
that this end would be attained by the destruction of the Union; they per¬ 
ceived that a strong nation promised more durable peace and more reliable 
commerce than it would when broken into fragments. But as the integrity 
of our country depends upon ourselves and not upon foreign nations, we 
should make ample provision for the maintenance of our national defenses, 
especially those of our sea-coast, lakes, and great rivers. A military rail¬ 
road should be constructed, connecting the loyal portions of Tennessee, 
North Carolina, and Kentucky with the other faithful parts of the Union. 
To protect our commerce, the commanders of sailing vessels, especially in 
the Eastern seas, should be authorized to recapture prizes which had been 
taken by pirates, and consular courts should be empowered to adjudicate 
respecting such prizes. There was no reason why the independence of 
Hayti and Liberia should not be acknowledged. Civil justice had been sup¬ 
pressed in the seceding states, in which there were two hundred millions of 
dollars due from insurgent to loyal citizens; but there were no courts to en¬ 
force these claims. lie had been urged to establish military courts to ad¬ 
minister summary justice in such cases, wherever our armies took possession 
of revolted districts; but he had declined to do so because he was unwilling 
to go beyond the most evident necessity in the unusual exercise of his pow¬ 
er. He urged Congress to establish temporary tribunals for this purpose. 
The message embodied a brief dissertation upon the subject of capital and 
labor. It had been assumed on one side that labor is available only in con¬ 
nection with capital; that nobody would work unless some capitalist in¬ 
duced him do so; and the question had been mooted whether it was better 
that capital should hire laborers, inducing them to work of their own con¬ 
sent, or should buy them, forcing them to work without their consent, it be¬ 
ing assumed in either case that the position of the laborer was one fixed for 
life. The President combated this whole theory. Labor, he said, was prior 
to and the source of capital, and there was no fixed position of laborer and 
capitalist. A large majority neither work for others nor have others work¬ 
ing for them; many both work themselves and hire others to work for 
them, and the laborer of to-day is often the employer of to-morrow. The 
message contained two pregnant paragraphs bearing upon the question of 
slavery. These will be considered in the following chapter, in which the 
course of the government upon this subject will be narrated. 

The army, according to the report of the Secretary of War, consisted, ex¬ 
clusive of 77,875 volunteers for three months, of 660,971 men. Of these, 
640,637 were volunteers for three years or for the war, and 20,334 regulars. 1 
The several arms of the service, volunteers and regulars, were distributed as 
follows: Infantry, 568,383; Cavalry, 59,398; Artillery, 24,688; Rifles and 
Sharpshooters, 8395; Engineers, 107. For the ensuing year appropriations 
were asked for a force of 500,000 men. The cavalry force was said to be 
larger than was necessary, and measures would be taken for its reduction. 
The secretary believed that “ the army now assembled on the banks of the 
Potomac would, under its able leader, soon make such a demonstration as 
would soon re-establish the authority of the government throughout all the 
rebellious states.” 

A few weeks after the meeting of Congress Mr. Cameron resigned his 
post as Secretary of War, and was succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton, who 
had been for a short time attorney general under Mr. Buchanan. Much 
dissatisfaction had been expressed with the administration of Mr. Cameron. 
It was evident, from a report of a committee of Congress, that gross frauds 
had been perpetrated, but it should be borne in mind that the whole depart¬ 
ment had to be created almost anew, and that its operations had to be in¬ 
trusted in a great measure to untried men. The retiring secretary retained 
the personal confidence of the President, who nominated him minister to 
Russia. Subsequently the House of Representatives passed a vote censur¬ 
ing the late secretary for having intrusted to a Mr. Cummings the control 
of large sums of money, and authority to purchase military supplies without 
restriction, and requiring from him no guarantee for the faithful perform¬ 
ance of his duties, and for having involved the government in a vast num¬ 
ber of contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in business pertain¬ 
ing to the subject-matter of such contracts. The President at once assumed 
the entire responsibility of the transaction for himself and for his cabinet. 

The Secretary of the Navy furnished a comprehensive statement of the 
strength of the navy and of its operations since July. It had blockaded the 
insurgent ports along a coast of nearly 3000 miles, had captured 153 vessels 
which had attempted to run the blockade, and had achieved signal success 
at Hatteras and Port Royal. The number of seamen in the service had 
been raised since March from 7600 to 22,000. When all the vessels pur- 


1 The volunteers for the war were furnished from the several states and territories in the fol¬ 
lowing proportions : 


California. 4,688 

Connecticut. 12.400 

Delaware. 2,000 

Illinois. 80,000 

Indiana. 57,332 

Iowa. 10,800 

Kentucky. 15,000 

Mafne. 14,239 

Maryland. 7.000 

Massachusetts. 26,760 

Michigan. 28,550 

Minnesota. 4,160 

Missouri. 22,130 

N§w Hampshire. 9,600 


New Jersey. 9,342 

New York.. 100,200 

Ohio. 81,205 

Pennsylvania. 94,760 

Rhode' Island. 5,898 

Vermont. 8,000 

Virginia. 12,000 

Wisconsin. 14.153 

Kansas. 5,000 

Colorado. 1,000 

Nebraska. 2.500 

Nevada. 1,000 

New Mexico. 1,000 

District of Columbia. 1,000 



EDWIN M. STANTON. 


chased and building were armed and equipped, we should have 264 vessels 
of all classes, mounting 2557 guns. Of these, 76 vessels, with 1783 guns, be¬ 
longed to the old navy ; 136 vessels, with 518 guns, had been purchased, and 
52 vessels, with 256 guns, had been constructed. There were in all 163 
steamers of all classes, with something more than 1000 guns. 

The report of the Secretary of the Treasury was anxiously looked for, as 
indicating the financial condition of the government and the policy to be 
adopted. The estimated receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30,1862, 
were in round numbers §329,000,000, of which only §37,000,000 were from 
customs and other usual sources, §20,000,000 from direct taxes, and the re¬ 
maining §272,000,000 from loans already authorized. The entire expendi¬ 
tures of the year were estimated at §543,000,000, leaving §214,000,000 to 
be provided for by new loans. The secretary hoped the war would be 
brought to a close before midsummer, in which case the amount asked for 
would be amply sufficient; but if it should be protracted another year on 
the present scale, the expenditures would be §475,000,000, and the receipts 
§96,000,000. To raise this sum it would be necessary to increase the duty 
on tea, sugar, and coffee; to impose a direct tax of §20,000,000 on the loyal 
states, besides an income tax of §10,000,000, and a tax of §20,000,000 on 
liquors, tobacco, carriages, bank-notes, and other evidences of debt, making 
a direct tax in all of §50,000,000. There would then remain §379,000,000 
to he procured by loans in some shape. The loans for the two years would 
then be §655,000,000. The whole amount of the public debt on the 1st of 
July, 1863, would, upon this estimate, be §900,000,000, a sum which the 
country could pay in twenty years as easily as it did the debt of §127,000,000 
which existed in 1816, at the close of the war with Great Britain. It was 
proposed to raise a part of this loan indirectly by means of a national cur¬ 
rency. There are, said the secretary, in circulation in the loyal states 
§150,000,000 of bank-notes, which is actually a loan without interest from 
the people to the banks. This may be transferred to the government in 
either of two ways. The notes may, by means of taxation upon them, be 
gradually withdrawn from circulation, and their place supplied by United 
States notes, payable on demand. This was partially attained by the De¬ 
mand Notes of the treasury; but this mode was, in his opinion, liable to 
some grave objections. That which he suggested was to issue to individu¬ 
als and associations notes redeemable by the proposed institutions them¬ 
selves, secured by a deposit of United States stocks and an adequate provis¬ 
ion of specie, the notes to be receivable for all government dues except cus¬ 
toms. These notes, he thought, would form the safest currency which the 
nation had ever enjoyed, for they would be of equal and uniform value in 
every part of the Union. In a short time the whole circulating medium of 
the country, whether notes or coin, would bear the national impress, and its 
amount, being easily ascertainable, would not be likely to be increased be¬ 
yond the wants of business. As the wants of the government increased 
with the protraction of the war, both these measures and several others were 
substantially adopted. The Demand Notes of the treasury, or “Green¬ 
backs,” as they were usually denominated, were first issued in large quan¬ 
tities, and became at first the common circulating medium. The establish¬ 
ment of national banks, based upon deposits of United States stocks, fol. 
lowed later. 







































198 


It was evident from the opening of the session that a great change had 
taken place in the views of Congress during the four months since the close 
of the extra session. The strength of the insurrection had proved far great¬ 
er than had been anticipated, and it was perceived that the nation was en¬ 
gaged in a struggle for existence which would call for its utmost energies, 
and demand the use of every means within its power. Hitherto the govern¬ 
ment had proceeded on the assumption that the institution of slavery, and 
the sovereignty of the states as recognized in the written text of the Consti¬ 
tution, were not to be interfered with, though individual members of Con¬ 
gress had declared that in case of necessity either or both of these must yield 
to the paramount object of maintaining the Union. This change was clear¬ 
ly indicated when a resolution was offered in the House reaffirming the 
Crittenden resolution of the previous session, which declared that the war 
was not waged for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the es¬ 
tablished institutions of the states, and ought to cease as soon as the suprem¬ 
acy of the Constitution had been vindicated. This resolution had passed by 
an almost unanimous vote four months previously. It was now laid on the 
table by a vote of 71 to 65. Fifty-three of the members who had then 
voted for it now voted to lay it on the table, thus in effect saying that it 
might, and probably would, be necessary to interfere with the civil and do¬ 
mestic institutions of the insurgent states. In the Senate, Mr. Saulsbury, of 
Delaware, one of the few “peace” members who remained, offered a resolution 
appointing ex-Presidents Fillmore and Pierce, Chief Justice Taney, Edward 
Everett, John J. Crittenden, and six others, commissioners to meet a like 
number of commissioners to be appointed by the Confederacy, to confer to¬ 
gether for the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the Consti¬ 
tution; and that upon the meeting of this joint commission active hostili¬ 
ties should cease, and not be renewed unless the joint commission should be 
unable to agree, or their agreement be rejected either by Congress or the 
Confederacy. This resolution was laid upon the table and never called up. 

The general character of the debates, and the arguments adduced, were 
similar to those of the last session, except that the supporters of the admin¬ 
istration expressed themselves more firmly and decidedly upon every point. 
The opposition in the Senate, weakened by the expulsion of Breckinridge, 
Bright, Polk, and Johnson, made up in pertinacity what they lacked in num¬ 
bers. In the House they were strengthened by the support of some mem¬ 
bers who had hitherto maintained a neutral position; still the administra¬ 
tion had a large majority in both houses, and- the most ample powers were 
conferred upon it for carrying on the war. 

Until near the close of the session it was supposed that the army in serv¬ 
ice, numbering fully 700,000 men, was as large and even larger than was 
required. “ There are,” said Senator Fessenden, of Maine, at the end of 
March, “ regiments in my own state to-day, raised and staying there, waiting 
to be called into the field, doing nothing, not armed, yet anxious to be in 
service. There are more men here on the Potomac than government knows 
what to do with. Half a million of men are all that we can possibly use.” 
This opinion was general, and the enlistment of volunteers was virtually 
suspended. The estimates were based on an army of 500,000 volunteers 
for the war. Toward the close of the session, after the disastrous result of 
the campaign before Richmond, a law was passed authorizing the President 
to call out the militia of the states for not more than nine months; to cause 
an enrollment to be made of all citizens from eighteen to forty-five years of 
age; to accept the services of 100,000 volunteers to fill up existing regi¬ 
ments; and to receive into service, naval or military, persons of African de¬ 
scent; and in case such persons should be slaves of rebels, they, their wives, 
■children, and mothers should be free. 1 Previous to this, the control of the 
army and navy was really vested in the President. He could select any 
naval officer of the grades of captain and commander, and appoint him to 
the command of a squadron, with the rank and title of “flag officer.” 2 He 
was authorized and requested to dismiss from service any naval or military 
officer for any cause which he deemed advisable. 3 He might, when he 
deemed the public service to require it, take possession of any-railroad or 
telegraph line, with all its appurtenances, and place all the agents and em¬ 
ployes under military control, so that they should be considered a part of 
the military establishment of the United States. 4 It was made his duty to 
cause the seizure of all property of persons who should hold civil or mili¬ 
tary office under the Confederate government, and also of all other persons 
engaged in aiding the rebellion who should not within sixty days after pub¬ 
lic proclamation having been made return to their allegiance; personal 
-property to be absolutely forfeited, and real estate during the lifetime of the 
offender. This proclamation was issued on the 25th of July, 1862. The 
penalty for treason was made death or imprisonment for not less than five 
years, with a fine of not less than $10,000, with disqualification to hold any 
office under the United States. The President was also authorized to grant 
pardon and amnesty upon such conditions as he deemed expedient. 5 

Appropriations were made on what then seemed to be the most liberal 
scale. To meet deficiencies in the army estimates for the year ending June 
30,1862, $209,000,000 were appropriated, besides $30,000,000 for the defi¬ 
ciency of pay to volunteers in the Western Department. For the ensuing 
year $538,000,000 were given. 6 The naval appropriation was $43,000,000, 
besides special sums amounting to $30,000,000 for building iron-clad steam¬ 
ers and gun-boats. 1 These are only the prominent items. There were, be¬ 
sides, large amounts appropriated for other objects directly connected with 
the war. 

Vigorous financial measures were required to meet this great expendi- 

1 Laws of the 37th Congress, First Session, chap. cci. 3 Ibid., chap. i. 3 Ibid., chap. cc. 

4 Ibid., chap. xv. 6 Ibid., chap, cxcv., and Joint Resolution, No. 63. 

4 Ibid., chaps, xxxii., lxix., cxxxiii. ’ Ibid., chaps, xxiii., lvii., clxiv. 


[December, 1861 

ture. Early in the session a joint resolution was passed declaring that, in 
order to pay the ordinary expenses of government, including the interest on 
the national loans, and to provide a sinking lund, taxes should be imposed 
which, together with the tariff, should yield an annual revenue of not less 
than $150,000,000.’ In accordance with the demands of the treasury, duties 
of from 2 to 5 cents a pound were levied upon sugar, 5 cents on coffee, and 
20 cents on tea, and an increase upon most other importations; a heavy ex¬ 
cise was imposed upon the manufacture of distilled and fermented liquors; 
a tax of about three per cent, upon most articles of manufacture; licenses 
varying from $5 to $200 upon trades and professions, stamps were re¬ 
quired upon legal and commercial documents; and a tax of three per cent, 
levied upon the excess over $600 of all incomes up to $10,000, and five per 
cent, upon all greater. 2 These, it was hoped, would produce sufficient to 
pay the ordinary expenses of government, including the interest on the 
public debt incurred and to be incurred. To meet the war expenses, re¬ 
course was had to the issue of paper money in the form of United States 
notes payable on demand, without interest. These were of various amounts, 
from one dollar upward. They were made receivable for all debts due to 
the United States except duties on imports, and payable for all debts due 
from the United States except the interest on the public debt, both of which 
must be paid in specie; for all other purposes they were made a legal ten¬ 
der. The entire amount of “greenbacks” authorized by different acts dur¬ 
ing this session and the last was $250,000,000. These notes might, at the 
option of the holder, be exchanged for treasury bonds, bearing interest at 
the rate of six per cent., redeemable at the pleasure of the government after 
five years, and to be paid in twenty years. Of these the Secretary of the 
Treasury was authorized at his discretion to issue $500,000,000 at par, in 
exchange for coin or demand notes. 3 

The provision making these notes payable for all government dues ex¬ 
cept interest of the public debt was, in effect, to make them payable at the 
pleasure of government. The proposition to make them a legal tender 
occasioned protracted debates, and met with strong opposition from some 
friends of the administration. It was urged in opposition that it was with¬ 
out precedent in our history; that it was unconstitutional by impairing the 
validity of contracts, since every contract for the payment of money was 
legally a contract for the payment of gold and silver coin, and that was the 
measure of the right of the one party and the obligation of the other. This 
provision divested one party of his right and released the other from his 
obligation. It said to one party, “Although you agreed to pay gold and 
silver, you shall be discharged by the payment of these notes;” and to the 
other, " Although you are entitled to demand gold and silver, you must be 
content to receive instead this paper.” This would, moreover, be only the 
precursor of a brood of promises to pay, not one of which would be redeem¬ 
ed in the constitutional currency of the country. In support of the propo¬ 
sition it was urged that, while the states were by the Constitution prohibited 
from making any thing but gold and silver a legal tender, there was no 
such prohibition as to Congress. Congress had the power to coin money 
and to fix the value of it. Gold and silver had indeed been accepted as the 
usual measure of value, and governments, by affixing their stamps to them, 
gave them an extrinsic value; any other thing which governments might 
choose to thus stamp would answer equally as well for currency. If all 
governments agreed upon one thing, it would be equally valuable every 
where. If one fixed upon a thing, it would be valuable within the juris 
diction of that government. Congress had at different times, without ques¬ 
tion, changed the weight and alloy of gold and silver coin; that is, it had 
said that the man who had agreed to pay a certain number of dollars could 
now discharge the debt by the payment of a less quantity of gold or silver. 
And if it should happen that gold should become as plentiful as iron, no 
one doubted that government would have the power of substituting for it 
some other metal. If, when the public good so required, Congress had pow¬ 
er to change the weight or alloy of gold or silver coin, or to substitute some 
other metal, and declare it legal tender, it had equally the power to issue 
paper money, and make that a legal tender. The prevailing argument for 
the measure, however, was the necessity of the case. Government had con¬ 
tracted large debts, and must contract still larger. The army must be paid 
and maintained. Gold and silver could not be had for this purpose, and 
something must be substituted. The abstract question of constitutionality 
must yield to the paramount law of necessity. Whether such necessity 
existed Congress must judge, and its judgment would be conclusive. 

The first bill for this purpose, which authorized the issue of $150,000,000 
of these notes, making them a legal tender, became a law on the 25th of 
February. It passed in the House by a vote of 93 to 59. In the Senate a 
motion to strike out the legal-tender clause was rejected by a vote of 22 to 
17; and the bill, with the clause, passed by 30 to 7. Of the seventeen sena¬ 
tors who wished to strike out the provision, five voted for the bill with the 
provision. This bill, in effect, decided the financial policy of the government. 
It sanctioned the view of the Secretary of the Treasury that “government 
can resort to borrowing only when the issue of notes has become sufficient¬ 
ly large to warrant a just expectation that loans of the notes can be had 
from those who hold or can obtain them at rates not less advantageous than 
those of coin loans before the suspension of specie payments.” In other 
words, before government could hope to borrow the large amounts which 
it needed, it must supply the people with the money to lend. 

Of deeper interest, and of more enduring consequence than even the milita¬ 
ry and financial measures of the Federal government, was its action in respect 
to slavery. To set this forth will be the purpose of the following chapter. 

1 Laws of the 37th Congress, First Session, Joint Resolution, No. C. 

* Ibid., chaps, ii., cxix. 1 Ibid., chaps, xxiii., cxlii. 





1840-1852.] 


THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY. 


199 



THE WIGWAM AT CHICAGO, Ill'll T FOR THE MEETING OF THE REPUBLICAN CONTENTION OF 1800. 


CHAPTER VIII. 

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY. 

Slavery in National Politics.—Whig and Democratic Conventions, 1840. 1844, 1848, 1852.—The 
Republican, American, and Democratic Conventions of 1856.—The Republican Convention of 
1860.—Its Platform.—The Democratic Conventions of 1860.—Disruption of the Democratic 
Party.—The Union Party.—Formation of Sectional Parties.—Analysis of the Electoral and 
Popular Votes for President. — Principles of the Parties.— Position of Mr. Lincoln on the 
Question of Slavery.—His Inaugural and Messages.—Contrabands.—General Butler’s Deci¬ 
sion.—Action of the Government.—Fremont’s and Hunter’s Orders.—Modified by the Presi¬ 
dent—Mr. Lincoln's Letter to Horace Greeley.—His Policy defined.—The Border States.— 
Analysis of the Slave and Free Population.—Their Relations to Slavery.—The President’s 
Proposition for Compensated Emancipation.—Meeting of Congress, December 2, 1861.—Anti- 
slavery Measures proposed.—The Debates.—Laws parsed.—Abolition of Slavery in the District 
of Columbia.—Resolution in favor of Compensated Emancipation—Colonization Schemes.— 
Prohibiting Slavery in the Territories.—Freeing the Families of colored Soldiers.—The Insur¬ 
rection and Confiscation Act.—The President’s proposed Veto.—Hesitation of the President. 
—Conference with Border State Representatives.—Premonitory Proclamation of Emancipation. 
—The new Policy of Government. 

A FTER the adoption of the Missouri Compromise in 1820, the subject of 
slavery was first introduced into national politics as a party question 
during the presidential canvass of 1840, when the Democratic National Con¬ 
vention adopted as one of the cardinal principles of the party a resolution 
that the government had no power to interfere with the domestic institutions 
of the states, and that all efforts to induce Congress to interfere with ques¬ 
tions of slavery, or to Lake incipient steps thereto, were calculated to endan¬ 
ger the stability and permanence of the Union. The convention of the op¬ 
position party, which had just assumed the name of Whig, put forth no for¬ 
mal declaration of principles, but confined itself to assailing the administra¬ 
tion of Mr. Van Buren on the grounds of general mismanagement and cor¬ 
ruption. Mr. Harrison was elected President, receiving the 234 electoral 
votes of eleven free and eight slave states; Mr. Van Buren having the 70 
votes of two free and seven slave states. Of the popular vote Harrison re¬ 
ceived 1,275,000, Van Buren 1,153,000, and barely 7000 were cast for Bir- 
ney, Abolition . 1 

In 1844, no allusion was made to slavery in the “ platform” or declaration 
of principles of the Whig party. The Democratic National Convention 
merely reaffirmed the principle of the previous campaign. Mr. Polk re¬ 
ceived the 170 electoral votes of seven free and eight slave states; Mr. Clay 
having the 105 votes of seven free and four slave states. Of the popular 
vote, 1,368,000 were east for Polk, 1,299,000 for Clay, and 62,000 for Bir- 
nev, Abolition. 

In the Whig Convention of 1848 a resolution was proposed affirming that, 
while Congress had no power to interfere with the institution of slavery 
within the states, it had the power, which it was its dm 3 - t0 exercise, to pro¬ 
hibit the existence or introduction of slavery into any territory possessed or 

1 In this and the followinc paragraphs the popular vote is given in round numbers. In South 
Carolina no popular vole is east even indirectly for President, the electors being appointed hv the 
Legislature. The vote of this state is not included in the usual statements. She voted uniform¬ 
ly for the Democratic candidate.. We have assumed the vote of the state to he 50.000. and that 
40,000 would have been cast for the Democratic candidates, and 10.000 for the opposition. In 
making our statements, we have added this majority of 30,000 to the numbers usually assigned to 
the Democratic vote. In the election of 1860 we have pul this down as cast for Mr. Breckinridge. 


to be acquired by the United States. This resolution was laid on the table 
without action. The Democratic Convention again affirmed the declaration 
in respect to slaveiy: and in consequence, a convention of a portion of the 
party assembled and adopted a series of resolutions affirming that slavery in 
the states depended upon state laws which the Federal government had no 
power to repeal or modify; but that it was the settled policy of the nation 
to localize and discourage slavery, and that it was the duty of Congress to 
prohibit its introduction into any territory now free. This convention nom¬ 
inated Mr. Van Buren for President At the election General Taylor re¬ 
ceived the 163 votes of seven free and eight slave states, Mr. Cass that of 
eight free and seven slave states, 127 in all. The popular vote was 1,360,000 
for Taylor, 1,250,000 for Cass, and 291,000 for Van Buren. 

In the Whig Convention of 1852 it was resolved that the party acqui¬ 
esced in the compromise measures of 1850, including the Fugitive Slave 
Law, as a settlement of all the questions which they embrace, and that if 
would discourage all efforts to renew the agitation of these questions. The 
Democratic Convention again affirmed the principle set forth in former plat¬ 
forms, with the addition that it covered the whole subject of slavery agita¬ 
tion in Congress; that the party would adhere to the compromise measures, 
including the Fugitive Slave Law, and would resist all attempts to renew, in 
or out of Congress, the agitation of the question of slavery, in whatever shape, 
or under whatever color the attempt might be made. A “Free Democratic 
Convention” then assembled. It put forth a declaration explicitly affirming 
that Congress had no power to make a slave or establish slavery; that it was 
the duty of the Federal government to relieve itself from all responsibility 
for the existence of slavery wherever it had the constitutional power to leg¬ 
islate for its extinction; that there ought to be no more slave states, no slave 
territories, no nationalized slavery, no national legislation for the extradition 
of slaves; that slavery was a sin against God and a crime against man which 
no human enactment or usage could make right; that the Fugitive Slavt 
Law had no binding force upon the American people, and should be repeal¬ 
ed , that the compromise measures were inconsistent with the principles of 
democracy, and inadequate for the settlement of the questions of whicli they 
were claimed to be an adjustment; and that there could be no permanent 
settlement of the slavery question except by the separation of the general 
government from slavery, the exercise of all its constitutional power and 
influence on the side of freedom, and by ieaving to the several states the 
whole subject of slavery, including the delivery of fugitives from service or 
labor. Mr. Hale was nominated for President by this convention. At the 
election, Mr. Pierce received the 254 electoral votes of fourteen free and thir¬ 
teen slave states, General Scott the 42 votes of two free and two slave states. 
The Democratic majority was much smaller in the electoral college than in 
the popular vote. Many large states were carried by small majorities. Of 
the popular vote, Pierce received 1,631,000,^Scott 1,386,000, Hale 155,000. 

After this decisive defeat the AVhig party virtually disappeared from na¬ 
tional politics. Many of its former members, especially at the South, went 
over to the Democrats; more, both North and South, formed themselves into 
a new organization, which assumed the name of Americans; while the great 
majority in the free states organized themselves into a new party, under the 



































200 


name of Republican, which received large accessions from Democrats who 
were dissatisfied with the position of their party in respect to slavery. 

The first Republican National Convention assembled at Philadelphia June 
17,1856, in accordance with a call addressed to the people of the United 
States, without distinction of party, who were opposed to the policy of the 
administration of Mr.Pierce, opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compro¬ 
mise, to the admission of slavery into a free territory, and in favor of the ad¬ 
mission of Kansas as a free state. The platform declared that the Federal 
Constitution, the rights of the states, and the union of the states should be 
preserved; that the existence of slavery in the territories should be prohib¬ 
ited by express enactments; that neither Congress -nor a territorial Legisla¬ 
ture had authority to give slavery a legal existence in any territory; and 
that it was “ the right and duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories 
those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery.” Mr. Fremont, who 
had been a Democrat, though he had taken no prominent part in politics, 
was nominated for President, and Mr. Dayton, a former Whig, for Vice-pres¬ 
ident. The American party was ingrafted upon a half secret association, 
whose main object was to confine all offices of trust and emolument to citi¬ 
zens of native birth. Its first national convention, styling itself the Ameri¬ 
can National Council, met at Philadelphia on the 19th of February. Its pro¬ 
ceedings took a wider range than was originally contemplated. The main 
points in the declaration which it put forth were that Americans only should 
rule America; that Congress should not interfere in questions appertaining 
to the individual states, nor any state with the affairs of another; that a con¬ 
tinuous residence of twenty-one years should be a requisite for the natural¬ 
ization of an alien ; that foreign paupers and criminals should not be suffer¬ 
ed to land on our shores; and that all laws should be enforced until repeal¬ 
ed, or pronounced null and void by competent judicial authority. A resolu¬ 
tion was proposed that no person should be nominated for President who 
was not in favor of the prohibition by Congress of slavery in any territory 
north of the latitude of 36° 30': this was rejected by a large majority. Mr. 
Fillmore, formerly a Northern Whig, and Mr. Donelson, a Southern Demo¬ 
crat, were nominated for President and Vice-president. A Whig Convention 
met, and went through the form of indorsing these nominations. Its plat¬ 
form deprecated the formation of sectional parties, and affirmed that public 
safety required the election of a President pledged to neither geographical 
section. The Democratic Convention met at Cincinnati on the 2d of June. 
It reaffirmed the doctrines respecting slavery put forth by previous conven¬ 
tions, adding a resolution that Congress should not interfere with slavery in 
the District of Columbia or in the territories, and that every territory, when¬ 
ever it had the requisite population, was entitled to enter the Union as a 
state, with a constitution, admitting or prohibiting slavery, as its people might 
choose. Mr. Buchanan was nominated for President, and Mr. Breckinridge 
for Vice-president. Mr. Buchanan received the 172 electoral votes of four¬ 
teen slave and five free states, Mr. Fremont the 114 votes of eleven free 
states, and Mr. Fillmore the seven votes of Maryland. Of the popular vote, 
Buchanan received 1,868,000, Fremont 1,341,000, Fillmore 874,000. 

In 1860, the Republican Convention met at Chicago on the 16th of May. 
Its platform declared that each state had .the exclusive right to regulate its 
domestic institutions according to its own judgment; that the dogma that 
the Constitution carried slavery into the territories was a dangerous heresy; 
that the normal condition of all the territory of the United States was that 
of freedom ; reaffirming the principle advanced by the previous convention 
that neither Congress nor a territorial Legislature had authority to give sla¬ 
very a legal existence in any territory. 1 Mr. Lincoln, formerly a Whig, and 
Mr. Hamlin, formerly a Democrat, were nominated for President and Vice- 
president. 

The Democratic Convention met at Charleston on the 23d of April. It 
was resolved that no nominations should be made until a platform had been 
adopted. The committee appointed to prepare this document could not 
agree, and two platforms were presented. That framed by the majority of 
the committee reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform, adding, “The democracy 
of the United States hold these cardinal principles on the subject of slavery 
in the territories: first, that Congress has no power to abolish slavery in the 
territories; second, that the territorial Legislature has no power to abolish 
slavery in the territories, nor to prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, 
nor any power to destroy or impair the right of property in slaves by any 
legislation whatever.” Several reports were presented from the minority of 
the committee. After various amendments, these at last were embodied in a 
series of resolutions reaffirming the Cincinnati platform, with the addition 
that, as differences of opinion existed in the Democratic party as to the na¬ 
ture and extent of the powers of a territorial Legislature over the institution 
of slavery in the territories, the party would abide by the decision of the Su¬ 
preme Court of the United States on the questions of constitutional law. 
This minority report was accepted in place of that of the majority. When 

1 The following is the text of the articles in the platform relating directly to slavery: 

“The maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to 
order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essen¬ 
tial to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend ; 
and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory, no mat¬ 
ter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.” 

“The new dogma that the Constitution, of its own force, carries slavery into any or all of the 
territories of the United States, is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit pro¬ 
visions of that instrument itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and with legislative and judi¬ 
cial precedent; is revolutionary in its tendency, and subversive of the peace and harmony of the 
country.” 

“The normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom. As our re¬ 
publican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that ‘no 
person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,’ it becomes our 
duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the Con¬ 
stitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of Congress, or of a territo¬ 
rial Legislature, or cf auy individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the 
United States.” 


[1856-1860. 

the question of the final adoption of this report came up, the resolution sub¬ 
mitting the decision of questions of constitutional law to the Supreme Court 
was rejected. The platform, as adopted, simply reaffirmed that of Cincinnati. 
About fifty of the Southern delegates then withdrew, and the remaining 
members, after voting that two thirds of a full convention should be required 
for a nomination, proceeded to vote for a candidate for President. A full 
convention consisting of 303 votes, 202 were requisite for a nomination. 
Fifty-seven ballots were taken. The votes for Mr. Douglas varied from 145 
to 152. The remaining votes were scattered; Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, and 
Hunter, of Virginia, leading. A few votes were cast for Dickinson, of New 
York, Johnson, of Tennessee, and Lane, of Oregon. One delegate voted per¬ 
sistently from first to last-for Jefferson Davis. At the 43d ballot Douglas 
received 151£, Guthrie 65£, Hunter (who had before had 42 votes) 16, Dick¬ 
inson 5, Lane 13, Davis 1. After that there was no essential change in the 
vote. It was evident that no man could secure the 202 votes required for a 
nomination, and the Convention, after a fruitless session of ten days, adjourn¬ 
ed to meet at Baltimore on the 18th of June. The members of the party in 
the several states were urged to appoint new delegates to fill the places of 
those who had withdrawn. The members who had seceded from the Con¬ 
vention had in the mean while held a convention of their own, lasting four 
days. After adopting the principles of the platform which had been voted 
down by the majority of the delegates, they adjourned to meet at Richmond 
on the 11th of June. They came together merely to adjourn till the 21st, 
awaiting the action of the Convention at Baltimore. When that Convention 
assembled, an angry discussion arose upon the admission of delegates. The 
disputed seats were mostly awarded to claimants who were in favor of the 
nomination of Mr. Douglas. Many members thereupon withdrew from the 
Convention; among them was Caleb Cushing, the chairman. The remain¬ 
ing delegates then proceeded to vote for a candidate for the presidency. 
There were left 194 votes; of these, 181 were given to Douglas, 7^ to Breck¬ 
inridge, and 5£ to Guthrie. The nomination of Douglas was then made 
unanimous. Mr. Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was nominated for Vice-president. 
He declined the nomination, and Mr. Johnson, of Georgia, was named in his 
place. The members who had seceded from this Convention assembled and 
nominated Mr. Breckinridge for President, and Mr. Lane, of Oregon, for Vice- 
president. These nominations were confirmed by the delegates who had se¬ 
ceded at Charleston, who were, now in session at Richmond. 

Thus the great Democratic party, which had, with three brief intervals, 
administered the affairs of the nation for more than half a century, was bro¬ 
ken up. Neither portion could hope to succeed against the vigorous and 
united Republican party which had sprung to life. There was but one hope 
left for those who deprecated the success of this party. It was certain that 
Douglas could not gain the vote of the South, which was essential to his elec¬ 
tion. It was equally certain that, if the bare choice lay between Lincoln 
and Breckinridge, the slave states would vote for the latter and the free 
states for the former, giving him the election. But if a third candidate were 
brought into the field, obnoxious to neither section, he might draw from both 
sides votes enough to prevent either of the others from receiving a majority 
in the electoral college. Then the election would devolve upon the states 
represented by the popular House of Congress, all the members from each 
state casting a single vote, and their choice being restricted to one of the 
three persons who had received the highest number of electoral votes. A 
convention of the former “ American” party, now styling itself the “Consti¬ 
tutional Union” party, had come together at Baltimore on the 10th of May, 
during the interval between the breaking up of the Democratic Convention 
at Charleston and its reassembling at Baltimore. Four years before this par¬ 
ty had signally failed in its attempt to thrust itself between the Republicans 
and the Democrats. Now there seemed a fair chance for it to mediate be¬ 
tween the free and the shave states. Its Convention laid down a platform 
“recognizing no principle other than the Constitution'of the country, the 
union of the states, and the enforcement of the laws.” To the text of this 
declaration all parties would assent; the only question would be as to its in¬ 
terpretation. In order to conciliate the South without offending the North, 
the nomination for President was given to John Bell, a respectable Tennes¬ 
see lawyer, who had served in Congress with fair credit. To give some 
weight to the ticket, Edward Everett was nominated for Vice-president. The 
Conservatives at the North saw in this nomination a possible means of pre¬ 
venting the election of Mr. Lincoln. If the electoral vote of New York or 
Pennsylvania, and one other free state, could be taken from him, the choice 
would devolve upon the House of Representatives, where it was certain that 
he could not secure a majority of the states. Accordingly, in New York and 
several other states, “Fusion” tickets for electors were made up, containing 
the names of men who favored Douglas, Bell, or Breckinridge. The under¬ 
standing was that all of these electors, if chosen, should east their votes so as 
to prevent the election of Lincoln. This subtle scheme was too intricate to 
work. Its practical result was merely to give to Lincoln one half of the 
electoral vote of New Jersey, which would otherwise have been cast against 
him. In that state the vote was very close. The “ Fusion” electoral ticket 
was made up of one half Douglas men, and one half who favored Breckin¬ 
ridge or Bell. Many of the Douglas voters struck off from their ballots the 
names of the Breckinridge or Bell electors, so that in their place three Re¬ 
publicans were chosen by a small majority. 

The result of the presidential election of 1860 was that Mr. Lincoln re¬ 
ceived 169 electoral votes, being the whole of those of the sixteen free states 
except three votes from New Jersey; Mr. Bell the 39 votes of Virginia, 
Kentucky, and Tennessee; Mr. Douglas the 9 votes of Missouri, and 3 from 
New Jersey—12 in all; and Mr. Breckinridge the 72 votes of the remain¬ 
ing eleven slave states. The popular vote, apportioning that cast on Fusion 




THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY. 


201 


May, 18 G 1 . ] 

tickets according to the best estimates of the strength of the several par¬ 
ties, and giving to Breckinridge a clear majority of 30,000 in South Car¬ 
olina, was, for Lincoln 1,855,000, for Douglas 1,360,000, for Breckinridge 
870,000, for Bell 590,000. 

Thus, previous to 1856, the question of slavery did not enter fairly into 
the presidential election, and there was no geographical line separating the 
great political parties. In 1840, Harrison was elected by the votes of eleven 
free and eight slave states; the votes of two free and seven slave states be¬ 
ing cast against him. In 1844, Polk was elected by seven free and eight 
slave states; against him were seven free and four slave states. In 1848, 
Taylor was elected by seven free and eight slave states; opposed to him 
were eight free and seven slave states. In 1852, Pierce was elected by four¬ 
teen free and thirteen slave states; against him were two free and two slave 
states. But in 1856, Buchanan was elected by the votes of the whole four¬ 
teen slave states and five free states, while eleven free states voted against 
him. And in 1860 Lincoln received the entire vote of the sixteen free 
states, with the exception of the half vote of New Jersey, while the whole 
vote of the fifteen slave states was cast against him. It is worthy of note 
that the first Republican candidate for the presidency was a native of a slave 
state, and his opponent of a free state; while the second Republican candi¬ 
date was born in a slave state, and his principal opponent in a free state. 

The Republican party came into power pledged by their formal declara¬ 
tion of principles against any interference by the general government with 
slavery in the states where it existed. This doctrine was avowed by all par¬ 
ties and sections; but the Republicans were also pledged to prevent,by the 
action of the general government, the introduction of slavery into the terri¬ 
tories. The Northern Democrats, in nominating Mr. Douglas, endorsed his 
doctrine of popular sovereignty, that the general government had no author¬ 
ity to decide the question of slavery in the territories, but that it belonged 
exclusively to the people of each territory, acting each for itself through its 
lawfully appointed Legislature. The Southern Democrats affirmed that by 
the Constitution slavery had a legal existence in the territories; denied that 
Congress or a territorial Legislature had any power to annul or impair that 
right; and demanded that the general government should, if necessary, pro¬ 
tect slavery in the territories. The Union party took no definite position 
upon the disputed question; though a majority of its members would have 
been content with the non-intervention doctrine of Mr. Douglas. If they 
had nominated him, it is probable that he would have been elected. 

Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, explicitly avowed his adherence to 
the principle that the general government could no't interfere with slavery 
in the states. “Apprehension seems to exist,” he said, “among the people 
of the Southern states that, by the accession of a Republican administration, 
their property, and their peace and personal security, are to be endangered. 
There never has been any reasonable cause for such an apprehension. In¬ 
deed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and 
been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speech¬ 
es of him \yho now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speech¬ 
es when I declare that 1 1 have no purpose, directly or indirect! j', to interfere 
with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have 
no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.’ Those who 
nominated and elected me did so with the full knowledge that I had made 
this and many similar declarations, and that I had never recanted them. 
And more than this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as 
a law to themselves and to me, this clear and emphatic resolution, 1 That the 
maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of 
each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its 
own judgment exclusively, is essential to the balance of power on which the 
perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend.’ I now reiterate 
these sentiments.” He also, in effect, pledged himself to enforce the execu¬ 
tion of the Fugitive Slave Law. There was no question that the provision 
of the Constitution requiring the delivery of persons held to service or labor 
was intended to secure the surrender of fugitive slaves. The intention of 
the lawgiver was the law. There was some difference of opinion as to 
whether this constitutional provision should be enforced by national or state 
authority; but, if the slave was to be delivered up, it was of little conse¬ 
quence to him or others by what authority it was done. Every member of 
Congress had sworn to maintain this provision of the Constitution, and there 
could be no difficulty in framing a law by means of which to keep that oath. 
Such a law ought to embody adequate safeguards that no free person should 
be surrendered as a slave. 

This emphatic declaration in favor of the maintenance of the constitution¬ 
al right of each state to regulate and control slavery within its limits, pre¬ 
supposed, of course, that the states recognized the authority of the Constitu¬ 
tion. If they attempted to set it aside by force and violence, they could not 
claim its protection. But, even after the war broke out, the President was 
anxious that the question of slavery should not be involved. But it soon 
became apparent that this was impossible. Slavery became involved from 
the moment when the national forces began to act in a slave state. On the 
26th of May General McClellan issued an address to the people of Western 
Virginia assuring them that not only would the Federal troops abstain from 
all interference with their slaves, but that they would crush any attempt at 
servile insurrection. General Butler had hardly taken command at Fortress 
Monroe when three slaves came in, saying that they belonged to a Colonel 
Mallory, who had gone off to the enemy, and was about to send them to 
North Carolina to work on the fortifications. Butler needed laborers, and 
set them at work. Colonel Carey, of the Virginia Volunteers, soon present¬ 
ed himself, claiming to be the agent of Mallory, and demanded that the 
slaves should be given up. Butler refused. “Do you mean to set aside 



BENJAMIN F. ISlTTI.nit- 


your constitutional obligations?” asked Carey. “Virginia passed an ordi¬ 
nance of secession two days ago,” was the reply, “and claims to be a foreign 
country. I am under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country.” 
“ You say we can not secede, and so you can not consistently detain them.” 
“ But you say you have seceded, and so you can not consistently claim 
them,” rejoined Butler, one of the shrewdest of Massachusetts lawyers, nev¬ 
er at a loss for finding law to sustain any position. “ You are using negroes 
upon your batteries. I shall detain these as contraband of war.” 

It would be hard to find in Puffendorf or Vattell warrant for this exten¬ 
sion of the definition of the term “contraband.” It was an epigram, but an 
epigram which, in the end, pledged the United States to the abolition of sla¬ 
very. This was on Friday, the 24th of May. From that day “contraband” 
became a synonym for slave. On Sunday eight more slaves came in, on 
Monday sixty, and so on from day to day, in families and by squads, until 
in a few weeks there were nine hundred, men, women, and children, in camp. 
Butler informed the War Department of his proceedings. They were sanc¬ 
tioned, and he was directed not to seize upon any slaves, and not to surren¬ 
der any who came into his lines of their own accord. Two months later he 
again asked for instructions. There were in his camps three hundred able- 
bodied slaves, liable to be used in aid of the insurrection, who might fairly 
be detained as contraband; but what should lie do with the six hundred old 
or infirm men, and women, and children, the fathers and mothers, wives and 
children of the contrabands? They were legally property, but property 
which had been abandoned by its owners, like a vessel adrift upon the ocean. 
The United States were the salvors, but salvors who would not hold such 
property. It seemed to him that all ownership of them had virtually ceased, 
and that they bad resumed their natural condition of human beings. But 
General McDowell had issued an order forbidding fugitive slaves from com¬ 
ing into or being harbored within his lines. Was this order to be enforced 
in all the departments? If so, who were to be considered fugitives? Was 
a slave a fugitive whose master had run away from him? Must the army 
refuse food and shelter to slaves whose masters had run away or been driv¬ 
en off? Moreover, it was understood that slaves who had actually labored 
upon rebel intrenchments should be harbored and fed; but why should this 
favor be shown to those who had thus wrought against us and be denied to 
those who had,by escaping, avoided such hostility 7 ? “In a loyal state,” 
said Butler, in conclusion, “I would put down a servile insurrection. In. a 
state in rebellion, I would confiscate that which was used to oppose my arms, 
and take all the property which constituted the wealth of that state, and fur¬ 
nished the means by which the war is prosecuted, besides being the cause of 
the war; and if it should be objected that, in so doing, human beings were 
brought to the free enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, 
such objection might not require much consideration.” 

To a case thus keenly put there could be but one substantial reply. The 
question as to fugitives in the states which adhered to the Union was not in¬ 
volved. There the ordinary forms of judicial procedure could be observed. 
But these could not be enforced in the insurrectionary states; and the rights 
dependent on the laws of these states must be subordinated to military exi¬ 
gencies, if not wholly forfeited by treason on the part of those claiming 
them. Meanwhile the Confiscation Act of August 6,1861, had provided for 
the case of slaves actually employed by their masters in aid of the rebellion. 
They were to be treated like other property; the rights of their owners 










202 


[May, 1861 



STAMPEDE OF SLAVES TO FORTRESS MONROE. 

















































































































































































December, 1861.] 


THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY. 


203 



FEEDING NEGRO CHILDREN AT IIILTON HEAP, SOUTH CAROLINA. 


were forfeited; and forfeiture of the claim of their owners was equivalent to 
enfranchisement. The laws under which all slaves in these states were held 
had been superseded by the rebellion, and the enforcement of these claims, 
in the case of loyal owners, would be inconvenient and injurious. The rights 
of these men would be best secured by receiving the fugitives and giving 
them employment, leaving the question of indemnifying the masters to be 
settled after tranquillity had been restored. Butler was therefore directed 
to receive all fugitives who came to him, but he must not interfere with the 
servants of peaceful citizens, nor encourage any to leave their masters, nor 
prevent the voluntary return of any. 

The Confiscation Act of August 6 was the only measure of the extra ses¬ 
sion bearing directly upon the question of slavery. This related solely to 
the case of slaves employed by their masters in the naval or military service 
of the enemy. Until, subsequently, other laws were enacted, the administra¬ 
tion was careful not to transcend the provisions of that act. On the 31st of 
August, General Fremont, then commanding the Western Department, issued 
an order extending martial law throughout the State of Missouri, confisca¬ 
ting the property of all persons who should take up arms against the United 
States, or be proved to have taken an active part with their enemies in the 
field, and declaring their slaves to be free men. The President directed this 
order to be so modified as to conform to and not to transcend the provisions 
of the act of Congress. In May, 1862, General Hunter, commanding the 
Department of the South, issued an order putting the states of Georgia, South 
Carolina, and Florida under martial law, declaring that, as slavery and mar¬ 
tial law were incompatible, the slaves in those states were forever free. The 
President set aside this declaration. He said that it belonged to him to de¬ 
cide whether, as commander-in-chief, he had the right to declare the slaves 
in any state to be free; and if he had the right, whether and when it should 
be exercised. This question was wholly distinct from that of police regula¬ 
tions in armies or camps. These were left to the discretion of the differ¬ 
ent commanders. Thus, while Butler, at Fortress Monroe, received fugitive 
slaves, Dix, in another part of Virginia, and Halleck, who had succeeded Fre¬ 
mont in Missouri, prohibited them from entering their lines. The same gen¬ 
eral principle was involved in instructions given in October, 1861, by the 
Secretary of War to General Sherman, who commanded the expedition to 
Port Royal. He was directed to avail himself of the services of any per¬ 
sons, whether fugitives from labor or not, who should offer themselves, or¬ 
ganizing them into squads or companies, as he should find advisable, but not, 
as a general thing, to arm them for military service. Loyal masters were to 
be assured that compensation would be made to them for the loss of the serv¬ 
ices of persons so employed. These measures brought into the lines a large 
number of women and children, who were fed by the government, and earn¬ 
est attempts were made to instruct the fugitives, and to employ their labor 


usefully in the cultivation of abandoned plantations. It was many months 
before the plan of arming the slaves was adopted. 

Mr. Lincoln’s cardinal idea was that he was in law and right the chief 
magistrate of an undivided and indivisible nation, and that it was his duty 
to restore the Union by bringing back the disaffected portions to the domin¬ 
ion of the Constitution and the laws. Every military and political measure 
should be directed to this end. Eighteen months after his inauguration, 
when ample authority had been conferred upon him by Congress, he thus 
defined his policy: “As to my policy I have not meant to leave any one in 
doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it in the shortest way un¬ 
der the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the 
nearer the Union will be—the Union as it was. If there be any who would 
not save the'Union unless they could, at the same time, save slavery, I do 
not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union un¬ 
less they could, at the same time, destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. 
My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy 
slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do 
it; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could 
do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What 
I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to 
save this Union; and what I forbear,I forbear because I do not believe it 
would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe that 
what I am doing hurts the cause; and I shall do more whenever I believe 
that doing more will help the cause. I shall try to cprrect errors when 
shown to be errors, and shall adopt new views as fast as they shall appear 
to be true views.” 1 In his message of December 2,1862, he reiterated all 
that he had said upon this subject in his inaugural address and in his mes¬ 
sage at the special session. “ Nothing now occurs,” he said, “ to add to or 
to subtract from the principles or general purposes expressed in those docu¬ 
ments.” The reference to the Confiscation Act of the special session was 
cautious and guarded. He had strictly adhered to its provisions. If a new 
law on the same subject should be proposed, its propriety would be duly con¬ 
sidered. But he threw out a hint against hasty and inconsiderate measures. 
“ The Union,” he said, “ must be preserved, and hence all indispensable 
means must be employed; but we should not be in haste to determine that 
radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the dis¬ 
loyal, are indispensable.” 

Of hardly less importance than the vigorous prosecution of the war against 
the armed insurgents was the retention of the border slaveholding states. 
These states held peculiar relations to the two sections of the country. Sla¬ 
very existed in them in law and in fact, but it was not their one great in* 


1 Letter to Horace Greeley, August 22,1862. 






















204 


Btitution entwined with every fibre of their political, social, and domestic 
life. Slaveholders formed a small, and, in many parts, a numerically insig¬ 
nificant portion of the people. In Delaware there was but one slave to sixty 
free persons, and more than three fourths of these were in the least populous 
of the three counties, with but one fourth of the free inhabitants; in the otln 
er two counties there was only one slave to 180 free. It was fast becoming 
a free state. In ten years the free population had increased twenty-three per 
cent., and the slaves had decreased twenty-one per cent. In Maryland there 
was one slave to seven free. Half of the slaves were in counties with but 
one sixth of the free population. In Baltimore, with a population of 212,000, 
there were but 2500 slaves, a little more than one in a hundred. In ten 
years the free whites had increased twenty-four per cent., the free colored 
twenty, and the slaves only three and a half per cent. In Kentucky there 
was one slave to four whites; but half of the slaves were in counties with 
only a fourth of the population. The whites had in ten years increased 
twenty-one per cent., the slaves seven. In Missouri there was one slave to 
ten whites. There were a score of counties having each less than a hundred 
slaves. In St. Louis there were but 1500 slaves in a population of 160,000; 
less than one to a hundred. In ten years the whites had increased eighty 
per cent., the slaves thirty-two per cent. In that part of Virginia soon to be 
known as the State of West Virginia there was one slave to eighteen free 
persons. Three fourths of the slaves were in counties having only one 
fourth of the whites. There were whole counties with only three or four 
slaves. Of the fifty-one counties there were twenty each having less than a 
hundred slaves. In half the counties the ratio of slaves to whites was less 
than one to a hundred; in the most populous county it was one to 220. 
These Union slave states contained, in 1860, three fifths as many whites as 
the Confederacy, and a little less than one eighth as many slaves. Taken 
collectively, the population of whites to slaves was then about seven to one. 
But, during the first year of the war, a considerable portion of the slaves 
in Missouri and Kentucky had been taken South, so that now the ratio of 
slave to free was not more than one to ten, and of these the majority were 
owned by men notoriously disloyal. 

There are no reliable statistics showing the number of slaveholders; but, 
considering that most men who owned slaves owned several, and many of 
them a large number, while there were considerable portions in which slave¬ 
ry had only a nominal existence, it may be assumed that in the border states 
not one citizen in fifty, and not one loyal man in a hundred, had any direct 
pecuniary interest in the perpetuation of slavery. It was almost universal¬ 
ly acknowledged that the institution was injurious to the non-slaveholding 
citizens, and, consequently, to the general welfare of the state. It seemed, 
therefore, entirely feasible to detach these states from any complicity with 
the strictly slaveholding Confederacy. If they remained loyal, the Union 
would have 22,000,000 whites, and the Confederacy but 5,000,000. If they 
joined the secession, the Union would have 18,000,000 whites and the Con¬ 
federacy 8,000,000, besides four and a quarter millions of slaves and free per¬ 
sons of color. 1 

Geographically and commercially the border states were connected as in¬ 
timately with one section as with the other. The great highway of the 
Mississippi bound Kentucky and Missouri to New Orleans; the great lakes, 
and railways, and canals bound them equally to New York. If the Union 
was broken up, no matter to which fragment they adhered, they would be 
border states, and exposed to all the evils of that position. In either case 
they would hold one of their great avenues of communication at the mercy 
of a foreign power. If they went with the Confederacy they would lose the 
lakes; if they adhered to the Union they would lose the Mississippi. Their 
interest, more than that of any other section, lay in the maintenance of the 
Union, and few of the people had any interest in the maintenance of slave¬ 
ry. But the slaveholders exercised a power altogether disproportionate to 
their numbers. Public officers and leaders of opinion belonged almost ex¬ 
clusively to this class. Slavery was, moreover, a state institution, and at¬ 
tachment to the state took precedence over attachment to the nation, though 
less decidedly than in the Far South. The sentiment of the civilized world 
had gradually arrayed itself against slavery. This, by the law of antago¬ 
nism, forced all slaveholding states into closer sympathy with each other, 
and so the institution of slavery formed a strong bond of union between all 
the states which maintained it. If the border states could be induced vol¬ 
untarily to abandon slavery, this tie between them and the South would be 
destroyed. 

To bring about the voluntary abandonment of slavery in the border 
states was a leading object in the policy of the President. To this end, in 
his message of December 2,1862, he recommended that measures should be 
taken to compensate states which should undertake the gradual emancipa¬ 
tion of their slaves. Three months later he sent in a special message recom- 

1 The statements in the preceding paragraphs are expressed approximately in round numbers. 
The following table exhibits the numerical relations of the Border States to the Union and the 
Confederacy, according to the census of 1800, West Virginia being included among the Border 
States: 


Border States. 

White*. 

Free Colored. 

Slave*. 

Total. 

Delaware. 

90,697 

19,723 

1,798 

112,218 

Maryland. 

516,128 

83,718 

87,188 

687,034 

West Virginia. 

368,623 

3,981 

20,630 

393,234 

Kentucky. 

Missouri. 

920,077 

10,146 

225,490 

1,155,713 

1,064,369 

2,983 

114,965 

1,182.317 


2,958,594 

120,551 

460,071 

3,530,216 

Tint Union. 





With Border States. 

21,025,370 

354,702 

453,315 

22.634,010 

Without Border States. 

18,966,776 

234,151 

3,244 

18,104,794 

Tllf. CONFEDERACY. 





Without Border States. 

6,082,088 

127,420 

3,070,831 

8.709,780 

With Border States. 

8,040,682 

247,971 

3,520,902 

12,239,996 


[January—July, 1862. 

mending that Congress should pass a joint resolution declaring that “the 
United States, in order to co-operate with any state which may adopt grad¬ 
ual abolition of slavery, will give to such state pecuniary aid, to be used by 
such state in its discretion, to compensate it for the inconvenience, public 
and private, produced by such change of system.” This proposition, he 
said, set up no claim of right on the part of the general government to inter¬ 
fere with slavery within the states. Whether they should accept it was left 
to their choice; but, he argued, the leaders of the rebellion hoped that the 
independence of some part of the disaffected region must be acknowledged, 
and then that the remaining part of the slaveholding section, finding the 
Union destroyed, would go with the South. To deprive them of this hope 
would substantially end the rebellion; and any state, by initiating emanci¬ 
pation, would in effect declare that in no case would it ever join the Confed¬ 
eracy. 

Congress had hardly met in December when it became evident that the 
legislation upon the subject of slavery would assume a new aspect. The 
dominant party had come to the conclusion that slavery had not only fur¬ 
nished the occasion for the war, but supplied the means of carrying it on, 
and that, in order to put it down, it would be necessary to interfere directly 
with the institution in the insurrectionary states. A wide difference of 
opinion soon developed itself as to the extent and manner of this interfer¬ 
ence. Notices of bills and resolutions upon this subject were offered, and 
the debates upon these Served to elicit the views of the members. The 
prevailing feeling was embodied in a series of acts, the debates upon which 
occupied a considerable part of the session. We shall describe these, keep¬ 
ing as nearly as possible to the order of time at which they became laws by 
receiving the approval of the President. 

Naval and military officers were prohibited, by an additional article of 
war, under penalty of dismissal from the service, from employing the forces 
under their command for the purpose of returning fugitive slaves. 1 

In accordance with the recommendation of the President, a joint resolu¬ 
tion was passed, declaring that the United States ought to co-operate with 
any state which may adopt the gradual abolition of slavery, by giving pecu¬ 
niary aid to such state. 2 This resolution was denounced by the extreme op¬ 
position as an unconstitutional interference with the subject of slavery in 
the states. In the House, Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, denied that the Con¬ 
stitution gave Congress any power to appropriate money to carry out the 
purposes of the resolution. In the Senate, Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, said 
that the resolution was extraordinary in its origin, source, and object; it 
was mischievous in tendency and unpatriotic in design; it was an attempt to 
induce some states to commence the work of abolition by holding out a pe¬ 
cuniary bribe to them. The states had never asked Congress for aid for 
any such purpose, and the offer was ill-timed and indelicate. In the House, 
Mr. Fisher, from the same state, said that he saw in the resolution a promise 
of a final settlement of the question of slavery. It was an olive-branch held 
out by the Northern states to the border states and to the whole South. In 
the Senate, Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, the successor of Mr. Breckinridge, who 
had been expelled, wished to amend the resolution so that it should affirm 
that although the whole subject of slavery within the states lay beyond the 
jurisdiction of the general government, yet when any state should determ¬ 
ine to emancipate its slaves, the United States would pay a reasonable price 
for those emancipated, and the cost of their colonization in some other coun¬ 
try. This amendment was rejected, receiving but four votes. The resolu¬ 
tion received a lukewarm support from a large portion of the Republican 
members. That Congress had a right to pass the resolution, and to make 
the appropriations required by it, in case any state should avail itself of its 
provisions, was assumed, but it appeared to most of them to have no prac¬ 
tical value. However, if it produced no good it could do no harm, and the 
resolution passed in the Senate by 32 to 10, and in the House by 89 to 31. 
It was looked upon as a means of testing the feeling of the border states, 
the only ones which would, in any case, accept the offer of compensation. 

A far more important act was that by which slavery was abolished in the 
District of Columbia. 3 By this act all persons held to service or labor with¬ 
in the district, by reason of African descent, were freed from all claim for 
such service or labor; and no involuntary servitude, except for crime, and 
after due conviction, should hereafter exist in the district. A board of com¬ 
missioners was appointed, to which all loyal persons might present claims 
against slaves discharged by this act. These commissioners might award a 
sum not exceeding $300 for each person thus discharged. These claims 
must be presented within ninety days from the passage of the act. No 
claims should be allowed for any slave brought into the district after the 
passage of the act, and none in any case from persons who had in any way 
aided or sustained the rebellion. The number of slaves in the district was 
about 3000. A million of dollars was appropriated for the indemnification 
of the owners of slaves thus freed, and $100,000 for the colonization of such 
as wished to emigrate to Ilayti, Liberia, or any other country beyond the 
limits of the United States. Other acts, closely connected with this, pro¬ 
vided that colored persons in the district should be amenable to the same 
laws, and liable to the same punishments as whites;* that any slave em¬ 
ployed by the consent of his owner in the district after the passage of the 
Emancipation Act should be free, and that in judicial proceedings there 
should be no exclusion of any witness on account of color; * 5 that ten per 
cent, of the taxes received from persons of color should be set apart to main¬ 
tain schools for educating t'aeir children; and a special board of trustee s 
was appointed for these schools . 6 

1 Laws of 37th Congress, 2d Scss., chap, xl., March 13, 1862. 3 Ibid., Joint Resolution, No. 

26, April 10, 1862. 3 Ibid., chap, liv., April 16, 1862. 4 Ibid., chap. Ixxxiii., May 21, 1862* 

6 Ibid., chap, cl., July 12, 1862. 6 Ibid., chaps. Ixxxiii., cli., May 21, July 11, 1862. 




























THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY. 


205 


July, 1862.] 

The main bill for emancipating the slaves in the district passed in the 
Senate by 29 to 14; in the House by 92 to 13. The debate in the Senate 
was long and earnest. Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, said that the liberation of 
slaves where they were numerous would cause a conflict of races which 
would result in the exile or extermination of one or the other. If slavery 
were abolished by the general government in any of the states, the moment 
the white inhabitants were again reorganized they would either reduce the 
freedmen again to slavery or expel them, or would hunt them down like 
beasts and exterminate them. He affirmed that slavery and the slave-trade 
existed by public national law, based upon the usage of the civilized world, 
and not by positive enactment. This general national law existed in every 
country wherein it was not repealed by positive enactment, so that slavery 
was general, and the abolition of it local. He and the entire body of sena¬ 
tors from the border states denied the right of Congress to emancipate the 
slaves in the district. Government might, if public necessity required it, 
take and use slaves like any other property, by making due compensation 
to the owners; but it could take property only for the purpose of employ¬ 
ing it in the public use; and setting slaves free was not thus employing 
them. In the House, Mr. Crittenden said that this was a most unwise time 
to adopt such a measure. It would be looked upon only as the commence¬ 
ment of a series of measures for the entire abolition of slavery. It would 
give to the rebels the strength of desperation, by inspiring them with the 
belief that peace would bring the spoliation of their property of all descrip¬ 
tions. 

The President, in signing the bill, merely suggested that the time for the 
presentation of claims should be extended in certain cases, and expressed bis 
gratification that the two principles of compensation and colonization were 
recognized and applied in the act. The scheme of colonization was for a 
while a favorite one with the government. An act for the collection of tax¬ 
es in the insurrectionary districts provided that lands, the taxes upon which 
should not be paid, might be sold or leased, one quarter of the proceeds to 
constitute a fund to aid in the colonization of persons of African descent in 
Hayti, Liberia, or any other tropical country. 1 A provision for the “trans¬ 
portation, colonization, and settlement in some tropical country, beyond the 
limits of the United States, of persons of African descent,” made free by the 
Confiscation Act, who should be willing to emigrate, was appended to that 
important law. 2 The President was also authorized to make an arrange¬ 
ment with governments having possessions in the West India Islands to re¬ 
ceive, employ, clothe, feed, and instruct, for a period of five years, all Afri¬ 
cans taken from slavers captured by United States vessels. 3 In all these 
schemes of colonization it was assumed that arrangements would be made 
with the governments of the countries by which the rights of freemen should 
be secured to the colonists. Negotiations were informally attempted for 
this purpose with Hayti and the states of Central America. A small colony 
was dispatched to Hayti, but the experiment proved a failure. The Central 
American states were wholly averse to any such colonization, and the 
scheme was finally abandoned. 

The distinctive principle of the Republican party, as formally enunciated 
in its conventions of 1856 and 1860, was that slavery should be prohibited 
in every part of the country over which the Federal government had the 
right of exclusive jurisdiction. This had been partially put into effect by 
the law emancipating the slaves in the District of Columbia. It was carried 
out to completion by the passage of an act “ to secure freedom to all persons 
within the territories of the United States.” This law r enacted,in brief but 
expressive terms, that “ from and after the passage of this act there shall be 
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the territories of the 
United States now existing, or which may be hereafter formed or acquired 
bv the United States, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted.” 4 The bill passed with little debate. 
There was an important distinction between these two measures. It was 
tacitly admitted that slavery had a legal existence in the district, and there¬ 
fore loyal owners were compensated for the loss of their slaves; it was as¬ 
sumed that slavery had no legal existence in the territories, and there it was 
merely prohibited. Except as a question of principle, this act was of little 
importance, for there were but sixty-three slaves in all the territories out of 
a population of 220,000; and the climate, physical nature of the country, 
and the character of the emigration, rendered it certain that no large num¬ 
ber of slaves would ever be taken thither, and that when the territories came 
to be admitted into the Union as states, their Constitutions would prohibit 
slavery. 

The government was slow to accept as soldiers persons of African descent, 
whether free by birth or enfranchised. The organization of negro regiments 
was discouraged until after the failure of the campaign before Richmond. 
It then became evident that all the force which the Union could by any 
means bring into the field would be required. The last important act of the 
session, which defined the power of the President in calling out the militia, 
empowered him to “receive into the service of the United States, for any 
military or naval service for which they may be found competent, persons 
of African descent, who shall be enrolled and organized under such regula¬ 
tions, not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws, as he may pre¬ 
scribe.” It was farther enacted that “ any slave of a person in rebellion, 
rendering any such service, shall forever thereafter be free, together with his 
wife, mother, and children, if they also belong to persons in rebellion. The 
pay of these colored troops was fixed at ten dollars a month and one ration, 
being only a little more than half that given to white soldi?rs.” 5 

1 Laws of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Second Session, chap, xcviii., June 7. 1862. * Ibid., 

chap.cxcv., July 17,1862. 1 Ibid., clmp. cxcvii., July 17 1862. ‘ Ibid., chap, cxi., June 18, 

1862. ! Ibid., chap, cci., July 17, 1862. 


But by far the most important act relating to slavery passed during the 
session was that known as the Confiscation Act. The various phases which 
this bill went through, and the debates which ensued in relation to it, evinced 
that there was a wide difference of opinion among the members of the Re¬ 
publican party as to the manner in which slavery should be dealt with. 
Those who took the most extreme .ground, prominent among whom were 
senators Hale, Sumner, Wilson, and Trumbull, wished to legalize the abso¬ 
lute and perpetual forfeiture of the property, including slaves, of all persons 
engaged in the rebellion. The Constitution expressly declares that “no at¬ 
tainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during 
the life of the person attainted;” but, as treason was punishable by death, the 
forfeiture of the life interest in the property of a condemned traitor would 
amount to very little. And as the persons of the rebels in the insurrection¬ 
ary states could not be reached by judicial process, even this interest in their 
property could not be touched by attaint of treason. To reach this property 
absolutely was the design of a bill presented by Mr. Trumbull during the 
first week of the session. The bill came up for discussion on the 25th of 
February', when it was explained and defended by its author in a long and 
elaborate speech. The object of the bill, he said, was to operate upon prop¬ 
erty, and not to affect the person of the traitor, and applied only to cases 
where he was beyond the reach of judicial process. We had the right to 
take the property of our enemy and destroy it, if necessary. Again, the bill 
forfeited the claim of any person engaged in the rebellion to the service of 
any other person owing him service or labor, and declared the person free 
from any such claim. Congress had clearly the right to pass such a law. 
Government had the right to go to the farm or the work-shop, and take away 
and place in the army a man who by his own voluntary contract owed serv¬ 
ice to his employer. A parent had a right to the service of his son until he 
was twenty-one years of age; yet the government could take the son of 
eighteen and place him in the army. The claim of a master to the service 
of his slave was certainly not more sacred than that of an employer to the 
service of his workman, or of a parent to that of his son. 

This sweeping measure for the universal confiscation of property and the 
general emancipation of slaves met with strenuous hostility not only from 
the opposition, including the members from the border states, but from 
some of the most earnest supporters of the administration. What would be¬ 
come of the loyal population of the South, asked Ten Eyck, of New Jersey, 
should all the slaves owned by rebels be set at liberty and allowed to roam 
the country at large? The policy involved in this measure, said McDou- 
gall, of California, would never secure peace, and would lead to a remorse¬ 
less, relentless war, which would involve subjugation, if not extirpation. 
The bill, said Cowan, of Pennsylvania, proposed to strip fully 4,000,000 of 
whites of all their property, real, personal, and mixed, of every kind whatso¬ 
ever, and reduce them to absolute poverty, and that at a time when they had 
in the field 400,000 men opposing us desperately. Should we, he asked, go 
back to the doctrine of forfeitures of the Middle Ages, and introduce feuds 
which centuries had not sufficed to quiet? The forfeitures of William the 
Conqueror sink into insignificance compared with those proposed by this 
bill. The act, said Browning, of Illinois, the successor of Douglas, sweeps 
away every thing, even the most ordinary comforts and necessaries of do¬ 
mestic life, and reduces all to absolute poverty and nakedness. It leaves 
them the ownership of nothing. They may repent of their past rebellion, 
and return to their allegiance, but they return bankrupts and beggars, with 
nothing on earth to render government desirable. The effect of the bill 
would be to make peace and reunion an impossible thing; it would fill the 
hearts of the entire Southern people with despair, and nerve their arms with 
the energy and desperation which despair inspires. 

A special feature of the bill, which excited the strongest opposition of 
some of the most earnest Republicans, was that it freed the slaves of all per¬ 
sons who had been engaged in the rebellion, by the direct action of Con¬ 
gress, without the intervention of any judicial process. This, it was argued, 
was in direct violation of the most solemn pledges of the administration, 
and the repeated declarations of the Republican party. Mr. Collamer, of 
Vermont, perhaps the most thoroughly anti-slavery state in the Union, spoke 
at length upon these points, quoting from speeches by senators Sumner, Fes¬ 
senden, and Sherman, expressly denying the right of Congress to interfere 
with slavery in a state, and maintaining that the pledges made to the coun¬ 
try when Mr. Lincoln was elected should be religiously observed. He point¬ 
ed out the distinction between this bill and the Confiscation Act of the last 
session forfeiting the property in slaves who had been actually employed in 
supporting the rebellion. The bill,he said, was, in his judgment, in direct 
violation of plighted faith, and of the provisions, prohibitions, and enact¬ 
ments of the Constitution. He did not think the people of his state wished 
him to aid in breaking any provision of the Constitution, and he would not 
do so if they wished it. 

It was clear that Mr. Trumbull’s bill could not pass the Senate. Several 
amendments were offered, and these were referred to a committee of nine, 
of which Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, was chairman. They reported a 
bill designed to harmonize the various opinions, and thus to secure the adop¬ 
tion of some measure which should meet the pressing emergencies of the 
times. This bill differed from that of Mr. Trumbull in making the confisca¬ 
tion of property and the forfeiture of the right to slaves a punishment for 
treason, to be inflicted only after the trial and conviction of the offender. It 
also authorized the President to grant pardon and amnesty to all persons 
who had been engaged in the rebellion, at such time and upon such condi¬ 
tions as he should deem expedient for the public welfare. 

This bill met with vehement opposition from the extremes on both sides. 
On the one hand it was said to be too lenient, and on the other hand too se- 







206 


[July, 1862. 



vere. Mr. Sumner offered a substitute, which he advocated in several elab¬ 
orate orations. He denied that the slaves of rebels could be regarded as 
property, real or personal. Though claimed as property and recognized as 
chattels by local law, the Constitution knew them only as persons. Being 
men, they were bound to allegiance and entitled to protection. No claim 
on the part of their masters could supersede the right inherent in the gener¬ 
al government to demand the services of all. By declaring the slaves free, 
we should take from the rebellion its main spring of activity and strength. 

1 Laws of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Second Session, chap cxcv., June 17, 1862.—The fol¬ 
lowing is an abstract of the different sections of the bill, the title of which is, “An Act to suppress 
Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and 
for other Purposes." 

Section 1. Every person who shall hereafter be convicted of the crime of treason against the 
United States shall suffer death, or be imprisoned for not less than five years, and fined not less 
than $10,000, and his slaves, if any, shall be declared free; the fine to be levied and collected on 
any or all of the property, real and personal, except slaves, of which the person so convicted was 
the owner at the time of committing said crime, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwith¬ 
standing. 

Section 2. If any person shall hereafter incite, assist, or engage in any rebellion against the 
authority of the United States, or give aid and comfort thereto, and be convicted thereof, he shall 
be punished by imprisonment for a period of not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more 
than $10,000, or both, and his slaves, if any. l>c set free. 

Section 3 disqualifies all persons who shall commit these crimes from holding office under the 
United States. 

Section 4 provides that this act shall not affect the case of any person guilty of treason before its 
passage, nnless convicted under it. 

Section 5 makes it the duty of the President to cause to be seized and applied to the support of 
the army of the United States all the property of the following classes of persons: (1) Officers of 
the rebel army and navy; (2) High officers, executive, legislative, judicial, and diplomatic, of the 
Confederacy; (3) Similar officers of any one of the Confederate states; (4) Those who, having 
held offices under the United States, shall hereafter hold offices under the Confederacy ; (5) Those 
who shall hereafter hold any office under the Confederacy or any one of the Confederate states; 
provided, however, that those described in the third, fourth, and fifth classes shall have accepted 
their Appointment since the secession of their respective states, or have taken the oath of allegiance 
to the Confederacy; (6) Those owning property in the loyal states who shall aid the rebellion; 
all sales or transfers of such property to be null and void; and it shall l»c a-wKtid bar to any suit 
for the possession of such property that the owner belonged to any one of these six classes. 

Section 6 provides that if any person, other than those described, aiding or abetting the armed 


God sometimes offered to nations as well as to indi¬ 
viduals opportunity, which was of all things most to 
be desired. Never before had such an opportunity 
been presented. The blow which would smite the 
rebellion would scatter prosperity and happiness 
throughout the land. It would mark an epoch from 
barbarism to civilization. Congress, and not the Pres¬ 
ident, had the supreme control over the operations of 
the war. By the old rights of war, freemen were 
made slaves; by those which he proposed, slaves were* 
made freemen. The substitute was rejected. Mr. 
Trumbull opposed the bill because it made treason 
easy. On the other hand, amendments were pro¬ 
posed, striking out, one after another, every important 
section. These were all voted down ; and the bill, as 
reported by the committee, passed the Senate by a 
vote of twenty-eight to thirteen; senators Trumbull 
and Sumner, notwithstanding their objections, voting 
for it, and several Republicans against it. 

Meanwhile a bill similar to the one proposed by 
Mr. Sumner had passed the House. The Senate re¬ 
fused to accept it, adhering to its own. A committee 
of conference was appointed, and the House acceded 
to the Senate bill, with slight amendments, by a vote 
of eighty-two to forty-two. 1 

But the bill had hardly passed before it was known 
that the President would refuse to sanction it. He 
had prepared a message vetoing it. His main objec¬ 
tions were against those parts of the first, second, sev¬ 
enth, and eighth sections which forfeited property be¬ 
yond the life of the person attainted of treason. To 
obviate these objections and some others, a joint reso¬ 
lution was proposed limiting the class of state officers 
whose property was to be confiscated, and providing 
that real estate should be forfeited only during the 
life of the offender. 2 The President, considering this 
resolution to constitute a part of the bill, signed it, and 
it became a law. 

The President was loth to change the avowed poli¬ 
cy of the administration by exercising the great pow¬ 
er thus placed in his hands. He clung to his favorite 
scheme of compensated emancipation. A week before 
the close of the session he sent a special message to 
Congress embodying the draft of an act providing 
that, in case any state should abolish slavery, bonds 
of the United States should be delivered to it of a'cer- 
tain sum for every slave, the whole to be paid at once 
if the emancipation was immediate, or in installments 
if it were gradual. The proposed bill was referred to 
committees, but no farther action was taken upon it 
No border state, for whom it was especially intended, 
responded to the invitation. 

On the same day, July 12,he requested all the mem¬ 
bers of Congress from the border states to meet him 
in conference. He laid before them his scheme, and 
urged them to favor it. If the war continued long, 
he said, slavery would be extinguished in those states. 
Much of its value had already gone, and all would 
soon be lost, with nothing to show for it. It would 
be better to take a step which would shorten the war, and secure substantial 
compensation for what would otherwise be wholly lost. How much better 
for these states as seller, and for the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out 
that without which the war never could have been, than to sink both the 
thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting each other’s throats. He hint¬ 
ed at the strong pressure exerted upon him to take stringent measures in 
regard to slavery. 

A majority of those’ to whom this appeal was made presented a reply, dis- 

rebellion, shall not, within sixty days after public warning and proclamation by the President, 
cease from rebellion and return to his allegiance, his property shall be in like manner seized. 

Sections 7 and 8 prescribe the manner of proceedings by the courts in these cases. 

Section 9 enacts that all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion, escaping 
and taking refuge within the lines of the army, all slaves captured from or deserted by such per¬ 
sons, or coming in any way under control of the government, shall be considered prisoners of war, 
shall be forever free from servitude, and not be again held as slaves. 

Section 10 enacts that no slave, escaping from one state into another, shall be delivered up, ex¬ 
cept on oath of the claimant that the owner or master of the slave has not borne arms against the 
United States, or given aid and comfort to the rebellion ; and prohibits all persons in the military 
service of the United States, tinder pain of dismissal, from deciding on the validity of any claim to 
the services of any escaped slave. 

Section 11 authorizes the President to employ as many persons of African descent ns he may 
deem necessary and proper for the suppression of the rebellion, and to organize und use them ns 
he may deem best for the public welfare. 

Section 12 authorizes the President to provide for the colonization, with their own consent, l»e- 
yond the limits of the United States, of persons freed by this act; the consent of the governments of 
the countries having been first obtained, with a guarantee of the rights of freemen to the colonists. 

Section 13 authorizes the President, by proclamation, to extend pardon and amnesty to all per¬ 
sons who may have participated in the rebellion, at such time, on such conditions, and with such 
exceptions ns he may deem exj>cdicnt for the public welfare. 

Section 14 gives the courts of the United States authority to institute such proceedings, and to 
issue such orders, ns may be necessary to carry this act into effect. 

The joint explanatory resolution passed by both houses, w hich is essentially a part of this act, 
provides that the clause relating to state officers in section 6 “shall be so construed as not to ap¬ 
ply to any act or acts done prior to the passage thereof, nor to include any member of a state Leg¬ 
islature, or judge of any state court, who has not, in accepting or entering upon his office, taken an 
oath to support the Constitution of the so-called Confederate states; nor shall the real estate of 
any offender under said act be forfeited beyond his natural life.” 

9 Laws of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Second Session, Joint Resolution, No. 63. 















September, 1862.] THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY. 


207 



senting from his opinion that the adoption of this pol¬ 
icy would terminate the war or serve the cause of the 
Union. Their states were loyal, and had manifested 
beyond a doubt that in no case would they join the 
rebellion or go with the Confederacy, even if its inde¬ 
pendence was recognized. But the right of holding 
slaves belonged to the states. They could not see that 
they were called upon to make the sacrifice-which was 
required by the proposition. They were asked to give 
up a valuable right, with no security for even the 
small compensation proposed. If, however, Congress 
would make the necessary appropriation of funds, and 
place them at the disposal of the President, to pay for 
the emancipated slaves and for their colonization, their 
states would consider the project. This reply was 
signed by twenty senators and representatives, most 
of them from Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. An¬ 
other answer, signed by seven members, three of whom 
were from Western Virginia, was a little more favora¬ 
ble. They would ask their states to take the subject 
into consideration, adding, “We are the more embold¬ 
ened to assume this position from the fact, now be¬ 
come history, that the leaders of the Southern rebel¬ 
lion have offered to abolish slavery among them as a 
condition'to foreign intervention in favor of their in¬ 
dependence as a nation. If they can give up slavery 
to destroy the Union, we can surely ask our people 
to consider the question of emancipation to save the 
Union.” 

The Confiscation Act was an attempt to harmonize 
different shades of opinion. It contained some appar¬ 
ent inconsistencies. The punishment for treason or 
rebellion, whether by death, imprisonment, fine, or the 
liberation of slaves, could be inflicted only after formal 
trial and conviction. But the property of all persons 
engaged in rebellion was to be seized and confiscated 
to public use, and their slaves, coming in any way un¬ 
der the control of the Federal power, were to be set 
free without the intervention of any judicial process. 

But these discrepancies were apparent rather than real. 

Trial, conviction, and punishment for treason were ju¬ 
dicial acts, to be performed according to legal forms. 

The seizure of the property of an enemy was a mili¬ 
tary measure authorized by the laws of war. Slaves 
were considered in their twofold character of property 
and persons. As property they could be seized, but 
the United States could not hold them as slaves; and, 
consequently, when the title of their former owners 
was annulled, there was no other to take its place, and 
they reverted to their natural condition of freemen. 

But, beyond this right of seizure of enemies’ prop¬ 
erty, it was held that, in time of war, government had 
the fight to employ any means not contrary to the 
laws and usages of civilized warfare to weaken the en¬ 
emy. This power was affirmed to be inherent in the 
very nature of our government, even though it were 
not expressly granted by the Constitution. Among 
these rights was that of emancipating the slaves of the 
enemy. Some conceived that this right pertained to Congress, and should 
be carried into effect by express enactment; others held it to be a military 
right pertaining to the President in virtue of his function as commander-in¬ 
chief of the army and navy. But those who were in favor of the measure 
cared little by whom it was effected, so that it was effected at all. The Pres¬ 
ident assumed that the power, and the responsibility for its exercise, de¬ 
volved upon him. 

Congress had hardly adjourned when the President was strongly urged 
to issue a proclamation for the universal emancipation of the slaves. lie 
hesitated, upon grounds of expediency, to take this decisive and irrevocable 
step. On the 13th of September he was waited upon by a committee from 
various religious denominations in Chicago. They urged him to issue a 
proclamation of emancipation for the reasons that it would enlist the sym¬ 
pathy of the civilized world, would promote harmony at the North, would 
give new soldiers to the Union, and would be in accordance with the will 
of God. 

Mr. Lincoln set aside the last argument by saying that very good men, 
claiming to represent the divine will, urged him to adopt very different 
measures. He thought that, if a direct revelation was to be made upon a sub¬ 
ject so intimately connected with his own duty, it would be vouchsafed to 
him. But he expected no direct revelation, and could only study the phys¬ 
ical facts of the case, and learn what was right, wise, and possible. A proc¬ 
lamation of emancipation might produce a good effect in Europe; it might 
help somewhat at the North; it might weaken the enemy by drawing off 
some of his laborers. But he did not think it would add available soldiers 
to our army. If the blacks should be armed, he feared that in a few weeks 
the arms would be in the hands of the enemy; besides, we had not arms 
enough to equip our white troops. Moreover, there were 50,000 soldiers in 
the Union army from the border slaveholding states, and it would be a seri¬ 
ous matter should such a proclamation drive them over to the enemy. But 


JACOII COU.AMF.lt. 

the main objection to issuing such a proclamation at that time was that it 
would bo useless. “ What good,” he asked, “ would a proclamation of 
emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want 
to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inop¬ 
erative, like the Pope’s Bull against the comet. Would my word free the 
slaves, when I can not even enforce the Constitution in the rebel states?” 

The state of affairs at that time afforded no reason to hope that such a 
proclamation would produce any good effect. The campaign on the Penin¬ 
sula had disastrously failed; the Array of the Potomac had been defeated 
and driven back upon the capital; the Confederates, flushed with victory, 
had crossed the Potomac and were threatening Baltimore, and, not impossi¬ 
bly, Philadelphia. On the very day when this interview took place, the gen- 
eral-in-chief telegraphed to General McClellan that he believed the Confed¬ 
erates were about to march in force upon the capital. On that day they 
seemed more likely to be able to dictate terms than to be forced to receive 
them. A proclamation from the President of the United States decreeing 
the emancipation of the slaves in the Confederacy would then have appear¬ 
ed as idle as a papal Bull against the comet. 

A single week wrought an entire change in the aspect of affairs. The 
battle of Antietam, fought on the 17th of September, had put an end to the 
triumphal march of the enemy. The Confederates were in full retreat. 
They had, indeed, got safely back across the Potomac; but it was believed 
that the army which had foiled McClellan at Richmond, and defeated Pope 
at Manassas, would be captured or annihilated. Men passed at a bound 
from the depths of depression to the heights of exultation. The speedy 
overthrow of the Confederacy was confidently anticipated. It seemed that 
this might be hastened by a warning proclamation, giving the insurgents the 
choice between prompt submission, and subjugation with the liberation of 
their slaves. 

So judged the President of the United States; and accordingly, on tha 
















208 


22d of September, he issued a proclamation declaring that hereafter, as here¬ 
tofore, the object of the war would be to restore the Union; that at the next 
meeting of Congress he should again propose a measure to compensate any 
slaveholding state, not then in rebellion, which should voluntarily under¬ 
take the abolition of slavery within its limits; that on the first day of Janu¬ 
ary, 1863, all persons held as slaves in any state then in rebellion should be 
free; and that the executive government of the United States, including its 
military and naval force, would recognize the freedom of these slaves, and 
would do nothing to hinder them from acquiring the actual possession of it; 
that on this day he would designate the states, and parts of states, which 
should then be considered to be in rebellion, and to which this provision of 
the forthcoming proclamation should apply. 

This warning proved entirely ineffectual, and, at the appointed time, the 
proclamation of emancipation was issued. It marked a new phase in the 
conduct of the war. The object was indeed unchanged, but entirely new 
measures were called into requisition to effect that object. Heretofore the 
claims of rebel masters to their slaves had been put upon the same footing 
as their claims to any other property. This claim might be annulled pre¬ 
cisely like the claim to a horse. The slave coming into possession of the 
government became free simply because the claim of the master having 
lapsed, there was no other to take its place, for the United States could not 
assume property in slaves. Henceforth slavery in all the insurrectionary 
states was declared to be abolished, and all the military and naval power of 
the government was solemnly pledged to maintain the freedom of all slaves 
in these portions of the United States. 1 * 

Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, having remained loyal, were 
not included in this proclamation. A portion of Virginia, including the for¬ 
ty-eight counties soon to be known as the State of West Virginia, and seven 
others, subsequently recognized as the loyal state of Virginia, were also ex- 

1 The following is the text of the preamble and closing paragraph of the proclamation of Sep¬ 
tember 22, 1862: 

“I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and commander-in-chief 
of the army and navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare, that hereafter, as heretofore, the 
war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between 
the United States and each of the states, and the people thereof, in which states that relation is 
or may be suspended or disturbed. 

“That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption 
of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave 
states so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the Uniied Stntes, and 
which states may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate 
or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize 
persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previous¬ 
ly obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued.” 

“And the Executive will in due time recommend that all citizens of the United States who 
shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the con¬ 
stitutional relation between the United States and their respective states and people, if that rela¬ 
tion shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United 
States, including the loss of slaves." 

Attention was also called to the provisions of the acts of Congress which forbid the naval and 
military force from returning fugitives; which declare all slaves of persons engaged in the rebel¬ 
lion, who in any way come into the control of the government, to be free; and which forbid the 
return of fugitive slaves unless the claimant makes oath that he has not been engaged in the rebel 
lion. The most important paragraphs of this proclamation were textually repeated in that of 
January 1, 1863, which we give in full: 

“ PROCLAMATION. 

“ Whereas, on the 22d day of September, in the ycaT of our Lord one thousand eight hundred 
and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States containing, among 
other things, the following, to wit: 

“That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and 
sixty-three, all persons held ns slaves within any states or designated part of a stntc, the people 
whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States,.shall be then, thenceforward, and for¬ 
ever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval 
authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or 
acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in anv efforts they may make for their actual freedom. 

“That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the 
states and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion 
against the United States; and the fact that any stnte, or the people thereof, shall on that day he 
in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elec¬ 
tions wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the 
absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the 
people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States. 

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United Stntes, by virtue of the power 
in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time of actual 
armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, ami as a fit and nec¬ 
essary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of 
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with niv purpose so to 
do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above-mention¬ 
ed, order and designate as the states and parts of stntes wherein the people thereof respectively 
are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: 

“ Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. 
John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, Stc. Marie, St. Mar¬ 
tin, and New Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated ns West 
Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accotnac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Prin¬ 
cess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts 
are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. 

“ And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all per¬ 
sons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and henceforward shall be 
free ; and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval au¬ 
thorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. 

“ And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, un¬ 
less in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they la¬ 
bor faithfully for reasonable wages. 

“And I farther declare and make known that such persons, of suitable condition, will be re¬ 
ceived into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other 
places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. 

“And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution 
upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of 
Almighty God. 

“ In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the seal of the United States 
to be affixed. 

“ Done at the City of Washington this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thou¬ 
sand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United States the eighty- 
seventh. 

“By the President: Abraham Lincoln. 

“William H. Sewabd, Secretary of State. ” 


[September, 1862 . 

empt. Tennessee had all along been represented in the Federal Congress, 
and being in great part occupied by the national forces, was not held to be 
in insurrection. Thirteen parishes in Louisiana were held by our forces, and 
were not included in the insurrectionary districts. The number of slaves in 
these states and parts of states was 832,259. These remained, as before, 
slaves under the state laws. In the remaining slave states, Alabama, Ar¬ 
kansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Texas, thirty-five parishes in Louisiana, and ninety-three counties in Vir¬ 
ginia, were 3,108,197 slaves. These were all declared to be free. 

During the interval between the issue of these two proclamations, and at 
various subsequent periods, the President and members of the cabinet ex¬ 
pressed their views in respect to this measure and its probable influence upon 
the war. Mr. Seward wrote to the American minister to France 1 that the 
great problem of domestic slavery in the United States presented itself for 
solution when the war began. The people were intensely engaged in the 
difficult task of its solution. The President’s message would carry the pub¬ 
lic mind still more directly and earnestly on its great work. Mr. Chase said 
that slavery, having come out of its shelter under state Constitutions and 
laws to assail the national life, must surely die. Who cared how its end 
came? In the rebel slave states it would come “by military order, decree, 
or proclamation, not to be disregarded or set aside in any event as a nullity, 
but maintained and executed with perfect good faith to all the enfranchised.” 
In the loyal slave states it would come by the voluntary action of the peo¬ 
ple, aided by the free states. Meanwhile the American blacks must be call¬ 
ed into this conflict as men, no longer as mere contrabands. We must fol¬ 
low the example of Andrew Jackson, who did not hesitate to oppose colored 
regiments to British invasion. We needed the good will of these men, and 
must make them our friends by showing ourselves their friends. 3 He had 
at first been averse to any interference with slavery in the states; but, as 
the war went on, “ we put greater and greater armies into the field ; but the 
slave population of the South was the real prop of the rebellion, raising pro¬ 
visions for the army while it was fighting in the field, so that they could 
have nearly all their laboring population in the battle-field, and they had 
another laboring population behind them to feed and support them. It 
seemed perfectly clear that we had to strike at this under-prop of the rebel¬ 
lion. The proclamation was the right thing in the right place.” 3 

That the proclamation was irrevocable was firmly maintained. The Pres¬ 
ident had been urged to retract it by some who considered it unconstitution¬ 
al. He replied: “I think the Constitution invests the commander-in-chief 
with the laws of war in time of war. But, as law, the proclamation is either 
valid or invalid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction ; if it is valid it 
can not be retracted any more than the dead can be brought to life.” 4 Mr. 
Blair, the Postmaster General, said, “ That measure, which involves both life 
and freedom in its results, when proclaimed was beyond revocation by either 
the civil or military authority of the nation. The people once slaves in the 
rebel states can never again be recognized as sucb by tbe United States. 
No judicial decision, no legislative action, state or national, can be admitted 
to re-enslave a people who are associated in our destinies in this war of de¬ 
fense to save the government, and whose manumission was deemed essential 
to the restoration and preservation of the Union and to its permanent peace.” 5 
Mr.Chase said, “Either the proclamation was a sham and an imposition in 
the face of the whole world, or else it was an effectual thing, and there are 
no slaves to-day in the rebel states. They are all enfranchised by the proc¬ 
lamation ; for what says it? All the slaves are declared now and forever 
free, and the executive power of the nation is pledged to the maintenance of 
this freedom.” 6 

It had been anticipated that this proclamation of emancipation would en¬ 
list the sypipathy of the European governments upon the side of the Union. 
All our ministers abroad had urged the adoption of such a measure. The 
result failed to justify this anticipation. Mr. Dayton warned the government 
that it might look for efforts from portions of the foreign press to misstate 
the motives of the proclamation and the consequences which would follow 
it. Another effort in favor of recognition would be made, ostensibly on the 
ground of humanity, but really because emancipation would weaken the 
South and interfere with the production of cotton. On the other hand it was 
urged, especially in Great Britain, that the measure did not go far enough. 
Earl Russell, in a dispatch to Lord Lyons,’ said that the proclamation was 
of a very strange nature. It professed to emancipate all slaves in places 
where the United States could not make emancipation a reality, but eman¬ 
cipate no one where tbe decree could be carried into effect. In some places 
a master could still recover his fugitive slave by process of law ; in the oth¬ 
er places, a slave, if arrested, was authorized to resist, and his resistance would 
be sustained by tbe military force of tbe United States. Slavery was there¬ 
fore legal or illegal according to locality. There was no declaration of a 
principle adverse to slavery in the proclamation. It was merely a measure 
of war, and of a very questionable kind. The dispatch concluded by say¬ 
ing, “ As President Lincoln has twice appealed to the judgment of mankind 
in his proclamation, I venture to say that I do not think it can or ought to 
satisfy the friends of abolition, who look for total and impartial freedom for 
the slave, and not for vengeance on the slave owner.” 


1 December 1, 1862. * Letter to Loyal League, April 0, 1863. 1 Speech at Cincinnati, 

October 15, 1863 4 Letter to the Springfield Convention, August 26, 1863. * Speech at 

Cleveland, May, 1863. 6 Speech at Cincinnati, October 15, 1863. 7 January 17, 1863. 





February—May, 1861.] 


POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 


209 


CHAPTER IX. 

POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 

The Confederate Provisional Government.—Ultimate Object of the Secession Leaders.—First 
Session of Congress.—Military and Financial Bills.—The Slave Trade.—Second Session.— 
War accepted.—Privateering.—Debts to the North.—Adjournment to Richmond.—Third Ses¬ 
sion.—The President’s Message.—Uprising of the South.—Wealthy Volunteers.—Hunter Sec¬ 
retary of State.—Judah P. Benjamin. —Men and Money voted.—Telegraph seized.—Alien and 
Confiscation Laws.—Number of alien Residents.—Result of the Confiscation.—Missouri re¬ 
ceived.—Last Session of the Provisional Congress.—President’s Message.—The Danville Rail¬ 
road.—The Permanent Government.—Constitution of the Congress.—Davis’s first Message as 
permanent President.—Gloomy Prospects.—Too much attempted.—Conscription proposed.— 
Confederate Finances.—Cotton Loan.—Planters ask for Relief.—Reply of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.—Depreciation of the Currency.—Foreign Relations.—Lord John Russell and the 
Confederate Commissioners.—Yancey’s Statement.—Weakened Condition of the Confederate 
Army.—Furloughs revoked.—The President’s Conscription Message.—The first Conscription 
Act.—Its Provisions.—Exempts.—Opposition in Georgia and Alabama.—The Situation in the 
Spring of 18G2.—Delays of the Federal Armies in Virginia.—The Movement upon the Penin¬ 
sula.—Panic at Richmond.—Increase of the Confederate Forces.—Lee as Commander-in- 
chief.—Failure of the Federal Campaign.—The Confederate Triumph and its Cost.—New 
Conscription Laws.—Davis and Butler.—Policy with respect to colored Soldiers. 

TT is proposed in this chapter to describe the foreign and domestic policy 
-L of the Confederate government from its organization in February, 1861, 
down to the close of the year 1862, dwelling especially upon the conscrip¬ 
tion laws, which enabled it to bring into the field a greater proportion of 
its population than had ever before been done by any civilized people. 

The government established at Montgomery on the 8th, and formally in¬ 
augurated on the 18th of February, 1861, was simply a compact entered into 
between six states claiming to be independent and equal. Florida, with 
77,000 whites, had an equal vote with Georgia, having more than ten times 
ns many. This government was only provisional, to expire, by its own lim¬ 
itation, in a year, unless sooner superseded. Though the compact was form¬ 
ed by only six states, it was certain that some, and believed that all, of the 
nine remaining slave states would enter into it in less than a year. Provis¬ 
ion was made in the Constitution for the admission of new states by the vote 
of two thirds of each house of Congress. If all the slaveholding states join¬ 
ed the Confederacy, it would have possession of the mouths of the Missis¬ 
sippi, of both banks of its lower course for more than a thousand miles, and 
of one bank of each of its great affluents, the Missouri and Ohio, for three 
hundred miles more. This would practically give it the control of the whole 
valley drained by the Mississippi and its main affluents, and it was confi¬ 
dently expected that, as soon as the Confederacy was firmly established, the 
northwestern free states would unite with it, either formally by becoming 
members, or actually by withdrawing from the Union and forming a sepa¬ 
rate government in close affiliation with that of the South. Some even went 
farther in their views, and believed that, the Union being dissolved, the Mid¬ 
dle States would follow the presumed example of those of the Northwest, 
and form still another government. Thus the Southern slaveholding Con¬ 
federacy, even if it were joined by none of the free states, would become the 
preponderating power of the continent. 

Provision was moreover made in the Constitution for the acquisition of 
new territory. This was only desired upon the southern border. The lead¬ 
ers of secession had for years favored the filibustering expeditions against 
Mexico and Central America; they had secured the annexation of Texas, 
and had introduced into the Democratic platforms of 1856 and 1860 resolu¬ 
tions directly or indirectly advocating the acquisition of Cuba. A saving 
clause was indeed added, that this acquisition should be made “ upon terms 
honorable to ourselves and just to Spain;” but it was perfectly understood 
that Spain would give up Cuba only upon compulsion, and had formally de¬ 
clared that any proposition for its purchase would be considered as an insult. 
Although it now suited the policy of the Confederate government to deny 
any purpose of aggression, it is certain that ultimate accessions of territory 
were expected to be made from its southern neighbors. In all territory, 
howsoever or whencesoever acquired, slavery was to be recognized and pro¬ 
tected. The idea of a great slaveholding confederacy, ultimately to embrace 
the whole tropical and semi-tropical regions of the North American conti¬ 
nent, was predominant in the minds of many, if not all of the leaders of the 
secession. 

So firmly was the idea of the speedy accession of the remaining slavehold¬ 
ing states implanted in the Southern mind, that, although the Constitution 
forbade the “importation of negroes of the African race from any foreign 
country,” an exception was made in the case of “slaveholding states or ter¬ 
ritories of the United States of America;” and when the Confederacy, on 
the 6th of May, declared war, or, as it was phrased, recognized the exist¬ 
ence of war with the United States, these slaveholding states were formally 
excepted from the declaration. And when, subsequently, laws were passed 
forbidding the payment of debts to citizens of the United States, ordering 
the expulsion or imprisonment of all alien enemies and the confiscation of 
their property, citizens of these states who had not actually engaged in hos¬ 
tilities against the Confederacy were expressly excluded from the operation 
of these laws. And when, still later, the illegal Sovereignty Convention in 
Kentucky, and the regularly deposed Governor Jackson, of Missouri, under¬ 
took to bring these states into the Confederacy, their action was promptly 
recognized, these states were formally received, their delegates admitted to 
scats in Congress, and the states were claimed as members of the Confed¬ 
eracy. 

The action of the Confederate Congress was mainly held in secret session, 
and there are few means of tracing the actual course of sentiment. This, 
however, is of little consequence, for almost from the outset the government 
assumed the form of a strict military despotism, all essential functions being 


centred in the President, Congress doing little more than act upon his sug¬ 
gestions and register his decrees. The idea was sedulously inculcated that 
there would be no real war; that the North dared not and could not fight, 
and, after a faint show of resistance, would recognize the independence of 
the Confederacy. ‘But the leaders knew better. They were assured from 
the outset that their position must be maintained by arms if maintained at 
all. While talking of peace, they set at once about vigorous preparations 
for war. The President was directed to take charge of all military opera¬ 
tions between the Confederacy and other powers; and on the 7th of March 
he was authorized to accept the services of 100,000 volunteers, to serve for 
twelve months unless sooner discharged,in order to “repel invasion, main¬ 
tain the rightful possession of the Confederate States of America in every 
portion of territory belonging to each state, and to secure the public tran¬ 
quillity against threatened assault.” This warlike measure was adopted a 
full month before any attempt had been made to furnish supplies to Fort 
Sumter, and more than five weeks before the President of the United States 
had issued the call for 75,000 militia to suppress unlawful combinations and 
cause the laws to be duly executed. 

The Congress adjourned after passing acts, none of which, with the excep¬ 
tion of that calling for 100,000 volunteers, were of great importance. The 
principal ones provided for the issue of a million dollars in treasury notes to 
meet current expenses; authorized the appointment of commissioners to the 
European governments; regulated the transit of merchandise, and requested 
the various states to cede to the Confederacy the forts, arsenals, navy yards, 
and other public establishments which they had seized. The article in the 
Constitution prohibiting the foreign slave-trade had been adopted by the 
vote of four states against two, South Carolina and Florida opposing it. A 
bill was passed to carry this provision into effect. This was vetoed by the 
President on the ground that in one section of the bill provision was made 
to transfer slaves who had been illegally imported to the custody of foreign 
states or societies, upon condition of deportation and future freedom, and, in 
case this proposition was not accepted, the President was required to cause 
the negroes to be sold at auction to the highest bidder. This provision was 
held by Mr.Davis to be “ in opposition to the policy declared in the Consti¬ 
tution, the prohibition of the importation of African negroes, and in deroga¬ 
tion of its mandate to legislate for the effectuation of that object.” The veto 
was sustained by Congress. 

The government of the United States, having refused to receive Forsvih 
and Crawford, who announced themselves to be commissioners authorized 
by the Confederacy to enter upon negotiations upon all subjects growing out 
of the secession, gave formal notice, on the 8th of April, that provisions 
would be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably if possible, otherwise by force. 
Thereupon ensued the bombardment and capture of that fort, the secession 
of other states, and other hostile measures which have already been fully de¬ 
tailed. 

On the 12th of April the Confederate Congress was summoned to meet on 
the 29th, in consequence of the “declaration of hostile purposes contained in 
the message sent by President Lincoln to the government of South Caroli¬ 
na.” In the mean time, the proclamation of President Lincoln of April 15, 
calling for 75,000 militia, and that of April 19, announcing the blockade of 
the Confederate ports, had been issued. The message of Mr. Davis, deliver¬ 
ed at the opening of this session, has been cited at length in these pages.’ 
On the 7th of May an act was passed recognizing war as existing between 
the Confederacy and the non-slaveholding states of the Union, and author¬ 
izing the issue of letters of marque and reprisal. 1 2 All captures and prizes 
made by these privateers were to be the property of the captors, and a boun¬ 
ty of twenty-five dollars was to be paid for every prisoner made by them 
and delivered into the hands of agents appointed for that purpose in Con¬ 
federate ports, and a bounty of twenty dollars for each person on board of 
any armed vessel which should be destroyed by any privateer of equal or 
inferior force. But three weeks before the passage of this act the President 
had issued a proclamation inviting all persons to apply for letters of marque 
and reprisal. The military force then on foot was stated at 35,000 men, of 
whom 19,000 were at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Phil¬ 
ip, and Pulaski, and 16,000 on the way to Virginia. It was estimated that 
the government had control of arms and munitions to supply an army of 
150,000 men. A law was passed forbidding the payment of any debt to any 
citizen of the non-slaveholding states, and all persons owing such debts were 
authorized to pay the amount in specie or its equivalent, or in treasury 
notes, into the public treasury, to be refunded with interest at the close of 
the war. 

Virginia having in the mean while joined the Confederacy, it was evi¬ 
dent that the immediate seat of hostilities would be transferred to that state, 


1 Ante, p. 113. 

The preamble to this act stated that, whereas the government of the United States had refused 
to treat with that of the Confederacy; the President of the United States had called for 75,000 
men to capture forts and strong-holds belonging to the Confederate States; had announced his 
purpose to blockade their ports; “and whereas the State of Virginia has seceded from the Fed¬ 
eral Union, and entered into a convention of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Confeder¬ 
ate States, and has adopted the provisional Constitution of the said states, and the states of Mary¬ 
land, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri have refused, and it is be¬ 
lieved that the State of Delaware, and the inhabitants of the territories of Arizona and New Mex 
ico, and the Indian Territory south of Kansas, will refuse to co-operate with the government of 
the United States in these acts of hostility and wanton aggression which are plainly intended to 
overawe, oppress, and finally subjugate the people of the Confederate States ; and whereas, by the 
acts and means aforesaid, war exists between the Confederate States and the government of the 
United States and territories thereof, excepting” the states and territories before mentioned; there¬ 
fore it is enacted “that the President of the Confederate States is hereby authorized to use the 
whole land and naval force of the Confederate States to meet the war thus commenced, and to is¬ 


sue to private armed vessels commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form 
as he shall think proper, under the seal of the Confederate States, against the vessels, goods, and 
effects of the government of the United States, and of the citizens or inhabitants of the states and 
territories thereof, except the states and territories hereinbefore named.” 






210 


[February—May, 1861 



THE FIRST CONFEDERATE CABINET. 



































































































































































































Mat—Jclt, 1861.] 


POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 


211 



ROHF.RT M. T. HUNTER. 

and from no point could they be so successfully conducted b} - the Confed¬ 
erates as from its capital. Accordingly, on the 22d of May the Congress 
adjourned to meet at Richmond on the 20th of July, and in the mean while 
the executive departments and the archives of the government were trans¬ 
ferred to that city, which thus became the capital of the Confederacy. 

The Congress met there at the appointed time, two days after the skirm¬ 
ish at Blackburn’s Ford, and the day before the battle of Bull Run. 

The message of President Davis announced that Alabama, Arkansas, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia had become members of the Con¬ 
federacy. The enormous military preparations made by the United States, 
he said, was a distinct avowal that they were engaged, not with mere rioters 
and insurgents, but in a conflict with a great and powerful nation. They 
were driven to the practical acknowledgment that the ancient Union had 
been dissolved, they recognized the separate existence of the Confederate 
States by a blockade of Southern ports, and a prohibition of all intercourse 
with the inhabitants of the Confederacy, whom they no longer recognized 
as citizens of the United States, and upon whom they were waging an in¬ 
discriminate and ferocious war. In this war rapine was the rule; private 
houses were burnt; the crops in the fields, and every article of use or luxury 
remaining in the dwellings from which the owners had fled, were destroyed ; 
even the acquisition of medicines for the sick and wounded was interdicted. 
These sweeping accusations were put forth, not for the information of Con¬ 
gress, but in order to inflame the Southern mind. They were made before 
a single Federal soldier had advanced a score of miles into an v portion of 
the territory to which the Confederates, upon their own principles, had the 
shadow of a claim. A large portion of the inhabitants of the border slave 
states, he said, were opposed to the prosecution of the war, and many' of 
them, if unrestrained by the presence of large armies, would joyfully unite 
with the South; hence they had been excepted in the enactments which 
authorized hostilities against the United States. The policy which had 
been secretly entertained, and was now openly avowed and acted upon by 
the Confederate government, would greatly extend the operations in the 
field. The forces hitherto raised had amply provided for the defense of 


the states which originally organized the Confederacy; 
for, with the exception of three fortified islands, which 
were maintained by the preponderating naval power 
of the Union, its forces had been driven from every 
point, and now, at the expiration of five months from 
the organization of the government, not a single hos¬ 
tile foot pressed the soil of the original Confederacy. 
•But the forces which had been sufficient to effect this 
would prove inadequate to repel invasion by half a 
million of troops now proposed by the enemy, and a 
large addition to the Confederate army would be nec¬ 
essary. The idea of any compromise or treaty which 
should involve the reconstruction of the Union was 
emphatically disavowed. 

The South had, in the mean time, rushed to arms 
with an alacrity not less than that shown in the up¬ 
rising of the North. Only 100,000 volunteers had 
been authorized by the law of the last session of Con¬ 
gress. More than this number offered themselves at 
once. In the Far South the question was not who 
should go, but who must stay. Companies were or¬ 
ganized in every neighborhood and village, who urged 
their claims to acceptance. In answer to one such ap¬ 
plication, the Governor of Mississippi replied that he 
had but three regiments to fill, and bad 150 companies 
to pick from. Large bounties were paid for the priv¬ 
ilege of taking the place of an accepted volunteer. 
There were companies in which every private was 
wealthy, or the son of a wealthy man, every one hav¬ 
ing his negro servants in camp. 1 The report of the 
Secretary of War showed that early in July 194 reg¬ 
iments and 32 battalions had been accepted, number¬ 
ing in all 210,000 men. At about the same time the 
Federal government had nominally in the field 230,000 
men, exclusive of three months’ volunteers, whose term 
was about to expire. The Federal Secretary of War 
hesitated to ask for more soldiers; the Confederate 
secretary recommended that Congress should call for 
and accept 300 regiments. 

Robert Toombs resigned his post of Secretary of 
State, and was succeeded by Robert M. T. Hunter. It 
has long been a peculiarity of Virginia politics that 
the state is always supposed to have at least one man 
who is the embodiment of all political wisdom. In 
default of a better, the place has been at times as¬ 
signed to a half-lunatic like Randolph, or an interm¬ 
inable declaimer like Wise. This position had some¬ 
how been accorded to Hunter, perhaps on the ground 
of long service; for, with a brief interval, he had been 
a representative or senator in Congress for nearly a 
quarter of a century. From 1849 onward he was 
chairman of the Committee of Finance in the Senate. 
He was chiefly noted for ponderous political platitudes 
to which constant repetition gave an air of profundity. 
In the Democratic Convention of 1860 he was named 
as a candidate for the presidency; in the first dozen ballots he received, 
though with a wide interval, the highest vote after that cast for Douglas. 
In the scheme of secession as at first drawn up by Southern senators, Hun¬ 
ter was to have been President, and Davis commander-in-chief of the army : 
but the rapid march of events which followed the first movements for se¬ 
cession demanded a leader of a different stamp from the sluggish Virginian. 
In a purely military government, the post of Secretary of State, though 
nominally the one of first dignity in the cabinet, was of no practical im¬ 
portance, and the vanity of Virginia might be safely flattered by bestowing 
it upon her stolid favorite, 2 for whom it was claimed by his admirers that 
“he possessed in a more eminent degree the philosophical characteristics 
of Jefferson than any other statesman now living.” The ponderous, prag¬ 
matical Virginian soon found himself out of place in the fiery revolutionary 
government. His fine-spun theories were brushed away like cobwebs by 
the fierce exigencies of the times. In a few months he was succeeded as 
Secretary of State by Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana. 

Mr. Benjamin, as is indicated by his name, and still morn evidently by 
his face, belongs to that keen and aspiring Hebrew race which for the last 


1 An Englishman, who thought himself fortunate in belonging to nil accepted company, says 
that the hundred men of his company represented not less than 5*20,000,000. “All of us," he 
writes, “wished to go forth and fight the Yankees; not that the Northerners were deemed worthy 
of such an honor, but there was a strong desire to get to close quarters wit h the enemy, and settle 
the question without farther delay. There was not a youth but fancied himself a match for any 
half dozen Now Englanders. Captains of other companies begged us to give tip our call, and 
offered munificent compensation if we would let their companies report instead. Giv^ tip the 
chance of fighting the Yankees? No, indeed ; we were the favored individuals, and not all the 
wealth of California could have bought us off m favor of others! Poor fellows! how soon the 
tune changed. Glad would some of these hot heads have been to return home months subse¬ 
quently.”— Rattle-fields of the South, by an English Combatant. 

1 The Richmond Ifispatch of July 2fi, 18G1, announces this cabinet change in terms which, 
while meant to be congratulatory, would have been exquisitely ironical if irony had been intend¬ 
ed. It says: “Mr. Toombs was of n temper to prefer the active duties <>f a soldier, in such a 
crisis as the present, to the monotony of an office which, for the present, is little more than nominal. 

. . . . Virginia's position in the Confederacy has been acknowledged by assigning to one of her 
statesmen the highest post in the Confederate cabinet. Mr. Hunter is so well known to the 
country that it would be supererogatory to dwell upon the qualities of mind and character which 
fit him so eminently for the post to which he has been called. It would be difficult to define an 
instance in which the trite phrase of speech so justly applies, * The right man in the right place.*” 



















212 


half century has wielded an influence in Christendom altogether dispropor¬ 
tionate to its numbers. He was one of the most unscrupulous and by far 
the ablest member of the Louisiana bar. In 1853 he was elected to the 
Senate of the United States. He was soon recognized as one of the keenest 
debaters and the most finished orator in that assembly. As a lawyer, his 
main object was the acquisition of wealth; as a politician, to effect tiie dis¬ 
memberment of the Union. When Jefferson Davis organized his first cab¬ 
inet, Benjamin was appointed attorney general, a poet for which he was 
expressly qualified by adroitness and unscrupulousness. After a while Le¬ 
roy Walker, the incompetent Secretary of War, was displaced, and Ben¬ 
jamin was named as his successor. In this department his career was far 
from brilliant. The Congressional committee of inquiry attributed to his 
incompetency the disaster which befell the Confederate cause at Roanoke 
Island. But if he was out of place as head of the War Department, the as¬ 
tute Southern dictator had discovered that he possessed faculties too valua¬ 
ble to be lost; so, in face of Congressional censure, Judah P. Benjamin was 
appointed Secretary of State in March, 1862. 

The session of the Confederate Congress which commenced on the 20th 
of July was short. The triumph at Bull Run, exaggerated by public re¬ 
port, had inspired the South with an overweening confidence of immediate 
success, and Congress was ready to grant more than the executive asked. 
The Secretary of War had asked for 300,000 men; Congress authorized 
the acceptance of 400,000. The issue of $100,000,000 in treasury notes, 
payable in six months after the ratification of peace, and of a like amount 
in bonds, bearing eight per cent, interest, and payable in twenty years, was 
authorized, the notes to be receivable for all public dues except the export 
duty on cotton. A war-tax of fifty cents on the hundred dollars was im¬ 
posed upon all real and personal property, including slaves; heads of fam¬ 
ilies whose property amounted to less than $500 being exempt. The Pres¬ 
ident was authorized to take the control of all telegraphic lines and offices; 
to appoint agents wherever he chose to supervise all communications pass¬ 
ing over the lines; no communication in cipher, or any of enigmatical or 
doubtful character, could be transmitted until its real purport was explained 
to the agent, and not then unless the person sending it was known to be 
trustworthy. Any person sending any dispatch relating to military oper¬ 
ations without first submitting it to the inspection of the agent, or in any 
case sending a message calculated to aid the enemy, was to be punished by 
fine and imprisonment. 

The Federal Congress had passed an act confiscating all property in the 
insurrectionary states which should be used in aid of the insurrection, in¬ 
cluding the enfranchisement of all slaves employed in the military or naval 
service of the insurgents. The Confederate Congress retaliated by passing 
sweeping acts ordering the banishment of all alien enemies, and the abso¬ 
lute confiscation of all their property of whatever kind, with the single ex¬ 
ception of debts due them from the Confederacy, or from a state belonging 
to it. This confiscation act was to be retrospective, its operation applying 
to every right or claim of any citizen of the Union subsequent to the 21st 
day of May. Bv these acts, and the proclamations issued in accordance 
with them, all citizens of the non-slaveholding states of the Union, who 
should not at once declare their intention of becoming citizens of the Con¬ 
federacy, and all subjects of neutral governments having a domicil within or 
carrying on business in the Union, were declared to be alien enemies. Ev¬ 
ery male of these classes above the age of fourteen years was required to 
leave the Confederacy within forty days. At the expiration of this period 
district attorneys and marshals were to make complaint against any such 
persons then remaining, the marshal arresting and keeping them in close cus¬ 
tody. If the court so ordered, they were to be removed in such a way as to 
prevent them from acquiring any information that could be prejudicial to 
the Confederacy. Any alien who should return after being removed should 
be delivered over to the military authority, to be dealt with as a spy or pris¬ 
oner of war, as the case might require. Receivers were appointed in the 
several districts, who were to summon before them all attorneys and coun¬ 
selors at law, all presidents and cashiers of banks, all administrative officers 
of railroads and other corporations, all agents of foreign merchants and cor¬ 
porations, all dealers in mercantile paper, all assignees and trustees of estates 
—all persons, in fine, “ who were known to do business for others.” To these 
persons a series of stringent questions was to be put, to which they were re¬ 
quired to answer upon oath. They were required to testify whether then, 
or at any time after the 21st of May, they had in their possession or under 
their control any property in which an alien enemy had any right, title, or 
interest, direct or indirect. If such was the case, they were to give minute 
and specific information respecting it. If they had disposed of any such 
property or interest, they were to state when, to whom, and for what the sale 
had been made, and by whom the property was then held. The same pro¬ 
vision applied to all debts due to any alien enemy. Every citizen was made 
a spy upon every other. Every person was to tell if he knew of any prop¬ 
erty held by or for, or any debts due to an alien enemy, describing them 
particularly, and giving the name and residence of the holder, debtor, trus¬ 
tee, or agent. The responsibility of the citizen was not limited to answer¬ 
ing the questions actually propounded,but lie was especially directed,in ad¬ 
dition, to state every thing else that he knew “which may aid in carrying 
into full effect the sequestration act, and state the same as fully and particu¬ 
larly as if thereunto specially interrogated.” If any attorney, agent, former 
partner, or trustee holding or controlling any property or interest in proper¬ 
ty belonging to an alien enemy failed to give information to the receiver, he 
was held to be guilty of a high misdemeanor, for which he was to be fined 
not more than $5000, be imprisoned not more than six months, besides be¬ 
ing liable to pay double the value of the property in question. 


[July—November, 1861. 

The number of persons directly affected by these laws was less than the 
framers supposed. There were residing in the Confederacy 233,000 persons 
born in neutral countries, of both sexes and of all ages. Of these a third 
were in Louisiana, another third in Texas and Virginia, leaving only a third 
in the eight remaining states. Of these only a few hundred came within 
the class of alien enemies by reason of having a residence or doing business 
in the Union. There were in the whole United States 4,136,000 residents 
of foreign birth, and of these 3,900,000 were in the Union states. There 
were resident in the Confederacy 98,000 natives of the border slave states. 
These were expressly excepted from the category of alien enemies, in ac¬ 
cordance with the fixed policy of the government to consider these states as 
quasi members of the Confederacy. By the census of 1800 there were 
120,000 natives of the free states, men, women, and children, resident in the 
eleven states which ultimately seceded. A large portion of these went to 
the North before the passage of these acts. Of those who remained, many 
gave in their adhesion to the Confederate government, leaving only a few 
thousands to be dealt with as alien enemies. These were unmercifully har¬ 
ried, but rather by self-constituted vigilance committees than by the slower 
legal process prescribed by the law. It is doubtful if a thousand persons 
were arrested and banished in the manner and by the forms prescribed in 
this alien act. 1 

Apart from its retaliatory intent, this law had a double purpose. Besides 
compelling the support of all the residents of the Confederacy, or at least 
preventing any open opposition to the government, and thus enabling it to 
present an apparently united front before the world, it was expected that it 
would bring a large amount of money into the treasury, which was now in 
sore need. The private debts due from the South to the North were esti¬ 
mated at $200,000,000; the interest of Northern citizens in real estate, rail¬ 
road and other stocks, and similar investments, could not be estimated at less 
than $100,000,000 more. The whole $300,000,000 was to be nominally 
swept into the Confederate treasury. But the anticipations of the framers 
of the law were disappointed. Private debtors saw no advantage in paying 
their debts into the treasury, and securing a discharge, when they could as 
well leave them wholly unpaid. In spite of the searching inquisition order¬ 
ed, little actual property could be discovered in which alien enemies had an 
interest. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury nearly a year after 
the passage of the Confiscation Act set down the receipts, independent of 
loans, at $14,000,000. A million and a half was derived from customs, ten 
and a half millions from the war-tax, and two millions from miscellaneous 
sources. The proceeds of the confiscation must be included under, and form 
only a part of this last head. There is no reason to believe that the nett 
amount from confiscations exceeded half a million of dollars during the first 
year of the operation of the law. 

An act was passed at this session to aid the disaffected citizens of Missou¬ 
ri in their opposition to the Federal government. This state was to be ad¬ 
mitted to the Confederacy when the provisional Constitution had been duly 
ratified by the old state government under Claiborne Jackson, and, in the 
mean while, the President of the Confederacy was authorized to send Con¬ 
federate troops to Missouri. An agreement for the accession of this state to 
the Confederacy was made at Richmond on the 31st of October, and ratified 
by an irregular meeting of the Legislature, where a quorum was obtained 
only by the admission of numerous proxies, on the 2d of November. Sen¬ 
ators and representatives appointed by this body, not by the people, were 
sent to Richmond, where they were admitted to seats in the Confederate Con¬ 
gress at the next session. 

Congress adjourned in September to meet on the 18th of November. At 
the opening only twelve members were present; but they represented six 
states, and the provisional Congress represented states in their collective ca¬ 
pacity, and six states being a majority of the eleven, it was decided that these 
twelve members formed a quorum. The President’s Message was delivered 
on the 19th. It gave a glowing account of the military operations in Vir¬ 
ginia and Missouri, and defended the invasion of Kentucky; spoke in hope¬ 
ful terms of the condition of the treasury; repeated the former charges 
against the Federal government for its manner of carrying on ihe war, and 
denounced the seizure of Mason and Slidell as a breach of international law 
and an insult to the British flag. The President made one suggestion, which 
was acted upon, and in the end became of great practical importance. For 
the successful prosecution of the war, it was indispensable that means should 
be supplied for transporting troops and military supplies. The war was to 
be waged mainly on the northern borders of the Confederacy, while men 
and supplies must be to a great extent drawn from the interior and the Far 
South. There were already two main systems of uninterrupted railroad 
communication between the northern and the southern portions. One was 
from Richmond along the sea-board, the other through Western Virginia to 
New Orleans. Besides these there was a third, complete with the exception 

1 The following table shows, as given in the census of 1860, the number of free persons residing 
in the seceding states who were born respectively in the free states, in the Union slave states, and 
in foreign countries: 


State* of the Confederacy. 

K> sidents born in 
the Free States. 

Resident' lioru in the 

I nion Slave States. 

Revd nip born in 
Foreign CouMrie*. 

Alabama. 

5,930 

2,955 

12.352 

Arkansas. 

11.040 

20.298 

3.741 

Florida. 

2,010 

375 

3,309 

Georgia. 

6,335 

1,318 

11,671 

Louisiana. 

14,103 

5.849 

81,029 

Mississippi. 

5,157 

4,369 

8,558 

North Carolina. 

2,397 

778 

3,299 

South Carolina. 

2,284 

402 

9,986 

Tennessee. 

12.478 

15,891 

21,226 

Texas. 

21.687 

28,149 

43,422 

Virginia. 

36,757 

17,744 

35,058 


120,277 

98,128 

233.651 




















-February, 1861.] 


POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 


213 



Otho R. Singleton. 
John J. McRae. 


Reuben Davis. 
Lucius Q. C. Lamas. 


Jefferson Davis, Senator. 
Alneht G. Brown, Senator 
William Rarkspalr. 


THE LAST DELEGATION FROM MISSISSIPPI IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. 


of an interval of forty miles between Danville, in Virginia, and Greensbor- 
ougli, in North Carolina. The construction of this short link would furnish 
a route through the interior of the Confederacy, and give access to a popu¬ 
lation and to military resources from which the government was then de¬ 
barred, besides greatly increasing the safety and capacity of the transporta¬ 
tion of troops and supplies from the farthest points. It was true that the 
Constitution prohibited Congress from appropriating money for internal im¬ 
provements intended to facilitate commerce, but this prohibition might be 
obviated by considering this a military work. The mode suggested by the 
President was that Congress should give aid to a company organized to con¬ 
struct and carry on the work. The road was finally constructed directly by 
government, and in the end proved the salvation of the Confederacy by en¬ 
abling it to transport troops rapidly between the East and the West. At 
more than one critical moment it practically increased by one half the of¬ 
fensive and defensive power of the Confederacy. 

The provisional government of the Confederacy came to an end, by its 


own limitation, on the 15th of February, 1862. Electors had in the mean 
while been appointed to choose a President and Vice-president for the per¬ 
manent government. The choice had been declared early in November. It 
was a mere matter of form. No candidates were named in opposition to 
Davis and Stephens, who received the unanimous vote of the electors. The 
provisional Congress had been a mere temporary junta, appointed by the 
Conventions and Legislatures of the several states. It was succeeded by a 
permanent Congress chosen by the people. This body convened on the 18th 
of February. Missouri and Kentucky having been recognized as members 
of the Confederacy, and sent delegates to both houses, all the slaveholding 
states were represented except Delaware and Maryland. The Senate, when 
full, consisted of 26 members. Nineteen were present at the opening. The 
House, if full, would have consisted of 112 members. 

About twenty-five of these men had been members of the Congress of the 
United States in 1860. Of these, Alabama sent Clay to the Confederate 
Senate; Curry, Pugll, and Clopton to the House. Arkansas sent Johnson to 




























214 


[February, 1862. 



Luoius J. Gartrf.ll. 
James Jackson. 


John W. H. Undrrwood. 
Martin J. Crawford. 


Robert Tooyns, Senator. 


Alfred Iverson. Senator. 


Thomas Hardeman. 


Joshua Hill. 


THE LAST DELEGATION FROM GEORGIA IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. 


the Senate. Georgia sent Hill to the Senate, and Gartrell to the House. 
Mississippi sent Brown to the Senate; Reuben Davis, McRae, Singleton, and 
Barksdale to the House. North Carolina sent Smith to the House, all her 
other members being new men. South Carolina sent to the House Boyce, 
M iles, Bonham, and McQueen, four of her seven last representatives in the 
Federal Congress; she also sent to the Senate Orr and Barnwell, who had 
formerly represented her at Washington. Besides these former members of 
the Federal Congress, there were about half a score of men in this Confeder¬ 
ate Congress who had acquired some political reputation. The other mem¬ 
bers were new men, thrown up from the masses by the fierce fires of seces¬ 
sion. 

The inauguration of Jefferson Davis as permanent President of the Con¬ 
federacy took place on the 22d of February, the 130th anniversary of the 
birthday of Washington. Three days after he sent in his message, setting 
forth the condition of the Confederacy. The new government began under 
gloomy auspices. At the East, Burnside had captured Roanoke Island, and 


effected a firm lodgment in North Carolina. In the West, GranJ; had taken 
Fort Donelson ; the Confederate forces, driven from Bowling Green, were 
evacuating Kentucky, and were in a few days to abandon Nashville, which 
had a few months before been named in Congress as the future capital of 
the Confederacy; Zollicoffer had been defeated and killed at Mill Spring; 
Price, driven from Missouri into Arkansas, had been defeated at Pea Ridge. 
Savannah was threatened by the Federal gun-boats. New Orleans, although 
no one then knew it, was in a few weeks to be captured by Farragut, inflict 
ing what then seemed the one great blow to which the Confederacy was ex¬ 
posed. The great Federal force on the Potomac, which had been transform¬ 
ed from a crowd into an army, hung threatening over Virginia, and was al¬ 
most ready to strike at Richmond, the heart of the Confederacy. The hope 
of foreign interference, upon which, in spite of protestations to the contrary, 
great reliance had been placed, was at an end. The maritime powers of Eu¬ 
rope had recognized the efficiency of the blockade, and in shutting their 
ports to prizes had rendered useless the law for sending out privateers. 




















February, 1862.] 


POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 


215 







r 



? 


Stdkniiam Moorr. 
Clement C Cut, Anofor 
James A. Stallworth. 


Williamson R. W. Conn. 
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Srnatnr 
David Clopton 


Jamts I.. Fron. 
James I~ M. Ccbrt. 
OEOBOE S. H0C6TON. 


THE LAST DELEGATION FROM ALABAMA IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 


There was no way of turning a prize to profit. The Confederate ports were 
shut by the Federal blockade; neutral ports by the orders of the govern¬ 
ments of Europe. 

In face of these facts and many others of like nature, Davis frankly ac¬ 
knowledged what he could not don}’. “Events,” he said, “have demon¬ 
strated that the government had attempted more than it had the power suc¬ 
cessfully to achieve. Ilencc, in the effort to protect bv our arms the whole 
territory of the Confederate States, sea-board and inland, we have been so 
exposed as recently to suffer great disasters.” In this message the President 
intimated rather than declared what was necessary to enable the Confederate 
States to wage a successful war with their more numerous enemy. Troops 
must be enlisted for long terms, instead of the short ones for which they 
had hitherto taken the field. lie hesitated even then to announce that the 
whole population of the South capable of bearing arms must be conscript¬ 
ed, and every man be made liable at any moment to be forced into the 
active army. 


The one bright point which the President found in the general gloomy 
aspect of affairs was the condition ofthc finances of the Confederacy’. “ The 
financial system,” he said, “ devised by the wisdom of your predecessors, has 
proved adequate to supplying all the wants of the government. IVe have 
no floating debt; the credit, of the government is unimpaired; the total ex¬ 
penditure for the year has been $170,000,000—less than the value of the 
cotton crop of the year.” He could hardly have foreboded, or, if he fore¬ 
saw, did not care to say, that in a few months the financial question would 
become quite as important as the military one; that the deficit in the Con¬ 
federate funds would involve as much peril and suffering as any possible 
disaster in the field. 

At the outset the Confederate government had no lack of money for im¬ 
mediate purposes. The treachery of Floyd, and the seizure of forts and ar¬ 
senals, had furnished arms and munitions for the first volunteers. Regi¬ 
ments fitted out at their own cost, or by the states, were offered to the gov¬ 
ernment. The first 100,000 men were put into the field costing the Confed- 







16 


[October, 1861 



Lawuknck M. Kkitt 


John McQueen. 
John D. Abkmork. 


Milledge I- Bonham. 


James Chestnut, Senator. 


James H. IIamvond, Senator. 


William Porciieb Miles. 


THE LAST DELEGATION FROM SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. 


eracy hardly a dollar. A brief war, if any, was anticipated, requiring no 
great outlay. Wanting, and, to superficial view, likely to want very little 
money, the credit of the Confederacy at home was good; so, when a loan of 
$8,000,000 was asked, nearly double the amount was offered at or above 
par. The government wisely accepted the whole. At that time the Federal 
government could hardly borrow a less sum upon any terms. This loan 
was soon exhausted, and much larger amounts were required. The capital 
at the South seeking investment was small. For years, whenever any man 
had accumulated money, he invested it in lands and slaves, which were de¬ 
voted to the production of cotton, which gave larger and surer returns than 
any other investment. The annual cotton crop of the South had been for 
some years worth not less than $200,000,000 a year, almost double the value 
of the gold product of California and Australia. Nearly all of this was ex¬ 
ported. As a medium of exchange, cotton was equivalent to gold; but, un¬ 
less as an article of export, it was worthless. If detained in the region where 
produced,it was a burden*and nuisance. When the government found that 
it piust contract large loans, it endeavored to make cotton a basis for secur¬ 


ing them. The plan was that every cotton-grower should pledge himself 
by formal contract to lend to the government a certain portion of the pro¬ 
ceeds of his cotton, receiving therefor bonds payable at a long day, with 
heavy interest. The government was not to buy the cotton directly. The 
planter was to sell it, as formerly, through his agents; but the money for the 
portion agreed upon, instead of being paid to him, was to be sent to the gov¬ 
ernment, the planter receiving in lieu treasury bonds. It was estimated that 
one half of the product of his cotton might thus be spared by the planter. 
This, if the whole year’s crop were sold as usual, would give the government 
$100,000,000. Agents were sent every where to urge the planters to make 
this conditional loan, and in a few weeks it was announced that $50,000,000 
had been pledged ; but, before any considerable part of the cotton could be 
sold, the blockade of the Southern ports shut it out from a market. The 
cotton was worthless. The government would have only the agreement of 
the planter to loan it half the proceeds when sold; the planter merely the 
agreement of government to give its bonds for it when sold and the proceeds 
paid over to it. 
































February, 1862.] 

Meanwhile the planters were thrown into great distress. The usual prac¬ 
tice at the South had been to sell the crop and receive the pay a year in ad¬ 
vance. They had received the money i’or this crop from Northern mer¬ 
chants, and had spent it. As the market was cut oft', they bad no means of 
carrying on their estates the coming year. They asked government to come 
to their relief. Many modes were suggested, all of which resolved into two. 
Some proposed that the government should purchase the whole cotton crop; 
others that it should advance one half of its value, payment or advance to 
be made, not in bonds, but in treasury notes, which had become the general 
circulating medium of the country. Mr. Memminger, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, replied to these propositions on the 17th of October. Govern¬ 
ment, he said, wanted to raise money. These suggestions proposed that it 
should spend money. That which was the least objectionable, because 
it involved the smallest outlay, proposed that government should loan 
$100,000,000 on pledge of the forthcoming cotton crop, receiving only the 
notes of the planters. The other plan, that government should buy the 
whole existing crop, involved the issue of $150,000,000, being the whole 
value of the cotton, less the $50,000,000 of cotton loan pledged. But cot¬ 
ton, unless brought to market, was of no use to the government. In either 
case it would have to pay out the money which was essential to its very ex¬ 
istence, and receive in exchange notes or produce which it did not need and 
could not use. To carry on the war, treasury notes to the amount of 
$100,000,000 had been issued, and these had become the measure of value; 
if another like amount were issued no new value would be created ; the ef¬ 
fect would be that two dollars must be paid for that which could now be 
purchased for one. Government, being the largest buyer, would thus pay 
double price for its purchases, and would actually sink the whole hundred 
millions which it had advanced. The planters were told that they could ex¬ 
pect no special aid from government, and they must look out for themselves, 
like all the rest of the community. They were advised, in the first place, to 
produce little cotton, but to devote themselves to the cultivation of provis¬ 
ions, and to make their own clothing, looking for money to loans from the 
banks, to be secured by factors’ acceptances based on pledges of produce. 
Banks could manage such loans much better than government, and, besides, 
much less advances would be looked for from them than from government. 
These suggestions were accepted to a great extent. The cotton crop of 1862 
was estimated at less than a quarter of that of the preceding year, and the 
production of food was largely increased. The cotton already gathered was 
left on the hands of the planters, and, some months later, a law was passed 
ordering it to be destroyed whenever it was about to fall into the hands of 
the enemy, who were advancing into the Confederate States by the coast and 
in the West. 

At a later period, when the value of cotton had been advanced fourfold 
in the European markets, the policy of the Confederate government in re¬ 
spect to it was changed. Swift steamers were built in the British ship-yards 
on the Clyde and Mersev to run the blockade, taking in arms and munitions, 
and carrying out cotton. The Confederate government purchased cotton 
and shipped it, receiving returns in gold and arms. The gold was employ¬ 
ed in Europe for the purchase of arms and munitions; the arms and muni¬ 
tions partly by running the blockade and partly through Mexico. Every 
blockade-runner was compelled to take a certain part of its cargo on gov¬ 
ernment account; the remainder was at the risk and for the profit of the 
owners. If one trip, out of three was successful, the whole adventure was 
profitable. 

The exigencies of the treasury in the mean time compelled the issue of 
paper money to an amount far exceeding the utmost estimates of the secre¬ 
tary. In January, 1861, the whole amount of currency in circulation at the 
South was $80,000,000. In January, 1863, it was $300,000,000. The de¬ 
crease in value, when once it set in, was more rapid than the increase in 
amount. The old story of the Sibylline books was reversed. Every fresh 
issue of paper made the whole amount of less value than before. Tn Sep¬ 
tember, 1861, when the issue of Confederate notes was $100,000,000, they 
were nominally equivalent to specie. Then the depreciation began. In 
November, specie commanded 20 per cent, premium ; in April, 1862, 50 per 
cent.; in September, 100; at the opening of 1863, fully 300. That is, gov¬ 
ernment, the largest purchaser, had to pay’ for its supplies four times as much 
in notes at the close of 1862 as it paid fifteen months before. Subsequently 
the depreciation became still greater. As we shall hereafter see, by the mid¬ 
dle of 1864, in spite of stringent measures to reduce the amount of currency 
by imposing a tax which practically amounted to the repudiation of a large 
part of its old issues, Confederate notes were worth barely five cents upon a 
dollar. 

The foreign relations of the Confederacy, when the permanent govern¬ 
ment was organized, were wholly unsatisfactory. The South had from the 
outset looked to the speedy recognition of the Confederacy by the European 
powers. Even if this were not followed by actual war between Great Brit¬ 
ain and the United States, it was believed that it must result in measures 
which would greatly benefit the South. Great Britain, it was argued, must 
in any case have American cotton ; the blockade prevented her from get¬ 
ting it except in small quantities and at enormous prices. She would there¬ 
fore be driven, right or wrong, to refuse to regard the blockade. Her mer¬ 
chantmen, protected,if need were, by her fleet, would throng to Confederate 
ports, bringing in arms, supplies, and gold, and taking away cotton, tobacco, 
and rice. To effect such a recognition was the first object of Confederate 
diplomacy. To do this, it was necessary, in the first place, to neutralize the 
strong anti-slavery feeling in Great Britain, and then to convince her of the 
commercial advantages which would result from recognition and free trade 
with the South. 


217 

Yancey, Mann, and Host, the first Confederate commissioners to Europe, 
sought an early interview with Lord John Bussell, the British Foreign Sec¬ 
retary. He refused to receive them in their official capacity, but gave them 
an unofficial reception. They assured him that the real cause of the seces¬ 
sion was not slavery, but the high price which the South was obliged to pay 
for manufactured goods, in order to protect Northern manufacturers. This, 
indeed, was in direct contradiction to the emphatic and really official decla¬ 
ration of Alexander II. Stephens, that “African slavery as it exists among 
us was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution.” It 
was in direct contradiction to every speech and declaration of Southern pol¬ 
iticians and statesmen from first to last, before and after the secession. One 
of the first acts of the Southern Congress, the commissioners went on to say, 
was to reduce the duties upon imports, while the new tariff of the United 
States would nearly exclude British manufactures from the North. Of the 
$350,000,000 annually exported from the United States, $270,000,000 were 
the products of the Southern states. They had this amount to sell, and for 
it they wanted the manufactures of Europe, especially those of GrenJ Brit¬ 
ain. Russell intimated that the Confederacy would reopen the slave-trade. 
The commissioners denied this. The Confederate Constitution directly pro¬ 
hibited this trade, and there was no purpose to revive it. This interview 
took place on the 4th of March, 1861, and, although it was far from satisfac¬ 
tory to the Southern commissioners, they decided to remain in London for a 
while, hoping that the recognition of the Southern Confederacy would not 
long be delayed. 

In August they addressed a formal note to the Foreign Secretary urging 
the recognition of the Confederacy upon the same general grounds, and 
complaining of the British proclamation of neutrality. The rule prohibit¬ 
ing prizes of either belligerent from entering British ports they declared to 
be a protection to the commerce and ships of the United States; for South¬ 
ern ports being shut up by the blockade, and neutral ones closed by procla¬ 
mation to Confederate prizes, they could only destroy any captures they 
might make. They then addressed themselves to the work of neutralizing 
the “anti-slavery sentiment so universally prevalent in England, which 
shrunk from the idea of forming friendly public relations with a govern¬ 
ment recognizing the slavery of a part of the human race.” They declined 
discussing with a foreign power the question of the morality of slavery, but 
asserted that the Federal government was no more hostile to slavery than 
was the Confederate. The party in power in the Union, they said,had pro¬ 
posed to guarantee slavery forever in the states if the South would remain 
in the Union. “The object of the war, as officially announced, was not to 
free the slave, but to keep him in subjection to his owner, and to control his 
labor through the legislative channels which the Lincoln government de¬ 
signed to force upon the master.” They therefore confidently believed “ that, 
as far as the anti-slavery sentiment of England was concerned, it could have 
no sympathy' with the North, and would probably become disgusted with a 
canting hypocrisy which would enlist those sympathies under false pre¬ 
tenses.” The reply to this communication was that her majesty’s govern¬ 
ment would not pretend to pronounce judgment upon the questions in de¬ 
bate between the United States and their adversaries; that it would not de¬ 
part from its strictly neutral position; would not acknowledge the independ¬ 
ence of the seceding states until the fortune of arms or the more peaceful 
mode of negotiation should have more clearly- determined the respective po¬ 
sitions of the two belligerents. Late in November the commissioners made 
one more attempt upon the British government. Under express instruc¬ 
tions from Mr. Davis, they endeavored to show that the blockade was inef¬ 
fective. and pointed out the commercial interests affected by’ it. The reply 
was sharp and decisive: “Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr. 
Yancey, Mr.Rost, and Mr. Mann. He had the honor to receive their letters 
and inclosures of the 27th and 30th of November, but, in the present state 
of affairs, he must decline to enter into any official communication with 
them.” 

Mr. Yancey, having been elected to the Confederate Senate, returned to 
the South after the absence of a year. In giving an account of the results 
of his mission, he said that the Confederacy had no friends in Europe. The 
sentiment there was anti-slavery, and that pbrtion of public opinion repre¬ 
sented by the government of England was abolition. But the North, also, 
had no friends in Europe. The independence of the South would be recog¬ 
nized only when the North was forced to acknowledge it. The nations of 
Europe would never raise the blockade until it suited their interest, but he 
believed they would find it necessary to do so at an early day. Mason and 
Slidell had in the mean time been busy in London and Paris. - Rost was 
sent to Spain, and Mann to Belgium; but they were unable to induce the 
European powers, all of whom had expressly or tacitly agreed to act in com¬ 
mon, to recognize the Confederacy, or to depart from their position of abso¬ 
lute neutrality. 

But the immediate difficulty which confronted the Confederacy at the or¬ 
ganization of its permanent government was the condition of the army. The 
Confederate army of 1861 was composed mainly of men who had enlisted 
for a year, and their term of enlistment was about to expire. The time of 
148 regiments would close in thirty days. Few of the men composing these 
regiments had re-enlisted. The rush of volunteers had ceased. Gay young 
men no longer contended for the honor of going to fight the Yankees. The 
long interval of inaction which had followed the battle of Bull Run, during 
which the Federal government was busy in gathering and training its re¬ 
cruits, had fearfully impaired the efficiency of the Confederate armies. The 
force which for months lay defiantly almost in sight of Washington was far 
less strong than was imagined. Had the Federal leaders known its real 
strength, they might have ventured a movement early in 1862 which would 


POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 





218 


[April—July, 1862. 


have swept it away. Beyond this army the Confederacy had at the moment 
no formidable force in the field. Richmond was almost destitute of defense. 

The disasters which the Confederacy experienced in the early months of 
1862 awoke the government to its danger, and pointed out its sole means of 
salvation. Their extended line of offense and defense must be contracted, 
and their forces concentrated upon vital points. Above all, the army must 
be largely increased. Furloughs had been so freely granted that the regi¬ 
ments in the field had been greatly weakened. By a general order of March 
24, every furlough and leave of absence was summarily revoked, every offi¬ 
cer and man absent from duty, except on a surgeon’s certificate of disabili¬ 
ty, was ordered to return at once to his command. The President, in a spe¬ 
cial message to Congress, said that the laws for raising armies should be re¬ 
formed. They had been so frequently changed that it was often impossible 
to determine what the law actually was. There was, moreover, a conflict 
between state and Confederate legislation. There must be some general 
system for raising armies, the power for which was by the Constitution vest¬ 
ed in Congress. This necessity was now rendered imminent by the vast prep¬ 
arations made by the enemy for a combined assault at numerous points. 
The state had a right to demand military service of every citizen, but it was 
not wise to place in active service the very young or the very old. Those 
under eighteen required instruction; those of mature age were needed to 
maintain order at home. These two classes constituted the reserve, to be 
called out and kept in the field only in an emergency. To retain this re¬ 
serve intact it was necessary, in a great war like this, that all capable per¬ 
sons of intermediate age should pay their debt of military service to the 
country. He therefore recommended that a law should be passed declaring 
that all persons residing in the Confederate States between the ages of eight¬ 
een and thirty-five, not legally exempt, should be held in the military serv¬ 
ice; that a prompt system should be adopted for their enrollment and or¬ 
ganization, and that all laws conflicting with this system should be repealed. 

The first general conscription law of the Confederacy, framed in accord¬ 
ance with this recommendation, was passed on the 16th of April, 1862. It 
withdrew every non-exempt citizen of the prescribed age from state control, 
and placed him absolutely at the disposal of the President during the war. 
It annulled all contracts made with volunteers for short terms, holding them 
in service for two years additional, should the war continue so long. All 
twelve months’ recruits below eighteen and over thirty-five years, who would 
otherwise have been exempted by this law, were to be retained in service 
for ninety days after their term expired. The President might, with the 
consent of the several governors, employ state officers to make the enroll¬ 
ment, but, if this consent was not given, the President should appoint Con¬ 
federate officers for that purpose. When all the companies and regiments 
from any state should have been filled, the remainder of enrolled men should 
be held as a reserve, from whom should be drawn by lot, at intervals of not 
less than three months, details to keep the companies always full. This re¬ 
serve, while at home, was not to receive pay or be subject to the articles of 
war. except that, if they Tefused to obey the President’s call, they should be 
treated as deserters. Whenever the exigencies of the service required it, 
the President was authorized to call out the entire reserve. This law was 
silent as to exemptions from service. The omission was remedied by sub¬ 
sequent orders; and as the course of events required still larger demands 
upon the people, these exemptions were more and more restricted, until they 
finally included only members of Congress and the state Legislatures, and 
such officials as were absolutely essential to administer the state and nation¬ 
al governments; certain clergymen, teachers, and physicians; a few editors 
and printers; and a certain number of persons absolutely required to con¬ 
duct agricultural operations and oversee slaves. 1 

Provision was made for carrying this sweeping conscription bill into 
prompt execution. Camps of instruction were established, where the en¬ 
rolled men were collected and drilled, and in each state there was a com¬ 
mander of conscripts charged with the supervision of the new levies. These 
were sent off in squads and companies, to be formed into regiments as gov¬ 
ernment pleased. State pride was, however, fostered by putting the recruits 
from each state together under officers from their own states. 

There were some murmurs against this law, which virtually made every 
white male between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five a soldier, liable to 
be brought into active service at a moment’s notice by the mere call of the 
President. These murmurs were promptly suppressed every where except 

1 The various conscription laws of the Confederacy were passed in secret session, and do not 
appear to have been published in full. The Richmond Examiner, n n opposition journal, of Janu¬ 
ary 30, 1864,‘published nn abstract of the Military Bill which had not lone before passed the Sen¬ 
ate, and was then under consideration in the House. In this abstract, officers of the general and 
state departments are placed among the exempts. The Richmond Sentinel, the organ of the gov¬ 
ernment, of February 17, gives an abstract of the bill as finally passed, the injunction of 6ecrecy 
having been removed. The following is its abstract of exemptions: 

“The tenth section provides that no person shall be exempt except the following: ministers, 
superintendents of deaf, dumb, and blind or insane asylums; one editor to each newspaper, and 
6 uch employes as he may swear to be indispensable; the Confederate and state public printers, 
and the journeymen printers necessary to perform the public printing; one apothecary to each 
drug store, who was and has been continuously doing business as such since October 10, 1862; 
physicians over thirty years of age of seven years’ practice, not including dentists; presidents and | 
teachers of colleges, academies, and schools, who have not less than thirty pupils ; superintendents 
of public hospitals established by law, and such physicians nnd nurses ns may be indispensable 
for their efficient management. One agriculturist on each farm where there is no white male 
adult not liable to duty, employing fifteen able-bodied slaves between ten nnd fifty years of age, 
upon the following conditions: the party exempted shall give bond to deliver to the government 
in the next twelve months 100 pounds of bacon, or its equivalent in salt pork, at government se¬ 
lection, and 100 pounds of beef for each such able-bodied slave employed on said farm, at commis¬ 
sioners’ rates. In certain cases this may be commuted in grain or’other provisions. The offi¬ 
cers and employe's of railroad companies engaged in military transportation, not heyond one for 
each mile used in such transportation, and under certain restrictions. Also exempts mail con¬ 
tractors and carriers.’’ 

This abstract makes no mention of the officials of the general or state governments; but it is 
probable that they were exempted by other sections, for it is provided that the President mav de¬ 
tail artisans, mechanics, or persons of scientific skill to perform indispensable services in various 

departments. 


in Georgia and Arkansas, where it seemed that a conflict might arise between 
state and Confederate authorities. Officers of the state militia had been ar¬ 
rested by the enrolling officers. The governor demanded their release, 
threatening to arrest any Confederate officer who should arrest any state of¬ 
ficer. The Confederate authorities yielded the point; but adding, through 
the Secretary of War, “If you arrest any of our enrolling officers in their 
attempts to get men to fill up the Georgia regiments now in the face of the 
enemy, you will cause great mischief. I think we might as well drive out 
our common enemy before we make war upon each other.” Brown, the 
irascible and pragmatic governor, was mollified by this concession to his dig¬ 
nity as chief magistrate of a sovereign state. He said that he was happy 
that the Confederate government had decided to respect the constitutional 
rights of the state so far as not to force her to the alternative of permitting 
any department of her government to be destroyed, or to defend herself by 
force. A local judge in Georgia pronounced the conscription law to be un¬ 
constitutional, but his decision was set aside by the Supreme Court of the 
state. 

The disasters which compelled the Confederate government to adopt the 
policy of concentrating its forces in Virginia caused great excitement in the 
states beyond the Mississippi. Governor Rector, of Arkansas, issued an ap¬ 
peal to the people of that state calling them to arms, and more than insinu¬ 
ating that the Confederate government had deserted the state, and that the 
call of the President for troops from Arkansas should be disregarded, and 
even hinting at the formation of a new confederacy of the Southwest. 1 The 
Confederate government wisely forbore here, as in Georgia, to enter upon a 
controversy with one of the states. The wisdom of concentrating its force 
in Virginia was soon apparent, and at the next election Rector was defeated. 

The conscription law was at once put into execution. Sweeping as it was, 
and rapidly as it was enforced, it was not an atom too sweeping, and barely 
in time to save the Confederacy from destruction. The Federal govern¬ 
ment, with the start in preparation of fully four months, delayed the advance 
of its troops upon Richmond, hesitating which line to adopt, when an ad¬ 
vance upon either of the proposed lines could hardly have failed of success. 
A full month of precious time was lost before the advance was begun. An¬ 
other month Was wasted in the siege of Yorktown, where an army of fully 
100,000 men was held in check by barely a tenth of their number. Three 
weeks more were taken up in the cautious advance across the Peninsula. 
Thus three full months, every day of which was of vital moment to the Con¬ 
federacy, were lost by the Federal army before it was fairly in the neighbor¬ 
hood of Richmond. 

For the greater part of this time the Confederate authorities well-nigh de¬ 
spaired of being able to defend their capital. On the 21st of April, while 
the Federal army was in check before Yorktown, the Confederate Congress 
adjourned in such haste as to show that the members were anxious to pro¬ 
vide for their own personal safety. The newspapers were bitter in their in¬ 
vectives against the fugitives. One invented the euphonious word “ske¬ 
daddle” to designate their flight. Another said that the stampeding mem¬ 
bers, afraid of railroad accidents, bad gone off by canal, a regiment of ladies 
being sent to clear the tow-path. They would escort the members to the 
mountains, and, leaving them under the protection of the children until 
McClellan would suffer them to come forth, would return to the defense of 
the country. But the alarm was by no means confined to Congress. The 
railway trains were blocked up by fugitives; the President sent his family 
to Raleigh; the government archives were packed up ready to be sent to 
Columbia, South Carolina. The state Legislature, however, passed resolu¬ 
tions calling upon the Confederate authorities to defend Richmond to the 
last extremity, and this demand was seconded by the local authorities of the 
capital. Fortifications were thrown up around the city, and the approaches 
by the James River were blocked up. Above all, time had been gained. 
Early in June the conscription law began to produce its effects in filling up 
the ranks, and by the time the Federal army was prepared to open its direct 
attack it found itself confronted by fully equal forces, and in a few weeks 
was greatly outnumbered. 

The President of the Confederacy had in the mean while given a great 
commander to its armies. Congress had not long before passed a bill cre¬ 
ating the office of commanding general, who should take charge of the mili- 


1 “By the authority and sanction of the Military Board, whose duty it is to protect the state 
from invasion, whose right it is to call an army into the field when the Confederate States refuse 
or neglect to protect the people, I call upon each and every man capable of hearing arms to pre¬ 
pare at once to meet the enemy. The law is that every able-bodied free white male inhabitant 
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five shall constitute the militia of the state. . . . All men 
between these ages, if physically able, may be called to the field now, the state being invaded. 
The state, always sovereign, is sovereign yet in her reserved rights, one of which is to defend her 
own soil, her own government, her own people.” Arkansas, he said, had severed her connection 
with the United States upon the doctrine of state sovereignty, nnd formed an alliance with the oth¬ 
er Confederate states. She had lavished her blood in support of the Confederacy. “She had 
done this because of her generous confidence that, when the evil hour came upon her, the Confed¬ 
erate flag would be found floating from her battlements defying the invader, nnd giving succor to 
her people. But untoward events had placed her beyond the pale of protection. Much impaired, 
though still capable of resistance, she will strike a blow for liberty, and continue to be free. If 
i left to her fate, she will carve a new destiny rather than be subjugated. It was for liberty she 
struck, nnd not for subordination to any created secondary power North or South. Her best 
friends arc her natural allies nearest at home, who will pulsate when she bleeds, whose utmost 
hope is not beyond her existence. If the arteries of the Confederate heart do not permeate be¬ 
yond the cast bank of the Mississippi, let Southern Missourians, Arknnsinns, Texans, nnd the great 
West know it, and prepare for the future. Arkansas lost, abandoned, subjugated, is not Arkansas 
ns she entered the Confederate government; nor will she remain Arkansas, a Confederate state, 
desolated ns n wilderness. Her children, fleeing from the wrath to come, will build them a new 
ark, and launch it on new waters, seeking a new haven somewhere of equality, safety, and rest.” 
This address closed with a call for 4500 volunteers from the militia of the state. If sufficient vol¬ 
unteers were not forthcoming, the deficiency wftuld be supplied by draft. “Troops raised under 
this call,” it was significantly added, “will not be transferred to Confederate service, under any 
circumstances, without their consent, and on no account unless a Confederate force sufficient to 
prevent invasion is sent into the state. These are raised exclusively for home protection. Horses, 
horse equipments, ami arms lost by the casualties of war will be paid for by the state.”— Jddress 
of Governor Rector, May 5, 1862. 






POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 


219 


July—December, 1862.] 

tary movements of the war. The design of the bill was to place Joseph E. 
Johnston at the head of the forces of the Confederacy. The President, with 
whom Johnston had never been a favorite, vetoed the bill; but Johnston, 
in virtue of his rank as senior general, commanded in the field before Rich¬ 
mond. A wound received on the 2d of June disabled him for a time; and 
on the following day Davis appointed Lee to the nominal office of command¬ 
ing general,the order providing that he should “act under the direction of 
the President.” There had been nothing in Lee’s previous career indicating 
that he possessed qualities beyond those of a brave and energetic subordi¬ 
nate. As commander of the state forces he had not been successful in West¬ 
ern Virginia. His sudden appointment to the chief command of the Con¬ 
federate forces was considered by the opponents of the administration as a 
part of Mr. Davis’s plan of holding every thing under his own control, by 
studiously keeping down every man who might by possibility become his 
rival. It is hardly possible that in such a crisis this could have been the 
motive for the promotion of Lee. It is far more probable that in him the 
President saw the great general. But, be this as it may, in the appointment 
of Lee to the chief command the Confederate forces gained as their leader 
one of the great masters of the art of war. 

The Federal campaign in the Valley and on the Peninsula was a failure. 
In the early days of June Richmond was in the utmost peril. In the earl}' 
days of July the Federal forces had been forced to the James River. In the 
early days of August the Federals were driven back from Cedar Mountain. 
At the close of the month, after losing the battles near the old field of Bull 
Run, the Army of the Potomac was driven back upon Washington. In the 
early days of September the Confederates were crossing the Potomac, invad¬ 
ing Maryland, and threatening Washington. 

When the Confederate Congress reassembled at Richmond on the 15th of 
August, the President might well offer his congratulations upon the issue of 
the events of the last four months. “The vast army,” he said, “which 
threatened the capital of the Confederacy has been defeated and driven from 
the lines of investment." The conscription law had saved the Confederacy; 
but this had been done at a fearful cost. The levy embracing all between 
eighteen and thirty-five had been exhausted. It was necessary to extend 
the conscription law so as to enable the President to call into active service 
all persons between thirty-five and forty-five. A law was passed to this ef¬ 
fect on the 27th of September, but the power thus conferred was not exer¬ 
cised until the expiration of almost a year. In July, 1863, the President 
called into active service all between eighteen and forty-five. Seven months 
later, in February, 1864, a new law was passed still farther extending the 
conscription, by including in it all between the ages of seventeen aud fifty. 
The full consideration of these two last conscription laws belongs to a sub¬ 
sequent period of this history. 

The Confederates bad from the very outset employed slaves and free col¬ 
ored persons in a military capacity. The works before Charleston, com¬ 
menced late in 1860, were mainly thrown up “by large gangs of negroes 
from the plantations,” 1 and by free negroes of Charleston, of whom 150 in 
a single day offered their services to the Governor of South Carolina. 2 In 
April the Lynchburg Republican proposed “ three cheers for the patriotic 
free negroes of Lynchburg,” of whom seventy had “tendered their services 
to the governor to act in whatever capacity may be assigned them in de¬ 
fense of the state.” It was triumphantly announced that all the fortifica¬ 
tions required for the harbor of Norfolk could be erected by the voluntary 
labor of negroes. 3 In June the Legislature of Tennessee passed an act au¬ 
thorizing the governor to “receive into the military service of the state all 
male free persons of color between the ages of fifteen and fiftyand if a 
sufficient number did not volunteer they were to be impressed. The South¬ 
ern newspapers of 1861 were full of accounts of colored volunteers. One 
told of a grand display, held November 23, at New Orleans, where 28,000 
troops were reviewed, among whom was a “ regiment composed of 1400 free 
colored men.” The works at Manassas Junction were mainly thrown up 
by the slaves of the neighboring planters.* In February, 1862, the Virginia 
House of Delegates passed a bill ordering the enlistment of free colored per¬ 
sons for six months. On the 10th of March Mr. Foote declared in the Con¬ 
federate Congress that, when Nashville was surrendered, 1000 or 1500 slaves 
had been called out and employed on the fortifications. In November, Gov¬ 
ernor Brown, of Georgia, called for slaves to complete the fortifications of 
Savannah ; if these were not voluntarily tendered, a levy would be made 
upon every planter in the state of one slave out of five, which would give a 
working force of 15,000. Subsequent to this time still more stringent meas¬ 
ures were taken to bring negroes into the Confederate service. 

Up to the beginning of 1863 the only law passed by the Federal Congress 
for the employment of colored soldiers was the act of July 17,1862, author¬ 
izing the President to employ in the naval and military service of the Unit¬ 
ed States persons of African descent, and freeing the families of such per¬ 
sons, provided they belonged to masters in rebellion. The passage of this 
law aroused an intense feeling throughout-the South, of which the Confed¬ 
erate government promptly took advantage. In his message of August 15, 
President Davis complains that “two at least of the generals of the United 
States are engaged, unchecked by their government, in exciting servile in¬ 
surrection, and in arming and training slaves for warfare against their mas¬ 
ters, citizens of the Confederacy.” Threats of vengeance were then made. 
These took form in a proclamation issued on the 23d of December, in which 
it was ordered that “all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered 
over to the executive authorities of the respective states to which they be¬ 
long, to be dealt with according to the laws of said states,” and that “like 

1 Dispatch from R. R. Riortlnn to l’crrv Walker. Mobile. * Charleston Mercury, January 3, 
1861. 1 Petersburg Express, April 23. * Beauregard's Report of the Battle of Bull Run. 


orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of 
the United States when found serving in company with said slaves in insur¬ 
rection against the authorities of the different states of the Confederacy." 
As the laws of the Southern States inflicted the punishment of death upon 
all insurgent slaves, and upon all who should aid them, the intent of this 
proclamation was to deny to all such persons who should be captured, and 
also to all white officers commanding them, the character of prisoners of 
war, directing them to be handed over for summary execution to the civil 
authorities of the several states. This proclamation was subsequently mod¬ 
ified by an act passed in May, 1863. It declared that the commissioned of¬ 
ficers of the enemy who might be captured should not be delivered to the 
state authorities, but should be dealt with by the Confederate government; 
that every white Federal officer commanding negro or mulatto troops should 
be deemed guilty of inciting servile insurrection, and if eaptured.be put to 
death or otherwise punished at the discretion of the military court; that ev¬ 
ery such person should be tried by the military corps or army capturing 
him, but the President might commute the punishment ordered by this 
court; but “all negroes and mulattoes who shall be engaged in war, or taken 
in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid and comfort to the 
enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate 
States, be delivered to the authorities of the state or states in which they 
shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws 
of such state or states.” The general principle thus attempted to be estab¬ 
lished was that no person of color should be recognized as a soldier of the 
Federal army, and as such be entitled, when captured, to the rights of a pris¬ 
oner of war, but should be held to be a malefactor, liable to the severe pen¬ 
alties prescribed by local law against offenders of other than pure white de¬ 
scent. Out of this general provision grew in the sequel many questions re¬ 
lating to the exchange of prisoners. 

The capture of New Orleans, at the close of April, 1862, had inflicted a 
severe wound upon Southern feeling. This was aggravated by the rigid 
government instituted over the conquered city by General Butler. Two 
special acts of his afforded a pretext for violent measures. Upon the infor¬ 
mal surrender of the city the Union flag had been hoisted upon the Mint. 
There wei£ then no Federal troops actually occupying the city, which was, 
however, commanded by the Union gun-boats, and virtually in their posses¬ 
sion. The flag was cut down by a gang of desperadoes, prominent among 
whom was one Mumford, a notorious character of the city. He was arrest¬ 
ed by General Butler, tried, and executed. Many women of New Orleans, 
after the complete occupation of the city, made it a point studiously to in¬ 
sult the Federal soldiers in the public streets. Butler determined to put. 
down these insulting demonstrations, and issued his famous “ General Order 
No. 28,” declaring that “when any female shall, by word, gesture, or move¬ 
ment, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, 
she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town 
plying her avocation.” By the municipal law of New Orleans, any woman 
of this class “plying her avocation” in the street was liable to be arrested, 
detained over night in the calaboose, brought before a magistrate, and fined 
five dollars. This was the extent of the penalty threatened by the order. 
It assumed that only women of that class would endeavor to attract the at¬ 
tention of strangers. Still, the order was most unfortunately worded. It 
gave occasion to the charge that the women of the captured city were aban¬ 
doned to the insults, if not to the passions, of lawless and excited soldiers. 
The Confederate authorities were not slow to take advantage of this. The 
charge was rung through the length and breadth of the land, where it 
aroused the fiercest frenzy. It was reiterated in Europe, where the recollec¬ 
tion of atrocities committed in captured cities by ungoverned soldiers was 
fresh in men’s memories. They had read of the outrages of the French un¬ 
der Suchet, at Tarragona; of the British, under Wellington, at Badajos; and 
of the thousand similar cases which marked the great war of the last gener¬ 
ation. They were reading the accounts which began slowly to transpire of 
the outrages committed within a few months by the British troops in India, 
and were prepared to believe that similar scenes were enacting in New Or¬ 
leans. Every instance of punishment which circumstances rendered neces¬ 
sary was repeated, exaggerated, and perverted, until the public mind in the 
South and in Europe was prepared not merely to justify, but to demand the 
most severe measures of retaliation. At length, on the 23d of December, 
President Davis issued a proclamation declaring that General Butler should 
no longer be considered a public enemy, but a felon deserving capital pun¬ 
ishment, an outlaw and common enemy of mankind; ordering that, in case 
he was captured, he should be hung on the spot; that the commissioned of¬ 
ficers serving under him should also, in case of capture, be reserved for exe¬ 
cution ; and that, until the execution of Butler, no commissioned officer of 
the United States should be released on parole. 1 The actual course of Gen¬ 
eral Butler, while in command of New Orleans, will be narrated in full in a 
subsequent chapter. 

From this survey of the foreign and domestic policy of the Federal and 
Confederate governments down to the beginning of the year 1863, we return 
to the series of great military operations of the year 1862. 

‘ “ I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, and in their name, do 

pronounce and declare the said Benjamin F. Butler a felon deserving of capital punishment. I 
do order that he be no longer considered or treated simply ns n public enemy of the Confederate 
States of Ainericn. but as an outlaw and common enemy of mankind, and that, in the event of 
his capture, the officer in command of the capturing force do cause him to be immediately exe¬ 
cuted by hnnging; and I do farther order that no commissioned officer of the United States taken 
captive shall be released on parole Ixsfore exchange until the said Butler shall have met with due 
punishment for his crimes. . . . All commissioned officers in the command of the said Benjamin 
F. Butler are declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but 
as robbers and criminals deserving death, and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, 
reserved for execution .”—Proclamation of Jefferson Dans, December 23. 18G2. 









220 


[January, 1862. 



CtJMUEBLAND GAP, 


CHAPTER X. 

EASTERN KENTUCKY. MIDDLE CREEK AND MILL SPRING. 

The General Situation at the beginning of 18G2.—The Necessity for immediate Action.—The 
President’s Order of January 27th.—The Situation in Eastern Kentucky.—Humphrey Mar¬ 
shall in the Big Sandy.—Garfield’s Brigade.—The March on Paintville.—Retreat of Marshall. 
—Middle Creek.—The Battle.—Marshall retreats to Abingdon, Va.—The Course of the Cum¬ 
berland.—Cumberland Gap.—Zollicoffer's Camp at Mill Spring.—General Crittenden joins Zol- 
licoffer.—Thomas moves against the Confederate Encampment.—The Battle of Mill Spring.— 
Death of Zollicofter.—Crittenden's Retreat to Gaincsborough. 

A NERVOUS disquiet pervaded the Southern mind at the commence¬ 
ment of a new year, the result, in a great measure, of the highly- 
wrought anticipations which had grown out of the Trent affair. It was pre¬ 
sumed that the Federal government would decide blindly, and without re¬ 
gard to the claims of justice, upon the question which had been forced upon 
it by the unauthorized seizure of Mason and Slidell, and it was a painful 
surprise to the Confederates to learn that the two commissioners had been 
quietly and dispassionately rendered up to the British government. The 
extraordinary unanimity with which the people of the North supported the 
administration in its efforts to subdue a rebellious section of the country was 
a disappointment hardly less keen or more easily admitting of consolation. 
The South, along with its hope of foreign interference, had insanely nourish¬ 
ed the fond expectation of what it called “ a popular revulsion in the North¬ 
ern people against the folly and pusillanimity of their rulers.” 1 It also very 
mucb galled the Confederates to look back upon the closing events of the 
past year—the repulse at Drainesvillc and the reverse in Missouri. Nor was 
the immediate future any more hopeful. The Confederacy was prepared 
neither in the East nor the West to assume the offensive: in the West this 
policy was impossible; in the East it was perilous. There was no good 
reason to expect that the national army would rashly set out upon an ill-ad¬ 
vised campaign, directly assailing the formidable strong-holds and fortifica¬ 
tions of the Confederacy; there was no necessity compelling that army to 
rush desperately into any campaign of whatsoever sort and favored by what¬ 
soever advantages; it could wait until its preparations had become so form 
idable as to be all but irresistible. The naval expeditions of the preceding 
year had inculcated a wholesome fear all along the Atlantic and Gulf 
coasts, and this apprehension was only matched by that which the threaten¬ 
ed movements of the national forces in the West naturally occasioned. 
Price was in full retreat southward, with three Union armies in his rear. 
McCulloch, with his daring band of Arkansas recruits, had withdrawn from 
the field. Kentucky was overawed. The blockade interposed an almost 
insuperable barrier between the Southern cities and all foreign ports. The 
national finances had been efficiently sustained by the entire wealth of the 
North, while those of the South were already betraying their fundamental 
weakness. Very soon, too, the twelve months’ soldiers of the Confederacy 
would have to be discharged. It was beginning to be seen, and already it 
was declared by the Southern press, that it is an old and ever-proven tru¬ 
ism, that when two sections are at war, the one which has the least means 
must find success in early and rapid action, for it can gain little by time, 
while the other finds in time the power to bring into efficient use its more 


1 Richmond Examiner, Jan. 1, 1862. 


varied means. The clearest policy of the weaker section in such a conflict 
was to find in the rapid use of its revolutionary enthusiasm an overmatch 
for the slower, less spirited, but more enduring North. 1 The Southern peo¬ 
ple were impatient for an advance of the Confederate army of the Potomac. 
•'We have gazed,” they said, “imploringly on the lion while the fox has 
been weaving his toils. Are we to continue hemmed in for another six 
months, and lack all things, or shall our armies on to Washington, and lack 
nothing?” 

There was somewhat of a restless spirit at the North also, but based upon 
entirely different grounds, and far more reasonable in its nature and its con¬ 
clusions. It was not peevishness, nor the outgrowth of a desperate spirit 
that would venture all at a single throw; it was rather the expression of 
confident hope mingled with an clement of considerable anxiety—hope so 
far as we ourselves were concerned, anxiety in regard to the attitude of Eu¬ 
ropean Powers. The aristocracy of the Old World was plainly committed 
to the interests of the Southern slaveholder, and it needed but a single stroke 
of policy or a change of ministry to give the sanction of authority to the 
opinions held by the Second Estate both in England and France. Nine 
months had passed since the declaration of war, and these nine months were 
especially signalized by reverses to the Federal armies. Every week’s de¬ 
lay in moving against the enemy's works enfeebled that respect for our 
strength as a nation which foreign nations had always entertained, and made 
the policy of interference, already backed by motives of selfish interest, ap¬ 
parently justifiable as well as natural. If it should come to the worst—if 
Europe should despair of an early termination of the war on account of the 
vacillation of our military commanders — then nothing short of national 
ruin, as complete and irretrievable as any upon historic record, stared us in 
the face. And for vacillation and hesitancy, moreover, there seemed little 
occasion. Hitherto the case had been different' we bad, in spite of the vast 
resources of the nation held in reserve, been compelled to create the very 
means and organization through which these resources should become avail¬ 
able and effective. But now, through unparalleled activity and determina¬ 
tion, the great want had been measurably supplied; and although it was im¬ 
possible to calculate with certainty upon success in every movement which 
wc were prepared to make, yet it is to be remembered, and was then earn¬ 
estly insisted upon, that in no war of any magnitude was it ever possible to 
obviate the chances of failure, whatever rnay have been the previous prepa¬ 
ration. The pressing exigencies urging on an immediate movement of our 

1 In addition to other disparagements, the Confederate army suffered very much from disease 
in eatnp, far more than the Federal army—not only bv reason of less favorable location, but also, 
and chiefly, through negligence. Says E. A. Pollard, in his Southern History of the War: “The 
most distressing abuses were visible in the ill-regulated hygiene of our camps. The ravages of 
disease among the army in Virginia were terrible. The accounts of its extent were suppressed in 
the newspapers of the day ; and there is no doubt thdt thousands of our brave troops disappeared 
from notice without a record of their end, in the nameless graves that yet mark the camping- 
grounds on the lines of the Potomac ami among the wild mountains of Virginia. Our camps 
were scourged w ith pneumonia and diarrhoea. The armies on the Potomac and in Western Vir¬ 
ginia suffered greatly—those troops in Client Mountain and in the vicinity of the Kanawha Val¬ 
ley most intensely. The wet and changeable climate; the difficulty of transportation, exposure 
to cold and rain without tents, the necessary consequence of the frequent forward and retrograde 
movements, as well as the want of suitable food for either sick or well .men, produced most of the 
sickness, and greatly aggravated it after its accession.” The Southern people, when made aware 
of these facts, with great generosity contributed immense sums in clothing and stores for the re¬ 
lief of their troops. During the latter quarter of 1861, the eleven states of the Confederacy con¬ 
tributed in this way a million and a half in money, besides the voluntary contributions which 
came from Missouri and Kentucky. 






















































































MIDDLE CREEK AND MILL SPRING. 


221 


January, 1862.] 

armies were those belonging naturally to the situation, and not the effect of 
popular clamor. Never was there more patience manifested by any people 
where so much—nothing less, indeed, than the life of the nation—was at 
stake, and manifested in connection with such stirring enthusiasm and ardent 
patriotism as was shown by the people of the loyal states in those quiet au¬ 
tumn and winter months, during which they waited without a murmur or 
the slightest breath of suspicion against the national authority. When, there¬ 
fore, General McClellan states in his report that, about the middle of Janu- 
ary, upon recovering from a severe illness, he found that “ excessive anxiety 
for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken posses¬ 
sion of the minds of the administration,” it is not to be understood that this 
anxiety was the result of any growing dissatisfaction among the people. 
There were currents from across the Atlantic drifting inevitably into a pol¬ 
icy hostile to the United States, the bearings of which were more patent to 
the Department of State than to the nation at large. The altered policy 
which then became necessary was not, as has sometimes been alleged, and 
as General McClellan seems in this connection to indicate, the result of the 
change in the secretaryship of the War Department, by which Edwin M. 
Stanton took the place of Mr. Cameron. But for the complications rapidly 
being developed in the Department of State, the War Department could have 
prosecuted its operations according to a more leisurely policy. Whether, 
even under these circumstances, that would have been a wise policy, is an 
independent question; a necessity from without, urging an immediate move¬ 
ment, disposed summarily of the whole matter. 

It is from this stand-point that we are to consider the important military 
order which his excellency the President issued from the executive mansion 
on the 27th of January, 1862, the substance of which was the following: 

“ That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement 
of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. 

“ That, especially, 

“ The army at and about Fortress Monroe, 

“ The Army of the Potomac, 

“The Army of Western Virginia, 

“ The army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, 

“ The army and flotilla at Cairo, 

“ And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 

“That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective com¬ 
manders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional 
orders when duly given. 

“That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War 
and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with 
all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will sever¬ 
ally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of 
this order." 

This was followed on the 31st by a special war order, “That all the dis¬ 
posable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the de¬ 
fense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object 
of seizing upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas 
Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and 
the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.” 

The subsequent modification of this special order by the President, and 
the events of the Peninsular campaign, will form the leading subjects of a 
subsequent chapter. In the mean time we turn to the Western field, and to 
the events which there followed each other, in execution of the President’s 
order, from Garfield’s victories in the valley of the Big Sandy to the evacu¬ 
ation by the enemy of all the important strong-holds in Kentucky. 

During the month of January, Eastern Kentucky .was the one sole field 
of active military operations. The Confederate force in Kentucky at this 
time was distributed among the three important military positions command¬ 
ing the southern part of the state and the main avenues into Tennessee, 
viz., Columbus, Bowling Green, and the region about Cumberland Gap. A 
small portion of this force, however, was located in the eastern part of the 
state, consisting of a few regiments of Kentucky troops under Colonel Hum¬ 
phrey Marshall, occupying an intrenched position at Paintville. We have 
previously given an account of the retreat of the Confederate force, not quite 
1500 strong, under Colonel Williams, in November, from Prestonburg and 
Piketon into Virginia. This was the result of an attack by General Nelson, 
who, if he had pursued the retreating enemy, might, perhaps, have reaped 
important frifits from his victory by the destruction or occupation of the 
Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad. • But this would have been a hazard¬ 
ous undertaking, considering the distance over which supplies would have 
to be transported, and the mountainous nature of the country to be traversed, 
added to the embarrassments which would have grown out of the hostile 
disposition of the inhabitants. General Nelson did not even continue the 
pursuit of Colonel Williams through Pound Gap, but withdrew to the cen¬ 
tral portion of the state with his forces. Immediately afterward Humphrey 
Marshall gathered together a brigade of Confederates at Paintville, with a 
battery of artillery and a few companies of cavalry. 

The colonel—a man of aldermanic dimensions—had occupied a somewhat 
prominent position in politics, and had served in the Mexican war, having 
led the famous charge of the Kentucky volunteers at Buena Vista. He had 
been elected to Congress in 1849; was appointed commissioner to China by 
President Fillmore, and afterward became a leading member of the Ameri¬ 
can party. He was not, however, destined to distinguish himself as a mili¬ 
tary hero in the valley of the Big Sandy, although great hopes were enter¬ 
tained at the South that he would make his way triumphantly to Frankfort, 
and establish the authority of the provisional governor Johnson in the place 
of the regular state government. 



Jamls a. 


The Big Sandy, having its head waters in Virginia, forms the northwest¬ 
ern boundary between that state and Kentucky, emptying its waters into 
the Ohio. At Louisa, a small village situated some twenty-five miles south¬ 
ward from its mouth, West Fork joins the main stream. Following the 
road up this fork for twenty-live miles farther, we reach Paintville. At 
high water the river is navigable as far as Piketon, twenty-five miles be¬ 
yond, and in November General Nelson had no difficulty in transporting 
his supplies to that point. On the 7th of January, however, when Colonel 
James A. Garfield broke up his camp on Muddy Creek and advanced against 
the enemy, the river was low, and occasioned great difficulty in the transport¬ 
ation of supplies. His force at starting was about 1500, consisting of the 
Forty-second Ohio and the Fourteenth Kentucky, accompanied by a squad¬ 
ron of cavalry. On the route he was re-enforced by a battalion of Virginia 
cavalry, under Colonel Bolles, and 300 of the Twenty-second Kentucky, 
making the entire force with which he marched on Paintville about 2200 
men. Another battalion of cavalry, under Colonel Wolford, together with 
the Fortieth Ohio, was also moving toward the same point from the west 
along Paint Creek. Hearing of this threatened attack, Humphrey Mar¬ 
shall had left his intrenchments two days before, and retired to a position 
among the heights at Middle Creek, a little below Prestonburg, leaving only 
a small force of cavalry at the mouth of Jennie’s Creek, three miles west of 
Paintville, to act as a corps of observation and to protect his trains. Before 
reaching Paintville, Garfield was made aware of the situation of this eav- 
alrj r force, though he had no certain knowledge of the whereabouts of the 
other and main portion of the enemy. Dispatching Colonel Bolles’s caval¬ 
ry and a company of infantry to attack the former from the north side, he 
himself, with a thousand men, crossed the Paint at four o’clock in the after¬ 
noon, to make an armed reconnoissance, which resulted in the discovery 
that the main body of the enemy had withdrawn. It was over two hours 
since he had sent Bolles up the creek, and now, seeing that he had a fair 
opportunity of securing the Confederate cavalry force, he promptly sent a 
messenger with orders to the colonel not to attack until he should have 
time himself to get in the rear and cut off the retreat. The orders, how¬ 
ever, came too late, as the attack had already been made, and the colonel 
was then engaged in pursuing the enemy up the Jennie; so that when Gar¬ 
field, a little later, had gained, as he supposed, the rear of the enemy, he 
soon discovered their cavalry equipments, which they had left in the con¬ 
fusion of flight, strewing the road, and indicating with certainty that the 
Confederates had escaped. Bolles, in the mean while, after pursuing until 
he came up with Marshall’s infantry rear-guard, returned to Paintville, 
where the Federal forces encamped for the night. 

The next morning the arrival of the Fortieth Ohio and Wolford’s cavalry 
brought the number of the Federal forces up to 2400 men. On the 9th, 
Garfield, detailing 1100 men from his four regiments, and detaching two 
cavalry squadrons to move along his right up Jennie’s Creek, followed the 
river road south to Prestonburg, the distance to this town from Paintville 
being twelve miles. He had been delayed a whole day at the latter place, 
awaiting supplies from George’s Creek, a few miles below on the river, 
which arrived in such scanty amounts as to render it impossible to give 
three days rations of hard bread—and it was useless to set out with less 
















222 


[January, 1862. 



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than that—to more than 1500 men. It was necessary, therefore, that fully 
1000 men should remain behind until the arrival of farther supplies. 

Humphrey Marshall, with over 3000 men, had taken up a position 
among the heights on the forks of Middle Creek, two miles below Pres- 
tonburg. His force consisted of two Virginia and two Kentucky regiments, 
one of the latter under the command of Colonel John S. Williams, being the 
same which Nelson had two months ago driven out of the state through 
Pound Gap. Two small detachments of cavalry and a battery of four 
pieces guarded the approaches to a position naturally very good for defense. 
On the evening of the 9th Garfield’s advanced column drove in the Confed¬ 
erate pickets, and a messenger was dispatched to Paintville with orders to 
move forward all the available force to participate in the morrow's conflict. 
As another boat-load of supplies had arrived that day from below, Lieuten¬ 
ant Colonel Sheldon was enabled to take about 700 men, at the head of 
which force he started early the next morning. The main body of Gar¬ 
field's force, having slept on their arms in the rain until four o’clock A.M., 
moved up Abbot’s Creek one mile, and crossed over to the mouth of Mid¬ 
dle Creek, a little north of Prestonburg, arriving there at eight o’clock. 
Supposing the enemy to be encamped on Abbot’s Creek, it was Garfield’s 
plan to gain his rear by moving up Middle Creek, thus cutting off the re¬ 
treat, while an attack was made at the same time by the cavalry upon the 
front. Small bodies of Marshall’s cavalry were met all along the march up 
Middle Creek for two miles and a half, when the Federal troops were drawn 
up on the slope of a semicircular hill. A thousand yards farther up the 
stream divided into two forks, which were held by the enemy. It was now 
noon, and with the small force available for an attack the approach was of 
necessity a cautious one, the re-enforcements not having arrived. It was 
not wise, through an armed reconnoissance, to seek information as to the 
numbers and disposition of the Confederate force, as this reconnoissance 
would inevitably bring on a general engagement, in which the Federal 
troops would not only be overwhelmed by a superior force, but would labor 
under the additional disadvantage of being precipitated into a battle with¬ 
out any previous plan of operation. Besides, the enemy was so posted in 
his concealed position as to command the road at the head of the gorge, 
and also to flank it from the left-hand side. His artillery, together with 


Colonel Williams’s regiment, was on the right-hand side of the road at the 
head of the gorge, and a crescent-shaped hill on the opposite side concealed 
another column just behind its crest. It was Marshall’s design to draw the 
Federal forces up the road, and then to open upon them from the front and 
left. Anticipating a manoeuvre of this nature, Garfield, having taken up his 
position on the slope of a semicircular hill on the right-hand side of the 
creek, dispatched twenty mounted men, who made a headlong charge up the 
valley, and, drawing the enemy’s fire, disclosed the position above indicated. 
Two columns, consisting each of two companies, were sent, one along the 
crest to the right, behind which Colonel Trigg’s Virginia regiment was sta 
tioned, and the other across the creek, to ascend the rugged crest farthest up 
the gorge on the left. The right column became immediately the target of 
the enemy’s artillery, but the latter was so badly served that its shells did 
not explode, while the small force dispatched to the left, after climbing up 
the rocky ridge on their hands and knees, engaged the enemj on that side. 
Both columns were re-enforced. Trigg’s regiment was withdrawn across 
the creek, and the battle raged chiefly on the left, which Garfield still far¬ 
ther re-enforced with one hundred and fifty men. The Confederates in the 
mean time had gained a commanding position on the top of the ridge, and 
directly in front of the Federal reserve force, on which they opened a heavy 
fire, that was returned with good effect. To guard against a flank move¬ 
ment, which was now threatened by the enemy’s right, another column of 
one hundred and twenty men was ordered to cross at a point lower down 
and drive the enemy from his new position, a movement which was suc¬ 
cessfully accomplished. After some pretty severe fighting, a similar success 
attended the Federal column on the crest nearer the creek, the enemy being 
also driven from his position at that point. On account of the great dispar¬ 
ity of the two opposing forces, the Federals were obliged to resort in many 
cases to an irregular mode of fighting, sheltering themselves whenever op¬ 
portunity offered behind trees and rocks. They had no heavy artillery, 
and the cavalry, having gone in a mistaken direction, did not participate in 
the engagement. The battle had now continued in this desultory style for 
over three hours, and it was four o’clock P.M. when Sheldon came up with 
re-enforcements from Paintville. These had started early in the morning, 

I and had marched fifteen miles without breakfast; but their courage, not 
















MIDDLE CREEK AND MILL SPRING. 


223 


January, 18G2.] 

daunted by these unfavorable circumstances, demanded to be tested in the 
fight with the already checked, if not baffled foe. The enthusiasm occasion¬ 
ed by their arrival was unbounded, and Garfield promptly dispatched his 
entire reserve to the right for an attack upon the enemy’s main position and 
the capture of his guns. Appreciating the new phase which the battle w as 
taking, Humphrey Marshall ordered a retreat, which was continued to Ab¬ 
ingdon, in Virginia. It was a short winter’s day, and was now too dark to 
admit of pursuit. The sky was illuminated with the burning of the ene¬ 
my’s stores preparatory to his disorderly flight. The next morning, on the 
arrival of the cavalry, a pursuit was sustained for several miles, and some 
prisoners were taken. Two or three days afterward the entire command 
returned to Paintville. 

This success, disposing of the Confederate force in Northeastern Ken¬ 
tucky, had an additional brilliancy imparted to it from the fact that it inau¬ 
gurated a long series of victories. Humphrey Marshall’s political antece¬ 
dents, and the reminiscences which haunted man}’ citizens of the North of 
his plump presence in Congress and in the famous American Convention, 
gave somewhat of piquancy to the dramatic features of this episode of his 
defeat. The victor, the young colonel from Ohio, was soon promoted to a 
brigadier, and afterward a major generalship, and in 1863 was elected to 
Congress from Ohio, his native state. Although not a graduate of West 
Point, he proved a most efficient officer in the early Western campaigns. 

If we now cross the mountains crowding the southeastern portion of Ken¬ 
tucky, we shall find ourselves in the valley of the Cumberland River, which 
has its rise among these mountains, and, taking a westward direction in its 
zigzag course, after its two head tributaries, coming down along either side 
of Pine Mountain, have formed a junction at Cumberland Ford, just north 
of Cumberland Gap, runs through Barboursville and Williamsburg, thence 
northw’cstwardly, just leaving Somerset to the north, while it sweeps dow’n 
into Tennessee, and, after a long and very winding course to the east, passes 
through Nashville, and then returns through a more regular channel into 
Western Kentucky, and empties into the Ohio at Smithland, about fifty 
miles above Cairo, having described a course twice the length of the Hud¬ 
son. That portion of Kentucky which this river cuts off before it first en¬ 
ters Tennessee was held by the Confederacy, and was a very important 
tract of country, guarding the entrance into Tennessee from Eastern Ken¬ 
tucky. 



FELIX Z jLLICOFKEB- 


The Confederate government early in the summer guarded against a Fed¬ 
eral advance into East Tennessee by way of Cumberland Gap by sending 
General Felix Zollicoffer, with a force of several thousand men, to the 
threatened point. Occupying the mountain ranges of Southeastern Ken¬ 
tucky, he had made advances into the interior as far as Manchester, his op¬ 
erations generally taking the form of raids, having for their purpose the de¬ 
struction of railroads, the dispersion of Federal encampments, and, still more 
frequently, the obtaining of provisions. In September a slight skirmish 
had occurred at Barboursville between a portion of his troops and a body 
of Home Guards. In October he had met with a repulse at Camp ild-cat, 
near Loudon. An expedition had been planned against him by General 
Schcepf in November; but a Confederate brigade having been sent to his 


relief from Bowling Green, the scheme was abandoned. General Alvin 
Schoepf, a European officer of considerable experience, now took up a po¬ 
sition at Somerset with about 5000 available men, a few cavalry, and a sin¬ 
gle battery of artillery. Fifteen miles to the southeast of this position was 
that occupied by Zollicoffer, at Mill Springs, on the south bank of the Cum¬ 
berland. In itself considered, the Confederate position was one of great 
strength. The banks of the river, rising to the height of three or four hund¬ 
red feet, afford sites favorable for fortification; and Zollicoffer had not 
only an intrenched camp at Mill Springs, but another on the opposite bank 
at Beech Grove. The northern encampment was occupied by five regi¬ 
ments, and fortified with twelve pieces of artillery; on the southern bank 
there were stationed two regiments and a considerable cavalry force. Ap¬ 
parently of great strength, the position was really a very weak one. The 
surface of the ground surrounding the encampment afforded no good range 
for artillery against an attacking infantry force; but a still greater disad¬ 
vantage was the scarcity of provisions. Wayne County was the only fruit¬ 
ful portion of the state from which the Confederates could draw supplies. 
Over a hundred and thirty miles intervened between them and Knoxville, 
and the Cumberland, commanded by Federal troops, afforded a precarious 
channel of communication. The unfavorable situation was heightened by 
impassable roads ; and as the immediate vicinity was rapidly exhausted, the 
Confederate soldiers were sometimes reduced to one third rations, while 
their mules and horses were often without any supply whatever. About 
the first of January General Crittenden arrived from Knoxville and as¬ 
sumed command of the army, which had been already re-enforced by Car¬ 
roll’s brigade. 



GEOBGE U. TUOMAS. 


Nearly at the same time that Crittenden arrived at Mill Springs, General 
Buell detached a force from his main army, and sent it against the Confed¬ 
erate strong-hold in Eastern Kentucky. The force thus dispatched consist¬ 
ed of seven regiments and a portion of Wolford’s cavalry, under the com¬ 
mand of General George H. Thomas, who had distinguished himself both in 
Florida and Mexico, and had, from 1850 up to the beginning of the war. 
been instructor of artillery and cavalry at West Point. A native of Vir¬ 
ginia, General Thomas was still true to his country, and had already, in Au¬ 
gust, 1861, been appointed a brigadier general of volunteers. Thomas left 
Lebanon on the 31st of December, and, after a march of nearly two weeks, 
reached Columbia, and, after a rest of four or five days, pushed on eastward 
to Fishing Creek, a few miles west of Somerset. It was now the 17th; the 
march had been over roads almost impassable, and four regiments and one 
of the batteries—more than one half of Thomas’s column—were yet strug¬ 
gling along on the road from Columbia. To await these, and also to com¬ 
municate with Schcepf, Thomas halted at this point, ten miles north of the 
enemy’s camp. The Tenth Indiana, of Colonel Manson’s brigade,'held the 
advance; and from this regiment two companies were sent out as picket 
guard on the road to Mill Springs, taking up their position beyond the 
junction of that road with the one leading from Somerset to Mill Springs. 
In advance of these was stationed a battalion of Wolford’s cavalry. The 
camp of the Tenth was not far in the rear. Colonel R. L. McCook, with 
two regiments of his brigade, the Second Minnesota and the Ninth Ohio, 
were encamped a mile to the right, on the Robertsport and Danville road. 
This disposition of Thomas’s forces guarded all the approaches to his en¬ 
campment, and also to Somerset. This was the situation on Friday night, 
i During the day Schcepf had visited Thomas, and arrangements were made 

















224 

for a co-operation of the two columns in the attack on Zollicoffer’s camp, 
which was to take place on the succeeding Monday. Recent rains had 
swollen Fishing Creek to such an extent as to render it impossible for either 
of the divisions to support the other in case of an attack being made by the 
enemy; therefore, to supply the place of the regiments which were yet de¬ 
tained on the road, it was arranged that Carter’s brigade should be sent from 
Somerset to General Thomas. This brigade consisted of the Twelfth Ken¬ 
tucky and two regiments of East Tennesseeans. On Saturday the Fourth 
Kentucky arrived on the field with Wetmore’s battery, which, with the reg¬ 
iments and Standards battery sent from Somerset, raised Thomas’s force to 
a complement of six 'egimcnts and three batteries, besides the small detach¬ 
ment of Wolford’s ca airy. 

In the mean time, the peculiar situation of the Confederate army on the 
Cumberland led to a movement which anticipated the Federal attack, and 
resulted in the battle of Mill Spring, otherwise known as the battle of 
Somerset, though it was fought at neither of these places, but midway be¬ 
tween them, at Cross Roads. By extraordinary efforts, Crittenden, having 
been informed of Thomas’s advance, had collected together sufficient pro¬ 
visions for two or three days ahead, and on Friday night had sent out a re¬ 
connoitring party, which had met and exchanged shots with the picket 
guard of the Tenth Indiana and then retired. Saturday night the Confed¬ 
erate officers met in council and determined to advance against Thomas, 
surprise bis camp, and give him battle at early dawn on Sunday morning. 
There were two considerations which led to this determination. The first 
related to the enemy, whose two columns would be united in an attack on 
the Confederate camp, but might be met separately in case Crittenden 
should take the initiative. The second regarded the position of the Con¬ 
federate army, which could easily be turned, and which therefore made it 
necessary that Crittenden should either make the proposed advance, or re¬ 
treat, leaving the wav open into East Tennessee. The Federal force, more¬ 
over, was estimated, on the basis of the reconnoissance made the previous 
night, at considerably less than its real value. Although there was a great 
deal ventured in this advance, made thus upon a mistaken estimate of the 
enemy’s strength, it had a reasonable hope of success if the surprise could 
have been calculated upon as certain. This was not the case; for Thomas, 
fully aware of the probability of an attack, had disposed of his forces ac¬ 
cordingly. 



M.\l> OF MMX SPRING AND TUB VICINITY. 


The Confederates marched out of camp at midnight in perfect silence, 
with Zollicoffer’s brigade in the van, followed by Carroll’s, making altogeth¬ 
er a force of eight regiments, with six pieces of artillery. After a march of 
six hours, through drizzling rain and over muddy roads, the skirmishers of 
the Fifteenth Mississippi encountered the Federal pickets at daybreak. The 
captain of one of the companies on picket guard had just reported to Colo¬ 
nel Manson that all was quiet, when a courier arrived with tidings of the at¬ 
tack. The long roll was instantly beat, and a company was promptly dis¬ 
patched to the support of the pickets, followed immediately bv the entire 
regiment, which had just formed in line of battle about seventy-five yards 
from the picket-firing, when Zollicoffer was seen close in front with the 
Mississippi regiment, supported by Battle’s and Stanton’s. For an hour 
the Indiana soldiers stood against these three regiments, when half of their 
number were obliged to retire from their position on the right of the road. 
At this moment the Fourth Kentucky came up on the left, and a part of 
McCook’s brigade on the right, making the numbers engaged at this point, 
on each side, nearly equal. The position now held bv the Federal troops 
was about a thousand yards in the rear of that originally taken by the 
Tenth, which, by the superior numbers opposed to it, had been driven over 
one hill and up the slope of another. Here the battle raged most hotly, and | 
for a time without any sensible advantage on one side or the other, until at 
length the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, their ammunition being 
nearly exhausted, took shelter in the woods along the crest of the second 
hill, when the Confederates rushed forward from their cover in the woods 
across the field intervening between the two positions. The crest once 


[January, 1862. 



ROBERT L McCOOK. 


gained, the field was theirs. Every nerve was strained to the utmost. Car- 
roll’s brigade was ordered up to support Zollicoffer, and on the Federal side 
McCook’s two regiments were called into action. One of these, the Second 
Minnesota, rapidly made its way among the logs and brushwood to the left, 
taking the place of the Fourth Kentucky and the Tenth Indiana, and at 
the same time the Ninth Ohio got into position on the right of the road in 
the woods, where it was separated from the enemy by a corn-field. Only 
the road separated the two regiments. In the rapid movement of the Con¬ 
federates under Zollicoffer, the latter was killed by S. S. Fr 3 q colonel of the 
Fourth Kentucky; but the regiments under his command, maddened by the 
event, rushed furiously on till they came into an almost hand to hand en¬ 
counter with McCook’s brigade, the Second Minnesota and the Confederates 
opposed to them pushing their muskets through the same fence. For half 
an hour the desperate conflict continued, and stdl remained doubtful. The 
Confederates had clearly an advantage in the numbers engaged, while the 
Federals had a compensating advantage in position, and also in the manage¬ 
ment of artillery, for the Confederate batteries overshot McCook’s brigade, 
while his told with fearful effect against the enemy. Suddenly the battle 
turned; the Confederates were driven back to their first position. In the 
mean while, Carter’s brigade having gained the enemy’s right flank, a bayo¬ 
net charge was ordered along the whole line, and the retreat of the Confed¬ 
erates was turned into a rout. They had lost their favorite leader, and 
Crittenden in vain endeavored to rally them against the pursuing Federals. 
One or two feeble stands were made, but without effect, and before night 
they had been driven within their intrenchments at Beech Grove, having 
lost in killed and wounded 300 men, besides fifty taken prisoners. The 
Federal batteries were brought up, and from commanding positions on the 
neighboring hills opened a cannonade on the enemy’s camp. Schcepf had 
joined Thomas, and it was intended to carry the fortifications the next 
morning by storm, but in the night the Confederates effected a retreat across 
the river. This movement was attended with great distress and a complete 
demoralization of the Confederate army, the scattered fragments of which 
were afterward collected together at Gainsborough, on the Cumberland, 
about thirty miles below the point at which that river enters Tennessee. 

The part which Colonel McCook’s brigade played in the battle of Mill 
Spring was prominent. The colonel, a native of Ohio, was thirty-five years 
of age, and was destined, in a few months, to lose his life, not on the fair field 
of battle, but by the hand of the assassin. He was murdered, August 6, 
1862, by' a company of guerrillas, in ambush near Salem, Alabama. Colonel 
McCook, at the beginning of the war, was placed in command ot the Ninth 
Ohio regiment, which had reached so high a degree of discipline that McClel¬ 
lan pronounced it the first in the army. With this regiment he had passed 
through the West Virginia campaign; under Rosccrans he was given the 
command of the second brigade. At Philippi, Rich Mountain, and Carnifex 
Ferry his command was always foremost in the fight. The battle of Mill 
Spring was the last in which he participated. lie was wounded here, but it 
was not long before lie was again at the post of duty. For his energy and 
bravery in this battle he was appointed a brigadier general, but his attach¬ 
ment to his old regiment led him to decline the commission. 1 

1 A largo number of the McCook family were engaged in the civil war on the Federal side. 
Among them arc the following: General Alexander McCook, the brother to whom Robert sent 
his hist message: “Tell Aleck and the rest that I have tried to live like a man and do my duty;” 
Daniel McCook, jun., adjutant general in General McCook’s staff, and who was to suffer death 
from wounds received at Kcnesaw Mountain in 18G4 ; Edwin McCook, then a captain in Colonel 
Logan’s Illinois regiment; Lieutenant Edward S. McCook, of the regular army; Major Anson 
| McCook, Second Ohio; Ilcnry McCook, cuptain of an Illinois regiment; Sheldon McCook, a 
I lieutenant in the navy. 


















February, 1862.] 


MIDDLE CREEK AND MILL SPRING. 


225 



ANDREW Ill'Ll. FOOTE. 


CHAPTER XI. 

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

The original Plan for the Advance of the Western Armies.—The Resistance to be overcome.— 
Estimate of Forces in the West.—The new Plan of Operations.—The Cumberland and Ten¬ 
nessee Rivers.—Their military Importance.—The Mississippi Flotilla.—Commodore Foote.— 
McClernand’s Reconnoissancc toward Columbus.—The Capture of Fort Henry, February G, 
1862.—Expedition up the Tennessee to Florence, Alabama.—Preparations for an Attack on 
Donelson.—Position of the Fort.—Disposition of the Confederate Army.—Buckner, Floyd, 
Johnson, and Pillow.—Floyd’s Suggestion in regard to the Defense of the Fort.—Operations 
on Thursday, February 13; Investment of the Fort by General Grant; Assaults on the Con¬ 
federate Lines.—Arrival of the Gun-boats.—Naval Attack on Friday; its ill Success.—Con¬ 
federate Council of War Friday Night.—The Battle of Saturday; early Success of the Con¬ 
federates; their final Repulse.—Floyd’s second Council; its Deliberations.—Escape of Floyd 
and Pillow.—Surrender of Fort Donelson by Buckner, Sunday Morning, the IGth.—Evacua¬ 
tion of Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus.—Polk’s Withdrawal to Island No. 10. 

T HREE times now within a period of three months had the way been 
laid open for an attack upon the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad; 
twice through Pound Gap and Virginia, and again, after the victory of Mill 
Spring, by way of Cumberland Gap. In neither case was the opportunity 
improved, because the Federal force at hand was not sufficiently large to se¬ 
cure a permanent possession, and because the plan of invading Tennessee 
through Eastern Kentucky had been given up for another, more feasible, 
and involving larger and more satisfactory results. It was deeply regretted 
by the government, and was the subject of complaint among many loyal 
people of the North, that the deliverance which had been promised through 
the original plan to the Unionists of East Tennessee had to be postponed; 
but any merely temporary relief would evidently have only aggravated 
their sufferings. The new plan of operations transferred the burden of the 
spring caTnpaign in the West from the department of General Buell to that 
of General Ilalleek, and the field of activity from Eastern to Central and 
Western Tennessee. Originally it was proposed that Buell should advance 
through Cumberland Gap, and take possession of the line of communica¬ 
tions connecting Tennessee with Richmond—a line which could be reached 
by a march of little more than thirty miles from the Gap—while Ilalleek 
should co-operate by the movement of a joint naval and land expedition 
down the Mississippi. The resistance to be overcome in this plan was very 
great in each department. Buell had two impediments; one was Buckner’s 
army, now strongly fortified at Bowling Green, and the other the geography 
of Eastern Kentucky. Bowling Green was, in relation to Tennessee, a most 
important military position, situated a little to the south of the centre of 
Kentucky, at the head of navigation, on the Big Barren, a branch of Green 
River, and commanding the only two lines of railroad communication be¬ 
tween the two states, namely, the Louisville and Nashville Road, and the 
branch of that route which, taking its departure five miles below Bowling 
Green, has its western terminus at Memphis. The Confederate army at this 
point must either be met in its intrenched position, or left in the rear. 
Though not impregnably fortified, Bowling Green was easily protected from 
an attack on the north, the approach in that direction being across the river; 
and, in order to cut off its communications with the South, it would be nec¬ 
essary to occupy in force each of the two railroad lines above mentioned. 
Whatever might have been the success of an attempt to capture it, it could 
not have been accomplished without great exhaustion of force; and to push 


a large army into Tennessee, leaving Buckner in its rear, would have been 
absolutely ruinous. In Halleck’s way, on the Mississippi, was Columbus— 
the Gibraltar of the West—thirteen miles below Cairo, and connected by 
railroad with Bowling Green and the Soirth. From this point, at the be¬ 
ginning of the year, the Confederate line of occupation stretched westward 
through Bowling Green and into Virginia, where the Great Kanawha con¬ 
tinued it on toward the eastern strong-hold of Manassas. Fort Columbus 
was originally a position of great natural strength. The eastern bank, on 
which it lay, was lined above and below by bluffs 150 feet in height; and 
north ol the town, one of these bluffs, facing up the river, was fortified with 
three tiers of batteries, and mounting altogether upward of fifty guns; the 
other sides open to attack were also well fortified. The works on the sum¬ 
mit of the hill cover an area of nearly four miles. To prevent the passage 
by the fort of glin-boats,'a strong iron chain stretched across to the opposite 
bank. The entire armament of Columbus consisted of 140 pieces of artil¬ 
lery. 

Still proceeding on the supposition that the plan which we have indi¬ 
cated, and which was the one originally proposed, was to be carried into ex¬ 
ecution, what was the amount of force on each side available for the cam¬ 
paign ? 

On the 1st of December, 1861, there were in Kentucky 70,000 Union 
troops, of which about 23,000 were raised in the state. These troops were 
under the command of General Buell, whose head-quarters were at Louis¬ 
ville. At that time upward of 18,000 of these troops had not yet been 
sworn in, and tlie greater portion were recently armed and undisciplined. 
But the work of recruiting and organization was rapidly going on, and it 
was to continue until Buell’s command should number 100,000 men. In 
Missouri, at St.Louis and Cairo, Ilalleek was gathering another army, fully 
as large as that of Buell. Regiments from Illinois, under the command of 
General Grant, constituted the great proportion of this army. Nothing is 
easier than to overestimate the effective force of an army freshlv recruited. 
Take, for instance, the combined force of Ilalleek and Buell at the begin¬ 
ning of 1862. It is set down in round numbers at 200,000 men. But from 
this flattering estimate made on paper we ha-. <, in the first place, to deduct 
between twenty to thirty per cent, for forces n ■■ yet fairly in the field. This 
would leave say 150,000 men in camp. Of tin: 150,000 a considerable pro¬ 
portion would be without arms and unorgar : d; a great number of regi¬ 
ments would be detached as garrisons at in > taut points; and a still far¬ 
ther deduction would have to be made for tl iso disabled by sickness, so that 
not more than 100,000 men could be coun cd upon as available for active 
operations in an offensive campaign. Neither Ilalleek nor Buell, therefore, 
could count upon a column of over 50,000 men each. That this estimate is 
not founded on conjecture will appear when we come to consider the forces 
engaged at the siege of Donelson. What was the force which was opposed 
to this by the Confederates? The two great centres about which this force 
gathered were, as we have already indicated, Columbus and Bowling Green, 
each of which was held by an army ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 strong. 
There were various detachments of force in Tennessee, the most important 
of which was Crittenden’s little army, which Thomas had driven to Gaines- 
borough. Bowling Green was the direct objective of Buell’s attack, as Co¬ 
lumbus of Halleck’s. The scattered detachments in Tennessee might easily 
be gathered together to harass the right flank of Buell’s army if he should 
pass across the mountains through Cumberland Gap. The forces at Colum¬ 
bus and Bowling Green, in their fortifications, were able to resist more than 
three times their own number in case of an attack made directly against 
them; they were so connected with each other and with their base of sup¬ 
plies that they would be able to stand a siege of any duration, as the Fed¬ 
eral force would be clearly inadequate to their perfect investment; they oc¬ 
cupied a central position, while the attack must move along the radii of an 
extended arc; the probabilities, therefore, in case of a direct attack, were de¬ 
cidedly in their favor. In the plan of operations originally proposed, such 
an attack was necessarily involved. This was clearly the case as regards 
Columbus; and no good general would ever dream of leaving so large a 
force as that at Bowling Green in his rear, unless his line of communication 
was secure against interruption. There could be no security like this in an 
advance through Eastern Kentucky. This advance, therefore, taken in con¬ 
nection with the co-operative movement of a naval and land force down the 
Mississippi, involved of necessity the capture both of Bowling Green and 
Columbus. Nothing would have better suited Albert Sidney Johnston, the 
Confederate general commanding in the West, than an attempt on the part 
of the Federal generals to reduce these two strong-holds. The attempt 
would certainly have resulted, if not in defeat, at least in such an exhaustion 
of force as would have made the Confederates masters of the situation in tho 
entire West. 

If, in relation to the above plan of operations, the Confederate position 
appeared to be one of extraordinary strength, it was yet, in relation to an¬ 
other plan, especially vulnerable; and every formidable difficulty incident 
to the one plan suggested some remarkable facility connected with the other. 
While East Tennessee was protected from invasion by Buckner’s army and 
three ranges of mountains, West Tennessee was only protected by two small 
forts weakly garrisoned, one on the Cumberland River, and the other on the 
Tennessee. While, on the one hand, there was access only by mountain 
passes and over miserable roads, on the other there were two unobstructed 
rivers; while an advance, in the one case, left the only possible channel of 
communication with any source of supplies in the hands of the enemy, in 
the other it was not only secure against any interruption of this nature, but, 
on the other hand, threatened the communications of the enemy himself. 
The Confederate armies at Bowling Green and Columbus, which, in relation 










226 



[February, 1862. 

to the one plan, were impregnable towers of strength, were, in relation to the 
other, not simply deficient in force, but most unfortunately situated. They 
held advanced positions suitable as centres of offensive operations, but with¬ 
out a supporting force sufficient for an aggressive campaign; and while they 
could not be turned by a flank movement either on their right or left, they 
could yet be left in the rear by the movement of Halleck’s entire naval and 
land force between them along the courses of two rivers, which, above Forts 
Henry and Donelson, were entirely in possession of the Federal armies. 
These two rivers were the Tennessee and the Cumberland. 

The course of the Cumberland, from its rise among the mountains of East¬ 
ern Kentucky, and through its extensive curvature into Tennessee on its 
way eastward through Nashville, and then northward through Western 
Kentucky until it empties into the Ohio, we have already described. The 
head waters of the Tennessee are separated from those of the Cumberland 
by the Cumberland Mountains. After the Clinch and the Holston, which 
are the head tributaries of the Tennessee, have united just east of Knox¬ 
ville, that river takes a southwesterly course, passing a little north of Chat¬ 
tanooga and down into Alabama, through the northwest corner of which it 
again returns into Tennessee, and, after traversing the entire breadth of the 
latter state, runs in a course nearly parallel to that of the Cumberland 
through Western Kentucky, and empties into the Ohio at Paducah, ten miles 
below the mouth of the Cumberland, having described a course of 700 miles 
in length. It was the existence of these two rivers which, leading into the 
very heart of the Confederacy, and constituting at the same time the most 
rapid, convenient, and secure channel of communication with the North, 
transformed the plan of the spring campaign in every important particular, 
and exchanged a very doubtful prospect for the glorious certainty of vic¬ 
tory ; and yet their importance was ignored both by the Federals and the 
Confederates—by the former until Buckner’s increasing army at Bowling 
Green had made an advance into Tennessee by way of Cumberland Gap 
a perilous undertaking, by the latter until a Federal advance by way of the 
Tennessee and Cumberland was a danger imminent and no longer to be 
averted. The peril to the Confederate armies which was involved in this 
advance was not wholly unforeseen, but it was not contemplated as one like¬ 
ly to be realized, or, if it should be realized, one which was likely to be of 
great magnitude. At an early period, General Polk, commanding at Colum¬ 
bus, had intended to occupy Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee; but 
he was anticipated in this movement by General Grant, who took possession 
of the place with a small force, which, by accessions from Cape Girardeau, 
was increased to about 5000 men. Not gaining any foothold in this quar¬ 
ter, the Confederates had built two forts—Henry and Douelson—the former 
on the Tennessee, and the latter on the Cumberland, near the Tennessee bor¬ 
der, and just north of the railroad from Bowling Green to Memphis, hoping 
that these strong-holds could be sufficiently strengthened before the Federal 
armies would be prepared to advance. Here, at this time, was the great 
weakness of the western half of the Confederacy, and both Commodore 
Foote and General Grant strongly favored an advance in this direction. 
The plan involving this movement was formed suddenly by General Hal- 
leck, and, as has been shown already, entirely transformed the main features 
of the campaign as originally proposed. Fortunately, all the preparations 
which had been made with the view of proceeding directly against Colum¬ 
bus were just as available for an advance down the Tennessee. 

The most important element in this preparation was the naval fleet which 
had been constructing on the Mississippi. It had been begun by General 
Fremont, who had found it necessary in this way to supplement his insuffi¬ 
cient force. This fleet consisted of a flotilla of twelve gun-boats at Cairo, 
carrying in all 126 guns, and of thirty-eight mortar-boats, which had been 
built at St. Louis, and then towed down to Cairo to receive their armament. 
Some of the gun-boats had been iron-clad, and cost $89,000 each. The Ben¬ 
ton, which was the most formidable, carried sixteen guns; the Mound City, 
Cincinnati, Louisville, Carondelet, St.Louis, Cairo, and Pittsburg, carried thir¬ 
teen guns each; and the Lexington, Essex, Tyler, and Conestoga only nine. 
The mortar-boats were sixty feet long by twenty wide, surrounded by iron- 
plated bulwarks; and the mortars, weighing nearly a ton, with a charge of 
fifteen pounds of powder threw a shell three and a half miles. A portion 
of these boats were not yet ready for action. The entire fleet was under the 
command of Commodore A. II. Foote. This naval officer was a native of 
Connecticut. He had entered the navy as midshipman at the age of fifteen; 
and his memorable services against the pirates in the East Indies and against 
the slave-trade on the African coast had gained him an honorable fame. He 
was now fifty-five years of age. His strength of purpose, his unflinching 
energy in execution, and his Christian character placed his name among the 
noblest of American naval heroes. 

Up to the very latest moment the Confederates were led in every possible 
way to expect an attack on Columbus by Halleck, and an advance by Buell 
into East Tennessee. This expectation on their part was doubtless height¬ 
ened by quite extensive demonstrations against Columbus both on the river 
and by land, which were made by Grant and Foote in the middle of Janu¬ 
ary. On the 7th of that month, Commodore Foote, with three gun-boats— 
the Essex, Lexington, and Tyler, made a roconnoissance down the Mississippi 
to within two miles of Columbus. At the same time, an expedition was or¬ 
ganized by General Grant to operate by land in the same direction. This 
expedition was under McClernand’s immediate command, and consisted of 
somewhat more than 5000 men, of which 4000 were infantry, 1000 cavalry, 
besides two batteries of light artillery. The men belonging to Schwartz’s 
battery were the only soldiers in the entire command who were not from 
Illinois.' On the 9th of January the cavalry crossed the river from Cairo to 
Fort Hall, on the eastern side, and guarded the approaches from Columbus, 






























































































































































































February, 1862.] 


FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



JOHN A- McCLERNAND. 


the infantry and artillery following the next day. Recon noissances were 
made in all directions, and especially toward Columbus, not discovering the 
enemy, though coming within a mile and a half of his defenses. On the 
14th, MeClernand, with his whole force, took up a position north of Bland- 
ville, and commanding the road between Columbus and Paducah by the oc¬ 
cupation of O’Neill’s and the Blandville bridge across Mayfield Creek. The 
next day he crossed Mayfield Creek, and at Weston’s General Grant came 
up with him. Proceeding to Milburn, ten miles east from Columbus, the 
expedition, at this point, might have been looked upon by General Polk ci¬ 
ther in the light of a demonstration against Columbus, or of a movement 
against the railroad running southward from Columbus to Union City. In 
the mean time General Smith had marched several columns from Paducah 
to Mayfield, whence communication was established with MeClernand. Aft¬ 
er making this formidable demonstration in the vicinity of Columbus, the 
Federal troops were suddenly, on the 21st, returned to Cairo. 

Movements were also made by General Buell, after the victory at Mill 
Spring, which indicated an advance in force into East Tennessee. The Cum¬ 
berland River was crossed at Waitsborough, and a column pushed toward 
Cumberland Gap, while General Buell seemed to be massing his forces main¬ 
ly on his left. That these operations had the designed effect on General 
Johnston is apparent from his sending a considerable force to Knoxville. 

Just on the eve of conflict the Confederacy began to suspect that Forts 
Henry and Donelson were after all to be the objective points of-attaek. The 
sudden withdrawal of Grant’s forces from the vicinity of Columbus, and Bu¬ 
ell’s change of front—General Thomas, instead of going to Tennessee, hav¬ 
ing turned back to Danville, forming a junction with Nelson, and thus flank¬ 
ed Bowling Green on the left—these movements revealed the secret of the 
whole campaign. The situation, from this point of view, became a critical 
one. Beauregard was immediately sent from Manassas to consult with John¬ 
ston in the West. It was too late, however, to readjust the elements in¬ 
volved in the impending conflict. The President’s order for a general ad¬ 
vance all along the line from Manassas to Columbus had'gone forth, and the 
blow must soon fall. No forces could be spared from the eastern half of the 
Confederacy to Johnston’s assistance; nothing but the delay of the Federal 
armies could relieve him. Perhaps he depended somewhat on this delay. 
The Federal fleet was not yet fully prepared; only a portion of the gun¬ 
boats had been iron-plated; several of the mortar-boats were yet only part¬ 
ly built; the Western army, also, was only partially organized. But this 
hope was vain. President Lincoln was determined to strike immediately 
with so many of the boats as were ready, and with so much of the army as 
could be made available for action, thinking that the Confederates would by 
delay gain more in the strength of their defensive positions than the Federal 
army would in its power to attack. And certainly, if the Confederates had 
been given time to re-enforce their weak positions on the Tennessee and the 
Cumberland, the whole prospect of the spring campaign would have been 
materially altered to their advantage. 

The battles of Middle Creek and Mill Spring were not directly involved 
in the plan of the campaign, which really commenced with the operations 
against Fort Henry. All the preparations having been completed,General 
Grant, commanding at Cairo, proceeded up the Tennessee under convoy of 
Foote’s flotilla of gun-boats. Ten regiments, with artillery and cavalry, and 
with three days’ rations in their haversacks, embarked at Cairo, and, pre¬ 
ceded by the gun-boats, reached Paducah on Monday, February 3d. The 


227 

next morning the fleet moored on the east bank of the Tennessee, nine miles 
below Fort Henry. A reconnoissance was then made to detect the presence 
of batteries, if there were any, along the bank, and to draw the fire of the 
fort for the purpose of ascertaining its range. While engaged on this recon¬ 
noissance, the Essex was pierced by a 32-pound shot. No serious injury was 
done, but a warning was received in regard to the inefficiency of this boat, 
which, originally employed as a ferry-boat at St. Louis, had been remodeled 
and fitted up as a gun-boat. That night the troops, having landed from the 
transports, were encamped at Bailey’s Ferry, between three and four miles 
north of the fort, having their encampment on an elevated ridge running 
parallel with the river. Wednesday was spent on both sides in making 
preparations. When the Federal troops landed at Bailey’s Ferry, General 
Tilghman, commanding the fort, was absent at Fort Donelson, but, having 
received information of the Federal approach, lie immediately returned. 
Colonel Ileiman, in the mean time, had guarded the approach to Fort Henry, 
on the Dover road, with two pieces of artillery. The garrison of Fort Hen¬ 
ry at this time—Tuesday night—consisted of little more than 2500 men. 
These, together with the force on the Dover road, made an arm}' of 3200 
men. It was palpably impossible to hold the position against a formidable 
attack. The situation of the fort itself was very unfavorable. Occupying 
a position not high enough above the river to be secure against the violence 
of the spring freshets, it was surrounded on all sides by elevated positions, 
which, once gained by the enemy, enfiladed its own defenses. One of these, 
on the opposite bank, Fort Ileiman, was thought so important that it had 
beet) occupied by a small force, and had been partially fortified. On Wednes¬ 
day morning two Tennessee regiments were added to the garrison, and the 
force at Fort Ileiman was recalled. A sudden rise of the river made the 
situation still more unfavorable for the Confederates. It not being possible 
to hold the commanding positions to which we have alluded, the Confeder¬ 
ate force was concentrated within its intrenched camp, abandoning the outer 
series of rifle-pits. 

The day passed by without an attack. General Grant was waiting for his 
re-enforcements to come up from Cairo. Reconnoissances, however, were 
made by the Federals on the road to Dover, which led Tilghman to believe 
that the main portion of Grant’s land forces was to be sent against Fort Don¬ 
elson. It was this supposition alone which determined him to remain and 
abide the issues of a battle. But on Thursday morning he was undeceived. 
Grant had, the previous night, issued his order for Commodore Foote to at¬ 
tack the fort on Thursday at eleven o’clock. His plan of co-operation was 
to march one column, consisting of eleven regiments of MeClernand’s divis¬ 
ion, to a point between Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Dover road, and 
another, consisting of ten regiments, under General C. F. Smith, to Fort Hei- 
man, on the west bank; both columns to advance simultaneously with the 
gun-boats. 

Seven gun-boats—the Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Conestoga,. 
Tyler, and Lexington, participated in the engagement. Four of these were 
partially iron-clad, the Essex being less perfectly inclosed in plates than the 
rest. These four formed the first line of the advance on Thursday. At 
half past ten the boats got under way, and the prompt and gallant commo¬ 
dore repeated his instructions to his men. The other three iron-clads were 
to keep in line with the flag-ship Cincinnati. It was urged upon the officers 
and men that it was of the greatest importance that they should keep cool 
during the engagement, and fire with slowness and deliberation, both to pre¬ 
vent heating the guns and random firing, and also to avoid unnecessary 
waste of ammunition. Somewhat more than a mile north of the fort Pan¬ 
ther Island is situated. Thus there were two channels of approach : the one 
on the east side being commanded by the guns of the fort, while the other, 
more shallow, was covered by the island. Obstructions which had been 
placed in the latter had been partially removed, and the high water enabled 
the boats to pass over those which remained without injury. Steaming up 
this passage slowly, so as to allow the troops on the two banks time to get 
into position, the four iron-clads finally appeared at the head of the island, 
with the three other boats closely following in their rear. Under cover of 
the island, they had entirely escaped the long-range fire from the fort. They 
now took up a position and opened upon the fort, the three boats in the rear 
firing over those in front. Neither the fort nor the gun-boats -were able to 
use their entire armament, the former, out of seventeen guns, only manning 
eleven, while only the same number were used by the latter out of seven¬ 
ty-five. The Confederates had twelve guns commanding the river: one 
ten-inch columbiad, one rifled 24-pounder, two 42-pounders, and eight 32- 
pounders. 

Before the bombardment had fairly commenced, Tilghman, becoming 
aware of Grant’s movements on his right and left flanks—for such, in fact, 
were the movements of MeClernand and Smith—disappointed and alarmed, 
immediately determined upon the retreat of the main body of his small 
army, before these operations, which would render escape impossible, should 
have been completed. There was no time to lose, and there was but a sin¬ 
gle avenue of retreat. In a few minutes the attack of the gun-boats would 
render the intrenched camp untenable, as fully two thirds of it was exposed 
to their fire. There was no chance of holding the fort against the prepara¬ 
tions w'hich Tilghman saw being made against it, and the only object of an 
engagement on his part would be to give time to his retreating columns. 
Accordingly, the order for their withdrawal to Fort Donelson was given, 
only the heavy artillery, with about seventy men, being left in Fort Henry. 
While this movement was being executed under Colonel Heiman, and the 
gun-boats were commencing their attack on the fort, McCIcrnand’s division 
was slowly making its way through the woods, and through the mud which 
was the result of a storm on the previous night. But for this impediment 








228 


[February, 1862 



FOOTE’S GUN-BOATS ASCENDING TO ATTACK FORT HENRY. 
























































































































February, 1862.] 


FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 


229 



the retreat of the Confederates would have been cut off and the investiture 
of the fort rendered complete. 

The bombardment, however, proceeded successfully, the first shot being 
fired at half past twelve o’clock. There was no cessation in the firing, and 
every shot from the boats made its impression on the fort, upon which Foote 
concentrated his entire fire, leaving the movements going on in the rear to 
General Grant, who, as we have seen, was unavoidably behindhand. The 
action on both sides was carried on with great spirit. A single 80-pound 
shell disabled every one of the Confederates at one gun, and the bursting of 
another produced a similar catastrophe. Neither were the gun-boats un¬ 
harmed. The Essex received a shot which penetrated her starboard boiler, 
and, filling the boat with steam, scalded her captain, W. D. Porter, and sev¬ 
eral of the crew, and she was compelled, disabled, to drift down the stream. 
The remaining gun-boats continued their fire, and steadily approached to 
within a thousand yards of the fort, and, after a hot engagement, lasting a 


little over an hour, achieved the victory. Tilghman had held out until all 
but four of his guns were disabled and the walls of the fort were giving way, 
when he pulled down his flag and surrendered the fort. This stubborn re¬ 
sistance had been prolonged to allow the main body under Heiman time to 
effect its retreat. Sixty-two prisoners were surrendered with the fort, among 
whom were twelve commissioned and six non-commissioned officers. Tilgh¬ 
man, who had been induced to remain to keep up the courage of his men, 
and who surrendered with them, was a stout man, and courteous in his man¬ 
ners, though of a somewhat haughty air. He was a graduate of West Point. 
On the occasion of his capitulation he expressed to the commodore his will¬ 
ingness to surrender to so brave a man. Foote replied, “ You do perfectly 
right in surrendering; but you should have blown me out of the water be¬ 
fore I would have surrendered to you.” 

From the extent of the outworks of Fort Henry, it was evidently the in¬ 
tention of the Confederates to re-enforce it very strongly. The rapidity, 
however, with which the Federal commanders proceeded to attack, prevent¬ 
ed this re-enforcement; and it was only the failure of General Grant to 
move his land forces with the requisite promptness that allowed the Con¬ 
federates to escape. A pursuit was ordered, and the rear of the enemy over¬ 
taken, but nothing was gained except a few prisoners who had lagged be¬ 
hind on account of exhaustion, and several pieces of light artillery. 

The capture of Fort Henry opened the Tennessee River to the Federal 
gun-boats up to the head of navigation at Florence, in Northern Alabama. 
Immediately after the surrender, Lieutenant S. L. Phelps, commanding the 
Conestoga, proceeded up the river, accompanied by the Tyler and Lexing¬ 
ton. About twelve miles south of the fort the Memphis and Ohio Railroad 
from Bowling Green crosses the river, after which it continues southeast to 
McKenzie, and from this point communication is established with Colum¬ 
bus by a branch road running northwest through Union City. The main 
road is continued from McKenzie on to Memphis. The connection, there¬ 
fore, between Bowling Green and both Columbus and Memphis depended 
on the railroad bridge across the Tennessee. This point was reached by 
Phelps a little after dark, and not only was the draw closed, but the machin¬ 
ery for turning it had been disabled. At the same moment, several Confed¬ 
erate transports were half a mile above the bridge, trying to escape up 
stream. A party was landed, and it took an hour to open the draw; then, 
the Tyler being left behind to destroy the railroad, the other two boats gave 
chase to the transports. Some of the latter were laden with military stores, 
and these had to be abandoned and fired; the concussion produced by the 
explosion of considerable quantities of gunpowder on board broke the sky¬ 
lights of the Conestoga, and raised the light upper deck from its fastenings. 
The house of a Union man living on the river bank was blown to pieces by the 
force of the explosion. Proceeding up the river to Cerro Gordo, in Hardin 
County, a Confederate steamer, which was being converted into a gun-boat, 



i i.AiiiiiA LOYAUBT8 QBJCXTLNG TUB KLUUiAi. GC.N-ilOATb. 




























230 


was captured the next day, and the day after two more at Eastport. Flor¬ 
ence, at the foot of the Muscle Shoal, was the natural terminus of the expe¬ 
dition. Here a deputation of citizens waited on the lieutenant deprecating 
violence, and especially praying that their railroad bridge might not be de¬ 
stroyed. As there was no military motive to the destruction of the bridge, 
the request was granted. The expedition then returned. The most import¬ 
ant feature connected with it was the exhibition, all along the route, of the 
Union sentiment of the people. Lieutenant Phelps, in his report, says: 
“ We have met with the most gratifying proofs of loyalty every where 
across Tennessee, and in the portions of Mississippi and Alabama which we 
visited. Most affecting instances greeted us almost hourly. Men, women, 
and children, several times gathered in crowds of hundreds, shouted their 
welcome, and hailed their national flag with an enthusiasm there was no 
mistaking; it was genuine and heartfelt.” 

Forts nenry and Donelson, although miles in the rear of Columbus and 
Bowling Green, were the front and centre of the Confederate line. Henry 
had been captured. It only remained to carry the works at Donelson, and 
the centre was broken. Johnston held, and now knew’ that he held, a 
wretched line of defense. It stretched from Bowling Green to Columbus, 
120 miles; was protected by less than 50,000 men; at its central position, 
which was as weak as it was accessible, there could not be brought up in 
time to be of use one third of that number. Time had from the first been 
a master element in this campaign. The President’s Military Order had 
contemplated the value of moments. It was not an order to move simply, 


[February, 1862. 

or to prepare to move, but to move at once, even with an uncompleted arma¬ 
ment. And after the movement had begun, time still controlled the chances 
and results. When Tilghman saw what was the disposition of the Federal 
forces on the forenoon of the 6th, he knew' that be could not hold Fort 
Henry; yet, only to gain two hours and ten minutes, he risked an engage¬ 
ment," and lost twenty-one men killed and wounded, besides sixty prisoners. 
Those two hours’ fighting netted him a profit of full 3000 men. The mud, 
which hindered Grant’s troops moving on his flank, helped him to this re¬ 
sult And, now that Henry was captured, very much depended on the ra¬ 
pidity with which a blow could be struck at Donelson. Every day wasted 
amplified the defensive works of that fort, and brougBt behind them thou¬ 
sands more of defenders. 

The gun-boats, however, had to be consulted in this matter of speed. It 
was thought impossible to do without them; they had taken Henry, and it 
was intended that they should play the most important part in taking Don¬ 
elson. But Commodore Foote wanted time, the very thing which could not 
be spared. The Essex and the Cincinnati had been worsted on the 6th, and 
were in no condition to fight again. Of the iron-clads only the St. Louis 
and the Carondelet remained intact It is true, the places of the two injured 
boats could be filled by others, but Fort Donelson was incomparably supe¬ 
rior to Fort Henry in the resistance it would offer. More boats were need¬ 
ed; at least the two disabled ones ought to be repaired. While Foote pro¬ 
tested on these grounds against an immediate attack on Donelson, Halleck 
and Grant insisted upon it as a military necessity. With the most rapid 
movement possible, much precious time would be consumed. The troops 
for Fort Henry had started with only three days’ rations; the army must 



FOBT bONiLBUX, TENNESSEE. 


be newly supplied. The prisoners, the sick, and the wounded must be at¬ 
tended to; new boats must be brought round from Cairo, also transports 
with re-enforccments; and, before the army at Fort Henry could move over 
from the Tennessee to the Cumberland, provision must be made for a change 
of base. 

Tilghman had surrendered Fort Henry on Thursday; it was not until the 
next Wednesday, the 12th, that Grant had his entire column in motion to¬ 
ward Donelson, though a great portion of McClernand’s division had moved 
the previous day. Here was a delay of six days, which, though necessary, 
was very costly. The distance between the two forts was twelve miles, over 
thickly wooded hills, broken by deep ravines, which, near the rivers, were 
choked with back-water. The roads were good, the weather pleasant and 
mild. The two main divisions of the army, McClernand’s and Smith’s, 
moved in separate columns; the strength of both, in round numbers, amount¬ 
ing to 20,000 men, including seventeen batteries, and from 1200 to 1500 
horsemen. In the march, as in subsequent operations, McClernand kept to 
Smith's right. The two commands were in communication with each other 
early in the afternoon, within two miles of the fort. The rest of the day was 
occupied in manoeuvring the troops into position, which was attended with 
slight skirmishing here and there, to test the enemy’s strength and to find 
his line of works, a matter of great difficulty from the nature of the ground. 
The Confederate pickets and outstanding forces were pushed back to their 
defenses, and the Federal forces rested for the night on a line in general par¬ 
allelism with that of the enemy. During the night batteries were posted in 


the most favorable position then accessible. It was General Grant’s design 
to make an assault the next day simultaneously with the gun-boats. 

Donelson was stronger, both by nature and art, than Henry. The position 
was a more commanding one, and it was more strongly fortified. The course 
of the Cumberland from Dover, where Fort Donelson was situated, toward 
its mouth, was almost due north; but just before reaching the town, and in 
passing it, westward. Upon a bluff, rising by a gentle slope from the river, 
just at the bend, to the height of a hundred feet, the State of Tennessee had 
built Fort Donelson. The fort was on the south, or left bank, its water bat¬ 
teries, from an elevation of thirty feet, commanding the river as far as their 
guns could reach. Back of the fort extended a plateau of a hundred acres; 
a deep gorge broke the bluff toward the south. The town of Dover, lying 
just above on the river, was also on an elevation, separated from the plateau 
on which the fort was situated by a long valley, filled to a considerable 
depth with back-water from the Cumberland. The country for miles around 
is uneven; not mountainous, but hilly and heavily timbered. The numer¬ 
ous elevations that diversify the surface terminate in bluffs, whose abrupt 
and precipitous sides, difficult of access even to the nimble goat, lead down 
into rough-looking ravines. The timber on the hills immediately skirting 
the lines of defense had been cut down by the Confederates to secure a full 
sweep for artillery, and to form an extensive abattis-work obstructing the 
approach. To return to the fort. The table-land on which it lay was the 
work of art, the ground having been leveled to afford room for the fortifica¬ 
tions and rifle-pits, which covered the entire space. By ravines along its 

















February, 1862.] 


FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 


231 



MAP ILLCSTUATINU TUB WESTERN CAMPAIGN IN FEBRUARY, 1S62. 


boundary the tableau was separated from a series of wooded hills, whose dis¬ 
tance from the fortified line was about 800 yards. 

The unfavorable feature of the defense was that the fort was so easily 
commanded by these neighboring ridges. 

It was not until the middle of December that prominent attention was di¬ 
rected to the works at Ilenry and Donelson. “ On reaching Donelson,” says 
Tilghinan, who was sent there at that time,“I found at my disposal six un¬ 
disciplined companies of infantry, with an unorganized light battery, while 
a small water battery of two light guns constituted the available river de¬ 
fense. Four 32-pounders had been rightly placed, but were not available." 
With two forts on his hands, Tilghman found his time for preparation short. 
By the 25th of January, when re-enforcements were being brought up in an¬ 
ticipation of attack, the batteries had been completed, and a field-work, with 
a trace of 1000 yards, had been built in the rear of the fort, and the work of 
protecting the approaches by rifle-pits had been commenced. Two weeks 
later Fort Henry was surrendered, and the vital importance of Donelson, 
covering the approach to Nashville, seemed for the first time to be thorough¬ 
ly understood. Beauregard and Johnston were in anxious consultation, and 
it was concluded between them that Nashville must be defended at Donel¬ 
son—that the best engineers and the ablest generals should be sent to the 
fort, and all the re-enforcements which could be spared should be hurried up 
with all possible dispatch. 

On the evening of the 6th, Heiman’s command, 3000 strong, entered Don¬ 
elson, with the not highly encouraging reminiscence of Foote’s gun-boat 
fleet still clinging to them. This was the main force then occup 3 'ing the 
defenses. Three Tennessee regiments were placed in the fort, constituting 
a garrison of about 1600 men. The re-enforcements which, during the next 
week, arrived at Donelson, came mostly from Bowling Green by railroad. 
General Bushrod R. Johnson came up on the 8th, and took the command 
until the arrival of Pillow on the 10th. 

Pillow found the works incomplete. Two heavy guns for the water bat¬ 
tery were yet unmounted; the works in the rear were deficient both in ex¬ 
tent and strength, and competent artillerists were lacking. It was late to 
make these discoveries; but prompt measures were taken to supply all de¬ 
ficiencies, the soldiers working in their trenches day and night. Even the 
tools necessary for this kind of work were so scarce that they had to be pass¬ 
ed from one regiment to another. In the mean time artillery companies 
were being exercised in the use of their guns. For three days the soldiers 
were at work constructing rifle-pits along the first line of heights, including 
within its crescent the fort and water batteries, with the field-work in their 
rear, and also the town of Dover, which it became now an imperative neces¬ 
sity to defend, since it had been made a ddpot for supplies. 

On the night of the 11th Buckner came to hand, and was placed in com¬ 
mand of the right, near the fort. Bushrod Johnson held the left, near Do¬ 
ver. Between the two, prominently advanced on a strong position on the 
left centre, was Heiman’s command. The space to be defended was a quad¬ 
rangle, lined by the Cumberland on the north, by two pretty large creeks on 
the east and west, and on the south by the outer line of rifle-pits. The quad¬ 
rangle was intersected by the wide stream of back-water running between 
the fort and Dover, which divided the right from the left, making it difficult 
to manoeuvre one division in support of another; a great disadvantage, con¬ 
sidering the length of the line—nearly three miles. This line, distant from 
the river from 400 to 1200 yards, was only one third completed on Wednes¬ 
day morning, when Grant started from Fort Henry. 

The re-enforcements to Donelson came in by detachments, some of them 
so tardily that they came near being left out altogether. Buckner s division, 
with the exception of one regiment, was all in before the 12th of February. 
The Second Kentucky came in with B. R. Johnson on the 8th; Brown s 
brigade on the 8th and 10th. Floyd’s division, which, after its reverses in 
West Virginia, had been sent to Tennessee, was the last to arrive. His force 


consisted of four Virginia and one Mississippi regiment, and was distrib¬ 
uted into two brigades—Wharton’s and McCausland’s, to which a portion of 
Baldwin’s brigade of Buckner’s division was temporarily attached. Floyd 
had received the order to re-enforce Donelson on the 12th. He had already, 
on the 7th and 8th, sent on Wharton, but was hesitating about the policy of 
dispatching the rest of his division. From Clarksville, on the 12th, he wrote 
to Johnston, urging that the main portion of the defensive force should be 
concentrated at Cumberland City', “ leaving at Fort Donelson enough to make 
all possible resistance to any attack which might be made upon the fort, but 
no more.” He thought that the character of the country made it dangerous 
to concentrate the entire army in the fort, and that a large body at Cumber¬ 
land City should flank the Federal army attacking the fort. He also advo 
cated the obstruction of the river to make it impassable for gun-boats. 

Whatever wisdom there may have been in these suggestions, they were 
too late to be applicable to the occasion. Grant was already within two 
miles of the fort, and Floyd had hardly dispatched his letter to Johnston be¬ 
fore peremptory orders came from the latter to advance his force immedi¬ 
ately. Floyd had been anxious to secure the adoption of his plan; and 
on the 11th, when Buckner left him to join Pillow, he carried to the latter 
an order from Floyd for the concentration of Buckner’s and his own divi¬ 
sions at Cumberland City. Upon a consultation between Pillow and Floyd 
the plan was changed, and the morning of the 13th found Floyd’s whole 
force inside of the Confederate intrenchments. The same morning also the 
Forty-first and Forty-second Tennessee arrived. On this Thursday morn¬ 
ing the defensive army probably numbered at least 15.000 men. 1 

On Thursday, the day set for the attack, there w'as but little disparity be¬ 
tween the opposing forces; what there was favored the Federals, but it did 
not amount at most to more than 3000 or 4000 men. The gun-boats and 
transports not arriving according to appointment, another twenty-four hours' 
grace was given the Confederates, of which they sedulously took advantage. 
Federal artillery was placed on the spurs opposing the lines of defense; 
McClernand’s division was brought up as nearly as possible to the south of 
Dover, so as to command the river road to Charlotte, the main outlet for es¬ 
cape in that direction. Oglesby’s brigade held the extreme right, support¬ 
ed on the left by W. H. L. Wallace; Smith’s division was drawn up on the 
left. Skirmishers had the day almost entirely to themselves. Among those 
on the Federal side the most famous were Birgc’s regiment of sharpshoot¬ 
ers, each one of whom, in gray uniform and gray felt cap, watched from be¬ 
hind his stump for the appearance of Confederate heads above their de¬ 
fenses. The distance between these keen-eyed watchers on one side and on 
the other was only about 300 yards. The fire was so incessant and so fatal 
that the Confederates were allowed no rest except in their uncomfortable 
rifle-ditches, it being impossible for them to reach their tents over the ridge 
without exposure. These ditches, with the earth-work in front, had been, 
as Floyd plaintively intimates in his report, carelessly, because hastily, con¬ 
structed so far from the ridge as to compel this exposure. 

The great event of the day was the gallant but useless assault made by 
three Illinois regiments—the Seventeenth, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth— 
supported by two others, on an advanced position of Heiman’s. The For¬ 
ty-eighth belonged to W. II. L. Wallace’s brigade, the others to Payne’s. 
When Wallace moved in the morning to the support of Oglesby, Colonel 
Ilayrie, with the Forty-eighth, had been left near the centre in support of a 
battery; 500 yards to his right were posted the Seventeenth and Forty- 
ninth, under Colonel Morrison. Hayne moved his regiment up to these, 
and, assuming the command of all three at Morrison’s request, prepared to 
storm the redoubt in their front This redoubt, separated from them by a 
wooded valley, formed Heiman’s right centre. Heiman’s position was an 
elevation shaped like a Y in contour. On either side a valley separated his 
brigade from Buckner on the right, and on the left from Drake’s brigade, 
which occupied another elevation, and which we have hitherto considered 


In the estimate of the number of men defending Donelson the Confederate accounts are va¬ 
rious. Lieutenant F. H. Duquecron, one of the officers engaged, reports the number ns 18,000. 
This also was the estimate given in an account of the battle by the Richmond Dispatch. He ought 
to have had some opportunity of knowing; he belonged to the Fourteenth Mississippi, which 
reached Dover from Bowling Green on the 9th, an.l was present until Saturday noon, when he re¬ 
ceived a wound in the leg. Contrary to this is Pillow’s report, which puts the number at only 
13,000. The Nashville Patriot, in the corrected copy of its list of casualties at Donelson, gives the 
following estimate of the numbers engaged: 


48th Tenn.... 230 3d Tcnn.... 650(750) 3d Miss... 500 

42d “ ... 498 51st “ ... 80 4th “ ... 535 

53d “ ... 280 50th “ ... 650 14th “ ... 475 

49 th “ ... 300 2d Ky. 618 20th “ ... 562 

30th “ ... 654 8th “ . 300 26th “ ... 434 (443) 

18th “ ...615 (685) 7th Tex . 300 50th Va. 400 

10th “ ... 750 15th Ark. 270 51st “ .... 275 

26th “ ... 400 27th Ala. 216 56th 14 .... 350 

41st “ ... 450 (575) 1st Miss. 280 36th “ .... 250 

32d “ ... 558 (555) - 


Battalions of infantry : Colin’s and Gowan’s. .... 330 


Battalions of cavalry: Gantt’s. 227 (800) 

Milton’s. 15 

Forrest’s. 600(1200) 

Artillerists. 677 


11,480 (11,781) 


Total, 


1,849 (2,922) 
13~329 (14,703) 


The numbers in the parentheses arc corrections made from the reports of Confederate officers. 
Wherever these rejams give numbers at all, they, save in one instance, exceed the corresponding 
ones in the list. It is fair, then, to presume that where no number is given there would also be 
an increase. It is certainly evident that Pillow understated his force; and it is possible that Du- 
quccron’s would, if all the data were known, prove much nearer the truth. Two things should be 
remembered in this connection. One is, that, on account of hurry of preparation, so urgent as to 
forbid the ordinary roll-call in the morning, and also by reason of the irregularity with which re- 
cnforccments came in, as well as the confusion consequent upon the surrender, no actual estimate 
was made. Floyd, when questioned by the Confederate Secretary of War, was entirely ignorant 
of the strength of his command. It is also to be remembered that, ns a rule, Confederate reporta 
studiously underestimate the forces engaged on that side. The estimate which we have given in 
the text is the one given by the Confederate Lieutenant Colonel Gilmer, chief engineer of the 
Western Department. 
































232 



[February, 1862. 

as a part of Heiman’s command. Heiman’s advanced salient was, at this 
stage of the investment, the only portion of the Confederate line distinctly 
visible. From this point the enemy’s cannon had sweep of-the valley across 
which the Federal troops filed in approaching Dover. Through the valley 
on Heiman’s right ran a road from Dover westward to the Tennessee; here 
the line of rifle-pits was broken. On this side Heiman had two regiments; 
in the centre was posted Maney’s battery, with two regiments, supported by 
another on the left side. The battery was on the summit of the hill and 
exposed. It was opposed on the 12th by two Federal batteries, which were 
under cover of the woods, one of them bearing on Heiman from the right, 
and the other from the left, the latter bearing also on Buckner’s left. These 
two Federal batteries had kept up a bombardment all day Wednesday, their 
fire being returned not only by Maney’s battery, but also by Graves’s on 
Buckner’s left, and bv another at Drake’s position. On the morning of the 
13th another battery was brought against Heiman’s left, and the one bear¬ 
ing on his right was advanced. In the course of the forenoon the advance 
line of skirmishers from the Illinois troops was observed making its way 
through the woods. Maney began to shell the woods; Graves also kept up 
a lire to the right, the gunners suffering severe punishment from Federal 
sharpshooters. Two lieutenants fell at Maney’s in quick succession, but the 
guns were kept in play. Meanwhile Hayne’s column, at 11 o’clock, had 
pushed across the valley and up the hill to within forty rods of the enemy’s 
rifle-pits. The Confederates now commenced firing along the entire line 
from 2000 rifles, while the three batteries kept up their thundering. The 
path of the approaching Federals was impeded by brushwood and fallen 
timber. The slaughter was abundant and merciless. Fifteen minutes of 
this deadly work seemed enough-for endurance that in the end only prom¬ 
ised to be bootless. The brave Illinoisans began to give way. Then they 
rallied again, and were repulsed; and still again, when they finally with¬ 
drew, having been under fire for nearly an hour. Colonel Morrison was 
severely wounded in the action, and carried from the field. 

Somewhat farther to the left, and at about the same time, a less formi¬ 
dable though equally gallant assault was made by a portion of Lauman’s 
brigade, the fourth of General Smith’s division. This brigade consisted of 
four regiments, together with which Birge’s Sharpshooters were associated. 
On Lauman’s right front Cavender’s 20-pound rifled Parrots had been placed 
in a position commanding a portion of the enemy’s works,, the Seventh 
Iowa and Birge’s regiment acting as support. This had been the position on 
j the evening of Wednesday. Thursday morning two regiments—the Four¬ 
teenth Iowa and the Twenty fifth Indiana—were ordered to assault the Con- 
federate line one mile from their front. The movement was over rugged 
ground. In the wooded ravine just beneath the position to be assailed the 
line was formed. The Twenty-fifth Indiana then moved up the hill, “un¬ 
der a most galling fire of musketry and grape,” says Lauman, “ until their 
I onward progress was obstructed by the fallen timber and brushwood.” A 
position was gained and held at a severe cost in life for two hours, when 
the regiment was ordered back out of range. In the mean time the Four¬ 
teenth Iowa had crossed a ravine and gained a position away to the right, 
which it held to some purpose, while Lieutenant Parrott, who, with the Sev¬ 
enth, was supporting the Cavender Parrotts, came up between the two as¬ 
sailing columns, holding the centre. This position was held by Lauman’s 
brigade till night. In addition to these assaults, a heavy cannonade was 
kept up all day, and nearly all night firing was continued, keeping the Con¬ 
federates under arms in their trenches. 

Thursday night, the weather, which had previously been genial for Feb¬ 
ruary, began to be cold and disagreeable; a storm of snow, mingled with 
sleet, caused great suffering among the troops. The change was so sudden 
that evidently no preparation had been made for it. 

There was yet no sign of any of the gun-boats except the Carondelet, 
which reached Donelson on the 12th, and the next day gave the enemv a 
foretaste of good things to come by sending upward of one hundred and 
fifty shells into the fort. This was on the morning of the 13th, and was in- 
| tended to aid the assaults made at that time on portions of the Confederate 
line. The enemy returned the fire with spirit, but most of their guns shot 
] over the gun-boat, only two striking; one of these, a 128-pound shot, passed 
through the port casemate of the Carondelet, burst her steam-heater, and 
fell into the engine-room. Nq one, however, was seriously injured During 
this engagement, which lasted about an hour, the Confederate Captain Dix¬ 
on, of the Engineer Corps, was killed at the battery. As to the other boats 
besides the Carondelet,thus: Tuesday night,before Grant had left Fort Hen- 
| ry, the steamer Minnehaha, with Colonel Baldwin and his regiment, the 
Fifty-seventh Illinois, on board, came up to the fort, and transports with re- 
enforcements were following after. These transports Grant ordered, through 
i Baldwin, to be turned back to Paducah, whence they were to start under 
convoy of the gun-boat fleet for Smithland, and thence up the Cumberland 
to a point a few miles below Donelson, where they were to land the re-en¬ 
forcements the next afternoon. The Minnehaha started down the Tennes¬ 
see at midnight, and reached Paducah early the next morning, having met 
on the way eight or ten transports loaded with troops. But it was found 
that only a part of the fleet were at Paducah ; the remainder straggled slow¬ 
ly up; and it was ten o’clock on Wednesday night when the whole arma¬ 
ment arrived at the mouth of the Cumberland. 

“The scene,” writes the Times correspondent, “was magnificent beyond 
description. The night was as warm as an evening in August in our more 
northern latitudes; a full moon looked down from an unclouded sky, and 
glanced off from bayonets, plumes, and sword-bilts without number. At in¬ 
tervals long jets of fleecy smoke burst out along the parapets of the two 
forts on the heights overlooking the town, and the boom of the welcome 



























February, 1862.] 


FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 


233 


went reverberating over the hills, till from the long distances in Kentucky 
it carne back like a whisper. In turns the bands on the boats charmed the 
ear with most eloquent music, which, added to the effect of scores of gayly- 
dressed ladies promenading the upper decks, gave the scene more the char¬ 
acter of some vast drawing-room gathering; so much like was it, that no one 
would have been surprised had the whole crowd suddenly resolved into ed¬ 
dies of whirling waltzes, or the swift, changeful currents of quadrille or gal- 
lopade.” 

The progress of the fleet, slow enough hitherto, now began to be impeded 
by the downward current of the Cumberland. Forty-five miles only were 
made in nine hours. This brought the fleet to Eddyville, where it was 
greeted -with vociferous demonstrations of loyalty; one gray-haired man was 
so affected at hearing “Yankee Doodle,” that he took off his hat and gave 
three cheers for the Union. At midnight, Thursday, the armament reached 
its destination. It consisted of six gun-boats and fourteen transports. From 
the latter a column of 10,000 men were landed,bringing Grant’s army up to 
30,000 strong. These fresh troops were General Lew. Wallace’s division, 
consisting of regiments from Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Nebraska. The 
landing was about tlirce miles below the fort. The distance to be traversed 
by these troops before they could reach McClernand’s left was very great, 
and the march could only be accomplished by means of a circuitous route, 
which, avoiding the back-water west of the fort, ran around by Smith’s rear 
along the ridges held by the Federal army. In this way it happened that 
Lew. Wallace’s men were all day Friday getting into position. 

This delay led to a new disappointment. It bad been intended that, as 
early as possible in the day, a combined attack should be made by the gun¬ 
boats on the water batteries and by the land forces on the rear. In the lat¬ 
ter part of the programme the new troops were given an important part, but 
their necessarily tardy movements proven ted any operations on Friday by 
Grant’s army except the usual skirmishing and cannonade. 

The gun-boats, however, steamed up the river, and at three o’clock P.M. 
commenced the attack. They were six in number. Four—the St.Louis,Ca- 
rondelet, Louisville, and Pittsburg—were iron-clad, each mounting thirteen 
guns; the other two, the Tyler and Conestoga, were wooden, mounting each 
nine guns. There was one boat less than the number at Fort Henry, and 
the conditions of the conflict were materially altered. The armament of 
Fort Donelson was greater than that at Fort Henry. Besides eight pieces in 
the main fort, there were the two batteries, mounting thirteen guns. Then, 
again, the water batteries at Fort Henry were of no use on account of their 
inferior position ; those at Donelson, on the other hand, were elevated thirty 
or forty feet above the river. Remembering, therefore, that at Fort Henry 
two of his iron-clads had been disabled, it is hardly possible that Commodore 
Foote entered upon this engagement without serious apprehensions regard¬ 
ing the result. He had discovered the vulnerable points of his gun-boats, 
but, before he had leisure to fortify them, he was called upon to expose them 
again to danger. 

As at Fort Henry, the wooden boats kept well to the rear of the iron¬ 
clads, which steamed up to the fort in the form of a crescent, opening fire at 
a distance of a mile and a half. The Confederate batteries did not reply 
until the boats were within point-blank range of their guns. Only twelve 
bow-guns could be brought to bear from the fleet; the enemy, from the fort 
and the batteries, worked nearly twice that number. The fleet moved 
slowly up into closer and closer combat, until it reached a point only about 
300 yards (Pillow says 150) from the Confederate guns. Foote probably 
hoped that close range would make his fire more effective. From where he 
stood he could have reached with his shot and shell nearly every spot with¬ 
in the Confederate lines. But he had no time to regard the opportunity, 
tempting as it was. These heavy guns, belching out ruin against the sides 
of his vessels, must be attended to first of all. Already the shot from a ten- 
inch columbiad and a rifled 32-pounder were beginning to tell on his boats, 
and Pillow was carefully watching their effect. But the fire from the fleet 
also was beginning to drive the gunners from their post; only give the 
gun-boats fifteen minutes more, and the victory would be theirs. But just 
at this critical moment “two unlucky shots"' turned the tide. One, pene¬ 
trating the pilot-house and mortally wounding the pilot, carried away the 
wheel of the St. Louis; the other disabled the tiller-ropes of the Louisville, 
and both vessels drifted helplessly down the stream. The frightened gun¬ 
ners returned to their batteries and redoubled their efforts, and soon the 
Pittsburg and the Carondelet followed their retiring comrades. After a 
fi<dit of an hour and a half the gun-boats had been defeated with a loss of 
fifty-four killed and wounded; among the latter was the commodore him¬ 
self, whose foot was seriously injured. A portion of the casualties was due 
to the bursting of a rifled gun on board the Carondelet. The Confederate 
batteries, well protected and well served, were essentially uninjured; ac¬ 
cording to the report of Gilmer, the Confederate chief engineer, not a man 
in them was killed. The wooden gun-boats, as has been said, participated 
in the battle only at long range, and threw curveting shell, which, passing 
over the Confederate works, exploded in the air above them ; on board 
these boats there were no casualties. It may have somewhat contributed 
to the defeat of the gun-boats that, in the excitement natural to a situation 
of more imminent peril, their guns were not worked with the deliberation 
which more than any thing else secured success for them at Fort Henry. 1 2 


1 General Grant’s Report. 

j Foote’s great difficulty for some weeks had been that he was unable to pet enough men to 
man his gun-boats. Thus, when he was about to move against Fort Henry, he says in a letter 
to Secretary Welles, , 

“I have’been obliged, for want of men, to take from the five boats remaining at Cairo all the 
men, except a sufficient niimlnir to man one gun-boat, for the protection of that important post. 
.It is peculiarly unfortunate that we have not been able to obtain men for the flotilla, as 




































































































234 


[February, 1862 


After the attack, the cessation of which was like the clearing up of a 
thunder-storm, a consultation was held between Foote and Grant, in which 
it was decided that the former should return to Cairo to prepare a more for¬ 
midable fleet, while General Grant should complete his investiture of Don- 
elson. To prevent Columbus from re-enforcing Donelson, the Tyler was 
sent around to complete the destruction of the railroad bridge just above 
Fort Henry. Phelps’s expedition of the previous week had failed, it seems, 
of doing its work thoroughly at this important point. The St. Louis and 
the Louisville were yet in a condition to remain, and it being thought nec¬ 
essary to keep up a show of force, or, at the least, to protect the transports, 
they did remain. The next day they steamed up the river and threw a few 
shells into the fort; but the only serious attack made by the gun-boats was 
that of the 14th. 

Floyd, who as senior officer assumed the chief command on his arrival, 
had inferred, from the close pressure of the Federal troops up to his lines, 
and from the pertinacity of their assaults on Thursday, that he would cer¬ 
tainly be attacked by Grant's whole army Friday morning. We have seen 
already how he came to be disappointed. All the forenoon he waited in 
vain ; there was nothing but the usual skirmishing. Doubt made the Con¬ 
federate commander restless, for something on one side or the other must be 
done quickly. If Grant would not fight him, then he must fight Grant. Of 
the two alternatives he very much preferred the former, remembering the 
assaults of yesterday; every repetition of these assaults exhausted the assail¬ 
ant. At last, after waiting nearly all day, the matter was decided for him; 
at three o’clock the gun-boats attacked in front, but the accompaniment of 
assault in the rear was not forthcoming. The gun-boats were driven away 
disabled, beaten. But, in spite of the shouts of victory arising from the two 
water batteries, Floyd had been disappointed. “ I was satisfied," he says, 
“ from the incidents of the last two days, that the enemy did not intend again 
to give us battle in our trenches. They had been fairly repulsed, with very 
heavy slaughter, upon every effort to storm our position, and it was but fair 
to infer that they would not again renew the unavailing attempt at our dis- 
lodgment, when certain means to effect the same end without loss were per¬ 
fectly at their command. Wc were aware of the fact that extremely heavy 
re-enforcements had been continually arriving, day and night,for three days 
and nights, 1 and I had no doubt whatever that their whole available force 
on the Western waters could and would be concentrated here, if it was deem¬ 
ed necessary, to reduce our position. There.was no place within our in- 
trenchments but could be reached by the enemy’s artillery from their boats 
or their batteries. It was but fair to infer that, while they kept up a suffi¬ 
cient fire upon our intrenchments to keep our men from sleep and prevent 
repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column above us on 
the river, both on the right and left banks, and thus to cut off all our com¬ 
munication, and to prevent the possibility of egress." 

It was Floyd’s policy, therefore, to fight the enemy at the earliest possible 
moment. But it was too late to accomplish any thing that day. A little 
after dark, at Floyd’s summons, all the division and brigade commanders of 
the Confederate army were gathered together for consultation at General 
Pillow’s head-quarters. It was then and there unanimously agreed that an 
attack should be made, in accordance with Floyd’s proposition, the next 
morning, for the purpose of cutting their way out into the open country 
southward. It fell upon Pillow and Buckner to plan the attack. The situ¬ 
ation to be considered was this: there were three roads leading southward 
from Dover. One of these closely skirted the river for a distance of twelve 
or fifteen miles, then branched off toward Charlotte. Another ran farther 
to the west, connecting with the former road and also with Charlotte. The 
third, still farther west, is mentioned in the Confederate reports as the Wynn's 
Ferry road. Across these roads stood Oglesby’s and W. II. L. Wallace’s 
brigades—in fact, the great body of McClernand’s division. Lew. Wallace’s 
division held the ridge on the left of the Wynn’s Ferry road. Every one 
of these roads was strongly fortified by Grant with 24-pound siege guns. In 
order to secure a retreat, Grant’s right must be defeated and rolled up on his 
centre. But how dispose the forces for this attack? This was the great dif¬ 
ficulty. Pillow’s force alone, estimated by himself at 7000, including Floyd’s, 
was incompetent for such a task; it was necessary that the great bulk of 
the three corps under Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner should be massed against 
the Federal right. Yet the proposition submitted by Pillow was that Buck¬ 
ner should lend him Hanson’s Second Kentucky regiment, and that, with 
this and the troops already intrenched on the left, he (Pillow) would roll up 
Grant’s right to a point opposite Buckner, where the latter should attack in 
flank and rear, and the enemy be driven to his gun-boats. A very satisfac¬ 
tory operation, if it could be accomplished. But one thing the over-san¬ 
guine Pillow had lost sight of in his calculations: if he should fail in his 
part, as most probably he must, then the battle would have been ventured 
in vain. Buckner, demurring to this impossible plan, had one of his own to 


they only arc wanting to enable me to have at this moment eleven full-manned, instead of seven 
partially-manned, gun-boats ready fir efficient operations at any point. The volunteers from the 
army to go in the gun-boats exceed the number of men required, but the derangement of com¬ 
panies and regiments, in permitting them to leave, is the reason assigned for not more than fifty 
of the number having been thus far transferred to the flotilla.” 

Again, starting for Donelson : 

“ I leave again to-night with the Louisville, Pittsburg, and St. Louis for the Cumberland River, 
to co-operate with the army in the attack on Fort Donelson. I go reluctantly, ns we arc very 
short of men, and transferring men from vessel to vessel, as we have to do, is having a very de¬ 
moralizing effect upon them. Twenty-eight men ran off to-day ("Feb. 11), hearing that they were 
again to be sent out of their vessels. I do hojie thnt GOO men will be sent immediately. I shall 
do all in my power to render the gun-boats effective in the fight, although they are not properly 
manned ; but I must go, as General Ilallcck wishes it. If we could wait ten days, and I had men, 
I could go with eight moitar boats and six armored boats.” 

1 This was not true. The only considerable body of re-enforcements which had reached Grant 
by Friday night were Lew. Wallace's division. It was true, however, that Grant intended to com¬ 
plete the investment of Floyd’s position, if it took 50,000 men to accomplish it. 


suggest, which certainly was wiser, though it was doubtful if any more good 
would come out of it than from Pillow’s. His plan was, that, leaving a regi¬ 
ment or two in his intrenchments on the right, he would move his command 
up near to Pillow’s, and, while the latter attacked Grant’s right, he would at¬ 
tack the right centre, “ and, if successful, take up a position in advance of the 
works on the Wynn’s Ferry road, to cover the retreat of the whole army.” 
Buckner also lost sight of the fact that, in leaving his lines on the left, he 
left them open to the enemy. But this circumstance was of no serious mo¬ 
ment except in the event of a failure in the main assault ; but in that very 
possible event all would be lost! General Buckner’s plan prevailed. 

The night which followed—that of Friday—was as bitterly cold as the 
preceding. The next morning opened with a cold and cheerless sky. Pil¬ 
low had ordered his men under arms at half past four, to march out of their 
works at five, more than an hour before light, but a halting brigade made 
the time of inarch fifteen minutes past five. 

Baldwin’s brigade, consisting of a Mississippi and a Tennessee regiment, 
had the advance, moving along the road west of the river road. A third of 
a mile on the march, and the enemy was found in some force. Baldwin 
found great difficulty in manoeuvring. The Twenty-sixth Mississippi, in 
front, was three times broken up in disorder while deploying. On the left 
of the road was an open field of 400 or 500 acres, open to the enemy’s fire. 
The Twenty-sixth Mississippi having been formed on the right, and the 
Twenty-sixth Tennessee filling up a gap still left between that regiment and 
the road, and also holding the road itself, Pillow sent the Twentieth Missis¬ 
sippi around to the left in the open field just mentioned, where it was only 
food for powder, and was soon afterward withdrawn. By this time Bald¬ 
win’s right was re-enforced by the arrival of McCausland’s Virginians and 
other regiments, while his left was strengthened by Wharton’s brigade. 
Pillow’s entire force operating against the Federal right was, at bis own es¬ 
timate, not less than 7000 strong. 

The attack was wholly unexpected by the Federals, who were taken at 
considerable disadvantage. The several brigades of McClernand’s division 
were very much detached from each other, and the difficulty of support was 
heightened by the masses of tangled brushwood, black-jack, and dense un¬ 
dergrowth of trees, which made the manoeuvre troublesome. Opposed to 
the advancing column of attack was a portion of Oglesby’s brigade, a few 
Illinois regiments, who held the road, inadequately supported by artillery. 

At first the advanced Federal regiments occupied the crest of the hill at 
the foot of which Baldwin, McCausland, and Wharton were deploying their 
forces. The troops on both sides were mostly under cover of the woods— 
a circumstance which concealed the immense volume of the Confederate as¬ 
sault. Part way up the slope the Confederate column advanced and watch¬ 
ed its opportunity, skirmishing and sharp-shooting, in the mean while, ac¬ 
tively going on. Wharton tried to gain way in the open field on the left, 
but a storm of Minie balls kept him back. After an hour’s skirmishing, the 
left of the column, under General Johnson, pushed up a ravine around to 
the left, flanking the Illinoisans, a dozen Confederate batteries in the mean 
while crashing the woods with their missiles. Hitherto Oglesby’s favorable 
position had baffled the enemy’s advance. The Confederate troops, many 
of them raw recruits, required “ extraordinary exertions on the part of their 
field and company officers to prevent their being thrown back in confusion 
to their trenches.” 1 But the movement to the left drove Oglesby’s right 
back to another position. Here a determined attack was made, met by an 
equally determined resistance. 

The battle extended along tbe lines, involving, at seven A.M., two regi¬ 
ments of W. II. L. Wallace’s brigade, supporting Oglesby on the left. These 
were the Eleventh and Twentieth Illinois, under Ransom and Marsh. A 
Confederate column charged up the hill in their front, and gained the road 
—the one west of the river road—but were repulsed, giving way to a fresh 
line, which advanced boldly to repeat the assault. Wallace brought nearly 
his entire brigade, consisting of 3400 men, upon the bill, and, with the assist¬ 
ance of Taylor’s and McAllister’s batteries, again and again drove back the 
defiant foe. 

It was now half past eight o’clock, and re-enforcements from tbe centre 
of the line, held by Lew. Wallace, were moving past to tbe extreme right, 
which, bent out of its original line, was yet obstinately disputing every step 
of ground. Lew. Wallace’s division had been awakened in tbe morning by 
the noise of battle far away to their right, and had supposed that Oglesby 
was attacking the enemy. At eight o’clock a message came from McCler- 
nand asking for assistance. Wallace bad been ordered to hold the centre at 
all risks, to prevent the enemy’s escape in that direction. A messenger was 
dispatched to Grant’s head-quarters, but the latter was on one of the gun¬ 
boats, consulting with Foote in regard to the possibilities of another naval 
attack. Lew. Wallace, receiving a second and more urgent message from 
McClernand, stating that his flank bad already been turned, sent forthwith 
Colonel Cruft’s brigade. This brigade, consisting of two Indiana and two 
Kentucky regiments, moved on to the woods beyond Taylor’s battery, and 
nearly to tbe extreme right of the line. Here it became engaged with a col¬ 
umn of tbe enemy emerging from a ravine in Oglesby’s rear. 

Oglesby’s brigade, which bad held on till the last, was now getting out of 
ammunition. Graves’s battery, from the Confederate intrenchments, had now 
more effective range than it had had all the morning, and thinned the ranks 
at every discharge. In good order the brigade gave way, breaking through 
Cruft’s line in its retreat, and leaving the latter fearfully exposed to the 
sweeping fire of the enemy’s infantry and artillery. Cruft had been misled 
by his guide, and had taken a position too far to the right, which he was 

1 See Baldwin’s Report. 







FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 


235 


February, 1862.] 

soon compelled to abandon. Every thing now seemed to depend upon the 
steadfastness of W. H. L.Wallace’s brigade. Upon his batteries, from three 
separate and commanding situations, the Confederate artillery was pouring 
its vials of wrath. Looking out upon bis right hand, he could see Pillow’s 
columns already pressfng upon his rear. Between his brigade and them 
only a single regiment of Oglesby’s command remained on the field. That 
regiment was the Thirty-first Illinois, commanded by Colonel John A. Lo¬ 
gan, late a Congressman from Illinois, but who, at the beginning of the war, 
had resigned his seat for the colonelcy of this regiment. Colonel Logan 
had been wounded in the thigh, but he still kept his post. Having ordered 
the surgeon to dress his wound, he again went to the front, remarking that 
he had fired twenty-two rounds since his hurt, and he could fire at least as 
many more now that the wound was dressed. His regiment partook of his 
dauntless spirit, and remained on the field till the last cartridge was gone. 

Matters were now, indeed, getting on rather badly in McClernand’s divis¬ 
ion, and they got on worse and worse until nearly noon, when the Confed¬ 
erates had gained their first point, having pushed him off of the two roads 
to Charlotte. They had also captured a portion of his artillery. Swartz’s 
battery they had taken and lost, and taken again. A part of McAllister’s 
battery was also captured. McClernand’s whole line was retreating, but in 
good order. “He did not retreat,” says Pillow, “but fell back, fighting us 
and contesting every inch of ground.” It had taken Pillow from six o’clock 
till noon to perform his part of the day’s work, viz., to roll McClernand back 
upon Lew. Wallace, upon the Wynn’s Ferry road. But where was Buckner? 



LEWIS WALLACE. 


Going back, then, to trace Buckner’s progress during the day. we find it 
in the morning considerably behind time in its operations. In the first 
place, it had to wait for Head’s regiment to come up from Heiman’s left to 
take possession of the abandoned lines. In the second place, the roads were 
slippery with ice, and in the darkness this was a great inconvenience. The 
fight was already in progress with McClernand when Buckner reached the 
rifle-pits on the right of Pillow’s previous line. Here, as the tardy regiments 
came up, the line was formed near the point where the Wynn’s Ferry road 
crossed Pillow’s intrenchments. Colonel John C. Brown’s brigade, consist¬ 
ing of three Tennessee regiments, partly held the rifle-pits, and was partly 
held in reserve. Graves’s battery was placed at the left of the road, bear¬ 
ing on two Federal batteries in its front, one on the road, the other opposite 
Buckner’s left. This battery also gave a good share of its attention, as has 
been already seen, to McClernand’s brigades on the Federal right, who were 
contesting the field with Pillow, and who were already gradually giving way. 

Buckner’s attack proceeded from a point on Heiman’s left. The latter, 
however, kept his original position, and Drake, who had the day before held 
the hill on his left, was now with Pillow. Buckner’s command amounted 
to over 4000 men. Not wishing to waste his force by assaults, he intended 
simply to hold his position and await the issue of the battle, which was now 
culminating on his left. But Pillow needed a more active co-operation than 
this; Buckner must relieve him by an advance. At nine Buckner was made 
to understand this, and sent the Fourteenth Mississippi, supported by two 
of his Tennessee regiments, against the batteries in his front, while Graves 
Sent his compliments entirely to the Federal right, his fire in front being 
masked by Buckner’s advance. Yesterday these compliments were lightly 


thought of—"Valentines” the soldiers called them facetiously—it was the 
middle of February—but to-day it was more serious. Graves’s artillery 
made more impression than even Buckner’s advance. While McClernand’s 
right was retiring, exhausted of ammunition, his left was pushing the Con¬ 
federates back to their defenses. Here Buckner, thwarted, crouched till 
noonday, when Pillow, who had almost forgotten him in the excitement of 
his partial victory, began to bethink himself of his military partner—of op¬ 
erations then due on the Wynn’s Ferry road. 

Accompanied by Gilmer, be rode across the field, and found Buckner 
where we have just left him, resting behind his intrenchments, and contem¬ 
plating the strength of the two Federal batteries yonder in his front. But 
that would not take the batteries. A movement was quickly made, at Pil- 
I low’s order, flanking them on their left and rear, while Pillow himself, with 
Forrest, his right-hand cavalry-man, who had been harassing Oglesby’s and 
W. H. L.Wallace’s rear, made a charge from the right. The batteries were 
driven back, leaving four pieces in the hands of the enemy. Buckner had 
gone around by way of the valley just off Heiman’s left, and now his forces 
joined those of Pillow, who had come round from the other side. 

Now, if ever, was the time for this Confederate army, or “our people”— 
as Floyd, in his peculiar but unmilitary style, expresses himself—to escape 
southward toward Nashville. The route to Charlotte was open, and now 
the Wynn's Ferry road also was clear. This evidently was the design from 
the beginning. With a view to this, all the regiments had taken with them 
blankets and knapsacks, with three days’ rations. But the excitement of 
successful pursuit made a mere escape appear a tame and unworthy con¬ 
summation of so costly a victory. Why not continue the movement against 
Lew. Wallace, and then against Smith himself, and sweep Grant’s army en¬ 
tirely away from the front of Donelson? This question was not modestly 
nor wisely answered by Pillow and his associates in command. It was for¬ 
gotten that, although a portion of Grant’s army, unprepared for assault, bad 
been met and beaten in detail, the attack could no longer have this advan¬ 
tage. The fight had already lasted six hours; the regiments which bad 
been driven had retired slowly, and were by no means demoralized. Many 
of these regiments had already had time to recover themselves, and with 
the troops yet untouched in their rear, presented a firm and irresistible front 
to their now well-nigh exhausted enemy. Nor this alone; but it was prob¬ 
able that in two hours more Floyd’s army would itself be driven, and the 
avenue of escape which was now open be again closed against it. All this 
was forgotten in the excitement of victorious advance. 

Instead of the whole army escaping by the river route to Charlotte, only 
| Baldwin’s two regiments remained on this route, B. R. Johnson having hur¬ 
ried off the others to the right for a new battle. 

Lew. Wallace had not been idle all this time. After sending Cruft’s 
I brigade to McClernand’s assistance, it was not long before fugitives from the 
right crowded in confusion upon his rear, and a mounted officer came gal¬ 
loping down the road, shouting, “We are cut to pieces!” T(? remain sta¬ 
tionary longer would invite panic. Thayer’s brigade was moved forward, 
with Wallace himself in advance. The junior Wallace, Oglesby, and Me 
Arthur, with portions of their brigades, were almost immediately met re¬ 
tiring in good order, and calling for more ammunition. The enemy was 
following close upon these. Between Pillow’s advance and the retiring 
troops Thayer’s brigade was interposed, being advanced to the tip of the 
ridge, and there formed in a line at right angles with the old one. This 
was the nucleus for a new front. Wood’s battery, a portion of the Chicago 
light artillerv, was posted in the road along which the enemy must ad¬ 
vance—at its right an Illinois and Nebraska, and at its left an Illinois and 
Ohio regiment. Two Illinois and an Ohio regiment were held in reserve. 
In the mean time, McClernand’s men were refilling their cartridge-boxes. 
Cruft’s brigade had joined Thayer’s on the right, and Taylor’s battery was 
brought to bear on the enemy, whose advance was now completely checked. 
Now the waves of battle began to flow backward against the Confederates. 

At three o’clock General Grant rode up the hill and ordered an advance 
against the retiring ranks of the enemy. At McClernand’s request, Lew. 
Wallace, whose troops were comparatively fresh, undertook the assault. 
Cruft’s brigade, headed by the Eighth Missouri and the Eleventh Indiana, 
from Smith’s division, with two Ohio regiments in reserve, formed the as¬ 
sailing column. The ground to be gained was in great part the same which 
had been given up in the forenoon. Across the valley or extended ravine 
in Wallace’s front was the ridge which had been last yielded. Here the 
Confederates were re-forming their line. Up this ridge a charge was made 
bv two Missouri and Indiana regiments, led by Colonel M. L. Smith, while 
Cruft moved around the base of the bill to the right. Before Smith lay an 
ascent of one hundred and fifty yards, “ broken by outcropping ledges of 
rock, and, for the most part, impeded by dense underbrush.” Cruft had to 
make his way around upon the enemy’s flank through brushwood. At in¬ 
tervals up the hill Smith’s skirmishers were rapidly advanced, and a lively 
bushwhacking followed between them and the Confederate pickets, each 
side taking shelter, as opportunity offered, behind rock and tree. Slowly 
the two regiments followed, and, when less than fifty yards had been gained, 
received a volley from the hill-top. It now fared hard with the skirmish¬ 
ers. Smith ordered his men to lay down, and when the violence of the fire 
was exhausted, thev rose again and pushed on up the hill. Thus falling 
when the fire was hottest, and then rising again, they at last reached the 
top, and Cruft at the same time attacking the enemy on the hill-side, the 
ridge was cleared. The fight and pursuit lasted for two hours, and by five 
o’clock the enemy had entirely disappeared from the field, taking refuge in 
his intrenchments. 

While this was going on along the Wynn’s Ferry road, an assault was 















236 


also being made by Smith’s division on Buckner’s intrenchments. While 
Buckner was yet on his way back to his lines the storm fell upon Head’s 
almost solitary regiment, which had been distributed along the rifle ; pits for 
a distance of three quarters of a mile. The regiment altogether only num¬ 
bered a little over 400 men fit for duty. These had been sharp-shooting all 
the forenoon. At two o’clock Buckner’s men began to return to their rifle- 
pits, but in great disorder. An attack was made by Smith before Han¬ 
son’s regiment, which was the first to return, had got into position. 

General Smith’s troops were fresh, and impatient to take part in the ac¬ 
tion. His division consisted of four Iowa, three Indiana, two Illinois, and 
one Missouri regiment. Three of these, the Second and Seventh Iowa, and 
the Twenty-fifth Indiana, supported by others, were selected for the assault, 
the main column of the division making a feint farther to the right. The 
ground to be gained was more precipitous and difficult than elsewhere along 
the lines. 

The assault was undertaken under cover of Stone’s Missouri battery. 
The regiments engaged in it were not surpassed by any in the service. It 
was at the head of the Second Iowa that General Lyon charged and fell at 
the battle of Wilson’s Creek. After the fight had lasted an hour at the 
right of the entire Confederate line, this regiment made an onset and gained 
a portion of the rifle-pits. Stone’s battery was brought forward, and al¬ 
though two regiments were ordered up from the fort, and others of Buck¬ 
ner’s were now at hand, it was impossible for the enemy to regain what he 
had lost. This position enfiladed the entire, right of the defenses of Donel- 
son, and, if darkness had not intervened, Buckner’s force would have been 
immediately routed. 

The day had come to a close—a day of uninterrupted battle. For the 
first time during the war had it occurred that all day long an engagement 
had been continued between the two opposing armies. The troops engaged 
on either side must be credited with distinguished bravery. It was on this 
occasion, for the first time, that Southerners admitted that Northern troops 
would fight as well as their own, and even then it was given out that this 
was true of the Western troops alone. Those engaged on the Confederate 
side were mostly from Tennessee and Mississippi; those on the Federal 
mostly from Illinois. From the latter state were at least twenty-nine regi¬ 
ments, four of which were of artillery; from Iowa there were six regiments; 
from Indiana the same number; from Kentucky there were two, and from 
Missouri three. If these troops—and many of them were raw recruits—had 
not been pretty richly endowed with Western “grit,” there is no doubt but 
that Pillow would have effected his design and delivered his army. But 
although, for nearly four hours, Oglesby almost entirely alone bore the 
brunt of the tremendous blow aimed at the Federal right, there was no 
flinching, and, until the ammunition gave out, there was no retreat. They 
so severely punished the Confederates that even after the latter had, by an 
obstinate contest of six hours, gained possession of the roads leading south¬ 
ward from Hover, they were no longer in a condition for the escape which 
they had fought to secure. 

In a battle so severe, the casualties were on both sides remarkably small. 
Grant gives no definite estimate of losses in his report, but sets them in the 
rough at not less than 1200, which is far beneath the true figure. 1 Pillow 
estimates his losses at 2000. The list of Federal losses are especially re¬ 
markable for the number of field-officers killed and wounded. The two 
regiments which lost more than any others were the Eleventh and Thirty- 
first Illinois, these two being the last to give way when MoClernand was 
driven. The loss of the Eleventh Indiana was almost half that of Wallace’s 
entire brigade. It was the resolution with which both officers and men re¬ 
sisted the overwhelming attack of Pillow and Johnson that gained the day 
for the Federals. “ We came to take that fort,” said Oglesby, “ and we will 
take it!” This was the sentiment of Grant’s entire army. 

That night the Confederate generals held a second council of war about 
midnight. It had taken till 12 o’clock to bury the Confederate dead. As 
on the previous night, the place of meeting was at General Pillow’s head¬ 
quarters in Dover. Floyd was there, and Pillow, attended by his aids, and 
Buckner, and in the course of the consultation Colonel Forrest made his 
appearance. The council was held under circumstances of ill omen. “ Our 
people" had made a desperate fight, but the gateways of escape which it 
had forced open were now shut against it. This had been clearly ascer¬ 
tained by scouts, who had returned with the gloomy intelligence that the 
Federal camp-fires were in the same positions as on Friday night. Forrest 
did not believe this testimony, but ocular evidence satisfied him of its 
truth. At one o’clock orders had been given for the entire command to 
be under arms at four o’clock in the morning, to march out on the road to 
Charlotte. Now these orders would have to be rescinded. And there was 
no other way of escape. Floyd had at night sent up the river to Nashville 

1 The following is the list of casualties as given in the officers’ reports immediately nfter the 
battle: 


Twentv-fifth Kentucky. 84 

Second Iowa. 198 

Seventeenth Kentucky. 40 

Forty-fourth Indiana. 4:t 

Seventh Iowa. 39 

Birg'*’s Sharpshooters. 4 









Forty-ninth Illinois. 08 

Toml.1388 


Lfssi than half the regimentR are here represented. The cro.itest number of casualties of course 
befell Met ’lernand's division. Smith's suffering: hardly any. Not a raiment of Oglesby's or Thay¬ 
er’s brigade is represented in thi* 1 m ; yet Oglesby must have suffered more in proportion than 
any other brigade engaged W. II. Wallace’s brigade lost CS7. If we put Oglesby’s loss at only 
700, we have, together with the numbers given in the list, a little over 2000, without including 
Thayer’s losses. 


[February, 1862. 

all the boats, with the wounded, and three hundred Federal prisoners which 
had been captured during the day, so that even this outlet was closed. 
The scene at Pillow’s head-quarters at about three o’clock on Sunday morn¬ 
ing had all the interest of a drama. The following dialogue will represent 
in substance the consultation which followed after the report of the invest¬ 
ment of Dover had been made by the scouts. 

Floyd. “Well, gentlemen, what is now best to be done?” 

Profound silence. 

Floyd (again). “General Pillow, what do you think it is best to do?” 

Pillow. “I think that we had better adhere to our previous resolution 
to cut our way out, sir.” 

Floyd. “ Well, General Buckner, what do you think it is best to do?” 

Buckner. “We can try to cut our way out, as we did yesterday, but 
we should lose three fourths of our command, sir. I can not hold my posi¬ 
tion for half an hour after daylight. If I attempt to take my force out I 
shall be seen by these fellows that have ensconced themselves in part of 
my intrenchments. They will surely cut me to pieces!” 

Colonel Forrest. “ But I will cover you with my cavalry.” 

Buckner. “That will make no difference. We can not cut our way 
out without its costing us three fourths of our men.” 

Floyd. “ I concur with General Buckner.” 

Pillow. “ If we can fight them another day in the trenches, by to-mor¬ 
row we can have boats enough here to transport our troops across the ri v- 
er, and let them make their escape to Clarksville.” 

Buckner. “It will be impossible for me to hold tny position for half an 
hour, as I have already informed you.” 

Pillow. “But why can’t you hold your position? I think you can hold 
your position ; I think you can, sir.” 

Buckner (a little touched). “I know my position better, perhaps, than 
you do, sir. I can only bring four thousand men to bear against the ene¬ 
my, while he can oppose me with any given- number. You, gentlemen, 
know that yesterday morning I considered the Second Kentucky, Colonel 
Hanson’s regiment, as good a regiment as any in the service; yet such was 
their condition yesterday afternoon, that, when I learned the enemy was in 
their trenches (which were to our extreme right, and detached from the 
others), before I could rally and form them, I had to take at least twenty 
men by the shoulders, and put them into line as a nucleus for formation.” 

Floyd. “It is evident, as General Buckner saj's, that we can no longer 
hold out in the trenches. What shall we do?” 

Buckner. “ The other alternative, it appears to me, is a plain one. We 
can surrender. It is an alternative which we can accept without dishonor, 
considering our determined resistance of yesterday. To repeat that resist¬ 
ance to-morrow would cost three fourths of the command—a sacrifice which 
no commander has a right to make.” 

Floyd. “We will have to capitulate; but, gentlemen, I can not surren¬ 
der ; you know my position with the Federals; it wouldn’t do—it wouldn’t 
do!” 

Pillow (still bent on “cutting out”). “I will neither surrender myself 
nor iny command ; I will die first!” 

Buckner. “ Then I suppose, gentlemen, the surrender will devolve upon 
me ?” 

Floyd (looking out for the main chance). “General, if you are put in 
the command, will you allow ine to take my brigade out by the river?” 

Buckner. “Yes, sir, if you move your command before the enemy act 
upon my communication offering to capitulate.” 

Floyd. “ Then, sir, I surrender my command.” 

Pillow (angrily). “I will not accept it; I will never surrender!” 

Buckner (calling for pen, ink, and paper, and not forgetting the bugler) 
“I will accept, and share the fate of my command.” 

Floyd, Pillow, and Forrest then began to busy themselves about getting 
out of the way. The former escaped with about fifteen hundred men, 
one half of his command, on board the steamer General Anderson and 
another smaller boat. These had come down at about daybreak from 
Nashville. Curiously, considering the state of affairs at Donelson, one of 
these boats brought down four hundred raw troops. The manner of pro¬ 
ceeding with the escape was to cross the river with a boat-load of troops, 
and then to return for more. Pillow and his staff got across in a small flat- 
boat, four feet by twelve, procured for him by an aid-de-camp, making their 
way to Clarksville by land. Forrest in the mean time, with a portion of 
his command, “cut out” by crossing the back-water on the left, and appear 
to have had an unpleasant time of it. To say nothing of the water, which 
was “saddle-skirt deep,” the weather was so intensely cold that “a great 
many of the men were frostbitten, and it was the opinion of the generals 
that the infantry could not have passed through the water and have sur¬ 
vived it.” The two hundred were brave fellows, but Gantt, and Wilcox, 
and Henry — Forrest’s subordinates — preferred to remain with Buckner, 
and were surrendered. 

The scene at the river, where Floyd was embarking his “ people,” became 
exciting as the morning light grew more distinct. All Floyd’s brigade, 
with the exception of the Twentieth Mississippi, consisted of Virginians un¬ 
der Wharton and McCausland. For these latter he showed the preference; 
they were embarked first; and, “to prevent stragglers from going aboard,” 
Colonel Brown, commanding the Mississippi regiment, was directed to place 
a strong guard around the steam-boat landing. The boats had only come 
down a short time before daylight, and the rumor that the position was to 
be surrendered spreading through the camps, a multitude of soldiers flock¬ 
ed to the river “almost panic-stricken and frantic,” hoping lo escape. But 
the Twentieth Misssissippi “stood like a stone wall." After several trips 

























February, 18(i2.] 




FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 


had been made, and nearly all of the Virginia regiments taken across, Buck¬ 
ner, who had already capitulated, began to grow uneasy, and ordered the 
boat to leave the landing, threatening, in case of delay, to send a shell in 
that direction. 

Thus the night and morning with the Confederate army. Outside of their 
intrench men ts, meanwhile, was a painful and heart-sickening scene. Thou¬ 
sands of dead and wounded were lying on the bloody field. On such a night, 
to be helpless from severe wounds was a suffering less dreadful than death 
itself, for it was bitter cold. Where Lew. Wallace's division held the battle¬ 
field, the terrible sufferings of these helpless soldiers were, so far as possible, 
relieved. The ground, according to Wallace’s report, “ was thickly strewn 
With the dead of McClernand’s regiments. The number of Illinoisans there 
found mournfully attested the desperation of the battle, and how firmly they 
had fought it All night, and till far in the morning, my soldiers, generous 
as they were gallant, were engaged in ministering to and removing their 
own wounded and the wounded of the first division, not forgetting those 
of the enemy.” 

As morning broke upon the Federal ranks, it found them on all sides 
drawn up ready for an assault on Donelson, in conjunction with an attack 
by the two gun-boats which Foote had left behind. Before the action was 
commenced a white flag was seen above Fort Donelson, the sound of Buck¬ 
ner’s bugle was heard, and the following note came directed to General Grant 
from General Buckner: 

“Sir, —In consideration cf all the circumstances governing the present 
situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the 
Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of ca¬ 
pitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view sug¬ 
gest an armistice until twelve o’clock to-day. I am, sir, very respectfully, 
your obedient servant, S. B. Buckner.” 

To which General Grant replied: 

“Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of commis¬ 
sioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms other than 
an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. 

“I propose to move immediately upon your works. I am, sir, very re¬ 
spectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. Grant.” 

This elicited from General Buckner the following remarkable answer: 

“Sir, —The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an 
unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your 
command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confeder¬ 
ate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which 
you propose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, S. B. Buckner.” 

The Fifty-eighth Ohio Volunteers was the first regiment on the enemy’s 
battery, and, immediately upon possession, its band opened with the “ Star 
Spangled Banner.” 1 

At the lowest estimate, 10,000 men were surrendered with the fort, besides 
forty pieces of artillery. Grant estimated the number of prisoners at from 
12,000 to 15,000. The prisoners were, for the most part, dressed in citizens’ 
clothes, having no military mark except black stripes on the pants. The of¬ 
ficers had on gray uniforms, and were distinguished from Federals holding 
similar rank by the great profusion of gold lace. Most of the Tennessee 
regiments had enlisted only for twelve months, and had received no pay 
since they had entered the service. 2 

Tlie results of the victory at Donelson distinguished it above any victory 
which had hitherto been gained in American history. The prisoners taken 
would have made a larger army than Scott led in Mexico. It was not mere¬ 
ly a siege, but a great battle. In his congratulatory order to his troops Gen- 
;ral Grant said: 

“ The victory achieved is not only great in the effect it will have in break¬ 
ing down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war 
ever taken in any battle on this continent.” And surely he did not over¬ 
step the limits of a becoming modesty in adding, “ Fort Donelson will here¬ 
after be marked in capitals on the map of our united country, and the men 
who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people." 

Very soon after the surrender of Donelson both General Floyd and Gen¬ 
eral Pillow were relieved of their commands. 3 * * * * * 9 * * * * 14 


1 The German colonel, Bausenwein, commanding the Fifty-eighth, was full of innocent rapture 
over the Confederate booty. In his report to the adjutant general he breaks out in this wise: “ I 
have some 4000 muskets, revolvers, Bowie-knives, etc., now under guard, and thousands of tents, 
provisions of enormous hulk (!)—in fact, even' thing of war implements. Hundreds of horses and 

mules! Our company officers walk no more; they arc supplied with Secesh saddles, horses, and 
mules, and happiness beams from their eyes and lips!” 

* As regards the disposition made cf the prisoners the following order will inform the reader: 

“ SPECIAL ORDER. 

“ H.-ad-quarters, Army in the Field, Fort Donelson, February Ifi, 18C2. 

“All prisoners taken at the surrender of F<>;t Donelson will be collected as rapidly as practica¬ 

ble, near the village of Dover, under their respective company and regimental commanders or in 

such manner as may be deemed best by Brigadier General S. B. Buckner, ami will receive two 
davs’ rations preparatory to embarking* for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, 
blankets, and such private property ns inay be carried about the person, and commissioned officers 
will be allowed their side-arms. By order U. S. Grant, Brig. Gen." 

9 The Confederate Congress commenced its session two days after the capture of Donelson. 

Just one week after the capture, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated us President of the Confederate 

States under the auspices of a permanent government. It is hardly any wonder tlmt Mr. Davis 
should have resented the echoes of disaster coming to his ears at such a time. It was an ill omen 

for the so-styled jtermnnent government. His resentment was certainly not diminished by the 

consciousness that he himself was responsible for the defeat. Anxious to divert popular venge¬ 
ance from his own freshly-crowned head, he, on the 11th of March, sent to Congress, together I 
with the official reports of the battle, the following special message: 

14 Executive Department. 

“ I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have Ivon received at the Wur Department 
of the defense and fall of Fort Donelson. They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. In- 
etreutions have been given to furnish farther information upon the several pvantA not made intel- 














































288 




GENERAL HITCBEU I DIVISION CROSSING GRVX-N RIVER, FEBBTJAKT, 1862. 


[February, 1862. 

tive of Kentucky, and a graduate of West Point, belonging to the same 
class as General Lee and General Joseph E. Johnston. For some time he 
held the professorship of mathematics at West Point; he afterward held a 
similar position in the Cincinnati college, where, in 1845, he founded an ob¬ 
servatory. At one time he had been adjutant general of Ohio. When the 
war broke out he saw what would be its magnitude, and immediately offer¬ 
ed his services. At this time fifty-seven years of age, he promised to be¬ 
come one of the most energetic and thorough of the Federal officers. 

His division broke camp at Bacon Creek, a few miles north of Munfords- 
ville, on Tuesday, February 11, marched across Green River to Camp Madi¬ 
son, and on Thursday and Friday completed the march from that point to 

doned responsibility by transferring the commnnd to a junior officer. In a former communication 
to Congress I presented the propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the disaster at 
Fort Donelson until official reports could be received. I regret that the information now fur¬ 
nished is so defective. In the mean time, hopeful that satisfactory explanation mav l»c made, I 
have directed, upon the exhibition of the case as presented bv the two senior generals, that they 
should be relieved from command, to await farther orders whenever a reliable judgment can be 
rendered on the merits of the case. Jefferson Davis.” 

The charges intimated in the above were more specifically stated by II. B. Brewster, the Con¬ 
federate A. A. General, in the following communication, addressed to Generals Floyd and l’illow, 
March 1G: 

“ Under date of March 4 the Secretary of War says: ‘The reports of Generals Floyd and Pil¬ 
low are unsatisfactory, and the President directs that both these generals be relieved from com¬ 
mand till farther orders.’ He farther requests General Johnston ‘in the mean time to request 
them to add to their reports such statements as they may deem proper on the following points: 

«** 1st. The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to 
repel attack. 

“‘2d. The failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found unten¬ 
able. 

‘“3d. Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer, instead of executing them¬ 
selves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army. 

‘“4th. What was the precise mode by which each effected his escape from the post, and what 
dangers were encountered in the retreat. 

“ ‘5th. Upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments 
of the senior general's brigade, etc.’ ” 

The different answers made by the two generals to these charges were characteristic. Pillow’s 
was manly but independent; and inasmuch as he had himself advised an effort to escape with 
the entire army, he could hardly have felt the burden of blame resting very heavily on his shoul¬ 
ders ; still he answered as if the charges applied to himself ns much as to any body. In regard 
to the failure to give timely notice of the need of re-enforcements, he said that up to Friday, the 
14th, there was no such need ; but if there had been, General Johnston had no men to spare. In 
this case it was clearly, as it appeared to him, the best policy to fight their way out. He seemed 
inclined to blame Buckner, as indeed he had reason to, for having failed to do his part of the 
work on Saturday, and thus enabling the enemy to recover himself. It was his own opinion that 
the assault might have been again tried with success on Sunday; but this was only his private 
opinion, and when the command was delivered over to him, he could not act upon it in the face 
of Buckner’s and Floyd’s assertion that it would cost three fourths of the army. 

Poor Floyd, on the other hand, feeling that the onus of complaint unavoidably rested on him¬ 
self, was disposed to resent the charges and to kick them back in the President’s face. 

In the first place, he had planned the whole defense to suit himself, but stu| id Johnston did not 
agree to his plans. He knew that Johnston's whole army could not repel the Federal advance up 
the Cumberland.(I) He considered the fort illy chosen, to begin with. Then, again, it had only 
thirteen guns, and only three of these were available against iron-clads. [Pretty well available, 
we should say, considering the results of the gun-boat fight on Friday !] lie did not call for re-en¬ 
forcements because he thought there were already troops enough in the miserable fi»rf, considering 
that it was only a trap after all. He thought the main object of the defense at Donelson was to 
gain time for Johnston to evacuate Bowling Green with all his supplies and munitions of war. 

Hold Donelson, indeed! Why, it could not be held except with a force of 05,000 men ; 50.000 
| at the fort, 20,000 at Clarksville, and 25,000 more at Nashville. What use, then, of making 


ligible by the reports. It is not stated that re-enforcements were at any time asked for; nor is it 
demonstrated to have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating the position; nor is 
it known by what means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the 
remainder to surrender; nor upon what authority or principles of action the senior general uhan- 


The more immediate results of the Federal victory were the evacuation 
of Bowling Green and Columbus by the Confederates. While the battle 
was being fought on Saturday, General A. S. Johnston was already at Nash¬ 
ville, awaiting the arrival of his command from Bowling Green. 

The column dispatched by Buell against Bowling Green consisted of 
General Ormsby M. Mitchell’s (third) division. General Mitchell was a na- 

























NASHVILLE. TENNESSEE. 


February, 1862 .] 


FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 


239 












































































































































240 


[February, 1862, 



RAILROAD BRIDGE ACROSS TUB CUMBERLAND AT KABUV1LLB. 


Bowling Green, a distance of forty-two miles. The town was occupied on 
the 15th without resistance, only three regiments of the enemy remaining 
behind. Both of the bridges across the Big Barren River were destroyed, 
and the Confederates had succeeded in shipping all their artillery to Nash¬ 
ville. In the mean time, Johnston, as we have said, was at Nashville direct¬ 
ing operations, and awaiting the event of the battle at Donelson. Up to 
the latest moment Pillow promised him success. So late as Saturday night 
that sanguine officer telegraphed to him, “On the honor of a soldier, the day 
is ours!” The telegram was received at midnight, and Nashville rang with 
the jubilations of an excited people. At dawn the news came of the sur¬ 
render of the fort. Then cheers were exchanged for a tumult of fear. It 
was Sabbath morning, and the good people of the town were at church 
thanking God for a great victory, when Governor Harris galloped through 
the streets of the capital proclaiming that Donelson had fallen, and their 
army had been captured, and that at any moment the enemy might come 
down upon' them. In an excited, hurried manner he summoned the state 
Legislature, and adjourned it to Memphis, leaving by a special train in the 
afternoon himself with the state archives. A scene of the utmost confusion 
followed. If the city had become the victim of a universal conflagration, 
the panic could scarcely have been greater. The churches were broken up, 
the streets were crowded with weeping women, and the side-walks were 
filled with trunks and baggage thrown hastily out of the houses, and some¬ 
times from the third story windows. The more reckless of the citizens 
abandoned themselves to plunder. In the midst of this general and con¬ 
fused exodus, General Johnston’s army might have been seen moving across 

an ado about a re-enforcement of a dozen or so thousands of men, which would be but a drop in 
the bucket. 

As to the “ failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found unten¬ 
able,” this seemed to Flovd a biting sarcasm on Jeff. Davis’s part. Pray, what had the bloody 
fight of the 15th meant, if it was not an “ attempt to save the army by evacuating the fort.” But 
perhaps the President was not satisfied because the attempt, unsuccessful on Saturday, was not re¬ 
peated on Sunday. He would remind the President that “there is such a thing as human ex¬ 
haustion—an end of physical ability in men to march and fight—however little such a contingen¬ 
cy may seem possible to those who quietly sleep upon soft beds, who fare sumptuously every day, 
and have never tried the exposure of protracted battles and hard campaigns.” Flovd then begins 
to grow somewhat extravagant in his details of what his army had suffered ; he speaks pathetically 
of “the conflict, toll, and excitement of unsuspended battle running through eighty-four hours.”(!) 
His excited imagination sees three Federal soldiers where there was but one. How was this 
force, six times his own, to be thrust aside? Then,besides, if his soldiers should cut their way 
out, “they would have to march over a battle-field strewn with corpses.”(!) 

The remaining charges related chiefly to Floyd’s escape with a good part of his own division 
after a surrender had been determined upon. This was easily explained. There were two boats, 
and these came so late that it was impossible for only a small part of the army to escape. The 
Benior general preferred, of course, to save his own troops to any others. 

However ludicrous some parts of Floyd’s report may appear, his arguments, on the whole, were 
perfectly just and reasonable. Like Tilghman at Fort Henry, Floyd could, by the defense of 
Donelson, effect nothing, except to gain time for Johnston to form a new line more defensible 
farther south. Donelson was, indeed, nothing else but a “trap,” as Floyd called it; and if any 
one was culpable for setting this trap, it was Jefferson Davis himself. He had placed the Con¬ 
federate army of the West in a situation adapted neither to offensive nor defensive operations, 
being too feeble for the former, and disposed in the worst possible manner for the latter. 


the Cumberland, with a long train following, which did not get over all 
night. Floyd had got up with his small detachment', and now remained as 
a rear guard until the retreat should be accomplished. On the following 
Thursday he too took his departure. 

There was sufficient reason why Nashville should have been abandoned, 
but there was hardly any occasion for the panic which crazed its citizens, 
who expected to see the gun-boats coming up before sundown. General 
Johnston had received the tidings of defeat as early as four o’clock Sunday 
morning. If he had issued a simple proclamation to quiet the natural alarm 
of the citizens, the tumult which followed would have been avoided. Ht 
left all this in the governor’s hands, who only made matters worse. It was 
true that Nashville was no longer tenable. The city had no natural situa¬ 
tion which could be made available for defense. Good turnpike roads led 
to it from all sides, and through it ran the Cumberland, navigable for the 
Federal fleet. Johnston’s engineer reported that the city could not be held 
by a force less than 50,000 strong. This, however, -was only ground for the 
removal of the army, and need only have disturbed such of the citizens as 
were particularly desirous of leaving their homes and property for the sake 
of sharing the fortunes of the Confederacy. But that which moved the cit¬ 
izens of Nashville was not so much disinterested patriotism as mortal terror. 
The Southern leaders had studiously endeavored, and in a great measure 
had succeeded in producing a popular impression among the people that 
within the lines of the Federal armies they were secure from no violence. 
This had been the impression ever since Beauregard had said that “ Beauty 
and booty” was the motto of the Union soldiers. 1 

The day after the surrender of Donelson, Commodore Foote, though still 
suffering from his wound, left Cairo with eight mortar-boats, two iron-clads, 
and the Conestoga, for another advance up the Cumberland — this time 
against Clarksville, a fortified position on the river, about fifty miles below 
Nashville, and on the Virginia Railroad. On the 20th, Clarksville, aban¬ 
doned by its garrison, fell into Foote’s hands. The railroad bridge across 
the river had been destroyed. The commodore, at the request of the mayor 
and other prominent citizens, issued a proclamation, guaranteeing safety to 
such citizens as chose to remain in the city. General Smith was left in 
command, while Foote returned to Donelson to prepare an expedition against 
Nashville. Buell had already sent large re-enforcements to Grant. A por¬ 
tion of these, under General Nelson, accompanied Foote on transports. These 

1 The following, from the Nashville Banner of Peace of about this date, indicates the manner in 
which this impression had been produced: 

“We have felt too secure, we have been too blind to the consequence of Federal success. If 
they succeed, we shall sec plunder; insult to old and young, male and female; murder of inno¬ 
cents; release of slaves, and causing them to drive and insult their masters and mistresses in the 
most menial services; the land laid waste; houses burned ; banks and private coffers robbed ; cot¬ 
ton and every valuable taken away before our eyes, and a brutal and drunken soldiery turned 
loose upon us.” 































































February, 1862 .] 


FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 


241 



<X>LUMUC8, KENTUCKY. 


troops occupied the capital without opposition. General Buell himself ar¬ 
rived on the 26th, and issued a proclamation, the object of which was to se¬ 
cure the citizens of Nashville from spoliation or injury. By this order, sol¬ 
diers were “forbidden to enter the residences or grounds of any citizens on 
any plea, without authority.” 

The next day, General Grant, accompanied by his staff, came up from 
Clarksville. Among other of the citizens, they called on Mrs. James.K. 
Polk, the wife of a late President of the United States. This lady, then 
about fifty years of age, had all her life been associated with the South, and 
her sympathies were clearly with the Confederate rather than with the 
United States government. But these sympathies she did not express, from 
a courteous regard for her visitors. “She hoped that the tomb of her hus¬ 
band” (which was in a corner of the beautiful garden, surrounded by cedars 
and magnolias) “would protect her household from insult and her property 
from pillage; farther than this, she expected nothing from the United States, 
and desired nothing.” 

The Confederate government, by their too hasty abandonment of Nash¬ 
ville, lost a large amount of stores. These consisted especially of clothing 
and commissary supplies. The mob had, for the most part, taken care of 
this property. Floyd had great difficulty in driving off the greedy crowd. 
The Confederate quarter-master left the city eight days before the arrival of 
the Federal army; if he had remained, he could doubtless have saved prop¬ 
erty amounting in value to hundreds of thousands. 

With remarkable rapidity, it was now proposed to move on Columbus 
with Foote’s fleet. This was needless, as already General Beauregard had 
ordered Polk to evacuate that strongly fortified place, and to adopt a posi¬ 
tion on the river farther south. The position selected by Polk was Island 
No. 10, the main land in Madrid Bend, on the Tennessee shore, and New 


Madrid, on the opposite bank. Island No. 10 was about ten miles below Co¬ 
lumbus. Defensive works had been thrown up at these points the previous 
autumn, and heavy batteries were being constructed. On the 25th orders 
were issued for the removal of the sick, preparatory to the evacuation of Co¬ 
lumbus. Two days afterward General McGown was assigned to the com¬ 
mand of the new position, his division being ordered thither February 27. 
The commissary, quarter-master’s, and ordnance stores had all been re¬ 
moved, and afterward the heavy guns. March 1, Polk’s entire army, except 
the cavalry, evacuated Columbus—General Stuart’s brigade moving, by way 
of the river, to New Madrid, the remainder by land to Union City. On the 
3d, two days after Polk and his staff left the works, a scouting party, consist¬ 
ing of a portion of the Second Illinois cavalry, sent from Paducah by Gen¬ 
eral Sherman, took possession of the town. The next day the fleet came 
down, and three regiments, under Generals Cullum and Sherman, took per¬ 
manent possession. 

The campaign commenced on the 1st of February had now terminated. 
It had been brief, but decisive. It had lasted but one month, but it was a 
continued series of victories. It renewed the enthusiasm of a people which 
had grown tired of waiting for results. Grant and Foote—the two heroes 
of this campaign—came before the people bearing splendid trophies in their 
hands. Henry, Donelson, Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus—all re¬ 
duced within a period of thirty days—appeared to Unionists to speak pro¬ 
phetically of the fate awaiting all Confederate strong-holds. A month ago, 
and one half of Kentucky was firmly held in the grasp of the Confederate 
armies; now, not only that state, but the greater part of Tennessee also, was 
restored to Federal allegiance. Hopes were entertained that another year 
of vigorous work would bring back all the seceded states. 



TUB CAPITOL AT NASHVILLE. 


















































242 


[February, 1862. 



BURN8IDK*8 EXPEDITION OFF PORTRESS MONROE. NIQUT SCENE. 


CHAPTER XII. 

ROANOKE AND NEWBERN. 

Hatteras Inlet at the beginning of 1862.—Situation and Importance of Roanoke Island; its de¬ 
fensive Works.—General Wise’s Command.—The New England Coast Division; its original 
Destination.—McClellan’s Instructions to Burnside.—The Burnside Expedition.—Commodore 
Goldsborough.—Arrival of the Fleet off Hatteras.—The Battle of Roanoke Island.—Destruc¬ 
tion of the Confederate Fleet and Capture of Elizabeth City.—Capture of Edenton, Plymouth, 
and Winton.—The Battle of Newbern.—Capture of Washington.—Bombardment and Capture 
of Fort Macon.—Beaufort. 

I ^HE old proverb that “misfortunes never come singly" was proved true 
- to the Confederacy in the month of February, 1862. Between the loss 
of Fort Henry and of Fort Donelson was sandwiched in, as it were, the cap¬ 
ture of Roanoke Island. Floyd and Wise, compatriots in the Western Vir¬ 
ginia campaign of the last autumn, but always at loggerheads with each oth¬ 
er, were now fitly disposed by Mr. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of 
War, at points as wide apart as possible. Wise, with his legion, had been 
sent to Roanoke Island, the eastern terminus of the Confederate line. Floyd 
had been dispatched to Tennessee, the western limit. J ust one week before 
Floyd surrendered Donelson, or, rather, left Buckner to transact the disa¬ 
greeable business for him, Wise had surrendered Roanoke Island. 

When North Carolina seceded from the United States, the Confederate au¬ 
thorities fortified Hatteras Inlet by the construction of Forts Hatteras and 
Clark. Other works were erected-commanding Oregon Inlet, farther north. 
It was not long, however, before these works on the North Carolina coa i 
were reduced by the Federal fleet under Butler and Stringham. Within 
the long, narrow sand-bar extending almost from Cape Henry to Cape Look¬ 
out, lie the waters of two extensive sounds, Albemarle and Pamlico. Pam¬ 
lico Sound, together with the embouchures of its two tributary rivers, the 
Neuse and the Pamlico, had been gained by Butler’s victories. The Con¬ 
federate force defending these waters, compelled to resign the inlets, had con¬ 
centrated on Roanoke Island. This island commands the only entrance to 
Albemarle Sound, which connects with Pamlico by means of Croatan and 
Roanoke Sounds on either side of the island. 

Roanoke Island is the key not only to a large portion of Northeastern 
North Carolina, but also to an important slice of Virginia—an especially im¬ 
portant slice, as including Portsmouth and Norfolk. 1 The island was de¬ 

1 “Roanoke Island was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two sounds, 
Albemarle and Currituck; eight rivers, the North, West, Pasquotank, the Perquimans, the Lit¬ 
tle, the Chowan, the Roanoke, and the Alligator; four canals, the Albemarle and Chesapeake, 
the Dismal Swamp, the Northwest Canal, and the Suffolk ; two railroads, the Petersburg and Nor¬ 
folk, and the Sea-board and Roanoke. It guarded more than four fifths of all Norfolk’s supplies 
of corn, pork, and forage, and it cut the command of General Huger off from all its most efficient 
transportation. It endangers the subsistence of his whole army, threatens the navy yard at Gos¬ 
port, and to cut off Norfolk from Richmond, and both from railroad communication with the South. 
It lodges the enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of Hatteras, gives them a rendezvous, and 


fended by a few regiments, mostly from North Carolina. General Wise was 
assigned to the command during the latter part of December, 1861. Benja¬ 
min desired him to bring his legion up to 10,000 strong by recruiting in 
North Carolina. It does not indicate any great enthusiasm in the Confed¬ 
erate cause on the part of that state that Wise was obliged to fall back upon 
the military authorities at Richmond for support. But no troops could be 
spared from the Virginia army. It appeared very likely that Roanoke Isl¬ 
and would prove to be another of Secretary Benjamin’s traps. The fortifi¬ 
cations were on the western coast, commanding the Croatan Sound, which 
was the only channel available for naval approach. There were three sand 
forts built at intervals on the northern half of this coast: Fort Bartow, at 
Pork Point; Fort Huger, at Weir's Point; and midway between these, Fort 
Blanchard, mounting four guns. The works at Pork and Weir’s Point were 
quite formidable, mounting together twenty-two guns, three of which were 
100-pound rifles. Opposite Pork, at Redstone Point on the main land, was 
Fort Forest. On the east side of the island there was a battery, covering 
the passage of troops to or from Nag’s Head, on the bar outside. On the 
southern end of the island there were no works whatever. Even if the 
marshy and densely-wooded character seemed to preclude the possibility of 
any formidable attack by land from this direction, it was still important that 
there should be some work commanding the entrance to Croatan Sound, ei¬ 
ther on the island or on the main land. To resist the approach of Federal 
troops toward the northern portion of the island, there was in the middle of 
it, nearly on a line with Fort Bartow, a strong redoubt, constructed with a 
pond covering it in front and flanking both extremities. This battery was 
thirty-five yards wide, and commanded a cart-road, the only available ap¬ 
proach from the south. Across from Redstone to Pork Point a line of ob¬ 
structions, consisting of piles and sunken vessels, had been formed, leaving 
an open channel under the guns of each of the two forts. A fleet of eight 
steamers, mounting each two guns, completed the defenses of Roanoke Isl¬ 
and. 

In the mean time an expedition was planning on the Federal side which 
would soon set these defenses at naught. On the 6th of September, 1861, 
General McClellan had requested the Secretary of War “ to organize two bri¬ 
gades, of five regiments each, of New England men, for the general service, 
but particularly adapted to coast service.” At the time this request was 
made, it was McClellan’s intention to use this force in the inlets of Chesa¬ 
peake Bay and on the Potomac. But so great was the difficulty of obtain¬ 
ing suitable vessels, and adapting them to the service required of them, that 
the expedition was not ready until January, 1862. McClellan, in the mean 

large, rich range of supplies, and the command of the sca-hoard from Oregon Inlet to (’ape Hcn- 
ry. It should have been defended at the expense of 20,000 men and of many millions of dollars." 
—Report of General Wise. 









































































February, 1862.] 


ROANOKE AND NEWBERN. 


243 



NORFOLK 


ORTSMOUT 


PR ANNIC.K 


RUMM, 


W.Vlanding 


SONLMERTON 


SOUTH MILLS 1 


TON 


[ROANOKE 


DURANT 


NAG'S 

(HEAD 


PLYMOUTH 


GREENVILLE 1 


BA N TA 

' 

^/VASH IMGTON 


STUMP' 
.POINT ' 


MIODLETOW 


Swan quarter 


DURHAM; 


NEWBERN 


MAP OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COAST. 


if 

* r C,N'?’E. tWKWULS 


FORTRESS.PIONROE 


HAMPTON 

ROADS. 


V?V- ViEHWI 


MURFREESBORO 


VVI 


LLIAM 


STO 


•V 


<<r> * 


« c o H r 


INLLT 


CRAVENVILL 


20 

























































244 


[February, 1862. 




1 The following is a list of the naval vessels, with the names of their commanders and the char¬ 
acter of their armament: 


1. Stars and Stripes... 

2. Louisiana. 

3. Hetzel. 

4 . Underwriter. 


6. Delaware. 

6. Valley City. 

7. Southfield. 

8. Hunchback. 

9. Morse. 

10. Whitehead. 

11. Seymour. 

12. Shawsheen. 


13. Lockwood.. 

14. Ceres. 

15. Putnam .... 

16. Brinker.... 

17. Granite. 

18. Perry. 

19. Bimey. 

20. Whitehall.. 


Lieut. Com’g. Worden. 

Lieut. Com’g. Murray. 

Lieut. Com’g. Davenport. 

Lieut. Com’g. Leffers. 


Lieut. Com’g. Quackenbush.. 


A. V. Lieut. Com’g. Behm. 

A. V. Lieut. Com’g. Colhoun. 

Acting Master Hayes. 

Acting Master Trench. 

Acting Master Wells. 

Acting Master Woodward .... 


4 8-in., 65 cwt.; 1 20-lb. Parrott. 
(1 8-in., 63 cwt.; 1 32-lb., 57 
-j cwt. ; 2 32 - lb., 3 cwt.; l 


j 12-lb. rifled. 

1 9-in.; 1 80-lb. rifled. 

(1 8-in, 63 cwt.; 1 80-lb. rifled; 
■\ 1 12-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. smooth 

( bore. 

jl 9-in.; 1 32-lb., 57 cwt.; 1 
( 12-lb. rifled. 

Lieut. Com’g. Chaplin. 4 32-lb., 42 cwt.; 1 12-lb. rifled. 

3 9-in.; 1 100-lb. rifled. 

3 9-in.; 1 100-lb. rifled. 

2 9-in. 

1 9-in. 

1 30-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. rifled. 

2 20-lb. rifled. 

(1 80-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. rifled; 
( 1 12-lb. smooth bore. 

1 30-lb. rifled; 1 32-lb., 33 cwt. 


Acting Master Graves . 


Acting Master McDiarmid ... 

Acting Master Hotchkiss. 1 20-lb. rifled. 


Acting Master Giddings. 
Act’g Master’s Mate Boomer 


1 32-lb. rifled. 

1 32-lb., 57 cwt. 

— 9 in. 

— 9 in. 


main outside on account of their too great draught of water. The City of 
New York, drawing sixteen feet of water, attempted to pass the shoals on 
the 14th and got aground. The next day the vessel went to wreck in sight 
of thirty vessels that could render her no assistance. All day on the 14th 
and that night her crew were lashed to the rigging to prevent the waves 
from sweeping them overboard. Four of her boats were gone. In the re¬ 
maining one, two brothers, William A. and Charles H. Beach,two mechanics 
from Newark, New Jersey, accompanied by the fireman, the second engineer, 
and the colored steward, managed to gain the fleet, and surf-boats were sent 
out to rescue their comrades. The next morning the gun-boat Zouave sunk 
at her anchorage, running foul of some obstruction. The Louisiana ground¬ 
ed the same day with the City of New York. A few days afterward the 
Pocahontas was wrecked. It was with great difficulty, and in connection 
with such dispiriting incidents as have been related, that the fleet was con¬ 
veyed into the waters of the sound through “the shallow, narrow, and tor¬ 
tuous” channel of the bulk-head. Says Goldsborough, alluding to this chan¬ 
nel, “Under the most favorable circumstances, scarcely an inch more than 
seven and a half feet of water can be found in it. It was only by the great¬ 
est exertions and perseverance on the part of my officers and men, and by 
turning every possible expedient to prompt account, that our vessels of the 
heaviest draught (some of them drawing quite eight feet) were worried 
through this perplexing gut.” It was not until the 28th that this feat had 
been successfully accomplished. 


while, had been appointed generai-in-chief. In his larger combinations he 
changed his original intention in regard to this expedition, and determined 
to give it a wider range, sending it to the North Carolina coast; partly be¬ 
cause Butler’s operations had opened the way, partly because permanent pos¬ 
session of Albemarle Sound would greatly facilitate the task of the blockad¬ 
ing fleet, but chiefly because he hoped to be able to strike a blow at the 
Weldon Railroad after the capture of Newbern. In his letter of instruc¬ 
tions, January 7, to General Ambrose E. Burnside, 
who was to command the expedition, he indicated 
the following series of operations: Burnside was 
first to unite with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in com¬ 
mand of the fleet, at Fort Monroe; the first point of 
attack was to be Roanoke Island; then Newbern 
was to be attended to, and, if possible, the Weldon 
road also. Raleigh itself might perchance come 
within reach, but there must be caution about that. 

Having taken Newbern, Burnside was to push down 
to Beaufort, reduce Fort Macon, and open the port 
Wilmington was brought up in prospect as the “ next 
point of interest,” but with a hint that its capture 
might require an additional force. The instructions 
concluded with the following caution regarding 
proclamations: “In no case would I go beyond a 
moderate joint proclamation with the naval com¬ 
mander, which should say as little as possible about 
politics or the negro; merely state that the true is¬ 
sue for which we are fighting is the preservation of 
the Union and upholding the laws of the general 
government, and stating that all who conduct them¬ 
selves properly will, as far as possible, be protected 
in their persons and property.” 

The expedition, when completed, constituted a formidable armada. The 
naval force consisted of twenty light-draught vessels, having altogether an 
armament of over fifty guns, of which more than one fourth were 9-inch 


guns; there were two 100-pound rifles, and only twelve of the guns were of 
less calibre than 30-pounders. 1 This part of the expedition was under the 
command of Flag-officer Louis M. Goldsborough, a native of the District of 
Columbia, and a citizen of Maryland. lie had been fifty years in the naval 
service of the United States, and over eighteen years he had passed at sea. 
He was flag-officer of the North Atlantic blockading squadron. A late act 
of Congress had placed him on the retired list, but of the opportunity thus 
offered he had not availed himself. 

The military division consisted, in the first place, of an army nearly fif¬ 
teen thousand strong. There were seven gun-boats connected with this di¬ 
vision : the Picket, which was Burnside's flag-ship; the Pioneer, the Hussar, 
the Chasseur, the Ranger, the Lancer, and the Vidette; the latter mounting 
three guns and the others four. The flotilla of transports numbered nearly 
forty vessels, each capable of conveying between four and five hundred men ; 
in addition, there was a large amount of small craft, fifty or more additional 
vessels, for the transportation of supplies sufficient for sixty days’ rations. 
General Ambrose E. Burnside, commanding the military division, was born 
in Indiana, May 23,1824. He graduated at West Point in 1847, and was 
attached to the Confederate General (then Captain) Bragg’s command in the 
Mexican war and the subsequent Indian campaigns. Retiring from military 
service in 1853, he did not enter it again until the civil war. He assumed 
command of the First Rhode Island Volunteers, but in the battle of Bull 
Run commanded a brigade. Soon after that battle he was made a brigadier 
general, and when the Coast Division was raised he was appointed its com¬ 
mander. Decisive in character, and at the same time a keen analyst of char¬ 
acter in others, courteous in manner and of a commanding presence, be was 
more than any other man fitted for the important position assigned to him. 

General John G. Foster, commanding the first brigade of Burnside’s army, 
was a native of New Hampshire, and at the time of our history now reach¬ 
ed was nearly forty years of age. He was second lieutenant of engineers in 
the regular army, belonging to the company of which McClellan was first 
lieutenant. He look part in the Mexican campaign, and at the battles of 
Contreras and Cherubusco earned the first lieutenancy. At El Morino del 
Rey he was severely wounded, and promoted to a captaincy. In 1854 he 
became Assistant Professor of Engineering at West Point. General Foster 
was one of the garrison of Fort Sumter when that work was assailed at the 
beginning of the insurrection. 

The expedition sailed out of Hampton Roads January 11, at half past nine 
o’clock at night, and arrived off Hatteras on the 13th, just as a northeast gale 
began to blow up, threatening danger in any attempt to pass over the bulk¬ 
head. Even in the most quiet sea there were several vessels which must re- 





































February, 1862.] 


ROANOKE AND NEWBERN. 


245 



JOHN Q. K08TEB. 


On the 5th of February, the fleet, with fifteen days’ rations, was in motion 
for Roanoke Island, which is distant thirty-eight miles from Hatteras Inlet. 
Williams’s brigade, consisting of four regiments, was left at the Inlet. The 
naval division led, advancing in three columns, commanded respectively by 
Worden, Murray, and Davenport. It was a fine day, but the fleet moved 
slowly, and it was not until evening that the low, swampy shores of North 
Carolina were visible. Curiously, the enemy had forgotten to remove the 
buoy on the eastern extremity of Long Point Shoal, twenty miles from the 
Inlet, and thus probably the loss of several vessels was prevented. That 
night a force was dispatched to the main land to secure the services of a cer¬ 
tain individual, peaceably or by force, as a pilot. The errand was success¬ 
fully accomplished. The next day was unpromising. A thick fog obscured 
all distant objects. Once during the forenoon it cleared away, disclosing 
Roanoke Island and the vessels of the Confederate fleet; but the fog return¬ 
ed again when the channel of Croatan Sound was nearly reached, and it be¬ 
gan to rain. The next day, Friday, February 7, was clear, and at nine o’clock 
the fleet weighed anchor for the third time, at the sign of the Union jack, 
and the Ceres and Putnam led the way, as on the previous day, in search 
of obstructions. Arriving soon at the entrance of Croatan Sound, there 
were then the marshes to be threaded. Through these the passage is so 
narrow that not more than two ships can pass abreast. At half past ten 
these had been cleared, and a signal gun was fired from one of the forts on 
the island announcing the impending attack. The Underwriter, which had 
been sent to discover the presence of a battery, if there was one, at Sandy 
Point, near Ashby’s Harbor, where Burnsida. intended to land his troops, 
gave signal a little after eleven o’clock that the coast was clear at that point. 
A few minutes later the naval division, accompanied by the seven gun-boats 
of the coast division, approached Pork Point, beyond which the Confederate 
fleet was drawn up behind a double row of piles. Before the bombardment 
commenced, Goldsborough signaled from the Philadelphia, “ This day our 
country expects every man to do his duty.” All the forts and vessels open¬ 
ed fire upon the attacking fleet, but the latter, in return, gave especial atten¬ 
tion to Fort Bartow. At one o’clock the flag-staff of this fort was carried 
away by a shot, and in less than half an hour afterward the barracks in the 
rear were in flames. 

In the course of the afternoon tire troops began to disembark at Ashby’s 
Harbor, under cover of the gun-boats. The lauding was not entirely un¬ 
guarded by the enemy, who had posted a small force there with a field bat¬ 
tery. But the Delaware, with Rowan on board, took up a position just south 
of Pork Point, and cleared the way with a few shots from her guns. In the 
mean time the bombardment went on. It had been hottest between two 
and three o’clock. Two hours later Fort Bartow ceased firing, and the Con¬ 
federate fleet withdrew around Weir’s Point. 


While this was going on, General Wise was lying 
sick at Nag’s Head, four miles east of the island, on 
the sand-bar. The Confederate force upon the island 
on the morning of the 7th consisted of the Eighth 
North Carolina regiment, under Colonel H. M. Shaw, 
who, in the absence of Wise, was the senior officer; 
the Thirty-first, under Jordan, and three companies 
of the Seventeenth, under Major G. II. Hill. These, 
allowing for an absence of four or five hundred men, 
made up a garrison of nearly 1600 men. Early on 
the morning of the 7th this garrison was re-enforced 
by ten companies of the Wise Legion, under the 
command of Colonel Anderson and Captain Wise, 
the general’s son. General Wise, notwithstanding 
his illness, issued all the necessary orders from his 
sick-bed, and attended to the wants of his army. 

By midnight on the night of the 7th nearly 10,000 
Federal troops had been landed at Ashby’s Harbor. 
It was a dismal night for the soldiers, who, before 
emerging upon the firm sandy plain in the interior, 
had to wade through mud knee deep, and then to 
content themselves with such sleep as they could get 
with only their overcoats to protect them from the 
cold rain. 

The next day, Saturday, the 8th, was Burnside’s. 
The gun-boats, indeed,kept up their fire during the 
day, and a little after noon passed the obstructions 
in the Sound, but the burden of the day’s labor fell 
on the military division. At seven o’clock in the 
morning the line of battle was formed. The advance 
up the island was in three columns: Foster’s brigade 
in the centre, Parke’s on the right, and Reno’s on the 
left. Foster was to move along the cart-road in front, 
while Reno and Parke flanked the enemy’s position 
by advancing through the woods on either side. 
The marshes and lagoons with which the island is 
covered rendered the approach difficult. A battery 
of six 12-pound boat howitzers headed the central 
column. 

The field work, which constituted the enemy’s sole 
defense against this land attack, was about a mile dis¬ 
tant from Ashby’s Harbor, on the cart-road. In its 
front the timber had been cut away to afford range 
for the artillery. It was garrisoned by 300 men, the 
remaining portion of the defensive force being held 
in reserve. Besides the clearing in front, the position was covered, front 
and flank, by an extensive lagoon. 

The Confederate skirmishers were soon met and driven in, and at a curve 
in the road the battery of howitzers was placed to bear upon the enemy’s 
battery a short distance ahead. The howitzers were exposed to a severe fire 
from three heavy guns in the Confederate work. An advance was made by 
the enemy with a view to flank Foster’s brigade, the others not having yet 
come into action or even attracted the notice of the Confederate officers. A 



JLbttlJr U KK>0 


















246 


[Febru4RY, 1862. 



LANDING OP THE TBOOP8 UKCOW NF.WBEBN. 


pretty sharp action followed between the Twenty-third 
and Twenty-seventh Massachusetts regiments and a 
portion of the Wise Legion under Anderson and Cap¬ 
tain Wise, in which the Confederates were repulsed. 

Here it was that Captain Wise received a wound which 
soon afterward proved mortal. The heroism of the 
Federal soldiers, who in many cases were obliged to 
stand waist-deep in water, was admirable. The wound¬ 
ed, as they were carried to the rear, smiled cheerfully 
and encouraged their companions. Nowhere did a 
single soldier flinch from the work in hand. Soon 
Parke passed Foster on the right and came into ac¬ 
tion. A charge was then ordered to be made by Haw¬ 
kins’s regiment of Zouaves, the Ninth New York, and 
simultaneously with this movement the flanking col¬ 
umn under Reno was disclosed on the left.- The Con¬ 
federate battery was now enfiladed from both sides by 
a raking fire which the bravest soldier could not stand 
and live, and the only hope left was in flight. The 
stars and stripes were hoisted above the hostile bat¬ 
tery, and the Federal columns hastened on in pursuit 
of the Confederates, who were retreating toward Nag’s 
Head. The Twenty-first Massachusetts and the Fifty- 
first New York were in the advance, and just reached 
the shore in time to prevent the escape of a small number of prisoners, 
among whom was Captain Wise. The Confederate encampments were still 
farther north; from these the enemy’s reserve force was driven toward the 
upper end of the island. But there was no chance for Shaw to make an¬ 
other stand. He therefore surrendered his entire command, which had that 
morning been re-enforced by four companies of the First North Carolina 
and a battalion under Colonel Green, bringing it up to a strength of at 
least 2500 men. Three thousand stand of small arms were also captured. 
Among the prisoners we have mentioned Captain Jennings Wise. He was 
wounded in the battle, and only survived it a few hours. Captain Wise had 
been previously editor of the Richmond Enquirer. The casualties in the 
Federal fleet amounted to twenty-five, of whom six were killed; in the mili¬ 
tary division Burnside reported a loss of 235, of whom thirty-five were killed. 

The Confederate fleet endeavored to escape by running up the Pasquo¬ 
tank River to Elizabeth City. The day after the capture of Roanoke Isl¬ 
and, thirteen steamers, under Commander Rowan, were sent in pursuit. It 
was also a part of Rowan’s mission to proceed up the river and destroy a 
link of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal. At nine o’clock on the morn¬ 
ing of the 10th, Rowan met the enemy’s vessels off Elizabeth City, and cap¬ 
tured or destroyed the entire fleet.’ The Ellis, one of the Confederate steam¬ 
ers, was transferred to the Federal fleet. Between forty and fifty prisoners 
were taken. 


The next morning, after the conflict between the two fleets, the Federal 
steamers passed into the harbor off Edenton, at the west end of Albemarle 
Sound. A portion of a flying artillery regiment stationed in the town fled, 
and many of the citizens, excited by apprehension on account of some un¬ 
founded reports, left their homes. The Federal troops took undisturbed pos- 

1 “The names of iho mcn-of-wnr vessels captured and destroyed by our vessels since wc reach¬ 
ed this island are as follows: Flag-steamer Sea-bird, destroyed ; steamer Forest, destroyed; steam¬ 
er Curlew, destroyed ; steamer Fanny, destroyed; steamer Ellis, captured; steamer Black War¬ 
rior, destroyed, and a new gun-boat on the stocks at Elizabeth City, also destroyed—making seven 
vessels in all; and each of the first six, I may add, was remarkably well armed ns a gun-boat. 
All of them, except the Curlew, were destroyed or captured in the attack at Elizabeth City; and 
it may be proper to mention that the whole of them, saving, of course, the one on the stocks, were 
struck by our projectiles of one kind or another in the course of the engagement they had with us 
off here on the 7th instant. The Curlew, during the engagement of the 7th, was so badly injured 
by one of our 100-pounder shells that she was compelled to seek shelter close under Fort Forest, 
where, as soon as our vessels burst through the double row of extensive obstructions (formed by 
piles and sunken vessels, nnd at, ns wc are credibly informed, a cost of $400,000) in order to get 
at her and also attack the fort, she was set on fire by her own crew, nnd, almost simultaneously, 
the fort, too, shared the same fate from the hands of those who were in it. In about an hour aft¬ 
erward, in the dark of the evening, both blew up.”— Flag-officer Golckborough's Report , February 
20 , 1 » 62 . 


session of the town. Eight cannon, and a schooner on the stocks, were de¬ 
stroyed. Two schooners jvere captured, one of them having on board 4000 
bushels of corn. On the 18th of February, Flag-officer Goldsborough and 
General Burnside issued a joint proclamation to the people of North Caro¬ 
lina. 1 

Albemarle Sound, at its western extremity, opens northward into the 
Chowan River, and eastward into the Roanoke. Leaving Croatan Sound 
on the afternoon of the 18th, Commander Rowan, with the Delaware, pro¬ 
ceeded on a reconnoissance up this river. Two steamers were to follow him 
with Hawkins’s Zouaves from Roanoke, and, stopping at Elizabeth City, he 
took away with him the force at that point, consisting of five steamers. Hav¬ 
ing ordered a reconnoissance to Plymouth, and anchored his fleet at the mouth 
of Roanoke River, with orders to follow him when the reconnoissance should 
be completed, he proceeded, with the Delaware and Perry, to Winton. At 
this place Union men were said to be in arms in expectation of the arrival 
of Burnside’s men. His vessels were fired upon by a North Carolina bat¬ 
tery. Early on the 20th, the entire command having arrived, after a short 
conflict the town was captured. 

General Burnside, after the capture of Roanoke Island, directed his force, 
in conjunction with the naval division, now left under Rowan’s command, 
against Newbern. This city was situated up the Neuse River, which emp¬ 
ties into Pamlico'Sound on the western side. The two commands embark 
ed from Hatteras Inlet March 12, and that night an. 
chored off the mouth of Slocum’s Creek, eighteen 
miles below Newbern. Here, the next morning, the 
military division landed under cover of the fleet. 
The troops were disembarked in the midst of great 
enthusiasm, some of them, too impatient to wait for 
the boats, leaping into the water and wading waist- 
deep to the shore. It was twelve miles from the 
place of landing to the enemy’s camp, and the roads 
were rivers of mire, through which the soldiers were 
obliged to march, dragging their heavy artillery 
with them. This toilsome march consumed the 
day, and the boat howitzers did not come up till 
three o’clock on the morning of the 14th. The ves- 
sels of the fleet, in the mean while, had moved up 
the river, shelling the woods in advance of the 
troops. At daylight on the 14th General Burnside 
ordered an advance, throwing General Foster with 
a column against the Confederate left. A second 
column, under Reno, was to attack the right; while 
a third, under Parke, was to attack in front. Gen¬ 
eral Reno advanced along the railroad, and the oth¬ 
er two columns by the turnpike. The soldiers had 
suffered much from tedious marches and exposure 
to rain, but they advanced to the attack with eager- 

i M Ronnoke Island, N. C., February 18,1862. 

“The mission of onr joint expedition is not to invade any of your rights, but to assert the au¬ 
thority of the United States, and to close with you the desolating war brought upon your state by 
comparatively few bad men in your midst. Influenced infinitely more by the worst passions of hu¬ 
man nature than by any show of human reason, they are still urging you astray to gratify their 
unholy purposes. They impose upon your credulity by telling you of wicked and even diabolical 
intentions on our part ; of our desire to destroy your freedom, demolish your property, liberate 
your slaves, injure your women, and such like enormities, all of which, we assure you, is not only 
ridiculous, but utterly and willfully false. 

“Wc nre Christians as well as yourselves, and we profess to know full well and to feel pro¬ 
foundly the sacred obligations of that character. No apprehensions need be entertained that the 
demands of humanity or justice will be disregarded. Wc shall inflict no injury unless forced to 
do so by your own acts, and upon this you may confidently rely. 

“These men nre your worst enemies. They, in truth, have drawn you into your present condi¬ 
tion, and are the real disturbers of your peace and the happiness of your firesides. We invite you, 
in the name of the Constitution, and in that of virtuous loyalty and civilization, to separate your¬ 
selves at once from their malign influence, to return to your allegiance, and not compel us to re¬ 
sort farther to the force under our control. The government asks only that its authority may be 
recognized, and, wc repeat, in no manner or way does it desire to interfere with your laws consti¬ 
tutionally established, your institutions of any kind whatever, your property of any sort, or your 
usages in any respect. 

“ L. M. Goldsborough, Flag-officer commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

“A. E. Burnside, Brigadier General commanding Department of North Carolina.” 



SINKING OK THE CONFEDERATE FLEET. 




























February, 1862.] 


ROANOKE AND NEWBERN. 


247 



ZLIZAX1ETU CITT, NOETII CAROLINA. 


ness. They had the day before learned of the evacuation of Manassas by the 
Confederate army of the Potomac. Reno, on the railroad, had the advance. 
The enemy’s works were five miles below Newbern, and were a mile in ex¬ 
tent, protected on the river bank by a battery of thirteen guns, and on the 
opposite side by a line of redoubts over half a mile in length. This line 
of works was defended by eight regiments of infantry, five hundred caval¬ 
ry, and three batteries of field artillery of six guns each. The Confederate 
forces were under the command of General Branch. 

General Reno’s column was moving upon the enemy’s right flank. As it 
moved up the railroad, a train was observed which had just arrived,bring¬ 
ing re-enforcements to the enemy. This train was attacked, and the enemy 
driven behind his intrenchments. The engagement then commenced, the 
Twenty-first Massachusetts regiment coming within short range of the ene¬ 
my’s redoubts and drawing their fire. General Foster’s brigade had come 
up on the main road at the right and had formed his line, the Twenty-fourth 
Massachusetts on the extreme right and the Tenth Connecticut on the left. 
Between the Tenth and Reno’s position General Parke held the centre. The 
Federal line thus formed extended more than a mile. The action, which 
was already begun, was quite severe. In some parts of the Federal line, par¬ 
ticularly on the right centre, the swampy ground, broken by ravines opening 
toward the enemy, exposed the soldiers to the enemy’s fire. The Twenty- 
third Massachusetts, on the left of the Tenth Connecticut, had hardly got 
into position before its colonel, Henry Merritt, fell, a cannon shot having 
passed through his body. The naval battery was placed in the centre, and 
the officers in charge of the guns stood by them persistently, although in 
some cases but a single gunner remained. Hammond, in charge of the Het- 
zel, lost all his men. On Reno’s right, also, the fire was very hot. Adju¬ 
tant Frazer A. Stearns, son of President Stearns, of Amherst College, and at¬ 
tached to the Twenty-first Massachusetts, was shot early in the battle. 


Thus far the Confederate troops had the advantage, for, although inferior 
in numbers, they fought behind breast-works. A charge was now made by 
four companies of the Twenty-first, who marched from the railroad at double- 
quick and drove the enemy from one of their breast-works, hoisted the Union 
colors, and were advancing against a second work, when a larger force at¬ 
tacked them, and they were obliged to withdraw. An assault made by the 
Fourth Rhode Island on Parke’s right was more permanently successful, re¬ 
sulting in the capture of a battery and two flags. From this work, in the 
centre of the Confederate line, Colonel Rodman, pursuing his advantage, 
charged upon the enemy’s works farther to the left, which Reno was also as¬ 
sailing with his entire command. Their centre being now broken, the ene¬ 
my fell back under the combined attack on his right. While this was go¬ 
ing on, the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts, holding the extreme right of the 
entire line of attack, pushed forward by a rapid movement and gained a po¬ 
sition within the enemy’s intrenchments, which were then occupied by Fos¬ 
ter’s whole brigade. The Confederates were now, after four hours’ fighting, 
in full retreat to Newbern. All three of Burnsides brigades were soon en¬ 
gaged in pursuit, and reached the river bank opposite Newbern about the 
middle of the afternoon. In the mean time the gun-boats had come up, and, 
by means of a steamer which they had captured, the army was conveyed 
across the river. The Confederates had escaped, by means of the railroad, 
to Goldsborough, after having burned the bridge across the river. 

The gun-boats had safely passed the obstructions below the city, and three 
or four forts which commanded the river, the most formidable of which was 
Fort Thompson, mounting thirteen guns, two of them rifled 32-pounders. 
This fort protected the left flank of the land force resisting Burnside’s ap¬ 
proach, and its reduction by the gun-boats formed an important part of the 
battle. Not a man was lost in the naval division. Several of the vessels 
were slightly injured in passing the obstructions. 














































































































































248 


[February, 1862. 



bombardment of nevvbern. 
































































































































































































































































































April, 1862.] 


ROANOKE AND NEWBERN. 


249 


As the results of this victory, besides the city, 
General Burnside took eight batteries, numbering 
forty-six heavy guns, and three batteries of light 
artillery of six guns each, two steam-boats, and a 
large amount of commissary and quarter-master’s 
stores, and two hundred prisoners. The Federal 
loss, as estimated in Burnside’s report, was nine¬ 
ty-one killed and 466 wounded; the loss in offi¬ 
cers was very severe. The Confederates admit¬ 
ted a loss of 500, including the prisoners. 

A week after the fall of Newbern,Washington, 
at the mouth of Pamlico River, was surrendered 
to a portion of the Federal fleet under Lieutenant 
Commander A. Murray. On the 19th of April, 
General Reno, with five regiments, took posses¬ 
sion of Camden, the capital of Camden county, 
and situated on the Pasquotank River, opposite 
Elizabeth City. Three of the regiments were 
landed at midnight of the 18th-19th three miles 
below Camden, but, by an incompetent guide, 
were led nearly a dozen miles out of their way. 
The Confederates were intrenched at South Mills, 
across the road by which Reno the next morning 
approached the town. Their rear was protected 
by a thick wood. From this position they were 
driven after a sharp engagement, in which the 
Federal loss was fourteen killed and ninety-six 
wounded. Most of Reno’s men were so much 
wearied with their long march and the heat that 
pursuit was impossible. 

The work of the expedition, according to the 
plan laid down by General McClellan, was now 
almost accomplished. It is true nothing had been 
done to seriously threaten the Weldon Railroad, 
but the Confederate position at Norfolk had been 
effectually flanked, and complete possession had 
been gained of Albemarle and Pamlico Sound. 
The reduction of Fort Macon would give the na¬ 
tional government the entire coast of North Car¬ 
olina. This fort commanded the entrance of 
Beaufort Harbor, one of the best on the South¬ 
ern coast. It was situated on the eastern extrem¬ 
ity of Bogue Banks, opposite Morehead City, and 
was considered more formidable than either of 
the forts yet attacked by the Federal fleet. This 
fort was bombarded on the 25th of April by three 
steamers and by three siege batteries on shore. 
One of the latter was mounted with three 32- 
pounder Parrotts. These shore batteries were 
constructed behind sand-hills, and, besides the 
Parrott guns, mounted eight mortars. The na¬ 
val squadron carried about thirty guns, and was 
under Commander Samuel Lockwood, of the Day¬ 
light. The military division consisted of two 
regiments, the Eighth Connecticut and Fourth 
Rhode Island, with five companies of the Fifth 
Rhode Island. The action commenced early in 
the morning from the batteries on shore. At 
half past eight the squadron began to fire on the 
fort, the three gun-boats moving in an ellipse, and 
delivering their fire by turns. It was evident, 
however, in a very short time, that these boats, 
in the unsteady waters where they were situated, 
would have little effect on the fort, while they 
were themselves suffering severe injury, and at 
ten o’clock they withdrew. The batteries on 
shore, also, during the early part of the day, fired 
too high, and most of their heavy shells exploded 
too far beyond the fort. About half an hour, 
however, after the withdrawal of the boats, this 
mistake was corrected. The bombardment from 
shore was continued nearly all day. There was 
not a strong garrison in the fort, not more than 
five companies, all told, under Colonel White, and 
they held out with great tenacity until their guns 
were all silenced. At four o’clock P.M. the flag 
of truce was displayed and the firing ceased. Four 
hundred prisoners were captured. The reduction 
of Fort Macon gave the Federal navy a port of 
entry and a harbor fitted for vessels of heavy 
draught. One of the most favorable results of 
the occupation of the North Carolina coast was 
the accession of a large number of negroes, who 
would otherwise have contributed greatly to the 
military strength of the Confederacy, as every 
slave on the plantation was equivalent to a white 
in arms. The slave population of the counties 
occupied was estimated in 1850 as over 30,000. 





















































































































































































250 



JOUN ERICSSON. 


CHAPTER XIII. 

THE VIRGINIA AND THE MONITOR. 

Confederate Privateers.—Treatment of captured Privateersmen.—Necessity of Iron-clads.— 
Transformation of the Merrimac into the Virginia.—The Stevens Battery.—Iron-clads pro¬ 
posed to the Federal Government.—Approval of the Plan of the Monitor.—Its Inventor and 
Builder.—The Revolving Turret, and its Inventor.—Launch of the Monitor.—Hampton Roads. 
—Appearance of the Virginia.—Sinking of the Cumberland.—Destruction of the Congress.— 
The Minnesota, Roanoke, and St. Lawrence.—Wooden Vessels and Iron-clads.—Close of the 
first Day’s Fight.—Appearance of the Monitor.—First Encounter of Iron-clads.—The Result. 
—The Monitor and Virginia watching each other.—Destruction of the Virginia.—Action at 
Drcwry’s Bluff.—Loss of the Monitor.—Perilous Voyage of the Passaic.—New Monitors built. 
—Obstacles to their Construction.—Forging Armor-plates.—Capacity of Turretcd Vessels.— 
The Turrets as proposed by Timby.—Automatic Aiming and Discharge.—Advantages of the 
Turret System. 

A T the commencement of the war the Confederates were without any 
naval force. Of the fifty vessels which they had seized in their ports 
and rivers only a few were capable of service on the ocean. They had nei¬ 
ther time nor means to construct vessels of war; but the Federal merchant¬ 
men offered a tempting prize which it was hoped might be secured by pri¬ 
vate armed vessels sailing under letters of marque. During the spring and 
early summer of 1861 several privateers were fitted out. Most of them 
came to grief; none were successful. The revenue schooner Aikin was 
seized at Charleston, and fitted out as a privateer under the name of the Pe¬ 
trel. She had hardly got to sea when she came in sight of the frigate St. 
Lawrence, to which she gave chase, supposing her to be an unarmed mer¬ 
chantman. Coming within range, the frigate discharged a single broadside, 
which-sank the privateer. The Echo, a condemned slaver, was seized at 
Charleston, and equipped as a privateer under the name of the Jeff. Davis. 
She made several prizes. Among these was the S. J. Waring, captured 
within less than two hundred miles from New York. The colored steward, 
William Tillman, and two seamen, were left on board, with a prize crew of 
five men, to take the vessel to Charleston. One night Tillman killed three 
of the captors, and, aided by one of the crew, compelled the others to take 
the Waring to New York, where salvage was awarded to him as the re-cap- 
tor. The Jeff. Davis was soon after wrecked on the Florida coast. The Sa¬ 
vannah, a pilot schooner of only 54 tons, was fitted out as a privateer. Aft¬ 
er making a single prize, she was captured by the frigate Perry, and her cap¬ 
tain and crew were put in irons as pirates. They were brought to trial as 
pirates, but the jury failing to agree, they were remanded. The Confeder¬ 
ate government thereupon selected an equal number of Federal officers, 
among whom was Colonel Corcoran, captured at Bull Run, and placed them 
in close confinement, to be treated in the same manner as the crew of the Sa¬ 
vannah. In consequence of this action, and of the prevailing sentiment at 
home and abroad, the Federal government receded from its position, and the 
rights of prisoners of war were tacitly conceded to captured privateersmen. 

The blockade of the Southern coast soon became so strict that privateers 
had no chance of sending their prizes into their own ports, and those of for¬ 
eign nations were closed by proclamations of neutrality. Privateers could 
only destroy their prizes without gaining any profit for themselves. The 
only practical advantage which the Confederates derived from the issue of 
letters of marque was the tacit acknowledgment by the Federal government 
that they were actual belligerents, and that prisoners made from them on 
the sea as well as on the land were to be considered as prisoners of war. 
Though Confederate citizens could not wage war upon the ocean with 


[January, 1862. 

profit to themselves, government might greatly injure the enemy by prey¬ 
ing upon its commerce. Armed vessels might be fitted out under the Con¬ 
federate flag, bearing regular commissions as men-of-war. They had no 
ships built for this purpose, and no means for constructing them at home. 
Until they could buy or build them abroad, they could only arm and equip 
some of the merchant-steamers which had fallen into their hands. The 
Nashville, formerly plying as a packet between New York and Charleston, 
and the Marques do la Habana, a New Orleans and Havana trader, her name 
having been changed to the Sumter, were armed and sent to sea. The fate 
of these two vessels, which has already been described in this History, 
showed that steamers built for commerce were not adapted for cruisers. 
Steamers possessing great speed and sufficiently stanch to carry a heavy ar¬ 
mament were demanded. In course of time several of these were procured 
in Great Britain. The career of two of these, the Florida and the Alabama, 
will be narrated hereafter. We now turn to a subject of greater import¬ 
ance, which comes up earlier in order of time. 

The Confederate authorities early saw the necessity of floating batteries 
to defend their coasts, harbors, and inland waters. They could not hope to 
rival their enemy in the number of vessels. They must rely upon the su¬ 
perior offensive and defensive force of a few. The maritime powers of Eu¬ 
rope bad instituted experiments to test the practicability of rendering ships 
invulnerable by clothing them with iron. France had built La Gloire, and 
Great Britain the Wanior. These were ordinary men-of-war, covered whol¬ 
ly or in part with solid iron plates four or five inches thick, which was 
thought sufficient to withstand the heaviest shot possible in naval warfare. 
But to construct a vessel of this class, with all thg appliances of European 
navy yards and founderies, required months. The Confederates needed such 
vessels in weeks. They had no means of building a hull or of making an 
engine. They had no iron which a European naval constructor would have 
thought fit for armor. But imbecility, treachery, and accident gave them a 
bull and engine ready for immediate use. 

In 1855 the United States built at different navy yards three powerful 
steam frigates, the Merrimac, the Roanoke, and the Minnesota. They were 
all nearly alike, of about 3500 tons burden, carrying from forty to fifty heavy 
guns. In April, 1861, the Merrimac was at the Norfolk Navy Yard, under¬ 
going repairs. When that place was abandoned, she was set on fire, scut¬ 
tled, and sunk. She was soon after raised by the Confederates, and John 
M. Brooke, formerly a lieutenant in the United States Navy, John L. Porter, 
Confederate naval constructor, and William P. Williamson, chief engineer, 
were ordered to examine into her condition and the use to which she might 
be put. They reported that her upper works were so much damaged that 
she could not be rebuilt without great expense and delay; but the bottom 
part of the hull, the boilers, and heavy parts of the engine, were almost with¬ 
out injury, and that these could be adapted for a shot-proof steam battery 
more quickly and for one third of the sum which it would cost to construct 
such a vessel anew. The plan was furnished by Brooke and Porter. The 
central part of the hull, for something more than half of its length, was cut 
down to within three or four feet of the water-line to form the gun-deck, and 
the hull was plated with iron to a depth of about six feet below the water¬ 
line. A casemate of entirely novel construction was built upon the gun- 
deck. Pine beams, a foot square and fifteen feet long, were placed side by 
side, like rafters, at an inclination of about 45 degrees. These projected over 
the sides of the vessel like the eaves of a house, their ends dipping two feet 
below the water. Upon these beams were placed two layers of oak planks 
four inches thick, one layer horizontal, the other vertical. This was first 
overlaid with ordinary flat bars of iron four and a half inches thick. Ex¬ 
periments which were made under the care of Lieutenant Brooke showed 
that this thickness of iron was inadequate, and a layer of railroad iron was 
added. This casemate did not come to a point, like the roof of a house, but 
there was a flat space on the top, rendered bomb-proof by plates of wrought 
iron. From this roof projected a short smoke-stack. The armament con¬ 
sisted of eight 11-inch guns, four on each side, and a 100-pound rifled Arm¬ 
strong gun at each end. The ends of the vessel were cut down still lower, 
so as to be two feet below water. A light bulwark, or false bow, of wood 
was built. This served the twofold purpose of preventing the water from 
banking up against the casemate when the vessel was in motion, and of 
a tank to diminish the draft. The' inclined roof and submerged eaves and 
ends constituted the novel and distinctive features of this battery, to which 
was given the name of the Virginia. The draft of the Merrimac had been 
about twenty-three feet, and her speed was fourteen or fifteen miles an hour. 
The iron heaped upon her when she was converted into the Virginia brought 
her down about two feet more, and her speed was reduced quite one half. 1 

The construction of the Virginia was commenced in June, 1861, and push¬ 
ed forward as rapidly as possible. The fact that this battery was being built 
could not long be concealed from the Federal authorities, but every effort 
was made to mislead them by false information. Now it was reported that 
the Virginia was ready for action, and would soon come out; then some 
Southern paper would contain a paragraph affirming that she was a failure; 

' The description of the Virginia is necessarily imperfect. The plans were carefully concealed 
in the archives of the Confederate naval department, which has never divulged them. No one 
except her builders and crew appears ever to have been on board of her. When she was blown 
up, so complete was the destruction that no fragment of her armor has been discovered. There is 
some doubt as to the character and thickness of the iron which covered the casemate. We have 
accepted, with some doubt, the statement of the double thickness, flat bars and railroad iron, mak¬ 
ing from seven to nine inches in all. This is confirmed by the effect of the shot which she with¬ 
stood, which would certainly have |»enctrntcd four inches if struck perpendicularly.—The accom¬ 
panying picture is the best ever taken. The submerged stem is not shown, ns it was below wa¬ 
fer and invisible. The bow, which appears projecting before the casemate, was simply the light, 
false bow, built upon the veal bow, which was below water. The sloping sides should have been 
represented as dipping below the water, instead of stopping at the edge of the hull, above the wa¬ 
ter-line. 






January, 1862.] 


THE MONITOR AND THE VIRGINIA. 


251 



THE VIRGINIA. 


her armor had been found too thin to be of service; more had been piled 
upon her, until accurate calculation showed that she would never float. 
Again it was said that her back had been broken in attempting to launch 
her, and that she was abandoned. Several persons made their appearance 
in the Federal lines claiming to have been employed upon her, and furnish¬ 
ed rude drawings of her construction. Whether they were treacherous or 
ignorant can not be known; but their descriptions were certainly far from 
accurate. 

The Federal government was slow to perceive the necessity of iron-clad 
vessels. Before the rebellion it had made no direct experiments in this di¬ 
rection. Robert and Edwin Stevens, wealthy citizens of New Jersey, had 
indeed, for some years, been engaged in constructing an iron battery upon a 
plan of their own, and Congress had at different times made appropriations 
to the amount of half a million ; the builders had also expended more than 
a quarter of a million dollars. In December, 1861, a commission was ap¬ 
pointed to examine this vgssel. They reported unfavorably. To complete 
her would cost more than $550,000, making the whole expense nearly 
$1,300,000, and it would be months before she could be made available. 
Meanwhile, when Congress met in extra session in July, 1861, the Naval De¬ 
partment asked for an appropriation of $50,000 for the purpose of testing 
iron plates. This was refused; but the President ordered that plate should 
be prepared, without waiting for an appropriation. At length, on the 3d of 
August, just before the close of the session, an appropriation of $1,500,000 
was made for building one or more iron-clads. The next day an advertise¬ 
ment was issued for proposals, and a commission appointed to examine the 
plans suggested. Seventeen proposals were presented for vessels ranging 
from 83 to 400 feet in length, to cost from $32,000 to $1,500,000 each. The 
commission reported in favor of three different vessels. The Ironsides, by 
Merrick & Sons, of Philadelphia, was to be a regular man of-war, covered 
with four and a half inch solid plates. She was to be 240 feet long, about 
3500 tons burden, to carry 20 heavy guns in broadside. She would be com¬ 
pleted in a year, at a cost of $780,000. The Galena, by C. S. Bushnell, of 
New Haven, was to be a steamer of 700 tons, brigantine rigged, pierced for 
18 guns. Her frame to be of solid timber 18 inches thick, covered from 2 
to 4 inches with plates of thin rolled iron. Ilcr armor was found in the end 
to be wholly inadequate to resist heavy guns. Her cost was $235,000. Both 
these vessels were built upon general models which had been long in use. 

Of an altogether different class was the Monitor proposed by John Erics¬ 
son, of New York. 1 Her design was so wholly new in every respect that 
the approval of the commission was cautiously guarded. They said: “ This 
is novel, but seems to be based upon a plan which will render the battery 
shot and shell proof. We are somewhat apprehensive that her properties 
for sea are not such as a sea-going vessel should possess; but she may be 
moved from place to place on our coast in smooth water. Wc recommend 
that an experiment be made with one battery of this description on the 
terms proposed, with a guaranty and forfeiture in case of a failure in any of 
the points and properties of the vessel as proposed.” 

Novel as the plan was to others, it was no sudden conception of the in¬ 
ventor. It had been thought out to the minutest detail, and been construct¬ 
ed in drawings and models for years. So confident was Ericsson of the 
perfect success of his invention, that he proposed for it the name of the 
“Monitor,” in order “to admonish the South of the fate of the rebellion; 
Great Britain of her fading naval supremacy, and the English government 
of the folly of spending millions in fixed fortifications for defense.” These 
terms were accepted. The price Was to be $275,000. The contract was 
signed on the 5th of October. The construction of the vessel was under¬ 
taken by Thomas F. Rowland, who, starting in life as the driver of a railway 
engine, then becoming an engineer and ship-builder, had, at the age of twen- 

' John Ericsson was born in Sweden in 1803. From bovhood he manifested decided aptitude 
for mechanical invention. In 1823 he went to England, where he acquired the highest reputa- 
tion as a constructive engineer. He carnc to America in 1839, assuming at once and maintain¬ 
ing a foremost place in bis profession. 


ty-eight, become proprietor of the “Continental Works” at Greenpoint, in 
the city of Brooklyn. Ericsson superintended the whole work in person. 
In spite of his threescore years, he was every where skipping up and down 
ladders, and over planks and gangways, as though he were a boy of sixteen. 
It seemed as though a plate could not be fitted or a bolt driven without his 
being at the workman’s side. So rapidly was the work pressed forward 
that the vessel was launched, with her engines on board, on the 30th of Jan¬ 
uary, just a hundred days after the keel was laid. 

The hull of the Monitor was constructed of a double thickness of iron, 
three eighths of an inch thick, strengthened by iron ribs and knees. It was 
140 feet long, 30 feet wide at the broadest part, and 12 feet deep. The 
shape and proportions were like those of the half of an egg-shell slightly 
flattened at the bottom. An Indian canoe is an almost perfect miniature of 
this hull, and is apparently hardly less frail, for a cannon ball would pierce 
the thin iron as easily as a pistol shot would the bark sides of the canoe. 
But this frail hull was so protected that when afloat no shot could reach it 
Five feet below the top, an iron shelf, strongly braced, projected nearly four 
feet from the sides. This shelf was filled up with oaken blocks three and a 
half feet thick, over which were bolted five series of iron plates, each an inch 
thick. This armor-shelf or platform projected sixteen feet at the stern, in 
order to cover the rudder and propeller, and ten feet at the bow, to protect 
the anchor. The entire length on deck was 166 feet, the breadth 42. When 
afloat, the entire hull and three feet of the armor-platform were submerged. 
To the eye the vessel was merely a low raft, rising only two feet above wa¬ 
ter. No shot from a hostile vessel could reach the vulnerable hull with¬ 
out passing through the invulnerable armor. This defensive structure of 
the Monitor was solely the invention of Ericsson. 

But a vessel of war must possess offensive as well as defensive power. 



TUOMA9 F. BOW LAND. 









































252 


[January, 1862, 






























































































































































































































































































































March, 1862.] 


THE MONITOR AND THE VIRGINIA. 


253 



LAUNCH OK TUE MON I TO II. 


This in the Monitor was embodied in two 11-inch guns, a heavier ordnance 
than had ever before been placed on any vessel. Ericsson had struck upon 
a principle which all European engineers had strangely missed. In the field, 
the primary object in warfare is to slaughter the enemy’s men; in naval 
warfare, to destroy his vessels. A rifle bullet will disable a man as effectu¬ 
ally as a cannon ball; heavy shot only will destroy a ship. In the field,the 
combatant will succeed who can strike the more blows; on the water, the 
one who can strike the heavier. The guns of the Monitor could be placed 
only upon the deck; these, as well as the gunners, must be protected. For 
the means of doing this the Monitor was indebted to the revolving turret, 
the invention of another than Ericsson, though he displayed rare genius in 
first adapting it to practical use. Ten years before Ericsson had dreamed 
of the Monitor, a lad residing in an inland American village had thought of 
revolving turrets. 

Theodore R. Timby was born in Duchess County, New York, in 1822. 
He received the education usual among the sons of American farmers. Be¬ 
fore he was twenty years old he was engaged in active business; but the 
bent of his mind was toward mechanical invention. At sixteen he con¬ 
structed a model of a floating dry-dock, but it was pronounced to be practi¬ 
cally useless by those to whom it was proposed, and he abandoned it. Years 
after it was re-invented by others; but these docks now in use contain noth¬ 
ing essential which was not embodied in the model of this young resident 
of a country town. Several other inventions were more profitable. His 
first model for a revolving turret was made in 1841. It was hardly six 
inches in height, but contains the germ of the whole invention. On the 
18th of January, 1843, he filed his first caveat for this in the Patent Office. 
The specifications were for a “ revolving metallic tower, and for a revolving 
tower for a floating battery, to be propelled by steam.” In the mean while 
he was constructing a large iron model, which was finished in the spring 
of 1843, and was during that year publicly exhibited throughout the coun¬ 
try. He urged his invention upon the attention of the American govern¬ 
ment, besides constructing several models, one of 
which was sent to the French government, and an¬ 
other to the Emperor of China. Our military au¬ 
thorities admitted the practicability of the invention, 
but assumed it to be wholly superfluous. The de¬ 
fenses of the country, it was said, were already more 
than could ever be required. A favorable report 
was indeed made, in 1848, to the Senate, one of-the 
committee being Jefferson Davis. No farther action 
was taken on this report, although it was endorsed 
by the chief of the Ordnance Bureau. Timby, how¬ 
ever, took out patents covering the broad claim “for 
a revolving tower for offensive and defensive war¬ 
fare, whether used on land or water.” The advant¬ 
ages of the revolving turret for naval warfare arc ap¬ 
parent at a glance. It furnishes a shield for guns 
and gunners which can be made invulnerable with¬ 
out using a weight of iron greater than can be float¬ 
ed ; and it enables the vessel, without altering its 
own position, to bring its whole ordnance to bear 
upon any point In the circle. When Ericsson bent 
himself to the invention of a floating battery, he 
found the one essential thing necessary to give it 
practical offensive power ready to his hands, though 
it is not probable that he then knew to whom he 
was indebted for it. 

The turret of the Monitor was constructed of 


and nine feet long. Eight of these plates constituted its thickness. It was 
thus nine feet high and eight inches thick, with a diameter of about twen¬ 
ty feet. The two port-holes, side by side, were oval, just large enough 
horizontally to allow the gun to be run out, with sufficient vertical height 
to give room for the elevation of the guns to secure the range for different 
distances. It was made to revolve upon a central shaft by means of a sep¬ 
arate engine. When not in action, by driving back a wedge it rested firm¬ 
ly upon a metallic ring upon the deck. The guns were loaded within the 
turret, and only run out to be discharged. The deck was perfectly flat, 
without even a permanent railing. The smoke-pipe and draff-pipe for ad¬ 
mitting air to the hull could be lowered below the deck. When the vessel 
was prepared for action the deck presented a smooth surface, broken only 
by the huge round turret, and a low square pilot-house near the bow. 
The vessel drew ten feet of water, and was rated at 776 tons. 

The work of the constructors was completed early in January. Two full 
months were spent in fitting the armament and testing the apparatus. On 
the 5th of March, in obedience to a sudden order, she set out for Fortress 
Monroe. She reached her destination on the night of the 8th, just in time 
to avert an overwhelming catastrophe, but just too late to prevent a great 
disaster; for the Virginia had come out ten hours before, and won the 
first battle in Hampton Roads. 

Hampton Roads is an indentation setting in westward from Chesapeake 
Bay. The narrow entrance is guarded by Fortress Monroe, built on a pe¬ 
ninsula jutting out from the southern shore. It then spreads out into an 
oval harbor some five miles in diameter. Here and there i 3 a shallow place; 
but almost every part is deep enough to float the largest vessel. The estu¬ 
aries of two rivers enter the top of the harbor from opposite directions: the 
James from the northwest, and the Elizabeth from the southeast. At the 
head of the estuary of the Elizabeth, eight miles from its opening, are Nor¬ 
folk on the east side, and Portsmouth, with Gosport, its suburb, on the west. 
The navy yard is at Gosport, which is about twenty miles from the entrance 
to the Roads. The harbor formed by the bay and estuary is one of the 
best on the continent. Hampton Roads was made the great naval rendez¬ 
vous for the Federal fleet. The north shore was occupied by the Federals, 
who had a camp at Newport News, at the mouth of the James. The Con¬ 
federates had intrenched camps at SewalPs Point and Craney Island, on 
each side of the mouth of the Elizabeth, covering the approach to Norfolk. 
During the spring and early summer of 1861, Norfolk had been so feebly 
held that it might have been taken. Butler, who had 11,000 men at For¬ 
tress Monroe, projected an expedition for this purpose; but the battle of 
Bull Run put a stop, for a time, to all active operations by the Federal ar¬ 
mies. Every possible man was withdrawn to Washington. Only 5000 
were left at Fortress Monroe, and for six months the enemy were left to 
construct the Virginia without hinderance. 

Meantime Federal fleets had assembled in the Roads and had been dis¬ 
patched upon various expeditions. In the first days of March the only ves¬ 
sels of war at that point were the steam frigates Minnesota and Roanoke, 
twins of the Merrimac, and the sailing frigates Cumberland, 24 guns, saved 
from the seizure at Norfolk, and Congress, 50 guns. The St.Lawrence, 50- 
gun ship, mounting 12 guns, came in on the 6th from a cruise. Besides 
these was a fleet of transports and tugs. The Minnesota and Roanoke lay 
down the Roads, near Fortress Monroe. The Roanoke, always unlucky, 
was disabled, having broken her shaft five months before. She bore the 
flag of Captain Marston, then the senior officer of the post, for Goldsborougb, 
the flag-officer in command, was absent with the Albemarle expedition. 
The Cumberland and Congress lay off the mouth of the Elizabeth River. 
Goldsborough had given strict orders that no sailing vessel should be left 
without a tug at hand to manage if. This provision was neglected. The 
apprehensions excited by reports of the near completion of the Merrimac or 
Virginia had died away. Men had come to look upon her as a bugbear, or, 




FLANS OF TITK MONITOR. 


These diagrams are accurately drawn to scale.—In Fig. 2 the exterior solid line represents the entire surfnee of the deck, including nrmor-shelf and 
overhang at bow and stern. The exterior dotted line represents the top of the proper hull: the interior line shows the dimensions of the flat bottom.— 
Fig. 1 is a profile of the vessel; the portion visible when the vessel is afloat is shown by the place of the water-line.—Fig. 3 is a vertical section of the 

i , • __ • i .1-1 i _ i j f x turret — The reference letters are the same throughout : A, Revolving Turret — B, B . Smnkc-vivt — C, Pilol-housc. — D. sinchur^oelL— E. Rudder.— F, 

plates OI ITOEl an men thick, about three teet Wide, Propeller —G, Iron Armor —H, Braces for Deck Beams— K, K, Water-line.—Gun.— M, (juruearriage. 











































254 


at worst, an enemy that could easily be managed by the Minnesota. “We 
are tired of waiting for the Merrimac,” wrote Captain Van Brunt, of the 
Minnesota, “ and wish she would come out.” 

At noon on Saturday, the 8th of March, what appeared to be three small 
steamers were seen coming down the Elizabeth. One of these, merely front 
the large size of her smoke-pipe, was conjectured to be the Virginia. Cut 
down as she was, she looked in the distance no larger than a tug. Her ap¬ 
pearance at that time was a surprise. The two frigates lay at anchor, with 
the wash-clothes of the crew hanging from the rigging. Radford, the com¬ 
mander of the Cumberland, was on the Roanoke, miles away, acting as a 
member of a court of inquiry. He took horse and rode for Newport News, 
where he arrived just in time to see his vessel go down. Marston ordered 
the Minnesota to get under way at once, and summoned two tugs to tow the 
broken-shafted Roanoke to the scene of action. The Minnesota was soon 
under full headway. Her speed being twice that of the enemy, she could 
choose her own grouud. Van Brunt meant to run her into the iron-clad, 
whose armor would be no protection against such a blow, and the shock 
would have broken her in two. Passing near Sewall’s Point, fire was open¬ 
ed upon the Minnesota from the rifle battery, one shot crippling her main¬ 
mast. She returned a broadside, and steamed on till she came within a 
couple of miles of the enemy. The tide was running ebb; the Minnesota 
drew twenty-three feet, and there was now less depth of water at a shoal 
part of the channel; but the bottom was soft, and it was vainly hoped she 
might be forced over. She stuck fast, out of range of the Virginia, and lay 
an idle spectator of the destruction of the Cumberland and Congress. The 
Roanoke was dragged slowly on by two tugs. She too ran aground at the 
stem, in twenty-one feet of water, and could go no farther. Her head was 
dragged around, and the helpless hulk was pointed down the bay. Going 
and returning, she was fired upon from the batteries at Sewall's Point. They 
aimed wildly; some shot passed through the rigging and fell far beyond. 
The fire was returned, but the balls fell short of the mark. 

The Virginia left the navy yard at Gosport at 11 o’clock in the morning. 
Her commander, Franklin Buchanan, had entered the United States Navy 
thirty-five years before. He had attained the rank of captain, and stood 
high on the roll. When the war broke out he was commander of the navy 
yard at Washington. He then threw up his commission and entered the 
Confederate service. Born in Maryland, he had not even the pretext of fol¬ 
lowing his state in taking up arms against his country. As the Virginia 
left her dock, the wharves on both sides of the river were crowded with 
spectators. Two barricades which closed the river were opened, and the 
iron-clad, accompanied by the Beaufort and the Raleigh, tugs, each mount¬ 
ing a single gun, steamed down the stream. It was the trial trip of the Vir¬ 
ginia, and she was found to move slowly. At one o’clock she cleared the 
Elizabeth River, and stood straight across the Roads toward Newport News. 
The Congress lay at anchor in the channel, three hundred yards from the 
shore; the Cumberland was two hundred yards be\ T ond. As the Virginia 
came within range, she opened upon the Congress from her lOO-.pound bow 
gun. Passing the Congress at three hundred yards, she received a harm¬ 
less broadside. She returned it with effect, a single shot disabling every 
man but one at a gun, and kept straight on for the Cumberland, which had 
been swung across the channel, to bring her full broadside to bear upon the 
approaching enemy. The Cumberland opened fire from her two pivot 
guns, and soon after with her whole broadside of eleven 9-inch Dahlgrens. 
Broadside after broadside followed in rapid succession, but the balls glanced 
harmlessly from the iron armor of the Virginia, which kept straight on, with¬ 
out returning a shot or showing a single man. She seemed to wish to give 
her defensive power a fair test Nothing could be more satisfactory. Six 
full broadsides had been received at nearer and nearer range, with no essen¬ 
tial damage. The Virginia kept straight on for minutes, which seemed 
hours, her bow pointed square at the side of the Cumberland. It was now 
three in the afternoon. There was a sharp shot, and a dull, heavy blow at 
the same instant. The iron-armed prow of the Virginia had struck the 
Cumberland near the bow, and below the water-line. Plank, beams, and 
knees gave way like laths, leaving a ragged opening into which a man 
might have passed; through this a torrent of water poured into the hold. 
The Virginia then opened fire. Every shot told. The first shot passed 
through the sick-bay, killing five men. Broadside after broadside followed 
in merciless succession, every shot reaching a vital part Sick-bay, berth- 
deck, and gun-deck were covered with dead and wounded. For half an 
hour the pumps of the Cumberland were worked, in the hope of throwing 
out the water as fast as it rushed in through the yawning hole in her side. 
It was all in vain; the water gained momently. The forward magazine 
was soon flooded, and all the powder for keeping up the fire was brought 
from the after magazine. In thirty-five minutes the water bad risen to 
the main hatchway, and the ship canted over, just ready to sink. All the 
wounded who could walk were ordered out of the cockpit. These were 
few. for most were unable to help themselves or be helped by others. All 
the while during these long minutes the Cumberland kept up her useless 
fire, no gun being abandoned until the waters creeping up toward the stern 
from the sinking bow drowned it out. All the while the Virginia kept up 
her slow and sure fire, every shot telling. Only one man was seen on board 
the iron-clad. Near the close of the fight he showed himself from a port¬ 
hole; a ball from the Cumberland cut him in two. The last shot from the 
fated Cumberland was fired by Matthew Tenney, from a gun just above wa¬ 
ter, that next to him being overflowed. He attempted to scramble out from 
the open port-hole, but the water rushing in swept him back, and he went 
down in the sinking vessel. In three quarters of an hour after the Virginia 
had given the fatal blow, the Cumberland went down in fifty-four foot wa- 


[MARCH, 1862. 

ter, her pennant still flying from the mast-head above the waves. Not a 
man was captured. A few swam to land, and more were picked up by 
small boats from the shore. The Virginia ceased her fire when the frigate 
went down, and turned toward the Congress. 

As soon as it was perceived that the Virginia had opened the fight, a num¬ 
ber of Confederate steamers came out from the James River and joined in 
the action. These were the Teazer, of one gun, the Jamestown, of two guns, 
and the Patrick Henry, formerly known as the Yorktown, of six guns. The 
last two had formerly been packets, owned by New York merchants, and 
plying between New York and Richmond. They had been seized by the 
Confederates, and converted into armed vessels. Seeing the fate of the Cum¬ 
berland, Lieutenant Smith, who commanded the Congress, hoisted sail, and, 
with the help of a tug-boat, ran the frigate ashore in water too shoal to per¬ 
mit the Virginia to run her down. All the small Confederate steamers as¬ 
sailed her with a sharp fire, which made terrible havoc among her crew. 
The Virginia, having finished the Cumberland, then turned upon the Con¬ 
gress. Taking up a position 150 yards astern, the iron-clad raked the frig¬ 
ate fore and aft with shell, every one, at that close range, telling with fatal 
precision. The fuses were cut short, and every shell burst inside the frigate. 
The first killed seventeen men at a single gun. During all the fire hardly 
a man was merely wounded; most who were hurt were killed outright, the 
head or shoulder being shorn off, or the body cut in twain. Surgical aid 
was useless. After the first fifteen or twenty minutes the surgeon of the 
Congress did not even pretend to amputate a limb. The most that he could 
do was to apply a tourniquet to stop the bleeding, and administer stimulants 
to prevent prostration. “The only insignificant wound which I dressed,” 
he says, “ was that of one of the crew who had his hand taken off.” 

The Congress was fast aground, and could meet the terrible broadsides of 
the Virginia only from her two stern guns. These were soon disabled; one 
was dismounted, the other had its muzzle shot off. Lieutenant Smith, the 
commander, was killed, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant Pen- 
dergrast. The frigate was disabled, and on fire in several places; not a gun 
could be brought to bear upon the enemy. If every gun had been brought 
to bear it would have been useless. A chance shot might enter a port-hole, 
but the armor of the Virginia was impenetrable. There was no hope of suc¬ 
cor from the Minnesota, which lay three miles off fast aground. At four 
o’clock the colors of the Congress were hauled down. An officer of the Vir¬ 
ginia took formal possession. The Congress prize was given in charge to 
Lieutenant Parker, who had brought the little gun-boat Beaufort alongside. 
He ordered that the frigate should be abandoned in a quarter of an hour, as 
he meant to burn her at once. The surgeon remonstrated. He said that it 
was impossible to remove the wounded in that time. A score or more of 
the crew of the Congress got on board the Beaufort. In the confusion it is 
said that they supposed her to be a Federal tug from the shore. The Con¬ 
gress lay within rifle-shot from the shore. A regiment or two had been 
hurried to the nearest point. They opened a sharp rifle and artillery fire 
upon the Beaufort. Several were wounded, among whom were Lieutenant 
Miner, of the Virginia. The gun-boat hauled off, and the Virginia again 
opened fire upon the ill-fated Congress, although she had a white flag flying 
to show that she was out of action. The Confederates reported, and doubt¬ 
less believed, that they were fired upon from the Congress, after her colors 
had been hauled down and while the white flag was flying. They were cer¬ 
tainly in error; but in the hurry and confusion they might well suppose 
that the shot which were fired from the shore came from the ship. They 
must stand fairly acquitted from the charge of having wantonly fired upon 
a defenseless enemy who had surrendered. The firing by the Federal forces 
from the shore can only be justified by presuming that the troops there did 
not see that the colors of the Congress had been hauled down, and were re¬ 
placed by the white flag of truce. After firing a few shells the Virginia and 
her allies left the Congress and turned toward the Minnesota. The Con¬ 
gress was on fire in several places. Her boats were manned, and those of 
the crew who were unhurt, and a few of the wounded, were taken ashore. 
The Congress continued to burn for eight hours. At midnight the flames 
reached the magazine, and the frigate, blown up, disappeared beneath the 
waters. 

The March day was wearing to a close, but there was still two hours of 
daylight, when the Virginia, having destroyed the Cumberland and Con¬ 
gress, bore down upon the Minnesota. This great steam frigate had lain all 
these long hours helplessly aground. Ste’am tugs had been vainly trying to 
haul her off. The Roanoke, after grounding, had gone down the Roads. 
The St Lawrence, in tow of a steamer, had approached the Minnesota. She 
too grounded, and, after receiving a single shell, and throwing in return a 
harmless broadside, was dragged off, and steered down toward Fortress Mon¬ 
roe. This one shell, a chance shot, thrown from the distance of half a mile, 
went sheer through the side of the St. Lawrence just above the water-line, 
passed through the ward-room, the surgeon’s state-room on the opposite side, 
demolishing a bulkhead; it then struck a heavy iron bar, and glanced back 
into the ward-room, where it rested, its force being expended. This shell 
failed to explode, and no person was injured; but the actual damage done 
by this one shot proved to the captain of the St.Lawrence that his vessel 
was no match for the Virginia. She was impervious to any shot from his 
fifty guns, while any shell from her might destroy the St.Lawrence. 

The Virginia, Jamestown, and Patrick nenry had borne down upon the 
stranded Minnesota. The draft of the iron-clad prevented her from coming 
within a mile of her enemy. She took a position at this distance on the 
starboard bow, and opened fire. Only one shot hit its mark. The Minne¬ 
sota returned from her 10-inch pivot, with no result. The Jamestown and 
Patrick Heniy were more effective. They took a closer position on port- 








THE MONITOR AND THE VIRGINIA. 


March, 18G2.] 

bow and stem, firing from rifled guns, and killing and wounding several 
men. The return from the Minnesota was quite as effective. The Patrick 
Henry received a shot which passed through her boiler, killing and wound¬ 
ing seven men, and disabling her for the moment. She was towed off by 
her consorts. Two full hours had been spent in this indecisive combat. 
Night was closing in. The f iiginia, essentially unharmed bv the fiery or¬ 
deal through which she had passed, dared not lie out the night in the R<>ads. 
At seven o clock, an hour after sunset, she hauled off. and with her consorts 
steamed to the sheltering batteries at the mouth of the Elizabeth. She 
might well do so. No vessel that ever floated had done so great a work in 
a single half day. She had destroyed two powerful vessels, carrving three 
times her number of men, and fully s ' x times her weight of armament. 
She, with two feeble consorts, had engaged two other great vessels, greatlv 
her superiors measured by any standard before known, inflicting far more 
damage than she received, and only prevented front destroying them be¬ 
cause she could not come to close quarters with them. Her first day's work 
might fairly be claimed as the greatest ever achieved in naval warfare. 
Great victories had before been won upon the ocean, but never had there 
been such a disproportion between the losses of victors and vanquished. 

The Cumberland went into action with 376 men. When the survivors 
were mustered there were only 255. She lost 121 in killed and drowned. 
The crew of the Congress were 434 officers and men; of these, 298 got to 
shore, 26 of them being wounded, 10 mortally; there were in all 120 killed 
and missing; about 20 of these were made prisoners, leaving a roll of killed 
and drowned of 100 men. Besides these. 3 were killed on the Minnesota, 
and 16 wounded; an absolute loss of fully 250 officers and men. On the 
Virginia there were but 2 killed and 8 wounded. On the other Confederate 
vessels 4 were killed and a few more wounded; an absolute loss of not more 
than 10 officers and men—fully twenty-five to one in favor of the Confeder¬ 
ates. The disproportion in the loss of vessels and material was still greater. 
The Roanoke and St. Lawrence were driven away, glad of the accident of 
low water, which kept off the Virginia and enabled them to escape. The 
Minnesota had inflicted as much damage as she had received. The Cum¬ 
berland and the Congress were utterly destroyed. They bad expended their 
utmost fire upon the iron-clad. The result was that they had riddled her 
smoke-stack and steam-pipe, shot away her flag-staffs and anchor, knocked 
off the muzzles of two guns, which were easily replaced, and bad started an 
armor-plate here and there. The Virginia herself, in dashing upon the Cum¬ 
berland, had twisted her iron prow. All the harm which she had received 
was immaterial, and could be wholly remedied in a few hours. She with¬ 
drew from action only because the coming darkness intervened. On the 
morning of the next day she was as efficient as before. 

The Virginia steamed off in the gathering darkness, leaving the Minnesota 
fast upon the mud-bank where she had lain for so many eventful hours. The 
recoil from her own heavy broadsides had forced her farther on, and she 
seemed to have made for herself a cradle. At ten o’clock the tide com¬ 
menced to run flood, and for six hours all hands were at work, steam-tugs 
assisting, to haul her off the bank. Every effort was unavailing. She lay 
fast, and at four o’clock, the tide having fallen, the work was suspended, and 
the Minnesota lay immovable, awaiting a new onset from the Virginia. 

Not wholly helpless, however, for a new actor had come upon the scene 
whose powers were yet to be tested. The Monitor had left New York three 
days before for Hampton Roads. The first part of the passage was stormy. 
The waves swept clear over her low deck, the turret often being the only 
thing above water. The draft-pipe for conveying air to the crew quartered 
in the hold was too low, and the water poured down it. It was lowered, and 
its opening in the deck tightly closed. Farther provision had been made 
for drawing air down the turret The machinery became disarranged. The 
crew were almost suffocated. Water also leaked down at the junction of 
the turret and the deck. These deficiencies were remedied, and the battery 
outrode the storm, proving to be in the main an excellent sea-boat On the 
evening of the 8th she came to Hampton Roads. She had for hours heard 
the heavy sound of the cannonading which announced that an action had 
been going on. At nine in the evening she reached the fortress and learned 
what had happened. Lieutenant Worden was ready to test bis untried craft 



mn totals or tsz nos: xoa. 


255 


JOB l~ VOOCX 



against the Virginia. In sixty minutes he was on his way to the Minnesota, 
by whose side the Monitor was anchored at an hour past midnight. The 
night passed, the morning broke, and the slow hours passed away until, at 
eight o’clock, the Virginia was seen bearing down upon the Minnesota. 

The Christian day of rest has come to be the battle-day of Christendom. 
At sunrise the Virginia appeared coining down toward the Minnesota. All 
hands were beat to quarters; but the iron-clad ran directly past, almost 
within reach of the guns of Fortress Monroe, and then turning, stood straight 
up the channel through which the Minnesota had come the day before. Sig¬ 
nal was made for the Monitor to engage. She ran down directly in the 
wake of the Minnesota, covering her as far as possible with her diminutive 
bulk, and laid herself directly alongside the Virginia. Never were antago¬ 
nists apparently so unequally matched. The Monitor was only one fifth of 
the size of her antagonist, and appeared much smaller, for she presented to 
sight nothing but her flat deck just above the water, her low, square pilot¬ 
house, and round turret The Virginia opened upon her with all her guns. 
Most of the shot flew over the low deck; a few struck the turret; but all 
except one glanced off, leaving hardly a mark. One rifled bolt, from the 
100-pound Armstrong, struck fair and square, penetrating half through the 
nine inches of iron. The bolt broke off, leaving the head sticking in the 
wound. Soon the antagonists began to manoeuvre for position, keeping up 
a fire all the while. The speed of the two vessels was about equal, but the 
light draught of the Monitor gave her an advantage. Once the Virginia got 
aground, and the Monitor steamed round and round her, trying bow, stern, 
and sides in search of a vulnerable point She fired cast-iron shot of 168 
pounds, and so short was the distance and so fair the mark that hardly one 
missed ; but they struck the sloping sides of the Virginia at so great an an¬ 
gle that they glanced harmlessly off; had they struck a perpendicular wall 
thev would either have gone through or been shattered. 

The Virginia soon got afloat again, and finding that she could make noth¬ 
ing of the invulnerable Monitor, turned her attention once more to the Min¬ 
nesota, which had already received an 11-inch shot just above the water-line. 
The iron-clad came head on, and received the full broadside of the Minne¬ 
sota. Fifty solid shot struck square. Any wooden vessel that ever floated 
would have gone down under such a fire. The Virginia was apparently un¬ 
harmed. She fired shell in return from her rifled bow-gun. The first shell 
passed sheer through four rooms, tearing them all into one, and in exploding 
set the ship on fire" The second shell went through the boiler of the steam- 
tug Dragon, which lay alongside, blowing her np, killing and wounding sev- 
en men. But the third shell was hardly fired when the Monitor interposed, 
compelling the Virginia to shift her position. She grounded again, and lay 
exposed once moreto the full broadside of the Minnesota. Afloat again, she 
steamed down the bay, closely followed by the Monitor. Reaching more 
open water,.she turned sharp around, and ran at full speed square against 
the Monitor. Her iron prow, which had pierced the ribs of the Cumber¬ 
land as though they had been of wicker-work, left hardly a mark upon the 
armed side of the Monitor, upon whose turret and pilot-house she now con¬ 
centrated her whole fire. Soon after the anxious spectators on the Minne¬ 
sota saw the Monitor standing down the bay, while the Virginia, with the 
Patrick Henry and Jamestown, which had been hovering around, headed ap¬ 
parent! v straight for the Minnesota, still fast aground, badly crippled, most 
of her shot expended, and her crew worn out with fatigue. Why the Mon¬ 
itor had withdrawn could not be known. Perhaps she had expended her 
ammunition; perhaps she had sustained some vital injury. All that ^ an 
Brunt could know was that the Virginia and her consorts were coming down 
upon him, and could take up a position to rake his stern with no possibility 











256 



[March, 1862. 

of an effective reply. He gave orders that preparations should be made for 
destroying his ship as soon as it was clear that all hope of saving her was 
gone; but, upon ascending to the deck, he saw that the Confederate vessels 
had no intention of continuing the fight. They had changed their course, 
and were heading with all speed for their refuge at Craney Island. 

Such was the fight of the Monitor and the Virginia, as seen through the 
smoke from the deck of the Minnesota. From the Monitor itself it present¬ 
ed some different phases. At eight o’clock the Virginia was seen close at 
hand. Worden took his station in the pilot-house to direct the fight; Sti- 
mers controlled the movement of the turret, Greene had charge of the guns. 
The action began at a quarter before nine. At half past eleven a shot from 
the Virginia struck square against the pilot-house. One of the wrought- 
iron logs, 9 inches by 12, of which it was built, was shattered. Worden was 
looking from a narrow loop-hole just opposite the point where the shot 
struck. Fragments of cement were driven into his face, blinding him, and 
forcing him to give the command to Greene. The fight was kept up for 
three quarters of an hour longer, when the Virginia drew off, sagging down 
at the stern as though she was aleak; but her movements showed that her 
machinery was unharmed. The Monitor, which Van Brunt, in the excite¬ 
ment of the moment, thought to be heading for Fortress Monroe, soon came 
up to the Minnesota, but the Confederate vessels were close up to their ref¬ 
uge under the batteries at Craney Island. The Monitor did not pursue 
them. In the heat of the action it could not be ascertained how much dam¬ 
age had been sustained. It was certain that her pilot-house was seriously 
injured; another shot striking it fairly would have disabled her. Her heavy 
guns were an almost untried experiment; the explosion of one would prob¬ 
ably have rendered her useless. In driving oft’ the Virginia she had done 
her work. In attempting more all might have been lost. Even after the 
Virginia disappeared from view the safety of the Minnesota seemed by no 
means assured. She still lay fast, exposed to a new assault. Van Brunt 
determined to get her off at all hazards. Guns and provisions were thrown 
overboard, and water-tanks opened to lighten the steamer; more tugs were 
brought into use, and the great steamer was dragged half a mile from her 
mud bed; then the tide fell, and she was again fast. When the tide rose 
the next morning she was again afloat, and was brought back to Fortress 
Monroe. 

If the importance of a battle were to be estimated solely by the actual loss 
inflicted or suffered, the first fight of iron-clads would be only a harmless 
duel. No man on the Virginia, it is affirmed, was harmed by the heavy shot 
of the Monitor or the great broadsides of the Minnesota. The firing had 
been going on for an hour and a half when a shot struck the Monitor turret 
fairly. One man happened to be standing so that his knee touched the wall 
just opposite; he was stunned, but soon recovered. Another man was par¬ 
tially stunned, but soon recovered. Besides Worden, no man was seriously 
harmed. On board the Minnesota three were killed and sixteen wounded, 
half of them only slightly. During the actions of the two days the Minne¬ 
sota expended 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and more than two tons of powder, 
without any essential harm to her opponent. She was seriously damaged 
in hull and armament! At the close of the fight, what with guns disabled 
and thrown overboard, she had but eleven that could be equipped for serv¬ 
ice. During the three and a half hours of the engagement the Monitor fired 
41 shot, few of which missed, but all except two or three were really harm¬ 
less. She was fairly struck twenty-two times: nine times on the turret, 
eight times on the side armor, three times on the deck, and twice on the pi¬ 
lot-house. Of all these shot, delivered at close range from heavy guns, only 
one, which struck the pilot-house, did any perceptible damage. 

The Monitor and the Virginia, exposed to such a terrible ordeal, both 
proved themselves invulnerable against any fire which had ever before been 
brought to bear by one ship against another. The conclusion seemed inev¬ 
itable that wooden ships were to be of no farther use in naval warfare, and 
that the great navies which France and Great Britain had built at such an 
immense cost were practically annihilated. When the tidings of this fight 
crossed the Atlantic, the London Times affirmed that England had on the 
day before 149 first class war-ships; now there were only two; beyond 
these there was not one that could, without madness, be pitted against the 
Monitor. Even these were not invulnerable; for, being iron-plated only 
amidships, they would be set in a blaze at either extremity in a few minutes 
by shells from their unassailable antagonists. The Illustrated London News, 
echoing the expressions of statesmen in Parliament, urged that Great Brit¬ 
ain should cease to erect sea-board fortifications, but should spend the money 
wasted upon them in cutting down the useless line-of-battle ships, plating 
their hulls -with iron, and fitting them with cupolas armed with guns at least 
as heavy as those of the Monitor. Like most hasty conclusions, this was too 
sweeping. In a few weeks Farragut showed at New Orleans, and again in 
a few months at Mobile, that wooden ships, boldly and skillfully handled, 
could yet play an important part even against iron-clads. 

The Monitor and the Virginia never again tried their strength against 
each other. For a month they lay watching each other, the one in the low¬ 
er Roads, the other at the mouth of the Elizabeth. On the 11th of April, 
the Virginia, with her old consorts, steamed out, as if bent on an action. By 
a rapid dash the fleet captured three Federal transports lying unguarded, 
and then returned. Twice after she showed herself in the Roads, as if to 
provoke a fight, and then steamed back. The Monitor now and then went 
up toward the mouth of the Elizabeth, but always drew back when her en¬ 
emy appeared. It was clear that neither side wished to risk losing their 
main defense. If the Virginia was lost, the water approach to Richmond 
would be in the hands of the Federals; if the Monitor was disabled, Hamp¬ 
ton Roads would be in the power of the Confederates. All the movements 

























































































































Mat, 1862.] 


THE MONITOR AND THE VIRGINIA. 


257 


of the rival iron-clads were mere feints, with no definite object. Meanwhile 
the Peninsular campaign had been inaugurated. McClellan had laid siege 
to Yorktown. The post was evacuated by the Confederates on the 3d of 
May. They resolved to withdraw all their force to the front of Richmond. 
Norfolk was abandoned, the work-shops and store-houses at the navy yard 
having been burned, and the great dry dock partially blown up. The troops 
by which this place.had been garrisoned were ordered to Richmond. Nor¬ 
folk was formally occupied by the Federal forces on the 10th of May. The 
withdrawal from Norfolk compelled the abandonment of the strong Confed¬ 
erate positions at Sewall’s Point and Craney Island. 

The Virginia had in the mean while been placed under the command of 
Josiah Tatnall, a veteran officer, who had spent a whole life in the naval 
service of the United States. Less than two years before he had command¬ 
ed the fleet of the Union in the Chinese waters. In June, 1859, he rendered 
important aid to the French and English in their disastrous assault upon the 
Pei-lio forts. When recalled from the East by the approaching troubles at 
home, he threw up his commission, and joined the enemies of the nation 
which he had so long served. The Confederate government was then eag¬ 
erly courting the support of foreign powers. Tatnall’s opportune service 
had made his name popular in France and England. To this, rather than 
any ability which ho had ever manifested, was owing his appointment to the 
command of the Virginia, the most important position in the Confederate 
navy. The abandonment of Norfolk shut the Virginia out from her refuge 
up the Elizabeth. She was liable at any moment to be assailed by a supe¬ 
rior force. The James River was still open to her. If she could be taken 
up that stream she might be safe, and also aid in defending Richmond; but 
she drew quite twenty-five feet, and forty miles below Richmond was a shoal 
where there was only eighteen feet of water. If she could be brought to 
that draft the pilots said they could take her over. The work of lightening 
was begun. The commander went to bed ; but he was awakened by an of¬ 
ficer who told him that the vessel had been lifted just enough to render her 
unfit for action, yet more than two feet less than the pilots had declared nec¬ 
essary to take her over the shoal. Moreover, the westerly winds which had 
prevailed had driven the waters down the stream, so that there was less than 
the required eighteen feet. The poor old commander, awoke by these tid¬ 
ings, saw nothing to be done but to destroy his vessel; so he ran her ashore, 
landed her crew, and set her on fire fore and aft. She burned fiercely for 
an hour, and then, just before dawn on the 11th of May, blew up. So en¬ 
tire was the destruction, that no fragment was ever discovered of sufficient 
size to enable any one to describe the details of her construction. “The 
Virginia,” reported Commander Tatnall, “no longer exists. I presume 
that a court of inquiry will be ordered to examine into all the circumstances, 
and I earnestly solicit it. Public opinion will never be put right without 
it.” The court was ordered, and reported that the destruction of the Vir¬ 
ginia was not necessary. She might have been taken up the Janies to a 
point of safety, where she could still have barred the ascent of the river. 
Then and there, if worst came to worst, was the time to decide upon the dis¬ 
position to be made of the Virginia. 

Four days after the destruction of the Virginia, the Monitor engaged in 
her second and last action. The James River was now open for operations, 
and Commander John Rogers was sent up the river with five vessels, among 
which were the Monitor and Galena. It was hoped that they could reach 
Richmond and compel the surrender of the city. The expedition met with 
no serious obstacles until it reached within eight miles of Richmond. The 
river here makes a sharp turn, with high banks on either side. On the west¬ 
ern side is Drewry’s Bluff, about 200 feet high, upon which the construction 
of a fort, since known as Fort Darling, had been hastily commenced. The 
river, here about 500 feet broad, was also obstructed by a double line of 
barriers, piles, and sunken vessels, and the banks were lined with sharp¬ 
shooters. The three wooden vessels anchored 1300 yards below the fort. 
The Galena ran up to within 600 yards, swung across the river, and was at 
once exposed to the full fire from the fort. The Monitor went still nearer, 
but found that her guns could not be elevated sufficiently to reach the bat¬ 
tery, and fell farther dowm to a point from which her guns could be brought 
to bear. The action was kept up for three hours. The Galena suffered se- 



Tilt PA88AIO AT 8&A. 



THE MONITOR IN THE BTORtf. 


verely. Thirteen shot and shell penetrated her side; bulwarks were shat¬ 
tered and knees started; the deck was pierced by the plunging fire, the 
wheel injured, and armor started in several places. It was clearly shown 
that the light armor of this vessel was of no practical use when opposed to 
heavy guns. The Monitor was hit squarely three times, once on the turret 
and twice on the side armor, but received no damage beyond a slight bend¬ 
ing of the armor-plates. The Naugatuck, which lay beyond the range of 
the fort, was disabled by the bursting of her 100-pound Parrott gun. Hav¬ 
ing expended nearly all her ammunition, the Galena withdrew, followed by 
the Monitor. The Galena lost thirteen killed and eleven wounded; three 
others, on the other vessels, were wounded by musketry from the shore. 
The Confederate loss was five killed and seven wounded. This action was 
at the time of far greater importance than is indicated by the loss suffered 
or inflicted. It was considered by both sides as proving that earth-works 
could not be reduced by gun-boats. “The action," said Lieutenant Jeffers, 
who now commanded the Monitor, “ was most gallantly fought against great 
odds, and with the usual effect against earth-works. So long as our vessels 
kept up a rapid fire, the enemy rarely fired in return ; but the moment our 
fire slackened, they remanned their guns. It was impossible to reduce such 
works except with the aid of a land force.” 

The Peninsular campaign had now been fairly commenced, and it was 
necessary to maintain a considerable fleet at Hampton Roads in order to 
convoy transports and protect the right flank of the army on its march along 
the York and Parnunkey Rivers. The Monitor remained here until nearly 
the close of the year. Then operations were contemplated against Charles¬ 
ton, and the Monitor, with the Passaic and Montauk, two vessels of the same 
general construction which had just been completed, was ordered to Beau¬ 
fort, South Carolina. The Monitor set out on the 29th of December, in tow 
of the steamer Rhode Island. The second day out they approached the 
stormy point of Cape Ilatteras. A gale sprung up, and the sea began to 
rise m heavy swells, breaking over the deck and pilot-house, and dashing 
against the base of the turret. The packing became loosened by the work¬ 
ing of the turret, and the water began to leak in here and through the sights 
holes in the pilot-house; but the pumps threw it out as fast as it entered 
until after dark. Then the gale increased, and the water began to dash into 



FUMTLNG AND BAILING. 












258 


[December, 1862. 



L068 OF T1IB MONITOR. 


the turret and down the blower-pipes. A great wave would lift the vessel, 
and,"when she descended to meet another, the flat under surface of her ar¬ 
mor-shelf came down square with a heavy blow', which still farther loosen¬ 
ed the packing of the turret, and caused other leaks. All the pumps were 
set to work; but the water gained,slowly at first,then rapidly. At half 
past ten it was above the ash-pits. A signal of distress was made, and the 
Rhode Island was requested to send boats to take off the crew. Two boats 
put off, which were filled to their utmost capacity. The sea dashed clear over 
the deck, sweeping off several men. By half past eleven the fires were all 
out, and the deck was on a level with the w'ater. The men remaining on 
board were crowded into the turret. The boats from the Rhode Island had 
at length succeeded in getting alongside again. The men were ordered to 
try to get on board them. Some, stupefied by fear, would not make the at¬ 
tempt. Bankhead, the commander, was the last man to leave the sinking 
boat. The last that was seen of the Monitor was at midnight, when she drift¬ 
ed away, the red light gleaming from her turret. She must have gone 
down a few minutes after, carrying with her twelve of the sixty-five men 
on board. The Monitor was lost just eleven months from the day when she 
was launched. 

The Passaic, in tow of the steamer Georgia, was a few miles behind the 
Monitor, and was nearly lost in the same gale. She began to leak first at 
the junction of the turret with the deck, and then toward the bows, and soon 
after near the stern. Ballast was thrown over, and then shot, in order to 
lighten the vessel. One after another the pumps gave out, and the men 
were set to bailing. Huge masses of water rolled over the deck, sometimes 
dashing clear over the top of the turret There was no hope of relief, for 
not a boat could live. For three long hours the officers and men worked 
in the darkness. Then came a cry that the water was within three inches 



AALSEF OH OSCE. 


of the fires, and the last pump had given out Then there was a fierce 
swash, and the water hissed over the glowing grates, for even the firemen 
and engineers had worked knee-deep in water. The men now gave up all 
hope. Some sat down and gazed silently at the rising water; some wept; 
some prayed; others rushed to the turret to be the last to go down. The 
officers urged the men to the pumps again. They were found to work, and 
hope again dawned. The head of the ship was turned straight toward the 
shore, forty miles away. This change of position saved her. The waves 
no longer lifted the vessel, but pitched her from side to side. As morning 
dawned the wind subsided. By bailing and pumping the crew gained upon 
the leak. The men flung themselves down upon the cold wet deck, and in 
a few moments were fast asleep. The next night the gale sprung up anew, 
and the leak began to gain a little; it was feared that new ones would be 
sprung. A brief account of what had happened was written, sealed up in a 
bottle, to which was attached a red flag, and thrown overboard. But the 
pumps worked well, and the storm was outrode. On the evening of the 2d 
of January the Passaic made Beaufort Harbor. 

The battle in Hampton Roads gave each side unbounded confidence in 
the soundness of the principle upon which its iron-clads had been construct¬ 
ed. The Virginia and the Monitor furnished the models upon which other 
vessels were constructed. None of the Confederate iron-clads equaled the 
first. They had no more bulls and engines ready furnished to their hands, 
and had not the facilities for constructing them. The Federal government 
immediately commenced the construction of nearly a score of the monitor 
class, but larger, and embodying many improvements. At a later period 
other turreted iron-clads were built, of far greater size, and with such changes 
in construction as were thought necessary to fit them for sea-going vessels. 
Some of these carried also a few heavy stationary guns; but their essential 
offensive feature was the revolving turret The construction of these ves¬ 
sels was attended with no small difficulty. The French and English iron¬ 
clads had been clothed only with solid armor-plates. Four and a half inches 
—just the width of this printed column—had been fixed upon as the stand¬ 
ard thickness. In Europe there were founderies provided with the means 
of rolling such plates. Nothing of the kind existed in America. These 
plates could be produced here only by the slow process of forging. 

To produce a forged plate, a quantity of fragments of all sorts of iron is 
bound up into a fagot about two feet square. This is thrust into a furnace, 
heated to a bright red, when the mass becomes almost as plastic as wax. It 
is then placed under a heavy steam-hammer, a few blows from which re¬ 
duce the fagot to a “bloom”—a homogeneous mass of iron, looking like a 
fragment of a wooden joist, about six inches square, and four feet long. To 
forge these blooms into plates, four or five layers are piled up upon the end 



































December, 1862.] 


THE MONITOR AND THE VIRGINIA 


255 






\ 

-i! 

l * v 1 > 1 





Si 






FORGING A 11 LOOM. 


FORGING A PLATE. 


of an iron bar, and thrust into a furnace. This bar answers the purpose of 
a handle to move the mass, and is suspended by chains so as to balance. The 
blooms, piled up on the flattened end of the bar, are thrust into a furnace, 
and heated for hours until they become plastic. They are then withdrawn 
from the furnace, swung around, and placed under a hammer still heavier 
than that which has reduced them from fagots, and beaten out flat, forming 
the commencement of a plate. Upon the end of this other blooms are piled, 
heated, and hammered out in like manner. This process is repeated until 
the plate has acquired the required length, when it is chiseled off from the 
bar. It is then simply a plank of solid iron, twelve or fifteen feet long, 
three broad, and four or five inches thick. This process is necessarily slow. 
There were no national founderies, and only two or three private ongg capa¬ 
ble of executing it. These could furnish only the plates for the Ironsides,- 
and for the Roanoke; for this unlucky vessel being useless in its original 
shape, it had been resolved to cut her down, and convert her into an ar¬ 
mored ship. The Ironsides proved in the end to be an effective vessel; 
the Roanoke was as useless as before. The turrets of the new monitors and 
their side armor must in the mean while be composed of layers of inch iron. 
The thickness of the turrets was increased from eight to eleven and even 
thirteen inches. This was found at Charleston in 1863, and at Wilmington 
in 1865, to be sufficient to resist the most powerful shot that could be 
brought to bear upon them. With some exceptions, which arose from 
causes nowise affecting the principle upon which they were constructed, no 
monitors have been seriously injured by the fire to which they have been 
subjected, even when put to service for which they were never designed— 
that of assailing fortifications. 

Still, the revolving turrets hitherto constructed embody only a portion of 
the possible offensive power involved in the design of their inventor. Those 
built afford perfect protection to ordnance and gunners. They also give the 
vessel the power of throwing its whole offensive power upon any required 
point of the circle within the range of its guns. But the fire is given from 
a gun moving around the circumference of a circle, and the slightest inter¬ 
val between the aim and the discharge sends the ball in a line different from 
that intended. In the turret as designed by Timby provision was made 
against this grave defect. His turret was to revolve, not upon a central 
shaft, but upon rollers around its periphery. From its centre rose a plat¬ 


form resting upon a central shaft, moving independent of the revolution of 
the turret itself This platform was to be the post of the commander dur¬ 
ing action. A telescope is firmly fixed upon this platform; by his side is a 
wheel, by which he turns the shaft in any direction, so as to keep the tel¬ 
escope pointed directly at the object of attack. If it moves he follows it 
with the telescope, just as a rifleman moves his piece when taking aim at a 
bird in flight. As the turret revolves, each gun is for an instant brought in 
a line exactly parallel with the commander’s telescope, always pointed upon 
the object of attack. If the gun be discharged at that instant, the ball must 
go straight to its mark. Provision is made to effect this with an instanta¬ 
neousness unattainable by the motion of human nerves and muscles. A 
galvanic battery is provided, with a separate conducting wire running to 
each gun; this is so arranged that the connection is formed at the instant 
when the gun is brought by the revolution of the turret in a vertical line 
below the telescope. If the fuse attached to the conducting wire is placed 
in the vent of the piece, the discharge is instantaneous, and the telescope, 
and consequently the gun, being pointed directly at the object, the aim is 
perfect, and the ball must go straight to its mark. The accompanying dia¬ 
gram represents a vertical section of a large turret, designed for a stationary 
battery, mounting sixty guns in two tiers. It shows the interior of such a 
turret, with the automatic sighting and discharging apparatus. The princi¬ 
ple and arrangement is the same whatever may be the number of the guns. 
The commander within the turret aims every gun of the battery with as 
much precision as a sharpshooter aims his telescopic rifle, discharging it by 
an electric current at the instant when the aim is secured. The gunners 
have nothing to do but to load the guns, run them to the port-hole, and in¬ 
sert the fuse. 

The correctness of the principle on which the monitor turrets is based has 
been proved to be sound by the severest practical tests. Great improve¬ 
ments may doubtless be made in the actual construction of the turrets and 
hulls. Thus, instead of having the turret entirely above deck, it may be 
sunk for fully a third of its height below deck. Its liability to be struck 
would thus be diminished in that proportion, while its chief vulnerable point, 
the base upon which it revolves, would be effectually shielded by the side 
armor of the vessel. The seaworthiness of the vessel would be increased by 
bringing the centre of gravity nearer the keel. The protected part of the 



VSKT1CAL SECTION OF STATIONARY BEVOI.VINO TLRRKT. 


A, A, exterior nod Interior Will, of the Turret, with dome-ehaped Roof K. revolving by the fleering F, upon ” G - G ,T '' , l -il.VI ih- 

om till- common centre.-It, The commanded platform, revolving, independently of the Turret, upon the sheft k, jr, bymean. of theRod and OeettnuU.-tln tile left ot ’llu Shaft ft Ilb. 
Circuit t I.O, r." forming the connection between the Gnlvanic Itatterv nnd Conductor! parsing to each t.un.—F, to It, Ventilators.—U, ii, Casemates, mounted with Guns, independent of 


-- V ,111. lilt l-ltrni, forming tuo vetumv v»- II manwaa * ,, o v aav - .aaaaa. *■"— • / — * - ---- ■ “-y , . 

Revolving Turrets.—I, I, Wall of subterraneous foundation for Turret, inclosing Chambers for Stores and Munitions. 







































































260 


[January, 1862, 


turret would require a much less thickness of armor, and its diameter might 
be increased without adding to its weight. JVitk a diameter of thirty feet 
instead of twenty there would be space for an armament of four or six in¬ 
stead of two guns. A vessel with such a turret, and with hull and engines 
capable of a high rate of speed, could not fail to be superior in offensive 
and defensive power to any iron-clad that can be built upon the European 
plan of vessels little differing from the old men-of-war, with lofty sides and 
presenting a great extent of perpendicular surface to attack, or even the 
Confederate plan of a long casemate with sloping sides. No vessel can be 
constructed upon either of these plans capable of floating the thirteen inches 
of iron which constitute the best monitor turrets. A man-of-war with its 
guns mounted in broadside can use only half its armament upon any one 
point at a time, and that only by exposing its whole side to the enemy. A 
monitor can bring its whole armament to bear upon any point at each rev¬ 
olution of the turret, which occupies about a minute; and if the turret should 
be.furnished with the automatic sighting apparatus, every shot is under the 
absolute control of one governing mind. A monitor, moreover, fights with 
equal force in any position. Its whole fire can be delivered at will from 
bow, stern, or either side. If it have speed to enable it to choose its own 
position, it never needs to present any portion of its hull except its sharp 
bow to the enemy. This offers a mark so small that it could be hit only by 
the merest chance. Practically, its low turret is the only assailable point, 
.and this, as already constructed, is capable of resisting any shot to which, in 
the present state of naval artillery, it can ever be exposed. It is safe to 
say that the defensive power of the turret can be increased more rapidly 
than the offensive power of artillery. 

It was a part of the design of the inventor of the revolving turret to adapt 



VERTICAL SECTION OF PROPOSED NAVAL TURRET AND HULL. 


it to fortifications of large size for harbor defense. The following diagram 
represents a cordon of turrets for the protection of the Harbor of NewYork, 
the approach to which is through the “ Narrows,” about one third of a mile 
wide. This would be reduced to a quarter of a mile by docks built out from 
each shore. Upon the extremity of each dock would be erected a turret, 
and another upon an artificial foundation midway between them. Each of 
these turrets would be one hundred feet in diameter, mounting sixty guns 
in two tiers. The turrets are to revolve once a minute, equal to about three 
and a half miles an hour. As every gun may be discharged at every rev¬ 
olution, the possible effective fire from each turret would be sixty shot a min¬ 
ute. The three turrets could thus, in ease of need, concentrate a fire of 180 
guns upon any point in the circle. A series of chains is stretched from turret 

to turret. When no attack is threat 
ened these chains rest upon the bot 
tom, leaving the passage unobstructed. 
They can be drawn up by a windlass, 
moved by the steam engine in the foun¬ 
dation of each turret. They are not 
to be drawn up “ taut,” but hang sway¬ 
ing in the water, at such a depth as to 
prevent the passage of a hostile fleet. 
They arc furnished with buoys near¬ 
ly sufficient to float the chains, so 
that only a small part of their tensilS 
strength is expended in supporting 
them, leaving almost the whole strength 
to resist- the passage of a hostile fleet. 
While detained here, any vessel would 
be exposed at point-blank distance to 
the whole fire of two turrets, which no 
ship ever built could sustain for a quar¬ 
ter of an hour. If thought necessary, 
movable torpedoes can be attached to 
chains in such a way as to be drawn 
directly below any vessel detained by 
the chains, and there exploded bv a 
galvanic battery. 


seems to be enough for all purposes of defense. The only objection to them is the ‘ through bolts,* 
which allow the nut inside to fly when the head is struck. The new system of making turrets, 

now adopted by the Navy Department, obviates this difficulty.I recommend that a system 

of turret should be devised by which it will have no connection with the spindle, but have a bear¬ 
ing all around its base, running on friction rollers. I would also recommend that the base of the 
turret should be carried below the spar deck.’” This officer was probably not aware that these 
tW4> features formed a part of the design of the inventor of the turret. Inspector Hughes reports: 
“The shot make an indentation on the iron, and break the bolts that fasten the plating together. 
The greatest indentations that have come to my knowledge were to the depth of 2^ and 2§ inches. 
In my opinion, these indentations were made fro» 11-inch and 13-inch solid shot.* A shot of this 
kind will generally break from one to five or six bolts. When the bolts break they can soon be 
replaced. I do not see that the turrets are injured practically.” 8 Admiral Goldsborough says: 
“A difference of opinion exists among naval minds, at home and abroad, as to whether the bet¬ 
ter expedient is to use the guns of an iron-clad turret-unse or in broadside ports. The tut ret I re¬ 
gard as decidedly preferable. It renders one gun of a class equivalent to at least two of the same 
disposed in opposite broadside ports, and this with a great reduction of crew. It admits also of 
much heavier guns. It does not necessarily involve a breadth of beam antagonistic to vclocitv. 
It affords a better protection to guns and men, and, withal, it secures the fighting of guns longer in 
a sea-way.” 9 Admiral Dahlgrcn, speaking of the whole of this two months' fighting, says : “The 
battering received by the monitors was without precedent. The Montauk had been struck 214 
times, the Wechawken 187 times, and almost entirely by 10-ineh shot. What vessels have ever 
been subject to such a test? It is not surprising that they should need considerable repair after 
sustaining such a severe pounding for so long a time, hut only that they could be restored at all 
to serviceable condition. All the little defects of detail were marked by a searching process. 
Decks were cut through, cannon were worn out, side-armor shaken, tops of pilot-houses crushed, 
etc.; but all these were reparable, and no vital principle was seriously touched.” 10 C< mmodore 
Rodgers, after comparing at length the relative advantages and disadvantages of the Ironsides and 
Monitor class of vessels, says; “To sum up my conclusions, I think that the Monitor class and 
the Ironsides class arc different weapons, each having its peculiar advantages, and both needed to 
an iron-clad navy; but that when the Monitor class measures its strength against the Ironside 
class, then, with vessels of an equal size, the Monitor class will overpower the Ironside class; and 
as vessels find their natural antagonists in vessels, and only their exceptional antagonists in forts, 
it must he considered, upon the whole, that the Monitor principle contains the most successful ele¬ 
ments for plating vessels for war purposes.” u Admiral Potter says: “Any professional man 
who will lay aside his prejudices caused hv the discomforts incident to monitors, must admit that 
as a harbor defense they arc the best and only vessels to be built. If they hnvc not been able to 
penetrate the harbor of Charleston, they have there done what no other vessels ever built could 
have accomplished. They held their own as no other vessels could have done, and under their 
shelter the army was enabled to perform its work successfully. ma This favorable opinion, based 
upon the performances of the monitors at Charleston, was confirmed after Porter had occusion to 
tost them at Fort Fisher, January, 18G5, with the addition that the new ones which he had under 
his command proved themselves excellent sea-vessels, even upon the stormy coast of North Caro¬ 
lina. Captain Blakely, the celebrated English gun-maker, writing of the endurance of the moni¬ 
tors at the capture of Fort Fisher, says: “The fort contained not one gun powerful enough to 
sink an iron-clad ship. Most of these guns were more powerful than any gun mounted on any 
fort in England, or on any English ship except one. vet they failed to injure the Federal fleet. It 
follows that the fleet could attack Portsmouth or Plymouth with more impunity than Fort Fisher f 
so far ns artillery fire is concerned.” 

1 Letter to the London Timr/t, April 1,1862. 2 Report on Armored Vessels, p. 13. 3 Ibid., p. 18. ♦ Ibid., 

p. 29. s Ibid., p. 90. « Ibid., p. 217. Mbid., p. 25G-259. e Ibid., p. 289. » Ibid.,p. 574. ‘0 Ibid 

p. 5S5. Ibid, p. 594. > 2 Ibid., p. 592. 



PROPOSED CORDON OF TURRETS FOR HABHOR DEFENSE. 


NOTE ON THE MONITOR SYSTEM. 

The invention of the Revolving Turret has been attributed to Mr. Ericsson, and to Captain 
Cowper Coles, of the British Navy. The latter expressly claims it for himself upon the following 
grounds : He says' that in 1855 he sent to the British Admiralty drawings for an armored vessel 
of light draft, the guns protected by a stationary “hemispherical tower.” This suggestion was 
not acted upon. In March, 1859, he sent in drawings in which this tower, or shield, was placed 
upon a “turntable,” thus constituting it a revolving turret. In Blackwood’s Magazine for De¬ 
cember, 1860, is an article on this subject, containing a drawing of such a turret, with the mechan¬ 
ism for turning it by hand. Now, in September, 1854, Ericsson had forwarded to the Emperor 
of Fiance plans for a vessel provided with “a semi-globular turret of plate iron six inches thick, 
revolving on a column and pivot, by means of steam power ami appropriate gear-work.” 1 * 3 Coles 
says that his plans were “so exactly similar” to that of the Monitor “ that I think it will be ap¬ 
parent that this invention is of English origin, and I claim it for this country”—that is, for him¬ 
self. But the date of Ericsson’s proposition to the French Emperor for a revolving turret ante¬ 
dates by almost four years that of Coles to the British Admiralty. But Timbv, as has been shown, 
exhibited his invention publicly, and secured a right to a patent for it in 1843. eleven years before 
Ericsson proposed it to the French Emperor, and sixteen years before Coles claims to have thought 
of it. During all this time it was in many ways a matter of public record, and his claim was so 
clearly undeniable that the contractors for the monitors purchased his patent for a large sum. 

Much discussion arose as to the capabilities of the monitors, of which Ericsson says “the re¬ 
volving cupola forms so important a feature.” 3 In April, 1864, the Secretary of the Navy pre¬ 
sented to Congress an elaborate “Report in Relation to Armored Vessels,” detailing all the facts 
which had at that time transpired, and giving the opinions of prominent naval officers upon the 
subject. These opinions differed greatly. Lieutenant Jeffers, who commanded the Monitor at 
Drewry’s Bluff, says, “ I am of opinion that protecting the guns and gunners does not, except in 
special cases, compensate for the greatly diminished quantity of artillery, slow speed, and inferior 
accuracy of fire; and that, for general purposes, wooden strips, shell guns, and forts, whether for 
offense or defense, have not yet been superseded.” 4 In the attack upon Fort Sumter, April 7, 
1863, six monitors took part. The reports of Admiral Dupont and the commanders of these ves¬ 
sels was decidedly adverse to them. They were certainly considerably injured, hut close exam¬ 
ination shows that these injuries to the turrets in no wise affected the principle of their construc¬ 
tion. Bolts were driven in, and some of the turrets were jammed at the base so ns to prevent 
their revolution; but, although exposed to a heavier fire than any ships had ever endured, no tur¬ 
ret was pierced. The Secretary of the Navy sums up the case thus: “ Brief as was the conflict, 
the fire brought to l»ear upon the monitor vessels was such ns could have been sustained by no or¬ 
dinary boats, and demonstrates their power of resistance and their adaptation for harbor purposes. 
That the vessels in that engagement should have returned from the encounter with so few casual¬ 
ties, and the loss of hut one life, is certainly remarkable.’’ 8 In the second attack upon the Charles¬ 
ton forts, July 11, three monitors participated. Admiral Dahlgrcn “was favorably impressed with 
the endurance of these iron-clnds. The Cnttskill was struck 60 times, a large percentage of the hits 
being very severe. The pilot-house, turret, side-armor, and decks were all more or less damaged. 
Some of the shots were large; one, found on deck, where it fell after striking the turret, proved 

to be a 10-inch.The test was very severe; yet, nficr firing 128 rounds, the vessel came out 

of action in good working order, ns was proved by her going into action next day.” 6 For two 
months during the siege of Fort Wagner the monitors were in action almost every day. Lieu¬ 
tenant Simpson, of the Passaic, reports: “ The strength of the turret has been most severely tried. 
At one place two round shot of very large enlihre (estimated by some as 11-inch, by others as 15- 
inch) have struck close together on the same plate, the impression of the second shot overlapping 
a portion of that made by the first. The mass of iron has been pressed in so ns to form an ex¬ 
tensive bulging on the inside, and the outer plate is broken, but no serious effect was produced. 
..... The turrets arc as near impregnable as any thing can be made, and eleven inches of iron 









































December, 18(il.] 


THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 


261 



DAVID G. FARRAGUT. 


CHAPTER XIV. 

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 

3ulf Expeditions proposed.—The Lower Mississippi.—Ship Island.—General Phelps’s Proclama¬ 
tion.—Reported Defenses of New Orleans.—Butler’s Instructions.—Ilis Voyage to Ship Island. 
—The Naval Expedition.—Porter and Farragut.—Farragut’s Instructions.—Meeting at Ship 
Island.—Surveys of the River.—Forts Jackson and St. Philip.—Bombardment of the Forts.— 
Cutting the Barricade.—Preparations for Passing.—List of Vessels.—The Passage of the Bar¬ 
ricade.—The Fight with the Forts.—The Naval Combat.—Destruction of the Varuna.—The 
Hartford on Fire.—The Brooklyn, Richmond, and Pensacola.—Destruction of the Manassas.— 
The missing Gun-boats.—The Losses.—The Passage up the River.—Capture of the Chalmctte 
Regiment.—Panic in New Orleans.—Destruction of Property.—The Chalmctte Batteries.— 
Arrival before the City.—The Summons to Surrender.—Bailey and Lovell.—Farragut and the 
Mayor.—The Union Flag hauled from the Mint.—Farragut’s Warning.—The Mayor’s Reply. 
—Waiting for Butler.—Surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.—Treachery of Mitchell.— 
Destruction of the Louisiana.—Condition of the Forts.—Surrender of the Vessels.—Arrival of 
Butler at New Orleans.—Landing of Troops.—The March through the Streets.—Military Oc¬ 
cupation of New Orleans. 

T IIE Federal government had no sooner recovered from the panic of Bull 
Run than it resolved to attempt the recapture of some of the places on 
the Gulf of Mexico which had been seized by the Confederates. New Or¬ 
leans was the most important of these. Not only was it the only large city 
in the Confederacy, but it was its chief commercial emporium. More than 
half the cotton sent abroad was shipped from its wharves; it was the entre¬ 
pot of the great valley of the Mississippi; its possession would open the 
whole course of the great river. But it was supposed to be so strongly de¬ 
fended that no force could be spared sufficient to take it. McClellan de¬ 
clared that it would require 50,000 men. Mobile was next in importance, 
and an expedition was planned against it, to be placed under the command 
of General Butler. Texas was then suggested as of more immediate import¬ 
ance. Galveston in our possession, the German cotton-planters would, it was 
thought, bring the state back to the Union. 

Whether New Orleans, Mobile, or Galveston were finally fixed upon as 
the object of attack, Ship Island was the best place of rendezvous for the ex¬ 
pedition, being within striking distance of every point on the Gulf of Mex¬ 
ico. The Mississippi, reaching its long arm downward, has built up a nar¬ 
row mud causeway for a hundred miles into the centre of the Gulf. The 
country on each side, lying below the level of the river, is a strange com¬ 
pound of swamps, bayous, and lagoons. Between this causeway and Cape 
St. Bias, on the east, is a deep indentation of the Gulf, with several smaller 
bays penetrating still farther inland. Midway in this indentation, known as 
Mississippi Sound, Mobile Bay sets up into the Alabama coast. The shal¬ 
low lagoons known as Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain, opening from the 
sound, pierce far into the State of Mississippi, furnishing a water route for 
vessels of light draught from New Orleans to the Gulf, independent of that 


by the river. Almost in 'the centre of the sound, ninety-five miles from the 
mouths of the Mississippi, sixty-five from New Orleans, and fifty from Mo¬ 
bile, is Ship Island, a low bank of shifting white sand, seven miles lorif and 
three quarters of a mile wide, almost the counterpart of Fire Island in Long 
Island Sound. On the eastern end, a few groves of stunted oaks and pine 
find sustenance; at the western end is an excellent harbor, capable of shel¬ 
tering a fleet of the largest vessels. The island possesses, also, the prime ad¬ 
vantage of an abundant supply of water. Sink a barrel any where, and it 
is filled with pure water filtered through the clean white sand. The island 
had been for some months in possession of a small detachment from the Fed¬ 
eral blockading navy, when in December, 1861, General Phelps was sent 
there with a considerable body of troops, the advance part of Butler’s expe¬ 
dition. He signalized his advent by a strange proclamation addressed to the 
people of the Southwest, in which he affirmed that the admission of any new 
slave state into the Union was a violation of the Constitution, and that the 
states in which slavery existed at the adoption of the Constitution were 
bound, by becoming parties to that compact, to abolish it. Monopolies, he 
said, were destructive to national prosperity, and slavery was the greatest of 
all monopolies. Labor was inherently noble, and the motto of the country 
should be,“Free labor and workingman’s rights.” This proclamation was 
never fairly published, and so it was quietly ignored by the government 
Butler was just about to embark for Ship Island from Fortress Monroe, 
when the order was countermanded. The affair of the Trent had occurred ; 
England had demanded the surrender of Mason and Slidell, and there was a 
prospect of war with Great Britain. This question was adjusted, and gov¬ 
ernment again took up the expedition to the Gulf. New Orleans was fixed 
upon as its object. If the accounts of its defenses, ostentatiously put forth 
by the Southern papers, were true, the city was unassailable by any force 
that could be brought against it. Forts Jackson and St.Philip, seventy-five 
miles below New Orleans, on opposite sides of the river, it was said, mount¬ 
ed 173 rifled 63-pounders of the best English manufacture. Just below 
them was a dam, which no fleet could force in less than two hours, during 
which it would be under the direct fire of the forts, many of whose guns 
were furnished with red-hot shot. The forts were manned by 3000 men, 
many of them experienced artillerists. Then there were almost ready two 
floating steam batteries, covered with four and a half inches of solid English 
and French iron plates, each carrying twenty 68-pounders, so arranged that 
their balls would “skim the water, striking the enemy between wind and 
water.” Besides these, there were fire-ships, incendiary shells, Congreve 
rockets, and the like. Then there was a constant succession of redoubts all 
the way from the forts to the city; those at Chalmette, Jackson’s old battle 
field, had rifled cannon, with a proved effective range of five miles. All the 










262 



GODFREY WKITZEU 


navies in the world could not force their way up the rapid current of the 
Mississippi in the face of such obstacles. Moreover, in New Orleans itself 
were 32,000 infantry, and as many more quartered close by, all in “disci¬ 
pline and drill far superior to the Yankees.” For generals the}' had Mans¬ 
field Lovell and Ruggles, “who possess our entire confidence;” and “for 
commodore old Ilollins, a Nelson in his way.” 

But the Federal government had learned that the strength of the defenses 
of New Orleans had been greatly exaggerated, and was convinced that the 
city might be taken by a strong naval force, aided by a moderate army. 
Butler asked for only 15,000 men. These were given to him, with a condi¬ 
tional promise of 3000 more from Key West and Pensacola. The troops 
were sent by detachments to Ship Island, the commanding general accompa¬ 
nying the last, leaving Hampton Roads on the 25th of February. His in¬ 
structions, dated two days before, directed him to keep the object of the ex¬ 
pedition a profound secret. No one was to know the destination except 
Major Strong, his chief of staff, and Godfrey Weitzel, soon to be a general, 
"but then only a lieutenant of the engineers, in which capacity he had aided 
in the construction of the forts on the Mississippi. “ The object of your ex¬ 
pedition,” said McClellan in his order, “is one of vital importance—the cap 
ture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the-Mississippi River, and 
the first obstacle to be encountered, perhaps the only one, is in the resistance 
offered by forts St.Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can re¬ 
duce the works. Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land 
your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their 
fire, and carry them by assault. The next resistance will be near the En¬ 
glish Bend, where there are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessa¬ 
ry for you to land your troops, to co-operate with the naval attack, although 
it is more than probable that the navy unassisted can accomplish the result. 
If these works are taken the city of New Orleans necessarily falls.” Then 
followed a plan for operations against Mobile, Pensacola, and Galveston. 
“ It is probable,” wrote McClellan, “ that by the time New Orleans is re¬ 
duced, it will be in the power of the government to re-enforce the land-forces 
sufficiently to accomplish all these objects;” but, in the mean time, Butler 
was “ never to lose sight of the fact that the great object to be achieved is 
the capture and firm retention of New Orleans.” This object was gained, 
but not in any respect in the manner proposed by McClellan. The forts 
were run, not reduced by the navy or carried by assault by the army; and 
when tidings came of the capture of the city, McClellan was calling for more 
men to enable him to hold his own before Richmond, instead of being able 
to send re-enforcements to New Orleans. 

Butler took leave of the President and cabinet on the 24th of February. 
“ Good-by, Mr. President," he said; “ wc shall take New Orleans, or you will 
never see me again.” “The man that takes New Orleans,” said the Secre¬ 
tary of War, “is made lieutenant general.” The prophecy was fulfilled in 
spirit, if not in letter. New Orleans was taken by the navy, not by the army. 
The commander of the naval expedition was in time created vice-admiral, a 
rank in the navy corresponding to that Of lieutenant general in the army. 
Of the man who was to be made lieutenant general, almost nothing was 
known, only that just a week and a day before he had “proposed to move 
immediately upon the works” at Fort Donelson, unless the “ terms of an im¬ 
mediate and unconditional surrender” were accepted. 

Butler, with the last of his command, left Hampton Roads for Ship Island 


[February, 1862. 

on the 25th of February, in the steamer Mississippi. The voyage, which 
should have been accomplished in a week, occupied a month. The steamer 
almost grounded near Hatteras Inlet; fairly grounded, and came near sink¬ 
ing, on the Frying-pan Shoals, oft’ Cape Fear; put into Port Royal for re¬ 
pairs; started out, and ran aground again. The captain was clearly incom¬ 
petent. If the vessel was to get to Ship Island by water she must have a 
new commander. Butler deposed the captain, put him under arrest, and ap¬ 
pointed a new commander in his place. At length, on the 25th of March, 
the Mississippi reached Ship Island. The commanders of the naval expe¬ 
dition were already there, awaiting Butler’s arrival. 

The naval force had been laboriously organized. Besides the blockading 
squadron in the Gulf, a fleet of armed steamers, gun-boats, and a bomb flo¬ 
tilla consisting of twenty-one schooners, each carrying a mortar capable of 
throwing a bomb of 215 pounds, was provided. The mortar vessels were 
placed under the command of David D. Porter, then commander in the navy, 
since admiral. He was the son of that Commodore Porter whose exploits 
in the Essex form one of the most stirring chapters in the naval history of 
our war of 1812, and a younger brother of William D. Porter, of whom we 
have written, and shall have to write. The outbreak of the rebellion found 
him, after thirty years of service, a lieutenant in the navy, his name stand¬ 
ing high on the list. 

The government hesitated long in selecting the man who should have the 
chief command of the naval expedition. The choice was not made until the 
preparations were almost completed. It fell upon David G. Farragut, then 
a captain in the navy, to whom was assigned the rank of Flag-officer of the 
Western Gulf Squadron. The father of Farragut, a native of the island of 
Minorca, came to America in 1776. He entered the army, where he rose to 
the rank of major. After the war, having married in North Carolina, he 
migrated to Tennessee, taking up his residence near Knoxville, where his 
son was born in the first year of the present century. Like many another 
boy inland born, he would be a sailor. Porter, an intimate friend of the fa¬ 
ther, procured a midshipman’s warrant for the child, then only ten years old, 
and took him upon his own vessel. Young Farragut, then fourteen years 
old, was with Porter in the famous Essex fight in Valparaiso Bay, and re¬ 
ceived the special commendation of his commander for his conduct, though 
he was too young to be recommended for promotion. In times of peace na¬ 
val promotion comes slowly. Farragut, who had become lieutenant in 1825, 
was appointed commander in 1841, and captain in 1855. Meanwhile he had 
served at home and abroad, afloat and ashore, noted always for his diligence 
in mastering the duties of his profession, and for his facility in acquiring lan¬ 
guages. He learned French at home, Spanish and Portuguese in South 
America, Italian and Arabic in the Mediterranean. The outbreak of the re¬ 
bellion found him on shore duty at Norfolk, where he possessed a small es¬ 
tate. Of his sixty years, all but ten had been passed in the service of his 
country. He was proof against the temptations which assailed every officer 
of Southern birth or connections—temptations to which Buchanan and Tat- 
nall, Maury aud Page, Semmes and Maffit yielded. He managed to make 
his escape from Norfolk, leaving every thing behind him. He bore his three¬ 
score years lightly. No one who saw him would suppose that he was past 
middle age. A modest, quiet man, doing the duty which came to his hands 
without show or parade, he was now to have the opportunity of showing 
that he possessed the highest qualities of a commander. 

Farragut received his first instructions on the 20th of January. They 
were followed by others three weeks later. As soon as his flag-ship, the 



DAVID D. PORTER. 


















SHIP ISLAND AND THE APPROACHES TO NEW ORLEANS. 


February, 1862.] 


THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 


263 
















































































































































































































































































264 


[April, 1862. 



KIKE-RAFTS. 


Hartford, was ready, he was to pro¬ 
ceed to sea, and take the command of 
the Western Gulf blockading squad¬ 
ron. The mortar boats were to ren¬ 
dezvous at Key West When all 
was ready, he was to collect such ves¬ 
sels as could be spared from the block¬ 
ade, proceed up the Mississippi, and 
reduce the defenses which guarded the 
approaches to New Orleans. When 
he appeared off that city, he was to 
take possession of it under the guns 
of his squadron, hoist the American 
flag, and keep possession until the 
troops came up. Then, if the squad¬ 
ron from above had not descended, he 
was to push a strong force up the river, and take the defenses in the rear. 

11 As you have expressed yourself perfectly satisfied with the force given to 
you,” wrote the Secretary of the Nav}’, “and as many more powerful vessels 
will be added before you can commence operations, the Department and the 
country will'require of you success. There are other operations of minor im¬ 
portance, but nothing must be allowed to interfere with the great object in 
view, the certain capture of the city of New Orleans. The Department relies 
upon your skill to give direction to the powerful force placed at your dispo¬ 
sal, and upon your personal character to infuse a hearty co-operation among 
your officers free from unworthy jealousies.” This confidence was fully jus¬ 
tified. The great object in view was gained; and if the secretary’s antici¬ 
pations that “ if successful, you open the way to the sea for the great West, 
never to be closed; the rebellion will be riven to its centre, and the flag to 
which you have been so faithful will recover its supremacy in every state,” 
were not at once attained, it was through no fault of Farragut and his asso¬ 
ciates. Never before, save when Nelson, supported by Collingwood, and 
Hardy, and Harvey, won the great fight at Trafalgar, was a commander so 
truly and loyally supported by his subordinates as was Farragut by Porter, 
Bailey, Bell, and the officers and men of every vessel in the fleet. No trace 
of any unworthy jealousy appeared. In the fight every officer did his best; 
and in the reports, while each told what his own vessel had done, every one 
was eager to praise his associates. These reports, fully forty in number, 
leave nothing to be desired by the historian who has to describe the capture 
of New Orleans. 

Farragut reached Ship Island on the 20th of February, more than a month 
before the arrival of Butler, who was daily expected. He ran down with 
his fleet to the mouths of the Mississippi, and for a full month was busy in 
getting his vessels over the bar. It was supposed that there was nineteen 
feet of water. If so, all the vessels could be got over, except, perhaps, the 
Colorado, which drew twenty-two when loaded, but lightened an inch for 
twenty-four tons. The Wabash drew eighteen feet on an even keel, and 
could be got over without difficulty. All the other vessels, it was thought, 
could easily pass. But fifteen feet was found to be the utmost depth. Nei¬ 
ther the Colorado or the Wabash could cross. The Mississippi, lightened 
almost to the bare hull, was got over, tugs pulling her through a foot of mud. 
The fleet which entered the Mississippi consisted of forty-five vessels of all 
classes. Five were powerful steam sloops, the largest vessels which had ever 
crossed the bar; there were seventeen gun-boats, twenty-one mortar schoon¬ 
ers, and two large sailing vessels. All told, they carried something more 
than 200 mortars and guns, many of them of heavy calibre. 

The last of the large steamers were not fairly over the bar until the 8th 
of April. But meanwhile Farragut and Butler had met at Ship Island and 
concerted their plan of operations. Porter’s bomb vessels were to assail the 
forts. If he reduced them, well; if not, Farragut would try to run past 
them. If he succeeded, Butler should bring up his forces through the bay¬ 
ous to the rear of the forts, cutting them off from New Orleans, which Far¬ 
ragut would have held with his fleet. 

Three weary weeks passed before active operations were begun. But 
much work was done in this interval. The whole course of the river up to 
the forts was accurately surveyed. No more desolate region exists than 
that near the mouths of the Mississippi. On the right is swamp and lagoon ; 
on the left lagoon and swamp.- A stunted tree, a dilapidated house, only 
breaks the dull mud level. One hardly knows whether land or water pre¬ 
dominates. Land first fairly gets the victory after a contest of thirty miles, 
when a thick belt of wood finds soil from which to grow on the west bank. 
Just here the river makes a bend, scarcely perceptible jn a general map. At 
this bend, on the first patch of firm ground, were placed the first and the 
only seaward defenses of New Orleans. On the west, or convex side of the 
bend, was Fort Jackson; a little above, on the east, or concave side, was Fort 
St.Philip. Fort Jackson itself mounted seventy-four guns, with a supple¬ 
mentary battery of six. Fort St. Philip had forty guns. Both forts had 
been constructed by the best engineers that West Point could furnish, among 
whom were Beauregard and Weitzel. They were not quite completed when 
the rebellion broke out, but the deficiencies were thought to have been sup¬ 
plied by the zeal of the Confederates. They were thought to be impregna¬ 
ble, though the voyager up the Mississippi would hardly notice them, unless 
it were as the first two objects which broke the monotony of the dull mud 
level. All that he could see was two neatly sodded green slopes, surmount¬ 
ed by low brick walls, with a few black openings for guns. The river here 
is half a mile wide, with a current of four miles an hour, its course command¬ 
ed by the guns of the two forts. But these guns were only a pajt.of the de¬ 
fenses. Straight across the river from Fort Jackson a strong barrier had 


been stretched. Upon this the Confederates had twice lavished their labor 
First, they had placed a row of heavy logs, bound together by an iron chain, 
across the stream. The drift-wood from above lodged against this, forming 
a huge raft, the pressure of which in time became too great for the strength 
of the chain; one night it parted, and the whole structure was swept down 
to the Gulf. Taught by experience, the Confederates built a new barricade 
upon wiser principles. Eight hulks, partially dismasted and filled with 
logs, were strongly anchored in the stream, with intervals through which the 
drift-wood could pass. A chain passing from one to another bound all to¬ 
gether. Near the left bank the barricade could be opened at will to permit 
a vessel to pass. One end of the barricade was covered by the guns of Fort 
Jackson; the other was protected by a battery, both sweeping its entire 
length, while Fort St.Philip, from above, could pour its whole fire upon any 
assailant. Above lay a fleet of rams, gun-boats, and fire vessels, whose num¬ 
ber and strength were unknown. The whole was in charge of a recreant 
Pennsylvanian, J. K. Duncan, brigadier general commanding coast defenses. 
The two forts were especially commanded by Edward Higgins, once an offi¬ 
cer in the army of the United States. 

The western bank of the river, for eight miles below Fort Jackson, was 
lined by a belt of dense woods fifty yards wide, completely hiding the fort 
from the view except at one point, where the trees had been cleared away 
in order to afford unobstructed range upon ascending vessels. Porter had 
resolved to place his bomb schooners close to the bank and screened by these 
woods, over which they were to fling their shells into the invisible fort. The 
exact bearing and distance of the fort from the station assigned to each ves¬ 
sel must be ascertained. This work was performed with no little risk by 
members of the coast survey detailed for that purpose. They had to resort 
to all kinds of observations from all possible positions, hardly one of which 
was upon firm ground. Some stations consisted of flags among the over¬ 
hanging branches, the angles between them being measured from boats in 
the stream below; other stations were the chimney-tops of deserted houses, 
to which the observers worked their way through the roofs. All the while 

they were exposed to a random 
fire from the guns of the fort, 
and to shots from riflemen lurk¬ 
ing in the woods. But, in spite 
of all difficulties, the work was 
accomplished, and an accurate 
map was prepared, showing the 
bearing and distance of almost 
every point in the river from 
the flag-staffs of the forts. 

On the morning of the 17th 
of April all the vessels of the 
expedition weredrawn upclose- 
ly together four miles below 
the forts. The enemy opened 
the fight by sending down a 
fire-raft, piled up with wood 
saturated with tar and turpen¬ 
tine. A boat which put off from 
the Iroquois dragged the raft 
ashore, where it burned itself 
harmlessly out. All that day 
and the following night fire- 
rafts came down, but it was 
soon found that they were harm¬ 
less. The final preparations 
for the bombardment were now 
made. The mast-heads of the 
bomb vessels would rise just 
above the woods on shore. 
From them the walls of the 
fort could be seen, though the 
vessels were undistinguishable 
from the forts; for Porter had 
ordered the masts to be dress¬ 
ed off with branches and vines. 
Of the dense mass of green, 
no one in the fort could tell 
what was forest and what was 
tiie fobts and vEssci-s. mast and rigging. On the 





























THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 


265 


April, 1862.] 

morning of the 18th all the bomb vessels had taken their positions, the fore¬ 
most a little more than a mile and a half (2850 yards) from Fort Jackson. 
Behind this, in close order, were anchored twelve other vessels; across the 
river were six other mortar vessels, the foremost a little more than two miles 
(3680 yards) from Fort Jackson, upon which the whole fire was to be con¬ 
centrated. At nine o’clock the action commenced, the mortar vessels firing 
in order, each one every ten minutes. The forts replied. All day long the 
mortar boats kept up their constant fire, while gun-boats were dashing here 
and there, up and down the river, firing upon and receiving fire from the 
forts. Fire-rafts also came down, but they were easily disposed of. No one 
of the vessels lying under the lee of the woods was struck this day; two of 
those across the river were hit, killing one man and wounding three. The 
day was wearing to its close when a dense column of smoke and flame was 
seen rising from the fort. The citadel had been fired by the bombs; all the 
clothing and commissary stores were destroyed, and the magazine was in 
imminent danger. Porter could not know this. He supposed that it was 
another fire-raft ready to be launched against him. Night-firing was uncer¬ 
tain ; the wind had set in fresh; no one could know how long the bombard¬ 
ment would last; the men were worn with labor and fasting, and so at dusk 
Porter ordered the firing to cease. If he had known all, he would have 
kept up the bombardment through the night. As it was, he thought it best 
to be prudent. This, he says, was the only mistake that occurred during the 
bombardment. Next day the bombardment was resumed, the fort respond¬ 
ing as briskly as before. One mortar vessel was struck by a shell and sunk, 
two men being wounded; another was hit by a shot which killed one man, 
and disabled the mortar for two or three hours. On the third day no harm 
was done to the fleet, and nothing showed that Fort Jackson was seriously 
injured by the 4000 bombs discharged at it Porter began to lose confi¬ 
dence in rnortars; but a deserter came in, telling a fearful story, only partly 
true, of the havoc made in the fort. Hundreds of shell, he said, had fallen 
within the works, casemates were broken in, citadel and outbuildings burnt, 
magazine endangered, levee cut, and men demoralized and dispirited. So 
the mortar fleet went to work with renewed vigor. 

Farragut, meanwhile, had come to the conclusion that the mortar fleet 
would never reduce the forts. He must try what could be done by steam¬ 
ers and gun-boats. Whatever was to be done must be done quickly, or the 
great fleet would be again reduced to a mere blockading squadron, for shells, 
fuses, and cartridges were nearly expended. He would try to run the forts, 
or, if that could not be done, would engage them at close action, “and abide 
the result; conquer or be conquered; drop anchor or keep under way, as in 
his opinion was best,” when the decisive moment should arrive. 

Before the forts could be passed the barricade must be cut. This work 
was assigned to Bell, the fleet captain, commander of the flag-ship. Two 
gun-boats were given him for this work. One of these, the Pinola, was fur¬ 
nished with a petard, to be flung on board a hulk, and then ignited by a gal¬ 
vanic spark. The other, the Itasca, was to rely upon stout arms wielding 
hammer and chisel. The boats crept up on the night of the 20th, under cov¬ 
er of a fierce bombardment and of darkness. They reached the barricade. 
The Pinola, stopping her engine, threw her petard fairly upon one of the 
hulks; the strong current caught the vessel, whirling her down stream, and 
snapping the conducting wire before the spark could be transmitted. The 
Itasca was more fortunate. She steamed up to the middle hulk, and lashed 
herself to it. Her men leaped on board the hulk. In half an hour they cut 
the chain and loosed the hulk from its anchors. Gun-boat and hulk, lashed 
together, were swept by the current to the shore, the hulk luckily inside. 
The central hulk thus removed, the one on each side swung awajq leaving 
an opening wide enough for three vessels to pass abreast. The Pinola, 
balked, through no fault of her own, in her own part of the enterprise, did 
good service in aiding her more fortunate consort. Getting again under 
way, she steamed up to the barricade, threw successively two five-inch haw¬ 
sers to the Itasca, broke both in trying to drag her off, started her at length 
with a larger one, and the two boats returned in triumph to the fleet. Their 
joint work was done. The way to New Orleans was open to Farragut, if 
he dared attempt it 

Farragut was ready to dare it. He made every preparation to fit his fleet 
for the venture which he saw must devolve upon it. The fleet would be ex¬ 
posed to hazards of every kind, and every precaution was taken against 
them. Foremost of all was one devised by Moore, the engineer of the Rich¬ 
mond. He proposed that the iron chain cables should be looped over the 
side of the vessels, so as to form a sort of armor protecting the line of the en. 
gines. This defense was adopted by the whole fleet Months after, it was 
adopted by the Kearsarge in her memorable encounter with the Alabama. 
Each commander made, besides, his own special arrangements for preventing 
shot from reaching vital points in his vessel. Hammocks, coal, bags of ash¬ 
es, bags of sand, were piled up forward and abaft. Some rubbed their ves¬ 
sels with mud, to render them less perceptible; others whitewashed their 
decks, to make things more visible by night. Farragut’s general order, 1 ad¬ 
dressed to the commander of each vessel, provided for almost every possible 


1 The following are sentences from this order: Send down topgallantmasts. Rig in the flying 
jibboom, and land all the spars and rigging except what are necessary for the three topsails, fore¬ 
sail, jib, and spanker. Trice up the topmast stays, or land the whi&ers, and bring all the rigging 
into the bowsprit, so that there shall be nothing in the range of the direct fire ahead. Mount one 
or two guns on the poop and topgallant forecastle, bearing in mind that you will always have to 
ride head to the current, and can only avail yourself of the sheer of the helm to point a broadside 
gun more than three points forward of the beam. Have a kedge in the mizzen chains; a hawser 
bent through the stern chock; also grapnels to tow off fire-ships. Have light Jacob ladders made 
to throw over the side for the use of carpenters in stopping shot-holes. See that pumps and hose 
are in good order for extinguishing fire. Have many tubs of water about the decks, for the pur¬ 
pose of extinguishing fire and for drinking. Have heavy kedge in the port main chains, and whip 
on the main yard, ready to run it up and let fall on the deck of any vessel you may run alongside 
of in order to secure her for boarding. 





















































































































































266 


contingency. Much of it is hardly intelligible except to the nautical mind ; 
but there are sentences which have the ring of Nelson or Napoleon: “I 
wish you to understand,” he says, “ that the day is at hand when you will be 
called upon to meet the enemy in the worst form for our profession. Hot 
and eold shot will, no doubt, be freely dealt to us, and there must be stout 
hearts and quick hands to extinguish the one and stop the holes of the oth¬ 
er. I shall expect prompt attention to signals and verbal orders, either from 
myself or the captain of the fleet, who, it will be understood, in all cases acts 
by my authority." 

Farragut had resolved to attempt to run past the forts. The time was 
fixed for the night of the 23d. The bombardment was to be kept up until 
then, mainly to occupy the enemy. So a rain of shells was kept up. Dun¬ 
can, in the forts, reported cheerfully for the public in New Orleans. The en¬ 
emy had fired 25,000 shells, of which a thousand had fallen in the fort, doing 
little real harm; “ they must soon exhaust themselves; if not, we can stand 
it as long as they can.” Confidentially, he writes less confidently. Mitch¬ 
ell, the naval commander, was urged to get the great ram Louisiana down at 
once, to draw off some part of the heavy fire from the mortar vessels. The 
position of the fort was critical; casemates were shattered and crumbling 
away, and the magazine was in peril. Duncan exaggerated his danger. In¬ 
stead of 25,000 shells, barely 5000 had then been thrown against him; of 
these, not a third of a thousand had fallen within the fort. For all practical 
purposes, it was as strong when surrendered on the 28th as when first as¬ 
sailed ten days before. 

Farragut’s arrangements for passing the forts, like most great things when 
stripped of all accessories, were very simple. The mortar fleet, with its own 
steamers, and the sailing vessels, were to remain behind, yet covering the ad¬ 
vance with their fire. Five steamers and twelve gun-boats were to run or 
fight the forts. All told, they carried 294 guns. 1 They were arranged in 
two columns. The barricade once passed through the opening made by the 
Itasca, Bailey, second in command, with the right column, was to deal with 
Fort St. Philip; Bell, captain of the fleet, with the left column, was to deal 
with Fort Jackson. Caldwell, of the Itasca, had in the mean while been 
sent up to ascertain if the gap which he had made in the barricade was still 
open. He found that the channel was clear, and that the whole fleet could 
pass. 

Just after two o’clock on the morning of the 24th two small red lights 
were shown. This was the signal for advance. At half past three the whole 
fleet was fairly under way. The Hartford—Farragut, perched in the fore¬ 
rigging, peering anxiously through his glass into the thick darkness—led 
the left column of the blue; Bailey, in the Cayuga, led the right, all the oth¬ 
er vessels following in close order. The forts were about two miles above. 
The vessels steamed slowly up against the strong current, making scarcely 
two miles an hour. As soon as they were fairly under way, the five small 
steamers belonging to the mortar flotilla threw a hot enfilading fire upon 
the water batteries, while the mortar schooners opened upon the forts a bom¬ 
bardment fiercer than had before been delivered. For an hour there was 
not an instant when five shells were not in the air; sometimes there were 
half a score. The ascending fleet was clearly in view from the flotilla be¬ 
low, every spar, man, and rope clearly visible through the flames, which 
seemed to be eating them up. When the last vessel disappeared in the 
smoke, Porter gave the signal to cease firing and drop down the river. He 
had done his share in the work. The rest must be left to Farragut. 

Both columns passed the barricade without serious difficulty, only that 
three gun-boats missed the opening and were obliged to turn back. The 
real work was now to begin, for they were right under the guns of the forts, 
and open to the attack of the Confederate rams and gun-boats. Each man 
had now to fight at his own discretion; Farragut could only guess how each 
vessel was conducting itself; but he was able after the fight was over to re¬ 
port that “it has rarely been the lot of a commander to be supported by of¬ 
ficers of more indomitable courage or higher professional merit.” 

Bailey, whose red flag was borne by the Cayuga, caught the first fire from 
Fort St. Philip. This fort had received no harm from the bombardment 
beyond the.disabling of a single heavy gun. The flag-boat could bring no 
gun to bear at first, and steamed straight on, delivering a fire upon the fort 
in passing, and soon finding herself attacked by the whole fleet of Confed¬ 
erate gun-boats, with no supporting vessel in sight “ Hot but congenial 
work,” says Bailey. Two large steamers, one on starboard bow, another 
astern, tried to board; off starboard beam was a third; but an 11-inch Dahl- 
gren, at thirty yards’ distance, quieted him; he shoved for shore, ran aground, 
and burned himself up. The Cayuga’s forecastle Parrott drove off her en¬ 
emy on the bow; by that time the Yaruna and Oneida came dashing up, 
and took part in the fight. 

The Varuna, Boggs in command, built for a merchant vessel, was the swift¬ 
est and weakest boat in the squadron. Giving Fort St. Philip a passing fire, 
she dashed up stream, and soon found herself in a nest of rebel steamers. 
She “ worked both sides” upon these. Her first opponent, apparently crowd¬ 
ed with troops, caught her starboard fire, and drifted ashore, with boiler ex- 


1 The following are the vessels, with the number of their guns, ordered to attempt to pass the 
forts: Steamships —Hartford, 28; Brooklyn, 2G ; Richmond, 24 ; Pensacola, 24 ; Mississippi, 13. 
Gun-boats— Cayuga, 7; Oneida, 10; Varuna, 9 ; Katnhdin, 7 ; Kineo, G ; Wissahickon, 6 ; Seiota, 
6; Iroquois, 9 ; Kennebec, 5 ; Pinola, 5; Itasca, 4; Winona, 6: in all, 17 vessels, with 294 guns. 
The three gun-boats Itasca, Winona, and Kennebec failed to pass the barricade. No accurate list 
of the Confederate vessels encountered above the barricade has been preserved. There appear to 
have been in all 16 or 18 armed vessels, carrying about 50 guns. Many of them were designed 
for rams, so that the number of guns is no measure of their real offensive jKnvcr. The iron-clad 
Manassas which was supposed capable of clearing the whole river, carried but one gun. The fol¬ 
lowing li*t, only partially accurate, is the most complete which can now be given of the Confeder¬ 
ate flotilla: Louisiana, iron-clad, 16; Manassas, iron-clad, 1 ; McRae. 8; Governor Moore, 3; 
General Quitman, 2; Jackson, 2; Lovell, 1 ; Warrior, 2 ; Resolute, 2 ; Reliance, 2 ; Breckinridge, 
Ij Stonewall Jackson, 1; Galveston, 2; Anglo-Norman, 2; Star, 1. 


[April, 1862. 

ploded. Three more on either side soon shared the same fate. She then 
slacked steam, and was overhauled by two of the enemy, both iron-clad at 
the bows, and intent upon running her down. Hitherto not a man had been 
hurt on the Varuna. But now the Governor Moore, her foremost enemy, 
gave a raking fire, which killed three and wounded nine men, and almost 
simultaneously butted her twice. The Moore got more than she gave. Boggs 
managed to throw three shells into her abaft of her armor, besides a few fa¬ 
vors from a stern rifled gun, when she dropped out of action partly disabled. 
Another boat, iron-clad at the bows, with an under-water beak, was at the 
same time assailing the Yaruna. She struck her fairly, with damaging force, 
receiving shot which glanced harmlessly from her mailed bow; then she 
drew off, and came back, delivering another blow on the same spot, which 
crushed in the side of the Varuna. But in the melee her bows were dragged 
around, exposing her unarmored side. Five 8-inch shells, delivered from the 
now sinking Varuna, settled her, and she went ashore. Fifty of her crew 
were killed and wounded. She was set on fire by her own commander, who 
burned his wounded with his vessel. This fight was brief. In fifteen min¬ 
utes after the Varuna was first butted she was on the bottom, her topgallant 
forecastle only being out of water. The Oneida had by this time come up. 
Boggs waved her on to finish the Moore. This accomplished, the Oneida 
returned and took off a part of the crew of the sinking Varuna; the rest 
were rescued by other vessels. The honors of the fight must be accorded 
to the Varuna, the only lost vessel. Before she went down she had helped 
to sink or disable six vessels of the enemy, any one of whom was fairly her 
match. 

The large steamers were meanwhile having a rough time. The Hartford 
had hardly got under way when she received the fire of Fort Jackson. She 
replied from two forecastle guns, keeping straight on for the barricade. Pass¬ 
ing this, Farragut sheered off at the distance of half a mile, and poured in 
full broadsides of grape and canister, which drove every man in the fort 
undercover; but the casemate guns kept up a hot fire. Fort St. Philip now 
opened upon the advancing fleet. The fire became general, but the smoke 
was so dense that it was difficult to distinguish friends from foes; the flash 
of the guns was the only object at which forts or fleet could aim. A huge 
fire-raft soon loomed up amid the blackness. Farragut, in trying to avoid it, 
ran his vessel on shore. The raft, pushed on by the ram Manassas, whose 
black hull was invisible, was shoved right upon the Hartford. In a moment 
the good ship was on fire half way up to her tops, the flames bursting 
through the ports and running up the rigging. “ Fire quarters” were beat¬ 
en, the flames extinguished, the steamer backed off from shore, extricating 
herself from the raft, and pointed up stream. This in a few minutes brought 
her opposite St. Philip, upon which she poured her fire from one broadside, 
while the other blazed at Jackson. A half hour more of this hot work car¬ 
ried the Hartford beyond the range of the forts, and brought her among the 
remains of the Confederate fleet, which had been pretty thoroughly dealt 
with by the gun-boats, which had gained the advance. 

The Brooklyn, meanwhile, had had her share of hot work. Her place in 
the line was directly after the flag-ship. In the smoke and darkness she lost 
sight of the Hartford, and became entangled among the hulks of the barri¬ 
cade. She fell athwart the stream, her bow grazing the bank. Here she 
caught the fire of St. Philip. Regaining her position, she passed the open¬ 
ing, and met the Manassas, which delivered a shot at ten feet distance; this 
was stopped by the sand-bags which protected that vital point, the steam 
drum. The ram twice attempted to butt; but she was too close to get up 
full speed, and the blows were harmless. Morse’s improvised chain armor 
proved a perfect protection to the sides of the Brooklyn. The Manassas slid 
off and disappeared in the darkness, to reappear only once more. A Con¬ 
federate steamer then tried the Brooklyn, which was all the time raked from 
Fort Jackson. “ Our port broadside,” says Craven, the gallant captain of 
the Brooklyn, “at the short distance of fifty or sixty yards, completely fin¬ 
ished him, setting him on fire almost instantaneously.” The Brooklyn 
groped her way in darkness and smoke until she found herself abreast of 
St. Philip, so close that there was but thirteen feet of water. She was in a 
position to bring her full broadside to bear, and for a few minutes poured in 
a storm of grape and canister which drove the men from their guns and si¬ 
lenced the fire of the fort. Having passed the forts, the Brooklyn, still un¬ 
der way, engaged several of the enemy’s gun-boats, pouring in a destructive 
fire at short range, generally from sixty to a hundred yards. “The effects 
of our broadsides,” says Craven, “ must have been terrific.” The Brooklyn 
was under fire an hour and a half, and suffered severely both in men and in 
damage to the vessel. 

The three other steam ships played- worthy but less conspicuous parts. 
The Richmond, the slowest vessel, groped its way through the fiery channel 
after the way had been cleared, suffering little. The Pensacola took the full 
fire of St. Philip passing slowly up, frequently stopping to return it. Her 
men lay flat on deck to receive the first fire of the forts. The enemy over¬ 
shot, and many lives were thus saved; but the loss on the Pensacola ex¬ 
ceeded that of any other vessel. She did not come up with the enemy’s 
gun-boats until the action with them was nearly over. The Mississippi, in 
a few months to go down at Port Hudson, felt the enemy’s fire. She re¬ 
ceived ten shots, eight of which passed sheer through her, and got a severe 
wound from the Manassas, which she at last disabled. 

The Manassas was the great reliance of the Confederate fleet She was 
built somewhat after the model of the Virginia, and it was supposed that she 
could deal with the Federal fleet as the Virginia had dealt with the Cumber¬ 
land. In the gray of the morning, when the Federal fleet had fairly passed 
the forts and had destroyed the Confederate flotilla, the Manassas appeared 
coming up after them, hoping even then to retrieve the fortunes of the fight. 





April, 1862.] 


THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 


267 



TOR UABTFORP ON FIBS. 


Farragut ordered Smith of the Mississippi to turn and run her down. The 
head of the Mississippi was pointed down stream, and she dashed toward the 
ram with the full velocity of steam and stream. When only fifty yards 
apart, the ram put her helm aport and dodged the blow, but ran fast on the 
bank. Her crew got ashore as best they could. The Mississippi, balked of 
her blow, poured in two broadsides, thoroughly riddling the Manassas, and 
then boarded. But it was not worth while to save her. The hulk was 
dragged off from the bank, fire set to her, and she w.as sent drifting down the 
current without a man on board. Half an hour after, the Manassas came 
drifting down the river below the forts, seemingly ready to pounce upon the 
defenseless mortar vessels. Fire was opened upon the hulk, but it was soon 
discovered that she was harmless. Flame and smoke were pouring from ev¬ 
ery opening, and she was evidently sinking. Porter, wishing to save her as 
a curiosity, got a hawser bn board and tied her to the bank. Hardly was 
this done when a faint explosion was heard, her only gun went off, and, emit¬ 
ting flames through her bow port, the Manassas gave a final plunge and dis¬ 
appeared under the turbid waters of the river. 

The morning had hardly broken, and the fog was not lifted from the riv¬ 


er, when Farragut, the battle won, looked round for his fleet. Three gun¬ 
boats were missing, whether captured, sunk, or driven back he could not 
then know. He afterward learned that they were safe. The Winona and 
Kennebec had got fouled among the hulks of the barricade, and at daylight 
found themselves a mark for the whole fire of the two forts, against which 
it was madness to contend, and had turned their heads down stream. The 
Itasca, which had opened the barricade, had met with misfortune and disap¬ 
pointment. She tried bravely to pass, and only desisted when several shot 
from Fort Jackson passed through her. One pierced her boiler, making an 
opening through which the steam rushed in a dense cloud, filling fire-room 
and engine-room, driving every one from below. Others caused leaks which 
threatened to sink the boat. She was also forced to withdraw. Caldwell, 
her commander, gave pathetic utterance to his heartfelt sorrow and disap¬ 
pointment that his disabled condition prevented him from being a partici 
pant in the complete success of the enterprise to which he had contributed 
so much. The Varuna, victorious in death, was a total loss. The seven 
days’ bombardment, and the three hours’ fight with forts and fleet, had cost 
in all 37 killed and 171 wounded, more thau half of which fell upon the five 








268 


[April, 1862. 



TUE CRESCENT CITY IN 1862. 


steam ships. 1 The forts shot too high throughout, and the gun-boats, lying 
low, were overshot. Their injuries were mainly received in the combat with 
the enemy’s flotilla. 2 The entire loss of the Confederates has never been 
ascertained. In the forts 14 were killed and 38 wounded. The loss on the 
boats must have been very severe, for at least twelve of them were sunk or 
burned. 

Farragut found his fleet somewhat battered, but sufficient for .the work 
which it had to do. Boggs, his own vessel being lost, volunteered to take a 
boat, make his way through the bayous bordering the Mississippi, and con¬ 
vey dispatches to Porter and Butler, still below the forts. Butler was told 
that the way was clear for him to send up his troops by the bayous in the 
rear of the forts, where their landing would be protected by gun-boats left 
for that purpose. For Porter there was a note from Farragut, telling in 
sharp sailor phrase of the rough time which he had had; how once he 
thought it was all up with him; how he fought his way through, destroyed 
the Confederate fleet, was starting for New Orleans; the city captured, he 
would come back and attend to the forts, which Porter should hold as they 
were, unless, indeed, they should surrender, as he thought they would, upon 
being summoned. Just now he was going ahead. “I wish,” he concluded, 
“ to get above the English Turn, where they say the enemy have not placed 
a battery yet, but have two above, nearer New Orleans. They will not be 
idle, and neither will I. You supported me nobly.” 

But after passing the forts there was no serious opposition. The batteries 
which had been reported to line the levee above had no existence. The 
Chalmette regiment was encamped at the quarantine station five miles above 
the forts. Bailey ran the Cayuga up to the bank, hailed the colonel, and or¬ 
dered him to pile his arms and come on board. The regiment surrendered, 
and were released on parole, only they must remain where they were until 
next day. The fleet steamed up the river through a scene of almost pasto¬ 
ral quiet. The banks for a mile on each side were lined with sugar planta-' 
tions, green with young cane, dotted over with gangs of negroes busy at 
work. Now and then a white flag, or the Union colors, was hung out from 
a villa, or waved from the levee. Sometimes a white man would appear, 
making gestures of hatred or defiance. Here and there the slaves swarmed 
up to the levee, hoe in hand, waving their battered hats, and shouting a wel¬ 
come to those who, they had learned by the strange system of free-masonry 
peculiar to the negroes, had come to be their deliverers. On other planta¬ 
tions, where they were kept under more strict control, they dug doggedly on, 
not seeming to notice the unwonted spectacle of an armed fleet steaming up 
the river. As evening fell, the fleet came to anchor eighteen miles below 
New Orleans by the bends of the river, but only half that distance in a 


1 The following is the loss on each vessel belonging to the running fleet, as reported by the sur¬ 
geon general: 


bell’s 

DIVISION. 


bailey’s 

division. 



Killed. 

Wounded. 


Killed. 


Hartford. 


10 

Mississippi. 

. 2 

6 

Brooklyn. 


26 

Pensacola. 


33 



4 




Sciota. 


2 

Oneida. 


3 

Iroquois. 

. 6 

22 

Varuna. 

. 3 

9 

Kennebec. 


— 

Katalidin. 

_ 

_ 

Pinola. 


7 

Kineo. 


8 

Itasca. 


4 

Wissahickon. 

_ 


Winona. 

. 3 

6 


io 

65 


26 

80 





Besides these, during the seven days’ bombardment, 2 were killed (one by a fall from the mast¬ 
head) and 26 wounded. One more was killed afterward. The entire cost of the capture of New 
Orleans was 39 men killed and 171 wounded; one mortar boat and one gun-boat sunk. 

3 According to the accounts of a deserter, the casemate guns which threw hot shot from Fort 
Jackson erred on the other side. The officer in command, fearing to fire too high, depressed his 
guns below the horizontal line; wishing to work his guns vigorously, they were run out with a 
jerk; the consequence was that the balls rolled out into the moat, while the guns blazed harm¬ 
lessly away with powder and wadding. The officers on the rampart told him that his shot were 
falling short. He tried to remedy the defect, and, fixing a correct aim on one particular vessel, 
blazed away at it. Only when the Federal fleet had got out of range did he discover that he had 
been devoting himself to one of the Confederate chain hulks. 


straight line. Huge volumes of fiery smoke were seen 
rolling up. A great panic had suddenly fallen upon 
the Crescent City. 

On the morning of the 24th no man in New Or¬ 
leans dreamed that the city was in danger. Duncan 
had telegraphed the evening before, giving an account 
of affairs up to the morning. “Heavy and continu¬ 
ous bombardment all night, and still progressing. No 
farther casualties except two men slightly wounded. 
We are cheerful, and have an abiding faith in our ul¬ 
timate success. Twenty-five thousand 13-inch shells 
have been fired by the enemy, one thousand of which 
fell into the fort They must soon exhaust them¬ 
selves; if not, we can stand it as long as they can.” 
Duncan overcounted. Hardly 5000 shells had then 
been thrown. Eight or nine thousand was the utmost 
limit after two days’ more. 

This cheering report appeared in the New Orleans 
morning papers of the 24th. Every body thought 
every thing was well until half past nine, when the 
alarm-bell was heard. Twelve strokes, four times re¬ 
peated, summoned all armed bodies to their head-quar¬ 
ters. A telegram from below, cut off at the fifteenth 
word, said, “ It is reported that two of the enemy’s 
gun-boats have succeeded in passing the forts.” Not 
two, but seven times two, if the truth had been known. 
Five long hours passed without a farther word. Mans¬ 
field Lovell, commander at New Orleans, had the day 
before gone leisurely down toward the forts. He came back, dashing along 
the levee at racing speed, bringing tidings that the whole Union fleet—not 
merely two gun-boats—had passed the forts, destroyed the Confederate flo¬ 
tilla, and were approaching New Orleans. It was late in the afternoon. 
The panic set in. Officers rode about impressing carts to haul the cotton 
from the store-houses to the levee for burning. The foreign consulates were 
crowded with persons bringing their valuables to be deposited for safe-keep¬ 
ing under foreign flags. The banks sent off their four millions of gold, 
which soon found its way to the Confederate treasury, never to be reclaimed. 
The military bodies hurried to their armories; but instead of the 64,000 in¬ 
fantry in and about the city, “ in discipline and drill far superior to the Yan¬ 
kees,” there were less than 3000 troops and a few thousand militia. Lovell 
abandoned the city, taking off his soldiers, and followed by some thousands 
of the militia; the others doffed their uniforms and remained behind. The 
governor of the state fled up the river in the swiftest steamer he could find, 
scattering proclamations directing the burning of every bale of cotton and 
every barrel of sugar which the enemy could by any possibility reach. The 
whole city was mad with apprehension and rage, with bewilderment and 
fury. Some denounced Duncan, some upbraided Lovell, some demanded 
that the city should be made another Moscow, some clamored that every 
Union man should be brought to the lamp-post. Worse even than the com¬ 
ing of the Yankees, all the scoundrelism of the city, noted for the number of 
its scoundrels, broke loose. The municipal authorities, restored to adminis¬ 
tration by the cessation of martial law, were at their wits’ end. The police 
was powerless. There was but one way to save the city from burning and 
plunder. The mayor called upon the European brigade, composed of for¬ 
eigners, to take charge of the city. They accepted the charge, and suppress¬ 
ed the tumult. At evening the authorized work of destruction began. The 
tor.ch was applied to 15,000 bales of cotton, piled up on the river bank; to 
nearly a score of cotton-ships, ready to elude the blockade through some of 
the fifty outlets; to as many steam-boats, the relics of that mighty fleet which 
once lined the levee, four deep, for miles; to a great iron-clad ram, almost 
completed, which was to sweep the river; to miles of steam-boat wood and 
acres of coal; to ship-timber, dry docks, board-yards—to every thing com¬ 
bustible which the Yankees could use. The heads of hundreds of barrels 
of sugar and hogsheads of molasses were stove in. Men, women, and chil¬ 
dren, white, black, and parti-colored, scooped up molasses and sugar from the 
ground, and carried it off in pails, baskets, tubs, and aprons. Few of the in¬ 
habitants of New Orleans, except the slaves, slept on the night of Thursday, 
the 24th of April. 

At dawn the next morning Farragut weighed anchor, and steamed cau¬ 
tiously up the river. Evidences of the panic in New Orleans were every 
where visible. Burning cotton-ships and ship-yard apparatus on fire came 
floating down. The destruction of property was awful. At half past ten 
they came in view of Jackson’s old battle-field, three miles below the city. 
Earth-works were visible by the old lines on each shore. The fleet was 
drawn up in two lines as before, one to attend to each bank. Bailey, in the 
Cayuga, was far ahead, not having seen the signal to slacken speed and al¬ 
low the slower vessels to come up. A raking fire was opened upon him for 
a mile from twenty guns—not the famous five-mile rifled cannon which the 
newspapers had placed there just twenty days before. He could reply with 
only two forecastle guns. In twenty minutes the fleet got up. Each vessel, 
in passing, bore away, and gave the forts a broadside of shells, shrapnel, and 
grape, silencing them effectually. This affair cost the fleet one man, Mid¬ 
shipman John Anderson, of the Brooklyn, knocked overboard by the wind 
of a ball and drowned. For the rest, it was, in Farragut’s words, “one of 
the little elegancies of the profession—a dash and a victory.” 

At noon the fleet rounded the bend, came into full view of the Crescent 
City, and cast anchor. Fires were blazing all along the shore; the stream 
was full of burning vessels; the levee was aswarm with an angry mob, who 



























































April, 1862.] 


THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 


269 


amused themselves with hunting down a few persons 
who raised a faint cheer for the Union. A fierce rain- 
shower came down and melted away a part of the 
crowd. In the midst of it a boat put off from the 
Hartford, with no white flag of truce flying. The crew 
were rigged in the freshest man-of-war style, as though 
they were on a pleasure-trip. In the stern sat three 
officers—Morton in command of the boat, Bailey and 
Perkins charged to see the authorities, whoever they 
might be, and demand the surrender of the city. 

These two stepped ashore, amid cheers for Jeff. Davis 
and the South, and groans for Lincoln and his fleet. 

Some of the crowd, wiser than the rest, conducted the 
two messengers to the City Hall, the mob yelling 
around. “ No violence,” said a newspaper next morn¬ 
ing, “ was offered to the officers, though certain per¬ 
sons who were suspected of favoring their flag and 
cause were set upon with great fury and roughly 
handledbut it added, “on arriving at the City Hall 
it required the intervention of several citizens to pre¬ 
vent violence being offered to the rash embassadors of 
an execrated dynasty and government.” 

The story of the actual surrender of New Orleans 
reads like a farce, which might at any moment be 
turned into a tragedy; for the furious mob, and the 
city which sheltered it, lay at the mercy of the Union 
fleet. 

The two officers entered the City Hall, and intro, 
duced themselves to his honor the mayor—a smug, 
pompous little gentleman, addicted to the use of flowery phrases. After 
formal salutations had been.exchanged, Bailey announced that he had come 
to demand the surrender of the city and the hoisting of the Union flag on 
the public buildings. Mayor Monroe had no authority to surrender, and 
would not hoist the Union flag; General Lovell was the military com¬ 
mander; he should be sent for. Meanwhile conversation was kept up; 
courteous in form, but with an occasional sharp tang. The Union officers 
praised the valor of the Confederate forts and fleets, and regretted the de¬ 
struction of so much property in the city. The mayor rejoined, tartly, that 
the property was their own ; if they chose to destroy it, it was nobody’s 
business. Bailey replied that, as things stood, it looked very much like 
biting off one’s own nose to spite his face. Just then Lovell came in. After 
due hand-shakings, Bailey again announced his errand. Lovell could not 
think of surrendering the city. He had evacuated it with his troops; it 
was defenseless, and Farragut could shell it if he chose. He would retire 
and leave the city authorities to do as they thought proper. The mayor 
thereupon said that he would consult the City Council, and report the result 
next day. 

Farragut was amused and puzzled; but, as his men were tired out, he con¬ 
cluded to wait till next day for the action of the city fathers, especially as 
there were several matters that could be attended to in the mean -while. 
There were sundry rams, almost completed, meant to be the terror of the 
river; several forts; and, above all, a boom lying ready to swing across the 
river to prevent the descent of any fleet from above. It was a stupendous 
structure, three quarters of a mile long, composed of logs four feet in diam¬ 
eter and thirty feet long, lying three abreast, bound together with chains. 
There were ninety-six of these lengths. These were all rendered harmless. 

An hour after daylight on Saturday a boat put off from the shore con¬ 
taining messengers from the mayor. The City Council would meet at ten, 
and the Federal commander should be apprized of the result of their delib¬ 
erations. Farragut replied that it was not within the province of a naval 
officer to assume the duties of a military commander. He had come to re¬ 
duce New' Orleans to obedience to the laws of the United States. The city 
must be surrendered, all hostile flags must be hauled down, and that of the 
United States be hoisted on all public buildings by noon ; there must be no 
more outrages upon loyal people; they should try to quell disturbances, re¬ 
store order, and call upon the people of New Orleans to return to their usual 
avocations; the rights of person and property should be secure. 

The city fathers met, and the mayor read to them the reply which he had 
prepared for Farragut. They approved it heartily. It was the most sin¬ 
gular document ever offered to a conqueror by the authorities of a conquer¬ 
ed town. The city had been evacuated by the troops, the administration 
of its government and the custody of its honor had been restored to the 
mayor, whose duty it became “ to transmit the answer which the universal 
sentiments of his constitueney, no less than the promptings of his own heart, 
dictated on that sad and solemn occasion. I am no military man,” he con¬ 
tinued ; “ it would be presumptuous in me to attempt to lead an army to the 
field, and I know still less how to surrender an undefended place. The city 
is yours by the power of brutal force. As to the hoisting of any other flag 
than the one of our own adoption, the man lives not in our midst whose 
hand and heart would not be palsied at the mere thought of such an act; nor 
could I find in my entire constituency so wretched and desperate a renegade 
as would dare to profane’with his hand the sacred emblem of our aspira¬ 
tions.” The mayor went on to compliment the commander upon the senti¬ 
ments which he had manifested. “They sprung from a noble but deluded 
nature,” were worthy of one “engaged in a better cause,” and the mayor 
“knew how to appreciate the motives which inspired them.” The Federal 
commander should remember that he had “a gallant people to administer; 
a people sensitive to all that can in the least affect its dignity and self-re¬ 



THE LEVEE IN 1862. 


spect. Do not allow them to be insulted by the interference of such as have 
rendered themselves odious and contemptible by their dastardly desertion 
of the mighty struggle in which we are engaged, nor of such as might re¬ 
mind them too painfully that they are the conquered and you the conquer¬ 
ors. Peace and order may be preserved without a resort to measures which 
could not fail to wound their sensibilities and fire up their passions.” And 
more of the same sort, the purport of all being that the captors were mod¬ 
estly desired to withdraw the fleet which commanded the city, and leave the 
people to themselves, with full power to work their will upon any Union 
men in their midst. At all events, if they wanted the Federal flag raised, 
they must do it themselves. There was bravado, if not braveTy, in this re¬ 
ply ; but a man powerless to harm his opponent, who knows that he can be 
harmed only by being struck through the bodies of women and children, 
may safely venture upon bravado. 

Next morning Farragut sent a small party ashore to hoist the Union flag 
on the Custom-house and Mint, with strict orders not to use their arms un¬ 
less actually assailed. They were insulted, but not assaulted. The flags 
were left without a guard; but the guns ot the Pensacola were trained upon 
the Mint, and the mob were warned that fire would be opened upon the 
building if any attempt was made to disturb the flag. At eleven o’clock 
the crews of all the ships were assembled on deck to “ return thanks to Al¬ 
mighty God for his great goodness and mercy in permitting them to pass 
through the events of the last two days with so little loss of life and blood.” 
An April shower seemed coming up, and the gunner of the Pensacola re¬ 
moved the wafers by which the guns are discharged. The report of a how¬ 
itzer from the main-top turned all eyes toward the Mint. Four men were 
seen upon the roof; one cut the flag from the s'taff, and all dragged it off. 
Without orders, the strings to every gun of the Pensacola were pulled. No 
shot followed. The fortunate removal of the wafers alone prevented a full 
broadside from being poured into the city. The flag was carried into the 
street, paraded in a cart to the sound of fife and drum, trailed through the 
mire, and then torn into shreds, which were distributed among the screaming 
crowd. 

Farragut hardly knew what to do. The insult had been committed; he 
could take ample vengeance, but only by opening fire, and punishing the in¬ 
nocent as well as the guilty. His kindly nature revolted at this. He took 
till next day to consider and to consult with Butler, who had come up the 
river, as yet without bringing any troops. The result was that Farragut 
wrote^o thetmayoiy noticing the refusal to haul down the state flag, detail¬ 
ing the outrages which had been committed, and warning him that “ the fire 
of this fleet might be drawn upon the city at any moment, and in such an 
event the levee would in all probability be cut by the shells, and an amount 
of distress ensue to the innocent population, which I have heretofore endeav¬ 
ored to assure you that I desired by all means to avoid. The election is 
therefore with you; but it becomes my duty to notify you to remove the 
women and children from the city within forty-eight hours, if I have rightly 
understood your determination.” 

The mayor returned an impudent reply. He could not conceive that the 
Federal flag bad been hoisted by the orders of “Mr. Farragut;” the inter¬ 
ference of any force while negotiations for surrender were pending was a 
flagrant violation of the courtesies, if not of the rights, recognized among 
belligerents. The city still contained a population of 140,000, and “Mr. 
Farragut” must be aware of the utter inanity of such a notification. “Our 
women and children,” he continued, “can not escape from your shells, it it 
be your pleasure to murder them on a question of mere etiquette. You are 
not satisfied with the peaceable possession of an undefended city, opposing 
no resistance to your guns, because of its bearing its doom with something 
of manliness and dignity, and you wish to humble and disgrace us by the 
performance of an act against which our nature rebels This satisfaction 
































270 


[April, 1862. 


you can not expect to obtain at our hands. We will stand yonr bombard¬ 
ment, unarmed and undefended as we are. The civilized world will con¬ 
sign to indelible infamy the heart that will conceive the deed, and the hand 
that will dare to execute it.” 

This insolent message gave Farragut an opportunity to extricate himself 
from the dilemma of submitting to an insult to his flag or of avenging it by 
punishing the innocent with the guilty. He simply replied that the mayor 
had made his letter so offensive that it would terminate all intercourse be¬ 
tween them. General Butler was close at hand with his forces. When he 
arrived the charge of the city would be turned over to him. But, in the 
mean time, the flag of the Union was to be raised on the Custom-house, and 
the mayor must see that it was respected. Every ensign and symbol of gov¬ 
ernment, whether state or Confederate, except that of the United States, must 
be hauled down. This was done. Captain Bell, with a few marines, marched 
into the city, hauled down the Confederate flag, hoisted that of the Union, 
locked the Custom-house, put the key in his pocket, and returned, leaving 
the flag unguarded. It was not again molested. 

By this time it was known that Forts Jackson and St. Philip had been 
surrendered, the remainder of the Confederate fleet destroyed or given up, 
and the river-road to New Orleans open to the unarmed transports which 
were to bring up Butler’s troops. The forts had been passed—not reduced, 
or even seriously injured. The great iron-clad ram Louisiana was unharm¬ 
ed. She had taken no part in the action, though on the day before her work 
had been assigned. It is said that her crew were all drunk. Three armed 
steamers had moreover escaped. If they were no match for the Union armed 
vessels, they might yet make havoc of the mortar schooners and transports. 
As soon as the passage was achieved, Porter sent a flag demanding the sur¬ 
render of the forts. Higgins had no official information that New Orleans 
had been occupied, and could not then entertain a proposition for surrender. 
The next day, the 28th of April, Colonel Higgins had occasion to change bis 
mind. Weitzel, whose old duck-shooting experience came into use, had 
guided expeditions through the bayous; they had got above both forts, cut¬ 
ting them off from communication with New Orleans. A mutiny had bro¬ 
ken out in Fort Jackson; 250 men had come out and surrendered to the 
Union pickets. Porter again demanded a surrender. “You have defended 
the forts gallantly,” he said, “and no more can be asked of you. I know 
you can hold out some time longer, but in the end you must yield. You 
can gain nothing by farther resistance. You shall have terms sufficiently 
honorable to relieve you from any feeling of humiliation. Officers shall re¬ 
tire on partfle, with their side-arms; soldiers shall be paroled, laying down 
their arms; public property shall be given up; private property shall be re¬ 
spected.” Higgins replied that he would give up the forts on these terms, 
but he had no authority over the navy, and was not responsible for what it 
should do. There had been a quarrel between the military and naval com¬ 
manders. Each Accused the other of failure of duty. Four Union boats 
steamed up with white flags flying, answered by white flags on the forts. 
Duncan and Higgins came on board the Harriet Lane, where the articles of 
capitulation were to be formally drawn up. While this was being done, 
word was brought to Porter that the Louisiana, all ablaze, was coming 
straight down upon them. “ This is not creditable to the naval command¬ 
er,” said Porter. “We are not responsible for the acts of these naval offi¬ 
cers,” responded Higgins. “ Is there much powder aboard, and are the guns 
loaded?” “I presume so; but we know nothing of naval matters here.” 
The heated guns now began to go off, with every probability of throwing 
shot and shell amid friends and foes. Porter coolly remarked to the Con¬ 
federate officers, “If you do not mind the explosion which is soon to come, 
we can stand it.” No one moved from his seat, and the conference pro¬ 
ceeded as calmly as though nothing had happened. The current sheered 
the burning vessel across the river, and when it was just abreast of Fort St. 
Philip it blew up, scattering the fragments in every direction, and killing 
one man in the fort. The noise was heard for miles. When the smoke 
cleared away not a vestige of the Louisiana was visible; she had gone down 
in the deep waters of the Mississippi. Had the explosion occurred, as Mitch¬ 
ell, the treacherous naval commander, intended it should, in the midst of 
the Federal fleet, every vessel would have been destroyed. 

Duncan and Higgins acted with perfect good faith. Not the slightest 
change was made in the forts while the articles of capitulation were being 
drawn up. Every thing was surrendered as it stood when the white flag 
was raised. Officers and men were released on parole. They came out 
from the fort looking more like school-boys going home than men who had 
just been made prisoners. Not a few were of Northern birth, who had en¬ 
listed to man the forts in the full belief that they would never be called 


upon to fight. New Orleans, it was thought, might be assailed from above; 
nobody dreamed that a fleet from below would seriously attempt to fight or 
pass the forts. Yet such is the marvelous power of discipline, that they 
stood to their work like men who were fighting for a cause dear to them, in¬ 
stead of one for which they bad no sympathy. A part of them, indeed, took 
the first fair occasion to desert. Duncan appeared at New Orleans next day, 
and harangued the angry crowd on the levee. He declared, with tears ifi 
his eyes, that nothing hut the mutiny of a part of his command could 
have induced him to surrender. But for that he could have held out -for 
months. 

Fort St Philip was hardly scarred. Fort Jackson, to an unprofessional 
eye, had been severely handled. It had been plowed with shells, the citadel 
had been burnt, the magazine endangered, casemates crumbled and flooded, 
walls cracked, drawbridge broken down, causeways blown up, holes made by 
bombs every where visible. Naval officers, who knew that a shattered ship 
was defenseless, were justified in supposing that the fort was really reduced; 
that another day’s bombardment would have finished it; that it could have 
stood but little more without coming down about its defenders’ ears, and 
would need to be demolished and rebuilt if government ever intended to 
fortify the site again. Weitzel, who knew better the capabilities of a fort, 
told a very different story. The navy, he reported, passed the forts, but did 
not reduce them. St Philip, with one or two exceptions, was without a 
scratch. To an unexperienced eye, Jackson seemed badly cut up; but to 
resist an assault, or even regular approaches, it was as strong as when the 
first shell was fired against it. 

The forts having been surrendered, Porter turned his attention to Mitch¬ 
ell, who lay half a mile above with three steamers, one of which he had just 
scuttled. A shot fired over him from the Harriet Lane caused him to lower 
his flag. Twenty-one officers and 300 men surrendered at discretion. The 
men were dismissed on parole; the officers were retained as piisoners to an¬ 
swer for their perfidious conduct in continuing hostilities while they had a 
flag of truce flying. 

The forts were surrendered on the 28th of April. Butler, hastening down 
to bring up troops some way, found the river-road open. The transports, 
among which was the Mississippi—not the war steamer of the same name 
—were soon under way, freighted with soldiers who had been wearily wait¬ 
ing at the Head of the Passes. At sunset on the 29th she reached the forts, 
now held by blue coats instead of gray. At midnight the general came on 
board, and the vessels passed up the river. The voyage occupied the whole 
of the last day of April. At noon on the 1st of May the Mississippi lay 
along the levee of New Orleans. A crowd had gathered, but not the angry 
mass which had been seen there for almost a week. They seemed to be dis¬ 
posed to make a joke of the circumstances. There was a popular song, set 
to a rollicking tune, telling how a mythical “ Picayune Butler” had come to 
a mythical town. The coincidence of names struck the mob. “Picayune 
Butler” was asked to come ashore and show himself. The general grimly 
enjoyed the joke. He wished the tune of “ Picayune Butler” played for the 
delectation of the mob. The band happened to be destitute of the score, 
and were obliged to give “Yankee Doodle” and the “Star Spangled Ban¬ 
ner” instead. 

But, apart from chaffing, there was work to be done. Butler determined 
to take military possession of the city at once. In four hours a company of 
the Thirty-first Massachusetts landed on the levee and quietly pressed the 
crowd back, making room for the remainder of the regiment and for the 
Fourth Wisconsin. Both regiments then formed, a file taking each side of 
the street, the general and his staff marching on foot. Strict orders had been 
given for the conduct of the troops. There was to be no plundering of pub¬ 
lic or private property. No officer or soldier should, upon any pretext, ab¬ 
sent himself from his station without arms or alone. They were to march 
in silence, except that the bands were to play; no notice to be taken of of¬ 
fensive or insulting words. If a shot was fired from a house, they should 
halt, arrest the inmates, and destroy the house. If they wefe fired upon 
from the streets, the offender should, if possible, be arrested, but they should 
not fire into the crowd unless absolutely necessary for self-defense, and then 
not without orders. The troops moved steadily on, seemingly unconscious 
of the surging masses crowding the side-walks, hurrahing for Beauregard, 
Bull Run, and Shiloh, cursing Butler and the Yankees. They passed the 
St Charles Hotel, now deserted; five days before it was the head-quarters 
of Lovell; to-morrow it was to be the head-quarters of Butler. They reach¬ 
ed the unfinished, roofless Custom-house, which the government had been 
building, Beauregard being engineer, when the rebellion broke out The 
Union flag floated, unguarded and unmolested, from its walls. The door 

was locked, and the key was on board 
the Hartford. Entrance was forced 
and, half an hour before sunset on 
the 1st of May, the Union troops were 
making preparations in an upper story 
for their first meal in New Orleans. 
Strong guards were posted at all need¬ 
ful points. The rage of the mob had 
exhausted itself, the city relapsed into 
perfect quiet. Butler returned to the 
vessel, to add the last words to the 
proclamation which was formally to 
announce on the morrow that New 
Orleans was again under the flag of 
the Union. 



PAfiSLSG UP THE BA TOO. 







THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. 


May, 1862.1 


THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 


271 


















































































































































































































































































272 


CHAPTER XV. 

BUTLER’S ADMINISTRATION AT NEW ORLEANS. 

The Condition of New Orleans.—Character of its Population.—Butler at the St.Charles.—Inter¬ 
view with the Mayor.—Quelling the Mob.—Butler’s Proclamation.—Soule’s Remonstrance.— 
Butler and the City Authorities.—Occupation of Baton Rouge.—Providing Food.—Charles 
Hcidseck.—Feeding the Poor.—The City Authorities reproved.—The Women Order.—The 
General and the Mayor.—Deposition of the Municipal Government.—Regulating the Cur¬ 
rency.—The Banks and their Issues.—Property sequestered by the Confederacy.—Cleaning the 
Streets.—The Quarantine.—Pardon of the Monroe Guard.—Execution of Mumford.—Execu¬ 
tion of Plunderers.—Punishment of Outrages.—Mrs. Phillips.—The Oath of Allegiance or Neu¬ 
trality required.—Protest of Consuls.—Modified Oath.—Butler and the Clergy.—Dr. Leacock. 
—Disarming the Population.—Consular Protest.—The Confiscation Act.—The Negro Ques¬ 
tion.—Colored Regiments.—Military Operations.—The Pass System.—Occupation of the La¬ 
fourche District.—Sequestration of Property.—Growth of Union Sentiment.—Butler’s Plans. 
—Charges against him.—His Recall.—Butler and the Consuls.—His Farewell Address. 

I N assuming the military government of New Orleans, General Butler un¬ 
dertook a difficult and delicate task. It will be the object of this chap- 
for to show how he performed it. The people were heterogeneous. At the 
outbreak of the rebellion the resident population was 168,000; 155,000 were 
free and 13,000 slaves. Of the free population, 10,000 were colored; of the 
whites, 80,000 were born in the United States, 65,000 in foreign countries. 
Ireland sent 24,000, Germany 20,000, France 11,000, England 3000. Al¬ 
most half of the free white population were born abroad; more than half 
out of the state. Of those of foreign birth, few became citizens by natural¬ 
ization, as is shown by the small vote cast. In the presidential election of 
1860 less than 11,000 votes were given ; of these, Bell received one half, the 
remainder being almost equally divided between Douglass and Breckin¬ 
ridge; not a single vote was given to Lincoln. No city in the Union has 
so few citizens in proportion to its white population. The alien element was 
strong beyond its ratio of number. Two thirds of the business men were of 
foreign birth. They had come to New Orleans to make money. For the 
country which protected them they cared nothing. All that they cared for 
was the profits which they could gain by trading; so that these were safe, 
they cared not for king or emperor, for Union or Confederacy. Of citizens 
by birth, the majority belonged to the Creole race; that is, as the word is 
used in Louisiana, people born in the state, but of French or Spanish blood. 
They are fond of money, and yet not specially active in the pursuit of gain. 
In ordinary cases, they kept rather aloof from politics, preferring luxury to 
excitement. Under the impulse of passion or revenge they were ready for 
any desperate deed. Two or three assassinations,as many fights and “en¬ 
counters” in street or bar-room, and as many more formal duels, were the av¬ 
erage from day to day. Besides the resident population, there was a float¬ 
ing mass of renegadoes and desperadoes from all quarters of the globe, fiery 
Frenchmen, revengeful Spaniards, sneaking Cubans, and, worse than either, 
the refuse of all the gamblers, swindlers, and ruffians swarming down the 
Mississippi from every part of the Union. A desperado for whom Vicks¬ 
burg or Natchez-undcr-the-Hill had become too hot, but who had no taste 
for roughing it in Texas, looked to New Orleans as a temporary refuge. 
This floating population, shifting from day to day, of which the census could 
take no account, numbered from 5000 to 10,000. 

New Orleans was a purely commercial city. It owed its being to the fact 
that it stood on the first tolerably firm patch of land above the mouths of 
the Mississippi. The resident population were at first loth to imperil their 
interests by rushing into secession; but the controlling mass of aliens, who 
could lose nothing, and might hope to gain much by the overthrow of the 
Union, soon seduced or forced the indolent impetuous Creoles to their views. 
Secession became the fashion. No young man who cared to have a place 
in society dared to do other than volunteer for the Confederate army. The 
population of New Orleans was depleted by 30,000 of the flower of its youth. 
They were in every army of the Confederacy. 

When New Orleans found itself powerless before the fleet of Farragut, its 
population numbered about 140,000. It was made up of the poor who 
could not leave, of the scoundrels who would not leave, and of people who 
eared not whether they staid or left, so that they could have either security 
or profit, going or staying. The scoundrels of the city, known by the Hin¬ 
doo name of “ Thugs,” were those who thronged the streets, and with whom 
the Union commander had first to do. 

The city of New Orleans had been built upon commerce. Most of its in¬ 
dustrious population lived by trade. When the blockade from above and 
the blockade from below cut off all but the venturous trade of blockade-run¬ 
ning, great distress ensued. The demand for labor was almost extinct. 
There was barely thirty days’ provisions in the city. The ordinary sources 
of supply were cut off. No more flour came from Mobile, no more cattle 
from Texas, no more marketing from up the Mississippi and the fertile Red 
River country. The rich could hardly obtain food, for the markets were 
empty and provision-stores mostly closed. Prices rose enormously; a bar¬ 
rel of flour cost sixty dollars. Fifty thousand people were in danger of im¬ 
mediate starvation. The hot season was also at hand, and the appearance 
of yellow fever might reasonably be anticipated. Its last appearance as an 
epidemic was in 1853, when, out of the 30,000 unacclimated population, 
29,020 were attacked and 8101 died in three months, 5269 dyiog in the sin¬ 
gle month of August. 1 There was every thing in the sanitary condition of 
the city to render its appearance as an epidemic probable, and in that case 
the utter annihilation of the unacclimated Northern army was almost inev¬ 
itable. “You’ll never see home again!” “Yellow Jack will have you be¬ 
fore long!” yelled the mob, as the advance of Butler’s force marched into 
the city. 

1 See Alexander Walker, editor of Now Orleans Delta, in Harper's Magazine for November, 
1853; and J. Snowdon Pigott, M.D., ibid., June, 1857. 


[May, 1862 

The whole actual force of the army now under the command of Butler 
was about 14,000 men. Ship Island, Forts Jackson and St. Philip, Baton 
Rouge, and many posts on the lagoons, must be occupied and garrisoned. 
To hold New Orleans, with its hostile population of more than 100,000, he 
had at the outset barely 7000 men. Should the yellow fever appear, he 
would in a month have not one. The enemy had a considerable force in 
the neighborhood, which might at any moment attempt to dislodge him. 
Farragut’s fleet, indeed, commanded the city, but it could act only by de¬ 
stroying it. If the Confederates chose to make a Moscow of New Orleans, 
the army of occupation might be annihilated. Butler was not merely to 
hold the city, but to govern it. He could not deal with it as Davoust dealt 
with Hamburg, or as the British dealt with Delhi. It was to be treated as 
if it were in fact as well as in theory a city of the United States, with no se¬ 
verity or rigor which was not absolutely necessary to maintain the author¬ 
ity of the Union. 1 

Butler decided to make the St. Charles Hotel his temporary head-quarters. 
It was closed; but an entrance was effected, and a son of one of the propri¬ 
etors discovered. He could not give up the hotel to General Butler; should 
he do so, he would be shot before he could reach the next corner; waiters, 
cooks, and porters would not serve, cook, or carry for him; besides, there 
were no provisions in the market. These difficulties were quietly set aside. 
Butler would take the hotel; the.geueral and his attendants could, if need 
were, wait upon and cook for themselves; for food, they had become accus¬ 
tomed to army rations, and could live very well upon them. His head-quar¬ 
ters established, Butler sent to the mayor, informing him that he would be 
happy to meet him and the Common Council at two o’clock. The mayor, 
emboldened by the moderation displayed by Farragut, replied impudently 
that his place of business was in the City Hall, where he could be seen dur¬ 
ing office hours. He was courteously informed that such a reply would not 
be likely to satisfy the commanding general. Monroe finally concluded to 
accept the invitation to the St. Charles. At the appointed hour he made his 
appearance, accompanied by several friends, among 'whom, as counsel and 
mouthpiece, was Pierre Soule, a shrewd lawyer, fluent speaker, and unscru¬ 
pulous politician, of French birth, and- a great favorite among the Creoles. 
Nine years before he had been appointed by Pierce, the most unprincipled, 
and, after Buchanan, the feeblest of our presidents, minister to Spain. He 
was a member of the noted Ostend Conference. 

A cannon lrad’been placed at each corner of the hotel, around which was 
drawn up a regiment, commanded by General Williams. The open space 
around was filled by a dense mob, who gathered courage from the quiet de¬ 
meanor of the troops, and filled the air with bootings and execrations. Wil¬ 
liams sent an aid to inform Butler that he feared he could not control the 
mob. “ Then let him open upon them with artillery,” replied Butler. 
“Don’t do that!” shouted the mayor. “The mob must be controlled,” re¬ 
plied Butler; “we can’t have a disturbance in the streets.” “Shall I go 
out and speak to the people?” asked Monroe. “As you please,” answered 
Butler; “but order must be preserved in the public streets.” The speeches 
of the mayor and his friends quieted the mob for a time; but their rage 
broke out anew at the sight of a half company of soldiers escorting the loyal 
Judge Summers, once Recorder of New Orleans, to a place of safety in the 
Custom-house. The orders given to Lieutenant Kinsman, who commanded 
the squad of fifty men, were brief and emphatic: “If any one molests or 
threatens you, arrest him. If a rescue is attempted, fire.” The squad, drawn 
up in two lines, with a space between in which were the lieutenant and the 
judge, worked its way through the surging mob. Those nearest the sol¬ 
diers kept quiet; those behind them, sheltered by the quiet ones, yelled and 
hooted. Half the way from the St. Charles to the Custom-house was accom¬ 
plished without a collision. Then one of the noisiest of the crowd happened 
to be within reach. “ Halt!” ordered the lieutenant; “ bring out that man.” 
In an instant he was dragged between the lines, still screaming and shout¬ 
ing. “Stop your noise," was the sharp order. “I won’t,” was the reply. 
“ Sergeant, lower your bayonet. If another sound comes from that man’s 
mouth, run him through.” The man was as mute as a corpse. Once more 
on the way a similar scene was performed, with the same result. Their 
work accomplished, the squad marched back through a crowd as silent as a 
funeral. Nobody had been hurt; but the mob of New Orleans was cowed 
by the mere display of the force of the law embodied in one lieutenant and 
fifty men. 

The afternoon had worn away, and the conference between the general 
and the mayor was adjourned, to be resumed in the evening. Butler opened 
it by reading his proclamation, printed copies of which were given to the 
other side. The printing of this proclamation had cost a little trouble. The 
printer, who was desired to print it, could not think of doing so, nor should 
it be done in his office with his consent. In two hours a file of soldiers 
were drawn up before the building. Half a dozen of them entered the of¬ 
fice, laid down their muskets, and stepped quietly to the cases. The quick 
click of type was heard. In two hours more the proclamation was in type, 
proofs read, corrected, revised, and copies enough for present use worked off. 
Its purport was that the city of New Orleans was occupied by the forces of 
the United States, who had come to restore order under the laws and the 
Constitution. For the present—for the third time in its history—the city 
would be governed by martial law. No ensigns or flags except those of the 
United States, and of foreign consulates could appear. All citizens who 
should renew' their oath of allegiance to the United States would be fully 
protected. All who maintained their allegiance to the Confederate states 
wmuld be considered rebels and enemies. Those who had been in the serv- 

1 Parlon’s “ General Batler in New Orleans" furnishes full details of the administration of But- 
ler in New Orleans. 





BUTLER’S ADMINISTRATION AT NEW ORLEANS. 


273 


Mat, 1862.] 

ice of the Confederate States, who should give up their arms and return to 
peaceful avocations, would not be unnecessarily molested. Foreigners not 
naturalized would still enjoy the protection of the laws of the United States. 
The killing of any soldier would be considered as assassination; the owner 
of any house in which such act should be committed would be held respon¬ 
sible, and the house would be liable to be destroyed by military authority. 
All disorders, disturbances of the peace, and crimes of an aggravated char¬ 
acter interfering with the forces or laws of the United States, would be tried 
and punished by a military court; other misdemeanors would be subject to 
the municipal authorities, if they desired to act; civil cases would be tried 
by the ordinary tribunals. The circulation of Confederate bonds and scrip 
was prohibited; but, as Confederate current notes were the only money in 
the hands of the poorer classes, they might circulate, if any one would take 
them. If a soldier of the United States should commit any outrage upon 
person or property, he would be promptly punished, and full redress be 
made. Martial law would be enforced, mildly if possible, rigorously if nec¬ 
essary, so long as the authorities of the United States deemed proper. In 
brief, Butler wished to govern only the military forces, and sustain the gov¬ 
ernment of the United States against its enemies, leaving the authorities of 
the city in full exercise of their ordinary municipal and civil functions. 

Sould, still spokesman for the mayor, objected to the proclamation. It 
would give great offense, and the people would never submit to it. They 
were not conquered, and could not be expected to behave as a conquered 
people. The presence of the troops would irritate a high-spirited and sensi¬ 
tive people. The troops could have no peace while they remained. “ With¬ 
draw them,” he said, “ and leave the city government to manage its own af- 
fairs. If they remain, there will certainly be trouble.” Butler fldmed up at 
this. “ I did not expect,” he said, “ to hear a threat from Mr. Sould on this 
occasion. New Orleans is a conquered city. If not, why are we here? 
Have you welcomed us? Are we here by your consent? Would you not 
expel us if you could ? New Orleans has been conquered by the forces of 
the United States, and by the laws of nations lies subject to the will of the 
conquerors. I have proposed to leave to the municipal government the free 
exercise of all its powers, and I am answered by a threat.” 

Sould disclaimed any intention of threatening the troops, but had merely 
stated what he thought would be the consequence of their remaining. But¬ 
ler replied that he would gladly take every one of his soldiers from the city, 
as soon as it could be shown that the city government had rendered it pos¬ 
sible for him to ride alone, without insult or danger, from one end of the 
city to another. But the events of the afternoon had proved that the city 
authorities were unable to control the mob. Lovell himself had been forced 
to proclaim martial law to protect peaceable citizens against the rowdies. 
“I know,” he concluded, “more about your city than you think. I know 
that this hour there is an organization established for the purpose of assas¬ 
sinating my men by detail. But I warn you that, if a shot is fired from any 
house, that house«will never again cover a mortal’s head; and if I can dis¬ 
cover the perpetrator of the deed, the place that now knows him shall know 
him no more forever. I have the power to suppress this unruly element in 
your midst, and I mean so to use it that, in a very short period, I shall be 
able to ride through the entire city free from insult and danger, or else this 
metropolis of the South shall be a desert from the plains of Chalmette to the 
outskirts of Carrolton.” 1 

The discussion was continued, but Butler was immovable. The mayor 
declared that the functions of the city government should be at once sus¬ 
pended, and the general could act his pleasure. This was objected to by 
others, and it was finally agreed that the City Council should deliberate upon 
the matter, and announce their decision the next day. They decided that 
the city government should continue to exercise its usual functions, but re¬ 
quested that the troops should be withdrawn from the vicinity of the Court¬ 
house, so that there might be no appearance that the authorities were acting 
under military compulsion. The request was more than complied with. 
The camps within the city were one by one broken up. Some of the troops 
established a permanent camp at Carrolton, on the outskirts; others were 
posted across the river at Algiers; others garrisoned the abandoned forts 
on the lagoons. A full brigade was sent to occupy Baton Rouge, of which 
possession had been taken by Commander Palmer, of the Iroquois, belong¬ 
ing to Farragut’s fleet. 2 When all these dispositions had been made there 
remained in New Orleans itself only 250 men, who were posted in the Cus¬ 
tom-house, and served merely as a provost guard. Butler had resolved to 
try a conciliatory policy, confining himself solely to his strictly military func¬ 
tions, leaving the internal government of the city to the municipal authori¬ 
ties, aided, if necessary, by the European brigade, who had been requested to 
continue their organization. How ill this mild policy succeeded will soon 
appear; but under it the city for a few days enjoyed a tranquillity to which 
it had long been a stranger. 


1 Parton’s “Butler in New Orleans,” p. 206. 

* The proceedings at Baton Rouge were, on a small scale, similar to those at New Orleans. The 
body of the fleet had passed up the river without stopping. On the 8th of May the Iroquois an¬ 
chored off the town, and the commander sent a note to the mayor demanding that the town 
should be surrendered; the flag of the United States be hoisted on the Arsenal; the property of 
.the Confederate states to remain intact, and be delivered over when demanded; the rights and 
property of citizens to be respected. The mayor and selectmen replied that the city of Baton 
Rouge would not be surrendered voluntarily to any power on earth ; hut it was without military 
force, and had no means of defense. Its occupation would be without the consent and against the 
wish of the pfenceable inhabitants. The city had no control over the Arsenal, except for the pur¬ 
pose of preserving the buildings since its evacuation, and it could not be expected to surrender it, 
or exercise any act which would be offensive to the sensibilities of the people, by hoisting the flag 
of the United States. Palmer did not wait to bandy messages, but sent a few men ashore, took 
possession of the Arsenal and barracks, and hoisted the Union flag without opposition. He then 
sent a note to the mayor telling him what he had done, and warning him that, although he had 
left no force on shore to protect it, the flag must not be molested ; adding, significantly, “The rash 
act of some individual may cause your city to pay a bitter penalty.” 


This quiet interval gave Butler an opportunity to provide against the 
famine and pestilence with which New Orleans was threatened. The ques¬ 
tion of food was the most pressing. There was at Mobile a quantity of flour 
purchased by the city for the subsistence of its citizens; a safe-conduct was 
to be given to steam-boats to come and return, conveying this flour. The 
Opelousas Railroad was authorized and required to run trains to bring pro¬ 
visions into the city. At the junction of the Mississippi and Red Rivers 
were large quantities of cattle, flour, and other provisions purchased for the 
subsistence of the city; a safe-conduct was granted to two steamers each day 
to bring these to New Orleans. The city authorities were to appoint an 
agent to superintend these transportations, the faith of the city being pledged 
that no aid or intelligence should be conveyed to the Confederates. 1 The 
orders which gave these privileges were drawn up on the suggestion of the 
city authorities. The faith of the city, solemnly pledged, was throughout 
deliberately and persistently abused. Under cover of it provisions were 
sent to Lovell’s troops, and most important information was regularly fur¬ 
nished to the Confederate authorities. A small but scandalous case was that 
of Charles Heidseck. He was a Frenchman, a member of the firm whose 
Champagne bottles are known all over the world. He had come to Amer¬ 
ica to look after the business of his house, and had for some time been a res¬ 
ident of Mobile. When the order appeared authorizing boats to convey 
flour from Mobile to New Orleans, he went on board as bar-tender. In this 
capacity he made several trips, conveying letters and information. He was 
finally detected, arrested, and sent to Fort Jackson. “I arrested him as a 
spy,” wrote Butler; “ I confined him as a spy; I should have tried him as 
a spy; and would have hanged him, upon conviction, as a spy, if I had not 
been interfered with by the government at Washington.” After some 
months of confinement the Champagne dealer was released, and suffered to 
return unhung to France. 

Food began to come in from all these sources. Butler contributed a thou¬ 
sand dollars to feed the poor.' Much beef and sugar intended for the rebels 
in the field had been captured. A thousand barrels of this were distributed 
without charge. Supplies came from New York exceeding the wants of the 
army. The commissary was authorized to sell the surplus to families at 
cheap rates: flour, seven and a half cents a pound; salt meats, ten; “ citj 
bank-notes, gold, silver, or United States treasury notes to be taken in pay¬ 
ment.” All this brought down the market price of provisions. Flour fell 
in a few days from sixty to twenty-four dollars. Those who had or could 
get money other than Confederate paper need not starve. But more than a 
third of the population had no money or means of earning it To find work 
for these, and the means of paying the laborers, came up in a short time. 

The city was reeking with the filth accumulated for weeks, forming a train 
for the yellow fever whenever a chance spark from the tropics should be at 
hand to fire it. The authorities had undertaken to clean the streets. They 
neglected to do so. Butler, on the 9th of May, sharply reminded them of 
their neglect. “You have assumed this work,” he said, “and it must be 
performed. The present suspension of labor furnishes ample supplies of 
hungry men who can be profitably employed to this end. Three days since I 
called the attention of the mayor to this subject, and nothing has been done.” 
The mayor averred that he had set 300 men at work upon the streets; but 
not a man of them could be discovered. Butler put forth a general order 
inveighing sharply against the conduct of the city authorities, and of the 
wealthy leaders of the rebellion, who had gotten up the war, and were en¬ 
deavoring to prosecute it, without regard to the starving poor. “ They have 
betrayed their country; they have been false to every trust; they can not 
protect those whom they have ruined, but have left them to the mercies of 
a chronic mob; they will not feed those whom they are starving. The 
United States have sent forces here to fight and subdue rebellious armies in 
array against their authority. We find substantially only fugitive masses, 
runaway property-burners, a whisky-drinking mob, and starving citizens 
with their wives and children. It is our duty to call back the first, punish 
the second, root out the third, feed and protect the last.” 

The male mob of New Orleans had been cowed by the mere fear of artil¬ 
lery and bayonets; but there was a female mob, composed mainly of the 
wives and daughters of the upper classes, who could not thus be reached. 
Protected by the immunities of their sex, they embraced every opportunity 
of insulting the Union troops. They flaunted secession colors upon their 
dresses, they sung secession songs, and thrummed secession tunes upon their 
pianos. If a body of soldiers passed the balconies where they were stand¬ 
ing, they would turn their backs contemptuously. If they met a Union of¬ 
ficer on the pave, they would sweep aside their dresses as if to avoid defile¬ 
ment, and turn into the middle of the street with insulting words and ges¬ 
tures. If a Union officer entered a street car or a church pew, these women 
would leave in a body. These annoyances, petty in themselves, grew to be 
unendurable. The climax was reached when a woman deliberately spat in 
the faces of two officers who were quietly walking in the street. Butler re¬ 
solved to put a stop to these insults, and to do it not by the exercise of mil¬ 
itary power, but simply by carrying into effect an old and well-known mu¬ 
nicipal law of the city. By this a prostitute plying her vocation in the 
street was liable to be arrested, confined over night in the calaboose, brought 
in the morning before a magistrate, and fined five dollars. What constituted 
plying this vocation in public? pimply that a woman openly and obtru¬ 
sively endeavored to attract the attention of strange men. For this purpose 
opprobrious epithets and insulting gestures are used as often as smiles and 
blandishments. Thereupon, on the 15th of May, was issued the famous 
General Order No. 28. The result in New Orleans itself was precisely what 


‘ General Orders, May 4,1862. 











274 


[May, 1862. 


was intended. Women who had grossly insulted soldiers and officers, know¬ 
ing that their sex shielded them from personal resentment, and who would 
have courted military arrest and formal trial as a kind of martyrdom, shrank 
back from the prospect of the calaboose and the police court. Not a single 
arrest w r as made under the order. There was no occasion for one. The 
threat of the calaboose and the police court did for the women what the 
mere threat of cannon-shot and bayonet-thrust had done for the men. 1 

In New Orleans the import of the order was thoroughly understood. Be¬ 
yond the city, where the municipal law upon which it was based was un¬ 
known, it was misunderstood and misrepresented. It was interpreted to 
give up the women of New Orleans to violence and outrage. Rewards were 
offered at the South for the assassination of Butler. In the British Parlia¬ 
ment, Lord Palmerston denounced it as “infamous.” Punch, the represent¬ 
ative of British sentiment, compared Butler with Nena Sahib. The Secre¬ 
tary of State admitted to the English charge that he “regretted that, in the 
haste of composition, a phraseology which could be mistaken or perverted 
had been used.” This admission was correct in substance. Ten words ex¬ 
plaining that each offending female was,“in strict accordance with the mu¬ 
nicipal law of New Orleans,” to be regarded “as a woman of the town ply¬ 
ing her avocation,” would have obviated all chance of misconstruction or 
misrepresentation. 

This order was the occasion, not the cause, of the deposition of the mu¬ 
nicipal government. Two weeks’ trial had demonstrated that the govern¬ 
ment of New Orleans could not be administered conjointly by two authori¬ 
ties so utterly hostile in aim as the Union general and the Confederate may¬ 
or and council. The city authorities not only neglected to perform the du¬ 
ties which they had undertaken, but they undertook to perform offensive 
acts beyond their sphere. A French armed vessel, supposed to be the pre¬ 
cursor of a large fleet, was in the river. The Common Council offered the 
hospitalities of the port to this fleet, the offer being couched in terms offen¬ 
sive to the Union. Butler rebuked them sharply. Your action, he said,is 
an insult both to the United States and to France. The tender of hospital¬ 
ities by a government to which only police duties and sanitary regulations 
are intrusted, is simply an invitation to the calaboose and the hospital. The 
United States authorities are the only ones here capable of dealing with for¬ 
eign nations. “The action of the city council in this behalf must be re¬ 
vised.” This was on the day when Order No. 28 was published. When 
that order appeared, the mayor sent to Butler a letter written by his clerk, 
and signed by himself, protesting against the order. lie could not suffer it 
to be promulgated without protest. Union officers and soldiers were by it 
allowed to place what construction they pleased upon the conduct of the 
women of New Orleans. He would not be responsible for the peace of the 
city while this order, which had “aroused the passions of the people, and 
must exasperate them to a degree beyond control,” and was “a reproach to 
the civilization, not to say the Christianity of the age,” was in force. But¬ 
ler at once issued an order suspending the mayor, and ordering his commit¬ 
tal to Fort Jackson. Before the order was executed, an interview was grant¬ 
ed. Butler said the letter was insulting. The mayor protested that he had 
not meant to insult the general; he only wished to vindicate the virtuous 
ladies of New Orleans. The general expounded the order, showing that it 
could refer only to those whose conduct evinced that they were not virtu¬ 
ous. The mayor averred that be was perfectly satisfied, and asked to with¬ 
draw his offensive letter. Butler wrote an indorsement, which Monroe 
signed, and was relieved from arrest. 2 In a few hours the mayor sent a note 
asking to withdraw his withdrawal. This was on Saturday. The mayor 
reiterated his request on Sunday, but was told that this was not a business 
day; on Monday his affair would receive attention. lie came on Monday, 
accompanied by a half score of friends and advisers. Butler, meanwhile, had 
received information which determiued him to make short work. Each of 
the mayor’s friends was asked whether he sanctioned the offensive letter. 
The mayor and three others who avowedly sanctioned it were sent to Fort 
Jackson ; the others were discharged. Pierre Soule, the mouthpiece of se¬ 
cession in the city, was also arrested, and sent to Fort Warren, in Boston 
Harbor. In a few weeks, however, he was released at the request of Butler, 
upon his parole not to return to New Orleans, nor to commit or advise any 
act hostile to the United States. 

The city government was suppressed, and the work of governing New 
Orleans was intrusted to General Shepley. On the 20th of May he issued a 
notice saying that, “ in the absence of the late mayor,” he should “ for the 
present, and until such time as the citizens of New Orleans shall elect a loy¬ 
al citizen of the United States as mayor of the city, discharge the functions 
which have hitherto appertained to that office.” Ample protection was as¬ 
sured to all peaceable citizens; any outrage committed by or upon soldiers 
would be punished; all city ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of 
the United States or with the general orders of the commanding general 
would be continued in force; all legal contracts made by or with the city 
authorities would be held inviolate. Captain Jonas II. French was appoint¬ 
ed provost marshal, with the general functions of chief of police, and Major 
Joseph M.Bcll provost judge, to try all charges of violation of municipal or 
national laws. 

Four things claimed the immediate attention of the new government: to 

* "Okm rai, Oilmen No. 2ft —As the officers and soldiers of the United States hnvc been sub¬ 
ject to repeated insults from tlie women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for 
the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter, when 
nnv female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier 
of the United States, she shall he regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town 
plying her avocation.'' 

'* The indorsement was in these words: “General Butler,—This communication having been 
sent under a mistake of fact, and being improper in language, I desire to apologize for the same, 
and to withdraw it." 




t.CuBi.i: V. SIU-I'M'.Y. 


supply food for the population; to furnish labor, so that the poor could pro¬ 
cure food; to provide a safe currency; and to guard against the yellow 
fever. 

Provisions soon began to appear in sufficient quantities to preclude the 
absolute necessity of famine. Dealers were at first disposed to close their 
stores, and it was necessary, for a few days, to order them to be kept open 
under penalty of a fine. The only currency in actual circulation consisted 
of “shinplasters,” car and omnibus tickets, and Confederate notes, the latter 
depreciated seventy per cent, in value. The banks had sent off their specie, 
but it was supposed that it could be recovered, and in that case they would 
be perfectly solvent. The banks were anxious to regain their funds. They 
asked Butler to give protection to the specie, if it could be recovered and 
brought back, promising to hold it in good faith to protect their bill-holders 
and depositors. Butler agreed to this, with the proviso that banks as well 
as individuals should restore all the property belonging to the United States 
which had come into their hands. “1 have come,” ho said,“to retake, re¬ 
possess, and occupy all and singular the property of the United States, of 
whatever name and nature. Farther than that I shall not go, save upon the 
most urgent military necessity, under whjch right every citizen holds all his 
possessions. Therefore, as safe-conducts may be needed for agents of banks 
to go and return with the property, these will be granted for a limited but 
reasonable period of time.” 1 No safe-conducts were required for thus pur¬ 
pose. Metnminger, the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury, wrote that 
“the coin of the banks of New Orleans was seized by the government to 
prevent its falling into the hands of the public enemy. It has been depos¬ 
ited in a place of security under the charge of the government; and it is not 
intended to interfere with the rights of property in the banks farther than 
to insure its safe custody. They may proceed to conduct their business in 
the Confederate States upon this deposit just as though it were in their own 
vaults.” 2 

To produce any thing like a redeemable currency the Confederate notes 
must be driven out. These had been allowed to circulate provisionally. A 
general order was issued 3 directing that neither the city nor any bank should 
exchange its obligations for Confederate notes, nor put out any obligation 
payable in such notes; and that after the expiration of ten days 4 all circula¬ 
tion of and trade in such notes should cease; that all sales thereafter made 
in consideration of such notes should be void, and any property thus sold 
would be confiscated, a quarter of the proceeds to go to the informer. Banks 
and bankers at once issued notices requiring all persons having deposits 
with them of Confederate notes to withdraw them at once, those not with¬ 
drawn “ to be at the risk of the owners;” that is, the banks, who had grown 
rich upon the traffic in these bills, now that they were worthless wished to 
throw the whole loss on the community. They had received them as money 
when they were supposed to be valuable, and wished to pay them out when 
they were mere waste paper. Butler promptly interposed. lie ordered 
that no incorporated bank or private banker should pay out any thing 
but specie, United States treasury notes, or the current bills of city banks.* 


1 May 14. - July 0. 3 May 1G. 4 That is, on the 27th of May. 

s Omni um. Order No. JO, May 10. 1802.—The following arc abbreviated extracts from this 
order . The hanks suspended specie payments, and then introduced Confederate notes ns currency, 
buying them at a discount, receiving them on deposit, paying them out, and collecting notes and 


















•Tune—July, 18G2.] 


BUTLER’S ADMINISTRATION AT NEW ORLEANS. 


275 



The Bank of Louisiana alone protested against this order, and endeavored 
to avoid compliance; but Butler had might as well as right on his side. lie 
was inflexible, and the bank, “ having no alternative but compliance,” yield¬ 
ed with the best grace in its power. Confederate notes and shinplasters dis¬ 
appeared, and were replaced by the currency of the United States, and by 
small notes issued by the city government. 

Soon after 1 an order appeared with which the banks had to do. Any 
person who had in his possession or under his control any property belong¬ 
ing to the “so-called Confederate States,” was required, under penalty of im¬ 
prisonment and confiscation of property, to give information concerning it. 
This order signified, among other things, that money deposited in any bank 
to the credit of the Confederacy had become the property of the Union, and 
must be surrendered. The Citizens’ Bank reported that the Treasurer of 
the Confederate States had upon its books a credit of §219,000. It proposed 
to pay over this sum in Confederate notes. Moreover, there were on de¬ 
posit in the bank to the credit of various Confederate receivers §215,000; 
this, the bank thought, was to be considered a special deposit, which should 
be paid in the same currency in which it was received. Butler would not 
accede to this view of the case, and ordered that the latter sum should be 
paid at once in gold, silver, or United States currency. For various reasons, 
he would refer the former sum to the government for adjudication; but the 
bank must, in the mean time, hold the notes as a special deposit, and also 
keep a like amount of bullion to await the decision. 2 Nearly a quarter of a 

drafts in them as money, thus giving them currency and circulation. Now that the re-establish¬ 
ment of the authority of the United States rendered this paper worthless, the batiks wished to 
throw the loss upon their creditors, depositors, and bill-holders. They refused to receive them, 
while they continued to pay them out; they required their depositors to take them ; they changed 
the obligation of contracts by stamping their own bills “redeemable in Confederate notes;” they 
invested the savings of labor and the pittance of the widow in this paper, while they sent away 
their specie, so that the people could have nothing but these notes; while all other property had 
become nearly valueless, hank stocks were selling at great premiums, and stockholders were re¬ 
ceiving large dividends. To equalize the loss, and have it fall, in part at least, where it ought, the 
order prescribing the medium by which payments were to he made was issued. Moreover, nil per¬ 
sons who had issued “shinplasters” were required to redeem them in current funds, under pen¬ 
alty of confiscation and sale of property for the purpose of redemption, or, in lack of this, of im¬ 
prisonment at hard labor. 

} General Order No. 40; June 6. 

8 Extracts from Butler's Reply to the Bank , Jan. 13, 1862.—“The report finds that there 
is to the credit of the Confederate States $219,090 94. This is, of course, due in presenti from 
♦he bank. The bank claims that it holds an equal amount of Confederate treasury notes, and 
desires to set off these notes against the amount so due. This can not be permitted. Confed¬ 
erate treasury notes arc not due till six months after the conclusion of a treaty of j>caec between 
the Confederate States and the United States. When that time comes it will be in season to set 
off such claims. The United States being entitled to the credits due the Confederate States in the 
bank, that amount must be paid in money or valuable property. I can not recognize the Confed¬ 
erate notes as cither money or property. The bank having done so by receiving them, issuing 
their banking upon them, loaning upon them, thus giving them credit to the injury of the United 
States, is estopped to deny their value. But there arc other considerations which may apply to 
this item: only the notes of the Confederate States were deposited bv the treasurer in the bank, 
and by the order of the ruling authority then here the hank was obliged to receive them. In equi¬ 
ty and good conscience the Confederate States could call for nothing more than they had compelled 
the bank to take. The United States succeed to the rights of the Confederate, States, and should 
only take that which the Confederate States ought to take. But the United States, not taking or | 


million of dollars was thus recovered from the banks, and paid over to tho 
treasury of the L nited States. “ This,” said Butler, “-will make a fund upon 
which those whose property has been confiscated may have claim." 

Soon 1 came another order which concerned individuals as well as corpo¬ 
rations. It ordered that all sums clue to any citizen of the Lrnited States 
which had been in any way sequestered by the ordinances of the Confeder¬ 
ate States, 2 or by those of Louisiana, were to be paid over to the lawful own¬ 
ers. Not a few debts due to American citizens were thus recovered. Amoiw 
those affected by this order was John G. Cocks, a judge at New Orleans. In 
1860 he had bought a score and a half of slaves from Major Anderson, for 
which he had given his notes. A mouth affer the fall of Fort Sumter, 
Cocks put forth in a New Orleans paper an insulting letter, addressed to 
“ Major Kobort Anderson, late of Fort Sumter," in which he said that these 
notes would, never be paid. Butler took possession of the large estates of 
Cocks, who had fled from New Orleans, holding them as security for the 
liquidation of Anderson’s claim. 

In a few weeks provisions had poured into New Orleans in sufficient 
quantities to obviate a famine; but the laboring classes were without means 
to purchase, and the filthy condition of the streets invited pestilence. The 
poor must be fed, and the streets must bo cleaned. It appeared to Butler 
that these two objects might be combined. lie accordingly proposed 3 to 
the military commandant and city council that the city should employ 2000 
men, to each of whom should be paid fifty cents a day by the city, tho Unit¬ 
ed States also issuing to each laborer a full soldier’s ration, worth quite as 
much, and sufficient for the subsistence of a man and a woman. This sug¬ 
gestion was accepted; the force was placed under the charge of Colonel T. 
B. Thorpe, a native of New York, who had for many years resided in Lou¬ 
isiana. The work thus undertaken was well done. The accumulated filth 
of months was purged away, and the city placed in a better sanitary condi¬ 
tion than it had known for years. Moreover, the changes of the river con¬ 
stantly create new lands within the city limits. This new land, known as 

recognizing Confederate notes, can only leave them with the bank, to be held by it hereafter in spe¬ 
cial deposit as so much worthless paper.” 

How far these considerations applied to the case of the sums deposited by the Confederate treas¬ 
urer was left to the decision of the government; but the bank was required to give security fur 
payment in case the decision should be against it. But the decision of Butler in case of the de¬ 
posits made by Confederate receivers was clear and definite. He said : 

“The several deposits of the officers of the supposed Confederate States were received in the 
usual course of business; were doubtless, some of them, perhaps largely, received in Confederate 
notes, hut, for the reason above stated, can only be paid to the United States in its own constitu¬ 
tional currency. These are. in no sense of language, ‘special deposits.’ They were he ld in gen¬ 
eral account, went into the funds of the bank, were paid out in the discounts of the hank, and, if 
called upon to-dav for the identical notes put info the hank, which is the only idea of a special de¬ 
posit, the hank would he utterly unable to produce them. As well might my private banker, with 
w horn I have deposited my neighbor’s check or draft ns money, which has lxtcn received as monev, 
and paid out ns money, months afterward, when my neighbor has become bankrupt, buy up other 
of his checks and drafts at a discount, and pay them to me, upon the ground that I had made a 
‘special deposit.’” 

1 July 9. 3 For which, sec ante, p. 212. 3 June 4. 



















276 


batture or “shoal,” is at first a mere mud-bank, and requires to be protected 
from the water before it is available as property. By well-directed labor, 
batture worth a million of dollars was in a few months added to the city 
property. 

The cleansing of the streets and canals was not alone an adequate safe¬ 
guard against the yellow fever. Butler had adopted the theory that this 
pestilence is indigenous in no region where there is frost every winter. 
Wherever there is great summer heat acting upon decaying vegetable and 
animal matter, the fever may spread. This forms the train ready for explo¬ 
sion, but it must be fired from abroad. New Orleans furnishes every con¬ 
dition for the spread of the disease when once introduced. 1 To prevent the 
introduction of this spark, a vigorous and judicious quarantine was estab¬ 
lished. The duration of this was in each case left to the discretion of the 
health-officer. His instructions were to detain a vessel as long as he thought 
necessary to protect the city, whether the time were one day or a hundred. 
A vessel loaded with hides and wool, its hold reeking with dead and putrid 
matter, was not placed on an equality with a steamer carrying only passen¬ 
gers and merchandise not likely to absorb and generate contagion. The 
rule was simply that any vessel should be kept in quarantine just sf> long 
as the health-officer deemed necessary to secure the city from infection. 
For a few days there was an alarm. One man, who had come on a steamer 
which had touched at Nassau, was seized by the disease. The house was 
cleared of all persons except an acclimated attendant, and the whole block 
guarded by sentinels. The man died; every article in his room was burned 
or buried; his attendant was quarantined; the whole quarter of the city 
was cleaned and fumigated. This, was the sole case of yellow fever in New 
Orleans during the summer of 1862. 

Food sufficient to obviate the absolute peril of famine had been brought 
to New Orleans. Labor sufficient to feed 4000 persons was furnished; 
but there were ten times as many whose ordinary means of livelihood had 
been cut off. These must be cared for; and in a few weeks there were 
35,000 persons, nearly a quarter of the population, fed from the public funds. 
Butler considered that this great burden ought to be made to fall, as far as 
possible, upon those who had been most active in bringing starvation upon 
the poor and helpless. A loan of a million and a quarter of dollars had 
been made by various corporations and individuals, and placed in the hands 
of a “Committee of Public Safety” for the defense of New Orleans. The 
subscriptions were in sums varying from a few thousand to more than two 
hundred thousand dollars. The subscribers to this loan showed that they 
had means to pay largely for the support of their starving neighbors. But¬ 
ler 2 ordered a sum equal to one quarter of their subscriptions to be paid by 
each of these persons. This produced more than $300,000. Moreover, 
about a hundred cotton-brokers, the leading commercial men in New Or¬ 
leans, had published a circular urging planters not to bring their produce 
to the city. Butler, by the same order, assessed a fine of from $100 to $500 
upon each of these. Under this order nearly $350,000 was received, which 
was set apart as “ a fund for the purpose of providing employment and food 
for the deserving poor.” From this fund a thousand men were to be paid 
to work on the streets and canals. Each was to receive a dollar and a half 
a day, the wages which had been paid for labor on the fortifications; the 
rations heretofore issued by the United States to these laborers being dis¬ 
continued. This fund was exhausted early in December, and one of the 
last acts of Butler 3 was to impose another assessment of a like amount upon 
the same parties. 

Meanwhile William B. Mumford, the man who had hauled down the flag 
from the Mint, had remained in New Orleans. He appeared in public, 
boasting of his deed, and defying the authorities to molest him. He was 
apprehended, brought before a military commission, tried, and condemned 
to death. While this was going on, it was discovered that a number of 
men had organized themselves into a military company, under the name of 
the “Monroe Guard,” with the purpose of breaking through the lines and 
joining the Confederate army. Among these were six soldiers who had 
been paroled at Fort Jackson. These were arrested and condemned to 
death, under the recognized laws of war. Strenuous efforts were made to 
procure their pardon. In these many of the Union men of the city joined. 
It was represented that they were ignorant men, who were totally unaware 
of the nature of their act. One of them, when brought before the commis¬ 
sion, declared that he did not know any thing about paroling. “ Paroling,” 
he said, simply, “ is for officers and gentlemen; we are not gentlemen.” 
Butler yielded to the urgent petitions for mercy. To one of these he re¬ 
plied: “You, who have exerted your talents to save the lives of Union 
men in their hour of peril, ought to have a determining weight when your 
opinions have been deliberately formed. You ask for the lives of these 
men. You shall have them. You say that the clemency of the govern¬ 
ment is best for the cause we all have at heart. Be it so. You are likely 
to be better informed upon this than I am. But if this example of mercy 
is lost upon those in the same situation, swift justice can overtake others in 
like manner offending.” The men were reprieved and sent to Ship Island. 
But the reprieve of these six rendered it impossible to spare Mumford. To 
pardon him would be judged by the mob as a confession of weakness. But¬ 
ler firmly resisted all entreaties. One venerable man, one of the noblest in 


1 “Lying upon a low alluvial plain, below the level of the Mississippi River at high water, it is 

surrounded by extensive undrained swamps, and has itself been reclaimed from a marsh. Its rich 

alluvial soil contains great quantities of vegetable mould, and is so damp that water can be ob¬ 

tained any where at the depth of a few feet. There are a number of cemeteries within the city 

limits which greatly taint the air. The drainage is imperfect, and the scavenger duty verv badlv 

performed. The open lots are also sources of disease, being the receptacle of the offal of the sur¬ 

rounding houses.”— Dr. 1'igott, in Harper's Magazine, June, 1857. 

8 General Order No. 55, August 4. a December 9. 


[June—August, 1862. 

the city, begged for mercy. “Give me this man’s life,” he prayed; “it is 
but a scratch of your pen.” “ True,” .replied Butler; “ but a scratch of my 
pen could burn New Orleans. I could do the one act as soon as the other. 
I think one would be as wrong as the other.” Mumford was hung on the 
7th of July: a tall, black-bearded man, aged forty-two, rather prepossessing 
in appearance, a gambler by profession. He met his fate with composure. 
He said that the act for which he was condemned was committed under ex¬ 
citement, and he did not think that he was suffering justly. The Confeder¬ 
ates endeavored to elevate Mumford to the rank of a martyr. His execu¬ 
tion formed a leading part of the charge in virtue of which Jefferson Davis' 
declared Butler to be an outlaw, who was to be hung at once in case he 
was captured. The execution was justified by every law of war, and de¬ 
manded by the exigencies of the times. It effectually subdued the mob, 
which otherwise would need to have been quelled by cannon and the bay¬ 
onet. 

No other military execution took place at New Orleans, except those of a 
gang of scoundrels who committed robbery and theft under the pretense of 
being Union officers. Early in June there were complaints that men wear¬ 
ing the Federal uniform, claiming authority to search for concealed arms, had 
repeatedly entered houses, and had gone off carrying with them valuable 
property. A flagrant case of this kind occurred on the 11th. The next 
day one of the perpetrators was detected. He betrayed his accomplices, two 
of whom were arrested on the 12th, and three more on the 13th. All were 
tried, convicted, and ordered to be executed on the 16th. They were Wil¬ 
liam M. Clary, George William Crage, late officers on board Union vessels; 
Frank Newton, a private in a Connecticut regiment; and Stanislaus Roy 
and Theodore Leib, residents of New Orleans. Leib was a mere boy, and 
his punishment was commuted, as was that of the informer. The others 
were promptly hung just five days after the commission of their crime. 

At the close of June reports reached New Orleans of disasters to the Fed¬ 
eral armies in Virginia. These came by telegraph over Southern lines, 
and were greatly exaggerated. The spirits of the Confederate sympathizers 
rose. Fidel Keller, a bookseller, procured a skeleton from a medical stu¬ 
dent, and exposed it in his window, labeled “ Chickahominy,” intending 
that the bones should be taken by the populace to be those of a Union sol¬ 
dier slain b'efo'rfe Richmond. John W. Andrews displayed in club-rooms 
and other public places a cross, which he declared to have been made from 
the bones of a Union soldier. These offenders were sent for two years to 
Ship Island. Lieutenant De Kay, a gallant young officer, had been fatally 
wounded by guerrillas while descending the Mississippi. After a month, 
he died on the 27th of June. His funeral took place the next day at an 
Episcopal church, where Leacock, the rector, an Englishman by birth, had 
promised to perform the rites of the Church. He failed to be present; but 
the sacred edifice was filled by a gang made up of the scum of the rabble, 
whose conduct was scandalous beyond description, and the solemn rites 
were hastily hurried over. The funeral procession was mocked and insult¬ 
ed as it passed along the streets. The most prominent among the insulters 
was a woman named Phillips, the wife of Philip Phillips, a native of Charles¬ 
ton, educated in Vermont and Connecticut, subsequently a member of the 
South Carolina Nullification Convention of 1832. He emigrated to Ala¬ 
bama, whence he was sent to Congress in 1853. At the close of his term 
he declined a re-election, and took up his residence in Washington. His 
wife was one of the leaders of fashion in the national capital during the ad¬ 
ministration of Buchanan. She was one of a clique of traitresses who, from 
their supposed influence in political matters, were popularly known as the 
“ boudoir cabinet.” She was exiled from the Union, and went to New Or¬ 
leans, where she made herself notorious as an advocate of the Confederates. 
Her conduct at the funeral of De Kay exhausted the measure of Butler’s 
forbearance. He ordered that she should be sent to Ship Island. 2 She was 
in a few weeks released and sent to Mobile. 

The population of New Orleans, native and foreign, might be fairly di¬ 
vided into two main classes—Union men and rebels. Six weeks after the 
occupation of the city, Butler concluded that it was necessary, as a public 
exigency, “ to distinguish between those who were well disposed to the 
government of the United States and those who still held allegiance to the 
Confederate States.” He therefore directed 3 * * that every person claiming to 
exercise any official function, military or civil, should take the oath “ to bear 
true faith and allegiance to the United'States of America, and to support 
the Constitution thereof.” Every official act performed by persons failing 
to take this oath within five days was to be null and void. All persons 
also, who had been citizens of the United States, who desired any right, fa¬ 
vor, or privilege beyond mere protection from personal violence, must take 
the oath before their request could even be heard. Every person born in 
the United States, and every person of foreign birth who had resided there¬ 
in for five years, and who had not claimed and received protection from the 
consul of his own government, was declared to be a citizen within the mean¬ 
ing of this order. Every alien was required to take an oath that “ So long 
as my government remains at peace with the United States, I will do no act, 
or consent that any be done, or conceal any that has been or is about to be 

1 Proclamation of Dec. 23, 1862; sec ante , p. 219. 

2 “ Mrs. Phillips, wife of Philip Phillips, having been once imprisoned for her traitorous pro¬ 

ceedings and acts in Washington, and been released by the clemency of the government, and hav¬ 
ing been found training her children to spit upon officers of the United States at New Orleans, for 
which act of one of those children both her husband and herself apologized, and were again for¬ 
given, is now found on the balcony of her house during the passage of the funeral procession of 
Lieutenant De Kay, laughing and mocking at his remains; and upon being inquired of by the 
commanding general if this fact were so, contemptuously replies, ‘ I was in good spirits that day : 
It is therefore ordered that she be not regarded and treated as a common woman of whom no of¬ 
ficer or soldier is bound to take notice, but as an uncommon, bad, and dangerous woman, stirring 
up strife and inciting to riot, and that therefore she be confined at Ship Island,” etc.— Butler's 
Order , June 30,1862. 8 General Order No. 41, June 10b 





FEEDING THE POOH AT NEW ORLEANS. 


June—August, 1862.] 


BUTLER’S ADMINISTRATION AT NEW ORLEANS. 


277 




























































































































































































































































278 


done, that shall aid or comfort any of the enemies or opposers of the United 
States.” There were also in the city many thousands who had served in 
the Confederate army. To them the option was given either to take the 
oath, or to surrender themselves as prisoners of war, to be paroled until reg¬ 
ularly exchanged, or to be put in confinement, as they might choose. The 
members of the Common Council, who had up to this time acted as the leg¬ 
islative power in the city, refused to take the oath, and their functions were 
suspended “ until such*time as there shall be a sufficient number of the cit¬ 
izens of New Orleans loyal to their country and their Constitution to enti¬ 
tle them to resume the right of self-government” 1 Nearly a half of the 
score of foreign consuls at New Orleans united in a protest against the oath 
required by this order. Their protest was sharply worded. Its substance 
was, that some persons of foreign birth, in order to receive protection, were 
required not merely to swear allegiance to the United States, but also not 
to “conceal” any acts done against the government. Butler rejoined with 
greater sharpness. If a foreigner wished to enjoy the privileges accorded 
to American citizens, let him take the oath of allegiance. If he did not 
choose to do this, but wished to remain a neutral, let him take the oath to 
do nothing to aid the enemies of the United States. If he wished to do 
neither, but was content to remain with mere protection from personal vio¬ 
lence, let him “be quiet, and keep away from his consul.” If he did not 
like any of these conditions, let him take himself away—the sooner the better 
for all parties. This reply concluded with an admonition that the foreign 
consuls, as a body, should present no more argumentative protests against 
his orders. This was no part of their duties or their rights. If any one of 
them had any suggestion to offer, he could easily learn the proper mode. 
Butler could not, however, refrain from one bit of grim humor. The French 
legion had been required to take an oath to “defend the Constitution of the 
State and the Confederate States,” without any protest from the French con¬ 
sul. Butler modified the oath required of foreigners so as to correspond 
with this, merely inserting the words “Constitution of the United States” 
instead of “Constitution of the State and of the Confederate States;” the 
oath, for the benefit of foreigners, being given in French as well as English. 2 

The consuls had no farther protest to offer upon this topic. But some 
months after it was reopened by the Reverend I)r. Leacock, the clergyman 
who had promised and then neglected to perform the funeral rites of De 
Kay. Some 12,000 persons had taken the citizens’ oath, 2500 the foreign 
neutrals’ oath, and more than 5000 Confederate officers and soldiers had 
given the required parole. Leacock was moved “to speak affectionately 
and candidly” to the Union general. lie had been “eating up God’s peo¬ 
ple as it were bread,” by inducing them to take oaths which they never in¬ 
tended to fulfill. The general was urged to “pause and consider his 
course,” to take “a very different course from that which he was pursu¬ 
ing.” The doctor had “great sympathy for the general,” and prayed that 
“God would give him grace to see his error, and sustain him in the dis¬ 
charge of his arduous and manifold duties.” Before the act of secession 
was performed Leacock had published a sermon, the concluding paragraph 
of which strongly urged secession. This was printed, and 30,000 copies 
had been sold. The doctor now said that this paragraph, printed from his 
own manuscript, was not actually delivered. In fact, he was, and always 
had been, a friend of the Union, in proof of which he adduced a paragraph 
of a sermon preached some weeks after the former one, in which the destruc¬ 
tion of the Union was earnestly deprecated. If this sermon was actually 
delivered at the time stated, it was a strange sequel to the one already pub¬ 
lished. 

A question had meanwhile come up which must be decided. The rubric 
of the Episcopal Church prescribed that prayers should be offered for the 
“President of the United States and all others in authority.” For this had 
been substituted, by direction of the bishop, Major General Polk, a prayer 
for the President of the Confederate States. After the occupation of New 
Orleans by the Union forces this could not clearly be done. When that 
part of the service was reached, the priest was wont to invite the congre¬ 
gation to spend a few moments in silent prayer. This at length came to 
be so notorious as to demand attention. Butler invited the prominent 
Episcopal clergymen to a conference. The question was whether they 
should offer the prescribed prayer for the President of the United States. 
Leacock endeavored to make a side issue. “ Your insisting upon the oath 
of allegiance is causing half of my flock to perjure themselves." “If that is 
the result of your preaching,” rejoined Butler, “the sooner you leave the 
pulpit the better.” “Are you going to shut up the churches?” “I am 
more likely to shut up the ministers.” The result was that Butler gave 
them the choice either to read the prayer for the President, omit the silent 
act of devotion, or leave New Orleans as prisoners of state. Leacock, and 
Goodrich and Fulton, much better men, refused to comply, and were sent 
North. Their churches were, however, kept open, service being performed 
by army chaplains, as laid down in the rubric. 

As a rule, every “ gentleman” of New Orleans wore a pistol or a knife as 

1 Order, June 27. 

3 Lxiract from General Order No. 42, July 9.—“The commanding general has received in¬ 
formation that certain of the foreign residents have scruples about taking the oath prescribed in 
General Order No. 41. Anxious to relieve the consciences of all who may honestly entertain 
doubts upon this matter, lie hereby revises the order so as to permit any foreign subject, at his 
election, to take and subscribe the following oath, instead of the oath as set forth. He is sure 
that no foreign subject can object to this oath, as it is in the very words of the oath taken by every 
officer of the European brigade, prescribed more than a year ago, and claimed as an aet of the 
strictest neutrality by the foreign officers taking it, and for more than a year passed by all the for¬ 
eign consuls without protest: 

“ ‘ I do "olemnly swear that I will, to the beat of my ability, support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United State* [the Constitution of the State and of the Confederate States]. So help me God.’ 

flit A DUCTION. ] 

*• * Jejare solennement, autant «iu*il pcm on moi, dr soutenir. de mainteDir, et de defendre la Constitution des ttate 
Uais [d« l'Etat et celle des Etats Confederacy Quo Dicu me eoit en aide.' " 


[June—September, 1862 . 

certainly as he did a bat or a coat. For a time Butler refrained from inter¬ 
fering with this local practice. But when Breckinridge, on the 5th of Au¬ 
gust, made his determined but unsuccessful attack upon Baton Rouge, 
among the Confederate killed and wounded were found citizens wearing 
their usual arms, who only the day before had mingled with the Union of¬ 
ficers, but who, on the approach of the Confederates, had hurried out to join 
them. Butler, on the representation of Weitzel, then resolved to disarm the 
population of New Orleans, and ordered that every private weapon, from a 
rifle to a dirk, should be given up, unless it were held by a written permit. 
The French consul remonstrated against the execution of this order, so far 
as it applied to French subjects. There were signs, he said, that the servile 
population meant to break the bonds which bound them to their masters, 
and they were only “partially kept in subjection by the conviction that 
their masters were armed, although their weapons were only such as could 
be used in self-defense.” Butler replied by showing that the professed neu¬ 
trality of rwuiy Frenchmen was not to be trusted. Few of them had taken 
the oath not to act against the United States. Bonnegras, the French con¬ 
sul at Baton Rouge, had been allowed to retain his arms, but his son was 
captured fighting against the Union. He could not see how arms which 
would serve for personal defense could not be used for offensive warfare. 
The fear that the blacks would wish to break the bonds which bound them 
to their masters was quite natural, since they, being an imitative race, would 
be quite likely to follow the example set them of rebellion against constitu¬ 
ted authorities; “but surely the representative of the emperor, who did not 
tolerate slavery in France, could not desire that his countrymen should be 
armed for the purpose of preventing the negroes from breaking their bonds.” 
But the United States could and would give better protection against out¬ 
rage, whether from white men or negroes, than could be furnished by any 
improvised citizens’ organization. Whenever the inhabitants of New Or¬ 
leans should by a united act show their loyalty or neutrality, he would be 
glad of their aid to keep the peace, and would even restore the city to them. 
But, until that was done, he should require the arms of all the inhabitants, 
white and black, to be under his control. 1 This order was followed by an¬ 
other offering specific rewards for the discovery of hidden weapons. Con¬ 
cealment being an overt act of rebellion, any slave giving information of 
such hiding by his master was to be emancipated. Moreover, any offense 
which might be lawfully resisted by arms, whether committed by whites 
or blacks, would be capitally punished. Men known to be in favor of the 
Union were allowed to retain their arms by special permission. Some se¬ 
cessionists doubtless kept their weapons; but for the practical purpose of 
aiding in the recapture of New Orleans, they were disarmed. 

The Confiscation Act 2 divided the rebels into two classes. The property 
of the first class, consisting mainly of high civil and military officials, was to 
be confiscated at once; that of the second class, comprising the great mass 
of the people, was liable to confiscation in case they did not return to their 
allegiance within sixty days after the issue of a proclamation to that effect. 
This proclamation was put forth on the 25th of July. One provision of this 
act made void all transfers of property made by rebels after the close of the 
sixty days of grace, which expired on the 23d of September. Disloyal cit¬ 
izens began to make nominal sales of their property to foreigners for the 
most paltry consideration. Before the passage of the Confiscation Act But¬ 
ler had assumed the responsibility of sequestrating the property of Twiggs 
and Slidell, taking the house of the former for his own head-quarters. 
Twiggs, displaced from his command at New Orleans, had fled on the ap¬ 
proach of the Union fleet, leaving behind him letters which showed that he 
had sought the command in Texas in order to betray his trust. He died, 
unregretted by friend or foe, soon after the capture of the city. 

Ten days before the expiration of the time of grace every neutral foreign¬ 
er was ordered to register himself, as it “ might soon become necessary to 
distinguish the disloyal from the loyal citizens and honest neutral foreign¬ 
ers residing in the department.” The day after the close of the period of 
grace, an order appeared pronouncing void every sale or contract, except 
for actual necessaries of life, made by any citizen who bad not returned to 
allegiance to the Union, and ordering every one who had not renewed his 
allegiance to report himself, with a description of all his property, actual or 
contingent, to the nearest provost marshal, whereupon he would receive a 
certificate showing him to be a registered enemy of the United States. Ev¬ 
ery householder was ordered, under severe penalties, to furnish a list of all the 
denizens of his house, giving their names, age, sex, and occupation. These 
lists furnished a complete record of the status of every resident of New Or¬ 
leans! It was added that every person who should within a week renew 
his allegiance to the United States, and remain truly loyal, would be recom¬ 
mended to the President for pardon for all previous offenses. 3 

The great slave question never came fairly before Butler for adjudication. 
His official instructions were silent on this point His private verbal in¬ 
structions were to the effect that the government had not been able to de¬ 
cide upon a comprehensive policy. The President, wisely resolved to take 
no step that must afterward be retraced, directed him, in his straightforward, 
homely phrase, to “ run the machine as he found it;” in other words, to raise 
no issues, and to meet those which presented themselves in such a way as 
to avoid censure from radicals or conservatives. Hence Butler gave little 
encouragement for slaves to leave their masters. But flagrant abuses were 
redressed; the jails were no longer permitted to be used as whipping-places 
for slaves; and, more than all,blacks were made equal with whites in the 
eye of the law. The decision which established this point was rendered al¬ 
most casually by Major Bell, the provost judge. A negro was called to the 

1 Butler to Count Mejan, August 14. a See ante, p. 198, 206. 

3 General Order No. 76, September 24. 





October, 1862.] 


BUTLER S ADMINISTRATION AT NEW ORLEANS. 


279 



witness-stand to testify against a white man. The defendants counsel ob¬ 
jected that, “ by the laws of Louisiana, a negro can not testify against a 


white man.” “ Has Louisiana gone out of the Union ?” asked Bell. “ Yes, 11 
responded the lawyer. “ Then,” rejoined Bell, “ she took her laws with her; 
let the man be sworn.” 

The formation of regiments of free colored men had, however, an import¬ 
ant though indirect bearing upon the question of slavery. The general gov¬ 
ernment, sadly bestead in Virginia, could send no re-enforcements to Lou¬ 
isiana. Butler, who must have men, called upon the free persons of color to 
volunteer. The call was met; in a few weeks there were three colored reg¬ 
iments of infantry and two batteries of artillery ready for service. He was 
recalled before these troops had opportunity of showing their worth. His 
successor had occasion to prove it at Port Hudson. The conduct of these 
regiments demonstrated, what many, both North and South, had doubted, 
that the colored race are capable of becoming soldiers, and, consequently, of 
becoming freemen. How this fact came to be recognized on both sides, and 
how it influenced the policy of both parties in the war, must be narrated 
hereafter. 

The capture of New Orleans had weakened the Confederacy, but had not 
given to the Union the additional strength which had been anticipated. It 
had not opened the Mississippi, whose navigation was interrupted by the 
fortifications at Vicksburg, impregnable against a naval attack. The at¬ 
tempts made by the fleet to reduce these works, and the failure of the plan 
devised by Butler to avoid them by changing the course of the river, so as 
to convert Vicksburg into an inland town, will be narrated hereafter. To¬ 
ward the close of his administration he had the mortification of seeing the 
batteries at Port Hudson springing up almost under his eye. A rc-enforce- 
ment of five thousand men and two monitors would have enabled him in 
October to have taken this place. But these could not be furnished to him. 
The disasters in Virginia, and the march of the enemy into Maryland, com¬ 
pelled the Federal government to.concentrate all its strength for the defense 
of the heart of the nation. 

Butler could undertake no important military operations, for, besides the 
occupation of Baton Rouge, he had a force bare]}' sufficient to hold New 
Orleans and its approaches. It would have been cruel for him to have 
taken possession of any points which he could not permanently hold. The 
moment his troops abandoned any place, every person even suspected of 
Union feeling would have been exposed to the vengeance of the returning 
enemy. Moreover, under the strict orders of the Confederate authorities, 
all cotton and sugar would have been destroyed in advance of his march in 
any direction, entailing ruin upon innocent holders. Butler’s wish was to 
have sent to him, or to be allowed to raise upon the spot, an army sufficient 
to hold every important point, with a supporting force that could not be 
overcome, the region being made to pay the expense. He believed that a 
few months under that regime would reduce the hostile population to sub¬ 
jection, and would convince Union men that they were not, by the with¬ 
drawal of the troops, to be given up to rapine and murder. 

The pass-office at head-quarters presented the most striking illustrations 
of Butler’s rigorous rule. Within the Union lines there were food, medi¬ 
cine, and clothing; beyond them were destitution and desolation. There 
were residents of New Orleans whose families were enduring the extremity 
of suffering; there were continuous applications for permission to convey 
food and medicine to them. These were at first freely granted; but it soon 
appeared that these permissions were systematically abused. Under cover 
of them supplies and munitions were conveyed to the hostile camps. A 
trunk of clothes would be found to have a false bottom concealing military 
supplies; thousands of percussion caps would be hidden in a barrel of flour; 
the persons of women w r ere stuffed out with contraband articles. The re¬ 
strictions upon the granting of passes were made more and more stringent, 
until at last they were almost invariably refused. 

The most notable operation of Butler beyond New Orleans was the occu¬ 
pation of the Lafourche District, a fertile and wealthy region lying west of 
the Mississippi. This was accomplished by Weitzel late in October. A 
series of swift marches, one spirited action, 1 and some minor conflicts, ac¬ 
complished the occupation of this district in four days. An immense 
amount of property liable to confiscation was found. The holders of it were 
glad to sell this at any price. Some of the officers of the invading force be¬ 
gan to purchase sugar upon speculation. Butler, knowing that this practice 
would demoralize his army, put a stop to it by a sweeping general order. 
Believing, he said, that the district was largely occupied by persons disloyal 
to the United States, whose property was liable to confiscation, and that 
sales were made of it to the prejudice of the rights of the government, it 
was directed that all the property in the district should be sequestered, and 
all sales thereof be held invalid; that the movable property be brought to 
New Orleans, and sold at public auction, the proceeds to be held subject 
to the rightful claims of loyal citizens and neutral foreigners. A commis¬ 
sion was appointed to take charge of this property, with authority to em¬ 
ploy the negroes of any plantation in working the same; any person who 
had not been actually in arms against the United States since the occupation 
of New Orleans might, upon returning to his allegiance, work his own 
plantation, and retain possession of his property except such as was neces¬ 
sary for the military service of the United Stages. The commissioners were 
also empowered to decide upon all questions of loyalty and neutrality, and 
to report to the commanding general such persons as they should judge 
proper to be recommended to the President for amnesty, pardon, and the 
return of their property, “ to the end tha t all persons that are loyal may 

■ This action, fought at Labadievillc October 27, is described at length bv Captain J. W. Dc 
Forest as. “of all the combats which I have seen, the most scientific, orderly, comprehensible, and 
artistically satisfactory. Similar results would have followed the same tactics if a hundred thou¬ 
sand men had been opposed to each other instead of less than six thousand. — 1 idc UarjjtrsMay. 
azint, September, 1864. 






















































































































































































































































































































280 


suffer as little injury as possible, and that all persons who have been hereto¬ 
fore disloyal may have an opportunity now to prove their loyalty and re¬ 
turn to their allegiance, and save their property from confiscation, if such 
shall be the determination of the government of the United States.” 1 Major 
Bell, the provost judge, was president of this commission, but the chief labor 
devolved upon Colonel Kinsman. For six weeks he was employed in ap¬ 
plying the provisions of the Confiscation Act to the District of Lafourche, 
setting the negroes at work upon abandoned plantations, and restoring to 
loyal men their estates which had been temporarily sequestered. The con¬ 
fiscated property was sold at auction to the highest bidder, and the proceeds 
paid over to the general treasury. No portion of Butler’s administration, 
with the exception of the woman order, has been so sharply criticised as 
this. But if the claim be granted that secession is rebellion, and that those 
who had taken up arms against the government were rebels, this measure is 
fully justified by every provision of public law and policy. 

Meanwhile a strong Union sentiment had been gradually growing up in 
New Orleans. This was shared only in a. slight degree by the upper class¬ 
es on the one hand, or by the lower classes on the other. But it was pre¬ 
dominant among the middle classes. Large and enthusiastic Union meet¬ 
ings were convened, and an election was held on the 3d of October, by or¬ 
der of General Sbepley, to choose two delegates to the Federal Congress. 
The canvass was eager, and no citizen who had taken the oath of allegiance 
was excluded from voting; 7500 votes were cast, of which nearly 5000 were 
given for Michael Hahn and Benjamin F. Flanders, both uncompromising 
Union men. The validity of this election was not, however, recognized, 
and the members-elect were not allowed their seats. 

As winter approached, Butler urged the government to furnish him with 
a force sufficient to enable him to extend his operations, and especially to 
reduce the works at Port Hudson. Early in December Senator Wilson 
called upon the Secretory of War to urge the importance of the request. 
Mr. Stanton approved of Butler’s vigor and ability, and promised to do what 
he could to aid him. Yet at this moment, not only was the recall of Butler 
determined upon, but his successor had been appointed more than three 
weeks before. On the 9th of November, the very day upon which Butler 
issued his Lafourche order, General Banks was assigned to the command of 
the “ Department of the Gulf, including the State of Texas.” 

The reasons for the recall of Butler have never been made public. 11 
There were, indeed, insinuations that he had prostituted his official position 
to serve his own private interests. Some color was supposed to be given to 
these charges from the fact that his brother, Andrew J. Butler, entered into 
large and profitable business transactions in New Orleans. When the port 
was opened in June, no man, with means and capacity, could fail to make 
money. Turpentine could be bought for $3 in New Orleans, and would sell 
for $38 in New York; flour was $24 in New Orleans, in New York $6; 
sugar was three cents in New Orleans, in New York more than twice as 
much. Andrew Butler, with large means and credit, entered into business, 
and, until prices at the two places were equalized, his profits were large. 
Later came large auction sales of confiscated property. Butler bought much 
of this; but there is not the slightest proof that he received any undue fa¬ 
vor. He purchased in open market, and if he secured a larger share than 
most of his competitors, it was because he was able and willing to pay more 
than the}'. Even if it is true, as has been alleged, that the general advanced 
his own private funds to his brother, and shared the profits, this of itself 
forms no ground of accusation. It was for the interest of the government 
and the country that the trade of New Orleans should be revived. If the 
general could by his own means advance this object, he was so far a public 
benefactor. One transaction, indeed, had a suspicious look upon its face. 
A quantity of cotton had been seized; Butler sent this to his own agent, 
with directions to sell it. Government seized the cotton. Upon investiga¬ 
tion, it appeared that the laborers upon Ship Island were without pay. 
Butler borrowed $4000 upon his own draft, paid the laborers with the pro¬ 
ceeds, sent the cotton to his agent to be sold, the draft to be paid, and the 
balance held to his order, so that, when the account was stated, he might 
settle with the government. Government, having seized the cotton, suffered 
the draft to be protested, much to Butler’s disadvantage; but when the af¬ 
fair was explained the money was refunded. 

This, and one other transaction of a much larger amount, are averred 3 to 
have been the only operations of a mercantile nature in which Butler was 
engaged while in command of the Department of the Gulf. There was at 
the levee a large number of transports which, by the terms of their charters, 
were to be sent home in ballast. No ballast was to be had nearer than the 
sand of Ship Island, thirty hours' steam from the city. The steamer Missis¬ 
sippi, hired at $1500 a day, required 250 tons of ballast; to take this at Ship 
Island, and afterward discharge it, would require at least fourteen days, at a 
cost to the government of $21,000. There was on the levee sugar enough 
to ballast the whole fleet; sufficient to ballast the Mississippi could be taken 
on board and discharged in four days, at a cost of $8000, thus saving $15,000. 
Butler proposed to allow merchants to ship sugar at a moderate freight, say 
$5 a hogshead, amounting, in the case of the Mississippi, to $2000 more— 
$17,000 in all. The difficulty was to find money to buy sugar at the mo- 

General Order, November 9. 

* He was received with preat cordiality by the President and cabinet. He inquired the reason 
of his recall. The President referred him to the Secretary of War, who had recommended the 
measure. Mr. Stanton said that the reason was one which did not imply, on the part of the gov¬ 
ernment, any want of confidence in his honor as a man or in his ability as a commander. “ You 
have told me,” answered Butler, “what I was not recalled for. I now ask you to tell me what I 
was recalled for." “You and I," replied the secretary, laughing, “arc both lawyers, and it is of 
no use lor you to file a bill of discovery upon me, for I sha’n’t tell you."— ParTon’s Butler in New 
Orleans , p. 613 

3 By Mr. Parton, who claims to have fully investigated the subject, with full access to every doc¬ 
ument bearing upon it.— Vide Butler in New Orleans , p.407-413. 


[October, 1862. 

ment Government had then no money at New Orleans; the general had 
none; but by pledging $150,000, his whole private fortune, he borrowed 
$100,000. This he placed in the hands of his brother, who with it bought 
and shipped sugar, receiving a commission on his shipments. Government 
took the sugar thus shipped, merely repaying the advance. Other mer¬ 
chants were also allowed to ship sugar upon payment of a moderate freight 
to the government The transports went home ballasted with sugar instead 
of sand. How much was saved in all by this arrangement has not been 
‘ stated. The saving to government on the Mississippi alone was $17,000. 
Some of the owners of the transports, who had contracted that their vessels 
should be sent back in ballast, conceived that they had a right to the pay¬ 
ment of freight, now that the ballast was in the form of sugar instead of 
sand. Their unreasonable claim was not allowed; and whoever was dis¬ 
satisfied, the Secretary of the Treasury was not. 

The true reason for the recall of Butler is probably to be found in the de¬ 
termination of the government to avoid all difficulties with foreign nations, 
and more especially with France. For many reasons, the administration of 
Butler had become odious abroad. This was owing, in a great measure, to 
the relations in which he became involved with the foreign consuls. The 
active population of New Orleans being largely composed of foreigners, 
gave the consuls great influence. With, perhaps, a single exception, they 
were in favor of secession, and believed in the ultimate triumph of the Con¬ 
federacy. Reichard, the Prussian consul, joined the Confederate army, raised 
a battalion, rose to the rank of brigadier general, and was now in Virginia, 
leaving as acting consul his partner, Krutschmidt, who bad married a sister 
of his co-religionist Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War. 
Mejan, the French consul, took such an open part against the Federal au¬ 
thority that the emperor was finally obliged to recall him. Others were 
more or less involved on the same side. For a while it seemed to be their 
main business to protest against Butler’s acts. Half of them protested against 
the oath of neutrality required from foreigners. The British consul protest¬ 
ed against an order directing the members of the British Guard to leave the 
city because they had sent their arms and uniforms to Beauregard’s camp. 
The French consul protested against the order for disarming the population, 
and against that for imprisoning Heidseck, of Champagne and bar-tending 
notoriety, and against several other orders. The Spanish consul remonstra¬ 
ted against the quarantine regulations; and so on. Once the whole consu¬ 
lar body, with the exception of the Mexican consul, joined in a formal pro¬ 
test. The occasion was this: 

The Citizens’ Bank, whose capital consisted mainly of bonds held by Eu¬ 
ropean owners, the interest upon which was payable semi-annually at Am¬ 
sterdam, was in February alarmed at the probability of an attack upon New 
Orleans from above, and resolved to deposit $800,000 in silver with the 
agent of the bondholders, to meet the interest which would become due in 
the course of the year. The agent of the bondholders, apprehensive that in 
case the city was abandoned by the Confederate troops it would be plun¬ 
dered by the rabble, placed this money in charge of Mr. Conturiti, the Dutch 
consul. Butler, thinking that this transaction was a fraudulent one, design¬ 
ed merely to get the specie under the control of the Confederate govern¬ 
ment, demanded that it should be given up to him until the matter could 
be investigated. Conturie refused. Butler had the key of the vault in 
which it was deposited taken by force from the consul, who was kept under 
formal arrest for a few hours. The consuls remonstrated, to Butler, to the 
Federal authorities, and to their own governments, against this violation of 
the person of a foreign representative. The Secretary of State, in reply to 
a communication from the Dutch minister at Washington, apologizing for the 
restraint put upon the consul at New Orleans, proposed to appoint a com¬ 
missioner to investigate the matter; meanwhile government should hold 
the silver, to deliver it up to the claimants if it should prove to belong to 
them. The bank, just before the passage of the forts, moreover bought 
something more than $700,000 of foreign exchange, paying for it specie, 
which was deposited with the French consul, the bills not to be accepted 
until the coin had been shipped. Butler, believing this transaction to be a 
fraudulent pretense to get the coin out of the bank, requested Mejan to re¬ 
tain it under his charge. 

Several other transactions, involving the same principles, occurred, the 
principal of which was the seizure of 3200 hogsheads of sugar which had 
been bought by Covas, a Greek, reputed to be the agent of an association 
of merchants in London and Havana. He had sold specie for Confederate 
notes, with which he had bought the sugar. Butler ordered the sugar to 
be retained until the transaction could be investigated. The English, 
French, and Greek consuls protested against this. 

The Federal government appointed Reverdy Johnson, an eminent law¬ 
yer of Baltimore, as a commissioner to investigate these transactions. He 
reached New Orleans early in June, and, after spending six weeks in inves¬ 
tigation, decided against Butler in every important case. The seizures, he 
said, “were evidently made under a misapprehension, to be referred to the 
patriotic zeal which governs him, to the circumstances encircling his com¬ 
mand at the time so well calculated to awaken suspicion, and to an earnest 
desire to punish, to the extent of his supposed power, all who had contrib¬ 
uted, or were contributing, to the aid of a rebellion the most unjustifiable 
and wicked that insane or bad men were ever engaged in.” 

Butler was deeply chagrined at this decision. He wrote to the Secretary 
of State 1 that another such commissioner as Mr. Johnson sent to New Or¬ 
leans would render the city untenable; that the result of his mission had 
caused it to be understood that the general was not supported by his gov- 


1 September 19. 









December, 1862. J BUTLER'S ADMINISTRATION AT 'NEW ORLEANS. 


ernment; that he was to be relieved, his acts overhauled; that a rebel 
might do any thing he pleased in the city, as the worst that could happen 
would be a few days’ imprisonment until a new commander should arrive. 
If this state of things was to continue, he would prefer that the government 
should get some one else to govern New Orleans. This suggestion was act¬ 
ed upon. But three days' after his successor was appointed, and a month 
before the official notice was received, Butler had the pleasure of forwarding 
a report which showed so clearly the misdeeds of Mejan, the French consul, 
that he was recalled. Sanford, the American minister at Brussels, wrote 
home in September that the Confederate agents in Europe were seriously 
embarrassed by the non-arrival of a large quantity of coin which they ex¬ 
pected from New Orleans, but that “assurances were now given that the 
money was in the hands of the French consul, and would be shortly re¬ 
ceived.” The purveyors of cloth were specially mentioned as unable to get 
their pay from the Confederate agents. This letter was sent to Butler, with 
directions to investigate the matter. He had many reasons for doing this 
work thoroughly. It was discovered that a firm doing business in New 
Orleans, under the name of Ed. Gautherin and Co., with a branch house at 
Havre, had a year before contracted to furnish the Confederate government 
with a large quantity of cloths for uniforms. These were the unpaid cloths 
referred to by Sanford. Early' in April these cloths reached Havana, 
whence they were shipped to Matamoras, in Mexico, were smuggled into 
Texas, and delivered to the Confederate agent. At this time, just before 
the Federal fleets passed the forts, De Bow, the Confederate produce-loan 
agent, borrowed of the People’s Bank in New Orleans $400,000 in specie, 
without interest, upon a pledge of cotton. This specie, intended to pay for 
these cloths, was deposited for security with the French consul. It was far 
into June before the goods were delivered, and until this was done payment 
was not to be made. Mejan, in the mean while, had promised not to deliver 
up any specie held by him in trust without the consent of Butler. Rever- 
dy Johnson’s report induced the government to direct that Mejan should be 
released from this engagement. He delivered the specie to Gautherin, who 
got it conveyed to Havana on board a Spanish man-of-war. In consequence, 
a second installment of goods, which was not to be delivered until the first 
was paid for, was forwarded to the Confederate authorities. Mejan, indeed, 
averred that he knew nothing of Gautherin except that there was a French 
house of that name in New Orleans, and that there was no money in his 
hands to carry out their contract with the Confederates. But incontestable 
documents demonstrated his complicity. His wife had accepted a present 
“ to close the affair well;’’ his clerk received a percentage for keeping the 
money in the consulate; besides which, there was good reason to believe that 
out of a sum of $19,000 charged to “expenses,” the French consul received 
a fifth. “Count Mejan,” wrote Butler in conclusion, “has connived at the 
delivery of clothing for the Confederate army since the occupation of New 
Orleans by the Federal forces; he has taken away nearly half a million of 
specie to aid the Confederates. His flag has been made to cover all manner 
of illegal and hostile transactions, and the booty arising therefrom. I am 
glad that my action here has been vindicated to the world, and that the 
government of the United States will be able to demand of the French gov¬ 
ernment a recall of its hostile agent” 

This vindication came too late. Before it was written the successor of 
Butler had been appointed; before it reached Washington that successor 
was on his way to New Orleans. Banks, bringing considerable re-enforce¬ 
ments, arrived at New Orleans on Sunday, the 14th of December, and pro¬ 
ceeded to the residence of Butler. On Tuesday the two generals met at 
head-quarters, and Butler formally surrendered the command of the Depart¬ 
ment 

He took leave of his comrades in a touching general order addressed to 


1 November 13. 

a The following are extracts from Butler’s Farewell Address to the citizens of New Orleans: 

“Commanding the Army of the Gulf, I found you captured, but not surrendered; conquered, 
but not orderly; relieved from the pressure of an army, but incapable of taking care of yourselves. 
I restored order, punished crime, opened commerce, brought provisions to your starving people, re¬ 
formed your currency, and gave you quiet protection, such as you had not enjoyed for many years. 
Whoever has quietly remained about his business, affording neither aid nor comfort to the enemies 
of the United States, has never been interfered with by the soldiers of the United States. 

“ Some of your women flouted at the presence of those who came to protect them. By a sim¬ 
ple order, I called upon every soldier of this army to treat the women of New Orleans as gentle¬ 
men should deal with the sex, with such effect that I now call upon the just-minded ladies of New 
Orleans to say whether they have ever enjoyed so complete protection and calm quiet for them¬ 
selves and their families as since the advent of the United States troops. 

“I hold that rebellion is treason, and that rebellion persisted in is death , and any punishment 
short of that due a traitor gives so much clear gain to him from the clemency of the government. 
Upon this thesis have I administered the authority of the United States. I might have regaled 
you with the amenities of British civilization, and yet been within the supposed rules of civilized 
warfare. Your property could have been turned over to indiscriminate ‘ loot,’ like the palace of 
the Emperor of China; works of art, which adorned your buildings, might have been sent away, 
like the paintings of the Vatican ; your sons might have been blown from the mouths of cannon, 
like the Sepoys at Delhi; and yet all this would have been within the rules of civilized warfare as 
practiced by the most polished and the most hypocritical nations of Europe. But I have not so 
conducted. On the contrary, the worst punishment inflicted, except for criminal nets punishable 
by every law, has been banishment, with labor, to a barren island, where I encamped my own sol¬ 
diers before marching here. 

“I have levied upon the wealthy rebels, and paid out nearly half a million of dollars to feed 
40,000 of the starving poor of all nntions assembled here, made so by this war. I saw that this re¬ 
bellion was a war of the aristocrats against the middling men—of the rich against the poor; a 
war of the landowner against the laborer; that it was a struggle for the retention of power in the 
hands of the few against the many ; and I found no conclusion to it save in the subjugation of the 
few and the disenthrallment of the many. I therefore felt no hesitation in taking the substance 
>f the wealthy, who bad caused the war, to feed the innocent poor, who suffered by the war. 


“ the Soldiers of the Army of the Gulf:” “ I greet you, my brave comrades,” 
be said, “and say farewell! You have deserved well of your country. 
Without a murmur, you sustained an encampment on a sand-bar so desolate 
that banishment to it, with every care and comfort possible, has been the 
most dreaded punishment inflicted upon your bitterest and most insulting 
enemies. \ ou had so little transportation that but a handful could advance 
to compel submission by the Queen City of the rebellion, whilst others waded 
breast-deep in the marshes which surround St. Philip, and forced the sur¬ 
render of a fort deemed impregnable to land attack by the most skillful en¬ 
gineers of your country and her enemy. At your occupation, order, law, 
quiet, and peace sprang to this city, filled with the bravoes of all nations, 
where for a score of years, during the profoundest peace, human life was 
scarcely safe at noonday. By your discipline you illustrated the best traits 
of the American soldier, and enchained the admiration of those that came 
to scoff. Y ou have fed the starving poor, the wives and children of your 
enemies, so converting them into friends, that they have sent their repre¬ 
sentatives to your Congress by a vote greater than your entire numbers, 
from districts where you were tauntingly told that there was 4 no one to 
raise your flag.’ By your philanthropy you have won the confidence of the 
‘oppressed race’ and the slave. Hailing you as deliverers, they are ready 
to aid you as willing servants, faithful laborers, or, using the tactics taught 
them by your enemies, to fight with you in the field. You have met double 
numbers of the enemy and defeated them in the open field. But I need not 
farther enlarge upon the topic. You were sent here to do that. I commend 
you to your commander. You are worthy of his love. Farewell, my com¬ 
rades! Again farewell!” To the citizens of New Orleans he issued a fare¬ 
well address, in which he declared the policy upon which he had acted, set 
forth and vindicated the measures he had employed, and urged upon the 
people to take the only measures compatible with duty or interest. 2 This 
done, he took leave of New Orleans, where he had for seven months exer¬ 
cised an authority as absolute as was ever committed to a single man. 



VIEW IN THE KBP.NCn QUARTER OP NEW ORLEANS. 


“I found you trembling at the terrors of servile insurrection. All danger of this I have pre¬ 
vented by so treating the slave that he had no cause to rebel. I found the dungeon, the chain, 
and the lash your only means of enforcing obedience to your servants. I leave them peaceful, la¬ 
borious, controlled by the laws of kindness and justice. 

“I have demonstrated that the pestilence can be kept from your borders. I have added a mil¬ 
lion of dollars to your wealth in the form of new land from the batture of the Mississippi. I have 
cleansed and improved your streets, canals, and public squares, and opened new avenues to unoc¬ 
cupied land. I have given you freedom of elections greater than you have ever enjoyed before. 
I have caused justice to be administered so impartially that your own advocates have unanimous¬ 
ly complimented the judges of my appointment. 

“You have seen, therefore, the benefit of the laws and justice of the government against which 
you have rebelled. Why, then, will you not all return to your allegiance to that government—not 
with lip service, but with the heart? 

“There is but one thing that at this hour stands between you and the government—and that is 
slavery. The institution, cursed of God, which has taken its last refuge here, in 11 is providence 
will be rooted out as the tares from the wheat, although the wheat be tom up with it. 

“I came among you,by teachings,by habit of mind,by political position,by social affinity,in¬ 
clined to sustain your domestic laws, if by possibility they might be with safety to the Union. 
Months of experience and of observation have forced the conviction that the existence of slavery 
is incompatible with the safety either of yourselves or of the Union. As the system has gradually 
grown to its present huge dimensions, it were best if it could be gradually Temoved ; but it is bet¬ 
ter, far better, that it should bo taken out at once, than that it should vitiate the social, political, 
and family relations of your country. I am speaking with no philanthropic views as regards the 
slave, but simply of the effect of slavery on the master. See for yourselves. Look around you, 
and say whether this saddening, deadening influence has not all but destroyed the very framework 
of your society. I am speaking the farewell words of one who has shown his devotion to his coun¬ 
try at the peril of his life and fortune, who in these words can have neither hope nor interest save 
the good of those whom he addresses. 

“ Come, then, to the unconditional support of the government. Take into your own hands your 
own institutions; remodel them according to the laws of nations and of God, and thus attain that 
great prosperity assured to you by geographical position, only a portion of which was heretofore 
youre.” 

























282 


[February 1862. 



BAUUEL B CCBT18 

CHAPTER XVI 

FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG.—THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN 

OF 1862. 

Price’s Retreat from Springfield.—General Samuel R. Curtis.—Federal Occupation of Springfield 
and Advance into Arkansas.—The Indian Tribes West of the Mississippi; the Sioux War; 
Albert Pike’s Intrigues.—Battle of Pea Ridge.—The Barbarities of War.—Operations in New 
Mexico.—Arizona; its social Organization ; Hostility of the Apaches.—Resume of the revolu¬ 
tionary Proceedings in Arkansas and Texas in 1861 ; Seizure of Arsenal at Little Rock; Meet¬ 
ing in Austin, Texas, in 1860; Governor Houston’s Career; General Twiggs’s Surrender; Con¬ 
federate Forces in Texas at the Beginning of the War. —Sibley’s Invasion of New Mexico. — 
John R. Baylor.—Colonel Canby’s Defense of Fort Craig; Battle of Valverde.—Retreat of Sib¬ 
ley to Texas.—Curtis’s Operations in Arkansas after the Battle of Pea Ridge; Advance on Lit¬ 
tle Rock; Governor Rector; Expedition up White River; Change of Base from Batesville to 
Helena.—Confederate Forces in Arkansas in the Autumn of 1862.—Guerrilla Operations.— 
Battles at Cane Hill and Prairie Grove.—The political Situation in Missouri; General Hal- 
leck’s Policy.—Capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10. 

I N this and the subsequent chapter we purpose to follow the course of 
military events in the West from the capture of Fort Donelson down to 
the Vicksburg campaign. This will bring the history of the war in the 
West down to the close of 1862. The events narrated are naturally grouped 
under two separate departments. To the first belong the military opera¬ 
tions west of the Mississippi; to the second, the operations along the Mis¬ 
sissippi and Tennessee Rivers — including the 
battle of Shiloh, the capture of Memphis, and 
the advance into Mississippi—and General Bu¬ 
ell’s and Rosecrans’s campaigns in Kentucky 
and Tennessee. 

These campaigns, even if we confine ourselves 
to the immediate field of active operations, disre¬ 
garding the distant military centres from which 
instructions were issued and whence supplies 
were obtained, covered an area of nearly 100,000 
square miles. The battle of Pea Ridge was 
fought on the very confines of civilization, at a 
point 500 miles distant from the line of Gener¬ 
al Bragg’s march into Kentucky. Prom New 
Madrid to the mouth of the Arkansas was more 
than 200 miles in a straight line; from the lat¬ 
ter point to St. Louis was more than 300; and 
yet this field, so wide in extent, was but a part 
of the theatre of war. General Hallcck’s and 
Buell’s forces were the right wing only of the 
Federal army, separated from the left, indeed, 
by nearly a thousand miles, and by the wild and 
tortuous ranges of the Alleghanies, but still co¬ 
operating with it as effectually as if there had 
been no such vast interval of space between. 

At the close of 1861 General Price had fixed 
his head-quarters at Springfield, in the south¬ 
western part of Missouri. At that time, of the 
four lines of railroad in the state starting from 


St. Louis, the two proceeding westward were entirely under Federal control 
A portion of the lines to Springfield and to Ironton were in the hands of 
the Confederates. The situation of Price’s army was not favorable for an 
offensive movement, but by retaining it during the winter he had gained a 
good supply of clothing for his troops and about 4000 fresh recruits from 
the state. He did not even regard bis position as tenable. When, in the 
latter part of January, General Samuel R. Curtis advanced along the line of 
the railroad to Rolla and then to Lebanon, Price began to retreat toward 
Arkansas. 

General Curtis, to whom General Halleck had given the command of the 
army in the field, was a native of Ohio, and at the time of which we are writ¬ 
ing was fifty-five years of age. He had studied at West Point, and received 
an appointment in the army, but in 1832 had resigned his commission, and 
devoted himself to law and afterward to engineering. He fought under Gen¬ 
eral Taylor in Mexico with the rank of colonel, was appointed military gov¬ 
ernor of Monterey and of other places occupied by the United States troops, 
and in these positions had developed a good degree of administrative ability. 
Subsequently he took a prominent part in the construction of railroads in 
the West From Keokuk, in Iowa, he was elected to Congress in 1858 and 
again in 1860, but at the beginning of the war he resigned his seat in order 
to participate in the great struggle. He accompanied the New York Sev¬ 
enth from Philadelphia to Washington, and was made an honorary member 
of that regiment. He then went back to Iowa, superintended the earliest or¬ 
ganization of troops in that state, and from the skirmish at Booneville was 
engaged in the war in Missouri under the conduct of General L3'on. He 
was at first colonel of the Second Iowa, but was soon made brigadier general 
of volunteers. He served under General Fremont, and afterward under Gen¬ 
eral Halleck. The latter, upon the withdrawal of General Price to Spring- 
field, gave General Curtis the command in the southwestern part of the state 
The army committed to his hands was organized into four divisions, under 
Generals Sigel, Asboth, and Davis, and Colonel Carr. It was chiefly made 
up of troops from Missouri and Illinois. There were also some Indiana and 
Iowa regiments, and a battery from Ohio. 

This army moved from Lebanon February 11th, and on the 14th General 
Halleck telegraphed to Washington that the Union flag then floated over 
the court-house in Springfield; that, after a short engagement, Price had re¬ 
treated, leaving behind a large amount of stores and equipments, and that 
Curtis’s cavalry were in close pursuit The fact that Price had abandoned 
his sick, amounting to about 600 men, proves that that general scarcely an¬ 
ticipated the Federal advance. He had waited, however, till the last mo¬ 
ment, expecting re-enforcements from the Confederate army in Arkansas. 
This gave General Curtis a great advantage; for, although Price was undis¬ 
turbed in his retreat to Cassville, he was obliged from that point to keep up 
a running fight for four days, until he reached Cross Hollows in Arkansas. 
From this position he was soon driven fifty miles southward to the line of 
Boston Mountains, leaving behind him again his sick and most of his stores. 
Indeed, General Curtis’s commissary had been mostly supplied by stores cap¬ 
tured from the enemy during his march southward from Springfield. A 
large number of recruits were captured on their way from Missouri to join 
Price’s army. Among these was Brigadier General Edward Price, son of the 
Confederate commander. 

General Halleck kept up a series of dispatches to Washington of the most 
encouraging nature. Four days after be had announced that the Union flag 
floated over the Springfield court-house, he notified to General McClellan the 
fact that it was also floating in Arkansas. He added that Price had been 
driven several miles across the Arkansas line, that his rear was being cut up, 
and that stores and prisoners were being captured from him hourly. The 
country, wild with excitement over the capture of Donelson, accepted these 
dispatches as certain indications of victory already obtained by the Army 



°£l)ihorn 

PeaSidge 


MAP OK TUX BEAT OK W.vu LN UibbOClU. 




































FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


283 


Avgust, 1861. J 


of the Southwest. In fact, not only had nothing decisive been accomplish¬ 
ed by that army, but it was daily being drawn into a perilous situation. The 
danger was not chiefly in its distance from a military base, but in its inferi¬ 
ority in numbers to the force which was being gathered against it All 
along his line of advance—at Rolla, at Lebanon, at Springfield, and at Cass- 
vilh -Curtis had weakened his force by leaving detachments to guard his 
communications, and could not, therefore, bring into the field more than ten 
or twelve thousand men, while the available force of the enemy was nearly 
twice that number, without counting the Indian allies of the Confederates. 
Situated just south of the border line between Arkansas and Missouri, and 
flanked on the west by the Indian Territory, the field of the proposed con¬ 
test was the one which would have been selected of all others as the most 
favorable for the concentration of Price’s, McCulloch’s, and the Indian forces. 
Yet General Halleck’s confidence in the Army of the Southwest was not 
wholly without justification. A good portion of General Curtis's force had 
bravely .met the enemy at Carthage, at Wilson’s Creek, and in subsequent 
battles, and even when opposed to superior numbers had dealt very effective 
blows. The Confederate army, too, was badly armed and weak in artillery. 

The attitude assumed by the Indian tribes toward the war should here be 
briefly noticed. In 1789 there were within the limits of the United States, 
including the Territories, less than 100,000 Indians. In 1853, by the exten¬ 
sion of the territorial domain from the acquisition of Texas, New Mexico, 
Utah, and California, their number had increased to more than 400,000. In 
California alone, upon its accession, there were 100,000. In New Mexico 
the estimated number was upward of 50,000. In Texas there were nearly 
30,000. In Utah there were 11,000. At the beginning of the war, the 
pressure of emigration westward for a score of years had driven all the great 
Indian tribes west of the Mississippi. What was known as the Indian Ter¬ 
ritory then covered only a small area comparatively upon the map, and was 
hedged in on all sides by territories which had either already become states 
of the Republic, or would soon become such. This limited space had been 
given bv the United States to the Indian tribes which had been driven across 
the Mississippi. Elsewhere, in Minnesota, Iowa, Oregon, and in the Territo¬ 
ries, the Indians existed in great numbers indeed, but they were limited to 
certain reservations. The relation of the government to all the Indian tribes 
in the West had been peculiar. The policy pursued regarded the perma¬ 
nent interest of the white man alone, while it bestowed temporary indul¬ 
gences upon the red man. Every thing else was left in the hands of the 
missionaries, who exercised a favorable influence upon this rapidly declining 



I>'MAN BQCVWS WINNOWIXG UU£AT. 


race. It was unfortunate, however, that the patronage which the govern¬ 
ment bestowed upon the Indians was frequently dispensed through agents 
who took many opportunities to defraud the beneficiaries. This, and the 
natural antipathy against the white man which it is almost impossible to 
eradicate from the Indian blood, led, finally, in the summer of 1862, to an 
outbreak of hostilities even among the tribes as far north as Minnesota. The 
Sioux Indians in that state, numbering about 1200 warriors, suddenly, in the 
month of August, attacked the settlements of the whites, and began a series 
of massacres, unrivaled in their horrible details except by the former out- 
rascs perpetrated by the same race upon the infant colonial settlements of 
the Eastern States. The only premonition of this terrible event had been a 
rumor which prevailed in the spring and early summer that the Indian tribes 
of Utah, Colorado, Dacotab, and Western Nebraska were making prepara¬ 
tions to ravage the Territories and frontier states. It Teas given out that 
Confederate emissaries had been among them, instigating them to revolt 
This rumor, taking so general a shape, and being, moreover, the natural pro¬ 
duct of an excited imagination, appears to have bad no practical effect It 
aroused no serious suspicions in the minds of the settlers, although it led the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to publish an advertisement warning the 
public of the dangers likely to be encountered by travelers on the overland 
route to the Pacific. Without attributing the outbreak in August directly 
to Confederate agencies, it is yet quite certain that the distraction of the 
country by civil war led the ignorant Sioux to hope for success in an under¬ 
taking upon which in more tranquil times they would scarcely have ven- 
turedr Apart from the first success of the marauders not much was effected 
by them. The loss of life was estimated in round numbers at 800, and that 


of property at between two and three millions of dollars. A few companies 
of troops under Colonel II. H. Sibley, afterward promoted to a generalship, 



IMHiLN CAXt* C.U'il-it* til UJLU.M1 £LUL£\. 


soon quelled the insurrection. In giving these details of the Sioux War we 
have anticipated in regard to time, but this seemed the most fitting place in 
which to speak of them, as they were somewhat nearly related to events 
which had been going on during the few previous months among the tribes 
farther south upon the Confederate border. In the summer of 1861 Albert 
Pike had been among these tribes acting as “commissioner of the Confeder¬ 
ate States to the Indian nations and tribes west of Arkansas.” Here, on the 
12th of August, he had entered into a treaty with the Camanches, according 
to the terms of which that nation agreed to settle upon reserves claimed to 
have been leased by the Confederates from the Choctaws and Chickasaws, 
in the southern portion of the Indian Territory, namely, that portion in¬ 
cluded between the Red and Canadian Rivers; in return for which agree¬ 
ment the Camanches were to be under Confederate protection, in token of 
which Albert Pike gave their chiefs letters of safeguard. 1 Other tribes than 
the Camanches were also decoyed from their allegiance to the Federal gov¬ 
ernment. A few days before the above treaty was made, the Confederate 
government had been organized at Mesilla, in Arizona, under John R. Bay¬ 
lor as governor. This movement was undertaken in spite of. rather than by 
the assistance of the Indians of that Territory. The evacuation of Fort Stan¬ 
ton by the Federal troops on the 8th of August left the enemy in possession 
of property equal to $300,000, including the fort, and there was not a single 
Federal soldier left within the limits of Arizona. The territory claimed to 
have been leased from the Choctaws and Chickasaws embraced an area of 
23,437 square miles, or a little less than one fourth ot the Indian Territory. 
If the Creeks, Seminolcs, Osages, and Cherokees eould also be alienated from 
the United States, the Confederacy would then have secured the entire Ter¬ 
ritory, having a population of nearly 72,000 souls. This country, with its 
52,000,000 of acres, would add greatly to the resources of the Confederate 
government, and, if it could be retained, would become a valuable secu¬ 
rity' for the pavment of the vast debt which that government must incur in 
the course of the war. Its mountains were filled with iron and coal. The 
Red River ran along its southern border, and the Arkansas almost through 
its centre. Albert Pike spared no pains to secure this boon for the Confed¬ 
eracy. To some extent he succeeded in bringing over even the Cherokees 
to the side of his masters. On the 21st of August, a mass meeting, attended 
by about 4000 of that nation, at Tahlegue, declared their adherence to the 
Confederate cause. The proceedings of this Indian convention were trans¬ 
mitted bv John Ross, the principal chief of the Cherokees, to General McCul¬ 
loch. 2 The Rev. Mr. Robinson, a missionary to the Cherokees, also made a 

1 The following is n copy of the letters of safeguard : 

“ The Confederate States of America to all their officers, civil and military, and to all other per¬ 
sons to whom these presents shall cotnc: 

•‘The bearer of this is Bis-tc-va-tia, the principal chief of the Ya-pa-rih-ca hand of the Xe-nm, 
or Camanches of the Prairie, and those w ho accompany him arc the head men of that hand, all of 
whom have this day concluded and signed in behalf of the w hole Ya-pa-rih-ca liand articles of a 
convention of peace and friendship between that band and other bands of the Xe-nm w ith us, and 
have thereby agreed to settle and live upon reserves in the country between the Red River and 
the Canadian, leased by us from the Choctaws and Chickasaws; and the said chief has also agreed 
to visit the other bands of the Xe-nm. not parties to the same convention, and now on the Staked 
Plain or elsewhere, and persuade them also to settle uj>on reserves in the same country. 

“\Yc have accordingly taken the said chief and the said head men. and all other persons of both 
sexes and all ages, of the said Ya-pa-rih-ca bund, from this day forward under our protection, un¬ 
til they shall for just cause forfeit the same, and that forfeiture be declared by us; and wc have 
therefore granted, and do grant to them and to each of them, these our 
“letters of safeguard 

for their protection, and to avail each and all of them ns far ns our authority and jurisdiction ex¬ 
tends. 

“Yon arc therefore hereby charged to rc«|* *ect these letters, and give all the said persons protec¬ 
tion anti safe-conduct; and any infraction by any of you of this safeguard will be visited by u« 
with all the jiennlties due to those who violate the public faith and dishonor the Confederacy 

“In testimonv whereof. Albert Pike, commissioner of the Confederate States to all the Indian 
r , nations and tribes west of those states, doth hereunto set his hand and affix the sea! of 
t ,EiI -3 his nrms. 

“Done and granted at the ngonev of the Confederate States for the Camanohrs.’W ichitas, and 
other bands of Indians near the False Wichita River, in the leased country aforesaid, this twelfth 
dav of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one. 

“Ai.nF.RT Pike, 

“ Commissioner of the Confederate States to the Indian nations and tribes west of Arkansas. 

“Countersigned, Wm. Qif.kxsbtrt, 

“Secretary to the Commissioner." 

* The following is a copy of John Ross’s letter: 

“ Executive Department, Park Hill, Cher kee Nation, Aupi-t 24, 19G1. 

“To Major Clark, Ass’t Quartermaster, C. S. A.; 

«* —I herewith forward to your care dispatches for General McCulloch, C. S. Army, which I 

have the honor to request von will cause to be forwarded to him by the earliest express. 

“ At a mass meeting of about 4000 Cherokees at Tahlegue, on the 2!st instant, the Cherokees, 
with marked unanimity, declared their adherence to the Confederate States, and have given their 
authorities power to negotiate an alliance with them. 

“In view of this action, a regiment of mounted men will he immediately raised and placed un¬ 
der the command of Colonel John Drew, to meet any exigency that may arise. 

“ Having espoused the cause of the Confederate States wc hope to render efficient service in the 
protracted war which now threatens the country, and to be treated with a liberality and confidence 
becoming the Confederate States. 

“ I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your humble servant. John* Ross, 

“Principal chief of the Cherokee nation.” 











284 


report of the affair to the Federal government. He stated that the Confed¬ 
erate commissioner had assumed the payment of the annuities hitherto re¬ 
ceived by the Cherokees from the national government. This was not a 
mere paper treaty. The Cherokees followed up the convention with active 
preparations to defend themselves and to assist their new ally. A home 
guard of 1200 men was formed. The Creeks, also, had raised a thousand 
men for service in the Confederate army. It is probable that in these move¬ 
ments the Cherokees, Creeks, and Camanclies were led by the same motives 
which in that very month the next year led the Sioux Indians to revolt 
There was the same natural antipathy to the white man, mingled with a sen¬ 
timent of revenge for past wrongs, real or imagined, and the same ignorant 
belief that the fortunes of the republic were declining, while the star of the 
Confederacy was in the ascendant. There was this difference, however. The 
Indians farther south very naturally considered that their immediate, if not 
their future destiny must be linked with that of the Confederacy, which was 
now opposing a very bold front against the national armies. All the Indian 
tribes, moreover, were doubtless gratified by the spectacle that w r as being 
afforded them of millions of white men pitted, army against army, in frater¬ 
nal strife, and were willing, so far as possible, to add fuel to the fire of rebel¬ 
lion. They never proved an ally of much consequence to the Confederates, 
who had an eye rather to their territory than to their services in the field. 
The Indian troops which were raised were placed under the command of 
Albert Pike, who received as the reward of his labors the rank of brigadier 
general in the Confederate army. 

Although Mr. Davis, in his message to the Confederate Congress, had de¬ 
clared that the events of the previous year had demonstrated that the gov¬ 
ernment had attempted more than it had power successfully to achieve, and 
that serious disasters had resulted from the effort to protect the whole terri¬ 
tory of the Confederacy, sea-board and inland, yet there was no disposition 
manifested in the subsequent conduct of the*war to attempt any thing less. 
Certainly no such disposition was shown west of the Mississippi. If Price 
had been retreating, it was only because of the military advantages to be 
gained by retreat Indeed, he would have remained at Springfield if McCul¬ 
loch had promptly come to his support. Besides, the Confederacy, at this 
time, was intent upon holding the power which it had gained over the In¬ 
dian country on its border, and which would have to be given up if its West¬ 
ern army should fall back far from that border. Every effort was now made 
to secure victory in the impending battle. The command of the trans-Mis¬ 
sissippi Department was given to General Earl Van Dorn, who reached the 
camp at Boston Mountains on the 2d of March. Price and McCulloch had 
been at loggerheads in previous campaigns, and this appointment of Van 
Dorn to the command of the entire army exercised a wholesome influence. 

General Curtis selected Sugar Creek, on the confines of Missouri, Arkan¬ 
sas, and the Indian Territory, as a line of defense. Here he awaited the at¬ 
tack of the enemy, which was made on Thursday, the 6th of March. Colo¬ 
nel Jefferson C. Davis, acting as major general in command of the third di¬ 
vision, held a position on Pea Ridge, north of the creek, commanding the 
Fayetteville road, one brigade on the right of the road, the other on the left. 
Two batteries, one of six and another of four guns, covered the approach, 
and one of them commanded the valley to the eastward and westward. Si- 
gel’s two divisions were seven miles south of the creek, at Bentonville. 
Carr’s division held the eastern part of the ridge. This ridge, from which 
the battle receives its name, extends along the north bank of Sugar Crefek, 
and is broken toward the north by gradual slopes, with an occasional ravine. 
From the position occupied by the army to the Missouri line was nearly 
eight miles. Two roads traverse the ridge, one from Bentonville, another 
from Fayetteville, and converge toward Keetsville. As the Missouri line is 
approached, these roads pass through a narrow valley, and are lined on ei¬ 
ther side by steep and continuous ranges of hills. Midway between the 
roads as they strike the ridge is Leetown, near the creek; on the road from 
F’ayetteville, and northeast of Leetown, was Elk-horn Tavern. From this 
tavern the Confederates designated the action as the battle of Elk Horn. To 
the northwest of Leetown an extensive ravine, known as Cross-timber Hol¬ 
low, crossed the Bentonville road. The camp was protected in the rear by 
a thick oak scrubbcry, which extended to the road on the west. Beyond 
this was an open field, bounded on the right by a range of hills near Elk- 
horn Tavern. 

On the 5th, General Sigel, at Bentonville, was apprised of the enemy’s ap¬ 
proach through a scout, and also by a message from General Curtis, which 
conveyed similar tidings, and ordered his return to Sugar Creek. He prompt¬ 
ly dispatched his train of 200 wagons northward, protected by a rear-guard. 
This guard, consisting of the Thirty-sixth Illinois and part of the Second 
Missouri, was attacked the next day by greatly superior numbers, and sur¬ 
rounded. But Sigel had remained behind, and succeeded in bringing off his 
men with an inconsiderable loss. He joined Curtis on the afternoon of 
Thursday. 

Van Dorn had begun to advance on Tuesday. With General Pike’s In¬ 
dian division, his numbers probably did not fall short of 20,000 men. In the 
newspaper reports of the time they were estimated at from twenty-five to 
thirty thousand. 1 His march was by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville. 
Sending only a small force to demonstrate in Curtis’s front, his plan was to 
make a detour to the westward, turning the Federal right, and, if possible, to 
gain the defile in Curtis’s rear. But for Sigel’s admirable skill in his retreat 
from Bentonville, by which he availed himself of the advantages which the 
nature of the ground afforded for the use of artillery against the enemy, he 
must have been cut off, his trains captured, and the whole Federal army 

1 Pollard says 16,000; but he evidently does not include the Indians. 


[March, 1862. 

placed in a position of great peril. He, however, accomplished a junction 
with the main army near the western edge of Pea Ridge. Van Dorn had, 
on the night of the 6th, gained the rear of the Federal army, with Price on 
his left, fronting southward, and McCulloch on the right nearly opposite Si¬ 
gel. The position taken by the Confederates compelled General Curtis to 
change front, after he had been all day engaged in obstructing the approach¬ 
es on the south side. The new line thus formed was at right angles to the 
one previously occupied, and extended from Sugar Creek to Cross-timber 
Hollow. Davis held the centre, Sigel the left, and Carr the right. 

The battle of Pea Ridge opened on Friday morning, Van Dorn, concen¬ 
trated against the Federal right, bearing down heavily upon Carr’s division. 
Curtis, also, had so distributed his force that, while he had three divisions on 
his right—Carr’s, Davis’s, and Asboth’s—only Osterhaus’s division had been 
left to Sigel. McCulloch endeavored early in the day to move eastward, so 
as to co-operate with Price and Van Dorn, and thus the action became gen¬ 
eral. Osterhaus’s division, with two of Davis’s regiments, moved out a mile 
beyond Leetown. Three pieces of flying artillery were sent in advance, sup¬ 
ported by the Third Iowa Cavalry. This was to delay the movements of 
the enemy until Osterhaus could come up. But the cavalry and artillery 
were swept back from the field like chaff before the wind. Farther to the 
right, Carr was also being driven back toward Elk-horn Tavern. The low 
brushwood and numerous hollows and ravines afforded shelter to the Con¬ 
federate troops as they advanced, and enabled them to engage the Federals 
at close quarters, where their shot-guns, loaded with buck-shot, were more 
than a match for the best long-range rifle. 

The enemy was pressing closely up to the road, which was the only possi¬ 
ble avenue of retreat to the Federal army. Once gained in force by Van 
Dorn, and the day would be lost to the Federals if only McCulloch should 
hold his own, and prevent Davis and Osterhaus from re-enforcing the right. 
The battle going on between Leetown and Elk-horn Tavern must decide 
the event. When the Third Iowa Cavalry had been driven back, and the 
forces of McCulloch had reached the cover of the brushwood beyond Lee¬ 
town, Colonel Osterhaus came up and engaged the enemy in a large open 
field to the left Then the second brigade of Davis’s division was sent in on 
the right, but was soon driven back. The enemy bad gathered in large 
force on this part of the field. Here were now several thousand of McCul¬ 
loch’s men, supported by a large body of Indians. Davis’s First brigade was 
with Osterhaus in the open field to the west. This was ordered to change 
its front and attack in the rear that portion of the enemy which was press¬ 
ing the Second brigade. This movement was accomplished with good effect, 
though not until the Second brigade had lost some of its guns, which were 
soon after recovered by the First. The success of the sortie made by Davis’s 
First brigade allowed the Second an opportunity to recover itself, and the en¬ 
emy was driven from this part of the field, leaving behind him his killed and 
wounded. Among the former were General McCulloch and General McIn¬ 
tosh, his second in command. Then two regiments of Sigel’s command re¬ 
enforced Davis, and were sent in on the right to support Carr. The desper¬ 
ate fight on the left centre had saved the day. Price’s men had by night 
reached the Fayetteville road in Curtis’s rear, and Van Dorn made Elk-horn 
Tavern his head-quarters. But, though victorious on his left, the enemy had 
been badly defeated on his right, and it was doubtful whether he could sus¬ 
tain bis position on the morrow. In regard to the ill success of the Confed¬ 
erate right, it can not be doubted that McCulloch’s and McIntosh’s death dis¬ 
couraged their troops, and contributed materially to their repulse. 

The result of the day, though very unsatisfactory to either army, were es¬ 
pecially discouraging to the Federals. The enemy held their line of com¬ 
munications. Their supplies were nearly exhausted. Their mules had been 
without food for forty-eight hours. There was no escape except by defeat¬ 
ing Van Dorn, who had strongly posted himself on the hills commanding 
the defile northward. 

Saturday morning opened from a sky overcast with clouds. The enemy’s 
cannon looked menacingly down upon the F’ederal encampment from the 
bold eminences to the northward, 200 feet in height. Batteries and battal¬ 
ions were posted at the base of these hills on either side. The Federal line 
was again changed, so that Davis held the right, Carr the centre, and Sigel 
the left. To General Sigel was allotted the most important part of the day’s 
operations. The battle commenced at eight A.M. Sigel opened a heavy 
cannonade on Van Dorn’s position, and advanced around to the left under 
cover of the fire. The Confederate artillery replied,but without much ef¬ 
fect. Davis pushed round on the right, turning the enemy’s left. The ad¬ 
vantage gained was that the Federal artillery enfiladed the Confederate lines. 
Some of the enemy’s guns were captured, and, to save them all from capture, 
they had to be withdrawn. Before the battle had lasted two hours, it had 
terminated in the retreat of the enemy from the field. The Confederates 
had failed of their object; but, on the other hand, it can not be said that the 
Federals had gained a very decisive victory. On both sides men and guns 
had been captured. The loss in killed and wounded on both sides was near¬ 
ly equal, amounting, in either case, to about 1000. 1 Van Dorn withdrew his 
forces from the field without molestation. 

1 The Federal force engaged in the buttle of Pea Ridge consisted of the following troops: 

First division. Colonel Osterhaus: Thirty-sixth Illinois, Twelfth Missouri, Seventeenth Missou¬ 
ri, Twenty-fifth Illinois, Forty-fourth Illinois, battalion Third Missouri, two battalions Benton Hus. 
sars (cavalry), battalion Thirty-ninth Illinois Cavalry, two batteries of 6 guns each. 

Second division. Brigadier General Ashoth : Second Missouri, Fifteenth Missouri, Sixth Mis¬ 
souri Cavalry, battalion Fourth Missouri Cavalry, two batteries 6 guns each. 

Third division, Colonel Jeff. C. Davis: Eighth Indiana,Twenty-second Indiana, Eighteenth In- 
diana, Thirty-seventh Illinois, Ninth Missouri, First Missouri Cavalrv, two batteries, one of 4 guns 
another of 6. 

Fourth division, Colonel Carr: Fourth Iowa, Ninth Iowa, Thirty-fifth Illinois, Twenty-fifth Mis¬ 
souri, Third Iowa Cavalry, Third Illinois Cavalry (two battalions), Bowen’s battalion of cavalry, 
two batteries of 6 guns and one of 4. 






March, 18 fi 2 .] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


285 



A. Camp of General Curtis.—B B. Route of Sigel from Bentonville.—L Spot where McCulloch felL—J. Tableau 

of Rea Ridge. 


The day after the battle, the Confederate commander sent a burial party 
to General Curtis, under a flag of truce, to ask for the dead left upon the 
field. The request was granted by the Federal commander, who took occa¬ 
sion to express his regret that he had found on the battle-field many of his 
dead who'had been tomahawked, scalped, and otherwise shamefully muti¬ 
lated. A few days afterward Van Dorn replied, making a counter-charge 
that some of his men. who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war had 
been murdered in cold blood by Germans of Sigel’s command. Sigel did not 
deny the charge, but stated, in a communication to General Curtis, that when 
Elbert’s three pieces of artillery were taken, the men serving at the guns 
were surrounded and shot dead, although seeking refuge behind the horses. 
“When such acts are committed,” said General Sigel in this letter, “it is 
very natural that our soldiers will seek revenge, if no satisfaction is given 
by the commander of the Confederate army.” * 1 

After the battle ofPea Ridge,Van Dorn retreated south of Boston Mount¬ 

Only a few of these regiments were full, a large number of sick having been left behind atRolla 
and Lebanon. 

The official report of losses was as follows: First division, 144 ; second division, 119; third di¬ 
vision, 329 ; fourth division, 701 : total, 1351, of which 203 were killed. General Van Dorn stated 
his loss at 600. This does not include the prisoners taken by General Curtis, which the latter 
claims to have amounted to 1000. Pollard says that Van Dorn took 300 prisoners. 

1 How far General Sigel’s account is justified may be inferred from the following extract from 
a narrative of the battle which appeared a month afterward in the Richmond Whig. It was writ¬ 
ten by an officer of General Price’s army. He gives a vivid description of the action on Friday in 
that part of the field near Leetown, where General McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, which 
we quote in full: 

“After listening some moments to the terrible tumult in the distance” [the writer refers here 
to the conflict going on near Elk-horn Tavern between Price’s column and the Federal right], 
“suddenly, and within 300 yards of me, two or three cannon opened their brazen throats, hurling 
their missiles of death through the undergrowth in almost every direction. As the sound of the 
cannon came the third or fourth time, like the noise in springtime on the marshy margin of a lake, 
only more shrill, loud, and apparently more numerous than even the frogs, came the war-whoop 
and hideous yell of thfc Indians. Here I was unconsciously in the midst almost of McCulloch’s 
charging squadron, and in range of a battery of three guns that were hurling death and defiance 
at them.” [These were the guns of Elbert’s flying artillery, which had been sent in advance to 
arrest McCulloch’s progress toward the Federal right centre.] 

“The battery was speedily charged and captured, those supporting it being borne backward 
three quarters of a mile by the impetuous forward press of the Confederates. Their retreat, most 
of the way, was through a corn-field, down a road upon its borders, but continuing into woods ad¬ 
jacent, full of undergrowth, where the main force of the enemy’s strongest wing was posted. Here 
began the rattling musketry, which soon increased to a Niagara in sound. For hours there was 
hardly an intermission, save that created by the stunning roar of the cannon, so close that the ears 
of both parties were deafened. Within this vortex of fire fell McCulloch and McIntosh. At one 
time, having concluded to make my way to the immediate command of General Price, after pass¬ 
ing from the corn-field down to the edge of the woods, just as four of us entered the woods a shell 

was thrown at us, bursting in our midst.I then went leisurely over the corn-field, and rode 

back to the deserted guns. 

“About forty-five men lay in the space of two or three hundred yards to the rear of the battery, 

all save one entirely dead, and nil but three Dutchmen .Here was a sterner feature of war 

than any I had vet seen. The Texans , with their large, heavy knives, had cloven skulls in twain, min¬ 
gling blood, and brains, and hair. The sight was a sad one , but not devoid of satis faction to our own 
exiles from home and wife. The character of the bloody victims , as denoted by their countenance, be¬ 
token victory for the South. I looked upon the faces of many dead enemies that day, and among 
them all found no expression of that fixed, fierce determination which Yankees describe as belong¬ 
ing peculiarly to the heroic hirelings who enlist for pay to desolate our homes.’* 


ains. General Curtis fell back to Keetsville, where he received re-enforce- 
ments from Kansas and Missouri. 

While General Curtis was on his march into Arkansas, events of consid¬ 
erable importance, though having no important bearing on the general cam¬ 
paign, were in progress farther westward, in that part of New Mexico which 
since February, 1863, has been known as the Territory of Arizona. 1 

country had a population of whites roughly estimated at 20,000. 
The Indian population was more than twice as numerous, about half of 
whom were friendly to the whites, while the other half were hostile. The 
Apaches, the most hostile of the tribes, had overrun the country several 
times, and were called “ devils” by their own race on account of their fiend¬ 
ish outrages. Although rich in mineral treasure of every sort, the Territory 
had been but partially developed. This was due to three causes. The prin¬ 
cipal obstacle was the negligence of the government during the few previ¬ 
ous years. The two other unfavorable elements in the way of rapid growth 
—the hostility of the Apaches and the sterility of the vast deserts—could 
have been either removed or counteracted if the authorities at Washington 
had properly appreciated the value of the Territory. The great motive to 
emigration which existed in the mineral wealth of the country lost its effect 
upon the people on account of the insecurity of life, which intimidated all 
except the adventurer, the speculator, and the reckless criminal from settling 
in a region known from time out of mind as the theatre of Indian massacre. 
The essential defect was the absence of a military force adequate to protect 
settlers from pillage and murder. 2 This region of our Western territory has 
an additional importance from the fact that it furnishes the most convenient 
route for the proposed Pacific Railroad. While there were great objections 
to be brought against any of the projected routes, those against this were 
fewer and of a less formidable character. It was this route, running along 
the 32d parallel of latitude, that Jefferson Davis very ably advocated in the 
Senate. It was a much shorter route than any of the others which were un¬ 
der consideration, and it traversed a much milder region. The greatest ob¬ 
stacle was the scarcity of water along the route. Springs were, on an aver- 
age, over twenty miles apart. In some cases as many as forty miles inter¬ 
vened between one supply of water and another. This scarcity of water was 
also a considerable obstacle to a continuous line of military posts.* But this 
was a difficulty very easily obviated by a system of artesian wells. Such a 
system was, indeed, in 1858, in process of construction, in order to facilitate 
communication across the desert from Fort Fillmore to Albuquerque, and 
from Fort Union to Santa F 6 . The events of 1861 not only interrupted the 
scheme of the Pacific Railroad route, but for more than a year threatened to 
deprive the United States of all military occupation of the Territory. 

Upon the first outbreak of the Southern insurrection, and even before ac¬ 
tive hostilities were inaugurated, the revolutionists had their own way in the 
territory west of the Mississippi. In Arkansas, before that state had seceded 
from the Union, the United States Arsenal at Little Rock had been seized 
with 9000 muskets, forty cannon, and a large supply of ammunition. Fort 
Smith was captured by the Confederates April 26,1861. In Texas, General 
Twiggs, to whom had been committed all the forts and the military property 
of the United States in that department, had, before the secession of Texas, 
and without the slightest plea on the score of necessity, delivered up all the 
posts under his command, together with property which, not including forts 
and public buildings, was valued at a million and a half of dollars. The 
troops were allowed to leave the state. When the Ordinance of Secession 
had been passed, on March 2 of that year, there still remained in Texas a 
few detachments of Federal troops, and these were made prisoners and re- 

1 The act establishing the Territory of Arizona was approved by the President February 24, 
18C3. The first section defines the Territory as “ all that portion of the Territory of New Mexico 
situated west of a line running due south from the point where the southwest corner of the Terri¬ 
tory of Colorado joins the northern boundary of the Territory of New Mexico, to the southern 
boundary-line of said territory of New Mexico.” 

7 In his report for 1858, the Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, afterward Confederate general 
thus treats of the situation on the Western frontier at that time: 

“The whole strength of the army, as posted, consists of 17,984 men, and the actual strength on 
the 1st of July last was 15,764. In addition to other movements, this force is called upon to gar¬ 
rison 68 forts of a large and permanent character .... and to occupy 70 posts less permanently 
established, where the presence of a force is absolutely required. The area over which these forts 
and posts arc spread embraces a circuit of about 3,000,000 square miles, and requires a journey of 
many thousand miles to visit the principal ones of them. 

“The external boundary of our country, requiring throughout a more or less vigilant military 
supervision, is 11,000 miles in length, presenting every variety of climate and temperature, from 
the inclement cold of our Canada frontier to the tropical regions of Southern Texas. But the oc¬ 
cupation of this long line of frontier is a trifling difficulty in comparison with that of protecting 
the double line of Indian frontier, extending from the Lake of the Woods to the banks of the Rio 
Grande, on the cast side of the Rocky Mountains, and from beyond the River Oregon on the Brit¬ 
ish frontier, to the head of the Gulf of California on the western slope of those mountains. Su- 
peradded to these lines, requiring to be occupied, are the great lines of intercommunication be¬ 
tween the Valley of the Mississippi and the Pacific Ocean, which imperatively demand that pro¬ 
tection which only the United States troops can furnish. These lines arc very long, and are now 
extremely im|K>rtant, while every year renders them more anti more so. From our Western front¬ 
ier of settlements to those of Northern Oregon the distance is about 1800 miles; from the same 
frontier to the settlements of California, via Salt Lake, is 1800 miles; from the frontier of Arkan¬ 
sas, at Fort Smith, by Albuquerque or Santa Fe, to Fort Tejon, is about 1700 miles; and from 
San Antonio, by El Paso, to San Diego, near the borders of the white settlements, is 1400 miles; 
constituting an aggregate line of 6700 miles, which ought to be occupied, and which we pretend in 
some sort to keep open. This simple statement of facts demonstrates, stronger than any arguments 
could do, the absolute necessity for an increase of the army. ... If there is a higher duty than an¬ 
other devolving upon a well-regulated government, it is to afford perfect protection to its citizens 
against outrage nnd personal violence; yet this great obligation is not j>crforined by the govern¬ 
ment of the United States. For a large portion of the year, scarcely a week elapses without bring¬ 
ing us intelligence of some Indian massacre or outrage more shocking than death itself; and it 
most frequently happens that these acts go unpunished altogether, cither from the want of troops 
for pursuit, or from their remoteness from the scenes of slaughter, which renders pursuit useless. 

In former times, when the hardy pioneer was allured away from the line of white settlements bv 
fertile lands alone, he scarcely ventured so far as to be l>eyond succor and protection from those he 
left behind. But far different is the state of things at present. Our Pacific settlements, with their 
great inducements of rich lands, salubrious climate, and fabulous mincrnl treasures, present to the 
inhabitants of the Atlantic states temptations to emigration which the privations of an intervening 
wilderness nnd desert, nnd -continual danger from roving bands of savages, hanging upon their 
march for many hundred miles together, can not deter them from undertaking. This migration 
strengthens the natural tics between the Atlantic nnd Pacific states, and adds immensely to the de¬ 
fensive strength of that remote region. Justice and humanity alike demand protection for these 
emigrants at the hands of government.” 





























286 


[1861 



FORT W ACIIITA. 




FOBT IUY1& 


































































18G1.J 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


287 





THS ALAMO, AXTOXIO, 6EXE&AL TWIOtifi'S llEAn.gr aRT T gA. 









































288 


[February, 1862. 


[eased on parole. The secession sentiment in Texas had never been violent. 
In December, 1860, the largest meeting ever held in Austin passed enthusi¬ 
astic resolutions in favor of the old Union, and the meeting was made the 
occasion for a gala-day. Governor Houston, in a letter to the commission- 



BAM. nOCSTON. 


er sent to Texas by the State Convention of Alabama, said that secession 
would involve civil war and the ruin of our institutions, if not liberty itself. 
The governor, it seems, from another portion of this correspondence, had 
some schemes of his own in connection witn the future of Texas. “ Texas,” 
said he, “ has views of expansion not common to her sister states.” He pro¬ 
posed to make the conquest of Mexico by the prowess of that single state. 
He was opposed to holding a State Convention. But the Convention was 
called, and the sentiment of the people having undergone a rapid change, 
the vote in favor of secession obtained a large popular majority. The gov¬ 
ernor endeavored to have the matter referred to the Legislature of the state, 
which was to assemble on the 18th of March, nis reluctant attitude pro¬ 
voked the members of the Convention. It was thought by many that he 
was opposed to the confederation of Texas with the other Southern states, 
and favored her setting up for herself. The Convention insisted upon its 
absolute authority, and declared the act of secession an accomplished fact. 
State troops were then dispatched to the Rio Grande to occupy the posts 
abandoned by the Federal troops. Subsequently an ordinance waspassed 
in the Convention, requiring the state officers to appear before that body and 
take an oath of allegiance to the Confederacy. The governor and secretary 
of state refusing to comply with this demand, their chairs were declared va¬ 
cant Lieutenant Governor Clark then became acting governor of the state.' 
In June all intercourse with the people of the Northern states was forbid¬ 
den, and all citizens of the latter states were warned to leave Texas within 
twenty days. During the year 1861 no offensive operations were underta¬ 
ken by the national government against Texas, with the exception of a bom¬ 
bardment of the Confederate batteries at Galveston in the month of August. 

Of the forts surrendered by General Twiggs, the principal ones were Forts 
Davis, Arbuckle, and Wacbita. Fort Davis was situated on the Rio Grande, 
about 500 miles from San Antonio, in a canon of the Lympia Mountains. 
It was in the midst of the most picturesque scenery. On either side, the im¬ 
mense rocks forming the sides of the cafion tower upward to a height of 500 
or 600 feet. Fort Arbuckle was on the northern frontier of the state, and 
Fort Wachita was sixty miles northwest of Arbuckle. It was near Fort 
Wachita that General Van Dorn had, in 1858, routed the Camanches in a 
pitched battle. Fort Brown, on the Rio Grande, and Fort Lancaster, on the 
San Antonio and San Diego mail route, were also included in the terms of 


1 A few months after these events the ex-governor declared the act of secession justifiable and 
necessary. 

“The life of General Houston is full of romance and adventure. He was born in Virginia, 
March 2, 1793; taken by his widowed mother to Tennessee while yet a boy; abandoned school 
because he could not agree with his teacher about his studies; ran away from a store, employment 
in which was too confining for his tastes; lived among the Indians as an adopted son of one of 
their chiefs for three years; returned home; entered the army ns a private at the nge of twenty; 
earned by his bravery promotions and the lasting friendship of General Jackson, under whom he 
served ; obtained the appointment of Indian Agent, in which office he distinguished himself by his 
zeal in preventing the importation of negroes through Florida, then a Spanish province, into the 
States; resigned his commission in the army; studied law six months; was forthwith elected 
prosecuting attorney, and honorably acquitted himself in this position ; gained such popularity as 
to obtain almost without opposition any office the State of Tennessee could give him: was elect¬ 
ed, first, major general of militia, the representative to Congress, then twice governor of the state; 
in 1829 separated from his wife, resigned his gubernatorial office, left Tennessee forever to make 
his home thenceforth with the Indians; proved a faithful and valuable friend to them; accom¬ 
plished the removal of several Indian agents for fraud; wearied in turn of this half savage life, 
emigrated to Texas ; assumed at once a prominent position in this then nebulous republic ns gen¬ 
eral in chief of all her forces; defeated and captured Santa Anna, and secured the independence 
of the state in a brief but brilliant campaign ; left the’milifarv command of the Lone Star Repub¬ 
lic to accept its presidency; proved himself as able and efficient in managing its civil affairs ns he 
had in wielding the sword; represented her subsequently for two successive terms in the Senate 
of the United States ; left the Senate only to be made governor; and continued, until a short peri¬ 
od previous to his death, the most popular, as he certainly was the most able, man which the state 
contained.”— Harper* Magazine, vol. xxx., p. 681. 


the surrender. General Twiggs had served with great distinction in the 
Mexican War. He was breveted major general for his gallantry at Mon- 
terey, and received a sword from Congress. As a reward for his disgrace¬ 
ful surrender of the United States forts and property in Texas, he received 
from the Confederacy the command of a major general, and was for a short 
time in command of New Orleans. He died at Augusta, Georgia, Septem¬ 
ber 15,1862. The surrender was made to Colonel Ben. M'Culloch, who had 
been selected for this purpose by the revolutionary committee of the state, 
styling itself the 11 Committee of Public Safety.” M‘Culloch, also, had served 
in the Mexican War, and had earned especial commendation from General 
Taylor in the battle of Buena Vista. He had had a great deal of experi- 
ence in partisan warfare on the Texan frontier, and had done much for the 
cavalry service of the United States. As soon as Lincoln’s election was 
known, he had identified himself with the secessionists in Texas. He had 
800 men under his command when he received the surrender of San Anto¬ 
nio. He was soon sent abroad to procure arms for the state; but,before he 
had succeeded in this mission, he was made a brigadier general. His part 
in the war in Missouri has already been shown in this history. He died, as 
we have seen, in the battle of Pea Ridge. 

Texas, immediately after her accession to the Confederacy, sent forces into 
all parts of the field to sustain the cause which she had adopted. Three 
regiments, under Wigfall, Hood, and Archer, were sent to Virginia; two, un¬ 
der Terry and Gregg, to Kentucky ; and two, under Green and Lock, to Mis¬ 
souri. By the 1st of November, 1861, there were nineteen regiments in the 
field, of which seven were disposed of ns above stated. Six were dispatched 
to the coast of Texas. The others were sent to the northern frontier, or 
were organized for operations in the Territories. 

Texas, from her geographical position, became the natural base for oper¬ 
ations against New Mexico. 1 The troops designed for the campaign in that 
country consisted, in November, of three regiments, organized into a brigade 
under the command of Brigadier General W. U. Sibley. During the previ¬ 
ous summer the Confederates had not been idle in New Mexico. In July, 
although they did not invade the Territory in any formidable force, they 
created such a panic that nearly all of the Federal military posts were aban¬ 
doned without a struggle. Forts Breckinridge and Buchanan were aban¬ 
doned upon the rumored approach of the Texan troops, without any attempt 
at defense, and even without an estimate of the amount of force likely to 
be brought against them. The garrisons, numbering about 450 men, start¬ 
ed over the mountains eastward to Fort Craig, which was located near Val- 
verde, on the Rio Grande. While they were moving in that direction, the 
garrison of Fort Fillmore, consisting of nearly 700 men, under Major Isaac 
Lynde of the regular army, disgracefully surrendered to a force of less than 
200 Texans on the 27th of the month. Four months afterward Major Lynde 
was dropped from the army list as a punishment for his delinquency. The 
next week after the surrender of Fort Fillmore, Lieutenant Colonel John R, 
Baylor, commanding the Confederate forces in the southern portion (Arizo 
na) of New Mexico, issued a proclamation taking possession of the Territory 
in the name of the Confederacy, assuming the title of military governor. 
Soon after Fort Stanton was abandoned, thus throwing into the hands of the 
revolutionists property valued at nearly half a million of dollars. Fort 
Craig was also abandoned. Messila became the military capital of Arizo¬ 
na. General Albert Sidney Johnston received from Governor Baylor the 
command of the Confederate forces in the Territory, which at this time num¬ 
bered less than 1000 men. On the 8th of September, however, General John¬ 
ston became commander of the entire military department of the West, and 
the charge of the operations in New Mexico was committed to General Sib¬ 
ley, who was preparing a military expedition for the complete conquest of 
that Territory. Sibley’s head-quarters were at Fort Bliss, in Texas. 

In the mean time the small Federal force left in New Mexico was under 
the command of Colonel E. R. S. Canby, who, by a general order of the War 
Department, was soon after placed at the head of the Department of New 
Mexico, with his head-quarters at Santa F& 

The Confederate General Sibley had proposed to reach the field of oper¬ 
ations early in September, 1861,but failed to do so, as he explains in his re¬ 
port, “ from misunderstandings, accidents, deficiency of arms, etc.” He says: 
“I found myself at this point” [Fort Bliss] ‘‘as late as the middle of Janu¬ 
ary, with only two regiments and a half, poorly armed, thinly clad, and al¬ 
most destitute of blankets. The ranks were becoming daily thinned with 
those two terrible scourges to an army, small-pox and pneumonia. Not a 
dollar of quarter-master’s funds was on hand, or had ever been, to supply the 
daily and pressing necessities of the service, and the small means of this 
sparse section had been long consumed by the force under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Baylor, so that the credit of the government was not as 
available a resource as it might otherwise have been.” Having established 
a general hospital at Donna Anna, he prepared to move up the Rio Grande, 
and on the 7th of February reached a point seven miles below Fort Craig, 
which, together with Fort Stanton, had been retaken by Canby. The latter 
occupied Fort Craig, the immediate object of the Confederate attack, with a 
garrison of 2500 men, 1000 of which were regulars. 

On the 16th of February Sibley reconnoitred, advancing to within a mile 
of the fort. Finding the latter too strong to be attacked, and the Federal 
commander declining a battle in the open field, he determined to cross the 
Rio Grande below the fort to the east bank, to turn the Federal position, and 
thus compel an engagement. It was supposed in the fort that Sibley was 
withdrawing his force, especially as Colonel Canby’s scouts had declared it 

1 In speaking of New Mexiro, it will be well understood by the reader that Arizona is included 

under that designation, since the events of which we write occurred over a year before the territo¬ 
rial organization of Arizona. 







Fkbruary, 1862 . "| 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


289 


N E V A D 



MAP OP NEW MEXICO. 


impossible for the enemy to advance through the sand-hills on the east side 
of the river. In truth, General Sibley, by crossing, had placed his army in 
an unfavorable situation, as his camp was destitute of water, which could 
only be obtained by gaining a point above the fort The Confederates cross¬ 
ed on the 20th. The day before, Canby had ordered his regulars—the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Tenth Infantry—together with Colonel Kit Carson’s and Pino’s 
regiments—also to cross the river and occupy an elevation opposite to and 
commanding Fort Craig. On the 20th he sent across some cavalry and ar¬ 
tillery to cover the infantry. An engagement followed, which was confined 
to the artillery, but in the course of which Pino’s regiment became demoral¬ 
ized, and the entire force had to be withdrawn to the fort. 

The Confederates were without water all day, and their animals, suffering 
extremely from thirst, became exhausted, and so completely broken down 
that the wagons could not be moved. It was now of the utmost importance 
that a Federal force should cut off the approach of the enemy to the river at 
Valverde, where was the only supply of water in the vicinity. For this pur¬ 
pose, the regulars, with Carson’s regiment, some cavalry, and two batteries, 
were moved up the west bank in that direction, but, upon arriving at their 
destination, it was found that the Confederates had already anticipated them. 
The batteries were opened upon the enemy, compelling bis retreat with con¬ 
siderable loss. The Federals crossed to the east bank, and eucountercd the 
full strength of Sibley’s command, which now made a desperate stand, and 
there followed the action known as the battle of Valverde. 

Colonel Canby came upon the field at noon with Pino’s regiment of New 
Mexicans, which had occasioned so much disorder on the previous day. The 
forces engaged on both sides were nearly equal, in either case amounting to 
a little over 1500 men. The earlier part of the battle was little more than 
an artillery duel. The two Federal batteries were situated, one of them, 
Lieutenant Hall’s, on the right, and the other, Captain McRae’s, on the left. 
The latter, about two P.M., was advanced toward a wood which covered the 
enemy’s right. A furious charge was made by the Texans, under Captain 
Lang, against this battery. His regiment was thinned at every step by suc¬ 
cessive vollies; but it still pressed on, picking off the gunners, one by one, 
with shot-guns and pistols, until only two men remained to man the guns. 
The force detailed to support McRae could not 
be brought up. Captain McRae had fallen; and 
soon the impetuous advance of the enemy decided 
the contest in this part of the field. The battery 
was captured, and no attempt was made for its re¬ 
covery. On the right a similar attempt was made 
against Hall’s battery, but the latter was gallantly 
supported by Carson, and the enemy at this point 
was repulsed. But the confusion on the left, con¬ 
sequent upon the loss of McRae’s battery, made 
it necessary that Canby should withdraw from 
the field. He retired upon the fort in good or¬ 
der. The Federal loss in this battle was esti¬ 
mated at about 200; that of the enemy some¬ 
what less. 

Not being in a condition to assault Fort 
Craig, General Sibley moved northward against 
Albuquerque and Santa Fe, which were evacu¬ 
ated by the Federals. About the same time, 

Tucson, near the southern border of the Terri¬ 
tory, was occupied by a band of roving guerrillas 
under Captain Hunter. From this point Hunter 
advanced northward toward the Pimo villages, 
and even threatened Fort Yuma, on the California boundary. The hostile 
Indians united with the Confederates, and the whole Territory, with the ex¬ 
ception of the strong forts held by the Federal troops, -was devoted to ra¬ 
pine and murder. 

General Canby, in March, was able to take the offensive. After success¬ 
ful skirmishes with the Confederates at Apache Pass and Pigeon’s Ranch, 


he threatened Albuquerque, the enemy’s principal 
ddpot of supplies. This movement compelled Sibley 
to evacuate the Territory, leaving his sick and wound¬ 
ed behind in the hospitals at Santa Fd, Albuquerque, 
and Sorocco. The Confederates had, by their out¬ 
rages upon peaceful citizens, exasperated the inhab¬ 
itants and made them bitter enemies. This doubt¬ 
less hastened their retreat into Texas, which, under 
the steady pressure of the Federal force in their rear, 
was a succession of disasters. As they withdrew, 
Fort Fillmore, Fort Bliss, and El Paso were imme¬ 
diately occupied by the Federals under the command 
of General Carleton, who, being now re-enforced by 
troops from California, was enabled to hold the Terri¬ 
tory against the enemy, and turn hi’s attention to 
the conquest of the hostile Apaches.’ 

After the battle of Pea Ridge, the military opera¬ 
tions of either army in Arkansas'were not especially 
significant About a month after that battle, it was 
supposed that Price was moving toward Springfield. 
This led to a temporary withdrawal of the Federal 
army from Arkansas But early in May General 
Curtis was again penetrating the state by a more 
easterly route. Moving southward from Salem, 
he occupied Batcsville, on the White River. Be¬ 
tween Batesville and Little Rock, on the Arkansas, was a distance of near¬ 
ly eighty miles. This latter point, the capital of the state, was the object of 
the Federal advance. As Curtis moved in that direction, there was great 
excitement in the capital. Governor Rector, on the one hand, upbraided 
the Confederate government for having made no provision for the defense 
of the state, while, on the other, he frantically appealed to the Missourians 
and Texans to come to the rescue. Ho said: “It was for liberty that Ar¬ 
kansas struck, and not for subordination to any created secondary power, 
north or south. Her best friends are her natural allies, nearest at home, 
who will pulsate when she bleeds, whose utmost hope is not beyond her ex¬ 
istence. If the arteries of the Confederate heart do not permeate beyond 
the east bank of the Mississippi, let Southern Missourians, Arkansians, Tex¬ 
ans, and the great West know it and prepare for the future. Arkansas lost, 
abandoned, subjugated,is not Arkansas as she entered the Confederate gov¬ 
ernment; nor will she remain Arkansas, a Confederate state, desolated as a 
wilderness. Her children, fleeing from the wrath to come, will build them 
a new ark, and launch it on new 'waters, seeking a haven somewhere of 
equality, safety, and rest.” 

But the governor docs not appear to have rallied about him any formida¬ 
ble forces of resistance. He soon took a hasty departure from the capital, 
and the executive government passed over to the martial authorities. The 
pressing need of men in Tennessee had depicted the Confederate armies of 
the Southwest almost to the last extremity of weakness. But, on the other 
hand, the importance of the Tennessee campaign to the Federal cause also 
reduced Curtis’s army to such an extent that he was forced to abandon the 
campaign against Little Rock. Thus there occurred a lull in the trans-Mis¬ 
sissippi campaign, which was only partially disturbed by frequent military 
expeditions. The principal one of these was that undertaken in June, after 
the capture of Memphis, up the White River. The object of this expedition 
was to open communication with the army of General Curtis. Four gun¬ 
boats—the St Louis, Mound City, Lexington, and Conestoga—accompanied 
by a transport having on board Colonel Fitch’s Indiana regiment, moved up 
the river toward St. Charles. The Mound City led, and, as it approached 
St. Charles, received the fire of two concealed batteries. The troops from 


1 At the close of the official report of his operations in New Mexico, Gcnernl Sibiev says: 

“ In concluding this report ... it is proper that I should express the conviction . . . that, ex¬ 
cept for its political geographical position, the Territory of New Mexico is not worth one quarter 
of tlie blood and treasure cxjicnded in its conquest. As a field of military operations it possesses 
not a single clement, except in the multiplicity of its defensive positions. The indispensable cle¬ 
ment, food, can not be relied on. During the’last year, and pending the recent operations, hund¬ 
reds of thousands of sheep have been driven off by the Navajoes. Indeed, such were the com 
plaints of the people in this respect, that I hud determined, as good policy, to encourage private 
enterprises against that tribe and the Apaches, and to legalize the enslaving of them." 


























290 



JOHN M. SCHOFIELD. 


the transport were landed with the purpose of taking the batteries in the 
rear, when a ball from the bluff penetrated the casement of the Mound City, 
and passed through her steam drum. The result was that only 23 out of a 
crew of 175 escaped scalding. A scene of great confusion followed. Fran¬ 
tic with pain, men leaped into the water, and some of them were drowned. 
Boats sent to their relief from the other vessels were fired upon with grape 
and canister with fearful effect. But Colonel Fitch, hearing of the accident, 
only pressed his regiment more rapidly forward, and carried the batteries at 
the point of the bayonet. But the expedition failed of its main object, and 
General Curtis, on the 24th of June, evacuated Batesville, and by the middle 
of the next month had securely established a new base at Helena, on the 
Mississippi, about fifty miles above the mouth of White River. The events 
of the year from this time resolve themselves into a bare chronicle. On the 
19th of September General Curtis was called to the command of the Depart¬ 
ment of Missouri, which was so defined as to comprehend Missouri, Kansas, 
and Arkansas. General Steele, who had arrived at Helena with a division 
of troops, then assumed the command of that post 

About this time the Confederate forces in Arkansas numbered probably 
25,000 men. General Hindman, with about 5000 men, covered Little Rock 


[December, 1862. 

on the north side. At Batesville there were 2000, under McBride. Holmes 
held Little Rock itself with 2000 men. Farther down the river, near Pine 
Bluff, Roan had 5000. Rains held the northwestern part of the state with 
four or five thousand. Between these scattered detachments and the Fed¬ 
eral forces there was an occasional encounter of arms. Sometimes the Con¬ 
federates would group together in small detachments, and, marching into 
Missouri, would there unite with irregular banditti for the purposes of plun¬ 
der or guerrilla warfare. When Curtis assumed command of the depart¬ 
ment, an army, styled the “Army of the Frontier,” was organized under 
General John M. Schofield, whose object was to subdue guerrilla bands, and 
generally to co-operate with the other forces in the trans-Mississippi district. 
Just at the close of October, a portion of this army, under Generals Herron 
and Totten, and numbering six or seven thousand men, came into collision 
with the Confederates in Southwestern Arkansas. The battle was fought 
near Fayetteville Hollows, a few miles north of Boston Mountains. Totten, 
with the main column, advanced from Osage Springs, while Herron, with 
another column, started from Cross Hollows, with the design of striking the 
flank of the enemy, who was thought to be in the vicinity of Fayetteville, 
seventeen miles distant. Herron had a force of less than a thousand men, 
made up chiefly of cavalry, imperfectly equipped. It turned out that this 
force had alone to contend with a much superior force of Texan Rangers; 
but, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, the enemy was driven four 
miles. In the same vicinity, just one month later (November 28,1862), there 
was a small skirmish at Cane Hill, between three Federal brigades, under 
General James G. Blunt, and a force of Confederates, made up of Marma- 
duke’s men, considerably re-enforced by guerrillas. This also resulted fa¬ 
vorably to the Federals. 

A few days afterward there was a more stubbornly contested action at 
Prairie Grove, a short distance northwest of Cane Hill. After the battle of 
Cane Hill,General Blunt had held the country in the immediate vicinity of 
the battle-field, that being the great wheat and corn growing district of the 
state. The Confederate forces were strongly re-enforced by bringing up the 
several detachments scattered over the state, and were commanded by Gen¬ 
eral Hindman. These forces may be roughly estimated at 15,000. Hind¬ 
man, with great promptness, advanced northward to cut General Blunt off 
from his communications. Blunt, at the first notice of this movement, sent 
for General Herron, who was at Wilson’s Creek with the second and third 
divisions of Schofield’s army. Herron moved at the instant, and in three 
days had marched over a hundred miles. In the mean while Blunt re¬ 
mained at Cane Hill, and the enemy slipped by him on his flank, thus gain¬ 
ing a position which, while it was strong against either Blunt or Herron, 
also enabled him to prevent their conjunction. It was, however, a position 
favorable to the Federal generals, on the simple condition of the ability of 
both to participate in the critical battle. 

On the morning of December 7 Herron had reached Fayetteville, and, 
resting for an hour, pressed on along the road from that place southward. 
Up to the previous night he had kept up communication with Blunt, but 
that was now broken off, for Hindman was planted between them, and hoped 
to fight them in succession. It was Sunday morning; “a mqre beautiful 
morning or a grander sunrise,” says Herron, “I never beheld;” but it inau¬ 
gurated a day of bloody, terrible battle. Herron had sent 3000 cavalry to 
Blunt’s support, and now his own need of such a force was most urgent. 
Part of his infantry and artillery must be detailed to guard his train of 400 
wagons, leaving him, at his own estimate, only 4000 available men. As he 
came out on the prairie by the mountain road seven miles south of Fayette¬ 
ville, the Arkansas cavalry, which had the advance, came “ dashing back in 
great disorder.” His army and Hindman’s had met, having, as a newspaper 








































































January, 1863.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


291 



JAMES G. HLIT.N1 


correspondent remarked, run together like two locomotives. Hindman’s ad¬ 
vance was pushed back on his main lines, which were found posted on a 
long ridge by a creek, and in Herron’s immediate front. The Federal com¬ 
mander decided to attack, trusting that Blunt, who could not be more than 
ten miles away, would hear the booming of artillery, and attack in time to 
decide the contest in his favor. By ten o’clock the crossing began under 
cover of several batteries. Herron was fortunate in his artillery, as also in 
the superior discipline of his command. The contest went on fiercely on 
his left. A battery of the enemy, strongly posted on a bill, was captured, 
and then the position had to be abandoned. A counter-charge was ordered, 
but the Confederates could not stand up in the face of Herron’s guns. Here, 
with varying fortune, the fighting was kept up till long after noon, and as 
yet nothing had been heard from Blunt. 

General Blunt, when he first heard the sound of battle, a little after noon, 
was more than five miles from the scene of conflict. At two o’clock he was 
upon the field, ne found the enemy on the ridge across the Fayetteville 
road. “ On the north, and in front of the enemy’s lines,” says he, in his re¬ 
port of the battle, “ was an open valley, divided into large fields, a portion 
of them cultivated in corn. At the east end of this valley, General Herron, 
with the second and third divisions, was engaged with the enemy.” Blunt’s 
column entered the valley at its western extremity, on the left wing of the 
enemy. Hindman was thus engaged in front and rear at the same time; 
but his force, though divided, was yet strong in each part. Between his and 



PLAN OP TUB UATTLE OF PBA1BIF. GROVE. 



FRANCIS J. HERRON. 


Blunt’s position there was a piece of woods, into which the greater part of 
Blunt’s column was thrown. From three o’clock until nightfall there was 
no interruption of the battle. Both Herron’s and Blunt’s commands slept 
on their arms all night, prepared to renew the contest on Monday ; but, un¬ 
der cover of the darkness, the enemy slipped away, and retreated across the 
Boston Mountains. The loss on both sides was severe; in Herron’s com¬ 
mand alone amounting to little less than a thousand. Blunt came upon the 
field later, and fought under less disadvantage, and suffered less severely. 
The Federal artillery had been worked with promptness and accuracy, and 
with terrible effect against the enemy, whose loss exceeded that of the Union 
army. The Confederates acknowledged that Hindman had been defeated. 
At the close of the month Blunt advanced south of Boston Mountains and 
took possession of Van Buren without any considerable resistance. 

Early in 1863 a force of the enemy, under General Marmaduke, moved 
on Springfield, Missouri; but .that place had been so carefully provided for 
against attack by General Browne that the Confederates were repulsed. 

The military situation in Missouri was closely interwoven with the polit¬ 
ical. General Fremont’s well-known political history, and his self-committal 
from the first to an anti-slavery policy, had excited against him the preju¬ 
dices of the Missourians. His policy had been unwise, because it was both 
partisan and premature. When General Halleck was sent to take his place, 
in November, 1861, he was especially instructed to shape his political course 
in such a manner as to prove that President Lincoln’s administration was 
committed, not to the abolition of slavery, but to the suppression of armed 
treason. To such a course Halleck steadfastly adhered so long as he was 
commander of the department. The necessity of severe military restrictions 
rendered political tolerance indispensable. Even after the Confederate ar¬ 
mies were driven out of the state, there were thousands of citizens who still 
sympathized with the Confederate cause, and who were willing to sacrifice 
much for its success. Against these there could be only severity in so far 
as they gave actual aid to the enemy. But there were also thousands of 
citizens thoroughly loyal to the United States government Severity against 
these, and in regard to points not involved in the main issue of the war, 
could not fail to alienate many of them from their adherence to the govern¬ 
ment, and drive them over to its opponents. In a state rent with intestine 
faction, it was wise to compose the strife so far as this could be done consist¬ 
ently with the simplest interpretation of loyalty. 

With General Halleck the only test of loyalty was support of the govern¬ 
ment. Those who could not stand this test were singled out and treated as 
enemies. Any one was at liberty to think as he chose of slavery, but it 
fared hard with those who stumbled at the oath of allegiance. His meas¬ 
ures against those found in arms against the government within the state, or 
contributing in any way to the comfort of the enemy, were justly severe. 
He ordered that all persons within his lines who, disguised as loyal citizens, 
were found giving information to the enemy, should be shot. Union fami¬ 
lies, crowding into St.Louis from all parts of the state, were quartered upon 
avowed secessionists. All the municipal officers of the city were required 
to take the oath of allegiance. His government, while it mulcted and pun¬ 
ished the disloyal, yet protected them against all unauthorized violence. 
There could be no seizure of private property except on the plea of strict 
military necessity, and even in this case, if it was unauthorized, it was pun- 














































292 


[March, 1862. 



ISSC1NG PASSES AT ST. LOCI8. 


ished with death. No arrests were made except upon definite and substan¬ 
tial charges. No slaves were taken from their masters except in cases where 
the latter were disloyal, and had used their slaves, or permitted them to be 
used for disloyal purposes. No fugitive slaves were admitted into his camps. 
Martial law was strictly enforced. All civil authorities attempting to inter¬ 
fere with the execution of any order from the head-quarters of General Hal- 
leck were arrested and punished. An order was issued requiring all pub¬ 
lishers of newspapers, those of St. Louis excepted, to furnish General Hal- 
leck a copy of each issue for inspection, under penalty of having their pa¬ 
pers suppressed. The officers of mercantile associations were required to 
take the oath of allegiance to the Federal government. The president and 
faculty of the University of Missouri, and the officers of all the railroad com¬ 
panies in the state, were required to take the same oath. Lawyers were not 
allowed to practice before submitting to the oath. The oath of allegiance 
was made the test of the privilege of suffrage at elections. Citizens who, as 
such, engaged in acts of hostility, were treated with marked severity. The 
arrest and trial of some persons apprehended for destroying railroad bridges 
and other property became the occasion of a correspondence, in which Gen¬ 
eral Price insisted that these men should be treated as prisoners of war. 
General Halleck replied that no orders of General Price could save from 
punishment spies, marauders, and incendiaries; that if armed forces in the 
garb of soldiers, and duly organized as legitimate belligerents, destroyed 


railroad bridges as a military act, they would be treated as prisoners of war; 
but that soldiers in the garb of citizens must suffer the usual penalties in¬ 
flicted upon citizens for their crimes. In accordance with this response, 
eight persons, who were convicted of the crime of destroying the railroad 
bridges, were shot in the month of February, 1862. After the Federal vic¬ 
tories in Tennessee, and the expulsion of Price from the southern border of 
the state, the military regulations hitherto in force were somewhat relaxed. 
During the remaining portion of General Halleck’s career the disturbance 
from guerrillas was inconsiderable. General Schofield assumed the com¬ 
mand of the department June 1,1862, which position he resigned in Septem¬ 
ber to General Curtis. 

While Grant and Buell were preparing for an advance southward from 
Nashville, and Curtis was carrying on his campaign west of the Mississippi, 
General Pope and Commodore Foote moved upon the enemy’s works at New 
Madrid and Island No. 10. The conflict on either side of the river was not 
more important than that for the possession of the river itself. Columbus 
had to be surrendered as the consequence of the capture of Donelson, but 
the new positions occupied by the Confederates at Island No. 10 and New 
Madrid were southward from Columbus only from twenty-five to thirty-five 
miles. The enemy determined to fall back step by step, in this way pre¬ 
venting the Federal gun-boats from establishing a connection with Farra- 
gut’s fleet at the mouth of the river. 



T21I CAROKDXLST RUNNING TUX CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT ISLAND NO. 10. 




















































































































March, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


293 


Island No. 10 is situated in a bend of the Mississippi, on the Tennessee 
border, and although ten miles above New Madrid on the river, is southwest 
of that place. New Madrid is on the Missouri shore. It was upon this isl¬ 
and that the Confederates had erected their principal fortifications, which 
consisted of eleven earth-works, mounting seventy heavy guns. At New 
Madrid there was a bastioned earth-work mounting fourteen guns, and in 
the upper part of the town a battery of seven pieces. The line of intrench- 
uents between the upper and lower work constituted the defense of the 



A MORTAR 


place. These works were occupied by five regiments of Confederate infant¬ 
ry, with several companies of artillery. In the river the enemy had also 
six gun-boats, carrying from four to eight guns. The Confederate General 
McCown commanded the troops holding New Madrid. 

New Madrid, being below Island No. 10, and its possession cutting off that 
island from its natural communication southward, was the first to be attack¬ 
ed. General Pope appeared before the town on the 3d of March, but had no 


heavy artillery, and no means of contending with the naval force in the riv 
er. While awaiting the arrival of his large guns, he posted a battery at 
Point Pleasant, twelve miles below, thus cutting off McCown from re-enforce¬ 
ments and supplies from the South. This battery had, of course, to be 
mounted with small guns, and, as a protection against the heavier artillery 
of the Confederate gun-boats, the guns were placed in sunk batteries, be¬ 
tween the rifle-pits, which affoifled protection to a thousand infantry. Thus 
invested on the south side, McCown drew re-enforcements from the island. 
The number of his command was nearly doubled, and three additional gun- 
boats increased the naval force, which was under the command of Commo¬ 
dore Hollins. 

After waiting over a week, Pope received his siege guns from Cairo, which 
were, on the night of the 12th, placed within 800 yards of the enemy’s main 
fortification, commanding the work and the river above it. At daylight the 
batteries were opened, and the fire of four heavy guns was concentrated upon 
the gun-boats with such effect as to disable some of them: also three guns in 
the enemy’s land-works were dismounted. The only impression made by 
the Confederate batteries on Pope’s lines was in the injury done to one gun, 
attended by the wounding of eight men, and in the loss of three men in an 
Ohio regiment. The result of the day’s operations convinced the Confeder¬ 
ate commander that it was useless to attempt farther resistance at that point, 
for General Pope was already about to cut off the line of retreat. McCown 
therefore abandoned New Madrid on the night of the 13th, leaving his dead 
unburied, and all his stores and ammunition, and even the knapsacks of his 
soldiers, and fell back upon the island. In regard to the military property 
abandoned by the enemy, the testimony of General Pope is that it included 
“all their artillery,field batteries, and siege guns, amounting to thirty-three 
pieces, magazines full of fixed ammunition of the best character, several thou¬ 
sand stand of inferior small-arms, with hundreds of boxes of musket car¬ 
tridges, tents for an army of 10,000 men, etc.” Untouched suppers, candles 
left burning in the tents, and the general appearance of the encampment, in¬ 
dicated that the retreat had been effected with unceremonious haste. 

The Confederate force was now concentrated on the island. General 
Pope’s occupation of New Madrid secured a perfect blockade of the river, 
and the defenders of Island No. 10 were too far removed from the main army 
under Johnston to receive any help from that source. The island, moreover, 
was not a good defensive position. It is flat, and commanded by the high 
ground on the left bank of the river. Its defenses had been constructed un¬ 
der the superintendence of General Beauregard, who, at the last moment, on 
the 5th of April, turned the command over to General McCall. 

On the 14th of March, the day of the capture of New Madrid, Commodore 
Foote moved from Cairo with an armament consisting of eight gun-boats, 
all iron-clad except the Conestoga, and ten mortar boats, lashed to steamers. * 1 
Two regiments of infantry accompanied the expedition, which reached a 
point about four miles above Island No. 10 on the morning of the 15th. The 
next day a bombardment commenced, which continued until the 7th of 
April. The great point to be gained was the rear of the fortifications, whic h 
Beauregard had erected on the high ground commanding the island. To 

1 These mortar boats were constructed at St.Louis at the suggestion of General Fremont. They 
were about GO feet long and 25 feet wide, surrounded on nil sides by an iron plate bulwark six or 
seven feet high. The weight of the mortar itself was 17,210 pounds. Its bore admitted easily a 
13-inch shell. From the edge of the bore to the outer rim was 17 inches! The weight of the 
mortar bed was 4500 pounds ; that of the shell, filled with wet sand, was 230 pounds; filled with 

I powder, 215 pounds. 


















294 


[March, 1862. 



'THE' GUH'-BOAT FLEET DROPPING DOWN STREAM TO RECON 


■ffiiilff! 1 


I STEAMERS TOWING IM O KT A RBO AT S INTO POSITION 

L_- -—--- 


OPERATIONS AGAINST ISLAND NO. 10—BOMBARDMENT FROM THE MORTAR BOATS. 























































































































































April, 1862 .] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


295 



efiect this, it was necessary that Pope should have transports to convey his 
troops from New Madrid to the Tennessee shore. Opposite Island No. 10, 
on the Missouri side, was a peninsula called Donaldson’s Point, which widens 
inland. From New Madrid across the widest part of this peninsula Wil¬ 
son's Bayou extends for about eight miles. Terminating in a large pond,it 
is only four miles distant from another pond which opens out into the river 
some distance above New Madrid. It occurred to General Hamilton, a sub¬ 
ordinate of General Pope, that, by means of a canal, which should take ad¬ 
vantage of the bayou and traverse the land between the two ponds, trans¬ 
ports might be brought from Foote’s fleet to New Madrid. This canal was 
undertaken, and cost the troops very much labor. It was twelve miles long, 
and for half of that distance it passed through heavy timber, which had to 
be sawed oil by hand four feet under water. In this way the transports 
were brought through. But there was now another obstacle to the passage 
of the troops. From Tiptonvillc to the fortifications east of the island 
McCall had erected batteries commanding the river. It was necessary to 
have gun-boats to cover the passage. These fortunately succeeded in run¬ 
ning the enemy’s batteries on the island, the Carondelet on the 4th of April, 
and the Pittsburg on the 6th. These soon silenced the hostile works along 
shore, and by midnight on the night of the 7th the army was on the west 
bank of the Mississippi. “The passage of this wide, furious river by our 
large force, ’ saj’s General Pope, in his official report, “ was one of the most 
magnificent spectacles I ever witnessed.” Pope and Foote were now mas¬ 
ters of the situation. The latter had been shelling the island for three weeks. 
During this bombardment the bursting of a rifled gun on board the St. Louis 
had killed and wounded fourteen men. 

There was no battle. As soon as the-crossing of Pope’s command was as¬ 
certained, the Confederates withdrew from the island. Not a single life had 
been lost by Pope’s army. There were captured three general officers, over 
100 heavy siege guns, twenty-four pieces of field artillery, and several thou¬ 
sand stands of arms. A floating battery of sixteen guns was also taken, 
which had been brought from New Orleans to Memphis, and thence to Isl¬ 
and No. 10. The prisoners, according to General Pope’s estimate, including 
those taken on the main land, numbered 6700, including 273 field and com¬ 
pany officers. Although the victory was bloodless, yet no battle-field had 
hitherto yielded so large results in captured material. The disaster to the 
Confederates was the more mortifying from the fact that, during the long 
siege, daily bulletins from the commanding general had assured them that 
the position was impregnable to the naval attack in front and unassailable 
in the rear. There appears to have been no knowledge on the part of the 
Confederate officers that the canal was being constructed on the west side of 
the river. The crossing of the Fcderals from New Madrid had all the ef¬ 
fect of a surprise, which was followed by a panic, and those who escaped in 
the general confusion suffered very much from hunger and fatigue. 

The same day that Island No. 10 was surrendered, the issue of the battle 
of Shiloh was being determined, more than 100 miles distant, on the banks 
of the Tennessee. 


CHAPTER XVII. 

FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG.—OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, 
AND NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI. 


The Confederate Military Situation early in 18G2; Lack of Munitions of War; Expiration of 
Terms of Enlistment.—Davis’s War Policy an Offensive-defensive Policy.—Confederate Plans 
of Operation. — Beauregard and the Army of the Mississippi.—Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg 
Landing.—General Grant’s Position; Lack of defensive Preparations.—Confederate Success 
of April Gth.—Arrival of Re-enforcements.—Defeat of the Confederates.—Ilalleck’s Arrival at 
Pittsburg Landing; Reorganization of the Army.—Advance against Corinth.—Colonel Elliott’s 
Expedition.—Capture of Memphis.—Naval Contest on the River.—Mitchell’s Campaign in 
Northern Alabama. 

Kirby Smith and Bragg North of the Tennessee.—Guerrilla Warfare.—John Morgan.—Invasion 
of Kentucky. — Battle at Richmond, Kentucky. — Excitement in Cincinnati and Louisville. — 
Kirby Smith’s Proclamation.—Bragg’s Movements; Capture of Munfordsville; the Race for 
Louisville.—Buell’s Army at Louisville.—Tragic End of General Nelson.—Bragg’s Proclama¬ 
tion to the People of the Northwest.—Junction of the two Confederate Armies.—Bragg’s Re¬ 
treat.—Battle of Pcrryville.—Evacuation of Cumberland Gap. 

Grant’s Army in Northern Mississippi.—Battles of Iuka and Corinth.—Grant’s Advance along 
the Central Mississippi Railroad.—General Ilovcy’s Expedition.—Confederate Occupation of 
Holly Springs. 

Rosecrans in command of the Department of the Cumberland.—llis Campaign for the Defense 
of Nashville.—Battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone River.—Retrospect of Political Events in 
Tennessee.—Governor Johnson’s Administration. 


A FTER tbe evacuation of Nashville, Albert Sidney Johnston’s army bad 
fallen back to Murfreesborough. This position covered the approach 
into East Tennessee. Tbe Federal plan of the campaign clearly did notcon- 
template an advance in that direction, for, although such an advance would 
afford relief to many suffering Unionists, still, for that reason alone it was not 
worth while to forego certain obvious military advantages connected with 
a campaign pushed directly southward toward Corinth. The principal of 
these advantages was the celerity of movement which was possible in an ad¬ 
vance up the Tennessee River, and there was added to this the greater fa¬ 
cility of obtaining supplies. An attempt was made by the Confederates to 
anticipate this advance by the fortification of Pittsburg Landing, a few miles 
from the southern border of Tennessee. This attempt was frustrated by the 
prompt action of two of Foote’s gun-boats securing that point as a base of 
operations for General Grant’s column, which advanced about the middle of 
March. This column consisted of five divisions, under Smith, McClernnnd, 
Wallace, Sherman, and Hurlbut. The two latter, made up chiefly of Ohio 
troops, bad been added since the capture of Donelson. It took eighty-two 
transports to convey this army with its material of war. Savannah, a few 

























































































































































































296 


[April, 1862. 


miles below Pittsburg, was made the grand depot for supplies, which were 
drawn from St. Louis and Cairo. General Buell’s army had its head-quar¬ 
ters at Nashville, on the Cumberland, more than a hundred and twenty miles 
distant Both armies were now under a single department, created by the 
President’s order of March 11, and designated the Department of the Missis¬ 
sippi. To this department also belonged General Pope’s command, and 
General Hunter’s, in Kansas. The supervision of the Department of the 
Mississippi was given to General Halleck. 

In the mean time the Confederate government had been making a great 
effort to reorganize its military forces in the field. In the first stage of the 
war troops had been enlisted only for the short period of twelve months, 
and during the early months of 1862 this term was expiring. Many of these 
re-enlisted. Calls were issued upon the states—upon Mississippi for seven 
regiments, upon Alabama for twelve, upon Georgia for 12,000 men, upon 
North Carolina for five regiments. These new levies, with the re-enlisted 
men, were all in the field by the 1st of April. All leaves of absence were 
revoked. Provision was also made for bringing into the army by conscrip¬ 
tion all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five; those 
between these ages already in the army were compelled to remain. 

Tennessee being the especial arena of the war in the West, her governor, 
Isham G. Harris, made extraordinary efforts to bring men into the field from 
that state. Before February 20 he had organized and put in the field fifty- 
nine regiments of infantry. He now proposed to “ prepare for efficient serv¬ 
ice in the field the whole military strength of the state.” As yet the war 
had done little toward exhausting the fighting material of the Confederacy. 
But few sanguinary battles had been fought. It has not been seldom that 
a single European battle has put out of combat a larger number of men than 
had been disabled or captured in the Confederate armies before April 1, 
1862, and the number of captured had been considerably larger than that of 
the disabled. Even the most martial class of Southern fighting men, those 
who were readiest to volunteer, and who became fittest officers in the field, 
still remained almost intact. The streets of the larger towns and cities of 
the South were still thronged with able-bodied young men. The Confed¬ 
erate President urged as his plea for conscription not the fact that volunteer 
service was likely to prove inadequate, but that it confined the burden of 
the war to the most patriotic class of citizens; he proposed by conscription 
merely to regulate the supply of force, so that an effective reserve might be 
held back to await a future exigency. 


The principal difficulty now attending the military operations of the Con¬ 
federates in the West, as in the East, was the lack of munitions. At the be¬ 
ginning of the war the seizure of all Federal forts along the coast had fur¬ 
nished material for a short period of war. But the Federal expeditions di¬ 
rected against important points on the sea-board soon called into requisition 
all the heavy guns thus captured. The Confederate factories were not yet 
adequate to supply the pressing demand either for small-arms or heavy ar¬ 
tillery. Of the sixty regiments furnished by Tennessee, the government had 
only been able to arm but 15,000; the rest were armed with old rifles and 
shot-guns furnished by citizens. At Fort Henry, Donelson, New- Madrid, 
and Island No. 10, hundreds of heavy guns and large numbers of small-arms 
had fallen into the hands of the Federals. The systematic evasion of the 
blockade, which, at a later period, contributed largely to the supply of the 
Confederate armies in war material, did not yet exist. Saltpetre for the 
manufacture of gunpowder was so scarce, and its possession so completely 
monopolized by speculators, that the Confederate Secretary of War, on the 
4th of February, issued an order that all military commanders should im¬ 
press the saltpetre in every district where it was found, paying therefor at 
the rate of 40 cents per pound. Then, again, in regard to the manufacture 
of light artillery, although there was an abundance of copper, there was not 
enough tin to convert the copper into bronze. The Ordnance Bureau, there¬ 
fore, solicited from citizens the use of all bells which could be spared. The 
reason of this was that bells contained so large an amount of tin in their 
composition; a ton of bell-metal being sufficient, with the proper amount of 


copper, for a battery of six pieces. The bells furnished from Fredericksburg 
alone sufficed for two such batteries. Beauregard issued a similar notice to 
the people of the Southwest, which met with a prompt response. The pub¬ 
lic prints of the South were full of offers made by Southern women to give 
to the government all the bell-metal which could be gathered from their 
kitchen furniture. Lead for bullets was also scarce, and one lady sent the 
lead weight attached to the striking part of her clock to help supply this de¬ 
ficiency. Subsequently, munitions of war were brought in large quantities 
from abroad, some of which came through Atlantic ports, and a large quan¬ 
tity by way of Matamoras, on the Rio Grande; so that at the close of 1862 
there was no longer any marked deficiency. 

The general plan of military operations adopted by Davis, and which now 
began to be clearly developed, was an offensive-defensive policy; at any rate 
and always to check the Federal column of advance on a line as far north¬ 
ward as could be safely chosen, and to seize upon every opportunity for a 
counter-advance which should carry the war into the loyal states—this was 
the theory upon which the war was to be conducted by the Confederacy. 
Considering the main purpose of the revolution itself, and the circumstances 
under which it was undertaken, this policy was eminently wise. The war 
had been begun, on the part of the revolutionists, to secure the empire of 
slavery over a vast section of territory; for its support it rested upon the 
wealth of the slaveholding class, and the power which that wealth gave this 
class over the poor whites of the South. Undertaken in the interest of 
wealth and power, it was an unpopular war. The first principle controlling 
the conduct of the war was that every slave state must be retained within 
the bounds of the Confederacy, and as much of the Territories as could be 
held. The second principle was that the war must be removed as far as pos¬ 
sible from the Southern states, partly because this would give the Confeder¬ 
acy a bold military front, but chiefly because the people, with the war at 
their thresholds, and levying upon them its utmost burden of want and hor¬ 
ror, could not safely be trusted. With the presence of Federal armies on 
Southern soil the old Union sentiment would revive, the popular respect for 
the national flag would return, and the people, in conjunction with the Fed¬ 
eral government, would turn the tables against the slaveholders. There 
would thus be a revolution within a revolution, in which event that class 
which was most directly interested in the war would suffer the entire bur¬ 
den of loss and shame. If the revolution had been a popular movement, 
then the problem involved would have been mainly a military one, unem¬ 
barrassed by political entanglements. 
In that case, the more pressing the 
demand for sacrifice of property or 
life, the more firm and sacred would 
have been the purpose to resist in¬ 
vasion. Under the circumstances, 
therefore, Davis’s plan was wise. 
Other plans there might have been 
displaying greater military sagacity, 
but there was none which promised 
so much as this one. 

This plan was one which we have 
termed offensive-defensive. But in 
the early months of 1862 only the 
defensive features could have been 
developed, and even these were de¬ 
veloped under great difficulties, such 
as have been already detailed. The 
armies of the Union immediately 
available for conflict considerably 
outnumbered the revolutionary ar¬ 
mies. This relation was reversed in 
a few months by the action of the 
Confederate conscription law. But 
this law did not begin to affect the 
army until early in June. Now ev¬ 
ery thing must depend upon the new levies of volunteers. 

The defensive plan which, under these circumstances, was adopted by the 
Confederates, was a simple one. Two routes were open to the Federal ad¬ 
vance, along two separate systems of railroad communication. One of these 
—the Georgia system—centred in Atlanta. The other, which drained the 
states of Alabama and Mississippi, and was connected with the Georgia sys¬ 
tem by means of the line eastward from Montgomery, had no one vital cen¬ 
tre, and its destruction would therefore involve a more complex and extend¬ 
ed campaign. The natural approach to the one system was through Chat¬ 
tanooga— to the other through Corinth and Memphis. Buell’s army, at 
Nashville, threatened rather the one; Grant’s, at Pittsburg, threatened rath¬ 
er the other. Johnston, so long as he remained at Murfreesborough, cover¬ 
ed the approach to Chattanooga, and a large column was being gathered at 
Corinth to oppose Grant. The Federal armies united would outnumber the 
Confederate, and this fact favored a concentration either in East or West 
Tennessee. Almost every military consideration dictated an advance on 
Corinth from Pittsburg. Johnston, fully aware of these considerations, did 
not long remain at Murfreesborough. 

On the 5th of March, General Beauregard, who had just left Island No. 10 
to its fate, assumed command of the Confederate forces in the Department 
of the Mississippi. In an address to his soldiers issued that day from Jack- 
son, he said that the Confederate losses since the commencement of the war 
were about the same as those sustained by the national arms, and that for 
the reverses lately experienced the enemy must be made to atone. He wish- 











GENERAL BUELL CROSSING BUCK RIVER AT COLUMBIA, TO EE-ENEORCE GRANT 











































































































































































298 


[April, 1862. 





Sluloll Cffur-cK' 


§trf? 


PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, OR PITTBBURO LANDING. 


ed those who shrunk from the task to transfer their arms to braver and firm¬ 
er hands, and to return home—a request which, at a later period, no Confed¬ 
erate officer would have dared to make lest it should be complied with. 
Beauregard’s army consisted of troops which had been in service for a few 
months in Tennessee and the adjacent states, to which large additions were 
daily being made. He had for his associates in command Generals Bragg 
and Polk,both of whom brought re-enforcements to his commands. Bragg 
had evacuated Pensacola in January for the more perfect defense of Mobile, 
and had now brought up a “fine corps of troops” from that city to Beaure¬ 
gard’s assistance. Polk brought his entire command, with the exception of 
the detachment left on the Mississippi. Johnston, too, was already on the 
march from Murfreesborough with an army of veterans. By the 1st of 
April the united army was well in hand in the vicinity of Corinth, holding 
the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads. Beaure¬ 
gard commanded the entire army, which was divided into three corps under 
Polk, Bragg, and Ilardee. 

Not until the 28th of March did Buell leave Nashville. Grant’s army 
was located on the south side of the Tennessee River, only eighteen miles 
from the combined armies of Johnston and Beauregard, who had already 
perfected their arrangements for an attack. It was three days before Buell’s 
army had crossed Duck River, and then they were ninety miles from Grant. 
The enemy had every advantage, if he could only bring up his three corps 
and compel a battle, which must terminate disastrously to the Federal col¬ 
umn, so inferior in numbers, at Pittsburg. Why, with this overwhelming 
advantage, Beauregard did not precipitate a battle with greater promptness, 
will always be an enigma to the historian. It was known, Beauregard says, 
in his report of the battle, as early as the 2d of April, that Buell was on his 
way to join Grant. Orders were issued at one o’clock on the morning of the 
3d for the movement, and there were only eighteen miles between Beaure¬ 
gard and Grant. Beauregard might have moved even sooner than this. 
The only reason he gives for not doing so is the “ want of general officers 
needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army 
brought thus suddenly together.” lie bad had nearly a month in which to 
supply this want, and it is to be supposed that Johnston’s column was al¬ 
ready properly organized and officered. At least it is certain that the army 
(7as no better off in this respect on the 2d than it was two or three days ear¬ 


lier. There was considerable delay in the movement. The orders issued 
by General Beauregard on the morning of the 3d contemplated that, on the 
4th, the three corps would have reached the vicinity of Shiloh Church, so 
that an attack might be made on the 5tli; a not very difficult undertaking, 
considering the short distance to be traversed. But the delays on the first 
day were great, and a severe rain-storm on the 4th interposed a farther im¬ 
pediment, so that it was not until late on Saturday afternoon of the 5th that 
the army reached the intersection of the road from Pittsburg to Hamburg. 
It must be remembered, however, that the difficulties in the way of Beaure¬ 
gard were also impediments in an equal degree to Buell’s march. Yet the 
latter had arrived at Savannah, seven miles from Pittsburg, with the advance 
of his army, on the evening of the 5th. 

Turning now to General Grant’s position, we find it most vulnerable to 
attack. Pittsburg Landing is a narrow ravine, with high bluffs on either 
side. Farther back from the river the country is broken and thickly wood¬ 
ed, with here and there an open field. On the very eve of battle we find 
Grant’s army encamped without a single breast-work or a single protection 
for a battery. The time had not yet come when the armies on either side 
had learned the all-important lesson of the value of artificial defense; but it 
was inexcusable that a permanent encampment should have been so entirely 
destitute of intrcnchments. There were two gun-boats on the river—the 
Tyler and Lexington. Grant’s advance line, consisting of three divisions, 
under Sherman, Prentiss, and McClernand, extended, without any judicious 
arrangement, from Owl Creek, on the right, to Lick Creek, on the left. The 
arrangement on the left was extremely faulty. Here one brigade of Sher¬ 
man’s division, under Stuart, was posted beneath bluffs which commanded the 
position. The rest of Sherman’s force was three or four miles distant, away 
off to the right of Shiloh Church. This gap was only filled by Prentiss’s 
division, as McClernand’s was massed close up to Sherman’s left and rear. 
Behind, and nearer the Landing, were the divisions of Hurlbut and Smith. 
The latter was commanded by W. H. L. Wallace, in the absence of General 
Smith, who was suffering still from a wound received at the siege of Donel- 
son. At Crump’s Landing, some miles below on the river, lay Lew. Wal¬ 
lace’s division. 

Such was Grant’s position when it was attacked by the enemy, Sunday 
morning, the 6th of April The attack was made in three lines. The first 























April, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


299 


was under Hardee, with one of Bragg’s brigades; the second advanced in I 
ihe rear of the first, under Bragg; while Polk’s corps, with a reserve, under 
Breckinridge,in its rear, formed the third. The entire force attacking was 
estimated by Beauregard as a'little over 40,000 men. The first blow, fall¬ 
ing upon Prentiss and Sherman, amounted almost to a surprise. The pick¬ 
ets were driven in, and, close upon their heels, the enemy followed. There 
was the least possible preparation for an attack. Prominent officers were 
still in bed. Breakfasts were being prepared, as if no such an event as a 
battle were at hand; and there was an entire lack of readiness in all details. 
Sherman, although, like the rest, taken by surprise, not having his men un¬ 
der arms until his advance guard had been driven back upon the main body, 
yet acted with great promptness and coolness. He called immediately to 
McClernand to come to his support on the left; sent word to Prentiss that 
the enemy was in his (Sherman’s) front in force, and called upon Hurlbut 
to come up to Prentiss’s aid. Leaving out Stuart’s brigade, which must, 
under the circumstances, be left to its separate commander, being on the ex¬ 
treme left near Lick Creek, Sherman’s division was drawn up in the vicinity 
of Shiloh Church. McDowell’s brigade held the extreme right, with a bat¬ 
tery guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek. Next to the 
left, and just west of the Corinth road, on which stood Shiloh Church, w r as 
Buckland’s brigade. Hildebrand's brigade was on the east side of the road, 
with the church between him and Bucklaud. In front of Sherman’s posi¬ 
tion ran a creek along his entire line. The position was good for defense, 
and, if advantage had been taken of it, and an abatis been constructed, the 
approach of the enemy up the slope to his encampment might have been re¬ 
pelled with ease. As it was, however, there was not even a breast-work, 
while the woods in front afforded cover to the enemy. Along the road in 
rear of the church Sherman had eight companies of cavalry, used to service 
at Donelson. A little after seven o’clock the general rode along his line on 
the left and became directly exposed to the fire, the enemy having already 
gained the woods in front, where he was massing his forces for attack. Here 
his orderly was killed. Appier’s regiment—the Tifty-third Ohio—held the 
extreme left, and was ordered to hold it at all hazards, being encouraged to 
do so by the presence of a battery on his right, which was supported by 
three of McClernand’s regiments. Two other Ohio regiments were on Ap¬ 
pier’s left, also having a battery on their right, at the church. 

The battle was fairly begun at about eight o’clock in the forenoon. In 
excellent order, Hardee’s columns advanced out of the woods in Appier’s 
front, a portion of them passing obliquely to the left to occupy the huge gap 
between Prentiss and McClernand, others advancing directly against Sher¬ 
man, and all covered by a heavy artillery fire from the woods, to which the 
two batteries already mentioned, in Hildebrand’s front, responded. Soon 
Sherman heard sounds of musketry and artillery away to the left, indicating 
that Prentiss was engaged. In less than an hour these sounds grew omin¬ 
ous, clearly announcing that Prentiss was falling back. Sherman’s own left, 
too, was being broken. Appier had fired but two rounds when he fell back, 
and was heard from no more during the battle, the movements of his regi¬ 
ment from this point becoming what Hildebrand, in his report, styles “gen¬ 
eral.” The regiment at his right followed soon, and the battery posted be¬ 
tween them was thus compelled to retire, with a loss of three guns, McCler¬ 
nand’s three regiments being unable to support it. Hildebrand’s own regi¬ 
ment then breaking up completed the rout on the left of the church. This 
necessitated the retreat of the battery at the church, and the abandonment 
of Sherman’s entire encampment. So complete was the demoralization of 
Hildebrand’s brigade, that the officer commanding saw no more of it that 
day A new line was formed by Buckland and McDowell on the Hamburg 
road, a short distance in rear of camp, but was no sooner formed than it was 
abandoned with the loss of a battery. The only thing now to be done was 
to fall back still nearer to the river and close up on McClernand’s right. 
This movement was fortunate for McClernand, who was now being hard 
pressed. McDowell’s brigade was thrown against the enemy’s left flank. 
Here the struggle was maintained until three o’clock P.M., the men taking 
advantage of every cover which the nature of the ground afforded. 

On the left the Confederates met even greater success than on the right. 
Prentiss, as wc have seen, was attacked nearly at the same time as Sherman. 
At this point, also, the surprise had been more complete than on the right. 
Prentiss’s command consisted of seven regiments, nearly one half of which 
were from Missouri. The line was formed on the open field, while the ene¬ 
my were sheltered by woods. On both flanks the Confederate columns ad¬ 
vanced. A portion of Bragg’s corps came in on Hardee’s right Prentiss 
was soon driven from his position; his rear was gained by the enemy, and 
he himself, with nearly half of his division, were captured. Before ten 
o’clock Prentiss’s encampment was in the enemy’s possession. Stuart’s iso¬ 
lated brigade was now placed in a perilous position. McArthur’s brigade, 
of W. II. L. Wallace’s command, started for his assistance, but, coming in too 
far on the right, became involved in the retrograde movement of Prentiss’s 
division. Stuart was on the Hamburg road, and a column of the enemy 
which came in on the field by this route attacked him just after lie had with¬ 
drawn so as to be out of Bragg’s way. Unable to hold his position, which 
was commanded by high bluffs, he fell back from ridge to ridge, making gal¬ 
lant resistance at each point, until at noon he was completely disorganized, 
and withdrew from the field. 

In the mean while the columns which had swept aside Prentiss’s division 
bent their whole force upon McClernand’s position. This division was the 
best and strongest in the advanced line. It numbered twelve regiments, all 
but one composed of Illinoisans. The other two divisions in front consisted 
of raw men; but McClernand’s division had borne the brunt of the Con¬ 
federate assault at Fort Donelson, and in some measure was used to the hor¬ 


rors of the battle-field. But having no efficient support on either hand, and 
the enemy being able to bring forward fresh troops continually, McClernand 
fell back, though not until he had lost more than half his artillery. His re¬ 
treat was in good order, bringing him out at length on a line with Hurlbut 
Thus by noon the entire Federal advance was driven in, routed for the most 
part, leaving three large encampments in the hands of the enemy, and hav¬ 
ing sustained heavy loss in artillery. 

Two divisions alone now remained intact, Hurlbut's and W. H. L. Wal¬ 
lace’s. These alone barred the victorious foe in front from the depots of 
ammunition and the transports. Wallace was now on Hurlbut’s left, par¬ 
tially filling up the gap caused by Prentiss’s rout. Hurlbut, for the sake of 
a better position, abandoned his camp and fell to the dense wood in the rear, 
where from this cover he had an advantage in repelling the enemy’s ad¬ 
vance across the open fields in his front. Soon after Wallace also fell back, 
and at half past four o’clock the entire Federal army was crowded into a 
narrow semicircular area extending about half a mile from the Landing. 

For eight hours the battle had lasted, and yet the Confederates, notwith¬ 
standing their success, still lacked a complete victory. They could see on 
every side many of the material fruits of victory, such, indeed, as rarely ever 
attends a decisive triumph ; but the business still before them gave them no 
leisure to secure these fruits. The work of the day would not be done un¬ 
til the Federals were swept from the field—from the Landing itself—as they 
had been from their camps. Besides, notwithstanding the}' had inflicted 
heavy injuries on Grant’s army, their plan of battle had failed. It had been 
Johnston’s design to leave an outlet of escape toward the north down the 
river, and to drive Grant’s army in this direction by massing overwhelming 
columns against his left. Instead of this, the Federals had fallen back on 
either side upon the centre, and still presented an obstinate front. One cir¬ 
cumstance had especially daunted the Confederates. At half past two o’clock 
their commander in the field had been killed while leading a charge against 
Wallace’s division. He had received a Miuie ball in his leg which severed 
an artery, and soon died from loss of blood. This had led to some confusion 
and delay on the most critical part of the field. Beauregard, who was suf¬ 
fering from indisposition, was then obliged to take the field, and, in the mean 
w'hile, the Federals had fallen back to their last line about the Landing, and 
organized their scattered commands. 

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the deceased Confederate commander, 
had had a somewhat eventful military career. His military education was 
completed at West Point in 1820. He served in the Black Hawk War, 
after which he left the army until 1836, when he emigrated to Texas, arriv¬ 
ing there shortly after the battle of San Jacinto. He then entered the Tex¬ 
an army as a private soldier. Soon he superseded General Felix Houston 
in the chief command. This led to a duel between the two officers, in which 
Johnston was wounded. In 1838 he was appointed Secretary of War in 



ALUE&T fclD.NEY JolJ.NaToN. 















300 


[April, 1862. 



Texas, and the next year carried on a successful campaign against the Cher- 
okees. He warmly advocated the annexation of Texas to the United States. 
In 1846 he commanded the volunteer Texan Rifles; was six months after¬ 
ward an inspector general on General Butler’s staff. President Taylor ap¬ 
pointed him paymaster in 1849 with the rank of major, and upon the pas¬ 
sage by Congress of the act authorizing the raising of additional regiments, 
he was made colonel of the Second Cavalry. In 1857 he was placed at the 
head of the forces sent to Utah, and was soon made the commander of that 
district. He resigned his position in the army at the beginning of the civil 
war, and upon his arrival at Richmond received a general’s commission and 
the command of the Confederate Department of the Mississippi. He died 
upon the battle-field for lack of prompt surgical attendance. His death was 
at first carefully concealed from the army, and it was given out that it was 
not he, but George M. Johnston, provisional governor of Kentucky, who had 
been killed. The latter, who participated in the battle, w r as also mortally 
wounded. 1 

The Federal situation was discouraging, but far from hopeless. W. H. L. 
Wallace had been mortally wounded. Prentiss, with a good part of his di¬ 
vision, had been captured. Half of the artillery of the army had been lost. 
The river, from Savannah to Pittsburg, was lined with stragglers, who were 
panic-stricken and unfit for fighting. Lew. Wallace’s division of veteran 
troops, which had been expected all day from Crump’s Landing, had mis¬ 
taken its route, and had not yet reached the battle-field, and the whole army 
was now huddled together in the vicinity of the encampment which had 
been occupied by W. H. L.Wallace. The hospitals along the ridge near the 
Landing were full to overflowing with killed and wounded. All day the 
battle had been fought without any definite plan; at its opening Grant him¬ 
self was miles away at Savannah, and when he came upon the field, at ten 
A.M., he saw nothing better to be done than to oppose the most stubborn 
resistance to the enemy. But the enemy had done his worst and spent his 
force, llis loss in killed, wounded, and missing nearly equaled Grant’s. 
Grant’s depots of ammunition were still intact, and there was not the slight¬ 
est doubt on his part that he would be able to hold with perfect ease the 
line which he had adopted. In this state of affairs General Grant visited 
Sherman’s line. The two generals estimated their loss, and a plan was 
formed for future operations. The time was to come when these two offi¬ 
cers were together to wield the united armies of the republic against the rev¬ 
olutionary forces which now, at the sunset of this 6th of April, were so de¬ 
fiant and confident of success. Grant naturally recurred to the battle of 
Donelson. He said to Sherman that, at a certain period of the battle, he saw 
that either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front. He 

1 The following extract from an article published tn Harper's Weekly, January 30,1858, shows in 
what esteem General Johnston was then held in the army: 

“Colonel Johnston is now. in the matured vigor of manhood. lie is nbovc six feet in height, 
strongly and powerfully formed, with a grave, dignified, and commanding presence. His features 
nrc strongly marked, showing his Scottish lineage, and denote great resolution and composure of 
character. His complexion, naturally fair, is, from exposure, a deep brown. IIis hnbits are ab¬ 
stemious and temperate, and no excess has impaired his powerful constitution. His mind is clear, 
strong, and well cultivated. His manner is courteous, but rather grave and silent. He has many 
devoted friends, but they have been won and secured rather by the native dignity and nobility of 
his character than by his powers of address. He is a man of strong will and ardent temper, but 
his whole bearing testifies the self-control he has acquired. As a soldier he stands very high in 
the opinion of the army. As an instance of this it may be mentioned that, in a large assembly of 
officers and gentlemen, the gallant and impetuous Worth, when asked who was the best soldier he 
had ever known, replied, * I consider Sidney Johnston the best soldier I ever knew.’ ” 


had taken the opportunity, and had ordered an advance all along the line, 
and the enemy had been beaten. It was just such a crisis now. The two 
instances were very nearly analogous. At Donelson, Pillow had succeeded 
in turning the Federal left upon its centre, driving one entire division from 
its camps. The reverse in the present instance was greater; but here, as be¬ 
fore, the enemy had spent his force in exhausting charges, and a few fresh 
troops would be certain to turn the tide. These were now near at hand un¬ 
der Lew. Wallace. It was then decided that the army, thus re-enforced, 
should on the morrow assume the offensive. 

In the mean time the defensive position at the Landing had been strength¬ 
ened. All the artillery of the army had been placed by Colonel Webster, 
Grant’s chief of staff, to cover every approach. For some time there had 
been a lull in the firing. The enemy was marshaling his columns for the 
final charge of the day. It was not long before these columns approached 
over the broken ground in front. But the fire from twenty guns checked 
their advance. They could make no headway against it Suddenly, too, 
there burst forth against them a rapid and overwhelming fire from the two 
gun-boats, which had been waiting all day for an opportunity to share in 
the battle. This opportunity was now afforded by the position of General 
Grant’s army. This new element in the conflict discomposed the Confeder¬ 
ates, who were compelled to withdraw from the field. 

That night Beauregard’s head-quarters were at Shiloh Church. Just at 
dark Lew. Wallace came up. A portion of Buell’s army had arrived. Buell 
came to Sherman at the close of the interview between the latter and Gen¬ 
eral Grant, and assured him that he could bring 18,000 fresh men for to-mor¬ 
row’s battle. All night long these men were crossing in the transports. 
Nelson and Crittenden had been able to get on the field just at the close of 
the last repulse of the enemy. These divisions were formed near the Land¬ 
ing, in a line perpendicular to the river, stretching up to the Corinth road. 
This line was continued in the same direction west of the road, where Hurl- 
but, McClernand, and Sherman took up their position. Among these last 
three divisions were apportioned the fragments which were left of Prentiss’s 
and W. H. L. Wallace’s. Lew. Wallace came in on the extreme right, con¬ 
tinuing the line to the neighborhood of Shiloh Church. During the night 
McCook’s division of Buell’s army took the position on Crittenden’s right, 
close up to the Corinth road. At nine o’clock it began to rain-—a fortunate 
circumstance for those of the wounded who had been left on the field of bat¬ 
tle, and were suffering from thirst. The gun-boats kept up an annoying fire 
all night, thus depriving the enemy of that sleep which was so necessary in 
view of the duties to be met in the morning. It was owing to this cannon¬ 
ade that the enemy was found the next morning to have withdrawn from 
the camps which he had captured on Sunday. 

The battle of Monday did not compare either in length or severity with 
that of the previous day. The advance was along either side of the Cor¬ 
inth road, Grant on the right and Buell on the left. It would have been 
better, doubtless, if this disposition had been exactly reversed, as in that 
event the hardest of the fighting would have fallen upon Buell’s- fresh men; 
for, while the enemy had yesterday massed against the Federal left, he now 
directed his heaviest column against the right, which was held in great part 
by the jaded troops of Grant’s army. 

Beauregard was now outnumbered, and, although he made a gallant resist- 











































GENERAL llALLECK'S ARMY ON THE TENNESSEE. 


April, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


301 










































































































302 



ance in the early part of the day, he had by noon brought into action his 
entire reserve force, and it was evident that he could neither hold his ground 
nor secure the fruits of yesterday’s victory. He withdrew from the field in 
good order, falling back on Corinth. 

We have called the attack on Sunday morning a surprise. General Grant 
claims that this was not the case, and that, if the enemy had sent him word 
when and where he would attack, he could not have been better informed. 
“Skirmishing,” he says, “had been going on for two days between our re- 
eon noitring parties and the enemy’s advance.” It is certain, however, that 
Johnston’s attack had all the practical effect of a surprise. Grant himself 
admits: “ I did not believe that they intended to make a determined attack, 
but simply to make a reconnoissance.” It was just this determined attack, 
preceded by only a feeble and imperfect warning, which tended more than 
any thing to the Federal reverse on Sunday. A larger number of Grant’s 
army were new troops as compared with the Confederate army. The ene¬ 
my had the important advantage of attack also, while Grant’s command had 
not even ordinary advantages in the way of defense. Thus the panic arose. 
With the exception of McClernand’s division, there was not a regiment in 
the advance line, on the morning of the 6th, which had ever seen a battle, 
and Johnston gave these men their first impression of the fury of a charge, 
which came upon them so suddenly as immediately to produce demoraliza¬ 
tion. It was not the fault of field and company officers that this happened, 
for these officers did their best to rally their broken regiments, and them¬ 
selves remained on the field after they had been totally abandoned by their 
commands. 

The battle had no decisive effect on the campaign. The losses were not 
far from equal on both sides. The Confederate loss Beauregard estimates 
at nearly 11,000; that of the Federals was about 3000 more; and this differ¬ 
ence may be explained by the number of prisoners lost in Prentiss's divis¬ 
ion. As to the forces engaged, thgre are no exact official estimates given on 
the Federal side. Grant had about forty regiments the first day, one fourth 
of which, at the lowest estimate, were of no use on the field. Buell and 
Lew. Wallace added to this force, on the second day, about 25,000 men. 


[May, 1862. 

Since the Confederates had taken 
the initiative of attack for the purpose 
of defeating one of two armies against 
which, combined, there was little hope 
of successful defense, and had failed in 
'that purpose, the result of the battle, 
so far as they were concerned, was 
equivalent to a defeat. As a test of 
force it afforded encouragement to the 
Federal commanders. General Hal- 
leck determined to reorganize the ar¬ 
mies under Grant and Buell, and to 
re-enforce them with every regiment 
that could be spared from other por¬ 
tions of the field. He started from 
St. Louis the very day after the battle. 
In less than two weeks after his ar¬ 
rival on the field, General Pope’s divi¬ 
sion, 25,000 strong, had been brought 
up from New Madrid, and before the 
close of April the three columns, un¬ 
der their respective commanders, were 
ordered to hold themselves in readi¬ 
ness to move. The army thus gath¬ 
ered together under Halleck’s com¬ 
mand numbered more than a hundred 
thousand men. Beauregard, also, had 
increased his force by calling Price 
and Van Dorn from Arkansas, who 
added an army which, if we are to believe a statement made to his soldiers 
by General Bragg, aliliost equaled “the Army of Shiloh.” Bragg’s entire 
address to his soldiers on May 5 indicates that the Confederate army at 
Corinth was quite equal to Halleck’s. He says: “ You will encounter him” 
[the enemy] “ in your chosen position, strong by nature and improved by 
art, away from his main support and reliance, gun-boats and heavy bat¬ 
teries, and, for the first time in this war, with nearly equal numbers.” He 
continues: “-The slight reverses we have met on the sea-board have worked 
us good as well as evil; the brave troops so long retained there have hast¬ 
ened to swell your numbers; while the gallant Van Dorn and invincible 
Price, with the ever-successful Army of the West, are now in your midst, 
with numbers almost equaling the Army of Shiloh. We have, then, but to 
strike and destroy, and, as the enemy’s whole resources are concentrated 
here, we shall not only redeem Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri at one 
blow, but open the portals of the whole Northwest.” It must be admitted 
that Halleck’s army was much superior to Beauregard’s in artillery and 
equipments. 

The roads south from Pittsburg were at this season of the year peculiarly 
difficult. At all times low and marshy, the country was now almost impass¬ 
able; bridges which the enemy had burned had to be rebuilt; but, on the 
3d of May, over comparatively dry roads, the army had advanced to within 
eight miles of Corinth. This place is twenty miles west of the Tennessee 
River, and somewhat farther from Pittsburg Landing. It is situated at the 
intersection of the Charleston and Mobile railroads. Between the small vil¬ 
lage and the Tennessee the country was broken, the roads across the marsh¬ 
es had been torn up, and the bridges destroyed. In the advance General 
Pope commanded the left, Buell the centre, and Grant the right; afterward 
the right was given to Thomas, Grant being made second in command. 
Pope’s division was re-enforced with a division drawn from Curtis’s Army 
of the Southwest. In order to prevent the re-enforcement of Beauregard, 
and to cut off his retreat, an expedition was sent out under Colonel Elliott, 
consisting of two cavalry regiments, with orders to strike the Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad in the vicinity of Booneville, and destroy the track, so as to 



COLONEL ELLET’g 1UM FLEET. 

























































































Apkil, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


303 



effectually prevent its use for the next few days. Elliott, it was intended, 
should then make his way through Northern Alabama, reporting there to 
General Mitchell at Huntsville. General Mitchell’s division of Buell’s army, 
instead of moving with the others to Pittsburg Landing, had, just before the 
battle of Shiloh, pushed directly south into Northern Alabama. Elliott was 
partially successful, destroying a large number of locomotives and cars at 
Booneville. 

Notwithstanding the confident tone with which Beauregard and Bragg 
had both addressed the army, indicating that Corinth must not be abandon¬ 
ed without a desperate struggle, that place was evacuated at the close of May 
without any considerable conflict with the Federal forces marching against 
it. Not a piece of ordnance was left behind. 

At the time of the evacuation the water was falling so low in the Tennes¬ 
see River that Halleck could no longer rely upon his water-base, and was 
obliged to resort to railway communications. This caused great delay, and 
the enemy were able to withdraw no inconsiderable number of troops east¬ 
ward for the defense of Richmond, then threatened by McClellan. But to 
give up Corinth was also to retire from Memphis. 

Immediately after the surrender of Island No. 10, Commodore Foote, with 
his mortar boats and some transports, moved down the river against Fort 
Pillow. This and Forts Wright and Randolph were the fortifications guard¬ 
ing the approach to Memphis, which was seventy miles below Fort Pillow, 
and fifty-eight below Fort Randolph. Fort Pillow is situated on the First 


Chickasaw Bluffs on the Tennessee shore. These bluffs rise to the height 
of seventy-five or one hundred feet, and are broken by ravines. This point 
on the river is the first good position for defense below Island No. 10. The 
river here makes a wide bend around Plum Point, and immediately below, 
at the Bluffs, another bend, so that Fort Pillow commands several miles of 
the river both above and below. Upon the Second Chickasaw Bluffs stands 
Fort Randolph, with Fort Wright just above, so that these two works take 
up the line of defense where Fort Pillow leaves it off. Foote established 
bis mortars at Craighead Point, opposite Fort Pillow, and three fourths of a 
mile distant. The bombardment commenced on the 17th of April by a fire 
from these mortars upon the fort and a small Confederate fleet in the vicin¬ 
ity of the latter. This attack was repeated daily, without any very sensible 
effect. In the mean time the Federal gun-boats lay at anchorage just out of 
range above the fort. There was no possibility of a co-operation of the land 
forces, at first on account of the height of the water in the river, and after¬ 
ward because Pope’s division was called upon to co-operate in the movement 
against Corinth. Pope’s army of 20,000 men was withdrawn on the morn¬ 
ing of the 17th to join Halleck’s command at Pittsburg, which step, says 
Commodore Foote, “frustrated the best matured and most hopeful plans 
and expectations thus far formed in this expedition.” Two regiments only, 
under the command of Colonel Fitch, were left to co-operate with the flotil¬ 
la. The plan of attack proposed to be carried out, if Pope had remained, 
was, that a canal should be built on the Arkansas side, so as to enable the 
gun-boats and transports to get in the rear and thus cut off the Confederate 
batteries. Even with the small force left under Colonel Fitch, amounting 



COLONEL m.i.K T'fl Ram AJ’F&OAOlllNG MEJtniig. 




















































































304 


[April, 1862, 



MEMPHIS BEFORE THE WAR, 























































































































































































































































































































































FROM DOXELSOX TO VICKSBURG. 


305 


Joe, 1862.] 



to noi more than 1200 men, an attempt was made to carry out this plan, but 
without success. 

The circumstances in which Commodore Foote was placed greatly chafed 
his spirits. He expected, when he left New Madrid, to be able to capture 
Memphis within the space of one week, and the departure of Pope's armv 
was, under these circumstances, a bitter disappointment. The wound which 
he had received at Fort Donelson added to his despondency. On the 14th 
of April he wrote to Secretary Welles: 

“ The effects of my wound have quite a dispiriting effect upon me from 
the increased inflammation and swelling of mv foot and leg. which have in¬ 
duced a febrile action, depriving me of a good deal of sleep and energy. I 
can not give the wound that attention and rest it absolutely requires until 
this place is captured.” 

His position was one in which he could not make a formidable attack, 
and one even which occasioned him apprehension. His force consisted of 
seven iron-clad and one wooden gun-boat, sixteen mortar boats, "onlv avail¬ 
able in throwing shells at a distance, and even worse than useless for de¬ 
fense,” and the small land force under Colonel Fitch. Against him were 
nine Confederate gun-boats already at Fort Pillow, and ten others reported 
on their way to Memphis from the Lower Mississippi. He expected soon 
to hear of the arrival in bis front of the heavy gun-boat Louisiana, just be¬ 
ing completed at New Orleans. This boat occasioned him some alarm, 
though he had not much to fear from the others, most of which were wood¬ 
en, though armed with heavy guns. Fort Pillow, according to his report, 
had not less than forty heavy guns. “Under these circumstances,” he writes, 
“an attack on our part, unless we can first establish a battery below the fort 
under the protection of the gun-boats, would be-extremeN hazardous, al¬ 


though its attempt might prove successful, and even be good policy under 
other circumstances: but it can hardly now be so regarded, as a disaster 
would place all that we have gained on this and other rivers at the merev 
of the rebel fleet, unless the. batteries designed to command the river from 
below are completed at No. 10, or at Columbus, which I very much doubt. 
I therefore hesitate about a direct attack upon this place now, more than I 
should were the river above properly protected.” Commodore Foote doubt, 
less retained a vivid recollection of his contest with the water-battery at Don¬ 
elson. At New Madrid and Island No. 10 every thing had been made to 
depend upon a movement in the rear of the enemy’s works. Such a move¬ 
ment was now scarcely possible. Even the tools necessary for cutting the 
proposed canal were not at hand, having been removed with Pope’s army. 
Foote’s indisposition, early in May, rendered it necessary for him to transfer 
the command of the Mississippi flotilla to Captain C. H. Davis. He returned 
to the East, and at Washington took the superintendence of the Bureau of 
Equipment until the summer of 1863, when he was appointed to supersede 
Admiral Dupont in the command of the South Atlantic squadron. While 
on his way to that destination he was taken ill, and died at New York on 
the 26th of June. 1863. His services in the West had been properly appre¬ 
ciated by the people and the government. He had been raised to the rank 
of rear-admiral, his commission dating from Jnlv 16,1862^ 

On the 10th of May a naval action took place on the river between the 
Federal and Confederate fleets. The Confederate squadron consisted, ac¬ 
cording to Davis’s report, of eight iron-clad steamers, four of which were fit¬ 
ted as rams from old New Orleans tow-boats, the upper works of which had 
been cut away, and their sides protected, in some instances, bv railroad iron, 
and in others by bales of cotton, hooped and bound together by iron bands. 







































































306 



[June, 1862 

These rams proceeded up the river and attacked the mortar boats. The 
gun-boat Cincinnati, under Commander Stembel, followed by the Mound 
City, under Commander Kilty, hurried up to the support of the mortar boats. 
The Cincinnati had hardly cut loose from the shore, and was in a position 
which prevented her from being easily handled, when the most formidable 
of the rams came up to close quarters. Twice the Cincinnati let fly her 
stern guns at th 4 ram, but without effect, and the latter came against her 
with great force, although without effecting any serious damage. This blow 
enabled the Cincinnati to move out from shore, when she hurled broadside 
after broadside against the sides of her grim antagonist. The ram again 
trusted to her striking power, and the two vessels again struck with a vio¬ 
lent blow, and, at the same moment, the ram received a full broadside from 
the gun-boat alongside, while on both sides there was a free discharge of 
musketry. At this crisis, and while all around him was in confusion, Com¬ 
mander Stembel shot the pilot on board the ram, and the next moment him¬ 
self received a severe wound. But the ram was disabled and drifted down 
the stream. In the mean while the Mound City disabled two others of the 
enemy’s vessels. The entire Confederate fleet had withdrawn before the ac¬ 
tion had lasted an hour. The Mound City and the Cincinnati were so bad¬ 
ly crippled as to need repairing. 

Fort Pillow was evacuated on the 4th of June, as a consequence of the 
evacuation of Corinth. Every thing of any value was either carried away 
or destroyed. All that now stood between the Federal force and Memphis 
was the Confederate fleet. Flag-officer Davis started immediately down the 
river, and, on the morning of the 6th, the enemy’s fleet of eight vessels was 
discovered lying off the levee at Memphis. On both sides preparations were 
made for an immediate contest. Five gun-boats—the Benton, Cairo, Caron- 
delet, Louisville, and St. Louis—with two vessels of the ram fleet, the Queen 
of the West and Monarch, under Colonel Ellet, moved down the river, the 
rams getting into action first. The Confederate fleet was ranged in two 
lines of battle. The contest was not long, lasting little more than an hour, 
and terminated in the destruction or capture of seven of the enemy’s vessels. 
In the very beginning of the action the General Lovell was sunk by the 
Queen of the West, in the middle of the river, with most of her crew. The 
Beauregard and Little Rebel had their boilers blown up; the former went 
down, and the latter had to be abandoned by her crew. One boat, the Jeff. 
Thompson, took fire from the Federal shells, and burned to the water’s edge. 
The General Price was run ashore and abandoned. The Sumter and Bragg 
were disabled and captured. A single boat—the Van Dorn—succeeded in 
effecting an escape. Only three men of the Federal flotilla were wounded 
in the engagement. 

Memphis was immediately surrendered by the mayor, John Park; and 
Colonel Fitch, with his little command, took possession of the city. During 
the whole of the naval action the levee had been crowded with a throng of 
interested spectators. Not a few of these hoped that it might terminate in 
the triumph of the national arms. The capture of Memphis left the Con¬ 
federates no large city, in Tennessee. Indeed, with the exception of a small 
force in East Tennessee, about Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Cumberland Gap, 
there was not, at the time of the capture of Memphis, any Confederate army 
in the state. Beauregard's army had fallen back to Tupelo, about eighty 
miles south of Corinth, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, followed by the 
advance of the Federal army under General Pope. General Grant’s army 
held the line of railroad skirting the southern boundary of Tennessee from 
Memphis to Corinth. Buell’s column was already moving upon Chattanoo¬ 
ga, which had been uncovered by Beauregard’s retreat In this direction, 
as we have already indicated, General Mitchell had been operating for the 
last two months, and had established himself at Huntsville, on the railroad 
connecting Memphis and Corinth with Chattanooga; but, for want of sup¬ 
port, he had been obliged to withdraw from all territory occupied by him 
south of that point. On the 1st of May he wrote to the Secretary of War: 
“The campaign is ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in perfect security, 
while all of Alabama north of the Tennessee River floats no flag but that of 
the Union.” When Buell moved against Chattanooga, Mitchell’s command 
was given to General Rousseau, and General Mitchell received the command 
of Port Royal. Thus, about the middle of June, we find Southern Tennes¬ 
see, from Memphis nearly to Chattanooga, held by three Federal armies, 
whose combined strength can not have been less than 125,000 men. Soon 
we shall see this line completely broken up by a formidable movement of 
the enemy in the rear. 

Shortly after his retreat from Corinth, General Beauregard retired for a 
brief period from the army on account of ill health. His command was 
turned over to General Bragg, who forthwith prepared to assume the offen¬ 
sive. He began to move his army from Tupelo westward toward Chatta¬ 
nooga. One reason of this movement was to anticipate General Buell’s 
march in the same direction; but Bragg had an ulterior purpose beyond that. 
He intended from Chattanooga to strike boldly into Kentucky. By this 
movement he expected not only to compel the abandonment by the Feder- 
als of their advanced positions, but also, by the aid of Kentuckians, to estab¬ 
lish the Confederate government in Kentucky. He was certainly justified 
in assuming the offensive; for, although the Confederates had been steadily 
losing territory, they had, in the mean time, by this very contraction, been 
steadily gaining men. Detached forces had been drawn in from all parts 
of the Confederacy, and were available at the most critical points of conflict. 
The Conscription Act also had brought into the field large numbers of fight¬ 
ing men. The Federal armies, on the other hand, though, taken all together 
at this time, not far outnumbering the forces of the enemy, were scattered 
all along the rivers in the West, and all along the Atlantic coast. The ad¬ 
vance southward of Halleck’s army necessitated a series of detached garri- 



































































































































































































Junk, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


307 



JOHN MUBGAJ4. 


sons along the lines of railroad used for the transportation of supplies. These 
garrisons were made the more necessary on account of the guerrilla operations 
of the enemy, which in the summer of 1862 were especially troublesome in 
Kentucky. 

Bragg’s projected invasion was preceded by a series of guerrilla expedi¬ 
tions. The lower counties of Kentucky suffered chiefly from their ravages. 
Property was stolen, outrages of every sort were not unfrequently perpe¬ 
trated upon Union citizens, bridges were burned, and even the friends of the 
Confederacy did not escape the lust of these desperadoes for plunder. The 
most successful of these expeditions was one undertaken by John Morgan, 
the most noted guerrilla leader of the war. Morgan was a native of Ken¬ 
tucky. When the war broke out he was a planter of considerable means, 
but he left his plantation and became attached to General Hardee’s division 
of the Confederate army. He had protected Johnston’s rear in the retreat 
from Nashville. Soon after that event he gathered about him a band of 
daring Kentuckians, whom he led in a series of predatory operations against 
railroads, supply-trains, and loyal citizens. His own regiment was joined 
on this occasion by some partisan rangers from Georgia, a Texas squadron, 
and two companies of Tennessee cavalry. He started from Knoxville July 
4, and his expedition was accomplished in less than one month. During 
that time he penetrated two hundred and fifty miles within the Federal lines, 
captured a large number of defenseless towns, took a large number of small- 
arms, and destroyed a great amount of valuable military property. On the 
11th of July Morgan had reached Lebanon, a short distance south of Frank¬ 
fort. The place was protected by less than a hundred men, and fell .easily 
into Morgan’s possession. Here large government depots, filled with sugar, 
coffee, and other provisions, were destroyed. Morgan proceeded as far 
northward as Cynthiana, where the garrison was surrounded and captured, 
after a desperate conflict with superior numbers. This put an end to Mor¬ 
gan’s successful career. He was soon overtaken at Paris, and defeated by a 
Federal force under the command of General Green C. Smith.. At the same 
time Forrest was engaged in an expedition of a similar character. On the 
13th of July, the day Morgan entered Cynthiana, Murfreesborough, in Ten¬ 
nessee, was surrendered to Forrest. The surrender was attended by the 
capture of an entire Michigan regiment. The impetuous onset of the Con¬ 
federate cavalry appears to have at once nearly settled the fate of the town. 
The force defending the place no doubt exceeded Forrest’s command. Ac¬ 
cording to General Buell’s report, the attack might have been effectually 
repelled. Encouraged by these successes, Colonel Morgan, who had retreat¬ 
ed into Tennessee, even ventured to attack Clarksville, on the Cumberland 
River, below Nashville, and succeeded in capturing that place, with a large 
quantity of military stores. 

The retreat of Beauregard’s army from Corinth was without doubt a most 
judicious movement. It was, in great measure, a surprise to General Hal- 
leck, who was thus compelled to form new combinations. Bragg, who came 
into command on the 16th of June, had in this way gained time not only 
to re-enforce his army, but even to prepare for a formidable movement into 
Kentucky. Every day brought some new increment to his army through 
the operation of the Conscription Act. As we have said previously, the Con¬ 
federacy had suffered very little from the exhaustion of its fighting popula¬ 
tion ; and, in regard to the munitions of war, there soon ceased to be any 


great uneasiness, for every week now brought into the several Confederate 
ports artillery of various calibre and small-arms without number; and, even 
apart from this foreign supply, there were already in operation, at Richmond 
and the great military centres in Georgia and the Carolinas, extensive man¬ 
ufactories devoted to the production of all the needed material for conduct¬ 
ing the war. The situation since the early spring had wonderfully changed. 
The prospects of the Confederacy were every day growing brighter. The 
vast combinations which McClellan had formed for the capture of Richmond 
had miscarried, as will be shown in the subsequent chapter. The govern¬ 
ment established by the revolutionists bad shown itself competent to meet 
emergencies which but a few months since had threatened its speedy over¬ 
throw. That government, although it had failed to obtain recognition from 
the great European powers, had elicited signal marks of respect by the en- 
ergy with which it was conducting a war of so great magnitude; and by 
many eminent foreign statesmen, whose words carried with them great 
weight and authority, it was considered to be on the fair road to success. 
At home, that government had not yet betrayed its inherent weakness. Its 
hold upon the masses of the Southern people had not yet been relaxed. 
The bold front which it was now prepared to show in the field inspired the 
timid with respect and confidence, and silenced its strongest opponents. 
But this bold front must be maintained, and at much risk. Any very de¬ 
liberate action was not within the scope of the policy which was forced upon 
the Confederate executive. Like all revolutionary governments, the Confed¬ 
eracy was in no position where it could exactly measure its resources and 
exercise a rigid economy in the exhaustion of its vital forces. Whatever 
else it might be,it must be audacious; when it ceased to be that,it gave up 
its prestige altogether. It was not permitted to stand upon the defensive, 
and await the developments of the national government against which it 
was arrayed. In a game of that sort it must inevitably be the loser. De¬ 
pending for its very existence upon impulse rapidly awakened, it must be 
maintained also by popular impulse. To hesitate, even upon the most ra¬ 
tional and carefully considered policy for effective defense, was to invite a 
popular reaction. Audacity was, therefore, the watchword of the revolu¬ 
tionists. The enemy must be stricken, blow upon blow, and paralyzed be¬ 
fore he should have time given him to develop his more various resources 
for war. And with the splendid armies now in hand, both in the East and 
West, this seemed quite possible to the Confederates. It looked like an easy 
matter to push back the waves of war northward, and, by a contrary tempest, 
to sweep every battle-field, and in (he heart of the great commercial cities of 
the North, and perchance in the national capital, to dictate the terms of peace. 
What these terms would be was significantly foreshadowed in the daily ed¬ 
itorials of the Richmond journals. Among these were the acceptance by the 
Northern states of the Confederate Constitution, and the acknowledgment 
of the right of secession. 

Evidently the Confederates were on the eve of important offensive move¬ 
ments, from which they expected the most extravagant measure of success. 
What these movements were in the West has already been indicated. To 
what issue they came, under the leadership of General Bragg, it will be our 
business to show in the remaining portion of this chapter. 

The possession of Knoxville and East Tennessee gave General Bragg the 





















308 


[June, 1862. 



CINCINNATI, OHIO. 


necessary foothold for the invasion of Kentucky. If General Mitchell’s col¬ 
umn had been sufficiently strengthened, it might have occupied such posi¬ 
tions in Northern Alabama and Georgia as would have compelled the evac¬ 
uation of East Tennessee. In the month of June the Confederates had 
abandoned Cumberland Gap. With a little exertion on General Buell’s 
part, Chattanooga and Knoxville might have been captured. The summer 
months were occupied by Buell in straggling, impotent blows against the 
enemy. He sent an expedition where he ought to have marched with an 
army. Thus, on the 7th of June, General Negley appeared before Chatta¬ 
nooga with a handful of troops, and instituted what perhaps might be called 
the feint of a siege. A few more thousand men, who could easily have been 
spared for the purpose, would have captured the place, insured our posses¬ 
sion of Knoxville, and have given the Federal army a strong position on 
the enemy’s flank if he should advance Ljito West Tennessee. By the want 
of energy displayed in the West, the Confederates were allowed two advant¬ 
ages. They were able to re-enforce their army in Virginia, and they were 
permitted in the West to take the initiative and to advance northward by 
the most auspicious route. It is true, doubtless, that the battle of Shiloh 
had been a heavy blow to the army. But this blow had fallen chiefly upon 


General Grant’s column. Buell’s army was fresh and well organized. The 
great want in the West was of a military leader—a man with military in¬ 
tuitions—a man of sufficient nerve to hold in hand and effectively wield the 
columns of a large army. Such leaders there were. Grant, Sherman, and 
Thomas—afterward recognized as the great martial heroes of the continent 
—belonged to the Western army, and held prominent positions; but they 
were overshadowed by officers whose claims were more ostentatious. Gen¬ 
eral Grant had shown great ability in the conduct of the operations against 
Fort Donelson. This the country had appreciated simply because it result¬ 
ed in success; the coolness with which the general had formed new combi¬ 
nations when his first plan had been disturbed by the sudden attack on his 
lines, and the promptness with which he had done the right thing at just 
the right time—these qualities had passed unobserved. At Pittsburg Land¬ 
ing, on the 6th of April, he had exhibited the same coolness and nerve, and 
the result was a success; but, just at the point of success, Buell came on the 
field, and the sudden turn which eighteen thousand fresh men gave to the 
battle caused the latter to be regarded as the hero of the entire action. Both 
Grant and Sherman had made great mistakes—they had not yet learned all 
the lessons of the battle-field. We have seen how, at Fort Henry, Grant, by 



VOLUNT&KBS OBOeaiNO THE OHIO FBOM CINCINNATI TO OOVINQTON. 











































































FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


309 


September, 1862.] 


waiting too long, had let the garrison slip by him on the road to Donelson. 
We have seen also what meagre preparation both he and Sherman had 
made against Beauregard’s attack in the battle of Shiloh; but the'time had 
not yet come when the armies on either side had learned to intrench them¬ 
selves even in the most temporary encampment. General Thomas owed 
whatever elevation he had at. this time to his victory over Zollicoffer at the 
battle of Mill Spring; but the time was to -come yet when he should win 
most important victories—when, by a simple master-stroke, he should wipe 
out of existence the Confederate Army of the West. General Halleck, the 
commander of the department in which these generals were operating, was 
himself an officer of more than ordinary ability. He was a careful student 
of military science, and was capable of great strategic combinationa He 
lacked, however, those peculiar characteristics which insure success to the 
commander on the field. Early in July, just after McClellan’s celebrated 
change of base, he was called to Washington to occupy the position of gen¬ 
eral-in-chief, a position for which he had eminent qualifications. His retire¬ 
ment from the West left Buell and Grant as the two great actors in that 
field, the former at that time being considered the greater general. Pope, 
who had won great distinction as the hero of New Madrid and Island No. 10, 
was also removed to the East, to take an important command in Virginia. 

This latter general was fighting a desperate battle on the old field of Bull 
Run on the same day that an important engagement was going on between 
the Federal troops and the advance of General Kirby Smith at Richmond, 
Kentucky. Kirby Smith commanded the Confederate forces in East Ten¬ 
nessee. Early in August he had commenced to move northward in two 
divisions, commanded by Churchill and Claiborne. Though he met with lit¬ 
tle resistance in his march, he encountered many difficulties. For many 
days his men had nothing to eat but green corn. His ordnance train was 
brought through without loss. However troublesome the intermediate jour¬ 
ney, Smith’s army knew that it was marching to the fertile valley of the 
Kentucky. At Richmond the first formidable resistance was encountered. 
This place is situated about fifty miles southeast of Frankfort, the capital of 
the state. There was a force stationed here under the command of Briga¬ 
dier General M. D. Manson, consisting of about eight regiments, mostly Indi¬ 
ana troops, a small squadron of cavalry, and nine pieces of artillery. Smith’s 
army was met a short distance from Richmond by this force, and the action 
began early on the morning of August 30. The enemy executed a success¬ 
ful flank movement with a portion of Churchill’s division, and broke the 
Federal lines. General Manson was captured. Just as the field was being 
abandoned to the enemy, General Nelson, coming from Lexington, tried to 
rally the flying troops, but without success; he was wounded in the effort. 
The superiority of the enemy in cavalry, as well as infantry, to a great de¬ 
gree decided the battle. The Federals left a large number of killed and 
wounded on the field, and lost largely in prisoners. Nearly all of their ar¬ 
tillery, too, was captured. 

This sudden movement of the enemy, who had already reached the banks 
of the Kentucky, created intense excitement both in Kentucky and Ohio. 
In Frankfort the Legislature was in session, but on receiving intelligence of 
the defeat at Richmond adjourned to Louisville, removing to that place the 
archives of the state, and about one million of money from the banks of 
Richmond, Lexington, and Frankfort. A proclamation was issued by Gov¬ 


ernor Robinson calling upon the citizens to take up arms in defense of the 
state. In two days time Lexington was taken. At this stage of his prog¬ 
ress Kirby Smith proclaimed to the people the object of bis invasion. He 
said: “ We come, not as invaders, but liberators. We invoke the spirit of 
your resolutions of 1798. * * * We call upon you to join with us in 
hurling back from our fair and sunny*plains the Northern hordes who would 
deprive us of our liberty that they may enjoy our substance.” The Confed¬ 
erate cavalry entered Frankfort on the 6th of September. There w r as no 
efficient force, as it then seemed, to prevent Kirby Smith from reaching the 
Ohio River. It was even anticipated that he might capture Cincinnati. 

The excitement in Cincinnati was so great that martial law was proclaim¬ 
ed, all places of business were closed, and the citizens were required to arm 
in defense of the city. Governor Tod issued a proclamation urging upon 
the citizens of Ohio the immediate requirements of the hour. General Lewis 
Wallace was placed in command of the force gathered together to cover the 
approach to Cincinnati. 

In the mean time, while Kirby Smith was demonstrating against the line 
of the Ohio farther north, the great bulk of Bragg’s army entered Kentucky, 
by way of Chattanooga, en route for Louisville. The season for this move¬ 
ment was well timed. If successful, the abundant harvests of the Kentucky 
and Ohio valleys, already ripening in the fields, would fall into the hands 
of the victors; for, while Kirby Smith was charging against the Federals 
that they were holding Kentucky in order to secure her substance, the Con¬ 
federates were open to precisely the same charge. 1 Suddenly, as Bragg 
drew nearer to Frankfort, Kirby Smith left Cincinnati, and, by a forced 
march, succeeded in effecting a junction with Him at the capital on the 4th 
of October. Here the two commanders amused themselves with the inau¬ 
guration of Mr. Hawes as provisional governor of Kentucky. 

General Bragg’s own column when he entered the state on the 5th of 
September consisted of thirty-six infantry regiments, with five regiments of 
cavalry. In one week’s time the advance of the column appeared in front 
of Munfordsville, at the crossing of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad 
over Green River, and demanded the surrender of the place. Up to this 
time Bragg had demonstrated against Nashville, in order to keep Buell at 
the latter place until he could strike the railroad between the Federal army 
and Louisville, which was its great base of supplies. He had, to a great 
degree, succeeded in deceiving Buell as to his real object, but his purpose 
was at length betrayed through intercepted dispatches. His movements 
had been well planned. Smith’s column demonstrated against Cincinnati 
on the right, Bragg’s against Nashville on the left; then suddenly, in both 
cases, the mask was laid aside, and both columns joined near Frankfort, a 
few miles from the real objective point of the campaign. The movement 
was as bold in conception as it was ingenious in design. But it failed in 
one important particular—it proceeded too leisurely. General Bragg was 

1 “The great and true source of meat supply is the State of Kentucky. If our armies could 

push directly forward over that state, and occupy it to the banks of the Ohio, the political advant¬ 
ages secured to the South would be of even small account compared with those she would derive 
in a sumptuary point of view. There are more hogs and cattle in Kentucky available for general 
consumption, two or three to one, than are now left in all the South besides; and steps ought to he 
taken by government to drive back these animals, as well as mules and horses, as our armies march 
forward, and place them within our lines. It is not only positively important to us that these an¬ 
imals should be promptly secured as they fall within our grasp, but it is negatively so, also, in de¬ 
priving the enemy of the convenient supplies of meat for their armies which they have derived from 
Kentucky .”—Richmond Examiner , September 12,1862. 



VSEUINO T8OOP8 ST TUB UBBSBT C1.BCX LN CIUOLNNATt. 

















































































310 


[September, 1862, 



GENERAL BUELL'S ARMY ENTERING LOUISVILLE. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































September, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


311 



VETERAN TROOPS MOVING CP THE OHIO TO LOCTSVTLLE AND CINCINNATI. 


too confident of the completeness of his disguise. It -will be admitted that 
both columns of his army encountered great obstacles in the way of a rapid 
march. He was compelled, in a great measure, to depend upon the country 
for supplies; but the country was full of adherents to the Confederate cause. 
He had, in the earlier stage of his march, a difficult route*; mountains were 
to be crossed, and here, where there must be the greatest delay, supplies were 
least abundant. Then, again, after a difficult march, his troops needed rest 
before they would be in a condition to fight decisive battles. All these dif¬ 
ficulties must be admitted; but, in view of other marches made by great 
armies during the war—marches longer and far more difficult, but accom¬ 
plished in one half the time—it is impossible not to lay the failure of Bragg's 
really splendid scheme for the occupation of the line of the Ohio to his slow¬ 
ness of movement. It was on the 21st of August that he had crossed the 
Tennessee River, just above Chattanooga. It was six weeks before his army 
was joined by Smith’s at Frankfort. Yet he was delayed by no important 
battle. The battle of Richmond, in which Kirby Smith was engaged, was 
decided in one day. Bragg himself had fought a battle at Munfordsville on 
the 14th and 16th of September. The advance of his column, as previously 
stated, had demanded the surrender of this place on the 13th. The Federal 
force stationed there for the protection of the bridge, under Colonel Wilder, 
consisted of a little over three thousand men, with four guns. This force 
surrendered on the 17th, after having sustained two attacks, with a loss of 
eight men killed and twenty wounded. Re-enforcements had arrived, so 
that the number of prisoners taken by the enemy was four thousand five 
hundred men, with ten guns. Apart from these battles, which gave the en¬ 
emy over seven thousand prisoners, there was no serious engagement on the 
line of march. There can scarcely be a reasonable doubt but that Bragg 
and Smith, if they had moved with greater rapidity, might have taken pos¬ 
session of Louisville without a struggle. What would have followed it is 
hard to say. Evidently General Bragg counted upon a more considerable 
demonstration in his favor from the citizens of Kentucky than he received. 
As had just been proved in Maryland, so too it was demonstrated in Ken¬ 
tucky, that the state was at heart loyal to the national government. Even 
the occupation of Louisville would not have, probably, added materially to 
the number of Bragg’s army, while his advanced position would have been 
untenable against the combination of forces which must soon have gathered 
against him. 

But in the race for Louisville Buell came out ahead. Having been made 
aware of Bragg’s purpose, Buell kept in his front, covering Nashville at the 
same time. Although the enemy had destroyed the bridge across Green 
River, Buell’s command forded that stream, driving the Confederates out of 
Munfordsville, and advanced rapidly toward Louisville. To this latter place 
had been transferred the intense excitement which a few days before had 


prevailed in Cincinnati. Many veteran troops, chiefly from Grant’s army, 
had been sent to both these places up the Mississippi and the Ohio, and, 
mingled with the new levies of troops, had done much to allay the popular 
apprehension. The command at Cincinnati was given to General Lewis 
Wallace, and General William Nelson commanded the troops at Louisville. 
Notwithstanding Buell’s haste to reach Louisville, it is still quite certain 
that, but for one circumstance, Bragg would have beaten him in the rare 
The road which the latter was taking crossed Salt River near Bardstown, 
about thirty-five miles south of Louisville, and the bridge at this point he 
found destroyed. The delay thus occasioned gave Buell the start. Just 
before the Federal army entered Louisville, on the 25th of September, the 
panic there had reached its height. In twenty-four hours more Nelson 
would have abandoned the city. All non-combatants had been sent out, 
and every thing was in confusion. To confusion was added a want of confi¬ 
dence on the part of many in General Buell’s generalship. Indeed, the lat¬ 
ter had scarcely got his army into the panic-stricken city before he found 
that an order had been issued front the War Department placing General 
Thomas in command, and it was mainly on account of the persistent solicit¬ 
ation of the latter that Buell was retained. 

The position which General Buell held was very similar to that of McClel¬ 
lan at the same period. Both generals were unfortunate from the political 
associations in which, whether by their own will or otherwise, they had be¬ 
come entangled. Americans do not easily forget the past histories of prom¬ 
inent public characters. This tenacity of memory is shown in the embar¬ 
rassments which attended Fremont’s administration in Missouri. It had not 
been forgotten that McClellan and Buell had in former times had political 
affiliations with men who were now leaders of the revolution. The great 
masses of the people, notwithstanding this knowledge, were willing to wait 
until the military competence or incompetence of these officers should have 
been proved, and to rest their judgment upon that basis alone, although 
there were many honest men who, from the well known sympathy of McClel¬ 
lan and Buell with a distinctively Southern sentiment, feared that they would 
conduct the war with less vigor than might else be expected. There are 
many circumstances which to the historian will show that this apprehen¬ 
sion was well grounded, though, as regards patriotism, no impeachment will 
ever rest against the names of either of these generals. In the mean time, 
even if they had been so inclined, they were not allowed to pursue a purely 
military policy without disturbance. A few partisans were determined to 
meddle with their military policy. Those whose sympathies were allied to 
theirs pressed them to a lenient policy, which would soften the blows direct¬ 
ed by their arms against the wealthy slaveholding classes of the South. 
These recommended the advance of those according with them in sentiment 
to the first commands. On the other hand, there were those equally parti- 








































312 [September, 1862. 


san who pressed them in exactly the opposite direction. These were un¬ 
willing that the war should be conducted, no matter how successfully, upon 
a policy which should touch too lightly the institution of slavery. They 
did all in their power to incite popular opposition to McClellan and Buell, 
and they urged strongly upon the President the necessity of their removal 
from command. The latter, taking sides with the great masses of the people, 
waited the course of military events, determined that the war for the Union 
must succeed, and that, if success should seem to be more sure from leaving 
slavery intact, he would so leave it; if by its destruction, then it should be 
destroyed. 

Buell’s temporary removal had no other than military grounds, the jus¬ 
tice of which was afterward fully proved. Thomas, as we have seen, though 
better fitted to command, protested against the decree from Washington, 
which was then retracted. He himself was made second in command, and 
thus occupied a position in which his military talent could not be made 
available. 

General Buell’s army, designated as the Army of the Ohio, numbered al¬ 
together, after its junction with Nelson, about a hundred thousand men, one 
half of whom were new recruits, who had been pouring into Louisville for 
the last few days. At Louisville he lost thousands by desertion. The army 
consisted of three corps. General Alexander McDowell McCook command¬ 
ed the First Corps, and General Crittenden the Second. Both these corps 
had been engaged in the second day’s fight at Shiloh. The Third Corps, 
commanded by General C. C. Gilbert, was Nelson’s old command. The 
command had been assigned to Gilbert at first temporarily, when Nelson 
was sent to Louisville. Nelson’s tragical end gave him the permanent com¬ 
mand. 

General Nelson was shot at Louisville on the 29th of September by Gen¬ 
eral Jefferson C. Davis. The affair grew out of the insolence of General 
Nelson toward the latter, who immediately borrowed a pistol and shot him' 
as he was ascending the stairs of the Galt House. General Nelson was a 
native of Kentucky. He had been, at the beginning of the war, over twen¬ 
ty years in the naval service, when he was suddenly transferred to a mili¬ 
tary department, relieving General Anderson of his command in Kentucky. 
When General Buell’s army advanced to Nashville, Nelson had an import¬ 
ant command. At the time of his death he had not yet recovered from the 
wound which be had received at the recent battle of Richmond. He was 
rough in his manner, but a good disciplinarian, and an excellent officer on 
the field. The difficulty between Generals Davis and Nelson appears to 
have sprung from some domestic dissension, and to have been aggravated 
by an exhibition of insolence on the part of Nelson, who had given Davis 
an insignificant command over the home guard defending the city. On the 
morning of the 29th Nelson met Davis at the Galt House, and asked him 
respecting the number of men in his command. Davis answered that be 
had about so many, giving the number approximately. Nelson replied an¬ 
grily, mingling expressions of rage with those of insult, and upon Davis de¬ 
manding an apology, struck the latter in the face Davis then borrowed a 
pistol from a lawyer in the vicinity, followed Nelson up the stairs and shot 
him, inflicting a mortal wound. For this act he was subsequently tried by 
court-martial and acquitted. General Davis was not a graduate of the Mil¬ 
itary Academy, but had been, previous to the war, appointed from civil life 
to a command in the regular army. He was one of Major Anderson’s sub- 



JCF> LBbO.N O. UtVb. 


ordinate officers in the defense of Fort Sumter. Immediately after the sur¬ 
render of that fort he returned to Indiana, his native state, and took com¬ 
mand of the Twenty-second Indiana Volunteers, joining General Fremont’s 
army in Missouri, where he was promoted to the command of a brigade, and 
took a prominent part in the conflict with General Price, both under Fre¬ 
mont and subsequently under General Curtis. The spirit of General Davis 
was evinced in the affair at Milford in 1861, where, with a force of scarcely 
five hundred of the Iowa cavalry, he surprised a Confederate camp, captur¬ 
ing a force of the enemy nearly three times the number of his own co’m- 
mand, with a thousand stand of arms, and a large quantity of military stores. 
It was not until this action that he received from the government a rank 
corresponding to his actual position. His commission as brigadier general 
dates from December 18,1861. 

General Bragg at Bardstown, September 26, issued a proclamation which 
is worthy of note, because it discloses the hopes at this time entertained by 
a large portion of the Confederacy in regard to the Northwestern states of 
the Union. Disclaiming any purpose of invasion, he said that his object 
was “ to secure peace, and the abandonment by the United States of their 
pretensions to govern a people who never have been their subjects, and who 
prefer self-government to a union with them.” He said that, at the inaugu¬ 
ration of the Confederate government commissioners were sent to Washing¬ 
ton to adjust the difficulties growing out of a political separation, but that 
the national government refused them recognition. “ Among the pretexts,” 
said he, “ urged for the continuance of the war is the assertion that the Con¬ 
federate government desires to deprive the United States of the free naviga¬ 
tion of the Western rivers.” On the contrary, he stated that the Confeder¬ 
ate Congress had, prior to the commencement of the war, publicly declared 
that the navigation of the Mississippi should be free to the states upon its 
borders. Having thus appealed to the interest of the people of the North¬ 
west, he proceeded to make another appeal, namely, to their desire for peace. 
The Confederacy, he said, restricted itself to the moderate demand that the 
United States should cease to prosecute war against it; but, because the gov¬ 
ernment at Washington was relentless in this particular, the Confederates 
were driven to protect their own country by transferring the seat of war to 
that of an enemy who pursued them “ with an implacable and apparently 
aimless hostility.” “So far,” he said, “it is only our fields that have been 
laid waste, ouy people killed, our homes made desolate, and our frontiers 
ravaged by rapine and murder.” It rested, therefore, with the people of the 
Northwest to put an end to the invasion of their homes, either by prevail¬ 
ing upon the general government to desist from war, or, if that-should not 
prove possible, their own state governments, in the exercise of their sover¬ 
eignty, should secure immunity from the desolations of war by making a 
separate treaty of peace, which the Confederate government would be “ ready 
to conclude on the most just and liberal basis.” “Nature,” he said, “has 
set her seal upon these states” [i. e., the states of the South], “ and marked 
them out to be your friends and allies. She has bound them to you by all 
the ties of geographical contiguity and conformation, and the great mutual 
interests of commerce and productions. When the passions of this unnatu¬ 
ral war shall have subsided, and reason resumes her sway, a community of 
interest will force-commercial and social coalition between the great grain 
and stock-growing states of the Northwest, and the cotton, tobacco, and sugar 
regions of the South. The Mississippi River is a grand artery of their mu¬ 
tual national lives, which men can not sever, and which never ought to have 
been suffered to be disturbed by the antagonisms, the cupidity, and the big¬ 
otry of New England and the East. It is from the East that have come the 
germs of this bloody and most unnatural strife. It is from the meddlesome, 
grasping, and fanatical disposition of the same people who have imposed 
upon you and us alike those tariffs, internal improvement, and fishing boun¬ 
ty laws, whereby we have been taxed for their aggrandizement. It is from 
the East that will come the tax-gatherer to collect from you the mighty debt 
which is being amassed mountain high for the purpose of ruining your best 
customers and natural friends. * * * You say you are fighting for the 
free navigation of the Mississippi. It is yours freely, and always has been, 
without striking a blow. You say you are fighting to maintain the Union. 
The Union is a thing of the past. A union of consent was the only union 
ever worth a drop of blood. When force came to be substituted for consent, 
the casket was broken, and the constitutional jewel of your patriotic adora¬ 
tion was forever gone.” 

General Bragg was not the only one who anticipated important results 
from the offer of peace to the Northwest based on a future alliance. The 
very same day that Bragg issued the above proclamation, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs laid before the Confederate Congress a report in favor of 
recommending to the President the “ issuance of a proclamation touching 
the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening of 
the markets of the South to the inhabitants of the Northwestern states upon 
certain terms and conditions.” The time at which this report was made, 
and the likeness which in all respects it bears to Bragg’s proclamation, indi¬ 
cates that the latter was a deliberately considered document, in which the 
military officer was the representative of a policy already approved by the 
great body of the Confederates. It is quite evident, also, that prominent 
men in the Northwest, in sympathy with the revolution, had given consid¬ 
erable encouragement as to the success of such a policy. As much as this 
is directly stated in one part of the report. It is gratifying,” the document 
reads, "to discover that high-spirited and intelligent public men in several 
of the Northwestern states have of late become exceedingly active in their 
endeavors to discourage and suppress the ferocious war spirit heretofore 
raging among their fellow-citizeus, and that their honest and patriotic efforts 
have been already attended with the most marked success.” At the same 











FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


313 


time, a minority report was laid before Congress dissenting from the views 
expressed by the majority of the committee. This report was signed by E. 
Barksdale, J. R. McLean, and W. R. Smith. These individuals did not be¬ 
lieve it advisable to offer exclusive commercial privileges to a portion of the 
people against whom the Confederacy was in arms. They did not see but 
that similar motives and arguments might be brought to bear upon the 
Eastern states as successfully as upon those of the Northwest. The manu¬ 
facturers of the New England states, they thought, would be as likely to be 
conciliated by a discriminating tariff as the Northwestern farmers by the 
removal of all tariff, and their ship-owners by a monopoly of the carrying 
trade of the South as the people along the Mississippi by the free navigation 
of that river. Give the city of New York, said they, the conduct of our 
poinmercial affairs, and she would be as likely to desist from her wickedness 
toward the Confederates as Cincinnati would be if allowed to exchange her 
pork on profitable terms for Southern cotton and tobacco. The signs of re¬ 
turning reason, indicating a desire for the return of peace among the inhab¬ 
itants of the Northwestern states, were not as apparent to them as to the 
majority of the committee. 1 But, notwithstanding this view of the case, as 
presented in the minority report, it is very evident that the prosperity of 
the South would have been enhanced to a far greater degree by an alliance 
with the Western than one with the Eastern states, if she should succeed 
in establishing her independence. The great obstacle in the way was the 
indisposition of the Western states to form such an alliance upon such a 
basis. 

General Bragg’s proclamation contained a formidable menace in the event 
of the refusal by the Northwest of the proposed adjustment. He said in 
effect: “ Here I am with an army which, including Smith’s off at my right, 
numbers not less than sixty thousand men. I bring also the olive-branch, 
which you refuse at your peril.” But, unfortunately for him, the bridge 
across Salt River was down, and Buell, with bis army, had already entered 
Louisville. At the same time that he menaced, it was likely that he must 
prove his ability to accomplish his threats. Indeed, it now was becoming 
quite clear that this Bardstown proclamation was to be the great feat of his 
boldly-planned campaign. He forthwith made arrangements for retreat. 
Instead of pushing on toward Louisville, he ordered his trains eastward to¬ 
ward Harrodsburg, leaving a strong force at Bardstown, with orders to keep 
Buell back until October 4th. In the mean time he went to Frankfort, 
where Kirby Smith arrived on the 4th, and the two officers on that day 
amused themselves with the inauguration of a Mr. Richard Hawes as pro¬ 
visional governor of the state. 

Buell was slow to move against the enemy. His army was tired with 
long marching, and his men came to Louisville without shoes and poorly 
clad; but it can scarcely be doubted that the enemy were'suffering even 
more inconvenience from precisely the same causes. He gave his army a 
full week’s rest at Louisville, and it was only on the 1st of October that, 
forming a movable column out of his three corps, he marched out, with a 
train of nearly two thousand wagons, stretching over twenty-two miles, to 


1 The following is the text of both reports: 

Majority Report. —The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred certain resolu¬ 
tions relating to the true policy of the war, and recommending to the President the issuance of a 
proclamation touching the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening 
of the market of the South to the inhabitants of the Southwestern states upon certain terms and 
conditions, have hud the same under consideration, and now report back said resolutions, with one 
or two slight amendments, and recommend that they be adopted. 

The expediency of conducting the war in which we are engaged with all possible activity, and 
of carrying that war into the enemy’s country, so soon as the same shall be found practicable, is 
believed to be now universally admitted by all enlightened men who have given their attention to 
the subject. It is evident that we must rely alone upon our own energies for success in the strug¬ 
gle of arms which is now in progress. In the present condition of affairs it is quite manifest that, 
in order to bring the sanguinary struggle in which we are engaged to an early termination, it will 
be necessary that every portion of our army should be kept in a state of constant readiness for act¬ 
ive exertion, and jhat no opportunity should be neglected of striking the forces of the enemy, 
wherever to be found upon Southern soil, with that boldness and heroic energy which are so cer¬ 
tain to secure to our arms the most signal success. 

It is equally manifest that the enemy will never be willing to desist from the unjust and fero¬ 
cious war which they arc now waging until the evils and inconveniences thereof shall have been 
brought home fully to themselves. When our valiant and disciplined armies (enhanced in num¬ 
bers and in strength, as it is hoped they will shortly be) shall have once found their way to the 
heart of the enemy’s country, and have indicted a just retaliation upon those who have so ruthless¬ 
ly ravaged our territories, pillaged our towns, and desolated our homes, it is to be reasonably ex¬ 
pected that even they will at last be able to discern the rank injustice and brutal cruelty which 
they have compelled us to experience, and for the perpetration of which they have not been here¬ 
tofore subjected to any thing like ndequute punishment. 

Your committee nre well satisfied that the issuing of some such proclamation by the President as 
that described in the resolutions referred to them, at such time as he shall deem expedient, could 
not but be attended with the most salutary effects. It is an undoubted fact that the government 
at Washington, aided by unscrupulous local demagogues in the Northwestern states, has succeeded 
to a considerable extent in deluding the people of that region into a general belief that, should we 
succeed in our struggle for indc|>cndcnce, it is the intention of the government and people of the 
Confederate States to shut them out from the free navigation of the Mississippi River and its great 
tributaries; and though the Provisional Congress of these states long ago emphatically negatived 
this idea by well-known acts of formal legislation, yet your committee is assured that the delusion 
on this subject still continues to exist among the people of the Northwest, and that the gross mis¬ 
apprehension in regard to the intentions and policy of the Confederate States of America, thus 
engendered and kept in existence by wicked and designing men, has operated most effectively in 
prompting the people of the Northwestern states (so closely connected with the South heretofore, 
both by geographical and political tics) to conii il u e freely, both in men and money, to the prose¬ 
cution of a war which, if successful on the part of those with whom it originated, would be, event¬ 
ually, ns disastrous in its effects to the people of the Northwestern states themselves as to those of 
the Confederate States of America. It is gratifying to discover that high-spirited and intelligent 
public men in several of the Northwestern states have of late become exceedingly active in their en¬ 
deavors to discouruge and suppress the ferocious war spirit heretofore raging among their fellow- 
citizens, and that their honest and patriotic efforts have been already attended with the most marked 
success. 

Such a proclamation as that recommended in the resolutions referred to this committee, it is 
confidently believed, would have a tendency greatly to strengthen the efforts of the advocates of 
peace in the Northwestern states, be calculated to bring those states quickly into amicable relations 
with the states of the South, withdraw them ultimately altogether from their present injurious po¬ 
litical connection with the states of the North and East, with which they have really so little in 
common, and thus enable us to dictate the terms of a just and honorable peace from the great com¬ 
mercial emporium of that region, through whose influence mainly has this wicked-and unnatural 
war been thus far kept in progress. 

Minority Report. —The undersigned, a minority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, beg 
leave to dissent from the report of the majority upon certain resolutions referred to the commit¬ 
tee, touching the issuing by the President of u proclamation to the inhabitants of the Northwestern j 


find the enemy. During the week he had been waiting the enemy's cavalry 
had swept the country in the vicinity of Louisville, destroying daily prop¬ 
erty estimated by hundreds of thousands. In this matter of cavalry Bragg 
bad great advantages over Buell, whose army, on the other hand, was no 
doubt more perfectly equipped, and was certainly larger in point of numbers 
than Bragg could bring upon the field. Buell advanced at the rate of about 
ten miles per day, and reached Bardstown the very day Bragg had determ¬ 
ined upon as that beyond which it was no longer necessary to hold the place. 
But, leisurely as were Buell’s movements, they brought his army into such 
close proximity with Bragg’s rear as to give the Confederate general some 
uneasiness. This brought on the battle of Perry ville, which was fought on 
the 8th of October. 

Buell, either from excessive caution, or because he was not aware of the 
enemy’s situation, had already lost a precious opportunity. He ought to 
have been fighting the enemy at Bardstown on the 1st, instead of just then 
beginning his march. If he intended to fight at all, here he had every ad¬ 
vantage in his favor. Let us see what he really did, and with what result. 

Smith, after the mock inauguration of Governor Hawes was over, fell 
back toward Harrodsburg. Buell had dispatched one division—Sill’s, of 
McCook’s corps—to look after him. The other two divisions—Rousseau’s 
and Jackson’s—formed the left column of Buell’s army, and took the load 
to Mackville. Gilbert, with the third corps, formed the centre column, 
moving by a road farther westward. Crittenden’s corps, the right column, 
moved to Bardstown, and was delayed at that point by slight skirmishes. 
Gilbert reached the northern skirt of Perryville on the 7th, and began to 
annoy Bragg’s rear with his artillery. McCook was within call; Critten¬ 
den would be in the course of twenty-four hours. Bragg had from fifteen 
to twenty thousand men within call. These were not all upon the field at 
Gilbert’s first collision with Bragg’s rear, for the reason that the latter had 
preferred to make a stand at Harrodsburg, where, on the 9th, he would be 
re-enforced by Kirby Smith’s army. Buell’s movements had altered this 
determination, and Bragg, with great promptness, brought up Hardee’s two 
divisions, under Buckner and Anderson, and Cheatham’s, which was com¬ 
manded by General Polk. Buell, notwithstanding he could outnumber the 
enemy, still wished to avoid a battle at this point, and he ordered up 
McCook’s corps from Mackville — a place equidistant from Harrodsburg 
anu Perryville, and ten miles from either—only because he anticipated that 
he should meet with some resistance at this stage of his march. 

McCook received this order at 2 o’clock on the morning of the 8th, and 
hurried up his column. His advance connected with Gilbert’s left on the 
road to Perryville before eleven A.M. The march had been through a 
rugged country so destitute of water that the men suffered much, and even 
the hospitals were insufficiently supplied. Along the route Gilbert’s ar¬ 
tillery was heard all the morning, but there was no general engagement 
in the forenoon. McCook arrived upon the field not a moment too soon, 
as the enemy was already preparing to occupy the commanding position on 
Gilbert’s flank, which Buell intended the First corps to hold. This position 


states, tendering to them the free navigation of the Mississippi River, and advantageous treaty 
stipulations at the close of the war. 

It is submitted that subjects relating to the conduct of the war are not appropriate matters of in¬ 
vestigation by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 

But, waiving this consideration, the undersigned totally dissent from the views of the majority 
touching the duties of this house. It is a work of supererogation for this body to undertake to 
decide and to declare the mode of conducting the war. It is a question involving consequences 
of vital moment, legitimately pertaining to the functions of the executive and those who have been 
chosen to lead our armies. But if such duty were, in fact, devolved upon this body, as is implied 
by the report of the majority, it would be in violation of all the rules of enlightened warfare to un¬ 
fold the plan which it is designed to pursue in the prosecution of the war. 

It is believed that thus far the executive has availed himself of the means placed at his disposal 
for conducting th? war in the manner most judicious and effective; and that in the signal success 
which has attended our struggle for the maintenance of the independence of the Confederate 
States will be found sufficient reason for leaving him, without interference, to the exercise of the 
duties imposed by the Constitution. 

The undersigned dissent from the recommendation that the government should tender to a por¬ 
tion of the citizens of the government with whom we are at war exclusive commercial privileges. 
It is not the part of wisdom to commit our government to any fixed policy in advance. Legisla¬ 
tion should not be anticipated, but should be shaped by existing events. If a deviation from this 
plain suggestion of wisdom be advised in the present instance upon the idea of the influence of an 
appeal to the self-interest of the inhabitants of the Northwestern states, it should not be forgotten 
that the same argument might, with equal propriety, be addressed to the inhabitants of the New 
England states. The manufacturers of that section would be conciliated by pledges that a dis¬ 
criminating tariff would, at the close of hostilities, be put into speedy operation for building up 
their interests, and ship-owners would be propitiated by pledges that they would be permitted to 
perform the carrying trade of the South as under the old Union. And the city of New York would 
be induced to pause in her course of folly and wickedness toward the Confederate States if assured 
that they would confer upon her the privilege of conducting their commercial affairs and enrich¬ 
ing herself upon the proceeds of her labor. 

The Northern people derived, under the former government, an annual profit of not less than 
$100,000,000 upon Southern trade. Their implements of war will be laid aside when assured 
that their coffers shall be filled with the proceeds of Southern labor. But the undersigned do not 
hesitate to repel the suggestion that the people of the South are willing to purchase peace by such 
a sacrifice of their rights, and by so degrading a concession to Northern cupidity. To be respect¬ 
ed, our course must be firm and our legislation rational and just. 

At an early period after the organization of the government of the Confederate States, a law was 
passed declaring the free navigation of the Mississippi River, with certain salutary restrictions. 
The policy of the government has not been changed on this subject. It is presumed to hr. re been 
known to the inhabitants of the Northwestern states before they embarked in a wicked and unjus¬ 
tifiable war against the people of the Confederate States. To proclaim this policy at the present 
time, coupled with offers of their lucrative trade, in the manner suggested by the majority, would 
be, in the highest degree, derogatory to the dignity of the government. It would bring upon it the 
imputation of pusillanimity. It would be accepted by the enemy as a confession of conscious weak¬ 
ness, and i'.s inevitable tendency would be to prolong the war. 

The undersigned are firm in the opinion that the most effective mode of conquering a peace is 
not to be found in extending to the enemy propositions of reconciliation, but in the vigorous pros¬ 
ecution of the war. 

The signs of returning reason, indicating a desire for peace among the inhabitants of the North¬ 
western states, upon the discovery of which the majority have congratulated the House, are believed 
to be delusive. The undersigned regret to say that they have not been able to discern them. But, 
in the event of the actual existence of these alleged pacific indications, it is clear that they are the 
result, not of temporizing expedients on the part of the government of the Confederate States, but 
of its manifestations of purpose to prosecute the war with vigor and effect. 

For these reasons the undersigned dissent from the views of the majority, and ask the concur¬ 
rence of the house in the opinion that they should be rejected. E. Barksdale, 

J. R. McLean, 

W. R. Smith. 








314 


[October, 1862. 




on Gilbert's left was especially important, because it secured access to Chap¬ 
lin s Creek. McCook formed his line on the range of hills known as Chap¬ 
lin’s Hills west of that stream, the road to Perryville being in the rear. 
Two of Rousseau’s brigades held the right; Terrell’s, of Jackson’s division, 
held the left. This latter brigade not only guarded the left flank, but pro¬ 
tected the trains in the rear. In order to still farther strengthen the left, 
Starkweather’s brigade of Rousseau’s division was placed in reserve behind 
Terrell. Another brigade of Jackson’s division, under Colonel Webster, was 
in reserve farther to the right, near Russell’s house. 


PLAN OP THE BATTLE OK PERBVYILLE. 

Bragg attacked a little after noon. He was compelled by McCook’s posi¬ 
tion to cross the stream more to the north, but his batteries played upon the 
national troops from favorable positions on both sides of the stream. Be¬ 
fore long, Terrell’s brigade was attacked with great impetuosity. This bri¬ 
gade consisted entirely of raw troops, and it was only through some mistake 
in manoeuvre that it was not in reserve in the place of Starkweather’s. 
Terrell’s men wavered beneath the shock, and, although their division com¬ 
mander, General Jackson, advanced to rally them, they were swept from the 
field, leaving Parsons’s battery in the hands of the enemy. Jackson was 
killed at the first fire. He was struck in the right breast by a piece of an 
exploded shell, and, with the exclamation “Oh God!’’ fell from his horse 
and died without a struggle. Even the enemy paid a tribute to his gallant¬ 
ry. Terrell also fell directly after, and McCook’s left flank was uncov¬ 
ered, and would have been destroyed, with the loss of the trains, but for the 
pluck of Starkweather’s men. These belonged to Rousseau’s division, Gen¬ 
eral O. M. Mitchell’s old command. 

As soon as McCook had become assured of the safety of his left, he rode 
over to the right only to find that Rousseau also had been driven back. 
He was even compelled to use Webster’s brigade. His reserves were now 
all in the front, and he was obliged to call for re-enforcements. In his ef¬ 
fort to support the right, Colonel Webster was killed ; Lytle, who held the 
extreme flank, fell on the field. It was not until the position at Russell’s 
house had been abandoned that McCook received any re-enforcements. 
Then Colonel Gooding’s brigade, of R. B. Mitchell’s division, came upon the 
field. This brigade consisted of three regiments, accompanied by a battery, 
and added fifteen hundred men to McCook’s command, which in the morn¬ 
ing had numbered thirteen thousand. Of these there were now not more 
than seven or eight thousand men capable of fighting. 

It was nearly dark when Gooding had succeeded in wresting the position 
at Russell’s house from the enemy and saving the line. But this had been 
accomplished at great sacrifice. At the close of the brief but desperate en¬ 
counter, five hundred out of the fifteen hundred had been killed or wound¬ 
ed. Colonel Gooding himself had been taken prisoner. Then there came 
up another brigade from Gilbert, which went into position on Gooding’s 
right. In fact, Buell was only just now aware that any battle was in prog¬ 
ress. He had given orders that McCook should not fight; but as the en¬ 
emy attacked, and so much depended upon McCook’s position, it is hard to 
see what else could have saved the day but fighting. The battle was now 
over. McCook had with great difficulty held his own, and had saved his 
command, while Gilbert stood apart, with some twenty thousand men or 
more, giving scarcely more assistance or co-operation than if he had been 
fifty miles from the field.’ The enemy, with one third of the force which 
Buell had in his front, had, by making that force bear upon McCook’s corps 
alone, overwhelmed the latter on both flanks, and almost swept it from the 
field. 

The loss had been very heavy on the Federal side. In Rousseau’s divi¬ 
sion alone the casualties amounted to over 2000; in Jackson’s the loss was 
greater, but many of these were counted as missing. The Confederates 
must have lost nearly as many men, as they attacked formidable positions. 

The next morning General Bragg withdrew his force to Harrodsburg, and, 
with Kirby Smith, moved southward toward Camp Dick Robinson, and 
thence out of the state altogether. The Confederates, although they failed 
in the military object of their invasion, succeeded in carrying out of Ken¬ 
tucky a great deal of plunder. According to a statement made by the Rich¬ 
mond Examiner, “ tl^e wagon train of supplies brought out of Kentucky by 
General Kirby Smith was forty miles long, and brought a million yards of 
jeans, with a large amount of clothing, boots, and shoes, and two hundred 


BOBEBT II. MITCHELL- 


wagon loads of bacon, six thousand barrels of pork, fifteen hundred mules 
and horses, eight thousand beeves, and a large lot of swine.” Of the jeans 
nearly all were taken from a single establishment in Frankfort. A large 
amount of plunder was captured. The enemy staid there four weeks, 
and during all that time trains of cars were running southward laden with 
mess pork and other stores, and numerous wagon trains similarly laden were 
traversing all the roads in that direction. The fact that this was possible 
illustrates the need which then existed for an efficient Federal cavalry force. 
Indeed, the want of such a force shows an extraordinary degree of negli¬ 
gence on the part of the government at this stage of the war. 

The invasion of Kentucky had made it necessary for the Federal troops 
under General Morgan to evacuate Cumberland Gap. This gap is nearly 
eighty miles in length, and is about one hundred and fifty miles south¬ 
east of Lexington. The mountain on either side rises to the height of 
twelve hundred feet; the gap itself is traversed by an excellent road. The 
position was important to the Confederates, chiefly because it guarded the 
approach to East Tennessee, and thus covered the line of railroad con¬ 
necting Richmond with the valley of the Mississippi. It had remained 
in their hands until General Mitchell’s campaign had compelled them to 
abandon it, about the middle of June, when it was occupied by a division 
of national troops under General George W. Morgan. A number of un¬ 
successful attempts were subsequently made by the Confederates to regain 
the Gap. It was only when Bragg’s advance into Kentucky had cut off 
all supplies that General Morgan determined to withdraw. He held out 
bravely to the last moment. On the 11th of September he had no corn 
left, and only a meagre supply of beans and rice. On the 17th he with¬ 
drew from the Gap, blowing up the magazine, and burning the commis¬ 
sary building, with his tents, wagons, gun-carriages, and other martial ap¬ 
pliances. His retreat of two hundred and fifty miles, through a mount¬ 
ainous and unproductive country, to the banks of the Ohio, forms an in¬ 
teresting episode of the war. Sometimes destitute of water, always de¬ 
pendent for its daily supply of food on foraging, harassed perpetually by 
Confederate cavalry, and sleeping at night under the open sky, his com¬ 
mand reached the Ohio River on the 4th of October. The whole com¬ 
mand numbered nearly twelve thousand men, and it succeeded, in spite of 
man}' embarrassments, in bringing off twenty-eight pieces of artillery and 
four hundred wagons. This success is the more remarkable when it is con¬ 
sidered that Morgan was continually skirmishing with the enemy, and was 
obliged to build new roads, under very disadvantageous circumstances, for 
the conveyance of his trains. His sick he had been compelled to leave at 
the 'Gap. 


Bragg’s invasion had broken up the advanced line of the national forces 
in Eastern Tennessee.- It had also, to a great extent, depleted General Grant’s 
army in Mississippi, portions of which had been sent to Cincinnati and Louis¬ 
ville. But a sufficient force was left to retain the line already held, which 
extended from Corinth, in Mississippi, to Tuscumbia, in Alabama. Some 
important changes had occurred since the month of July. General Halleck 
had been called to Washington to assume the position of general-in-chief, 
and the command of that portion of the Western army not included in Gen¬ 
eral Buell’s department had been given to General Grant. Pope had been 
called away to take command of the Army of the Potomac, and his place 
was now taken by General Rosecrans. 























September, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG 


315 



rr.RBYVlLLE, KENTUOKY. 


Though Bragg had taken the bulk of the Confederate army in the West 
into Kentucky, still a large Confederate force had been left in Northern 
Mississippi. This force, under the command of Generals Price and Van 
Dorn, confronted General Grant in September, holding a position which, 
from its uninterrupted railroad connection with Chattanooga, enabled it to 
co-operate with Bragg’s movement. Van Dorn was the principal in com¬ 
mand. If his force had been united to that of General Price, the whole 
would have constituted an effective army. Instead of this, the plan of 
operations agreed upon contemplated that Price should cross the Tennes¬ 
see River to operate against the rear of General Buell, who was then ad¬ 
vancing northward to intercept Bragg; and, in the mean time, while Grant’s 
forces would thus be drawn eastward from Corinth, the latter place was to 
be captured by Van Dorn. Upon the first development of this plan, Grant 
began to concentrate his army by abandoning Tuscumbia and Iuka. A 
small force under Colonel Murphy was left at the latter place. Almost im¬ 
mediately afterward a body of Confederate cavalry dashed into the town, 
drove Murphy out, and captured the place, which contained a large quantity 
of medical and commissary stores. For neglecting to destroy the six hund¬ 
red and eighty barrels of flour which were there stored, Colonel Murphy 
was arrested by General Buell. It was now determined by General Grant 
to attack General Price on the north, west, and south. 

The left wing of Price’s army rested near Iuka, a little village of about 
three hundred inhabitants. Against this position, Grant, accompanied by 
Ord’s division, moved with about eighteen thousand men, taking the road to 
Burnsville, a little northwest of Iuka. Rosecrans, with two divisions, under 


Generals Stanley and Hamilton, was ordered to Jacinto, to attack tn the rear. 
Both columns started at the same time. Rosecrans reached Jacinto on the 
18th of September, and the next day, after a march of twenty miles, ad¬ 
vanced against the enemy. The enemy’s skirmishers were met at Barnett’s 
Corners, and were driven in. Grant in the mean time had arrived at Burns¬ 
ville. By some misunderstanding, each column awaited for the attack to be 
commenced by the other. This occasioned considerable delay. At length 
a dispatch came from General Grant stating that he was waiting upon Rose, 
crans’s attack. The latter promptly moved forward, and found the Confed¬ 
erates posted on a high ridge about two miles from Iuka. It was then four 
o’clock P.M. General Hamilton’s division formed in line under a severe 
fire. The enemy had clearly an advantage in position. Hamilton could 
bring but a single battery, the Eleventh Ohio, to bear upon him. The 
ground was broken by ravines, and densely covered with undergrowth. It 
has been claimed for each side that it was outnumbered by the other. Rose¬ 
crans, in an order issued eight days after the battle, speaks of the unequal 
ground, which permitted the enemy to outnumber his men three to one. 
On the other hand, Pollard says that the Confederates were “ overmatched 
by numbers.” 

It was almost night when the battle commenced, but in the two hours 
during which it lasted it raged with uncommon fierceness. Upon the Fifth 
Iowa and the Eleventh Missouri, supporting the battery, fell the most stun¬ 
ning blows from the enemy. The former lost seventy-six, the latter one 
hundred and sixteen, in killed and wounded. About the Eleventh Ohio 
battery there was the hottest work. The action had scarcely lasted half an 
































































































316 



R1CUAR0 F. OGLESBY. 


hour before seventy-two of its men were put out of combat. The battery 
was charged and captured by the Confederates, and was again recaptured 
by the Fifth Iowa. Thrice again was it captured and recaptured. The 
fighting was in some instances hand to hand. It is said that in one Spot, 
not over sixteen feet square, there were counted the next morning seven¬ 
teen Confederate soldiers lying dead around one of their officers. 

Grant did not attack, and during the night Price’s army left the field. 
By casualties in the field and captures during the forced retreat, the loss 
sustained by that army amounted to upward of two thousand men. The 
Federal loss was nearly eight hundred. General Grant’s combinations ren¬ 
dered it impossible for General Price to carry out his original plan of co¬ 
operation with Bragg. Van Dorn had also failed of his object, not having 
reached Corinth soon enough to insure its capture. The two armies, under 
Price and Van Dorn, were soon concentrated at Ripley, some distance west 
of Iuka, for an attack on Corinth. General Grant had abandoned Iuka and 
returned to Corinth. Four days afterward, Rosecrans, who had just been 
promoted to be a major general, assumed command of that place. In order 
to guard the line of railroad upon which the Federal army depended for 
supplies, General Grant proceeded to Jackson, fifty miles north of Corinth, 
having posted Ord’s force on the same railroad farther south, at Bolivar. 
Thus Rosecrans was left at Corinth with an army numbering little more 
than twenty thousand men. 

Van Dorn, in command of the Confederate army in Mississippi, moved 
against Corinth on the 2d of October, the day after Buell marched from 
Louisville against Bragg. The battle known as the Battle of Corinth was 
fought on the 3d. Van Dorn moved from Chewalla, on the line of the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, west of Corinth. It ought to have been 
evident to the Confederate commander that an attack on Corinth had scarce¬ 
ly a chance of success. He had a larger army than Rosecrans, it is true; 
but the latter held a position which, considering the situation of Grant’s and 
Ord’s columns, was defensible against an army more than twice ns strong as 
that constituting its defense. The reason that Van Dorn moved from the 
west on Corinth was his knowledge of the fact that Beauregard, early in the 
year, had constructed fortifications on the north and east. These fortifica¬ 
tions had been very much strengthened since the Federal occupation. Hal- 
leck had constructed a line of works inside of those constructed by Beaure¬ 
gard, and Grant had constructed still another inside of this latter. This in¬ 
terior line consisted of a chain of redoubts, arranged with a view to concen¬ 
trate the fire of several heavy batteries upon an attacking force. 

As soon as the enemy’s approach assumed a definite shape, Rosecrans 
called in the outpost garrisons on the south side at Iuka, Burnsville, and 
Rienzi. The outpost on the Chewalla road was withdrawn a short distance 
and strengthened. It yet appeared doubtful to Rosecrans whether the main 
attack would be directed against himself, or against Bolivar, Bethel, or Jack- 
son, at which places there were strong garrisons. But he would rather gain 
than lose on either supposition. If the attack was mainly against Corinth, 
then his position was eminently favorable for defense; if against any posi¬ 
tion farther north, then his position was equally favorable for offensive op¬ 
erations in the enemy’s rear. Of the two cases offered, he would have much 
preferred the latter, as more fatal to Van Dorn. In an interview with his 


[October, .1862. 

division commanders on the morning of the 3d, Rosecrans instructed them 
“to hold the enemy at arm’s-length” until the latter should assume a defi¬ 
nite position, when they were to take a position where they could avail 
themselves of their batteries and the favorable ground in the vicinity of 
Corinth. 

On the 3d, the Federal troops on the Chewalla road had been pushed 
back with severe loss. Brigadier General Hackleman was killed, and Gen¬ 
eral Oglesby was severely wounded. It was Davies’s division that had been 
principally engaged. The fight all day had been a general skirmish in the 
midst of dense timber, where heavy artillery could not be used to advan¬ 
tage. The plan of attack was, however, pretty fully developed. The main 
rebel column under Van Dorn rested its right upon the Chewalla road, and 
extended toward the north; its left, under Price, lay upon the Mobile and 
Ohio-Railroad, almost directly north of Corinth, while Lovell held the ex¬ 
treme right. It was upon this side of the town—the northwest side—that 
Van Dorn expected to find the line of defense weakest But during the past 
ten days other works had been built here, of which the Confederate com¬ 
mander was ignorant The new line consisted of four redoubts. On the 
right, near Beauregard’s old line, one of these was situated. On the night 
of the 3d, Fort Richardson, mounting five guns, was constructed, to cover the 
approach by the Bolivar road, which ran out from Corinth a little east of 
north. Fort Williams, which had been built to command the heights over 
which ran the road from Chewalla, was a very strong work, mounting sev¬ 
eral heavy Parrott guns; and Fort Robinette, built on a high, narrow ridge, 
enfiladed both the Bolivar and the Chewalla roads. Still another fort on 
the extreme left, near the Corinth Seminary, strengthened that flank, at the 
same time that it afforded additional protection to the centre. The ground 
along this line was unusually favorable to the use of artillery. 

With admirable skill, Rosecrans had anticipated the probable approach of 
Van Dorn’s army—had done his best, indeed, to tempt the latter in this very 
direction, and had made this part of his line as strong as any other. * His 
line of battle on the morning of the 4th faced northward. Hamilton’s di¬ 
vision, which had just fought the battle of Iuka, held the right from Fort 
No. 1 to Fort Richardson. Then came Davies’s division, joined on the left 
by six companies of Yates’s sharpshooters. Stanley’s division, consisting 
of two brigades, came next in order, its left resting on Fort Robinette, and 
McKean’s division, with McArthur’s brigade, held the extreme left. The 
cavalry, under Colonel Mizner, was posted on both wings and in the rear. 
The whole line was covered well in front by the undulations of ground, 
and the various batteries, under Lieutenant Colonel Lathrop, were either 
protected by fortifications or by an apron of hay or cotton-bales. 

The near approach of the Confederates had placed the town of Corinth in 
an uncomfortable situation. There were a great number of non-combatants 
in the place, and the knowledge that the enemy was within a thousand yards 
of Rosecrans’s line, and could easily shell the town, was a reasonable ground 
of uneasiness. Whatever apprehension there may have been on this point 
was realized before daylight. A battery had been planted by the enemy in 
Stanley’s front, and not more than two hundred yards distant from Fort 
Robinette, from which, before daybreak, a fire was opened upon the town. 
The breakfast-fires of the Federal soldiers enabled the enemy to get the 
proper range, and a good number of shells were sent into the streets of 
Corinth. There was panic then among the non-combatants, who had been 



DAVID B. STANLEY. 
















FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


317 


October, 1862. "J 

uneasy all night, and who now had recourse to hurried flight At daylight 
a fire from Fort Williams in a very few minutes silenced the troublesome 
battery. The enemy meanwhile was forming at a little distance in the 
woods, while batteries on either side were already in action, and skirmish¬ 
ing was going on between sharpshooters in the marshy ground in front. 

At about half past nine Price’s column, in a dense mass, debouched on the 
Bolivar road. As it advanced it took the form of a wedge, and moved up 
with fierce velocity, as if it would pierce and overwhelm all opposition. 
Every Federal battery directed its full and unobstructed fire against this 
massive column, piercing it in front and on the flank, and making huge gaps 
iu >t—gaps which were no sooner made than filled. Musketry was then 
added to artillery; “but,” says an eye-witness, “ the enemy bent their necks 
downward and marched steadily to death, with their faces averted like men 
striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail.” The Fed¬ 
eral sharpshooters from behind their hastily-built breastworks poured in 
their fire, but still Price’s column moved inflexibly onward. As it came 
nearer, the wedge had opened and developed into two columns, spreading 
out over the whole front of the field. Up the whole line pressed over ev¬ 
ery obstruction—up to the crest of the hill, flanking Fort Richardson on the 
right. Davies’s division began to falter; but at the right moment Rose- 
crans was in its ranks, and they rallied, but not until the enemy had gained 
Fort Richardson. Even Rosecrans’s head-quarters were captured, and from 
the shelter of the house a fire was opened on troops in the rear. In the 
yard of this house seven Confederate soldiers were found dead after the 
battle. Richardson, after a desperate aud unequal contest for the posses¬ 
sion of the fort, fell at last, and the enemy rushed into the captured work. 
Scarcely had the fort been taken before it was retaken by the Fifty-sixth 
Illinois. 

Hamilton’s division on the right had, in the mean time, swept the enemy’s 
lines on the flank with a steady fire. Having fallen back a little when 
Stanley wavered, it now charged forward in the wake of the Fifty-sixth Illi¬ 
nois. There was an advance all along the line. A few minutes before, and 
it had appeared for a moment uncertain whether the enemy might not com¬ 
pensate for his terrible loss in approaching by an important success on Rose- 
orans’s flank. But now all was changed. Price’s entire column was broken 
and in swift retreat, flinging aside its arms, and scattering into the woods 
from which, but a little before, they had issued an immovable phalanx. 

Van Dorn’s column, which was to have attacked simultaneously with 
Price on the Chewalla road, was delayed by ehe nature of the ground. Ra¬ 
vines, and densely-wooded thickets, and artificial obstructions were in his 
way. The action with Price was over in a few minutes, and Van Dorn 
came on the field too late. Still the latter advanced. If the advance of 
Price’s column had been gallant, yet it was surpassed by the almost incredi¬ 
ble bravery of the Texan and Mississippian soldiers of Van Dorn’s command. 
Besides the entanglements and topographical obstacles in their way, their 
line of advance was within point-blank range of the thirty-pound Par¬ 
rott guns of Fort Williams and the guns of Fort Robinette. Supporting 
these works was a strong column of veterans as yet fresh for the battle. 
But Van Dorn’s men overcame all obstacles with a courage that seemed ir¬ 
resistible. Colonel Rogers came on in advance at the head of his Texan 
brigade. But they paused at the ditch; Rogers fell just as he had leaped 
over. Then the Ohio brigade of Stanley’s division, which Colonel Fuller 
had all this while kept lying with their faces to the ground behind the ridge 
on the right of the fort, rose and delivered six successive volleys, driving 
the Texans back. But the Confederate supports came up, and there was a 
severe hand-to-hand fight, which resulted at length in the success of the na¬ 
tional troops. The victory had been gained at a fearful cost of life. The 
Sixty-third Ohio went into the fight with two hundred and fifty men, and 
left just one half that number of killed and wounded on the field. The 
rout of Van Dorn’s column was as complete as had been that of Price’s. 
Forts Williams and Robinette, the latter of which had borne the brunt of 
the assault, now poured their ruinous shower of shell into the midst of the 
flying enemy. Such had been the obstinacy of the assault on Fort Robi¬ 
nette that fifty-six dead Confederates were found heaped up in front of the 
redoubt. 

The battle had lasted now for an hour and a half since Price’s column 
came out on the Bolivar road. But the pursuit was an important part of 
the battle. Says the correspondent from whom we have already quoted: 
“ The pursuit of the beaten foe was terrible. Sheets of flame blazed through 
the forest Huge trunks were shattered by crashing shells. You may 
track the flying conflict for miles by scarified trees, broken branches, twisted 
gun-barrels and shattered stocks, bloodstained garments and mats of human 
hair, which lie on the ground where men died; hillocks which mark ditches 
where dead rebels were covered, and smoothly-rounded graves where slaugh¬ 
tered patriots were tenderly buried.” The retreat was continued across the 
Hatchie River to within a short distance of Ripley. General Hurlbut, of 
Ord’s command, joined in the pursuit. Huilbut, while the battle was going 
on, had started from Bolivar, intending to strike the enemy’s rear. On the 
5th the enemy’s retreat was intercepted. Eight guns were captured, many 
hundred small-arms, and several*hundred prisoners. 

As regards the generalship displayed in the battle of Corinth, there can 
be but one opinion. General Rosecrans planned and fought the battle with 
consummate skill. It must of course be admitted that he was exceedingly 
fortunate in having opposed to him two generals who were as rash in their 
attempt against Corinth as their attack was magnificent. Very few battles 
in the war were so obstinate and bloody as the battle of Corinth. General 
Rosecrans,in a congratulatory order issued October 25th, said to his troops: 

“ Upon the issue of the fight depended the possession of West Tennessee, 


E. O. O. ORn. 



and perhaps even the fate of operations in Kentucky. The entire available 
force of the rebels in Mississippi, save a few garrisons and a small reserve, 
attacked you. They were commanded by Van Dorn, Price, Villipigue, 
Rust, Armstrong, Maury, and others, in person. They numbered, according 
to their own authorities, nearly forty thousand men—almost double your 
own numbers. You fought them into the position we desired on the third, 
punishing them terribly; and on the fourth, in three hours after the infantry 
entered into action, they were beaten. You killed and buried one thousand 
four hundred and twenty-four officers and men, some of their most distin¬ 
guished officers falling, among whom was the gallant Colonel Rogers, of the 
Second Texas, who bore their colors at the head of his storming column to 
the edge of the ditch of Battery Robinette, where he fell. Their wounded, 
at the usual rate, must exceed five thousand. You took two thousand two 
hundred and sixty-eight prisoners, among whom are one hundred and thirty- 
seven field-officers, captains, and subalterns, representing fifty-three regi¬ 
ments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries .of artil¬ 
lery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, thirteen batteries, 
seven battalions, besides several companies. You captured three thousand 
three hundred and fifty stands of small-arms, fourteen stands of colors, two 
pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You pursued his 
retreating columns forty miles in force with infantry and sixty miles with 
cavalry, and were ready to follow him to Mobile, if necessary, had you 
received orders. ****** 

“ But our victory has cost us the lives of three hundred and fifteen brave 
officers and soldiers, besides the wounded. * * * The memory of the 
brave Hackleman, the chivalrous Kirby Smith, the true and noble colonels 
Thrush, Baker, and Miles, and Captain Guy C. Ward, with many others, 
live with us and in the memory of a free people, while history will inscribe 
their names among its heroes.” 

The same day that this order was issued General Rosecrans. was ordered 
from Corinth to Cincinnati to command the Department of the Cumberland, 
which was made to comprise that portion of Tennessee east of the Tennessee 
River, and such parts of Northern Georgia and Alabama as might be taken 
possession of by the national forces. The armies of the West were at this 
time reorganized, the troops under General Grant constituting the Thirteenth 
Army Corps, and those under Rosecrans the Fourteenth. On the 16th of 
October Grant had been assigned to the command of the Department of the 
Tennessee, which was defined to include Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, 
Northern Mississippi, and all of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Ten¬ 
nessee River. 

After the battle of Corinth, Van Dorn, collecting together the scattered 
fragments of his army, took a position in the vicinity of Holly Springs, on 
the Cairo and New Orleans Railroad. General Grant, having received a con¬ 
siderable re-enforcement from new levies, followed the line of this railroad, 
advancing southward from Bolivar and Jackson. He began this movement 
on the 4th of November. During the month of November it remained at 
Lagrange, three miles east of Grand Junction. The Federal occupation of 
New Orleans, and the advance which the national armies had made into 
Arkansas, seemed to render possible a successful campaign for the complete 













818 



conquest of the Northwest, or at least for the possession of the Cairo and New I 


[December, 1862. 

Orleans Railroad. But there were great obstacles in the way of success in 
this direction, the most formidable of which was that the advance was far 
into the enemy’s country. A long line of communications stretched back 
in the rear, which must be guarded against attack. No small portion of 
Grant’s army must be detached for garrisons at Columbus, Humboldt, 
Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, and Grand Junction, and at every stage 
of the advance there must be a farther depletion. Much might have been 
effected by a large and effective force of cavalry; but this force was want¬ 
ing. The distance over which supplies were to be transported, even to Grand 
Junction, was one hundred and forty miles. Memphis was far preferable to 
Columbus as a base of supplies, being only fifty miles distant from Grand 
Junction, but the road was not in running order. 

On the 28th of November Grant moved from Lagrange. The next day 
Hamilton’s advance entered Holly Springs, from which Yan Dorn had re¬ 
tired, and was reported to be strongly fortified on the Tallahatchie River. 
By December 1 the main portion of Grant’s army was in camp at Lampkin’s 
Mills, south of Holly Springs, and seven miles north of the Tallahatchie. 
Simultaneously with Grant’s advance General Curtis marched a column of 
seven thousand men, under General Alvin P. Hovey, from Helena, in Ar¬ 
kansas, on the Mississippi, intending to co-operate with Grant by striking 
Van Dorn’s flank on the Tallahatchie.. This caused Van Dorn to give up the 
position held by him on that river and to retire farther southward, through 
Oxford, closely followed by Grant. 

Hovey’s expedition was very successful. The cavalry which accompanied 
it, under Colonel Washburn, contributed greatly to this success. Hovey’s 
column crossed the Tallahatchie on the 28th of November, and then destroyed 
the railroad line for some distance. At Oakland an engagement occurred 
with the Confederate cavalry, which resulted favorably to Colonel Wash¬ 
burn. The Confederate steam-boats on the Tallahatchie were destroyed, and 
some locomotives which had been left behind by the enemy. Having effected 
this much, and the enemy having fallen back nearly to Jackson, the expe¬ 
dition returned to Helena. A few days later, General Grant having made 
his head-quarters at Oxford, Van Dorn saw the way open for an attack on 
Grant's rear. He determined, therefore, to surprise and capture Holly 
Springs. About daylight on the morning of December 20, Van Dorn’s cav¬ 
alry, consisting of twenty-two regiments, appeared in the streets of Holly 
Springs. In the railroad depot, on the east side of the town, there were two 
trains of cars, one of them empty and the other loaded with cotton. These 
were fired. A hundred men were guarding the valuable government stores 
at the depot, but these were soon overwhelmed and captured. Other detach¬ 
ments of infantry in the suburbs of the town were surprised and captured 
in squads. Six companies of the Second Illinois Cavalry were surrounded, 
but, after a gallant fight, cut their way out, and the enemy began his work 
of destruction. All the Northern men in town were taken prisoners, and, 
after being plundered, were paroled. The passenger and freight depots were 
burned. The arsenal, full of arms and ammunition, suffered the same fate. 
Some twenty or thirty buildings on the public square and eighteen hundred 
bales of cotton were involved in the conflagration. It was estimated that 
the government property destroyed amounted to two millions of dollars, 
besides the cotton. 

The attack on Holly Springs was not a surprise to General Grant, who 
had telegraphed to Colonel Murphy, commanding the town, that he would 
be attacked. He had sent on re-enforcements, which, however, arrived too 
late. The telegraphic dispatch to Colonel Murphy reached him on the 
evening of the 19th. He had under his command five or six hundred infan¬ 
try, besides the Second Illinois Cavalry, and, with a proper disposition of this 
force, and making the necessary preparations for defense, he might have 
resisted the attack successfully until re-enforcements came to his assistance. 
General Grant, in his order four days afterward, properly stigmatized the 
surrender of the place as disgraceful. He said: “With all the cotton, pub¬ 
lic stores, and substantial buildings about the ddpot, it would have been per¬ 
fectly practicable to have made, in a few hours, a defense sufficient to resist, 
with a small garrison, all the cavalry force brought against them, until the 
re-enforcements, which the commanding officer was notified w T ere marching 
to his relief, could have reached him.” 1 

Other stations along the line were captured, and it was the enemy’s inten¬ 
tion to destroy every bridge between Corinth and Columbus. The destruc¬ 
tion of his depot of supplies at Holly Springs rendered it impossible for 
Grant to continue his advance southward. He returned to Holly Springs 
with his army, from which a detachment of ten thousand men was sent to 
General Sherman to assist in the operations against Vicksburg. 

Returning from General Grant’s department to that which was now under 


1 The Richmond Dispatch of January 15 contained the following estimate of the victory gained 
at Holly Springs: 

“The surprised camp surrendered 1800 men and 150 commissioned officers-, who were imme¬ 
diately paroled. And then commenced the work of destruction. The extensive buildings of the 
Mississippi Central depot—the station-house, the engiuc-house, and immense store-houses—were 
filled with supplies of clothing and commissary stores. Outside of the depot the barrels of flour 
were estimated to be half a mile in length, one hundred and fifty feet through, and fifteen feet 
high. Turpentine was thrown over this, and the wholc*amount destroyed. Up town, the court¬ 
house and public buildings, livery-stables, and all capacious establishments, were filled, ceiling- 
high, with medical and ordnance stores. These were all fired, and the explosion of one of the 
buildings, in which was stored one hundred barrels of powder, knocked down nearly all the houses 
on the south side of the square. Surely such a scene of devastation was never before presented to 
the eye of man. Glance at the gigantic estimates: 

“ i,809,000 fixed cartridges and other ordnance stores, valued at $1,500,000, including 5000 
rifles and 2000 revolvers. 

“ 100,000 suits of clothing and other quartermaster’s stores, valued at $500,000 ; 5000 barrels 
of flour and other commissary stores, valued at $500,000. 

*‘$1,000,000 worth of medical stores, for which invoices to that amount were exhibited, and 
1000 bales of cotton, and $600,000 worth of sutlers’ stores.” 

According to this account, General Grant’s wife was among the captured. 





































































































































HOLLY SPRINGS. MISSISSIPPI 


December, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


319 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































320 



ALVIN P. UOVJ5Y. 


Rosecrans’s command, we find the eastern, and a large portion of the central 
part of Tennessee occupied by the Confederate army which Bragg had with¬ 
drawn from Kentucky in October. 

The army which Rosecrans received from Buell was now largely re-en- 
forced by new levies. President Lincoln had, in July and August, called 
600,000 new men into the field. 1 Buell’s army had been'grcatly depleted 
by desertions. In June some 14,000 men were absent from his command. 
This demoralization increased to such an extent that, in September, special 
officers were appointed to arrest deserters and return them to service. Rose¬ 
crans had in his army so many raw recruits that he was compelled to de¬ 
vote considerable time to their discipline. In moving against Bragg, he had 
also to contend against another difficulty. Two large armies had ravaged 
the space intervening between the Ohio and the Tennessee Rivers since the 
middle of summer. It was now autumn; and, unless Rosecrans waited for 
the harvests of another year to ripen, he could enter upon an active cam¬ 
paign only after he should have accumulated a large store of provisions. 
Not only could he not supply his army from the country, but the very av¬ 
enues of communication with a distant base of supplies must be provided. 
The Cumberland River was too low for his purpose. The Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad had been destroyed by Bragg. The bridges had been 
burned, and the tunnel at Gallatin, north of Nashville, had been destroyed. 
The railroad must be repaired, and even then it would be a poor substitute 
for the river. The enemy had a superior force of cavalry, under Forrest and 
Morgan, and it would be no difficult matter for Bragg to dispatch a force to 
his rear which would undo in an hour the work of days. It would not 
have been easy to interrupt the water communication except by elaborate 
fortifications. A river does not depend upon the safety of bridges, as does 
a railroad, for its continuous and perfect communication. 

In the subordinate officers there was some change. We drop Gilbert, and 
have the good fortune of Thomas’s company as an actual instead of a nom¬ 
inal commander. McCook and Crittenden are retained, and Rousseau is 
deservedly elevated to the command of a corps. In the exchange of Buell 
for Rosecrans we are also gainers, if we look for vigorous operations. There 
are many obstacles in the way, as we have pointed out; but Rosecrans meets 
these with a determined will. Little more than a month after his assump¬ 
tion of command he is on the move, and by the 1st of November has his 
advance at Bowling Green. A week later McCook’s corps passed through 
Nashville. But the railroad had been completed only as far as to the north¬ 
ern border of Tennessee. 


1 The following table, prepared from official 
each of the loyal states up to December 1, 1862. 
just after the capture of Fort Sumter. 


Maine. 30,240 

New Hampshire. 16,000 

Vermont. 19,006 

Massachusetts. 72,107 

Rhode Island. 10,000 

Connecticut. 28,651 

New York. 219,059 

New Jersey. 27,400 

Pennsylvania. 230,000 

Delaware. 2,500 

Maryland. 10,000 

West Virginia. 20,000 

Kentucky. 65,000 

Missouri. 38,081 

Ohio. 164,402 


This estimate includes nearly 100,000 
period of time. 


iports, shows the number of troops furnished by 
This table does not include the 80,000 furnished 


Indiana. 96,698 

Illinois. 130,059 

Michigan. 47,220 

Wisconsin. 42,557 

Minnesota. 10,957 

Iowa. 50,000 

Kansas. 14,000 

California. 9,000 

Oregon. 1,500 

Colorado. 3,300 

Nebraska.. 3,500 

New Mexico. 2,000 

District of Columbia. 2,000 

Total. 1,356,087 


furnished for special service and for a short 


[November, 1862. 

If the Confederates ever needed a commander bold, and at the same time 
wise, it was now. The opportunity offered to such a commander was even 
greater than it had been in the summer. Then the Confederate armies were 
being rapidly filled by the new Conscription Act, and numbers had made 
Bragg confident of great results to be gained by a march to the Ohio. His 
invasion had not gained the objects for which it was undertaken. He had 
failed to take Louisville and Cincinnati. He had not even gained any im¬ 
portant victory in the field. The Northwestern states had not sued for 
peace, notwithstanding the magnanimous terms which he had offered. 
Even the citizens of Kentucky had not rallied around his standard. Those 
who joined him had been pressed into the service against their will. What 
might have been the attitude of Kentuckians if he had succeeded in the 
military objects of his invasion is only conjecturable. Many had greeted 
his arrival when the way seemed open to a grand success. Many had been 
intimidated by the formidable appearance of his army when there was a 
panic in the great Northern cities on the line of the Ohio, and when as yet 
the Federal armies appeared incompetent to oppose an adequate resistance. 
But when his army began to halt, then to waver, and finally to retreat with¬ 
out the prestige of victory before Buell’s army, the situation was reversed. 
Those who were intimidated lost their fears. Those whose expectations of 
Confederate success had been aroused now lost their hope, and began to 
fear for the consequences of their premature demonstrations in Bragg’s fa¬ 
vor. Bragg had been unable to accomplish what he had threatened against 
those who resisted him, and had disappointed those who had been too hasty 
and prodigal in their trust. When his troops left Lexington, women ran 
through the streets wringing their hands in terror and dismay, and his train 
was encumbered with the vehicles of panic-stricken refugees. When the 
more wealthy citizens looked upon the flaming piles in which their property 
was being consumed, because if left it would no longer enrich a Confederate 
army, the keen anguish of distress was mingled with a sentiment of disgust 
for the treachery of which they had become the unhappy victims. But an 
immense amount of stores which had been captured from the defenseless 
was carried away by the retreating army, and this was almost the solitary 
token of its poor success. When the train passed through Bryantsville, on 
the 13th of October, the few guns and ammunition wagons which had been 
captured had the precedence. Then came the long train of captured stores, 
which was followed by humiliated refugees, flying with their negroes in 
every imaginable sort of vehicle, from stately carriages and stage-coaches 
down to ambulances and Jersey wagons. The infantry, artillery, and cav¬ 
alry of the army brought up the rear, and intermixed with the medley spec 
tacle were vast herds of cattle, horses, and mules. “ The effect of our retreat 
along the road every where,” writes a Confederate historian, 1 “ was sinking 
and depressing in the extreme. No miniature'banners waved, no white 
kerchiefs greeted our troops with approving smiles from lively women, and 
no wild cheer was heard responsive to the greetings which had attended 
their march into Kentucky. Trembling women stole to the doors to look 
upon the strange, mystified scene before them, and, as the truth gradually 
forced itself upon them, their eyes filled with tears, and they shrank back, 
fearing even to make the slightest demonstration of friendliness. All was 
sullen, downcast, and gloomy.” The same writer farther on admits “that 
the South was bitterly disappointed in the manifestations of public senti¬ 
ment in Kentucky.” He says: “ The exhibitions of sympathy in this state 
were meagre and sentimental, and amounted to but little practical aid to our 
cause. Indeed, no subject was at once more dispiriting and perplexing to 
the South than the cautious and unmanly reception given to our armies, 
both in Kentucky and Maryland. The reference we have made to the sen¬ 
timent of each of these states leaves but little room to doubt the general 
conclusion that the dread of Yankee vengeance and love of property were 
too powerful to make them take risks against these in favor of a cause for 
which their people had a mere preference, without any attachment to it 
higher than those of selfish calculation.” 

In the summer, then, Bragg had been overconfident of his power to over¬ 
whelm the states of the Northwest by his newly-conscripted army. Now 
his force was less in number, but the opportunity offered was, even under 
this disparaging circumstance, more tempting to a vigorous military leader. 
It was possible now to make use of the solitary advantage gained by the 
summer campaign. The devastation of the country over which both armies 
had passed and repassed, while it hindered Rosecrans, in so far helped Bragg. 
The latter had shown a great degree of boldness in design in the summer 
campaign, but, at the same time, had betrayed his lack of great executive 
ability. So. far as successful execution of a plan depended upon fearless 
firmness, he could be trusted; so far as it depended upon keen and com¬ 
prehensive insight, he was almost certain to be foiled. It was just this lat¬ 
ter element, which he so much wanted, that was most necessary in an en¬ 
counter with Rosecrans, who was himself especially distinguished by this 
very characteristic of genius. The Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston 
was now in command of the department, bat he was unable to take the field 
on account of a severe wound received in Virginia, in the battle of Seven 
Pines. That Johnston was a far abler general than Bragg can not well be 
questioned, but what would have been the prospect of success if he had been 
actually in command, it is scarcely possible to jnfer from the most careful 
scrutiny into his subsequent campaigns. 

On the 26th of November the cars for the first time ran through to Nash¬ 
ville. A heavy force was posted at Gallatin to protect the road. From that 
time the preparations for the campaign were speedily pushed forward. At 
the close of December the army had been clothed, and sufficient ammuni- 

* Pollard’s Second Year of the War, p. 159. 








































December, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


321 



tion and supplies were brought to Nashville to secure the army against the 
needs which might at any time arise from the interruption of the railroad. 
Having made these preparations, Rosecrans awaited his opportunity, which 
was not long wanting. It was impossible for Bragg to make a false move 
which would not immediately lay him open to his wary antagonist. To all 
appearance Rosecrans was at his leisure. It was given out that he would 
no doubt go into winter quarters at Nashville. But, as soon as his army 
was provided for, he began to look with dissatisfaction upon the interval be¬ 
tween Nashville and Murfreesborough. Which army should cross that in¬ 
tervening space to attack the other—his or Bragg’s? Bragg’s army num¬ 
bered sixty thousand men, of which force nearly one third was cavalry. 
Rosecrans had 40,000 infantry and about 3000 cavalry. The question as 
between a movement from Nashville on Murfreesborough and one from 
Murfreesborough on Nashville was momentous. The army receiving the 
attack would avoid the waste of force attending an advance movement, and 
be able to avail itself of fortifications. But it was important that an action 
should not long be delayed. The enemy could well afford to wait, but every 
day materially diminished Rosecrans’s stock of provisions. Happily for 
Rosecrans, Bragg solved the problem, and in a highly satisfactory manner, 
by sending off a large portion of his cavalry under Forrest and Morgan. 
Forrest was dispatched to General Grant’s rear, while Morgan advanced into 
Kentucky to break Rosecrans’s line of communication. This was a fortu¬ 
nate event for Rosecrans. One brigade of the enemy’s cavalry, under the 
best horseman of the Confederacy, was thus out of the field. Morgan was 
not dangerous, acting in his rear, as provision had been made against that 
event. These “clouds of mounted men,” as Rosecrans called them, had been 
his principal annoyance. They swept the country in every direction. Rose¬ 
crans’s cavalry force was so small that it was kept within the infantry lines. 
Bragg had still a large cavalry command left under Generals Wheeler and 
Wharton. So settled was Bragg’s opinion as to Rosecrans’s indisposition 
to assume the offensive, that he had on neither of the roads leading in his 
direction any heavy force. Polk and Kirby Smith were at Murfreesbor¬ 
ough, while Hardee held the left toward Franklin with an advanced guard 
at Nolensville. Rosecrans deemed that his opportunity had arrived, and 
moved December 26th. McCook’s corps of three divisions advanced on the 


Nolensville pike against Hardee. Thomas, with two divisions under Neg- 
ley and Rousseau, advanced by the Franklin and Wilson pikes to threaten 
Hardee’s flank, and then to fall in to Nolensville, ready, in the event of 
McCook’s success, to support Crittenden against an attack at Stone River, 
south ofLavergne; for Crittenden had advanced along the Murfreesbor¬ 
ough pike to the latter place with Wood’s, Palmer’s, and Van Cleve’s divi¬ 
sions. Crittenden’s corps at Lavergne was the pivot of the entire move¬ 
ment; McCook’s was to strike hard upon Hardee; and Thomas’s was to 
support either McCook or Crittenden, as circumstances should decide. The 
plan was admirably well conceived. There were two possible issues to the 
action: either Hardee would be re-enforced, and the main battle would be 
fought west of Murfreesborough; or he would fall back on Murfreesbor¬ 
ough, uniting with Polk and Smith in the defense of that place. 

On the 26th McCook was skirmishing all day, and at night occupied a 
strong position at Nolensville. The same night Crittenden was at La¬ 
vergne, having passed over a rough and difficult country, intersected by 
forests and cedar brakes. Thomas also had made good progress, meeting 
little resistance. All this day and the next the separate columns pushed 
on through a drenching rain. The Christmas holidays were now begun, 
but they were no holidays to the weary soldier. On the second day of his 
advance the movements of Hardee were clearly developed. He was retreat¬ 
ing, but not southward. It was now certain that the battle would be fought 
at or a little north of Murfreesborough. On the night of that day Critten¬ 
den had reached Stewart’s Creek. Thomas had brought bis column to No¬ 
lensville. McCook was following Hardee closely-and watchfully. On the 
29th McCook’s advance brought him within seven miles of Murfreesbor¬ 
ough ; Crittenden moved to within three miles of that glace, at Stone River; 
and Thomas held the centre, Rousseau’s division being nearer to Crittenden, 
and held in reserve; while Negley’s was in the front That night Rose¬ 
crans, having moved his head-quarters to Stewart’s Creek, went to the front, 
where he remained. Although it was only about thirty miles from Nash¬ 
ville to Murfreesborough, Rosecrans’s advance on the latter was greatly im¬ 
peded by Wheeler’s and Wharton’s cavalry. The main cause of delay, 
however, was the necessity for Rosecrans to await the development of the 
affair between McCook and Hardee. 





















322 


The situation of Bragg’s army was a good one for defense. Upon Mur¬ 
freesborough as a centre numerous important pikes converge. The rail¬ 
road from Nashville, taking Lavergne upon its route, runs through the 
town in a southeasterly direction. As Rosecrans had little cavalry, it was 
not necessary for Bragg to detach from his army any considerable force to 
guard that portion of the railroad which was in his possession. He held a 
central position, while Rosecrans moved along the radii of a quadrant. One 
thing, however, was unfavorable. The topography of the country in the 
vicinity of Stone River rendered it difficult to operate successfully with cav¬ 
alry. It was a broken and heavily-wooded country, with here and there an 
open field, and was, well adapted to the use of infantry and artillery. 

The battle known as the battle of Stone River lasted several days. But 
the main actions—those which decided its character and result—were fought 
on the 31st of December, 1862, and the 2d of January, 1863. The battle 
was fought on the banks of Stone River, a stream which, flowing eastward, 
crosses the pike a mile north of Murfreesborough, where it abruptly changes 
its course, flowing northward and parallel with the road. On the evening 
of December 30th, the left of Rosecrans’s line lay along the river on its west¬ 
ern bank. Two divisions of Crittenden’s corps, Van Cleve’s and Wood’s, 
extended from the Murfreesborough pike to the river. The other division 
—Palmer’s—held the cotton-field on the right of the pike. Thomas held 
the centre, with Negley on Palmer’s right, and Rousseau in reserve. McCook 
lay off to the left, his line being extended to a great length toward the 
Franklin road, facing southeastward. 

Stone River, which skirted the Federal left, ran through the enemy’s line. 
The great mass of the Confederate army lay on the west bank opposite 
McCook. This portion of Bragg’s lines was held by Hardee’s corps. Breck¬ 
inridge’s division of this corps was detached from the rest, and held a posi¬ 
tion on the east bank. Polk held the ground between Hardee and Breck¬ 
inridge. 

Both Bragg and Rosecrans had determined to attack on the 31st, and the 
plan of attack formed by each exactly corresponded. On each, side the 
bulk of the army was massed on the left wing. Bragg thought to whip 
McCook, and push Rosecrans off from the pike connecting him with Nash¬ 
ville. Rosecrans designed to crush Breckinridge, and, rapidly following up 
the blow, get in between the enemy and Murfreesborough. Neither had 
any positive expectation of being attacked by the other. As Rosecrans was 
obliged to bring his left wing across the river in order to carry out his plan, 
his movements were subject to greater delay. He was thus somewhat an¬ 
ticipated by Bragg. He bad instructed McCook, in case of an attack being 
made upon his corps by Hardee, to hold out stubbornly, thus insuring the 
success of the attack on Breckinridge and Polk. 

McCook’s corps consisted of three divisions, which extended from left to 
right thus: Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The latter division was surprised 
by Hardee at daybreak on the 31st, and while Rosecrans’s movements on 
the left had hardly begun. The latter was not unwilling that McCook should 
be attacked, if only it did not disturb his prearranged plan. But in this re¬ 
spect he was destined to be disappointed. He was not aware of the ad¬ 
vantage which Hardee was rapidly gaining on McCook. Perhaps he re¬ 
membered the obstinacy with which this corps of McCook’s had a few weeks 
before withstood the attacks of the same enemy at Perryville. Three or 
four hours of obstinate resistance on McCook’s part would without doubt 
enable him to overwhelm Breckinridge; certainly such commanders as Da¬ 
vis and Sheridan could maintain the battle for that length of time. There 
was one thing, however, which disturbed Rosecrans’s confidence, McCook’s 
line, he feared, was not arranged in a proper manner. He had the night be¬ 
fore spoken of this arrangement to McCook. Said Rosecrans: “ I don’t like 
the facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you, who know 
the ground.” The battle had been going on about an hour, when one of 
McCook’s staff officers announced that the right was heavilv pressed, and 
needed assistance. The messenger was not sufficiently explicit. He cer¬ 
tainly failed to impress upon Rosecrans’s mind the impression that there was 
any danger. The fact was that two of Johnson’s brigades—Kirk’s and Wil- 
lich’s—had been routed, leaving their batteries in the enemy’s hands. Da¬ 
vis, too, had been doubled up brigade by brigade, although gallantly resist¬ 
ing, and driven back. This was not reported to Rosecrans; and the latter, 
although he heard the battle swerving more and more to the'left, supposed 
that McCook was refusing his right gradually, according to the instructions 
given him. He therefore directed the officer .to return and direct General 
McCook to hold on obstinately. 

It was not long before a second officer arrived, as Van Cleve was crossing 
Stone River, and stated that the right wing was being driven. This was 
now only too evident to Rosecrans, who could hear the sound of battle rap¬ 
idly swaying northward. Sheridan had followed Davis, and the peril was 
now imminent. Van Cleve was 'recalled, and two of his brigades sent over 
to the centre. Rousseau’s division was sent into the cedar brakes to sup¬ 
port Sheridan, and become the nucleus of a new formation. The scene 
which met Rosecrans’s eye as he went over to the right would have un¬ 
nerved a man of less resource. The stragglers from McCook’s routed com¬ 
mand were swarming to the rear through the brakes in crowds. The ene¬ 
my had succeeded in breaking up Rosecrans’s plan of attack, and had car¬ 
ried his first position. Even Negley had given way in the centre, and Rous¬ 
seau could scarcely bear up against the impetus of the attack. All the troops 
on Palmer’s left had been sent to the right. The only division which re¬ 
tained its original position was Palmer’s. Let us see how that division was 
situated, so much now depended upon it Most of the division was now on 
the right of the pike. Cruft’s brigade was a little in the rear, in the wood. 
Hazen stood across the pike, so that his front line extended eastward to the 


[December, 1862. 

railroad which runs between the pike and the river. It was of the first im¬ 
portance that this position of Hazen’s should be held, in order to cover the 
formation of a new line, in which work Rosecrans was now engaged. 1 he 
river on Palmer’s left, being deep and having but a single ford, was a good 
flank defense. A rise of ground at the railroad afforded some protection 
against the enemy’s artillery. Palmer’s troops were well-disciplined veter¬ 
ans, and were fresher than the troops of the enemy, who had been fighting 
since morning. About ten o’clock Hazen and Cruft were attacked in great 
force; but, fortunately, the valor of the Federal troops and the strength of 
Parsons’s artillery baffled every onset The whole of Bragg’s army, with the 
exception of Breckinridge, was now engaged. At one o’clock P.M. and at 
four o’clock fresh attempts were made to drive Hazen from his position, but 
without success. 

In the mean time Rosecrans had been at work farther to the right When 
McCook’s routed battalions retreated out of the corn-fields and through the 
skirts of the woods on Rousseau’s flank, the latter officer found it quite im¬ 
possible, under the circumstances, to get his division into position in the 
cedar thicket. Galloping off to General Thomas, he described his situation. 
In the rear there was open ground, about three'miles distant from Murfrees¬ 
borough. Here the railroad and turnpike, about fifty rods apart, run through 
a slight cut, forming a natural rifle-pit. Farther back there is on either side 
of the road a-swell of ground, which, once gained and held, constituted an 
impregnable position. To this favorable position Rousseau withdrew his 
division, with General Thomas’s permission. Guenther’s and Loomis’s bat¬ 
teries were posted on the left, with Stokes’s Chicago battery, and were strong¬ 
ly supported by a brigade of regulars. Scribner’s brigade took position in 
the natural rifle-pit above mentioned, and Beatty’s brigade held the crest on 
the right, which stretched away to the northern edge of a cedar wood. 
Scarcely had the line been formed, stretching from Hazen northwestwardly 
to Van Cleve’s position on the right flank, when the gray uniforms of Har¬ 
dee’s troops were seen issuing from the edge of this wood. The bill on the 
left, where the batteries had been placed, commanded the entire space in 
front of the wood on the right, and as rapidly as the enemy came forth into 
the open ground his ranks were mown down without mercy. It was im¬ 
possible for Bragg to move Rosecrans from his strong position, while every 
onset decimated the ranks of his own troops. The prompt formation of the 
Federal line-in-the strongest possible position had turned the fortune of the 
battle. But Rosecrans’s loss in the early part of the day had been heavy. 
Over twenty-five pieces of artillery had fallen into the enemy’s hands, and a 
large number of prisoners had been captured by Wharton’s cavalry. Wheel¬ 
er had the day before succeeded in gaining Rosecrans’s rear, and captured a 
large number of wagons loaded with supplies and baggage, and so small 
was the Federal cavalry command that he made the entire circuit of the 
lines, and joined Wharton on the left. But these movements of the enemy’s 
cavalry scarcely disturbed Rosecrans, who could not by any mere annoy¬ 
ance, or even partial reverse, be diverted from the end he had in view. 

The battle on Wednesday ended with the complete repulse both of Har¬ 
dee on the right and of Polk at the centre. Hazen at the close of the day 
withdrew from the advanced position which he had held with wonderful 
tenacity for ten hours. The next day opened the new year, 1863. Rose¬ 
crans’s position was so strong that Bragg feared to make an assault, and 
contented hitnself with skirmishing and a few cavalry raids. Rosecrans had 
been re-enforced by Starkweather’s and Walker’s brigades; but he preferred 
to wait for fresh supplies of food and ammunition before resuming offensive 
operations. 

On Friday, the 2d of January, the contest was renewed with some degree 
of vigor. Bragg early in the morning directed a heavy cannonade against 
the Federal centre from four strong batteries, and made demonstrations 
against the right. But this show of attack was not followed up, and, indeed, 
was intended merely to discover whether Rosecrans still kept his position in 
force; for the cavalry scouts had reported to Bragg indications of a retro¬ 
grade movement on the part of the Federal commander. 

While Bragg was speculating thus in regard to the movements of Rose¬ 
crans, the latter was quietly crossing Stone River with Van Cleve’s divi¬ 
sion, and, before Bragg was fully aware of the movement, he had gained a 
position on and under cover of an eminence which commanded Polk’s line, 
enfilading it Either Polk must withdraw or Van Cleve. The whole of 
Breckinridge’s division, therefore, was massed in front of the threatening 
position, and heavily supported by artillery, and by cavalry to the number 
of 2000. Before the formidable assault which was made by Breckinridge 
at about four o’clock P.M., Van Cleve retired in some confusion to the other 
side of the river. But it was not long before the situation at this point was 
exactly reversed, and the pursuers were the pursued. 

Just on the other side of the river from the eminence carried by Breckin¬ 
ridge was the crest from which, on Wednesday, Loomis’s, Guenther’s, and 
Stokes’s batteries had belched forth destruction against the enemy. Here 
General Crittenden, who commanded on this part of the field, directed his 
chief of artillery to dispose his batteries for a terrific cannonade, while three 
brigades—two of them from Negley’s division—were ordered up to meet the 
enemy, who was endeavoring to push his advantages. At this point Rose¬ 
crans reports: “ The firing was terrific and the havoc terrible. The enemy 
retreated more rapidly than they had advanced. In forty minutes they lost 
2000 men.” Bragg had timed his assault fortunately for himself. Had it 
occurred earlier, with the same disastrous result, there would have been no 
need of protracting the already sufficiently bloody battle of Stone River for 
another day. Rosecrans says: “ It was now after dark and raining, or we 
should have pursued the enemy into Murfreesborough. As it was, Critten¬ 
den’s corps passed over, and, with Davis, occupied the crests, which were in- 




MURFREESBORO UGH, TENNESSEE 


December, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


323 



















































































































































































































324 


trenched in a few hours.” If Bragg had deemed Polk’s line untenable with 
a single division in this commanding position, now that it was occupied by 
a whole corps it was absolutely necessary for the Confederate general to with¬ 
draw. Iu order to guard against an attack on his l ight, which might again, 
as on Wednesday, disturb his plans, Rosecrans resorted to a very ancient, 
but very effective species of strategy. By a heavy division of camp-fires, 
and by a feigned line of battle, whose only reality consisted in torches, he 
succeeded in impressing the Confederate commander with more respect for 
his forces in that direction than might have been entertained upon a closer 
inspection. 

About noon on the 3d of January, Bragg determined to give up the con¬ 
test. Up to that time there had been no fighting during the day. It had 
been raining since long before daybreak, and Rosecrans would have found 
great difficulty in pushing the enemy, dragging his artillery through the 
muddy fields. Besides, the troops of both armies were nearly exhausted by 
exposure and fatigue. That night Bragg retreated to Duck River with per¬ 
fect security. It was an utter impossibility for Rosecrans, under the circum¬ 
stances, to follow in pursuit. Even if the weather had been favorable, he 
had no cavalry, and his artillery horses were worn out. 

Bragg and Rosecrans, in their official reports of the battle, both claim that 
they were opposed by superior numbers. Rosecrans estimates the force with 
which he left Nashville at nearly 47,000, and in the battle at 43,000. The 
enemy’s force he estimates at over 62,000. Bragg, on the other hand, gives 
the number of his effective force, on the morning of December 31, as less 
than 35,000, and estimates the force opposed to him at nearly 70,000. 

Considering the numbers engaged, the battle of Stone River was one of 
the bloodiest of the whole war. The entire Federal loss in killed was 1553, 
of whom 92 were officers. The wounded numbered a little over 7000, and 
the loss in prisoners was nearly 3000, making the Federal loss in the aggre¬ 
gate nearly 12,000, or more than one fourth of the entire army. The entire 
Confederate loss is stated bv Bragg as 10,000. Both armies lost the services 
of important general officers by death or wounds. General Sill, of McCook’s 
corps, was killed. On the Confederate side, Generals James E. Rains and 
Roger M. Hanson were killed, and Generals Chalmers and Adams were 
disabled. 



Tlir. BTONK RIVER MONUMENT. 


Turning now from the military operations in Tennessee, we will close this 
chapter with a review of the political situation in that state. 

The manner in which Tennessee was first carried over to the side of the 
rebellion has been recorded in this history. The governor of that state, 
Isham G. Harris, had from the first identified himself with the Confederate 
leaders. With evident reluctance, Tennessee followed the policy urged 
upon it by its governor. The eastern portion of the state was intensely 
loyal, giving 33,000 out of 48,000 votes against secession. Among those 
who disapproved of secession was John Bell, who, as Presidential candidate, 
carried the largest vote in the state. But he equally disapproved of what 
was then styled the coercive policy of the administration in relation to the 
seceded states. He regarded this policy as a justification of the state in re¬ 
fusing aid to the general government, but, as a matter of expediency, ad¬ 
vised the people to take the attitude of neutrals and mediators. It was im¬ 
possible, however, after the President’s proclamation of April 15,1861, for 
the more conservative citizens to stem the tide which then set in in favor of 
the revolutionists. Those who had before counseled inaction now looked 
with favor upon that clause of Governor Harris’s reply to Secretary Cam¬ 
eron, which, while it refused two regiments of militia to put down the insur¬ 
rection, threatened to raise 50,000 troops, if necessary, for the defense .of 
Southern rights. Even Neil S. Brown, formerly Governor of Tennessee, 
who had joined Bell in his efforts to sustain a neutral position, now recom¬ 
mended a vigorous war policy. He said: “I have hoped obstinately against 
such an alternative; but the conviction is forced upon my mind that it is the 
settled policy of the administration, and, so far as I can see, of the whole 
North, to urge a war of extermination against the South. The clouds are 
gathering in every direction, and the signs now are that the border states 
arc lo be the battle-ground. In this view, the first duty is to arm at once; 
and to talk of keeping out of such a contest, if it comes, is simply idle.” 


[May, 1861. 

When the Legislature met in extra session on the 25th of April, Governor 
Harris, in his message, recommended the passage of an ordinance separating 
the state from the Union, with a view of joining the Confederacy as soon 
thereafter as possible. The members of the Legislature had not been elected 
upon any such issue as was now presented, and could not fairly be said to 
represent the views of the people. But the governor “could sec no propri¬ 
ety for encumbering the people of the state with the election of delegates to 
do that which it was in the power of the Legislature to enable them to do 
for themselves.” The Legislature had been in session about a week, when 
Henry W. Hilliard, commissioner from the Confederate States, appeared be¬ 
fore it, and addressed the members. His object, he said, was to establish a 
temporary alliance between Tennessee and the Confederacy, as a movement 
preliminary to a permanent relationship. Something more was at issue than 
the right to hold slaves, namely, the right of self-government. 

This address and the governor’s message induced the Legislature, on the 
1st of May, to instruct Governor Harris to enter into a military league with 
the Confederacy. The governor, in obedience to this instruction, appointed 
as commissioners for that purpose Gustavus A. Henry, Archibald O. W. Tot¬ 
ten, and Washington Barrow. The league was established May 7th between 
these gentlemen and Mr. Hilliard. According to the terms of the Conven¬ 
tion, the military operations, offensive and defensive, of Tennessee against 
the United States were, until the union of that state with the Confederacy, 
to be as completely under the control of President Davis as if the union had 
already been established. Upon becoming a permanent member of the Con¬ 
federacy, the state would turn over to the Confederate government all the 
public property, naval stores, and munitions of war in her possession and 
acquired from the United States. The expenditures of the state in the in¬ 
terim were to be met and provided for by the Confederate government. 

There was a great majority of the Legislature in favor of the ratification 
of this treaty. On the 6th of May an ordinance was passed submitting to 
the vote of the people a Declaration of Independence. At the same time 
with the Ordinance of Secession, another for the adoption of the Confederate 
Constitution was submitted to the people. The Legislature passed an act 
calling on the governor to raise 55,000 men for the defense of the state, 
25,000 of whom were to be immediately fitted for the field. Before the day 
of election—June 8, 1861—Governor Harris had most of these 25,000 mer. 
in camp, equipped, for the most part, with munitions belonging to the United 
States. The presence of this army was intimidating to the people ; it was 
an indication of the governor’s determination to sustain the revolutionary 
party in any event; for these armed men had been put into the field before 
the people had expressed a desire to separate from the Union, and it was not 
likelv that any expression of opinion which the people might now make 
would avail any thing. Apparently, the result of the election was a major¬ 
ity of 57,000 in favor of secession. What the vote really cast was it’will 
never be possible to ascertain. The means already used by the governor to 
precipitate the secession of the state had not been so honorable as to preclude 
a reasonable suspicion that his agents would see to it that the'Tevolutionary 
party should show an overwhelming majority. 

In order to still farther strengthen the power which he had gained, Gov¬ 
ernor Harris, in May. ordered the disbandment of all organizations except 
his own, and that all arms belonging to such organizations be returned to 
the State Arsenal at Nashville. All debts due to the citizens of Northern 
states, he declared, must be repudiated. 

So steadfast were the counties of East Tennessee to the Union, that the 
general government had not yet discontinued the mails in that section. 1 At 
Knoxville in May, and at Greenville in June, large Union Conventions were 
held. Several of the central and western counties joined iii the protest 
against the revolution. The Convention at Greenville lasted three days. A 
declaration of grievances was adopted, in which it was stated that the right 
of free suffrage had been obstructed by Governor Harris’s government; that 
the people had been insulted in their own homes, and that women and chil¬ 
dren had been shot down by brutal soldiery, and innocent citizens plundered 
and butchered. It was declared that the Ordinance of Secession was not 
binding upon loyal citizens. A memorial was prepared, petitioning the Leg¬ 
islature to afford the people of East Tennessee a separate government. But 
this portion of the state was unable to cope with Governor Harris and his 
army, and it was not yet possible for the United States to furnish any mate¬ 
rial assistance. In spite of weakness, the people held fast to their opinions, 
and were abundantly rewarded with persecution. Irregular squads of cav¬ 
alry and infantry swept the country, conscripting the citizens, destroying 
the crops, and heaping every possible indignity upon defenseless women and 
children. Soon the thoroughfares into Kentucky were crowded with refu¬ 
gees, who made their way across the mountains with great difficulty. Able- 
bodied men also fled and entered the Union army. The first regiment of 
loyal Tennesseeans was composed of soldiers who had been exiled from their 
homes. Many of these were wealthy, and, for the Union cause, left all their 
possessions behind them to be ravaged by the secessionists, and many left 
behind them families. The number of men left, however, was sufficient to 
oppose an obstinate resistance, and the mountainous character of the country 
favored their efforts for self-defense. At length these men grew bolder, 
and, in an irregular manner, assumed a sort of offensive warfare, burning the 
bridges along the line of the railroads over which the Confederate forces re¬ 
ceived their supplies. 

Tennessee was the first of the Confederate States occupied by the national 


1 The counties in which loyalty prevailed were the following: Anderson, Bledsoe. Blount, Brad¬ 
ley, Campbell, Carter, Claiborne, Cocke, Grainger, Green. Hamilton, Hancock. Hawkins, John¬ 
son, Knox, Marion, McMuir, Meigs, Monroe, Morgan, Polk, Khea, Sevier, Sullivan, and Wash 
ington. 








March, 1862.] 


FROM DO NELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


325 



armies. The fall of Donelson insured the fall of Nashville also. The Con¬ 
federate government of the state then transferred its seat to Memphis. All 
the troops raised by Governor Harris had been ungrudgingly yielded up to 
the demands of General Albert Sidney Johnston, and at the time of the cap¬ 
ture of Donelson the governor had not a single armed company subject to 
his command. General Buell occupied Nashville on the 25th of April, 1862. 
Three days before this, General Grant issued an order declaring West Ten¬ 
nessee under martial law. The capture of Memphis in the June following 
entirely disorganized Governor Harris’s government. The governor him¬ 
self took the field, and was present at some of the most important battles of 
the year. 

The appointment of Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee, 
with the rank of brigadier general, was confirmed by the United States Sen¬ 
ate on the 5th of March, 1862. Andrew Johnson, who was to be the next 
Vice-President of the United States, and who was, through a melancholy 
occasion, to be also its President, was born at Raleigh, North Carolina, De¬ 
cember 29,1808. His parents occupied a humble station in life. The father 
died when the son was about four years of age, and the circumstances of the 


I family were still more straitened. When ten years old the boy became a 
tailor’s apprentice, and in the shop, through an accidental acquaintance with 
a man of eccentric but studious habits, he learned to read, and acquired a 
rudimentary education. He went to Tennessee while still a young man, and 
there married. His choice of a partner proved quite fortunate to his future 
prospects, for his wife became his teacher. . In 1829 Mr. Johnson held his 
first office, that of alderman of Greenville, of which city he was, in the sub¬ 
sequent year, elected mayor. In 1835 he was sent to the state Legislature, 
where he espoused the principles of the Democratic party. Under the auspi¬ 
ces of this party he was elected a member of Congress in 1843, where, in 
regard to the important questions of the admission of Texas, the Mexican 
War, the Tariff of 1846, and the Homestead Bill, he strongly advocated the 
policy upon which his election was based. In 1857 he was elected to the 
United States Senate for the full term which would end in 1863. 

Johnson was a Democrat after the school of Andrew Jackson. The Jack¬ 
sonian element of his democracy was especially apparent in his career at the 
time of the first development of the secession theories in the Senate of the 
United States. Among the Southern senators he stood almost alone in his 





















826 


denunciation of secession as treason, and in his advocacy of the right of the 
general government to exact from the states submission to the Constitution 
and the laws. In his speech delivered December 19,1860, his argument 
against disunion was very strong as affecting Southern interests. He pre¬ 
dicted that disunion must destroy slavery; that a hostile or even alien gov¬ 
ernment upon the border of a slaveholding state would be the natural haven 
of rest to the hunted slave. “ If one division was allowed, others would fol¬ 
low; and,” said he, “rather than see this Union divided into thirty-three 
petty governments, with a little prince in one, a potentate in another, a little 
aristocracy in a third, a little democracy in a fourth, and a republic some¬ 
where else—a citizen not being permitted to pass from one state to another 
without a passport or a commission from his government—with quarreling 
and warring among the petty powers, which would result in anarchy—I 
would rather see this government to-day—1 proclaim it here in my place— 
converted into a consolidated government.” In view of the proposed ag¬ 
gression by the Southern states upon the Federal forts and Federal ships, 
his language was still stronger. In a speech delivered March 2, 1861, he 
said: “Show me those who make war on the government and fire on its 
vessels, and I will show you a traitor. If I were President of the United 
■States I would have all such arrested, and, if convicted, by the Eternal God 
I would have them hung.” 

In assuming his position as Governor of Tennessee, Mr. Johnson was, of 
course, obliged to resign his seat in the Senate. Fortunately, he had been 
twice governor of the state in previous years, and knew well the temper of 
the people with whom be would have to deal. But even thus his course 

1 “The President has conducted this mighty contest, until, as commander-in-chief of the army, 
he has caused the national flag again to float undisputed over the Capitol of our state. Mean¬ 
while the state government has disappeared. The executive has abdicated; the Legislature has 
dissolved ; the judiciary is in abeyance. The great ship of state, freighted with its precious cargo 
of human interests and human hopes, its sails all set, and its glorious old flag unfurled, has been 
suddenly abandoned by its officers and mntinous crew, and left to float at the mercy of the winds, 
and to be plundered by every rover upon the deep. Indeed, the work of plunder has already com¬ 
menced. The archives have been desecrated, the public property stolen and destroyed ; the vaults 
of the State Bank violated, and its treasures robbed, including the funds carefully gathered and 
consecrated for all time to the instruction of our children. 

“In such a lamentable crisis, the government of the United States could not be unmindful of 
its high constitutional obligation to guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of 
government, an obligation which every state has a direct and immediate interest in having’ ob¬ 
served toward every other state; and from which, by no action on the part of the people in any 
state, can the Federal government be absolved. A republican form of government, in conso¬ 
nance with the Constitution of the United States, is one of the fundamental conditions of our po¬ 
litical existence, by which every part of the country is alike bound, and from which no part can 
escape. This obligation the national government is now attempting to discharge. I have been 
appointed, in the absence of the regular and established state authorities, as military governor for 
the time being, to preserve the public property of the state, to give the protection of law actfvelv 
enforced to her citizens, and, as speedily as may be, to restore her government to the same condi¬ 
tion as before the existing rebellion. 

“In this grateful but arduous undertaking, I shall avail mvself of all the aid that may be af¬ 
forded by my fellow-citizens. And for this purpose I respectfully but earnestly invite all the peo¬ 
ple of Tennessee, desirous or willing to see a restoration of her ancient government, without dis¬ 
tinction of party affiliations or past political opinions or action, to unite with me, by counsel and co- 


[March, 1862. 

was a difficult one to pursue. The state had not been wholly occupied by 
the national arms. Even those portions which had been brought again un¬ 
der Federal control were infested by the raids of Morgan and other daring 
partisan rangers. The Union sentiment among the citizens was not as fer¬ 
vent as had been anticipated, partly because sectional antipathies had been 
naturally intensified by the bloody strife, and partly because the chance of 
war might in a few weeks reverse the current of success in favor of the 
Confederates. 

Governor Johnson reached Nashville on the 12th of March, accompanied 
by Emerson Etheridge, clerk of the House of Representatives, and Horace 
Maynard, member of Congress from Tennessee. The next evening after his 
arrival he was called upon by citizens, who desired to elicit an expression 
of opinion on the critical question of the day. The address which he deliv¬ 
ered on the occasion he afterward published as an “Appeal to the People of 
Tennessee.” 1 It was eminently conservative. Military rule was, for a time, 
a necessity. It did not arise from the desire of the Federal government to 
usurp powers belonging to the states, but from the constitutional obligation 
imposed upon the President to provide for every state a republican form of 
government. In the present instance, there was a state which had no gov¬ 
ernment whatsoever. The government which had been had disappeared, 
and, in the confusion incidental to a period of strife, anarchy must ensue, 
unless, for a period, a provisional government could be established. His dec¬ 
laration of the policy which he intended to pursue was succinct, but very 
plain. Those who had been loyal wouldffie honored; those who would be¬ 
come so would be welcomed on their return; but intelligent and conscious 


operative agency, to accomplish this great end. I find most, if not all of the offices, both State and 
Federal, vacated either by actual abandonment, or by the action of the incumbents in attempting 
to subordinate their functions to a power in hostility to the fundamental law of the state, and sub¬ 
versive of her national allegiance. These offices must be filled temporarily, until the state shall 
be restored so far to its accustomed quiet that the people can peaceably assemble at the ballot-box 
and select agents of their own choice. Otherwise anarchy would prevail, and no man’s life or 
property would be safe from the desperate and unprincipled. 

“I shall, therefore, as early as practicable, designate for various positions under the state and 
county governments, from among my fellow-citizens, persons of probity and intelligence, and bear¬ 
ing true allegiance to the Constitution and government of the United States, who will execute the 
functions of their respective offices until their places can be filled by the action of the people. 
Their authority, when their appointments shall have been made, will be accordingly respected and 
observed. 

“To the people themselves the protection of the government is extended. All their rights will 
be duly respected, and their wrongs redressed when made known. Those who through the dark 
and weary night of the rebellion have maintained their allegiance to the Federal government will 
be honored. The erring and misguided will be welcomed on their return. And while it may be¬ 
come necessary, in vindicating the violated majesty of the law, and in reasserting its imperial 
sway, to punish intelligent and conscious treason in high places, no merely retaliatory or vindic¬ 
tive policy will be adopted. To those especially who in a private, unofficial capacity have as¬ 
sumed an attitude of hostility to the government, a full and complete amnesty for all past acta 
and declarations is offered, upon the one condition of their again yielding themselves peaceful cit¬ 
izens to the just supremacy of the laws. This I advise them to do for their own good, and for the 
peace and welfare of our beloved state, endeared to me by the associations of long and active years, 
and by the enjoyment of her highest honors.” 




















































































October, 1862.] 


FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG. 


327 



FOBT .NEGLEY, BASliVlLLK. 


treason must be punished. A full amnesty was offered to all who in a pri¬ 
vate, unofficial capacity had been hostile to the government. 

Upon the refusal of the Common Council of Nashville, and other officers, 
to take the oath of allegiance, Governor Johnson declared their places vacant, 
and appointed others to fill them. The mayor was arrested for “disloyal 
practices.” The press was placed under military supervision. This firm 
policy elicited important results. The citizens began to express anxiety to 
take the oath, and even Confederate soldiers were 'desirous of availing them¬ 
selves of the general amnesty. Trade began to revive; vacant houses were 
reoccupied; there was security of life and property. 

That the majority of the citizens in Nashville was not any too loyal is 
apparent from the vote given May 22d for judge. A disunionist, Turner S. 
Foster, was chosen by a majority of 190. Governor Johnson gave Judge 
Foster his commission, and the same day had him arrested and sent to the 
Penitentiary. On the 12th of May a Union meeting was held at Nashville, 
and a fortnight afterward at Murfreesborough. Substantially the same res¬ 
olutions were adopted on both occasions. The state to which the revolution 
had reduced Tennessee is touchingly depicted in the language of these reso¬ 
lutions. Schools, colleges, universities,churches, were closed; the common- 
school fund had been abstracted and carried away; the funds of the State 
Bank had been seized by Governor Harris and his adherents; the state debt 
had been increased by millions; commerce had been cut off and manufac¬ 
tures shut up; judicial proceedings were suspended—and all this was the 
result of the unfortunate alliance into which the state had entered with the 
Confederacy. 

Governor Johnson’s policy was such as the circumstances of his position 
compelled him to adopt In all things he was firm. It wrtuld have pleased 
him better if he had not been so frequently forced to take arbitrary meas¬ 
ures. But indulgence to the enemies of the government was certain to be 
abused. He was even obliged to force those who could not desist from the 
use of treasonable language to go south beyond the Union lines. He found 
loyal citizens who had been reduced to extremest poverty by the rebellion, 
and he deemed it not unjust to assess the wealthy sympathizers with the re¬ 
bellion for the relief of these people. 1 

1 The following was the form of the circulars sent by Governor Johnson to some of the richest 
secessionists of Nashville: 

M State of Tennewe, Executive Department, Nashville, August IS, 1S62. 

“ Sir,—T here are many wives and helpless children in the city of Nashville and county of Da¬ 
vidson who have been reduced to poverty and wretchedness in consequence of their husbands and 
fathers having been forced into the armies of this unholy and nefarious rebellion. Their necessi¬ 
ties have become so manifest, and their demands for the necessaries of life so urgent, that the laws 
of justice and humanity would be violated unless something was done to relieve their suffering and 
destitute condition. 

“You are therefore requested to contribute the sum of-dollars, which you will pay over 

within the next five days to James Whitworth, Esq., Judge of the County Court, to be by him dis¬ 
tributed among these destitute families in such manner as may be described. 

“Andrew Johnson, Military Governor.'’ 


Nashville, tbe military centre of the Federal armies in Tennessee, was 
four times isolated from tbe Northern states before tbe end of August. On 
tbe 28th of August General Rousseau was placed in command of the city. 
He was soon succeeded by General Thomas; but the presence of the latter 
with Buell’s army being very much needed, Negley assumed the command 
While Bragg was fighting Buell at Perryville, the Confederate Generals J. 
R. Anderson and Forrest, attended by Governor Harris, concentrated a large 
force east of Nashville for the purpose of making an attack upon the city. 
But the army which they had brought together was defeated at Lavergne 
on the 7th of October by a detachment of General Negley’s troops, command¬ 
ed by General Palmer. Other attempts were directed by the Confederates 
against Nashville, but these never succeeded. That which caused Negley 
the most annoyance was the busy persistence with which Morgan worried 
his line of communication with the North. At one time, soon after the bat¬ 
tle at Lavergne, both Negley’s army and the citizens were so far deprived 
of supplies that they were compelled to live off the country, and even the 
area allowed them to forage in was very much restricted by the Confeder¬ 
ate cavalry. The troops had been for some days living on half rations when 
Rosecrans reached Nashville with his army in November. 

The retreat of Bragg’s army from Murfreesborough after the battle of 
Stone River brought the whole of Western and Middle Tennessee under 
Federal control. Afterward Burnside’s operations in East Tennessee almost 
entirely defeated the forces of the Confederacy in that portion of the state. 
But for the power of Morgan and Forrest, it would have been, possible to 
have reorganized the state under a permanent government As it was, the 
provisional government continued throughout the year 1863, and it was not 
until January 26,1864, that Governor Johnson issued his proclamation for 
a state election. 1 

1 Governor Johnson would willingly have taken this step at an earlier stage if the people had 
been prepared for it. His views on the subject of reorganization are thus expressed in a public 
speech made in September, 1863: 

“ Tennessee is not out of the Union, never has been, and never will be out. The bonds of the 
Constitution and the Federal power will also prevent that. This government is perpetual; pro¬ 
vision is made for reforming the government, and amending the Constitution, and admitting states 
into the Union, not for letting them out of it. 

“ Where are we now ? There is a rebellion; this was anticipated, as I said. The rebel army 
is driven back. Here lies your state—a sick man in his bed, emaciated and exhausted, paralyzed 
in all his powers, and unable to walk alone. The physician comes. Don’t quarrel about ante¬ 
cedents, but administer to his wants, and cure him as quickly as possible. The Un*ted States 
sends an agent or a military governor, whichever you please to call him, to aid you in restoring 
your government. Whenever you desire, in good faith, to restore civil authority, you *:an do so, 
and a proclamation for an election will be issued as speedily as it is practicable to hold one. One 
by one, all the agencies of your state government will be set in motion. A Legislature will be 
elected. Judges will be appointed temporarily, until you can elect them at the polls; and so of 
sheriffs, county court judges, justices, and other officers, until the way is fairly open for the people 
and all the parts of the civil government to resume their ordinary functions. This is »o nice, in¬ 
tricate metaphysical question. It is a plain, common-sense matter, and there is nothing in the 
way but obstinacy.” 



































828 


CHAPTER XVIII. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 

I. FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 

Authorities for the Peninsular Campaign.—The Strength of the Army of the Potomac.—Impa¬ 
tience at its Inactivity.—Army Corps.—Lincoln’s and McClellan’s Plans for the Campaign.— 
McClellan’s Argument.—Strength of the Confederate Army.—The Council of War adopts 
McClellan’s Plan.—The President’s Order for an Advance on the 22d of February.—Condition 
of Beauregard’s Army.—Fortifications at Centreville and Manassas.—Beauregard replaced by 
Johnston.—New General Orders.—Centreville and Manassas abandoned.—McClellan’s Prom¬ 
enade.—Condition of the Confederate Fortifications.—McClellan’s Plan modified. The Presi¬ 
dent orders it to be carried into Effect.—McClellan relieved from the general Command.— 
McClellan’s Address to the Army.—His new Plan of Operations.—Topography of the Penin¬ 
sula.—Yorktown.—The Defenses of the Peninsula.—Magruder’s Force.—Landing of the Fed¬ 
eral Troops at Fortress Monroe.—Conflicting Opinions as to the Strength of the Enemy.— 
Blenker, Wool, and McDowell withdrawn from McClellan’s Command.—The Reasons for this. 
—Its Effect on future Operations.—Proposed Naval and Military Attack upon Yorktown aban¬ 
doned.—Statements of McClellan and Goldsborough.—Unsuccessful Attempt to force the Lines 
at Lee’s Mill.—Magruder’s Account.—Siege Operations begun.—Smith’s Attempt to force the 
Lines at Wynne’s Mill.—The Force of the Parties.—McClellan and the President.—Progress 
of the Siege.—Arrival of Franklin’s Division.—Strengt h of the Army, June 30.—Proposed At¬ 
tack upon Gloucester abandoned.—The Sieges of Yorktown in 1781 and 1862.—Completion 
of the Federal Batteries.—Losses during the Work.—Effectiveness of the Army.—The Aban¬ 
donment of Yorktown.—McClellan’s Dispatch.—Weakness of the Warwick Line.—Johnston’s 
Retreat.—The Battle of Williamsburg: Stoneman repulsed; Confusion as to Command; 
Hooker at first successful; he is hard pressed; is relieved by Kearney; Movements of Peck 
and Hancock; Hancock’s decisive Charge; Losses; Movements of McClellan.—Franklin sent 
up the River.—He is attacked at West Point.—The White House taken as a Base.—Johnston’s 
Plans.—Norfolk to be abandoned.—Its Surrender.—The Destruction of the Virginia.—Tatnall’s 
Trial.—Note on the Virginia.—Drewry’s Bluff.—Combined Attack on Fort Darling proposed 
by Goldsborough and declined by McClellan.—The Reason.—McClellan again demands Re¬ 
enforcements.—McDowell’s Corps promised.—The President’s Order.—Johnston’s Proceed¬ 
ings.—His probable Force.—Panic in Richmond.—Proceedings of the Authorities.—Jefferson 
Davis and his Family.—The Citizens and the Press.—McClellan’s Advance from Williamsburg. 
—He reaches the Chickahominy. 

F ROM the survey of the operations in the West, we now turn to the 
more important and disastrous campaign on the Peninsula of Virginia.' 
McClellan, when, in July, 1861, placed in command of the Army of the 
Potomac, found in and about Washington hardly 50,000 men, with thirty 
imperfectly equipped field-pieces. The panic which followed the rout at 
Bull Run soon subsided. The nation had unbounded confidence in the new 
commander, to whom was ascribed the entire credit of the successful opera¬ 
tions in Western Virginia. This confidence was not shaken by the disaster 
of Ball’s Bluff. On the 1st of November he was appointed to the chief com¬ 
mand of the armies of the United States. The whole nation applauded the 
action of the government. 1 2 Re-enforcements poured in, and by the middle 
of October there were in and about Washington 152,000 men, of whom 
133,000 were present and fit for duty. On the 1st of November the Army 
of the Potomac numbered 168,000, of whom 147,000 were fit for duty; but 
there were 13,000 imperfectly equipped, leaving an effective force of 134,000. 
The artillery numbered nearly 300 guns. Its weakest arm was the cavalry. 
This numbered nominally about 15,000, of whom half were wholly or par¬ 
tially unarmed. 3 Yet, in the opinion of many generals, the cavalry force was 


1 The coniuct of the Peninsular Campaign has been assailed and defended upon purely parti¬ 
san grounds. So differently has it been represented, that I have thought proper to give the au¬ 
thority upo i which every important statement in the text has been made. The works which are 
only occasionally referred to are fully designated in the proper places. The following authorities, 
which are continually cited, are designated thus: 

“ McC. Rep." —Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, etc. 
By George B. McClellan, Major General United States Army.—This report is a defense, as 
well as a statement, of the operations of the commander. The edition cited is that put forth by 
the author. Where the same document is found here and in other authorities, it is usually referred 
to this report. 

u Com. Rep." —Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (1863).—This report 
is especially valuable for the official documents which it embodies, and for the sworn testimony of 
leading generals. Only Part I., which relates to the Army of the Potomac from its organization 
to the battle of Fredericksburg, is referred to in these chapters. 

“Sec. of War Rep" —Report of the Secretary of War, Dec. 1, 1862. This report embodies 
that of General Halleck, general-in-chief, after July 11, and several important documents from 
General McClellan, not embraced in his detailed report. 

“ Reb. Rec." —The Rebellion Record, etc. Edited by Frank Moore. —My obligation to this 
valuable collection of documents is not to be measured by the frequency of direct citations. Usual¬ 
ly, when documents are referred to without direct citation, they are to be found in this collec¬ 
tion, where the^ are presented in a more accurate form than in the newspapers of the day. Not 
unfrequently they have been corrected by the authors themselves. 

“Art. Op" —Report of the Engineer and Artillery Operations of the Army of the Potomac, etc. 
By Brigadier General J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer, and Brigadier General W. F. Barry, Chief 
of Artillery. 

“ Pen. Camp" —The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents, as Developed by the Report of 
Major General George B. McClellan. By J. G. Barnard, Brigadier General, etc.—This is a re¬ 
view of some points in McClellan’s Report. It is strongly controversial in tone, but embodies 
some important semi-official statements. 

“ Pollard.” —Southern History of the War, etc. By Edward A. Pollard, Editor of the Rich¬ 
mond Examiner.—This is chiefly valuable as the only formal attempt to present the history of the 
war from a Southern stand-point. It is thoroughly partisan. It is hard to tell whether hatred to 
the Union cause or hatred to the Richmond administration predominates in the author’s mind. 
The work, however, embraces many citations from official reports not as yet accessible in any other 
form. 

“ Magruder.” —Report of Operations on the Peninsula. By Major General J. B. Magruder, 
Commanding.—This report embraces only the first half of the period occupied by the siege of 
Yorktown, down to April 16, when Magruder was displaced by the arrival of Johnston. It is con¬ 
tained in “Official Reports of Battles" (p.515-537, as republished in New York), published by 
order of the Confederate Congress. 

“ De Joinville.” —The Army of the Potomac, etc.—This appeared in the Revue des Deux 
Monde* of Paris, over the signature of A. Trognon. It is attributed, without contradiction, to the 
Prince dc Joinville, son of Louis Philippe, who accompanied his nephews, the Comte de Paris and 
the Due de Chartres, with the Army of the Potomac, in which they served on the staff of General 
McClellan. It throws much light upon many points of the history. 

“Lee.” —Report of General Robert E. Lee of the (Derations of the Confederate Army of 
Northern Virginia, from the Battle of Seven Pines to that of Fredericksburg.—This report, though 
printed by order of the Confederate authorities, has not as yet (July, 1865) been published. Aft¬ 
er the capture of Richmond a copy of it fell into the hands of the editor of the New York Herald , 
to whom I am indebted for it. Having it only in newspaper “-slips,” I am not able to cite the 
pages to which reference is made. 

3 “With the retirement of General Scott came the executive duty of appointing in his stead a 
general-in-chief of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in council nor country 
was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The 
designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in a considerable degree, the selection of the coun¬ 
try as well as of the executive, and hence there is better reason to hope that there will be given 
to him the confidence and cordial support thus by fair implication promised.”— President's Mes- 
eage , Dec. 3, 1861. 3 McC. Rep., 47. 


[January, 1862. 

greater than was needed.' The importance of this arm of the service was 
yet to be learned. McClellan had from the first insisted that the war was 
to be mainly fought by the Army of the Potomac. The resources of the 
nation were lavished upon it; to it every other department was subordina¬ 
ted. Before the 1st of November it had nearly reached its utmost strength 
in numbers and discipline. Officers and men were eager to commence active 
operations. No one dreamed of going into winter quarters. The strength 
of this army was, indeed, much below that which McClellan thought requi¬ 
site for an advance movement. He wished for a nominal force of 240,000, 
which would give about 208,000 effective men. Of these, 35,000 were to 
garrison Washington, 10,000 to garrison Baltimore and Annapolis, 13,000 
to guard the Potomac above and below the capital, leaving 150,000 for the 
column of active operations. This force provided, he thought the Army of 
the Potomac might successfully assume active operations, the great object 
to be attained being “the crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manassas;” 
the advance “ not to be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible 
to avoid it.” 2 

The Confederate army of the “Department of Northern Virginia” lay 
mainly at Centreville and Manassas. Its outposts were pushed forward 
within a few miles of Washington ; from their most advanced points the Cap¬ 
itol was visible. They had also a force in the Valley of the Shenandoah, 
threatening the capital from above; and had erected batteries at every com¬ 
manding point along the lower Potomac, completely closing the approach by 
water. McClellan believed that at the close of October their “force on the 
Potomac was not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably 
commanded, and strongly intrenched.” 3 

The autumn months of 1861 had been unusually favorable for military 
operations; yet week after week passed, and no movement besides recon- 
noissances and consequent skirmishes was made by the Federal army. The 
impatience grew stronger as autumn lapsed into winter, and winter verged 
toward spring, with no indications of activity. The Confederate flag floated 
in plain view across the Potomac from the Capitol; the unmolested Confed¬ 
erate batteries barred the lower Potomac. Was the great national army, 
whose perfect organization had been so loudly vaunted, meant for work or 
for play? Were there not private plans, working against the public weal, 
which kept it motionless? Surmise grew into accusation. The administra¬ 
tion was charged with wishing, for selfish purposes, to protract the war 
rather than to end it. A difference of opinion had arisen between the Pres¬ 
ident and the general as to the organization of the army. Lincoln wished 
it to be divided at once into several corps. McClellan was opposed to this. 
It was a delicate matter, he said, to appoint major generals before they had 
been tried by actual service, and had shown their fitness to be selected to 
command 30,000 or 40,000 men. A major general could not be stowed away 
in a pigeon-hole, if he should prove incompetent, as easily as a brigadier 
general. He proposed to manage the entire army himself in some battle or 
campaign, and then select from the brigadier generals such as should prove 
themselves competent for higher commands ; 4 yet he himself, wholly untried 
in military operations on a large scale, wished to have the sole command of 
an army of 150,000 men. The Secretary of War and most of the generals 
were in favor of the immediate organization of army corps; but the Presi¬ 
dent, who was slowly feeling his way, deferred for a time to the opinion of 
McClellan, and the corps were not arranged until the very day when the 
Army of the Potomac was ordered to prepare for the expedition to the 
Peninsula. 

Of far more importance was the difference of opinion as to the entire plan 
of the campaign. The bulk of the Confederate force lay at and near Cen¬ 
treville and Manassas, drawing its supplies mainly from Richmond by way 
of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The President wished the Army 
of the Potomac to advance directly upon this railroad, at a point between 
Manassas and Richmond, and, by assailing the enemy’s base of supply, force 
him to come out of his intrenchments and give battle in the open field. 
McClellan wished to assume the lower Chesapeake Bay as his base of opera¬ 
tions, transporting the army by water down the Potomac and up the Rappa¬ 
hannock, disembarking at Urbana, and thence marching upon Richmond, 
forty miles distant. 

Two full months passed beyond the time which McClellan had fixed upon 
for the advance, and the direction in which it was to be made was not de¬ 
cided. The general laid his plan before the President, who disapproved it, 
and adhered to his own. To assure the country that this inaction was to 
come to an end, the President, on the 27th of January, issued a general 
order appointing the 22d of February as the day for a general advance of 
all the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent 
forces. This was followed, on the 31st of January, by a special order, 
directing that, after providing for the defense of Washington, the disposable 
force of the-Army of the Potomac should be formed into an expedition for 
the Immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad 
southwestward of Manassas Junction, the details to be in the discretion of 
the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move on or before the 22d of 
February. McClellan asked to submit in detail his objections to this plan, 

1 “In my judgment, n large amount of cavalry is not useful, and can not be used south of the 

Potomac. I have always said that the regular cavalry would have been sufficient for the opera¬ 
tions of this army—merely as advanced guards, and to carry reports and messages.”— Richard¬ 
son, Com. Rep., 113. “I think we have more cavalry than we want; I should suppose that one 
half of the cavalry that is across the river [less than 12,000] would be sufficient.”— Heintzelman, 
Ibid., 119. “I have in my division one regiment of cavalry. I would be very glad to get rid 
of two thirds of it. I think, as things are situated now, that 2000 cavalry are as much as we want 
for the whole army.”— Franklin, Ibid., 124. “There are twelve divisions. My division has one 
regiment of cavalry. I think we might do with less. I think I might have done with two thirds 
of the amount of cavalry I have. If we were organized by corps of three divisions each, two reg¬ 
iments of cavalry would be sufficient for the three divisions.”— McDowi ll, Ibid., 139. 

3 McC. Rep., 46-49. 3 Ibid., 46. * Com. Rep., 6. 







February, 1862.] 


FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 



SOUTHEASTERN VIRGINIA. 








































































330 


and his reasons for preferring his own. 1 Lincoln granted permission in a 
note, in which he said that he would give up his own plan if McClellan 
would show wherein McClellan’s was preferable in point of cheapness, cer¬ 
tainty, and worth of victory, or facility for retreat in case of disaster. 2 

McClellan replied on the 3d of February, in an elaborate paper which he 
had previously prepared. 3 It proceeds throughout on the assumption that 
the force of the enemy was at least equal to his own. At the close of Oc¬ 
tober he had estimated that they had on the Potomac 150,000 men. In 
March he reduced the estimate to 102,500, besides 13,000 in the Yalley of 
the Shenandoah. In this paper no direct estimate was given. The nominal 
force of the Army of the Potomac, including those in Maryland and Dela¬ 
ware, was, on the 1st of February, 219,000, of whom 28,000 were sick, ab¬ 
sent, or in confinement, leaving 191,000 present for duty. 4 * After providing 
for the safety of Washington, he hoped to have from 110,000 to 140,000 
troops to be thrown upon the new line. 6 

His principal objections to the President’s plan were, that the nature of 
the country and the condition of the roads were such that the movement 
must be so slow that the enemy could not be taken by surprise; that, even 
if the roads were in a tolerably firm condition at the commencement, they 
•were liable to be obstructed at any moment by rain and snow; that, how¬ 
ever the operation was undertaken, whether by a direct assault upon his 
fortifications, or by an attempt to turn either or both flanks, the enemy, oc¬ 
cupying a strong central position, with roads diverging in every direction, 
could concentrate his whole force for a decisive action upon any one point; 
and that, even if the operation were successful, the result would be indeci¬ 
sive. We should gain merely the possession of the battle-field, the evacua¬ 
tion of the line of the upper Potomac, and the moral effect of the victory. 
The main army of the Confederacy would not be destroyed. It could fall 
back upon other positions, and fight again and again, should the condition 
of his troops permit. If he was in no condition to fight again out of the 
range of his intrenchments at Richmond, he could fell back to them, destroy¬ 
ing railroad bridges and otherwise impeding our progress through a region 
where the roads are as bad as they well can be; “ and we would probably 
find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theatre of war, or to seek a 
shorter land-route to Richmond, with a smaller available force and at an 
expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at 
once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces and 
perfect his defensive arrangements at the very points where it is desirable 
to strike him when least prepared.” 6 

In favor of his own plan, he urged that the route from the lower Chesa¬ 
peake Bay was the shortest land-route to Richmond, striking directly at 
the heart of the enemy’s power in the East; that the region was more fa¬ 
vorable for offensive operations-than that in front of Washington, the roads 
being passable at all seasons of the year, and the spring two or three weeks 
earlier. A movement in force on that line would oblige the enemy to aban¬ 
don his intrenched position at Manassas in order to cover Richmond and 
Norfolk; for, should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction could 
be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the 
assailant. If the movement were successful, it would give us the capital, 
the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall, all the 
waters of the Chesapeake would be ours—all Virginia would be in our pow¬ 
er, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The 
alternative presented to him would be to beat us in a position selected by 
ourselves, disperse, or surrender. If we were beaten in battle, we should 
have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fortress Monroe, 
with both flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole move¬ 
ment our left flank would be covered by the water; our right would be se¬ 
cure, for the enemy would be too distant to reach us in time; he could op¬ 
pose us only in front, we bringing our fleet into full play. ■ Should circum¬ 
stances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we could use Mob Jack 
Bay; or, “ the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fortress Monroe as a 
base, and operate with complete security, though with less celerity and bril¬ 
liancy of results, up the Peninsula.” In conclusion, he said: “It is by no 
means certain that we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I re¬ 
gard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoralize the ene¬ 
my by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have 
chosen, in which all is in our favor, and where success must produce im¬ 
mense results. Nothing is certain in w.ar, but all the chances are in favor 
of this movement So much am I in favor of the southern line of opera¬ 
tions, that I would prefer the movement from Fortress Monroe as a base—as 
a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana—to an at¬ 
tack upon Manassas.” 

The argument was ably stated; but, as the event proved, McClellan great¬ 
ly overestimated the obstacles in the way of the President’s plan, and as 
greatly underestimated those in the way of his own. The force of the en¬ 
emy at Manassas was hardly half what he supposed.’ When he reached 

■ McC. Rep., 96, 97. 

* Lincoln to McClellan, Feb. 3, 1862. “You and I have distinct and different plans for a move¬ 
ment of the Army of the Potomac. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, np the Rappahannock to 
Urbana, and across and to the terminus of the railroad on the York Ri^er. Mine to move directly 
to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the 
following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: First. Does not your plan involve a 
greatly larger expenditure of time and money? Second. Wherein i9 victory more certain by your 
plan than mine? Third. Wherein is victory more valuable by your plan than mine? Fowth. In 
fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy’s com¬ 
munications, while mine would? Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more diffi¬ 
cult by your plan than mine?” * * * McC. Rep., 98-107. 4 76., 52. 4 76., 106. 4 76., 105. 

7 The Confederate government carefully abstained from making any public statement of the 
strength of its armies in the field. Their actual force in Northern Virginia at any period can be 
given only by approximation. At the close of October, when it was probably largest, McClel¬ 
lan had estimated it at 150,000. A few weeks later, Butler, collecting all accessible official evi¬ 
dence, calculated that there were 70,000. Three estimates of the number, near the beginning of 


[March, 1862. 

the Peninsula he found the region far more difficult than thafr in front of 
Washington, even after he had adopted the line from Fortress Monroe, upon 
which he had supposed that he could “operate with complete security, al¬ 
though with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula.” The 
order directing an advance upon Manassas was not formally revoked, but 
its execution was not required. The President, according to his wont, took 
time to consider. He was still in favor of his own plan, but he said he 
was not a military man, and would submit the question to a council of war 
consisting of the twelve generals commanding divisions, and be governed 
by the decision of the majority. Four of the generals, Sumner, McDowell, 
Heintzelman, and Barnard, were in favor of Mr. Lincoln’s plan of an onward 
movement right on to Richmond. Eight generals, Fitz John Porter, An¬ 
drew Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Keyes, and Naglee 
(who represented Hooker), voted for McClellan’s plan. This council was 
held on the 8th of March. 1 

McClellan’s plan having thus been definitely sanctioned, Lincoln determ¬ 
ined that it should be put into execution. On the same 8th of March two 
general orders were issued. By the first order McClellan was directed to 
organize his army for active operations into four corps, to be commanded 
according to seniority of rank: First Corps, McDowell; Second ‘Corps, Sum¬ 
ner; Third Corps, Heintzelman; Fourth Corps, Keyes. Besides these was 
to be a Fifth Corps, under Banks, to operate in the Valley of the Shenan¬ 
doah ; and the defenses of the capital were to be placed under Wadsworth, 
who was to be military governor of the District of Columbia. 2 The second 
order-directed that no change of base should be made without leaving a suf¬ 
ficient force to render the capital entirely secure; that not more than half 
of the Armji of the Potomac should be moved, without the assent of the 
President, until the Potomac River was freed from the enemy’s batteries; 
and that the movement toward the lower Chesapeake should be commenced 
not later than the 18th of March. 2 On the next day, March 9, came import¬ 
ant tidings from two different quarters. In Hampton Roads the Virginia 
had sunk the Cumberland and Congress, and had encountered the Monitor; 
and the Confederate army had evacuated its position at Centreville and 
Manassas, and along the Potomac, and were falling back toward Richmond. 

During the long period of inaction, Beauregard had commanded the Con¬ 
federate forces in Northern Virginia. He was the popular hero of the day. 
He had taken Kort Sumter. He had won the fight at Bull Run. During 
the pleasant months of the late summer and early autumn, volunteers flocked 
to the army and filled its camps. They expected a short war; possibly a 
fight or two, to be decided by their terrible bowie-knives, at the very sight 
of which every Yankee who could would run. All idea of discipline and 
organization, every thing that distinguishes an army from a mob, was scout¬ 
ed. Quite possibly at this time there were 100,000 or 150,000 Confederate 
troops toward the Potomac. But by the time winter set in the spirit of 
volunteering had died out The old volunteers were anxious to return to 
their homes, and no new ones came to fill their places. At the close of Jan¬ 
uary, 1862, Beauregard was displaced from his command. The pretext was 
that his services were needed at the West Joseph Johnston was placed in 
command. For the first, but not for the last time during the war, the thank¬ 
less task was imposed upon him of retrieving the errors of his predecessors. 
He found an army diminished in numbers, ill disciplined, ill provided, and 
suffering from sickness. 4 He saw at once that it was beyond his power to 


March, have been preserved, all purporting to be based upon reports of McClellan’s secret service 
corps. The first is stated by Colonel Lecompte, a Swiss officer serving on McClellan’s staff, to 
have been furnished on the 21st of February by the Count of Paris, who was also on the staff 
( Barnard , Pen. Camp., 13); the second was laid before a council of war on the 2d of March 
(ibid., 95); the third is given by McClellan ( Report, 122), as furnish^l on the 8th of March by 
the chief of the secret service corps. These estimates, adapting the locations to those laid down 
in the last, are as follows: 

Council , March 2. 


McClellan, March 8. 

At Manassas, Centreville, Bull \ 

Run, Upper Occoquan, and > 

vicinity.) 

At Brooks’s Station, Dumfries, \ 

Lower Occoquan, and vicin- > 

ity. ) 

At Leesburg and vicinity. 4,600 

In the Shenandoah Valley. 13,000 

115,500 


80,000 


18,000 


Same region.... 29,900 


Same region.... 20,600 

Not given (say) 4,500 
Not given (say) 13,000 
63,500 


Count of Paris , Feb. 21. 
Same region. 47,000 

Same region. 18,000 

Leesburg. 6,000 

Winchester... 12,000 to 18,000 
83,000 to 89,000 

The Committee on the Conduct of the War say, “The strength of the enemy was variously 
estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimates based their 
opinions upon information received at head-quarters. Subsequent events have proved that the 
force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates; and the strength of their fortifi¬ 
cations was very greatly overestimated.”— Com. Rep., 7. 

1 Sumner’s and Barnard’s testimony (Com. Rep., 360, 387). This important council, whose vote 
fixed the general plan of the campaign, has been strangely unnoticed. The question before it was 
whether the plan of Lincoln or that of McClellan should be adopted. No one of the generals tak¬ 

ing part in it who testified before the committee could even fix the date. It was, they thought, 
late in February or early in March. Mr. Raymond (Administration of President Lincoln, 225) 
says it was held “late in February.” The true date is fixed incidentally by McClellan (Report, 

116). But he speaks of it merely as a meeting of commanders of divisions, convened by his in¬ 
vitation “for the purpose of giving them their instructions, and receiving their advice and opin¬ 
ions respecting their commands.” a McC. Rep., 58. 3 Ibid., 117. 

4 “ It was really most surprising to observe the inertness which followed the battle of Manassas. 

Our War Department, our generals, our soldiers, were all reposing on their laurels, lost in the hap¬ 
piest dreams of their late success. Nothing was done toward insuring the fruits of this victory. 
The idea of having beaten the Northern army was so consoling that the Southerners began to 
think that the idea that the soldier should be taught was pure folly. ‘We have now,’ they said, 

‘beaten Scott, the greatest general of the age; we have destroyed his army, and, consequently’ 
it would be a waste of time to drill, exercise, and do things of that kind. We need only to draw 
our dreaded bowie-knives, and every enemy who is able to run will do so.’ These ideas predom¬ 
inated among the soldiers of the army, and the officers took no pains to counteract them. When 
McClellan was appointed to the chief command of the Federal army, and set to work to strengthen 
his position by the construction of field-works in order to be enabled to proceed the better with 
the organization of his forces, Beauregard at last began to bestir himself, and to rouse his officers 
and men from their lethargy. Fortified works on a grand scale were now undertaken, and, i n¬ 
deed, the preparations were so extensive that it appeared as if the whole state of Virginia was to 
be fortified. No step9 were, however, taken for the erection of hospitals, the improvement of the 
roads, or the instruction of the soldiers. We were especially ill provided with medicines and 
clothes, and the troops suffered greatly in consequence. Added to this, sickness broke out in Beau¬ 
regard’s camp. It was the more serious,inasmuch as our authorities had never directed their 
attention to any sanitary precautions. Wounded men and horses were alike treated in themost 
negligent manner, and the consequences were indeed appalling. Dead horses lay about in hund- 
















RUINS OP IIBIDOE AT BLACXBCRK'S FORD. 


withstand a serious attack, and resolved to fall back the moment any, de¬ 
termined movement was made by the Federal forces. Beauregard had, in¬ 
deed, laid out immense works at Centreville and Manassas. At Centreville 
were two lines. One faced east, a mile and three quarters long; the other 
faced north, two miles long. In both were thirteen distinct forts, connected 
by “infantry parapets,” “double caponniers,” and “redans.” There were 
embrasures for seventy-one guns. On a high hill commanding the rear of 
both lines was a large redoubt with ten embrasures. Manassas was defend¬ 
ed in all directions by a system of detached works, with platforms for heavy 
guns, arranged for marine carriages, and connected by infantry parapets; the 
system being rendered complete by a very large work with sixteen embra¬ 
sures, commanding the highest of the other works by about fifty feet 1 The 
works at Manassas had been mounted with guns. Those at Centreyille had 

reds as they had fallen, and nobody seemed to care any thing about it, or to take any steps to put 
an end to a state of things so detrimental to the health of the army. Before long the hospitals in 
Beauregard's camp became enormously overcrowded, and the scythe of death reaped a large har¬ 
vest in the narrow lanes of the camp, mowing down the lately blooming youth of the South. Hap¬ 
pily for the army, General Beauregard received orders to assume command of the army on the 
Mississippi. It was, indeed, high time for a change in the administration of the Army of the Po¬ 
tomac, as the demoralization, negligence, and the lax discipline which permitted the soldiers to 
assume a bearing which verged on actual insubordination were becoming .quite unbearable. Pale, 
haggard faces peered out upon you from the tents, and forms worn to the bone by hunger and 
disease tottered about. Nobody seemed to exert any authority, and nobody was disposed to obey. 
Beauregard left his army in the most deplorable condition, hurrying straight to the scene of his 
future defeat.”— Estvan, War Pictures from the South, 107-109. 

“The Acts of Congress providing'for re-enlistments had failed to effect the desired object. The 
spirit of volunteering had died out, and the resolution of our soldiers already in the field was not 
sufficient to resist the prospects, cherished for months amid the sufferings and monotony of the 
camps, of returning to their homes The exigency was critical, and even vital. In a period of 
thirty days the term of one hundred and forty-eight regiments expired. There was good reason 
to believe that a large majority of the men had not re-enlisted, and of those who had re-enlisted a 
very large majority had entered companies which could never be assembled, or, if assembled, could 
not be prepared for the field in time to meet the invasion actually commenced ”— Pollard, ii., 
2*3. 1 McC. Rep., 123. 


been merely laid out, but no "heavy artillery had been placed in them, and 
for weeks they were occupied only by a corps of observation, ready to fall 
back upon any alarm. 

Beauregard’s order upon giving up the command of the army, issued on 
the 30th of January, and Johnston’s order upon assuming it, five days later, 
clearly indicate that both were aware of their perilous position. The main 
point of each was an urgent appeal to the troops not to disband. 1 Johnston, 
however, before giving the final orders for evacuation, waited for some defi¬ 
nite movement on the part of the enemy. He had trusty friends who in¬ 
formed him at once of every thing that took place in Federal councils. So 
long as the Federal authorities were undecided where to strike, he might 
safely hold his position. But the moment he learned of the order to move 
by the way of the Peninsula, he called back his corps from Centreville, de¬ 
stroyed the bridges over Bull Run, and fell back to Manassas. The next 
day, March 10, he evacuated this place, burning every thing which he could 
not carry away. 2 

Early on the 9th of March McClellan was apprised that the enemy was 

* Beauregard said: “ I can not quit you without deep emotion, without even deep anxiety in 
the moment of our country’s trials and dangers. This is no time for the Army of the Potomac— 
the men of Manassas—to stack their arms and quit, even for a brief period, the standards they 
have made glorious by their manhood.”— Reb. Rec., iv., 66. Johnston said: “Accustomed 
to the comforts and luxuries of home, you have borne and met the privations of camp life, the ex¬ 
actions of military discipline, and the rigors of a winter campaign. Your country now summons 
you to a noble and a greater deed. The enemy has gathered up all his energies for a final con¬ 
flict. He does not prbpose to attack this army so long as it holds its present position with undi¬ 
minished numbers and unimpaired discipline; but, protected by his fortifications, he awaits the ex¬ 
piration of your terra of service. Expecting a large portion of our army to be soon disbanded, he 
hopes that his immense numbers will easily overpower your gallant comrades who will be left here. 
The commanding general calls upon the twelve-months’ men to stand by their brave comrades who 
have volunteered for the war. You can not, you will not draw back at this solemn crisis of our 
struggle, when all that is heroic in the land is engaged, and all that is precious hangs trembling 
in the balance.”— Reb. Rec., iv., 130. 3 Com. Rep., 260. 



SYAOUATION OF max a^uh JUKOTIOH. 


















































































332 



[March, 1862. 

evacuating his positions atCentreville, Manassas, and on the upper and low. 
er Potomac. This, he thought, presented a good opportunity for his troops 
to gain some experience on the march and bivouac preparatory to a cam¬ 
paign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other impediments 
which accumulate around an arm}' in camp. He hoped, though rather faint¬ 
ly, that by marching upon Manassas he might be able to harass the rear'of 
the retreating enemy. 1 On the morning of the 10th the Army of the Poto¬ 
mac began its “ promenade” toward Manassas. Centreville was reached at 
noon. For once the Virginia mud did not prevent a rapid march. The 
formidable works which had so long been an object of dread were found to 
be thoroughly dilapidated. They did not appear to have been touched for 
months. The banks and escarpments were washed down by the rains. The 
ditches were so filled up that a man might leap across them. There was 
not the slightest evidence that a single heavy gun had ever been mounted 
upon them. There were, indeed, huts sufficient to shelter an army of 50,000 
or more men ; but the utmost force collected here at any time was 12,000 
or 15.000. 2 The army marched no farther than Centreville, but McClellan 
and a strong escort rode on to Manassas, wading Bull Run, for the rude 
bridge at Blackburn’s Ford had been destroyed. The strong-hold at Manas¬ 
sas was a scene of ruin. Here the promenade ended. Stoneman, with a 
force of 2300 cavalry and infantry, pushed on fourteen miles in the track of 
the retreating Confederates. They found the roads strewed with abandoned 
small-arms, stores, and munitions, showing that the final retreat had been 
hasty. They were, however, far from disorganized. After ascertaining 
their position, and finding them too strong to be assailed, Stoneman re¬ 
turned. The whole army then marched back, and in less than a week after 
it bad set out was again in its camps near Washington. 

In the course of this week the plan of the campaign was modified. In¬ 
stead of going up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and thence marching 
straight across the Peninsula, as McClellan had all along proposed, the “less 
brilliant” plan of landing at Fortress Monroe was adopted. This change 
was’ made at a council of the four newly-appointed corps commanders, 
McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, held at Fairfax Court-house on 
the 13th of March. According to the memorandum of the proceedings giv¬ 
en by McClellan, it was unanimously voted “ that, the enemy having retreat¬ 
ed from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, 
it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations 
to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between 
the York and James Rivers,” provided that certain conditions were secured; 
but if this could not be done, “ the army should then be moved against the 
enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment” 3 But 
Sumner testified that no such proposition was submitted to the council, and, 
had it been submitted, he should have voted against it. 4 McClellan assent¬ 
ed to what he considered the decision of the council, and communicated it to 
the War Department The Secretary of War replied that the President had 
considered the plan, made no objections to it, but ordered that in its execu¬ 
tion sufficient force should be left at Manassas Junction to make it sure that 
the enemy would not repossess himself of that position and line of commu¬ 
nication ; that Washington should be left entirely secure, and then the gen¬ 
eral should “move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing 
a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any where between here and there; or, 
at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the en¬ 
emy by some route.” 5 

The President had by this time become convinced that the direction of 
the active operations of the Army of the Potomac would fully occupy all 
of McClellan’s powers, without the task of controlling the entire military 
operations of the nation. Accordingly, on the 11th of March, an order was 
issued stating that “ General McClellan having personally taken the field at 
the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved 
from the command of the other military departments, he retaining the com¬ 
mand of the Army of the Potomac.” All the region west of Knoxville was 
formed into a new Department of the Mississippi, the command being given 
to Halleck; and a new Departmen' - ’^e Mountain, embracing all between 
those of the Mississippi and the Poton.„c, was created for Fremont All 
commanders of departments were to report directly to the Secretary of War. 
McClellan, though chagrined that this order was published before it was offi¬ 
cially communicated to him, yielded to it with a good grace. He wrote to 
the President, “I have said to you that no feeling of self-interest or ambition 
should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to 


• McC. Rep., 118, 119. 2 Com. Rep., 243-250. ‘ McC. Ilep., 128. 

4 “When the army returned to Fairfax Court-house a council was convened there, consisting of 
the four corps commanders, McDowell, Heintzelman, Keyes, and myself, and the proposition was 
submitted to us in this form: Whether, as the enemy was then rapidly retreating through the coun¬ 
try, and the roads were in a very bad condition, it would not be better to turn them by a movement 
by water—as my understanding was, to descend the Potomac and land at Urbana. With the un¬ 
derstanding that the army was to land at Urbana, I yielded to the proposition ; and I will add, that I 
was never more surprised in my life than, when I embarked at Alexandria, to learn that the whole 
army was going down to Fortress Monroe. I had not dreamed of any such movement, and would 
not have voted for it.”— Com. Rep., 360. The testimony of General Keyes, however, confirms the 
view of McClellan. He says : “About the 13th of March a council of corps commanders was 
held at Fairfax Court-house, at which were present Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, 
and myself. General McClellan was not much present during the discussions. The subject of 
the campaign was talked of. I do not know that any minutes were made. It was finally agreed 
and understood that we were to take the army down to Old Point Comfort and move up the Pen¬ 
insula. . . . The corps commanders were unanimous in their agreement. In consequence 

of the arrangements made there, the army was embarked for Old Point Comfort.”— Com. Rep., 
598. He also wrote to Senator Harris, June 7: “The plan of campaign on this line was made 
with the distinct understanding that four army corps should be employed, and that the navy should 
co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left, by mov¬ 
ing gun-boats up the James River. . . . The above plan was adopted unanimously by Generals 
McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by General McClellan, who 
first proposed Urbana as our base. The army being reduced by 45,000 troops, some of them 
among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the plan to which wc are re¬ 
duced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.”— McC. Rep., 165. 

4 McC. Rep ., 129- 















































































































FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


333 


March, 1862.] 



TU£ NKLSO.n HOfit, YOtt.vTuW.N. 


have the opportunity to prove it; and you 
will find that, under present circumstances, 

I shall work just as cheerfully as before, 
and that no consideration of self will jn 
any manner interfere with the discharge 
of my public duties.” 1 

On the 14th McClellan issued a stirring 
address to his army. “ For a long time,” 
he said, “ I have kept you inactive, but not 
without a purpose. You were to be dis¬ 
ciplined, armed,, and instructed. The for¬ 
midable artillery you now have had to be 
created; other armies were to move and 
accomplish certain results. The patient la¬ 
bors of many months have produced their 
results. The Army of the Potomac is now 
a real army, magnificent in material, admi¬ 
rable in discipline and instruction, excel¬ 
lently equipped and armed. Your com¬ 
manders are all that I could wish. The 
period of inaction has passed. I will bring 
you now face to face with the rebels, and 
only pray that God may defend the right. 

In whatever direction you may move, how¬ 
ever strange my actions may appear to 
you, ever bear in mind that my fate is 
linked with yours, and all that I do is to 
bring you where I know you wish to be—on the decisive battle-field. I 
shall demand of you great, heroic exertions, rapid and long marches, priva¬ 
tions perhaps. We will share all these together.” And more in the same 
strain.* 

McClellan then submitted to the War Department his proposed plan of 
operations. Fortress Monroe was to be the first base of operations, Rich¬ 
mond being the objective point, to be reached by the way of Yorktown and 
West Point. It was assumed that the enemy would concentrate bis forces, 
and that a decisive battle would be fought between Richmond and West 
Point. The first object of the campaign was to capture Yorktown by a 
combined naval and military attack, which would be the work of only a few 
hours; then West Point would be established as the new base, about twen¬ 
ty-five miles from Richmond, “with every facility for developing and bring¬ 
ing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the 
James.” The co-operation of the navy was again and again insisted upon 
as an absolutely necessary part of this programme. “ Without it the opera¬ 
tions may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in 
front several strong positions, which, by its aid, could be turned without se¬ 
rious loss of either time or men. . . . For the prompt success of this 

campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its 
whole available force, its most powerful vessels, upon Yorktown. There is 
the most important point—there the knot is to be cut.” 3 

The Peninsula of Virginia lies between the James and York Rivers, which, 
running nearly parallel from the northwest, empty into Chesapeake Bay, 
their mouths forming wide estuaries. Fortress Monroe occupies the extrem¬ 
ity of the Peninsula, and is connected with the main portion only by a nar¬ 
row sand beach. The extreme length, from the fort to a line drawn between 
Richmond and West Point, is about sixty miles; the average breadth about 
twelve. At Yorktown, twenty miles up, it is narrowed to eight, which width 
it preserves ten miles, to Williamsburg; then the rivers begin to diverge. 
The shores of the lower portion of the Peninsula are deeply indented with 
creeks, some of which extend half way across. The land is flat and low, 


1 Me C. Rep. ,125. ’ Ret. Rec., iv., 306. ‘ MeC. Rep. ,132-134. 


covered with swampy forests, through which sluggish streams flow lazily, 
expanding after every rain into miry ponds. Here and there is a small set¬ 
tlement, grouped around a rude church, a court-house, or a cross-road tav¬ 
ern. , The roads, winding from one to another, hardly passable at any time, 
are, after a storm, impracticable for a wheel-carriage. The climate is unheal¬ 
thy during the summer, but the soil is generally fertile, and the fisheries pro¬ 
ductive, the oysters of the York and James Rivers being among the finest 
in the world. The population is 45 to the square mile, about equal in den¬ 
sity to that of Pennsylvania, the slaves slightly outnumbering the whites. 
Yorktown is a dilapidated village of some fifty houses, on the York River, 
twenty miles from Fortress Monroe. It is chiefly noted for the surrender 
of Cornwallis in 1781. In the colonial times it was much larger, and for a 
long time vied with Williamsburg, the capital of the colony. The principal 
building is the Nelson House, built by Thomas Nelson, one of the signers 
of the Declaration of Independence, and afterward governor of Virginia. 
For years it had been occupied as a tavern, the only one in the place. It 
stands upon a bluff, the highest point of land on the Peninsula below Rich¬ 
mond. Opposite is Gloucester Point, setting sharply in from the northern 
bank, reducing the width of the York River from two miles to one. 

Strong fortifications bad been thrown up at Yorktown under the direction 
of General Magruder, formerly an officer in the United States army. On one 
side they commanded the river, and on the other overlooked the narrow neck 
of land. He had also prepared an elaborate line of defense, stretching for 
miles down both rivers, and almost meeting in the centre of the Peninsula. 
Magruder was confident that, with 25,000 men to hold it, this line could not 
be broken by any force that could be brought against it. But 11,000 was 
the utmost force given him, and he had to adopt a shorter line, which could 
be held by his small force. This line, which was thirteen miles long, fol¬ 
lowed the course of the Warwick River, a muddy stream rising close by the 
Yorktown bluff, and flowing through swamps across the Peninsula into the 
James. At intervals of three or four miles were mill-dams, which set the 
water back, forming a series of shallow ponds. The only roads crossed these 
dams. Redoubts were thrown up at the hfeads of the bridges and at vari¬ 
ous points along the Warwick. Six thousand men were retained in garri¬ 
son at Yorktown, Gloucester, and Mul¬ 
berry Island, leaving five thousand to de¬ 
fend the line of the Warwick. 1 

The Federal army was hurried to the 
Peninsula as rapidly as transportation 
could be furnished. The advance, con¬ 
sisting of Heintzelman’s corps, landed on 
the 23d of March. They were ordered 
to encamp close by Fortress Monroe, in 
order to leave the enemy in doubt wheth¬ 
er Norfolk or Yorktown was to be the 
immediate object of attack. Four-days 
afterward a reconnoissance was made as 
far as Big Bethel, but strict orders had 
been given by McClellan that no demon¬ 
stration should be made. Heintzelman 
believed that, had he been permitted to 
advance, he could have forced the ene¬ 
my’s lines with a single brigade, have iso¬ 
lated the troops at Yorktown, and have 
compelled the surrender in a few days. 
Hooker was of the same opinion. 2 The 

1 Magruder, 516. 

3 Heintzelman testifies: “A few days after I got 
to Fortress Monroe, I got information, which I con¬ 
sidered reliable, that General Magruder had about 
7500 men on the Peninsula; at all events, not to 
exceed 10,000. ... I think, if 1 had been per- 



FOBTiKlOATJONB OF YOBKXOWJI, LOOUiatt TUWAttO XUS &1VL&. 




































834 


Confederates were fully aware of the weakness of their position, and of the 
disasters which would follow had it been forced. 1 

McClellan reached Fortress Monroe on the 2d of April, preceded or im¬ 
mediately followed by the bulk of his force. It was less than he had de¬ 
manded. Blenker’s division of 10,000 men had been withdrawn from his 
immediate command, to be held in a position to re-enforce Fremont. He 
had expected to be authorized to draw 10,000 men from Wool’s force at 
Fortress Monroe. On the day following his arrival he received orders de¬ 
priving him of all control over Wool’s forces, and was forbidden to detach 
any of his troops without his consent. “This order,” he says, “ left me with¬ 
out any base of operations under my own control.” The very next day he 
was informed that McDowell’s whole corps was detached from his immediate 
command, and ordered to remain behind. It had been stipulated by the 
council which recommended the Peninsular movement that “ the force to be 
left to cover Washington should be such as to give an entire feeling of se¬ 
curity for its safety from menace.” Sumner thought that 40,000 men in all 
for the defense of the city would be sufficient; the other corps commanders 
thought that, “ with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully gar¬ 
risoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the 
Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice.” To man the forts, it was esti¬ 
mated, would require 25,000 first rate troops—50,000 in all. McClellan pro¬ 
posed to leave for the defense of Washington and its approaches 73,000 men. 
Of these, 35,000 were in the Valley of the Shenandoah; 20,000 at Warren- 
ton, Manassas, and on the lower Potomac; and 18,000 in and before the 
capital. But the military authorities at Washington “ did not consider 
the force in the Valley of the Shenandoah as available for the immediate 
defense of the capital, being required for the defense of that valley;” and 
Wadsworth, who had been appointed military governor of the district, said 
that the force under his command was “ nearly all new, imperfectly disci¬ 
plined, several of the regiments in a very disorganized condition, and en¬ 
tirely inadequate to and unfit for the important duty to which it had been 
assigned.” They reported that the stipulation and the order of the Presi¬ 
dent “ had not been complied withand, in consequence, Lincoln ordered 
McDowell’s division to remain behind. 2 

The combined naval and military attack upon Yorktown, which McClel¬ 
lan had declared to be the essential feature of his plan of operations, was 
never made. It seems hardly to have been mentioned after his arrival at 
Fortress Monroe. It appears to have been set aside in consequence of the 
presence of the Virginia, which lay apparently ready for another raid upon 
the fleet. “Flag-officer Goldsborough," says McClellan, “then in command 
of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt 
justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the 
Virginia, and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest 
with her, he did not feel able to detach for the assistance of the army a suit- 


mitted to advance when I first landed on the Peninsula, I could have isolated the troops at York¬ 
town, and the place would have fallen in a very few days. ... I supposed that we could 
force the enemy’s lines at about Wynne’s Mill, so as to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing it. 
. . . I was always of opinion that we could have forced their lines; and, from information 

that we got at the Adams House, about two miles from Williamsburg, the day before the battle 
there [*. e., May 4], I was satisfied we could have done so. We were willing to try it with a sin¬ 
gle brigade. General Hamilton made the application, and I forwarded it to the commanding 
general.”— Com. Rep., 346, 347. 

Hooker testifies: “When General McClellan landed, there were somewhere between 8000 and 
15,000 at Yorktown. . . . From my examination of the works at Yorktown, I felt that their 

lines could be pierced without any considerable loss by the corps with which I w^s on duty— 
Heintzelman’s corps. We could have gone right through and gone to the rear of the enemy. 
They would have run the moment we got to their rear, and we could have picked up the prisoners. 
Right there at Yorktown they had expended a great deal of labor. But I would have marched 
right through the redoubts which were a part of the cordon they had, and got on the road between 
Yorktown and Richmond, and thus compelled the enemy to fight me on my ground, and not have 
fought them on theirs. If McClellan had thrown his army between Yorktown and Williamsburg, 
it would have resulted in the capture and destruction of the enemy’s army. I know of no reason 
why that could not be done.”— Com. Rep ., 675, 576. 

McClellan estimated the enemy’s force much higher. He says: “Information which I had 
collected during the winter placed Generhl Magruder’s command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, 
independently of General Huger’s force at Norfolk. Knowing that General Huger could easily 
spare some troops to re-enforce Yorktown, and that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston’s 
army at Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York Rivers to the same point, I 
proceeded to invest the town without delay.”— Report , 155. General Keyes wrote on the 7th of 
April: “ Suppose we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next ? 
The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains the command of James River, and we do not first 
reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to subsist this army three marches beyond where 
it is now. . . . The line in front of us is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of 

the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we have to oppose to him. ... If 
we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed from two great water-courses in 
the hands of the enemy; our supplies would give out, and the enemy, equal if not superior in num¬ 
bers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army.”— McC. Rep., 167,168. Gen¬ 
eral Keyes appears subsequently to have modified his opinion. In testifying before the committee 
a year after, he said: “My impression now is that, if the whole army had been pushed forward, 
we should have found a point to break through. ... I will not say that, if we had pressed 
on immediately on arriving in front of their lines, we might not have found a point where we could 
have broken the line, and then have invested Yorktown on two sides, when the fall of it would, of 
course, have been hastened. It is my opinion that if we had pressed on rapidly when we first ar¬ 
rived, we might have found a point through which we could have broken.”— Com. Rep., 600, 601. 

1 Colonel Cabell, the Confederate chief of artillery, reports: ‘ ‘ From the topography of the ground, 
it was absolutely necessary to occupy the whole of this line in the then condition of our forces. 
Our forces were so few in number, that it was essential to the safety of the command that the 
whole should be defended, as the breaking of our lines at any point would necessarily have been 
attended by the most disastrous results; the centre broken or our flank turned, compelling a pre¬ 
cipitate retreat to Yorktown or Mulberry Island, to stand a siege of the enemy’s land force, assist¬ 
ed by the whole naval force, with but little prospect of relief or re-enforcements when the enemy 
occupied the intervening country. Three roads led up from the Peninsula and crossed our line of 
defenses. The first, on our right, was the Warwick Road, that crossed at Lee’s Mill; the second 
crossed at Wynne’s Mill; and the third was commanded by redoubts Numbers 4 and 5, near York¬ 
town. The crossing at Lee’s Mill was naturally strong, and fortifications had been erected there 
and at Wynne’s Mill. Below Lee’s Mill, the Warwick River, affected by the tides, and assisted by 
6wamps on each side, proved a tolerable protection; but the marshes could easily be made passa¬ 
ble, and the river bridged.”—M agruder, 531. 

3 For full details of these withdrawals, see McC. Rep., 134,139-142; Com. Rep., 251, 252, 303- 
305. McClellan, in reviewing his campaign, says this reduction of force “ removed nearly 60*000 
men from my command, and reduced my force by more than one third after its task had been as¬ 
signed, its operations planned, its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It 
frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to 
withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled 
the adoption of another, a different, and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and 
brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error.”— Report , 160. 


[April, 1862. 

able force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. At no 
time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend 
us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had 
partially silenced the works.” 1 Goldsborough, however, asserted that he 
had given to McClellan all the assistance for which he asked. “ I was re¬ 
quested,” he says, “ to perform services in connection with the army, and 
every thing was done that was asked. General McClellan came on board 
my ship to consult me, and I pointed out to him what I thought the best 
plan, to which he assented. The plan of attack upon Yorktown was that I 
should furnish him with seven gun-boats, which I did. Every thing was 
furnished to General McClellan by the Navy Department that he desired in 
the way of gun-boats. He told me that he wanted no more than I had de¬ 
tailed for him.” By the plan then agreed upon, the approach to Richmond 
was to be made by the York River, Goldsborough guaranteeing to prevent 
the Virginia from interfering with it, for which he said that he had ample 
means. The main body of the army was to advance direct upon Yorktown 
from Fortress Monroe; a strong force to be landed, under cover of the gun¬ 
boats, within four mileS; while another column was to land on the northern 
side of the York, and attack Gloucester in the rear, where it was wholly un¬ 
protected. Gloucester, it was thought, would fall without any fighting, and 
its fall would involve that of Yorktown, whose river front could be attacked 
from the Point more effectually than by the fleet. No attempt was made to 
execute this plan—why, Goldsborough never knew. 2 The reason undoubt¬ 
edly was that McClellan, who greatly overestimated the enemy’s strength, 
dared not attempt it at once after the withholding of McDowell’s corps, to 
whom he had assigned the attack upon Gloucester, nor even a fortnight later, 
when he was joined by Franklin, whose division formed a considerable part 
of that corps. 

McClellan then undertook to carry out the plan, which Heintzelman had 
proposed, of piercing the Confederate line in the centre of the Peninsula, and 
interposing a force between Yorktown and Richmond. W. F. Smith’s divi¬ 
sion of Keyes’s corps was directed, on the morning of the 5th of March, to 
go straight up the Peninsula to the Half-way House, between Yorktown and 
Williamsburg, so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown, and 
prevent re-enforcements from being thrown in. Heintzelman was to send 
Fitz John Porter’s division by a road nearly parallel, but to halt at Powers’s 
House, six miles below Yorktown, there to await farther orders. Heavy 
rains fell all the morning, which made the roads almost impassible for the 
infantry of Smith’s column. He could bring forward only a few guns; am¬ 
munition, provision, and forage could not be brought up at all. Early in 
the afternoon he unexpectedly found himself brought to a stand by the War¬ 
wick River, and the works which guarded its passage at Lee’s Mill. On all 
the maps of that region the river was laid down as running parallel with, 
and not crossing, the main road from Newport News to Williamsburg, re-en- 
tering a creek on the James, and making the so-called Mulberry Island a 
real island. Instead of this, the Warwick was now found to run directly 



TDK PENINSULA, BELOW WILLI AMSflURG. 


1 McC. Rep., 166. 


* Goldsborough’8 testimony, Com. Rep., 631-633. 












April, 1862.] 


FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


335 


across the Peninsula. Heintzelman’s division, after overcoming lome slight 
resistance at Big Bethel and Howard’s Bridge, found itself in like manner 
checked when almost in front of Yorktown. 1 Skirmishing, which Magruder 
magnifies into an attack of “ furious cannonading and musketry,” ensued at 
both points; but the result was that the Confederates held the line of the 
Warwick intact. If McClellan found the line “stronger than was expected, 
unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River, and incapable of being car¬ 
ried by assault,” 2 Magruder was still more astonished that the line was not 
forced. He believed that he had before him the whole army of the Poto¬ 
mac, “forming an aggregate of not less than 100,000, since ascertained to 
have been 120,000,” and that he had held them in check with 5000. For 
several days he expected another attack; his men slept in the trenches un¬ 
der arms, but, to his surprise, day after day passed without an assault. In 
a few days the object of the delay became apparent. Long lines of earth¬ 
works began to appear in every direction through the intervening woods 
and along the open fields. 3 McClellan had become convinced that “ instant 
assault upon Yorktown would have been simple folly,” and that he must 
prepare for it by the preliminary employment of heavy guns and some siege 
operations.”* The five thousand Confederates, who, without re-enforcements, 
held for at least six days the line of the Warwick, decided the whole course 
of the campaign. They delayed the entire Federal army for a month in the 
swamps of the Warwick. 

Much was to be done before Yorktown could be formally invested. Miles 
of road were to be cut and corduroyed through swampy forests, and bridges 
to be built over sluggish streams. Direct hostile operations were suspend¬ 
ed. McClellan ordered Keyes, whose corps was posted opposite the line of 
the Warwick, “not to move any of the troops from their positions unless 
the enemy actually lands or crosses the Warwick.” Once only did he de¬ 
part from this cautious policy. Smith, whose division was posted on the 
extreme right, chafed at this inactivity. Keyes, who had more than once 
“seen a disposition on his part to try to break through the enemy’s lines 
with his division, or a part of it,” ordered that no such attempt should be 
made. Smith had discovered that the weakest point was at Wynne’s Mill, 
near the centre of the enemy’s line. He was authorized by McClellan, with¬ 
out the knowledge of Keyes, to push a strong reconnoissance to this point, 
and sustain the reconnoitring party by a real attack, if found expedient* 
At this point the enemy had only a single battery of three six-pounders. 
The fire of this was silenced, and four companies of the 3d Vermont, wad¬ 
ing to the arm-pits, crossed the stream, and drove a North Carolina and Geor¬ 
gia regiment from their rifle-pits. These rallied, and, re-enforced by three 
regiments, forced the Vermonters out of the pits and back across the stream, 
with heavy loss. The other regiments who were preparing to support the 
advance were recalled. Later, an attempt was made by the 6th Vermont to 
cross by the dam; but a single gun of the enemy commanded this passage, 
and the attempt was abandoned. The four companies of the 3d which 
crossed the Warwick lost 25 killed and 50 wounded, most of them severely. 
The entire loss was 35 killed and 120 wounded. Magruder represents this 
affair as a decided victory; the Federal loss, he thought, could not be less 
than 600, his own being not more than 75 ; “but,” he adds, “all the re-en¬ 
forcements which were on their way to me had not yet joined me, so that I 

> McC. Rep., 154,159. ’ Ibid., 160. * Magrcrer, BIT. 

* McC. Rep., 162. * McC. Rep., 177; Com. Rep., 599 . 



WILLIAM F. SMITH. 


was unable to follow up the action by any decided step.” He enumerates 
fourteen entire regiments of infantry, besides artillery and dragoons, as en¬ 
gaged or within supporting distance. These were the forces on the line of 
the Warwick. Adding to them the troops in the fortifications, the Confed¬ 
erate force in and about Yorktown probably numbered from 20,000 to 
25,000 men. Additional re-enforcements soon arrived, and with them came 
officers who outranked Magruder, and he ceased to command. 1 This was 
the only serious engagement on the Peninsula previous to the evacuation 
of Yorktown, although an almost continuous artillery fire and picket shoot¬ 
ing was kept up on various parts of the line. 

Meantime for a fortnight an almost continuous dialogue was held by tele¬ 
graph and mail between McClellan and the government at Washington, run¬ 
ning thus: 2 


1 MA«RU»F.n, 517-535. a Com. Rep., 319-323. 



ti vk.s ,. UOAX) IlliUSUliU TLU> MWAMV. 





























836 


[April, 1862. 


McClellan, April 6. The enemy are in large force along our front. De¬ 
serters say they are daily re-enforced from Richmond and Norfolk. I beg 
you to reconsider the order detaching the first corps from my command, 
if you can not leave me the whole of that corps, let me not lose Franklin 
and his division. April 6. The order forming new departments, if enforced, 
deprives me of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely nec¬ 
essary to enable me to advance to Richmond. I request that my orders for 
wagon-trains, etc., that I have left behind, as well as Woodbury’s brigade, 
may be at once complied with. I repeat my request that Franklin may be 
restored to my command. 

Lincoln, April 6. Your orders for forwarding transportation and Wood¬ 
bury’s brigade under your command will not be interfered with. You have 
over 100,000 troops with you, independent of Wool’s command. You had 
better break the enemy’s line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. 
They will probably use time as advantageously as you can. 

McClellan, April 7. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with 
strong re-enforcements. It seems clear that I shall have on my hands the 
whole force of the enemy—not less than 100,000 men, possibly more. When 
my present command all joins me, I shall have about 85,000 men. With 
this army I could assault the enemy’s works, and perhaps carry them; but 
were I in possession of their intrenchments, and assaulted by double my 
numbers, I should not fear the result. I shall do all in my power to carry 
the works; but I should have the whole first corps to land upon York River, 
and attack Gloucester in the rear. 

Lincoln, April 9. My explicit directions that Washington should be left 
entirely secure have been neglected. Do you think I should permit the 
line from Richmond to this city to be entirely open except the resistance 
which could be ofi'ered by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? When I 
telegraphed that you had more than 100,000 men, I had just obtained a 
statement, taken from your own returns, making 108,000 with you or on 
the way. You say you have but 85,000. Where are the other 23,000? 
Wool’s command is doing for you just what a like number of your own 
command would have to do if that command was away. I suppose your 
whole force is with you now. If so, it is the precise time for you to strike 
a blow. The enemy will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements 
than you can by re-enforcements alone. Let me tell you it is indispensable 
for you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. I have al¬ 
ways thought that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fight¬ 
ing at or near Manassas, was only shifting, not surmounting a difficulty: we 
should find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments at either 
place. The country is noting that the present hesitation to move upon an 
intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. I will do all I can 
to sustain you ; but you must act. 

McClellan, April 10. The reconnoissance of to-day proves that it is 
necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin’s and 
McCall’s divisions, and I will at once undertake it. If you can not possibly 
send me the two divisions to carry out this final plan of the campaign, I will 
run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the result, if you will give me 
Franklin’s. Grant me this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. 
I wish the two divisions; Franklin’s is indispensable. I have determined 
on the point of attack, and am engaged in fixing the positions of the bat¬ 
teries. 

Adjutant General, April 11. Franklin’s division has been ordered to 
embark immediately for Fort Monroe. 

McClellan, April 12. Thank you for the re-enforcements sent me. 
Franklin will attack on the other side. The moment I hear from him I will 
state point of rendezvous. I am confident. April 13. Arrangement pro¬ 
posed by Franklin would assist me much. Our work progressing well. We 
shall soon be at them, and I am sure of the result. April 14. Have seen 
Franklin. Thank you for your kindness and consideration. I now under¬ 
stand the matter, which I did not before. Our field-guns annoyed the ene¬ 
my considerably to-day. Roads and bridges now progressing rapidly. 
Siege-guns and ammunition coming up very satisfactorily. Shall have 
nearly all up to-morrow. The tranquillity of Yorktown is nearly at an 
end. 

Secretary of War, April 20.' I am rejoiced to learn that your opera¬ 

1 In the Committee’s Report this dispatch is dated the 27th. This is doubtless an error, as it 
clearly refers to the two preceding dispatches, and to McClellan’s dispatches of the 18th (not given 
in the Report) relating to the affair of the 16th, in which he says, “The conduct of the Green 

Mountain Boys is spoken of in the highest terms. They drove a superior number of the enemy 
from their fortified position, but were forced to relinquish it on the rebels being re-enforced. The 
loss of the enemy must have been very heavy, as the well-directed fire of our artillery mowed them 
by acres.” 



BATTERS NO. L 



REMAINS OF BRITIBU WORKS AT YORKTOWN. 

tions are progressing so rapidly, and with so much spirit and success, and 
congratulate you and the officers and soldiers engaged upon the brilliant 
affair mentioned in your telegrams. Every thing in the power of the de¬ 
partment is at your service. I hope soon to congratulate you upon a splen¬ 
did victory that shall be the finishing stroke of the war. 

Here the colloquy appears to have closed for a while. The tranquillity 
of Yorktown was not disturbed for a fortnight; and it was many months 
before the splendid victory was achieved which was to be “the finishing 
stroke of the war.” Franklin, with his division, 11,000 strong, reached York¬ 
town on the 14th, raising the effective force of the Army of the Potomac to 
more than 100,000 men, 1 besides the 10,000 of Wool, who at Fortress Mon¬ 
roe were doing just what, had they been removed, McClellan would have 
been obliged to do with the same number of his own command. McClel¬ 
lan’s first plan, for the success of which he proposed to hold himself respon¬ 
sible, was to join Hooker’s division to Franklin’s, and, landing on the Severn, 
to make a diversion by attacking Gloucester in the rear. This plan was 
abandoned because “ no more troops could be spared” to assist Franklin. 
He then determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking Franklin on the 
north bank of the York, under the protection of the gun-boats. A place for 
landing was selected,but nothing more was done. Franklin’s division was 
kept for more than three weeks on board the transports, and was not disem¬ 
barked until the 6th of May, after Yorktown had been abandoned and the 
battle of Williamsburg had been fought. 2 

By the middle of April the works at Yorktown had been reconnoitred, 
the locations for the batteries determined, and the roads and bridges to reach 
them well advanced. The topography of the place indicates the position 
of its defenses. The Confederate works occupied the precise lines of the 
British works of 1781, which were until recently in fair preservation. The 
level bluff upon Which Yorktown stands forms an irregular parallelogram, 
the longer sides, running northwest and southeast, being 1200 yards, the 
shorter sides being 400 and 600 yards. It is inclosed by deep ravines, which 
almost meet in the rear. The American forces in 1781 advanced southwest- 
wardly from Williamsburg. The Federal forces in 1862 advanced from the 
opposite direction; but the attack in both cases was directed against the 
southwestern face of the works. In 1781 the assailing batteries were ad¬ 
vanced to within 200 and 300 yards from the defensive works; in 1862 
they were from 1500 to 2500 yards; one battery, with two two-hundred 
pound and five one-hundred pound Parrotts, was 3810 yards from the near¬ 
est point of the defenses. All told, there were fifteen batteries, mounted with 
111 guns and mortars. By the 3d of May these were essentially completed 
and armed. The work had been carried on under an incessant but inef- 

‘ McClellan undesignedlv gives the impression that Franklin joined him a week later. He says 
(Report, 176), “ On the 22d of April, General Franklin, with his division from General McDowell’s 
corps, had arrived and reported to me.” The misdate here implied has been positively made by 
various writers; among others, by Hillard, who says {Lift and Campaigns of McClellan, 180), “On 
the 22d of April, while the siege of Yorktown was going on, General Franklin’s division of Gen¬ 
eral McDowell’s corps arrived, and reported to General McClellan. These troops were kept on 
board the transports, and not embarked for some days.” The force of the Army of the Potomac 
at this precise date has not been given ; but, on the 30th of April, no considerable re-enforcements 
having arrived in the interval, McClellan ( Report , 53) says that there were, nominallv, including 
Franklin, 126,387 men. Of these, however, 11,037 were absent by authority, and 6015 sick or 
under arrest, leaving an effective force of 109,335. 

The Assistant Adjutant General furnished the following detailed statement, “ accurately com¬ 
piled from the morning Report of the Army of the Potomac on the 30th day of April, 1862, signed 
by Major General McClellan and his assistant adjutant general” {Com. Rep., 323) : 


Number of Men composing the Army of the Potomac, April 30, 1862. 


General Staff*, Engineers, and Engi¬ 
neer Brigade, Cavalry Division, 
Escort to Head-quarters, and Pro¬ 
vost Guard. 

Second Corps, General Sumner. 

Third Corps, General Heintaelman... 
Fourth Corps, General Keyes. 

Present 
for duty. 

Sick and 
on special 
duty. 

Aggregate 

absent. 

Present and 
absent. 

13,787 

19,054 

34,633 

33,586 

11,332 

798 

887 

2009 

1886 

270 

2,072 

2,061 

3,068 

4,089 

846 

16,657 

22,002 

39,710 

39,561 

12,448 


112,392 

5850 

12,136 

130,378 


The Assistant Secretary of War states (McC. Rep., 109), “ In thirty-seven days (and most of it 
was accomplished in thirty days) from the time I received the order [Feb. 28], there were trans¬ 
ported to Fort Monroe 121,500 men.” Franklin’s division can not, from the dates, be included 
in this number. 3 McC. Rep., 176; Com. Rep., 621, 632; Art. Op., 71-82- 



MORTAR BATTERY. NO. 4. 




























May, 1862.] 


FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


337 



81EOE OF YORK TOWN, OCTOBER, 1T31. 

A, British Outworks , takm possession of bnt'eA nun-icons on their arrival _B, First Parallel.— C, D, American 

Batteries. — E, Bomb Battery —G, French Bat toy .— H, French Bomb Battery. f. Second Parallel. — K, Redoubt 

stormed by the Americans —L , Redoubt slornud by the French. —M, M, M, French Batteries. —N, French Bomb 
Battery —O, American Batteries. 

fectual fire from the enemy. Not a score of lives were lost by this fire. 1 
But the troops suffered severely from sickness during that month. Nearly 
an eighth of the army was disabled by disease. Its morale was also im¬ 
paired ; it was hard to bring officers and men to endure, day after day and 
week after week, the weary toil of digging in the Warwick swamps. The 
Army of the Potomac was less effective at the beginning of May than it had 
been a month before. 2 

McClellan, in opposition to the opinion of the chief of engineers, would 
not open fire from the batteries, one by one, as they were finished, but re¬ 
solved to wait until all were ready, when he would have such an overwhelm¬ 
ing force as would crush every thing before it. He departed from the plan 
only so far as to open with- solid shot and shell from the 100 and 200 pound¬ 
ers of Battery No. 1, upon the wharf at Yorktown, 4800 yards distant, where 
the enemy were discharging several vessels. Most of the percussion shells 
failed to explode, and those filled with Greek fire produced no perceptible 
effect. The vessels were driven off, and took refuge across the river, behind 
Gloucester Point. 3 Daybreak on the 6th of May was the time fixed upon 
for the general fire to open. On the afternoon of the 3d the enemy began 
a vigorous fire of shells into Heintzelman’s camp, which was nearest to York¬ 
town. 'A balloon, which was sent up to reconnoitre, seemed to be a special 
mark. They kept up a random fire, without any apparent object, until after 
midnight. .Toward daylight, Heintzelman was awakened by a rattling fire 
of musketry. He telegraphed to the officer commanding the skirmishers in 
the trenches, and received answer that there was no fighting, but the light 
of a great fire in Yorktown was visible. At daylight it was reported that 
the enemy were evacuating their works. Heintzelman went up in the bal¬ 
loon, saw that the number of camp-fires about Yorktown was much dimin- 


is, 


ARMAMENT. 

2 200 -pdr. Parrotts, 

5100-pdr. Parrotts. 

3 41-inch Rifled, 

6 30 -pdr. Parrotts, 

6 20 -j>dr. Parrotts. 

7 20 -pdr. Parrotts. 

10 IZ-inch Mortars. 

8 20 -pdr Parrotts. 

5 10-incA Mortars. 

0 20 -pdr. Parrotts. 

6 20 -pdr. Parrotts. 

10 \0-inch Mortars. 

7 4\-i»ch Rifled, 

3 l00-j»dr. Parrotts. 

4 U)-inch Mortars. 

10 -inch Mortars, 

5 8-inch Mortars. 

7 30-pdr. Parrotts. 

310< Parrotts , 

1 100-pdr. Janies. 

2 8-inch S. Howitzers. 


SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, APRIL, 1 

The Figures (1—15) designate the Union Batteries.- 
Redoubts. 


■The Letters (A, B, C, D) designate 




ished, and the guns had disappeared. Presently he saw the Federal skirm¬ 
ishers entering the works. He came down, and, presuming that he should 
be at once ordered in pursuit, gave direction for his troops to prepare three 
days’ rations. But hour after hour passed, and no orders came. He rode 
over to head-quarters, and found that orders had been given for the pursuit; 
but it was past noon before they got off. 4 Magruder, who had constructed 
the works, and had so obstinately held them without re-enforcements, had 
ceased to command a fortnight before. A council of war had decided that 
the fortification was untenable, and must be abandoned; and the fire of the 
previous evening was merely to mask the evacuation. Of the ninety-four 
guns, fifty-six were left behind, only three of them disabled. 5 McClellan tel¬ 
egraphed to Washington, “We have the ramparts; have guns, ammunition, 
camp equipage, etc. We hold the entire line of his works, which the en¬ 
gineers report as being very strong. I have thrown all my cavalry and 
horse-infantry in pursuit, supported by infantry. No time shall be lost. 

1 “An incessant fire was kept up during the day with rifled projectiles and eight-inch shell and 
solid shot, and thirty-two and forty-two pounder shot, without retarding the work in the least 

Since our first appearance before Yorktown (April 5), 
and particularly since the 15th, the ravines have been 
filled with men night and day, making roads, building 
batteries and parallels, and guarding the works. The 
loss of life has been most trifling. I have not the 
exact number, but I have reason to Believe that it 
does not amount to a dozen.”— Art. Op., 146. 

3 On the 30th of April the sick-list numbered 5618; 
there were also “absent by authority” 11,037 ( McC.'. 
Rep., 53). It is fair to assume that two thirds of the 
leaves of absence must have been given by reason of 
disability. “April 19. Colonel Alexander states that 
the men worked well, but their officers do not attach 
sufficient importance to the work to be performed, 
many of them lying in the shade in place of superin¬ 
tending the work” {Art. Op., 159). “ April 21. Of the 
3000 men asked for, 2326 reported this morning for 
duty” {Ibid., 160). “ April 26. Very little work was 

done last night; it was impossible to get the forking 
parties to do any thing” {Ibid., 169). “ April 27. A 

great deal of difficulty and delay is still experienced in 
regulating the working parties. Details, after waiting 
at the place where they have been directed to go, re¬ 
turn to camp and report no engineer officer to be found; 
while the engineer officer reports waiting several hours 
without seeing them” {Ibid., 171). “ April 28. To-day 
only 1000 men reported in place of 1500 to Lieutenant 
McAlester” {Ibid., 173). “We should probably have 
succeeded [in an immediate assault upon Yorktown], 
and if we failed, it may well be doubted whether the 
shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more 
demoralizing than the labors of the siege. Our troops 
toiled for a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps 
of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but 
disease took a fearful hold upon the army, and toil and 
hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, 
impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from 
Yorktown so good an army as we took there” {Ibid., 
62). 

5 Art. Op., 63, 127; Com. Rep., 429. 

♦ Com. Rep., 347. 4 Art. Op., 189 . 














































338 


[May, 1862. 



MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK. (1880.) 


The gun-boats have gone up tbe York River. Gloucester is also in our 
possession. I shall push the enemy to the wall.”’ 

The works at Yorktown were certainly of very great strength. Probably 
they could not have been carried by assault unless the assailants were fully 
twice as many as the defenders. There were also strong outworks, extend¬ 
ing for a mile to the head waters of the Warwick. This stream, with its 
swampy borders, presented a very strong defensive line if held by an ade¬ 
quate force. But, extending for more than ten miles, a much larger force 
than the enemy had at his disposal would have been needed to hold them 
against a determined attack. They consisted of an infantry parapet and 
trenches along the bank, with three or four redoubts and batteries, mount¬ 
ing only two or three light field-pieces to sweep the main approaches. At 
no time before the 16th of April could Magruder have given more than 
10,000 men to the defense of this whole line without stripping Yorktown 
of its garrison. A real attack- by 20,000 men could have pierced the line. 
Once broken, there was nothing between the assailants and Williamsburg. 2 

Johnston, who had for a fortnight been in command on the Peninsula, 
conducted the retreat from Yorktown with rare ability. Besides the heavy 
guns, and ammunition belonging to them, he left little behind. His trains 
and the mass of his troops were well under way hours before their depart¬ 
ure was perceived. The weather had favored him. Several clear days 
had put the roads in good condition, and before the pursuit was commenced 
he was past the defensive lines before Williamsburg, and well on his way to 
Richmond. A strong rear guard was left behind near Williamsburg, where 
works had been thrown up to check any pursuit. Two main roads run 
down the Peninsula from near Williamsburg; one, following the York Riv¬ 
er, goes to Yorktown; the other, following the course of the James, crosses 
the Warwick at Lee’s Mill. These two roads, which are connected by nu¬ 
merous cross-roads, come together a mile east of Williamsburg. At this 
point was Fort Magruder, the centre of the Confederate works, which, to the 
number of thirteen, stretched clear across the narrow isthmus between the 
two rivers. All these works were hidden by heavy forests, concealing them 
from view until the observer was within a mile. Tbe trees-near the works 
had been felled, so that the occupants of the redoubts might have timely’no¬ 
tice of the approach of an enemy and bring their artillery to bear. 

McClellan, though he was convinced that the force of the enemy outnum¬ 
bered his own, had no idea that they would make a stand before Williams¬ 
burg. He remained at Yorktown to direct the movements of Franklin’s di¬ 
vision by the York River to West Point, having ordered Stoneman, with 
all the availal cavalry and four batteries of horse artillery, to pursue the 
enemy and harass his rear. A heavy and continuous rain-storm now set in, 
which soon rendered the roads difficult. But Stoneman pressed on, and, a 
little past noon of the 4th, debouched from the screen of woods, and found 

1 Reb. Rec., iv., G. 

3 For the strength of the Confederate works on the Warwick, see especially Art. Op ., 194-201. 
The most exaggerated reports were put forth respecting the strength of this line. Thus the New 
York Herald of April 22 furnishes an elaborate map showing three continuous lines of intrench- 
ments running completely across the isthmus. The first line mounts 140 guns, the second, two 
miles in the rear, has 120 guns, both being provided with “hot shot furnaces.” The third, two 
miles beyond, has 240 guns, and consists, besides the intrenchments, of six forts. Behind these 
appear the “encampments of the rebel army in four grand divisions,” besides a “reserve at Wil¬ 
liamsburg;” in all, 500 guns, besides those of Yorktown itself. The works on Gloucester Point 
were said to have “eighteen 100-pounder rifle guns.” Instead of which, most of the pieces were 
light navy guns; “the others are believed to be as heavy as 32-pounders.” Of the whole, only 
eight in all bore on the river and on our positions.— Art. Op., 193. 


himself under a hot fire from Fort Magruder. He fell back, suffering some 
loss in men and guns, to await the coming up of the infantry, without whom 
it was useless to attempt to assail the enemy’s works. Hooker’s division of 
Heintzelman’s corps had been ordered to support Stoneman. They left 
Yorktown about noon. While struggling to reach the position where Stone¬ 
man stood at bay, they found the road occupied by Smith’s division, which, 
coming up from Lee’s Mill, had turned into this road. Hooker had to stop 
for three or four hours until Smith had passed. Night was closing in before 
he was able to advance. He pressed on for four hours through the darkness 
and rain, hoping to come up with the enemy before morning; but the men 
were exhausted by laboring the previous night in the trenches before York¬ 
town and by the long march. They must have rest. An hour or two be¬ 
fore midnight they were ordered to halt, and flung themselves down in the 
miry road. At daybreak they were aroused and summoned to march. In 
an hour after they came in sight of Fort Magruder. Hooker required but 
a few minutes to decide upon his course. He was in pursuit of a retreating 
army. It was his. business to attack it, and, if he could not capture it, to 
hold it in check. His own force was hardly 9000; but within two hours’ 
march were 30,000 men, and within four hours’ march was the bulk of the 
Army of the Potomac, 60,000 more. lie was sure that he could hold his 
grasp upon the enemy against thrice his numbers for twice the time that it 
would be required for aid to reach him. The Confederates were soon driv¬ 
en into Fort Magruder, and Hooker pushed his skirmishers so close to the 
works that not a gun could be worked. If a man showed his head or hand 
he got a ball in it. Hooker sent word to the commanding officer in the 
rear that there was nothing in the way of his advancing his troops. The 
enemy “was in a vice,” and could not fire; the line of defenses across the 
isthmus could have been carried, he said, without the loss of ten men. 1 

But there was really no commanding officer there. McClellan was at 
Yorktown. Ileintzelman had been ordered to take charge of operations 
in front; but Sumner had come up in person the night before without 
any troops of his own corps, and assumed command in virtue of seniority. 
“ Sumner ranked me,” says Heintzelinan, “ and I had nothing to do.” That 
night nothing was done. Next morning a consultation was held. Sumner 
decided to assail the enemy’s left, and troops were ordered up for that pur¬ 
pose. So hour after hour passed away. Hooker all the while had been 
hotly engaged upon the left. The sound of the firing was plainly heard at 
head-quarters. Heintzelman was sent in that direction to take charge of 
operations. He had scarcely gone when Hooker’s letter came, telling Heint¬ 
zelman that he had been hotly engaged all the morning; his men hard at 
work, but much exhausted; but communication was open; troops could 
come up, take post by his side, and whip the enemy. In twenty minutes 
the letter was returned from Sumner, with an endorsement that it had been 
opened and read by the senior officer on that field. 2 But no re-enforcements 
came up. For hours Sumner was apprehensive of an attack upon the cen¬ 
tre, where he kept his post, though he repeatedly gave orders for the troops 
in the rear to move up on the same road which Hooker had taken. 3 



OEOBGE STONEMAN. 


‘ Com. Rep., 577. 3 Hooker’s Report, Reb. Rec., iv., 15. 

3 Keyes, in his testimony (Com. Rep., 603), says that these orders were countermanded; but 
Sumner (Testimony, Ibid., 361) makes no reference to any such countermand; and Kearney’s 
division, which relieved Hooker, and Peck’s and Hancock’s brigades, which performed important 
parts toward the close of the battle, came up under orders from Sumner. McClellan (Report, 188) 
merely mentions the countermanding by Sumner of orders to re-enforce Hanceck, 


























FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


339 


May, 1862.] 



TUJS WHITE UOCSE. 


Hooker had opened the battle at 
half past seven in the morning. At 
nine he had silenced the fire of Fort 
Magruder, and kept his advantage for 
two or three hours. But the enemy 
began to receive re-enforcements, and 
took the offensive Longstreet, who 
commanded the rear, had retreated be¬ 
yond Williamsburg; he turned back 
to strengthen the force which was 
engaged. Three times in succession 
the Confederates charged upon Hook¬ 
er’s centre, each time with fresh 
troops, and each time were thrown 
back with heavy loss. Hooker’s am¬ 
munition began to give out. Long- 
street made a furious charge upon a 
battery left for a moment without 
support, and captured four guns, but 
was again driven off. So the tide of 
battle ebbed and flowed until between 
four and five in the afternoon, when 
Kearney came upon the 'field. For 
six hours he had been struggling up 
along a single muddy road, encum¬ 
bered with other troops and trains. 

He outranked Hooker, who gladly 
left the command to him, his wearied 
regiments resting from the fight. 

Kearney dashed impetuously for¬ 
ward, and, after a sharp contest, drove the enemy back, gained bis rear, 
and won the fight on this part of the scene. Darkness now closed in, and 
the regiments bivouacked on the field which they had won. 

Toward the close of the day the action had stretched to the right of Fort 
Magruder. Peck’s brigade, which had come up, took position there, and 
held its ground against all attacks. Hancock had come up still farther 
to the right. He took possession of two redoubts, which were weakly held, 
and repeatedly asked for re-enforcements to enable him to advance and take 
another redoubt which commanded the plain between him and Fort Magru¬ 
der. Sumner twice ordered this re-enforcement, and twice countermanded 
the order at the moment of execution. At length, the request being repeat¬ 
ed, Sumner ordered him to fall hack; but Hancock deferred the execution 
of this order to the last moment. He was unwilling to lose the advantage 
which he had gained. The enemy began to press hard upon him. Feign¬ 
ing to retreat slowly, he suddenly turned upon them, poured in some ter¬ 
rific volleys of musketry, and then giving the word, “ Now, gentlemen, the 
bayonet 1” charged with his whole brigade. The enemy broke into utter 
rout, leaving behind more than 500 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Han¬ 
cock’s loss was only 31. This brilliant charge, just in the dusk, closed the 
battle. The entire Federal loss was 2228; of these, 456 were killed, 1400 
wounded, and 372 missing. More than two thirds of this was suffered by 
Hooker’s division, which lost, in all, 1575, of whom 338 were killed, 992 
wounded, and 335 missing. Nearly all of the prisoners were taken on the 
night preceding the battle. They were men who had straggled into the 
woods, and, not being able to extricate themselves in the darkness, were cap¬ 
tured by the enemy’s pickets. The loss of the Confederates must have been 
larger. During the greater part of the fight they attacked with superior 
numbers, and were flung back by cannon and musketry. Hooker believed 
that the killed of the enemy was double his own. The next day more than 
eight hundred of his wounded were found in the hospitals at Williamsburg; 
others were distributed among private houses, and all the available tene¬ 
ments in the vicinity of the battle-field were filled with them. 

McClellan.had remained at Yorktown to superintend the preparations for 
sending Franklin’s troops up the river. He sent aids to observe operations 
in front It was past noon before he heard any thing to lead him to sup¬ 
pose that there was any thing occurring beyond a simple affair of a rear 
guard. At one o’clock came a message importing that all was not going 
well in front. Soon Sprague, the governor of Rhode Island, who was acting 
as aid to the chief of artillery, dashed up, reported how matters stood in 
front, and urged him to go up there at once. “ I thought they could take 
care of that little matter,” replied McClellan; but promised to go up. 1 He 
reached Sumner’s head-quarters between four and five, took the command 
in person, and, hearing heavy firing toward the right, ordered three brigades 
in that direction; but, before the orders could be executed, Hancock had 
decided the day on that part of the field. 2 

Night put an end to the contest, and the wearied troops slept upon the 
muddy field, many without food, and all without shelter. The enemy took 
advantage of the darkness to decamp, leaving their dead and wounded be¬ 
hind them. During the night McClellan sent word to Heintzelman not to 
renew the attack in the morning, as he was about to make other dispositions, 
and would send re-enforcements. The Confederates, making no delay at 
Williamsburg, pushed on up the Peninsula for Richmond. A few cavalry 
were sent after them, who succeeded in picking up some prisoners and four 
or five guns which had stuck fast in the mud. 

The day after the battle four divisions were sent in transports up the York 
River. They landed at West Point The landing had just been effected, 
when, at nine o’clock on the morning of the 7th. an unsuccessful attempt 
was made to drive them off by a body of Confederates who had got thus 


far on their retreat A sharp musketry fire was kept up till afternoon, 
when the Confederates withdrew, and kept on their retreat Tl. ■ Federal 
loss in this affair was 49 killed, and 154 wounded and missing. / ..er two 
or three days’ delay at Williamsburg, the army commenced its slow march 
up the Peninsula, and on the 16th of May the head-quarters were established 
at the White House, on the Pamunkey, one of the two streams which unite 
to form the York River. This place is thirty miles north of Williamsburg, 
and twenty-five east of Richmond, with which it is connected by the Rich¬ 
mond and York River Railroad. 3 

Johnston had determined to abandon Yorktown some days be foie the 
evacuation took place. On the 28th of April he wrote to Tattnall, the com¬ 
mander of the Virginia, “ The enemy continues his cautious policy. The 
preparations for opening fire upon Yorktown seem to be nearly completed. 
His great superiority in artillery will probably enable him to dismount our 
guns very soon.” He suggested to Tattnall that possibly he might make a 
dash past Fortress Monroe and destroy the Federal transports in the York 
River. On the 10th of May Johnston wrote: “ Finding it necessary to aban¬ 
don this position, and regarding the evacuation of Norfolk as a consequence 
of that measure, I have directed Major General Huger to withdraw his troops 
from that place and remove to Richmond. I have also desired Captain Lee 
to abandon the navy yard, and report to the Secretary of the Navy in Rich¬ 
mond, saving as much as possible of the public property, and destroying, if 
practicable, what he can not save.” Norfolk had been held by Huger with 
15,000 men. The greater part of these went toward Richmond almost si¬ 
multaneously with the evacuation of Yorktown. A few thousand were 
left behind until the last moment. Intelligence of this reached Fortress 
Monroe on the 8th. Wool, with a few thousand men, set out to take pos¬ 
session. They approached Norfolk on the afternoon of the 10th. At the 
outskirts they were met by the mayor and a deputation of citizens with a 
white flag, and bearing a letter from Huger, stating that, being unable to 
hold the city, he had surrendered it into the hands of the civil authorities. 
The mayor said that he had come to surrender the city into the hands of 
the United States, and to ask protection for the persons and property of the 
citizens. This was assured by Wool. The general, Mr. Chase, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, who had accompanied the expedition, and the mayor, then 
entered a carriage and drove to the City Hall to inaugurate the new govern¬ 
ment. Wool issued la proclamation appointing General Viele military gov¬ 
ernor, who was to see that no peaceable citizen should be molested, and that 
no United States soldier entered the city without a written permit from the 
commanding officer of his regiment Wool then left the city. A crowd of 
people assembled. The mayor made a speech. He said that if the question 

1 Sprague’s testimony, Cow. Rep., 570. 

a I)c Joinville says (p. 55): “The success of Hancock had been decisive, and the reserves brought 
up by the general-in-chief, charging upon the field, settled the affair." McClellan ( Report , 184) 
shows that the contest was over before these re-enforcements could come up. Kstvnn, who scarce¬ 
ly ever tells the truth even by accident, and whose work is only worthy of notice because others 
have repeated his statements, brings McClellan personally into the action. He says ( War Pic - 
fares, 279): “Suddenly a shout of a thousand voices broke upon the ear like the rushing of a 
mighty wind from the wood. What did this portend? There was little time left for us to spec¬ 
ulate. Charge after charge was made upon our men, and the news then spread that McClellan, 
with the main body of his army, had arrived on the field of battle. This explained the loud cheers 
from the wood. Our men could no longer stand their ground. McClellan in perso.n led on his 
troops into the midst of the fire. Magruder, now finding that the battle wrs )cs*, ordered a re¬ 
treat to be sounded.” 

3 The place derived its name from a plain white wooden house, occupying the site of the resi¬ 
dence of Mrs. Custis, afterward the wife of Washington. This, as well as Arlington House on the 
Potomac, had fallen to the daughter of George Washington Parke Custis, the son of Martha Wash¬ 
ington by her former husband. She was now the wife of General Robert E. Lee. The fnmily of 
Leo had been residing at the White House, but had, just before the arrival of the Federal troops, 
removed to the neighborhood of Richmond. Mrs. Lee left n|»on the wall the following note: 
“Northern soldiers, who profess to honor the memory of Washington, forbear to desecrate the 
home of his first married life, the proj»erty of his wife, now owned by her descendants.—A Grand¬ 
daughter of Mrs. Washington." Under this one of the Union guards wrote: “A Northern offi¬ 
cer has protected your property, in sight of the enemy, and at the request of your overseer." This 
residence w as burned at the close of Judc, when the Federal forces abandoned West Point 














340 


[May, 1862, 



THE OCCUPATION OP NORFOLK. 


had rested with him he would have defended the city to the last man, but 
the government had decided differently; the citizens of Norfolk had been 
deserted by their friends, and all that the city authorities could do was to 
make the best terms possible. The Union commander had granted all that 
had been asked, and now the citizens should yield, and abstain from acts of 
violence and disorder. The crowd dispersed, having given three cheers for 
Davis and three groans for Lincoln. No notice was taken of this impudent 
proceeding. The loss of Norfolk, as has already been related, involved the 
destruction of the iron-clad Virginia. 1 A court of inquiry decided that this 
was unnecessary. A naval court-martial was convened, before which Tatt¬ 
nall was arraigned. The court honorably acquitted him, affirming that, on 
the day before the evacuation of Norfolk, a council was held by order of the 
Secretary of the Navy to determine what should be done with the Virginia; 
that Tattnall was in favor of passing Fortress Monroe and taking the ship 
into York River, or of running to Savannah with her, but that he was over¬ 
ruled by the council, who directed that she should remain on this side of 
Fortress Monroe for the protection of N orfolk and Richmond; that she was 

1 Ante , page 257. 


lightened in order to enable her to go up to a safe place on the James; that 
she could not be lightened sufficiently to enable her to reach that place, but 
was thereby rendered vulnerable; 1 that all which was necessary for the en¬ 
emy to do was to keep a watch upon her until her provisions were exkaust- 

1 Note on the Virginia. —The report of the trial of Tattnall enables us to correct and 6tipple- 
mcnt our account (ante, pace 250) of the Virginia. It shows that she was far less formidable than 
was supposed. The iron plating of the roof or shield was only four inches thick. The “knuckle” 
formed by the projection of the eaves of the roof beyond the hull was twenty inches under water. 
Below this the hull was covered for a depth of two feet by three layers of iron, each an inch thick 
and eight inches broad, put on horizontally. She then drew between twenty and twenty-two feet 
of water. After her encounter with the Monitor she was put on the dock, with the purpose of put¬ 
ting additional plates two inches thick perpendicularly upon the hull; the iron, however, gave out 
before all her whole length could be covered. These additional plates reached about one hundred 
and eighty feet from the bows, leaving sixty feet at the stern with only three inches. Four shots 
from the Monitor struck within a space of eight feet. A rafter was cracked and the plates some¬ 
what broken,hut there was no serious injury. When the additional plating was put on she ^rew 
twenty-two feet forward and twenty-three feet aft. Her engines were very defective. They failed 
several times, and the engineer said they were liable to fail at any moment. It was often found dif¬ 
ficult to start, to stop, or to reverse them. In the opinion of Buchanan, her first commander, she 
was not seaworthy, not being sufficiently buoyant, and would founder in a common sea; the mo¬ 
ment a sea struck her it would wash into her ports ; she was only fitted for harbor defense. Cates- 
by Jones, her executive officer, thought her no match for the Monitor, if properly handled ; the 
Monitor ought to have sunk her iD fifteen minutes; one of the smallest tugs might have disabled 
her rudder and propeller. 























































































































FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


341 


Mat, 1862.] 

ed, and then capture her; and that, under these circumstances, the only al¬ 
ternative of her commander was to abandon and destroy the ship, as he had 
done. The navy yard at Gosport was destroyed by fire, and an attempt, 
only partly successful, was made to blow up the great stone dry dock. All 
the batteries which guarded the James River were abandoned, and the water 
approach was open to within eight miles of Richmond. 

Four days after the destruction of the Virginia, the Galena, Monitor, and 
two gun-boats were repulsed at Fort Darling on Drewry’s Bluff. Among 
those who defended the fort were the crew of the Virginia. 1 The boats had 
been put to a work for which they were not adapted. Goldsborough urged 
McClellan to send a force to capture that fort, which was of no great 
strength. 2 He offered to lead the naval attack in person. If the fort should 
be captured, he said that the vessels could remove the obstructions above, 
go straight to the city, and shell it to surrender. McClellan considered the 
proposal, and concluded to defer a decision until he had got his army on the 
other side of the Chickahominy. 3 4 The truth was, that, in consequence of his 
urgent representations, an order had just been given to McDowell which 
rendered it necessary to move on the basis of the York River rather than 
on the far preferable line of the James. 

Yorktown had scarcely been evacuated when McClellan again began to 
represent his-force as wholly inferior to that of the enemy. On the evening 
of the battle of Williamsburg he telegraphed, “I find Joe Johnston in front 
of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own, and very 
strongly intrenched.” Five days later, Williamsburg having been aban¬ 
doned, he writes from “three miles beyond Williamsburg,” “I regard it as 
certain that the enemy will meet us with all his force on or near the Chick¬ 
ahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have. Every ef¬ 
fort should be made to re-enforce me with all the disposable forces in East¬ 
ern Virginia. If I am not re-enforced, it is probable that I will be obliged 
to fight nearly double my numbers strongly intrenched. I do not think it 
will be possible for me to bring more than 70,000 men upon the field of 
battle.” Four days later he said,“I can not bring into actual battle more 
than 80,000 men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, 
probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. I 
beg that you will cause this army to be re-enforced without delay by all the 
disposable troops of the government I ask for every man that the govern¬ 
ment can send me. Any commander of the re-enforcements whom your 
excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I 
may heretofore have addressed to you on the subject. I will fight the ene¬ 
my, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have, and I 
firmly believe that we shall beat them; but our triumph should be made 
decisive and complete.” He desired that these re-enforcements should be 
sent by water, because their arrival would be more safe and certain, and be¬ 
cause he would then be free to rest his army on the James River whenever 
the navigation of that stream should be opened. 

To these repeated and urgent requests, the President replied on the 18th 
that he was unwilling to uncover the capital entirely ; that, even if this 
were prudent, the junction could be more speedily made by a land march 
than by water; but, in order to increase the strength of the attack upon 
Richmond, McDowell, whose forces had been augmented to 35,000 or 40,000 
men, would march by the shortest route, and, keeping himself always in a 
position to save the capital from any possible attack, he should so operate 
as to put his left wing in communication with McClellan’s right, which 
should be extended to the north of Richmond. The communication be¬ 
tween the forces might be established either north or south of the Pamun- 
key River. After this had been effected, McDowell was to be under the or¬ 
ders of McClellan ; but he must give no orders which could put McDowell 
out of position to cover Washington. This definitive order decided the plan 
of the operations against Richmond/ 

The conduct of Johnston evinced that he was at no time in command of 
the powerful force attributed to him. He had made no attempt to interfere 
with the siege operations against Yorktown, but abandoned his strong works 
as soon as he found that they were likely to be assailed. He gave up his 
strong lines at Williamsburg after fighting just long enough to enable his 
trains to escape, abandoning his sick and wounded. He pursued his retreat 
to Richmond, making no attempt to impede or harass the enemy beyond 
the slight attack upon a single division which was for a moment isolated at 
West Point. Instead of 150,000 or 160,000 men, it is hardly possible that 
his strength could have exceeded 50,000 or 60,000. 

The approach of the Federal army occasioned a fearful panic at Rich¬ 
mond. Congress adjourned in haste on the 21st of April. The Confeder¬ 
ate officials sent off their wives and children, and packed up the government 
archives for transportation to Columbia. Packing-boxes and trunks became 
the staple wares, and encumbered all the sidewalks; the railway depots 
were crowded with baggage, the trains thronged with refugees. The panic 
increased as successive tidings came that Yorktown had been evacuated, 
Williamsburg abandoned, Norfolk surrendered, the Merrimac destroyed, 
and the Federal gun-boats were ascending the James River. The only ob¬ 
struction to their ascent was the incomplete fort at Drewry’s Bluff, and the 
unfinished barrier just above it. The Secretary of the Navy advertised 
for timber to construct new defenses; schooners loaded with plaster and 
guano were seized and sunk in the river; sharpshooters were called upon 
to organize into companies to line the banks. One enthusiastic individual 

1 Tattnall's Trial , p. 89. 3 Pollard, i., 324 ; ii., 30, says that it mounted only four guns. 

3 Goldsborongh’s testimony, Com. Rep., 633. 

4 McC. Rep., 191-195; Com. Rep., 324-329. “Had McDowell joined me by water,” says 
McClellan, “I could have approached Richmond from the James, and thus avoided the delays 
and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one 
body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream.”— Report , 195. 


offered to be one of a hundred to board the whole fleet of gun-boats and 
take them at all hazards. The state Legislature resolved that the city should 
be defended to the last extremity, “ if such defense is in accordance with the 
views of the President,” and appointed a committee to wait upon him to 
learn his intentions. He said that it would be the effort of his life to defend 
Virginia and to cover the capital; he had never thought of abandoning the 
state; if Richmond should fall, which he did not anticipate, that would be 
no reason for withdrawing the army from Virginia; the war could be car¬ 
ried on in the state for twenty years. Notwithstanding his confident words, 
•he was worn and haggard. His family feared for his life. He lost no time 
in putting his house in order. He was baptized at home one Tuesday 
morning, and was confirmed in church an hour later. His family should 
go to Raleigh; they only feared that they had delayed too long already. 
The 16th was appointed as a fast-day. On the day when the proclamation 
was issued, tidings had just coffie of the capture of New Orleans. The 
evacuation of Yorktown and the abandonment of Norfolk had been de¬ 
termined upon. Well might the proclaniation declare that “recent disaster 
has spread gloom over the land, and sorrow sits at the hearth-stones of our 
countrymen.” In the interim Norfolk had been seized, and the Virginia, 
“the iron diadem of the South, worth an army of 50,000 men,” destroyed. 
On the day before the fast, Letcher, the governor, summoned all who were 
willing to unite in defending the capital of the state to assemble at the City 
Hall. He was there, in the vinous condition which was his wont, and made 
a speech. “I have been told,” he said, “that the duty of surrendering the 
city would devolve upon the President, the mayor, or myself. I answered, 
if the demand is made upon me, with the alternative to surrender or be 
shelled, I shall reply, Bombard and be damned 1” Mayo, the mayor, fol¬ 
lowed in the same vein. “When the citizens of Richmond,” he said, “de¬ 
mand of me to surrender the capital of Virginia and of the Confederacy to 
the enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign 
the mayoralty; and when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver 
up the city, I hope I have physical courage and strength enough left to 
shoulder a musket and go into the ranks.” 1 The governor ordered all the 
stores and other places of business, except such manufacturing establish¬ 
ments as were engaged in fulfilling contracts for the government, to be 
closed at two o’clock in the afternoon, so that all persons should have time 
for drill and discipline, and directed the militia to assemble at three, every 
day excepting Sunday, to be drilled for the four hours until sunset. The 
city was thronged with refugees from the border states, the dregs of the 
Baltimore mob predominating. A few of these, with nothing to lose, held 
a public meeting and passed resolutions devoting Richmond to flames as 
soon as the Union troops should enter it. A portion of the city press clam¬ 
ored for this. “ To lose Richmond,” said the Dispatch, “ is to lose Vir¬ 
ginia, and to lose Virginia is to lose the key to the Southern Confederacy. 
Virginians, Marylanders! ye who have rallied to her defense, would it not 
be better to fall in her streets than to basely abandon them ? The loss of 
Richmond in Europe would sound like the loss of Paris or London, and the 
moral effect will hardly be less. It is better that Richmond should fall as 
the capital of the Confederacy than that Richmond exist the dtipot of the 
hireling horde of the North. The next few days may decide the fate of Rich¬ 
mond. It is either to remain the capital of the Confederacy, or be turned 
over to the Federal government as a Yankee conquest. The capital is to 
be either secured or lost—it may be feared not temporarily—and with it 
Virginia. Life, death, and wounds are nothing if we only can be saved from 
the fate of a captured capital and a humiliated Confederacy. Let the gov¬ 
ernment act—let the people act. There is time yet. If fate comes to its 
worst, let the ruins of Richmond be its most lasting monument.” 

McClellan’s advance toward the panic-stricken city was slow. Thesis- 
tance from Williamsburg was a little more than forty miles. On the 8th 
the troops collected there began to move. In two days nineteen miles bad 
been gained. On the 13th the army was concentrated near West Point. 
On the 14th and 15th rain fell. On the 15th and 16th two divisions set out 
for the White House, five miles farther. So bad were the roads, that the 
train of one division occupied thirty-six hours in passing this distance. 
About this time two provisional army corps were organized—the Fifth, con¬ 
sisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes, and the reserved artillery, was 
placed under Fitz John Porter; the Sixth, consisting of Franklin’s division 
and that of Smith, which was detached from Keyes’s corps, was placed un¬ 
der Franklin. On the 16th head-quarters were at the'White House; on 
the 19th five miles beyond. On the 20th more rain fell, but the advanced 
light troops reached the banks of the Chickahominy. On the 21st the main 
body of the army was near that stream, which was henceforth to be historic. 2 

1 For the panic in Richmond, see Pollard, i., 322-325 ; ii., 28-34, 309-311. Reb. Rec., iv., 
136, 424-426. # An intercepted letter, written on the 7th of May by a niece of Jefferson Davis, 
resident in his family, furnishes some striking details. She writes: “1 am ready to sink with de¬ 
spair. There is a probability of General Jackson’s army falling back on Richmond ; and, in view 
of this, no lady is allowed to go up on the rnilroad to Gordonsville, for fear, if allowed to one, that 
many others would wish to do it, which would incommode the army. General Johnston is fall¬ 
ing back from the Peninsula or Yorktown, and Uncle Jeff', thinks we had better go to a safer place 
than Richmond. If Johnston falls back as far as Richmond, all our troops from Gordonsville and 
Swift Run Gap will also fall hack to this place and make one desperate stand against McClellan. 
The Yankees are approaching Richmond from three different directions—from Fredericksburg, 
Harrisonburg, nnd Yorktown. Uncle Jett*, is miserable. He tries to be cheerful and bear up 
ngainst such a continuation of troubles, but I fear he can not live long. Our reverses distressed 
him so much, and he is so weak and fcfcble, it makes my heart ache to look at him. What a blow 
the fall of New Orleans was! It liked to have set us all crnzv here. Every body looks distressed, 
nnd the cause of the Confederacy looks drooping nnd sinking. We all leave here to-morrow 
morning for Raleigh. Three gun-boats are in the river on their way to the city, and may prob¬ 
ably reach here in a few hours, so we have no longer any time to delay. I only hoj>c we hpve 
not delayed too long already. I am afraid that Richmond will fall into the hands of the enemy, 
as there is no wny to keep bnck the gun-boats. James River is so high that all obstructions are in 
danger of being washed away; so there is no help for the city. She will either submit, or else be 
shelled. Uncle Jeff, was confirmed last Tuesday, in St. Paul’s Church, bv Bishop Johns. He 
was baptized in the morning, before church.”— Pollard, ii., 31. 3 McC. Rep ., 187,18Q. 





349 


[May, 1862. 



TI1E MAKCH FROM WILLIAMSBURG 






















Mat, 1862.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOM1NY. 


343 



OULU U VUiKiR. —McCLKLLAN'h ItLAD-qUAJlTLUS. 


CHAPTER XIX. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 

II. ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY.' 

The Chickahominy.—McClellan’s Advance.—Correspondence between McClellan and the Presi¬ 
dent.—McDowell ordered to move.—The Order suspended.—Jackson’s Oj>erntions in the Val¬ 
ley of the Shenandoah.—Retreats from Winchester.—Joined by Ewell.—Battle of ICernstown. 
—The Order to McDowell.—Battle of Bull Pasture.—Position of the Union Forces.—Battle of 
Front Royal.—Retreat of Banks to the Potomac.—Crosses the River.—Panic at Washington. 
—Fremont’s Movements.—Battle of Lcwisburg.—McDowell ordered*to follow Jackson.—He 
sends Shields reluctantly.—Jackson in Peril.—He Retreats up the Shenandoah.—Eludes Fre¬ 
mont and Shields.—The Pursuit by Fremont.—Battle of Cross Keys.—Battle of Fort Repub¬ 
lic.—End of the Pursuit.—Results of Jackson’s Expedition.—The Union Army on the Chick- 
ahominy.—Battle of Hanover Court-house.—Elation of McClellan.—Condition of Johnston.— 
The Union Left across the Chickahominy.— Bailie of the Seven Pines: Johnston’s Plan.—His 
Statement of his Force.—The Storm at Richmond.—Casey driven back.—Conduct of his Di¬ 
vision.—Keyes and ’^Varney forced beyond the Seven Pines.—New Line formed.—Close of the 
Action.— Battle of Pair Oaks: Sumner crosses the Chickahominy.—The first Action, May 31. 
—The second Actiou, June 1.—Repulses of the Confederates.—Hooker’s Reconnoissance.— 
The Losses.—Results of the Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.—What might have been 
accomplished. — McClellan and McDowell. — Bridges and Intrenehments. — Lee takes Com¬ 
mand.— His Antecedents and Character. — Resigns his Commission.—Enters the Southern 
Army.—Fortifies Richmond.—His Plan on assuming Command. — Stuart’s Expedition.— 
McClellan ready. — Affair of King’s School-house. — McClellan’s Dispatches. —The Evening 
before the Seven Days. 

HE Chickahominy, rising in swampy uplands northwest of Richmond, 
flows southeastwardly for about fifty miles, parallel with and midway 
between the James and the York rivers. It then turns sharply to the south, 
and, after a winding course of twenty miles, falls into the James forty miles 
below Richmond and ten west of Williamsburg. Toward its mouth it be¬ 
comes a considerable stream, navigable by small steamers for twenty or thir¬ 
ty miles. The military operations of the Peninsular campaign embraced 
that part of the stream between Bottom’s Bridge on the south, where it is 
crossed by the Williamsburg road, and Meadow Bridge, fifteen miles to the 
north, whqje it is crossed by the Fredericksburg Railroad. Richmond lies 
nearly opposite the centre of this line, about six miles from the Chickahom¬ 
iny at its nearest approach. 

Between these points the river flows through a belt of wooded swamp 
three or four hundred yards wide. The swamp is bordered on both sides by 
low bottom lands sloping gently up to the level of the surrounding country. 
The entire breadth of the intervale is about a mile, in some places a little 
more, in others a little less. The tops of the trees rise to the level of the up¬ 
lands, screening the view from one side to the other. In dry summer weath¬ 
er the stream is a mere rivulet, flowing sluggishly through the swamp, some¬ 
times in a single channel, oftener in several. A moderate shower fills the 
channel, which is about a dozen yards wide and four feet deep. A heavy 
shower or a continuous rain-fall, causing a rise of two feet more, floods the 
swamp and overflows the bottom lands. These bottoms are intersected by 
deep ditches, and even when not overflowed are so soft as to be impassable 
for cavalry and artillery. 

The swamp and stream had been crossed by several bridges. All of those 
in front of Richmond had been destroyed by Johnston when he fell back 
from Yorktown and Williamsburg, and the approaches to them were com- 

» Since the date of note \ p. 328, we have Recured the Confederate “ Reports of the Operations 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, from June, 1862, to and including the Battle of Fredericks¬ 
burg, Dec. 13.1862.” They include the reports of Jackson and his subordinate officers of the op¬ 
erations in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and Lee’s report of his operations from the Seven Days’ 
Battles to the Battle of Fredcfickshurg. There are also about 3. r >0 reports of subordinate officers, 
the whole forming two large volumes. These will be cited as “ Lee's Rep. the references being 
throughout to the pages of the edition printed by order of the Confederate Congress at Rich¬ 
mond in 1864. 


manded by batteries on the southern side. Besides the bridges were a few 
fords, approached by side-roads, over which a pedestrian could in dry weath¬ 
er make his way over swamp and stream. But this season had been unu¬ 
sually rainy. The channel was always full to the brim, and every shower 
flooded swamp and bottoms. Infantry might possibly have picked their 
way across in loose order, but cavalry would have sunk to the horses’ 
girths, and artillery and trains beyond their axles, in the spongy soil. For 
an army the Chickahominy was impassable except by bridges, and these, 
as experience soon proved, must be built above the level of the highest 
floods, and provided with long approaches across the swamp. The best 
places for the bridges were covered by the batteries of the enemy, and other 
points had to be chosen. Bridges of boats and pontoons were out of the 
question. The soil was too soft and spongy to afford a foundation for piles. 
It only remained to build the bridges upon trestles, the approaches being 
embanked or corduroyed. As a military obstacle, the narrow Chickahom¬ 
iny, with its bordering swamps and bottoms, liable to overflow at any mo¬ 
ment, was more formidable than a broad river which could be crossed by 
boats, or over which a pontoon bridge could be thrown in a few hours. 1 

In moving from Williamsburg the right wing of the Federal army had 
kept to the north, striking the Chickahominy at New Bridge, directly in front 
of Richmond; the left wing, keeping to the south, had reached the river at 
Bottom’s Bridge, thirteen miles below. On the 22d of May, Stoneman’s ad¬ 
vance guard of cavalty and Franklin’s corps, on the right, were near New 
Bridge, with Porter at supporting distance in the rear; Keyes, on the left, 
was at Bottom’s Bridge, with Heintzelman as a support; between Keyes and 
Porter was Sumner, connecting the right with the left. The head-quarters 
were established at Cold Harbor, just in the rear of the head of the right 
wing. The bulk of the enemy were across the Chickahominy, on the main 
road from New Bridge to Richmond; but a detachment had been left at Me- 
chanicsville, on the north bank, four miles above. 2 This was brushed awav 
on the 24th by the artillery, which forced it across the bridge, which was 
then destroyed. 

The approaches to Richmond from below were only slightly held. Bot¬ 
tom’s Bridge had been demolished, but close by was a practicable ford, which 
had been seized on the 20th, when a division crossed the river and occupied 
the opposite high ground. Naglee made a long reconnoissance in force 
down the right side of the Chickahominy, taking almost the same route by 
which, five weeks later, the Union army retreated to the James. He fol¬ 
lowed this by another reconnoissance directly toward Richmond, going be¬ 
yond the Seven Pines, only six miles from the city. In neither reconnpis- 
sance was any serious resistance encountered, or the enemy found in force. 
Keyes’s corps was then sent across the Chickahominy at Bottom’s Bridge, 
with orders to take up a position near the Seven Pines. Heintzelman’s corps 
was also sentacross; and he, being the senior officer, was placed in command 
of all the forces then on the south side of the stream. 3 Johnston, in his re¬ 
treat, had strangely neglected to obstruct the York River Railroad, running 
directly from Richmond to the White House on the Pamunkey. The bridge 
by which the railroad crossed the Chickahsrr.iny was indeed destroyed, but 
so little other damage was done that by the 26th the road was in operation 
up to the river, and the bridge nearly reconstructed. 


1 For the character of the Chickahominy as a military obstacle, see especially Art. Op., 19,20; 

MeC. Rep., 189 ; also both works passim. 

3 Strictly speaking, the banks of the Chickahominy arc the northwest ami the southeast. In re¬ 
ports and documents they are variously denoted as the smith or west, and the north or east. The 
side toward Richmond, being the right looking down the stream, will he called by us the right or 
south ; the opposite one, the left or north. * McC. Rep., 186-188; 213. 214. 




















844 



McClellan still continued to urge that his force should be re-ent'orced; es¬ 
pecially that McDowell’s whole corps should be sent to him at once by wa¬ 
ter. “My pickets,” he writes, 1 “are within a mile of Bottom’s Bridge, and 
scouts are within a quarter of a mile. 1 am advancing on the other roads. 
The indications are that the enemy intend fighting at Richmond. Our pol¬ 
icy seems to be to concentrate every thing there. They hold central posi¬ 
tions, and will seek to meet us while divided. I think we are committing 
a great military error in having so many independent columns. The great 
battle should be fought in mass; then divide if necessary.” Sound advice: 
if he had himself acted upon it two weeks later at Fair Oaks, or six weeks 
later at Cold Harbor, his campaign would have had a different termination. 

Three day's later 2 he transmitted what the President calls his “long dis¬ 
patch." It had been raining, and “ rain on this soil soon makes the roads 
incredibly bad for army transportationyet this was the very region where 
he had insisted, not four months before, that “the roads are passable at all 
seasons of the year.” 3 He had been a mile across the Chickahominy, the 
enemy being about half a mile in front. All the bridges were destroyed, 
and “ the enemy were in force on every road leading to Richmond, within a 
mile or two west of the stream." Yet on the previous day they were not 
in great force opposite Bottom’s Bridge,* upon the Williamsburg road; and 
on the same day Naglee had made his reconnoissance down the right bank 
for a dozen miles, crossing other roads, without serious resistance, or finding 
“ the enemy in forceand on the third, fourth, and fifth days after, “ a very 
gallant reconnoissance was pushed by Naglee with his brigade beyond the 
Seven Pines,” seven or eight miles beyond the river, meeting “considerable 
opposition,” but none which his single brigade could not overcome. 5 Thus 
one of the main approaches to Richmond by way of the Williamsburg road 
and the York River Railroad for eight miles beyond the stream and within 
six of the city, was not, for a full week, “ held by the enemy in force.” All 
accounts, McClellan continued, represented the numbers of the enemy as 
greatly exceeding his own, and every thing gave positive assurance that the 
approach to Richmond involved a desperate battle between the opposing 
forces. All his divisions were moving toward the foe, and he should ad¬ 
vance steadily and carefully, attacking in such a manner as to employ his 
greatest force. He regretted the state of things in McDowell's command; 
be had no means of knowing when he would start, what were his means of 
transportation, or when he would be in the vicinity of the Chickahominy; 
but there was little hope that he would come by land in time for the com¬ 
ing battle. He was, moreover, not sure that he comprehended the orders 
which had been given to McDowell; he wished that the extent of his own 
authority should be clearly defined, and hoped that McDowell would be 
placed under his orders, he himself being strictly responsible for the closest 
observance of the President's instructions; and, above all things, let McDow¬ 
ell be sent at once by water. “But, in any event,” he concluded, “I shall 
fight with all the skill, caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust 
that the result may cither obtain for me the permanent confidence of my 
government, or that if may close my career.” 

To this the President replied on the same day, “You will have just such 

' May IS; Com. Rep., 327. ’ May 21, Kf C Hep., 10G-I08. * Ibid., 104. 

* Ibid., 190. 1 Ibid, 213; Naglce’s Report, Rcb Rec., 81. 


[March, 1862. 

control of McDowell and of his forces as you indicate;” adding that McDow¬ 
ell could go by land quicker than by water; by land “ he can reach you in 
five days after starting, whereas by water he will not reach you in two weeks, 
judging by past experience.” 1 

On the morning of the 24th McClellan received a dispatch from the Pres¬ 
ident announcing that McDowell would soon be with him. The President 
had left McDowell’s carnp the evening before. Shields’s command 'was 
there, but so worn that he could not move till Monday, the 26th ; but both 
he and McDowell said that they would positively move on the morning of 
that day. Meanwhile Anderson, the Confederate general who was opposing 
McDowell’s advance, had as his line of supply and retreat the road to Rich¬ 
mond. Could not McClellan, almost as well as not, while he was building 
the Chickahominy bridges, send a force from his right to cut off the enemy’s 
supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks 
of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat? If he could do that, 
he would prevent the army now opposed to him from receiving an accession 
of nearly fifteen thousand men, and if he saved the bridges he would secure 
a line of railroad for supplies besides the one he then had. The President 
closed by reiterating, “You will have command of General McDowell after 
he joins you precisely as you indicated in your last dispatch to me of the 
21st.” There was in this dispatch one sentence ominous of evil: “ We have 
so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yester¬ 
day at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of a regiment of infantry and 
two companies of cavalry, and putting Banks in some peril.’’ 2 

McClellan was greatly elated by this dispatch. McDowell’s forty thou¬ 
sand would soon be added to his command, giving him a force “sufficiently 
strong to overpower the large array confronting him.” His elation was 
brief. On the afternoon of the same day be received another dispatch from 
the President announcing that the order for McDowell to march toward 
Richmond had been suspended. 3 

The reason for this sudden change of order is to be found in the bold and 
skillful operations of “Stonewall Jackson,” one hundred and fifty miles 
from McClellan, and half as far from McDowell. In the previous autumn 
Jackson had been assigned to the command ofjhe Confederate forces in the 
Valley of the Shenandoah. During the winter and early spring his force 
was about ten thousand men, but his numbers were apparently doubled by 
the celerity of his movements. “ The rapidity of his marches,” says a Con¬ 
federate writer, “is something portentous. He is heard of by the enemy at 
one point, and before they can make up their minds to follow him he is off 
I at another. He keeps so constantly in motion that he never has a sick-list, 
and no need of hospitals. He will assuredly make his mark in this war, 
for his untiring industry and eternal watchfulness must tell upon a numer¬ 
ous enemy, unacquainted with the country, and incommoded by large bag¬ 
gage trains.”* His operations were annoying rather than important, except 
as they compelled the Federal government to keep a considerable force to 
watch him; but by hard service his command was brought into a state of 
great efficiency. 

Simultaneously with Johnston’s abandonment of Manassas in March, 
Jackson fell back up the valley from Winchester toward Staunton, followed 
by Shields, with a division of Banks's Fifth Corps. This retreat, which was 
kept up as far as Newmarket, brought Jackson within fifty miles of John¬ 
ston, who lay near Gordonsville, awaiting the development of McClellan’s 
plans. Shields undertook to decoy Jackson from joining Johnston. He 
made a feigned retreat back to Winchester, marching his whole force thirty 
miles in one day. The ruse was successful. Jackson turned to pursue. 
Banks, who thought it impossible that Jackson would venture to attack him, 
marched his whole corps, with the exception of Shields’s division, toward 
Centreville. Shields, who still hoped that Jackson would venture an at¬ 
tack, secretly posted the bulk of his division in a secluded position two miles 
from Winchester. The people of that town, ignorant of this, reported to 
Jackson that the place was evacuated except by a small rear-guard. On 
the evening of March 22, Jackson’s cavalry made a dash into Winchester, 
driving in Shields’s pickets. The attack was repulsed after a sharp skirm¬ 
ish, in which Shields was severely wounded, liis arm being broken by the 
fragment of a shell. Banks, confident that Jackson would not renew the 
engagement, set off next morning for Washington; but Shields, anticipating 
a strong attack, notwithstanding his wound, prepared to receive it. The 
assault began at noon with a sharp artillery fire, which met wfitb a strong 
reply. At three o’clock Tyler’s brigade charged upon the Confederate bat¬ 
teries on the left, and captured them. Then followed a general and success¬ 
ful assault upon the Confederate right and centre. The Confederates re¬ 
treated, leaving their dead and wounded behind. Banks returned next 
morning, and pursued the retreating enemy thirty miles to Woodstock, 
ceasing the pursuit only when his men were thoroughly exhausted. The 
Federal loss in this engagement was 103 killed and 441 wounded. Of the 
Confederates, 270 w-ere reported to have been buried on the battle-field, and 
many others by the inhabitants. Their entire loss was estimated at 500 
killed and 1000 wounded. 5 


1 Com. Hi 7 ... 329 » ,1/cC. /?»•/,., 199. 

: “ In consequence of General Banks's critical position. I have been compelled to suspend Gen¬ 
eral McDowell’s movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's 

Ferry, and we arc trying to throw General Fremont’s force and a part of General McDowell’s in 
their rear.''— MrC. Rep., 200. 4 Southern Generals, 172. 

4 The Fcderals usually style this action, fought March 23, the Battle of Winchester. The Con¬ 
federates more properly rail it the Battle of Kornstown, from the hamlet near which it was fought. 
Shields states his own force to have been 0000 infantry, 7. r »0 cavalry, and 24 pieces of artillery. 

He estimates the force of the enemy at 0000 infantry," 1300 cavalry, and 36 guns.— (Reb. Rec., 
iv., 328-343.) Pollard says that the Confederate forces amounted to C 000 men, besides Ashby’s 
cavalry, while Shields was 18,000 6 trong. “The enemy,” he 6 ays. “was left in possession of the 
field of battle, two guns, four caissons, and about 300 prisoners. Our loss was about 100 killed. 






















Mat, 1862.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


345 



JxMZts turiEi.n w. 


position from the direction of Romney The advance, under Milroy, came 
along the western side of the Shenandoah Mountains as far as McDowell, a 
village forty miles southwest of Harrisonburg, which was still occupied by 
Banks. Here Milroy was attacked, on the 8th of May, by Jackson, and, al¬ 
though re-enforced by Schenck, who had come up just in time with a small 
re-enforcement, was compelled to retreat after a sharp engagement In this 
action, sometimes called that of Bull Pasture, the Confederates sustained the 
heavier loss, but, having a strong supporting force at hand, though not act¬ 
ually engaged, they gained their point of driving Milroy from the field and 
capturing a considerable amount of stores. 1 Fremont, with his main body, 
had been coming down from the same direction. His advance having been 
thus driven back, he halted at Franklin for fully ten days. 

The Federal forces in this region we re now so widely scattered as to in¬ 
vite an attack upon some of their severed portions. Banks, stripped of 
Shields’s division, was at Strasburg with barely 6000 men. Fremont was 
at Franklin, seventy miles away to the southwest, with the Shenandoah 
Mountains between him and Banka McDowell was near Fredericksburg, 
as far to the southeast, just ready to march toward Richmond. A single 
regiment, and a few companies, 1400 men in all, were at Front Royal under 
Colonel Kenly; these, with a few at Rectortown, formed the only connec¬ 
tion between Banks and McDowell. Jackson, who had concentrated his 
command at Harrisonburg, was practically nearer each of these bodies than 
any one of them was to any other. Bauks was the nearer and weaker ene¬ 
my, and Jackson resolved to strike at him. Concentrating his whole com¬ 
mand at Newmarket, he marched down the South Fork of the Shenandoah, 
placing the three ranges of the Masanutten, the North, and the Shenandoah 
Mountains between himself and Fremont, and struck Kenly at Front Royal 
at noon on the 23d. The Union lorce was posted here merely as a protec¬ 
tion against guerrilla raids, and was wholly too weak to resist an attack in 
force. It was swept away after a brave but brief resistance, four fifths be¬ 
ing killed or captured. 

The Confederates then pushed toward Winchester, hoping to gain the rear 
of Banks, who was still at Strasburg, and cut off his retreat down the Valley. 
Banks’s position was perilous. To remain at Strasburg was to be surround¬ 
ed, and either starved out or beaten. An attempt to retreat westward over 
the mountains would involve the abandonment of his trains at the outset, 


This repulse was a severe check to Jackson. He fell back, faintly pur¬ 
sued by Banks, to Harrisonburg, where he remained for three weeks; and 
then, on the 19th of April, crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah, thus 
placing himself within supporting distance of Johnston, who, “shutting out 
his army from all intercourse with the public,” held his position behind the 
Rappahannock and Rapidan, the main body being near Gordonsville. To¬ 
ward the close of April, when the plans of McClellan had become developed, 
Johnston took the bulk of his forces to the Peninsula, but detached Ewell’s 
division of about ten thousand to the support of Jackson. The junction 
took place on the last day of April. 1 

In the mean while great changes had been made, and were proposed to be 
made, in the disposition of the Federal forces in this region. A new De¬ 
partment, called that of the Rappahannock, including the District of Colum¬ 
bia, had been created, the command being assigned to McDowell. Shields’s 
division was withdrawn from Banks and attached to McDowell, who, thus 
strengthened, was ordered on the 17th of May to join McClellan before 
Richmond, but still to keep himself in a position to cover Washington. 2 
Banks, who bad followed Jackson as far as Harrisonburg, was at the same 
time ordered to fall back fifty miles to Strasburg, and there fortify himself. 
Forces from Fremont’s Mountain Department were approaching Jackson’s 

and probably twice as many wounded ; that of the enemy was certainly more than double. The 
greater portion of our dead left on the field of battle were buried under the direction of the mayor 
of Winchester. Some fifty citizens collected the dead, dug a great pit on the battle-field, and gent¬ 
ly laid the poor fellows in their la't resting-place. 

Scarcely a family in the country but had a rela¬ 
tive there .”—Southern H'mtory of the War, j., — 

281-284. 

Shields, in a published letter, congratulated 
himself that “Jackson and his stone-wall brigade, 
all the other brigades accompanying him, 
will never meet this division again in battle.” Yet 
lie adds, somewhat inconsistently, “The cnemv'<! 
sufferings have been terrible, and su»’h .^y 
have nowhere else endured durin" ..r; and 
yet such were their gallantry a> . mgh state of 
discipline that at no time dun h->»:lc or 

pursuit did they give way to panic. ** 41 • * 

Mount Jackson, and are by this time, .. 
in communication with the main body of the reb¬ 
el army.” In his official report he says: “Jack- 
son, with his supposed invincible stone-wall bri¬ 
gade, were compelled to fall back in disorder upon 
their reserve. Here they took up a new position 
for a final stand. A few minutes only did they 
stand, when they turned dismayed and fled in 
disorder.”— Reh. Rer ., iv., 320-335. 

' Southern General 175, 263, 347. 

a “ Upon being joined by General Shields’s di¬ 
vision, you will move upon Richmond by the gen¬ 
eral route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg 
Railroad, co-operating with the forces under 
General McClellan, now threatening Richmond 
from the line of the Pamunkev and York Rivers. 

While seeking to establish, as soon ns possible, a 
communication between your left wing and the 
right wing of General McClellan, you will hold 
yourself always in such a position ns to cover the 
capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any 
large body of the rebel forces. General McClel¬ 
lan will be furnished with a copy of these instruc¬ 
tions, and will be directed to hold himself in read¬ 
iness to establish communication with your left 
wing, and to prevent the main body of the ene¬ 
my's army from leaving Richmond and throwing 
itself upon your column before the junction of 
the two armies is effected.”— McC. Rep., 195. 


with the certainty of being attacked on his flanks by a superior force. All 
that remained for him was to retreat down the Valley, “entering the lists 
with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the possession 
of Winchester, the key of the Valley.” The distance for each was about 
equal. At nine o’clock on the morning of the 24th the retreating column 
was on its march, the train in front The rear had hardly gone three miles 
when reports came from the front that the enemy held the roads. The train 
was sent to the rear, and the troops moved to the front. After a short en¬ 
counter, the head of the Confederate column was beaten back, and Banks 
succeeded in reaching Winchester. Before daybreak next morning he was 
assailed by Jackson with superior and constantly increasing force. After a 
desultory conflict of five hours, Banks began a burned retreat toward Mar- 
tinsburg. Here he halted a couple of hours, and then pushed on for the 
Potomac, which he reached at Williamsport by sunset. The river was still 
between him and the pursuing enemy. The ferry was barely sufficient to 
transport the ammunition train; the ford was occupied by the wagons; the 
cavalry could wade and swim the stream ; but there was no apparent means 

1 Our casualties amounted to 28 killed, 80 severely wounded, 145 slightly wounded, and 3 
missing, making a total of 256.— Sckenck's Rf/*>rt. “The Confederate loss in this ac tion was con¬ 
siderable. Of 350 killed and wounded, nearly two thirds were Georgians. Wc engaged the en¬ 
emy with not more than one third of his own numbers, which were about 12,000.”— Pollard, 
ii., 35. But the official reports of Milroy and Schenck give their entire force at 2268, while they 
believed that the Confederates “brought into action not less than 5000, besides their reserved 
force cf 8000 in the rear.” 



r«0>T HOY AX. 


























846 


[May, 1862. 




HANCOCK^ 


>0T0M^ 


KJMNEY 


:CTOR' 


THOROUGHFARE* 


OWASHINGTI 


FIRANKLI 


STAUNTON^ 


> Banks’s Report, etc., Reb. Rec. t 52-67; 139-141. 


1 Com. Rej, y 274, 275. 


to get the infantry across. Fortunately, however, a pontoon train had been 
brought along all the way from Strasburg, and by its aid the infantry were 
all got across before noon of the next day. “ Never,” says Banks, “ were 
more grateful hearts in the same number of men than when, at midday on 
the 26th, we stood on the opposite shore." In this retreat of fifty-three miles 
Banks lost six or eight hundred men, of whom the greater part were cap¬ 
tured. Of his train of 500 wagons he lost 55, besides considerable stores 
destroyed at Strasburg and Winchester. Banks, some days after, estimated 
his entire loss at about 900, of whom 38 were known to be killed and 155 
wounded, the rest missing.' 

Jackson reached the river just in time to see his enemy safe on the Mary¬ 
land side. He rested there for a single day, and had divine service 
performed in camp. He issued an address to his army congratulating 
them upon their success in driving the Federal army from the Valley 
of the Shenandoah, and capturing several thousand prisoners, and an 
immense quantity of stores and provisions. 

This movement of Jackson caused a panic in Washington almost as 
great as that which the approach of McClellan had occasioned at Rich¬ 
mond. Rumor trebled his force. Geary, who was posted at Manassas 
Gap, reported that, besides those in pursuit of Banks, there were 10,000 
at Front Royal, and as many more at Orleans, all pressing forward in 
the same direction. Washington was thought to be menaced. 11 1 
think,” telegraphed the President to McClellan on the 25th, “that the 
time is near at hand when you must either attack Richmond or give 
up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington.” The Sec¬ 
retary of War telegraphed to the governors of several states that “in¬ 
telligence from various quarters left no doubt that the enemy in great 
force were marching toward Washington,” and directed them to send 
all their militia and volunteers for the defense of the capital. Mili¬ 
tary possession was ordered to be taken of all railroads, and they were 
directed to hold themselves in readiness to transport troops and muni¬ 
tions to the exclusion of all other business. 

Fremont was ordered to move southeastward from Franklin to Har¬ 
risonburg, thus throwing himself upon Jackson’s rear. On the very 
day before this order was sent, and at the very hour when Kenly was 
annihilated at Front Royal, a brigade of Fremont’s command, under 
Colonel Crook, had gained a decided advantage over a superior force 
of the enemy, under Heth, at Lewisburg, fifty miles to the southwest, 
across the Alleghany Mountains. Fremont issued a glowing order to 
his troops, announcing that “the results of this victory would be im¬ 
portant,” and that “the forces now under his immediate command 
lacked but the opportunity to emulate the gallantry and share the 
glory of their comrades of the Army of the Kanawha.” 3 The oppor¬ 
tunity was not wanting, for at that moment the order was on its way 
directing him to march against Jackson. Instead of going southeast¬ 
ward to Harrisonburg as ordered, he went northeastward toward Stras¬ 
burg, making a much longer march, but, as he averred, by a more 
practicable route, to throw himself upon Jackson’s rear. 

McDowell was at the same time ordered to lay aside for the present 
the movement upon Richmond, and to put 20,000 men in motion at 
once for the Shenandoah, to operate either in conjunction with Fre¬ 
mont or alone against Jackson, and for the relief of Banks. He 
obeyed the order with a heavy heart. He wrote to the President, 

“ Co-operation between General Fremont and myself to cut off Jackson 
is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practical impossibility. 

I am beyond helping distance of General Banks, and no celerity or 
vigor will avail as far as he is concerned. The line of the retreat of 


the enemy’s forces up the Valley is 
shorter than mine to go against him. 
It will take a week or ten days for 
the force to get to the Valley by the 
route which will give it food and 
forage, and by that time the enemy 
will have retired. I shall gain noth¬ 
ing for you there, "and shall lose 
much for you here. It is, therefore, 
not only on personal grounds that I 
have a heavy heart in the matter, but 
I feel that it throws us all back; and 
from Richmond north we shall have 
all our large masses paralyzed, and 
shall have to repeat what we have 
just accomplished.” The President 
replied, in his simple, earnest way: 
“I am highly gratified at your alacri¬ 
ty in obeying my order. The change 
was as painful to me as it can possi¬ 
bly be to you or to any one. Every 
thing now depends upon the celer¬ 
ity and vigor of your movement.” 1 
McDowell seems not to have dreamed 
that Jackson would follow Banks up 
to the Potomac, placing himself, go¬ 
ing and returning, almost twice as far 
from Strasburg as either Fremont or 
McDowell would have to go to reach 
that vital point. This remonstrance 
was dated on the 24th of May. Nine days after, Jackson, on his retreat, 
passed through Strasburg, just before the junction of Fremont and Shields, 
whose division of McDowell’s corps was sent to the Valley, was to have 
been effected. Had either or both of these commands marched with only 
half the celerity of Jackson in his advance and retreat, the Confederate 
force would have been shut up in the lower portion of the Valley, with 
scarcely a possibility of escape. 

Jackson perceived the full peril of his situation. Giving his wearied 
force but a single day’s rest, he began his retreat on the 29th, masking the 


3 Reb Rec 14L 


MAP OF OPERATIONS IN TUE y .vi.l.It v. 































ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


347 


June, 1862.] 

movement by a feigned attack upon Harper’s Ferry by Ewell’s division. 
On the 30th his whole reunited force was at Winchester, but made no delay 
there, pushing straight on for Strasburg. On that same day, Fremont, after 
a hard march up the west side of the Shenandoah Mountains, had crossed 
this and its outlying range, Hunting Ridge, and was at Wardensville. Next 
day the advance was pushed forward to the road between Winchester and 
Strasburg. Jackson had passed that point only a few hours before on the 
w ay to Strasburg. Fremont followed, and on the morning of the 1st of 
June his advance came upon Jackson’s rear. A skirmish ensued; but 
Fremont's advance was checked, and Jackson got clear to Strasburg. Here 
he was told that Shields had been for forty-eight hours in possession of 
Front Royal, but had fiot joined Fremont. He at once inferred that he was 
marching down the South Fork of the Shenandoah by way of Luray, mean¬ 
ing to cross and get first to Newmarket. Sending a detachment to burn 
the bridges over the South Fork, Jackson kept rapidly on up the turnpike, 
harassed by Fremont’s pursuing force. So close were they upon him that 
his only means of escape seemed to be to put the North Fork of the Shenan¬ 
doah between him and bis pursuers. He crossed the stream at Mount Jack- 
son on the 3d, destroying the bridge behind him. This was hardly accom¬ 
plished w-hen the Federal forces appeared on the opposite bank. It took a 
whole day to reconstruct the bridge: Jackson had thus secured so much 
the start, and on the 5th reached Harrisonburg, the point from which he 
had commenced his adventurous march a fortnight before. Here be made 
no delay, for Fremont was again close on his rear. He turned to the east 
toward Port Republic on the North Fork, hoping to cross that before 
Shields, who was marching more slowly down its east side, could come up. 
Ashby’s cavalry, with some infantry, was left ns a rear-guard at Harrison¬ 
burg. Colonel Wyndham, of the Uuion cavalry, making a reconnoissance 
on the 7th, fell into an ambuscade, and, with a considerable portion of his 
men, was captured, an infantry skirmish ensued, in which each side suffered 
some loss. In this skirmish Ashby was killed. 

Thus far, owing to the happy accident which enabled him to slip between 
Fremont and Shields at Strasburg. and to the start gained by the destruction 
of the bridge at Mount Jackson, the Confederate army' had retreated with¬ 
out serious loss. But the two commands of the Federals, each fully equal 
to his own, were marching in parallel lines about fifteen miles apart, but 
with the deep South Fork of the Shenandoah, over which all the bridges 



run var JONATHAN JACfifiON. 


below Port Republic had been destroyed, between them. If Shields reached 
this place first in force, Jackson would be hemmed in. There was now no 
alternative but to prevent this junction by checking Fremont, and then either 
out-fighting or out-marching Shields. Ewell, whose division had performed 
the main part of the fighting in this expedition, was posted at the Cross 
Keys, midway between Harrisonburg and Port Republic, while Jackson him¬ 
self kept on four miles farther, to the neighborhood of the latter place. 

Ewell’s position was strong. In front was a valley and rivulet, with 
woods on either flank. He was attacked by Fremont on the 8th. The ac¬ 
tion lasted from eleven in the morning till four in the afternoon, skirmish¬ 
ing and artillery fire being kept up until dark. Ewell held his position 
during the night, but before dawn was ordered to join Jackson, who was 
seriously threatened at Port Republic by Shields. In this action Ewell had 
five brigades of 8000 men, but only 6000 were brought into close action. 
Fremont’s whole force was about 18,000, less than half of whom were 
brought upon the field. Both Fremont and Ewell assert that they occupied 
the field of battle, and thus each claims the technical honors of victory. 
The real advantage was certainly with Ewell. He had checked Fremont’s 
advance, and left Jackson’s whole force for another day free to act against 
Shields. 1 * 

Port Republic is a forlorn village, situated in the angle formed by North 
and South Rivers, affluents of the South Fork of the Shenandoah. The South 
River is a shallow stream easily fordable, the North River crossed by a wood¬ 
en bridge connecting the town with the Harrisonburg road. Shields’s ad¬ 
vance had reached this place on the morning of the 8th. A body of caval¬ 
ry dashed across the South River into the town, and planted a gun opposite 
the entrance to the bridge. A Confederate brigade crossed, drove them 
back, and captured the gun, the cavalry falling back three miles to their in¬ 
fantry support. Night closed this skirmish, which was going on simultane¬ 
ously with the battle at Cross Keys, seven miles distant. By dawn Ewell 
had joined Jackson, who resolved to throw his whole force across the river 
and attack Shields, burning the bridge in his rear, so as to prevent Fremont 
from joining Shields. His whole force was now upon the east side of the 
South Fork, which ran between him and Fremont. Tyler, who led the ad¬ 
vance of Shields, had barely 3000 men. Posting these in a commanding po¬ 
sition, covered by a battery of six guns, he awaited the attack. ‘Several as¬ 
saults of the enemy were repelled with heavy loss; but a Confederate bri¬ 
gade, marching through a dense forest, charged upon Tyler’s left flank, and 
by a combined assault on front and flank forced him from his position, with 
the loss of all his guns except ohe; these were abandoned because the artil¬ 
lery horses had been killed. The retreat was orderly, the enemy pursuing 
for a number of miles. 

Just at the close of the action the force of Fremont appeared on the op¬ 
posite side of the river, but no attempt was made to cross. Jackson states 
his loss in this battle at 133 killed, 929 wounded, and 14 missing—1167 in 
all, of whom nearly two thirds belonged to Ewell’s division, which had been 
also engaged the previous day. In these three days this division lost nearly 
1000 men. The Union loss in killed and wounded must have been much 
smaller, but Jackson claims to have taken 450 prisoners. 3 

Here ended the pursuit of Jackson. Why the forces of Fremont and 
Shields were not united and brought against Jackson is one of the mysteries 
of this miserable campaign. On the 8th of June, the day of the battle of 
Cross Keys, orders were sent from the War Department that Fremont 
should “take post with his main force near Harrisonburg, to guard against 
operations of the enemy down the Valley of the Shenandoah and Banks, 
who had meanwhile recrossed the Potomac, should take position at or near 
Front Royal; and that McDowell, “ having first provided adequately for the 
defense of the City of Washington, and for holding the position at Freder¬ 
icksburg, should as speedily as possible execute his former instructions to 
march toward Richmond, whither, indeed, McCall’s division of his army had 
in the mean while been ordered to go by water. 3 Fremont, instead of stop¬ 
ping at Harrisonburg, fell back in a few days as far as Mount Jackson, leav¬ 
ing his wounded behind; Shields took post at New Market; and Jackson, 
on the 12th, retired across the South River, where he remained near Weyer’s 
Cave for three days, when he set out to join Lee at Richmond. The object 
which he had in view had been fully accomplished. With barely 20,000 
men he bad neutralized McDowell’s 40,000, Fremont’s 20,000, and driven 
Banks’s 6000 beyond the bounds of the Confederacy, leaving McClellan to 
confront first Johnston and then Lee before Richmond. 


The order of May 24th shut off McClellan from all hope of any imme¬ 
diate support from McDowell’s corps, and he proceeded to shape his meas¬ 
ures accordinglv. The first thing to be done, in his estimation, was to 
throw a series of bridges across the Chickahominy, in order to enable his 
whole army to cross at different points. Of these there were eleven, “all 
1 long, difficult, and with extensive log-way approaches.” The necessity of 
1 all these is not apparent, for nearly the whole army was finally passed over 
I by two of them. “The entire army,” McClellan affirms, “could probably 


I Each commander, in his official reports, greatly exaggerates the loss of the other-in this battle. 
Ewell savs- “There arc good reasons for estimating the loss of the enemy at -000 in killed, 
woiinded! and prisoners. On a part of the field they buried 101 at one spot, 15 at another, and 
a house containing some of their dead was said to have been burned by them; and this is only a 
part of their loss."—/(<■/.., i„ 63.) Fremont, in his report, made next day, says: “ rhe en¬ 
emy's loss we can not clearly ascertain. He was engaged during the night in carrying off his 
dead and wounded in wagons. This morning, on onr march 200 of Ins dead were counted on 
one field, the greater part being badlv mutilated by cannon-shot. Many of his dead were also 
scattered through the woods, and many have been already buried. -(Art. life., v 110.) Fre¬ 

mont estimated his own loss at 125 killed and 500 wounded, making no mention of prisoners, of 
whom, indeed, it is hardly possible there could hare been many. Ewells report states his loss 
specifically at 43 killed. 230 wounded, and 14 missing-267 in all.—(Are * Hep., t.,120.) 

3 Ltt'&Rtp., i., 55-60,121 i Tyler’s Report, Reb. Rec., v., 110. Com.Rtp., 275 
















BRIDGE AUEi Kib 1 HE ClilCKAliOMIM SWAMP. 


have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, 
but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communi¬ 
cations, or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our 
supply ddpot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated on 
the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was many 
days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transport¬ 
ation not furnishing a single day’s supplies in advance, the troops must have 
gone without rations, and the animals without forage; the army would have 
been paralyzed.” 1 But Bottom’s Bridge and the railway bridge, only a 
mile apart, and on the direct line of his communications, were above the 
reach of the highest water, and, these protected, his communications across 
the river were safe. It was surely easier to protect these than a half score 
of points. He believed all the time that he was confronted across the river 
by a force greatly superior to his own; and yet, by some unexplained 
course of reasoning, he decided, “under the circumstances, to retain a por¬ 
tion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were com¬ 
pleted.” 2 He divided his army into two parts, neither of them in a position 
to aid the other in case of a sudden attack in force. The troops that crossed 
the Chickahominy were directed in a General Order “to go prepared for 
battle at a moment’s notice.” They were to preserve discipline, obey orders, 
and especially to bear in mind “that the Army of the Potomac has never 
been checked ; keep well together, throw away no shots, but aim carefully 
and low, and, above all things, rely upon the bayonet.” 3 

By the 28th of May the two corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, form¬ 
ing the left wing, were on the south side of the Chickahominy, massed 
checker-wise along the Williamsburg road for a distance of about six miles. 
The right wing, comprising the corps of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter, was 
stretched for eighteen miles along the north bank of the Chickahominy. 
The two wings formed an acute-angled triangle of unequal sides, the apex 
being at Bottom’s Bridge. The distance between the centre of the two 
wings was hardly five miles in a direct line, but between them flowed the 
Chickahominy, over which no practicable bridge had been thrown except 
at the apex of the triangle. If the left wing, which was thus thrown across 
the river toward Richmond, were attacked in force by the enemy massed in 
superior numbers on that side, the right wing could come to its aid only by 
a march of more than twenty miles; so if the right were assailed, it could 
be aided by the left only by an equal march. 4 For a hostile commander, 
with any thing like an equal force, there were two courses open. He could 
throw his entire strength upon the weaker left wing with a probability, as 
sure as any thing in war can be, of annihilating it; or he could fling his 

1 Mc.C. Rep., 200. • Ibid., 201. J Gen. Order, May 25th, Reb. Rec., v.. 431. 

4 McCieilan, while attempting to explain why he failed to push his advantage at Fair Oaks, 
shows the complete isolation of his two wings. He says: “The only available means of uniting 
our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance upon Richmond, soon after the battle, was to march the 
troops from Mechanicsvillo and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bot¬ 
tom’s Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distanc. 
of about twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time this march could not 
have been made with artillery in less than two days.”— Report, 223. 


whole army upon the Federal right, attacking its weak line of communica¬ 
tion with its supplies. Johnston tried the former plan at the close of May. 
He failed only through accidents which neither party could anticipate. Lee 
tried the second plan at the close of June, under circumstances which should 
have insured its defeat. The result was that the Federal army, outgener¬ 
aled, but not outfought or outnumbered, was driven from the Chickahomi¬ 
ny to the James, bringing the Peninsular campaign to a disastrous close. 

For a few days McClellan’s dispatches to the President were hopeful. 
On the 25th of May, the time was very near when he should attack Rich¬ 
mond. Next day, he was “quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory 
to the last struggle.” He had cut the Virginia Central Railroad in three 
places, and would try to cut the other railroad. He thought the Richmond 
intrenchments not very formidable, and hoped soon to be within shelling 
distance. His arrangements for the morrow were very important, and, if 
successful, would leave him free to strike on the return of the force de¬ 
tached. 1 

He had just learned that a considerable force of the enemy was near 
Hanover Court-house, to the right and rear of his army, threatening his 
communications, “and in a position either to re-enforce Jackson or to im¬ 
pede McDowell’s junction, should he finally move to join us.” This force, 
as it afterward appeared, was Branch’s division of raw men from North 
Carolina. Fitz John Porter was ordered to dislodge them. Marching four¬ 
teen miles through a heavy rain, Porter’s advance, under Emory, reached 
the neighborhood of Hanover Court-house at noon on the 27th, and found 
a portion of the enemy drawn up across the road to dispute their progress. 
Emory, re-enforced by a portion of Morell’s brigade, routed this body after 
an hour’s firing, and the main body of the Union force were ordered to pur¬ 
sue them northward, while Martindale, with three regiments, was sent west¬ 
ward toward Ashland to obstruct the railroad and cut the telegraph wires. 
He soon found himself opposed by a superior force, and sent to Porter for 
re-enforcements. For reply he received orders to march to the right, in 
which direction the enemy were, as Porter supposed, retreating north, pur¬ 
sued by the main part of the corps. Martindale rejoined that the enemy 
was on his left, but prepared to obey orders, when he was directed to march 
to a certain distance and halt But so confident was he that Porter was 
misinformed of the position of the enemy that he obeyed the order only in 
part, keeping back a portion of his force to guard the van of the main col¬ 
umn. Soon his force of 1000 men was attacked by the whole strength of 
the enemy, estimated at from 5000 to 7000 men. He stood his ground 
stoutly for two hours, but was sorely bestead. His centre was broken, and 
the enemy getting through the woods upon both his flanks. Porter at 
length found that he was mistaken in supposing the enemy was retiring to 
the north, and that he had been “pursuing a myth.” He faced his whole 
column about, and fell upon the flanks of the enemy, who were held at bay 
by Martindale. The Confederates were routed, and fled in confusion. 


McC. Rep., 204? 205. 




















































Mat, 1862.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


349 



611ELL1NO ACROSS TUB CHICKAHOMINY SWAMP. 


“ The immediate results of these affairs,” says McClellan, “ were some 200 
of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, 730 prisoners sent to the rear, 
one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small-arms, and two 
railroad trains captured. Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and 
missing.” 1 

McClellan was jubilant at the result of this action, the first which had 
been fought by his direction. It was, he said, a glorious victory; the rout 
of the rebels was complete—not a defeat, but a complete rout. Porter had 
gained two complete victories over superior forces. The enemy were con¬ 
centrating every thing on Richmond; he would do his best to cut off Jack- 
son, but was doubtful whether lie could. All the railroads had been cut 
but that from Richmond to Fredericksburg. The President replied that he 
was very glad of Porter’s victory, but added, “ If it was a total rout of the 
enemy, I am puzzled to know' why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Rail¬ 
road was not seized. Again: As j r ou say you have all the railroads but the 
Richmond and Fredericksburg, I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you 
can have any except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap 
of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, 
is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating upon 
Richmond I think can not be certainly known to you or me.” McClellan 
was no wise satisfied with this guarded congratulation. “ I do not think,” 
he wrote, “ that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's 
victory He has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously 
threatened ; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel 
forces. It was one of the handsomest things of the war, both in itself and 
its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. An¬ 
other day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery.” 2 
Martindale, whose firm stand against superior forces had secured the vic¬ 
tory, was not so enthusiastic either as to the conduct of the affair or its 
value. 3 

Johnston was in no position to attack, or even seriously to threaten, 
McClellan’s right on the eastern side of the Chickahominy. He had fallen 
back from Yorktown, from Williamsburg, and then across the Chickahomi¬ 
ny, simply because he was opposed to a greatly superior force. Of course, 
plausible reasons must be given for these movements. Yorktown, it was 
said, was evacuated because “ McClellan, by his arrangements, had made the 
place untenable;” 4 * the strong lines at Williamsburg were abandoned be¬ 
cause he wished to fight the enemy in the open field, out of the reach of 
gun-boats ,* the Chickahominy was crossed because he did not wish to fight 
a great battle with so formidable an obstacle in the way of his retreat, in 
case he was worsted. 6 Branch’s six regiments, so far from being sent from 
Richmond to threaten McClellan’s right and his communications with his 
base of supplies, were moving down from Gordonsville to the defense of 
Richmond, whither Johnston was calling ever}- man, with the exception of 
Jackson’s command in the Valley of the Shenandoah. Two days before the 

1 McC. Rep., 208. * Ibid., 208-212. 

3 “ The whole line of our march and our left flank, by the order of the commander-in-chicf, was 

left exposed and o|>en to assault; following the directions which the general gave, instead of a 
vieton-, we should have been involved in an ugly catastrophe. . I went with a force of 

only about 1000 men to encounter the whole force of the enemy that day, from 5000 to 7000 
The general results were these: A cross-fire opening upon us from the woods; I had my wing? 
supported in columns—my centre was broken—and maintained my position there about two 
hours, while the rest of the army were pursuing a myth, when the return of the second brigade 
under Morell enabled us to take the rebels thus held at advantage, and repulse them, resulting in 
the rout of the enemy. ... I never comprehended any object in the movement to Hanover 
Court-house except it was to intercept some of the enemy, if any should happen to be between 
Hanover Court-house and Fredericksburg.”— Martindale’s Testimony, Com. Rep., 635-637. 

* Southern Generals , 265. * Pollard , ii., 1G. • Memphis Appeal. 


affair at Hanover Court-house, J. R. Anderson, who had been confronting 
McDowell near Fredericksburg, was on his way to Richmond, and the day 
after the battle his force passed Ashland, almost within sight of Porter’s 
battle-field, and hurried on to the capital. There was now no enemy be¬ 
tween McDowell and McClellan, and their advanced guards were only fifteen 
miles apart. Jackson was at this moment at Williamsport on the Potomac, 
200 miles away. The terror excited at Washington by his bold movement 
alone prevented the junction of McDowell with McClellan.' 

But if McClellan’s right wing, stretched along the eastern branch of the 
Chickahominy, was unassailable by any force at Johnston’s command, the 
weaker left, practically isolated on the other side of the stream, invited a sharp 
and sudden blow. About 30,000 men, belonging to Keyes’s and Heintzel- 
man’s corps, had been sent across the Chickahominy. 2 Keyes, whose corps 
was in the advance, intrenched itself a mile behind a place on the Williams¬ 
burg road known as “The Seven Pines,” nearly midway between the river 
und Richmond. The place was named from a clump of pine-trees which for¬ 
merly stood at the crossing of several roads. Casey’s division of this corps 
was pushed a thousand yards beyond the Pines to Fair Oaks Farm. 3 Here 
were two pleasant houses in a grove of fair oak-trees, with a long pile of wood 
cut for the railroad. Casey’s pickets were advanced a thousand yards far¬ 
ther to the edge of a dense forest, through an opening in which the enemy 
were descried in force. The region was mostly wooded and intersected bj 
marshes, with small clearings around the few houses. The trees were hasti¬ 
ly cut down to form abatis, rifle-pits were dug, and one or two redoubts 
for artillery hastily constructed 

Heintzelman’s corps lay behind that of Keyes, stretching also to the left, 
in order to cover the approaches to the White Oak Swamp, which came 
close up to the Williamsburg road. Although Keyes was in the advance, 
Heintzelinan was told by McClellan that he was to command on that side 
of the Chickahominy, and if there was any fighting to do, lie must do it. 
He thought the troops were too much scattered, but dared not change their 
position in face of the positive orders which he had received; but after a 
week he got authority to place his men as he saw fit, and sent half of them 


’ McC. Rep ,211, De Joinville, 68 —As early as May 29th McClellan was apprized of the sig¬ 
nificance of the Confederate troops near Hanover Court-house. On that day he wrote to the Sec¬ 
retary of War: “ General Anderson left his position in the vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 A.M., 
Sunday [May 25th], with the following troops: 1st South Carolina; one battalion South Carolina 
Rifles; 12th, 13th. and 14th South Carolina; 3d Louisiana; two batteries of four guns each, 
namely, Letcher’s Virginia, and McIntosh's South Carolina batteries. General Anderson and 
his command passed Ashland yesterday morning en route for Richmond, leaving men behind 
him to destroy the bridges over the telegraph road, which they traveled. This information is re* 
liable. It is also positively certain that Branch’s command was from Gordonsville, bound for 
Richmond, whither they have now gone. It may 1« regarded as |<ositive. I think that there is 
no force between Fredericksburg and the Junction’’ [of the Virginia Central and Richmond and 
Fredericksburg Railroads, ten miles north of Ashland]. Yet the very next day he wrote that bis 
right flank had been “seriously threatened" by Branch, the dispersal of whose division had ef¬ 
fected “ the clearing of our right flank and rearthis “ dispersal,” apart from the loss of prison¬ 
ers and killed, amounting only to hastening their march to Richmond. He repeats this state-, 
ment in his Report prepared more than a year later, asserting that Branch’s force “was in the 
vicinity of Hanover Court-house, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our commu¬ 
nications ’’—( Report, 2 11 , 212, 205 ) They were certainly to the right, at a distance of fifteen 
miles, and endeavoring to get away; but they were not in his rear, and could only threaten his 
communications by almost reversing their line of march, and putting the Chickahominy and three 
fifths of the Union army directly between themselves and the Confederate force before Richmond. 
Lee, indeed, made this very movement a month later, but not until his strength was nearly double 
that of Johnston, and he had measured the capacity of his antagonist. He made it, also, with 
more than 60,000 men, instead of with six rnw regiments. 

a “There were four divisions on the right bank of the Chickahominy— one a very weak one. 
T should think the strength of the four divisions must have been 30,000 men, perhaps.”—McClel¬ 
lan’s Testimony, Com Rep., 433. 

3 There are two Fair Oaks mentioned in the reports of the actions of May 31st and June 1st. 
The failure to discriminate these has given rise to much confusion. “Fair Oaks Farm” is on the 
Williamsburg road, something more than half a mile beyond the Seven Pines. “Fair Oaks Sta¬ 
tion” is a wooding point on the railroad, about a mile from the farm. 



































































850 


[May, 1862. 
























































































Mat, 1862.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMIMY. 


351 



forward to the Seven Pines. This was only the day before the battle 
opened. 1 

Johnston, in the mean while, was informed, but only partially, of the 
movement across the Chickahominy. His “ trusty scouts” could only tell 
him on the 30th of May that Keyes’s corps had crossed, and were encamped 
on the Richmond side of the stream. He'resolved to “attack them next 
morning, hoping to be able to defeat Keyes’s corps completely in its ad¬ 
vanced position before it could be re-enforced.” The attack was to be made 
by the four full divisions of Huger, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and G. W. Smith, 
comprising fully three fifths of Johnston’s entire force. 2 The main as¬ 
sault was to be made in front by Longstreet, with his own division and that 
of Hill; Huger was to move down the Charles City road, and attack the 
left flank of the force engaged by Longstreet; and Smith was to march 
down to the junction of the New Bridge and Nine-mile roads, and be ready 
to assail the right flank of Keyes or to cover Longstreet’s left. 

During the afternoon and night of the 30th a storm more violent than 
had been known for a generation swept over Richmond. This seemed 
providential for the Confederates. The channel of the Chickahominy was 
already full to its brim. The stream, swollen by the storm, would overflow 
the swamp and bottom, preventing any aid to be sent to Keyes from the 
other side. The left wing of the Union army seemed doomed. Though it 
was twice as strong as Johnston supposed, it was still greatly overmatched, 
and its destruction would have been the greater success for the Confeder¬ 
ates. 3 

The attack was to be made simultaneously at daybreak. The storm de¬ 
layed the movements of the troops, but by eight o’clock Longstreet was in 
position, ready to begin. Hour after hour he waited for Huger, unwilling 
to make a partial attack instead of the combined movement which had been 
planned. Noon had passed before he decided to commence the assault, 
without waiting for the dilatory Huger. 4 

Casey’s dvision of Keyes’s corps was in the advance at Fair Oaks Farm, 
three quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, its pickets being pushed 
a third of a mile farther, up to the very edge of the wood in and behind 

* Hcintzclraan’s Testimony, Com. Rep., 351. 

* In the organization of the Confederate armv, a “division” was the largest member, answer¬ 
ing to a “ corps” in the Union army. Each division comprised from four to six brigades. The 
strength of a division at this time was about 12 , 000 , so that the attack, as planned, would have 
been made by 48,000 men ; but, as Huger failed to execute his part, there were but 36,000 Con¬ 
federates actually engaged. Including Branch and Anderson, who reached Richmond the day 
before with about 12,000, Johnston could have had barely 20,000 men beyond these four divi¬ 
sions; as Huger had only recently been brought from Petersburg, where he was posted for some 
time after his abandonment of Norfolk, Johnston could not have fallen back from Yorktown and 
Williamsburg with more than 45,000. For General Johnston’s own statement of his force at dif¬ 
ferent periods of the campaign, see note at the end of this chapter. 

3 “I determined to attack next morning [May 31st], hoping to be able to defeat Keyes’s corps 
completely in its more advanced position before it could be re-enforced. . . . Heavy and 

protracted rains during the afternoon and night, by swelling the stream of the Chickahominy, in¬ 
creased the probability of our having to deal with no other troops than those of Keyes.”—(. John - 
gton’s Report.) “The storm of May 30th was terrible. Never, even in the tropics, have I seen a 
more sudden and sweeping deluge. The creek which flowed at the bottom of the hill below the 
house in which I lived [in Richmond], and over which, in ordinary times, a boy might leap, filled 
the valley, on the morning of May 30th, with a shallow lake more than one hundred yards in 
width.’’-^-(Hurlbert, in De Joinvil/e, 114.) “During the day and night of the 30th of May a very 
violent storm occurred. The rain, falling in torrents, rendered work on the rifle-pits and bridges 
impracticable, mado the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges 
across the Chickahominy. Tho enemy, perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were 
placed, and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off by the 
rapidly-rising stream, threw an overwhelming force upon the position occupied by Casey’s divi¬ 
sion.”— (McC. Rep., 215.) “ General Keyes’s corj>s and a part of General Heintzelmnn’s were on 
the right bank of the Chickahominy. General Sumner’s corps, with the rest of the army, were 
on the other bank of the river. The enemy took advantage of our position, and the small force 
that was on the right bank, and made their preparations to just gobble up Keyes’s whole corps. 
They attacked me on the 31st of May. The preceding night was one of the worst I ever saw. I 
never before heard such a thunder-storm as there was on that night.”—(Casey’s Testimony, Com. 
Rep., 443.) “On Friday night we had one of the worst rain-storms, thunder and lightning, that 
I ever saw. A man who had lived there twenty-nine years said that it was one of the worst 
storms they ever had in that country.”—(Heintzelman’s Testimony^ Com. Rep., 354.) “Through 
all the night of the 30th of May there was a raging storm, the like of which I can not remember. 
Torrents of rain drenched the earth The thunderbolts rolled and fell without intermission, and 
the heavens flashed with a perpetual blaze of lightning. From their beds of mud and the peltings 
of this storm, the Fourth Corps rose to fight the battle of the 31st of May, 1862.”— (Keyes s Rep.) 

* Johnston says that the advance was made at 2 P.M., “ the engagement being opened by ar¬ 
tillery and skirmishers, and by 3 o’clock it had become close and heavy.” But, according to the 
concurrent accounts of all the Union officers, the skirmishing began by noon, and within an hour 
the action became serious. Johnston’s report was written nearly a month after the battle, and 
while he was still feeble from the effects of his wound. There can be no doubt that he is incor¬ 
rect in his statements of time, placing the important periods of the action two hours later than 
they actually occurred. In giving thi time, we adopt the general statements of the Union au¬ 
thorities. 


which the enemy was posted, his strength being fully screened from view. 
There had been indications of an impending attack. The cars had been 
heard running all the night before from Richmond, indicating that troops 
were being brought to the front. Early in the morning an aid of Johnston 
was captured close to the Union lines. Keyes ordered his division to be 
under arms at 11 A.M. Soon tidings were brought that the enemy were 
coming in force down the Williamsburg road. Casey advanced several 
batteries toward his picket-lines to meet them, at the same time sending 
back for re-enforcements. lie had scarcely done this when the enemy 
burst through the screen of woods. The pickets and supporting regiments 
were swept back in confusion. The artillery had been thrown forward; in 
order to save the guns, Naglee made a bayonet charge upon the advancing 
enemy, and pressed them back to the woods. Here he was met with a fu¬ 
rious fire of musketry, and forced back; the guns were saved, with the ex¬ 
ception of a single piece, and the whole division fell back to the line of de¬ 
fense at Fair Oaks Farm. Here this weak division, scarcely five thousand 
strong, held its ground for three hours against three times its number. 
But at length, pressed in front, almost enveloped on both flanks, and hav¬ 
ing lost one third of its number, it fell back to the second line of defense 
in front of the Seven Pines, then held by Couch’s division. The retreat 
was made just in time. Had it been delayed a few minutes, the whole di¬ 
vision would have been surrounded and captured. As it was, they lost a* 
battery of five guns. Casey maintained that this stubborn resistance at this 
line really saved the day, and prevented this action from resulting “in a 
severe repulse, which might have resulted in a disastrous defeat” 1 

Couch’s division at the Seven Pines had been weakened by sending reg¬ 
iments to the support of Casey. Their line of defense, protected by a slight 
abatis, lay across the road. Keyes, the corps commander, who was now on 
the ground, brought forward what re-enforcements he could from the rear, 
and made a stand. Thus far the weight of the fight on the Confederate 
side had been borne by Hill’s division, which was in the advance. Long- 
street’s force now came up, and pressed the line in front, while its superior 
numbers enabled it to assail the right and left flanks at the same time. 
Couch, who was on the right with two regiments, was forced from his posi¬ 
tion. Instead of falling back, he withdrew along the Nine-mile road to Fair 
Oaks Station, where he took part in the action which soon began at that 
point. Longstreet, who was now on the field, leaving the Union right, 
pressed with all his force upon the centre and left, between Couch and the 
main body of the division. Heintzelman by this time had brought forward 
Kearney’s division of his corps, Hooker’s being then' near White Oak 

1 The conduct of Casey’s division was nt the time a matter of sharp discussion. Several officers, 
who saw only the disorganized regiments, reported that it hud behaved disgracefully: McClellan, 
in his first dispatch, declared that “Casey’s division, which was the first line, gave way unaccount¬ 
ably and discreditably.” Upon more complete information, he officially withdrew the charge, say¬ 
ing, “I withdraw the expression contained in my first dispatch, and 1 cordially give my indorse¬ 
ment to the conclusion of the division commander, that ‘ those parts of his command which behaved 
discreditably were exceptional cases.’”— (McC. Rep., 222.) Still it is certain that the division, as 
such, was broken by the overwhelming force to which it was opposed. A portion of it, with oth¬ 
ers, rushed back, a disorganized mass. Heintzelman, in his Report, states the case fairly. He 
says: “ Some of the regiments fought gallantly till overwhelmed by superior numbers. After they 
were once broken, however, they could not be rallied” [as n body, that is, since, as he implies and 
as Keyes affirms, among the fragments of regiments which formed the line which finally checked 
the Confederate advance were portions of Casey’s, as well as of Couch’s and Kearney’s divisions]. 
“The road was filled with fugitives (not all from this division) as far as Bottom’s Bridge. Colo¬ 
nel Starr’s regiment, of General Hooker’s division, had to force its way through them with the bay¬ 
onet, and a guard I placed at Bottom’s Bridge stopped over a thousand m n.” 



SILAS CASJCT. 





















352 



I)ARIl!8 N. COUCH. 


Swamp, too far away to come up in time. The fight raged fiercely with 
varying success for an hour and a half, until five o’clock, when the Union 
force began slowly to give way, and fall back from the position at the 
Seven Pines. The right, with Couch, had moved northward toward Fair 
Oaks Station ; the left, with Berry, of Kearney’s division, held Us ground, 
keeping the enemy before it in check until nightfall, when they fell back 
southward by way of the White Oak Swamp. The Union centre fell back 
fighting a few hundred yards to a narrow strip of woods crossing the Wil¬ 
liamsburg road. Here Heintzelman in person succeeded in rallying about 
eighteen hundred men, the fragments of regiments, and checked the advance 
of the enemy, who never got beyond this belt of woods. It was almost by 
accident that this stand was successful. Keyes, who was on the left of the 
proposed line, saw that the key to the position was a spot where the wood¬ 
ed ground sloped abruptly to the rear. If the enemy gained this the day 
was lost. He called a single regiment to follow him across an open field 
of seven or eight hundred yards. They dashed on in the face of a scorch¬ 
ing fire, and gained the spot just in time. “Had they been two minutes 
later,” says Keyes, “they would have been too late to occupy that fine po¬ 
sition, and it would have been impossible to have formed the next and last 
line of battle, which stemmed the tide of defeat, and turned it toward vic¬ 
tory.” The new line, formed of fragments from regiments from every divi¬ 
sion which had been engaged—Casey’s, Couch’s, and Kearney’s—had hard¬ 
ly been formed, when a heavy mass of the enemy, which had been held in 
check, came down upon it. They were met by a fire so deadly that their 
advance was checked. 

It was now past six o’clock, and, though it wanted an hour of sunset, the 
dense vapors rising from the swamp made all objects indistinct. The Con¬ 
federates, who had pressed the Union forces for two miles from Fair Oaks 
Farm to beyond the Seven Pines, fell back a little toward Richmond, pass¬ 
ing the night under arms on the battle-field and in the camps which they 
had won. The Union troops fell back a mile in the other direction to an 
intrenched camp. 

The battle had hardly opened when the sound of musketry was heard at 
McClellan's head-quarters, six miles away in a direct line, on the other side 
of the Chickahominy. He was confined to his bed by illness, but sent an 
order to Sumner, whose corps lay nearest the battle-field, and who had just 
thrown two bridges over the Chickahominy, to hold himself in readiness to 
march to the scene of action. The storm which had on the previous even¬ 
ing burst so furiously over Richmond, had spent its force there and to the 
south; northward it was comparatively slight. The inundation which 
Johnston supposed would render the Chickahominy impassable by day¬ 
break began to appear at noon. It was now two hours after noon. The 
bridges had become almost impassable, many of the timbers of the best one 
being already floating. Sumner more than obeyed the order which he had 
received. Instead of merely preparing to move, he advanced his two divi¬ 
sions—those of Sedgwick and Richardson—halting the leading company of 
each upon the bridge opposite it. He thus saved an hour, when, as events 
proved, minutes were priceless. 

Tidings came to head-quarters that the day was going hardly, and Sum¬ 
ner, at half past two, was ordered to cross. Sedgwick’s division in the ad¬ 
vance pressed over the shaking bridge. The artillery was dragged with 
difficulty through the swamp on the other side. Sumner, with this division, 
guided by the sound of the firing, pushed on to Fair Oaks Station, where he 
arrived just in time to fight the battle of Fair Oaks, which, although no one 


[June, 1862. 

then knew it, prevented that of Seven Pines from being an entire defeat for 
the Union forces. At Fair Oaks Station he met Couch, who told him that 
he had been separated from the rest of the army, and was momently expect¬ 
ing an attack. Sumner took the command, and hastily formed Sedgwick’s 
division and Couch's few regiments along the north side of the railroad 
from the station eastward. The formation was incomplete, when, at five 
o’clock, the enemy opened a furious attack upon his centre, hoping to get 
possession of the battery of artillery which had been posted there. 

This Confederate force was composed of G. IV. Smith’s division, which 
had for eight hours remained idle at its post where the Nine-mile road 
joined that leading to New Bridge. Johnston had taken his place here, and 
Jefferson Davis had come out to witness the fight. This division had taken 
its post at eight o’clock in the morning. For three hours, from one till four, 
Johnston was utterly unaware that a battle had been going on scarcely four 
miles away. 1 At four o’clock Johnston ordered Smith to move, and in an 
hour he had begun a hot attack upon Sumner’s line. The early twilight 
was just closing in, when Sumner, who had sustained a heavy fire, charged 
with six regiments directly into the woods, and hurled the enemy back in 
confusion. At this moment Johnston was struck by a fragment of a shell, 
severely wounded, and borne from the field. Night closed the battle of 
Fair Oaks, as it closed at almost the same moment that of the Seven Pines. 

Just then Richardson’s division of Sumner’s corps came upon the field, 
lie had begun to cross the Chickahominy by “Sumner’s lower bridge,” 
which was nearest to his own camp; but before his division was half over, 
the rising waters made this bridge impassable, and two brigades, with all 
the artillery, had to cross by the upper bridge, over which Sedgwick had 
crossed. When this division came up, it was posted along the railroad to 
the left of Sedgwick, connecting this with Birney’s brigade of Heintzelman’s 
corps, which had been scut in that direction, but had halted, without having 
taken part in the fight.* The two forces bivouacked in the field, their pick¬ 
et lines being within speaking distance. 

The disabling of Johnston left the Confederates with an incompetent 
leader. Smith, who succeeded to the command, appears to have gone ovet 
to the Seven Pines, but found the forces there in no condition to renew their 
attack here on the next morning. 3 But the attack was fiercely renewed on 

1 Wc here follow Johnston’s notation of time, as it relates to matters that came under his per¬ 
sonal observation. He says; “ I had placed myself on the left of the force employed in this at¬ 
tack, with the division of General Smith, that I might be on a part of the field where I could ob¬ 
serve and be ready to meet any counter-movement which the enemy’s general might make against 
onr centre or left. Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, the sound of the mus¬ 
ketry did not reach us. I consequently deferred giving the signal for General Smith’s advance 
until four o’clock, at which time Major Jasper Whiting, of General Smith’s staff, whom I had sent 
to learn the state of affairs with General Longstrect’s column, returned, reporting that it was press¬ 
ing on with vigor. . . . Smith’s division moved forward at four o’clock, General Whiting’s 

three brigades leading. Their progress was impeded by the enemy’s skirmishers, which, with 
their supports, were driven back to the railroad. At this point Whiting’s Own and Pettigrew’s 
brigades engaged a superior force of the enemy. Hood’s, by my orders, moved on to co-operate 
with Longstreet. General Smith was desired to hasten up with nil the troops within reach. He 
brought up Hampton’s and Hatton’s brigades in a few minutes. The strength of the enemy’s po¬ 
sition, however, enabled him to hold it until dark. About sunset, being struck from my horse, se¬ 
verely wounded, by a fragment of a shell, I was carried from the field, and Major General G. W. 
Smith succeeded to the command.” 

3 Birney was put under arrest by Heintzelman, and brought before a court-martial on charge 
of disobedience of orders in having halted his brigade. He was honorably acquitted, it being 
shown that he had obeyed orders received from Kearney, his immediate commander. His bri¬ 
gade, then commanded by Colonel Hobart Ward, did good sendee in the action of the following 
day. 

3 Thus only can wc explain Johnston’s statement that “General Smith, who succeeded to the 
command, was prevented from resuming his attack on the enemy’s position next morning by the 
discovery of strong intrcnchments not seen on the previous evening.” He indeed adds: “Smith’s 
division bivouacked on the night of the 31st within musket-shof of the intrenchments which they 
wore attacking when darkness stayed the conflict.” But there were no intrcnchments near Fair 
Oaks Station, where Smith’s attack upon Sumner was made. Johnston represents the sharp fight¬ 
ing on the railroad next day merely as a demonstration upon two of the Confederate brigades, 
which was repelled. But he was clearly misinformed as to the character of this action. The con- 



BDW1N V. 8CMNOL 





bEAHCHING FOB THE DEAD AND WOUNDED. 


June, 1862.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


353 


































354 


[June, 1862. 



PICKETS IN TUE WOODS. 


the right, near Fair Oaks Station. The Confederates advanced down the 
railroad—avoiding Sedgwick’s division, which had fought the previous day, 
and was still held to the right by Sumner in position at Fair Oaks—and 
fell upon Richardson’s division, which formed the centre. The attack, re¬ 
pulsed at one point, was renewed at another, but without success, Richard¬ 
son’s line, supported by artillery, standing firm. 

Meanwhile Hooker had come up from the left, making for the heaviest 
fire, for the ground was so densely wooded that the position of the combat¬ 
ants could not be seen. He found Birney’s brigade, now commanded by 
Ward, drawn up in line of battle, and with this force fell upon the enemy’s 
rear, and, after an hour’s hard fighting, pushed them from the woods by 
which they were sheltered. He then ordered a bayonet charge. The en¬ 
emy broke and fled toward Richmond. Almost at the same moment Rich¬ 
ardson’s whole line, farther to the right, advanced, pouring in its fire at close 
range, following up the advantage by a bayonet charge, which put the en¬ 
emy to flight. The line of retreat followed by the Confederates took them 
from the railroad to the Williamsburg road, where the forces who had the 
day before gained the battle of Seven Pines still held the direct way to 
Richmond, and the whole force moved back, utterly foiled in the object for 
which the attack had been made. The Union force was too much scattered 
to venture a pursuit. * 1 

The battle of Sunday, June 1st, began at seven in the morning, and was 
over at eleven. At noon McClellan came upon the field at Fair Oaks, but 
he had no orders to give; he was quite satisfied with what had been done. 2 
On the next day the Union forces assumed the position at Fair Oaks Farm 
which they hail held before the battle. Sumner also retained his position 
at Fair Oaks Station, strengthening it by earthworks. The losses in killed 
and wounded in these two battles were nearly equal. That of the Confed¬ 
erates was 4233; that of the Union, 4517, of whom 890 were killed; there 
were also 1222 missing, three quarters of them from Keyes’s corps. 3 The 

current Accounts of nil the Union generals show that it was n serious attack by Smith’s entire di¬ 
vision, which was effectually repulsed.—See Richardson’s Letier, Reb. Roc., v., 87; Sumner’s Tes¬ 
timony, Com. Rep., 363; Hooker’s Testimony, ibid-, 578 ; McC- Rep., 220 ; De Joinville, 77. 

1 Heintzelman gave orders to pursue, but countermanded them at the urgent request of Kear- 
nev, who said it was better to let well enough alone, and that McClellan would order a general 
advance in a few days. Next day he learned that the Confederates had retreated in confusion, 
and sent Hooker forward, who penetrated to within less than four miles of Richmond. He was 
then stopped by order of McClellan, and directed to establish his command on the ground occu¬ 
pied before the battle by Casey’s division at Fair Oaks Farm.— Com. Rep., 352, 578. 

3 Sumner’s Testimony, Com. Rep., 363. 

3 These are the official statements. McClellan’s report of his loss is: 

Cmrjm. Kill'd. Wounded. Missing. 

General Sumner’s. 183 - 804 .... 146 

*» llelntzelman’s. 259 .... 980 .... 155 

»* Keyes’s. 448 .... 1753 .... _92l 

890 3627 1222 

Johnston does not distinguish between killed aud wounded. lie says : 

Longstreet reports the loss in his command at being about. 3000 

Smith reports his loss at. 1233 

4233 


Confederate attack was well conceived, and, bad it been carried out accord¬ 
ing to Johnston's plan, would Hardly have failed of success. If Huger had 
come down upon the left at any time, or if Smith had moved only an hour 
earlier from the right, Heintzeiman and Keyes must have been utterly 
crushed. Or had the full flood of the Chiekahominy come down, as was 
expected, four hours before instead of four hours after noon, Sumner could 
not have crossed, and the Union forces on the south side of the river would 
have been annihilated in plain sight of the whole army on the opposite bank, 
utterly powerless to give any aid. 

As it was, the blow bad utterly failed, and the Confederate force hurried 
back to Richmond broken and dispirited. Had McClellan known how ut¬ 
terly broken it was, be might have marched straight on to Richmond on 
the 1st of June. 1 The city itself and its approaches were then utterly un¬ 
fortified. Even McClellan was convinced, only six days before, that the 
Richmond intrenchments were not formidable. 2 There was, indeed, nothing 
between him and Richmond except the six miles of space, a few rifle-pits 
and sand-works not mounted with artillery, and the disjointed fragments of 
a defeated army. The formidable works which in a few days crowned ev¬ 
ery hillock and swept every road were hardly begun. They were the work 
of Lee, constructed at a later date. Hooker saw nothing of them when he 

McClellan indeed says ( Rep., 221), “General J. E. Johnston reports the loss of the enemy in 
Longstreet’s and Smiib’s divisions at 4283; General 1>. II. Hill, who had taken the advance in 
the attack, estimates his loss at 2500, which would give the enemy’s loss 6783.” But Hill's divi¬ 
sion was included in Longstreet’s “command,” and his loss forms a part of Longstreet’s. There 
is, indeed, reason to suspect that the Confederate loss is understated bv Johnston. Hurlbert, the 
translator of De Joinville, who was at the time detained in Richmond under surveillance, says: 
“There were published in the Richmond papers detailed brigade and regimental reports of the 
losses in sixty out of seventy-two organizations, regiments, battalions, and companies mentioned 
as taking part in the engagements. I computed these, losses as they were published. The sum 
total was 6733, killed, wounded, and missing.” Correcting a probable misprint (6233 for 6283), 
this is within one of McClellan’s statement of the Confederate loss, purporting to be taken from 
Johnston’s Report. It is to bo noted, however, that the 2500 loss ascribed to Hill’s division make 
just the difference between the two statements (4233 and C733). It might he supposed that some 
one, seeing these two statements, and finding in Johnston’s Report no separate mention of Hill, 
whose loss must have been large, his division doing most of the fighting on the first day, assumed 
this number in order to make the accounts coincide, and that McClellan hastily adopted the state¬ 
ment without verifying it by Johnston’s Report. From the nature of the actions, the Confeder¬ 
ates charging intrenchments, and being exposed to artillery, while they brought none into the 
field, their loss might be presumed to he in excess. We, however, admit Johnston’s statement 
into the text. 

1 Hurlbert (Appendix to Do Joinville, 1 12) says: “ They were in a perfect chaos of brigades and 
regiments. The roads to Richmond were literally crowded with stragglers, some throwing away 
their guns, some breaking them on the trees — all with the same story, that their regiment had 
been ‘ cut to pieces,’ that the 4 Yankees were swarming on the Chiekahominy like bees, and fight¬ 
ing like devils.’ In two days of the succeeding week the provost-marshal's guard collected be¬ 
tween 4000 and 5000 stragglers, and sent them into camp. What had become of the command 
of the army no one knew. By some persons it was reported that Major General Gustavus W. 

Smith had succeeded Johnston ; by others, that President Davis had taken the reins of the army. 
General Johnston himself was reported to be cither actually dead or dying. . . . Had I been 

aware on that day of the actual state of things upon the field, I might easily have driven in a car¬ 

riage through the Confederate lines directly into our own camps. It was not, indeed, till several 
days after the battle that any thing’like military order was restored throughout the Confederate 
positions.” * McC- Rep-, 204. 





































































*AIR OAKS FARM.—BURYING THE DEAD AND BURNING THE HORSES 


June, 1862.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


355 





































































356 


[June, 1862 



PICKET GUARD ON TOE CUICKAliOMINY. 


advanced within three and a half miles of Richmond. Had it been found 
inexpedient to endeavor to march into Richmond, there was nothing to pre¬ 
vent the Union lines from being advanced fully a mile and a half, clear be¬ 
yond the woody belt which had sheltered the Confederates. Richmond 
would then have been within shelling distance. McClellan seems never to 
have imagined the possibility of an advance by his left wing, which then 
comprised three of his five corps. He simply said that he could not at once 
throw his whole army across the Chickahominy, and pronounced the idea 
of then marching upon Richmond as too absurd to be entertained by any 
one. But his ablest officers, who had met the enemy at Seven Pines and 
Fair Oaks, were of a different opinion. 1 

The Chickahominy continued to rise slowly but continuously all through 
Sunday, June 1st, though the rain had ceased. Many supposed that its up¬ 
per waters had been dammed, and that the sluices had been opened. All 
the bridges, except the railroad bridge, were swept away or their approaches 
submerged. For several days the railroad bridge was the only communi¬ 
cation between the two wings of the arm}', and that was made passable only 
by planks laid between the rails. 2 To build new bridges high above the wa¬ 
ter seemed to McClellan the work of the time. He kept up, however, a 
brisk correspondence with the government at Washington, the main topics 
being the weather, and what he was going to do when the weather should 
permit. 3 The weather was certainly unpropitious. Never, within the mem¬ 

1 After having shown (see ante, p. 348, Note *) the utterly isolated position of the two wings of 
his army, he proceeds: “The idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vig¬ 
orous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only 
five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a mo¬ 
ment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance, 
involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy, would have exposed 
each to defeat !n detail. Therefore I held the position already gained, and completed our cross¬ 
ings as soon as possible.”— (AftC. Rep., 223.) But Keyes testified: “I think McClellan should 
have pushed right on after the battle of Fair Oaks. I do not know why he did not cross and at¬ 
tack, and win the battle. I think, if he had possessed the great quality of an energetic general, we 
should have taken Richmond."— (Com. Rep., 445.) Sumner testified: “When the enemy had 
retreated after the battle of Fair Oaks I know of no military reason for not immediately follow¬ 
ing them up to Richmond; and from information which we afterward received, I do believe that 
if the general had crossed the Chickahominy with the residue of the annv, and made a general 
attack with his whole force, we could have carried Richmond. . . . If we had attacked with 

our whole force, we should have swept every tiling before us ; and I think the majority of the offi¬ 
cers who were there think so now.”— (Ibid., 3GG.) Keyes testified : “I am not able to state why 
the enemy were not pursued; but it is my opinion that if they had been vigorouslv pursued bv all 
the forces available for the pursuit, our army might have gone into Richmond.”—( Ibid ., 609.) 
Hooker was asked, “ Suppose that, the next day after the repulse of the enemy at Fair Oaks, Gen¬ 
eral McClellan had brought his whole army across the Chickahominy, ami made a vigorous 
movement upon Richmond, in your judgment, as a military man, what would have been the effect 
of that movement ?" He replied, “ In answer to that, I would say, that at no lime during the whole 
campaign did I feel that we could not go to Richmond.”— (Ibid., 579.) Hooker had, the day after 
the battle, advanced a mile or more toward Richmond heyond Fair Oaks Farm, meeting no resist¬ 
ance except a little picket-firing, when he was recalled by a telegram to the effect that he should 
“return from his brilliant rcconnoissance : we can not afford to lose his division.” “I had no 
expectation,” he said, “of being lost.” — (Ibid., 578.) * Art. Op., 26. 

3 June 2. “ Our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross 
with the rest of the force, and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a 


ory of the oldest inhabitant, had there been on the Peninsula such a rainy 
season as this. 

McDowell was now, for the third time, ordered to join McClellan. He 
wrote from Manassas to McClellan joyfully announcing the fact. McCall’s 
division was to go by water, the remainder of the corps by land. He him¬ 
self, with the remainder, would be with him in ten days by way of Freder¬ 
icksburg. This was on the 10th of June. Two days after, he wrote that 
McCall was on the way, but circumstances would prevent him from coming 
with the other troops at the time promised; but he asked that McCall’s di¬ 
vision should be so placed as to join the remainder of his corps when they 
arrived. McClellan had all along been jealous of McDowell. He wrote to 
the President intimating that McDowell was willing that the general inter¬ 
ests should be sacrificed to increase his own command. He wished no 
troops not under his full control, but would prefer to fight the battle with 
what he had, and leave others responsible for the result.* McCall’s division 

very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe" [he had 
just been officially informed that Wool’s deportment had been merged into his own, General Dix 
there replacing Wool, who was sent to Fort McHenry, near Baltimore]. “But the morale of my 
troops is now such that I can venture much, and do not fear for odds against me. The victory is 
complete, and all credit is due to our officers and men.”— (Coin, Reji., 333.) June 2. “Our left 
is every where advanced considerably beyond the positions it occupied before the bnitlc.” [This is 
erroneous. The left never occupied a position on the Williamsburg road in advance of Fair Oaks 
Farm ; and Fair Oaks Station, where Sumner posted himself, was no nearer Richmond.] “ I am 
in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to cross the right. We 
have had a terrible time with our communications, bridges and causeways, built with great care, 
having been washed away with the fieshet. All that human labor can do is being done to ac¬ 
complish our purpose.” June 3. “The Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my 
way ;m several days. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be, to protect the com¬ 
munications across it. Nothing of importance except that it is again raining.” June 4. “Ter¬ 
rible rain-storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared off; bridges in bad condition, 
and still hard at work upon them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the 
corps on ihc right bank, but I can not re-enforce them from here until my bridges are all safe, ns 
my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as 
they may probably attempt. I have to be very cautions now.” June 5. “Rained most of the 
night—has now ceased, but it is not clear. The river is still high and troublesome. Enemy 
opened with several batteries on our bridges near here this morning; our batteries seem to have 
pretty much silenced th<*m, though some firing is still kept up. The rain forces us to remain in 
statu quo." June 7. “The Chickahominy has risen so as to flood the entire bottom to the depth 
of three and four feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this; and the men are work¬ 
ing night and day, up to their waists in water, to complete them. The whole face of the countrv 
is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow 
roads, which renders any movement either of this or the rebel army utterly out of the question un¬ 
til we have more favorable weather. I am glad you are pressing forward re-enforcements so vig¬ 
orously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall 
reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets 
about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets and securing a very advantageous position.” [It 
is hard to see in.what direction the pickets were advanced a mile: certainly not toward Rich¬ 
mond.] June 10 (much abridged). “I have information, not reliable, that Beauregard has ar¬ 
rived. I am completely checked by the weather; the Chickahominy is in a dreadful state; we 
have another rnin-«tortn on our hands. I shall attack ns soon ns weather and ground will per¬ 
mit ; but there will he a delay. I suggest that large detachments should be sent from Halleck’a 
army to strengthen this. I will attack whenever the weather permits.”— (MrC. Iiep., 224-230.) 

* McDow’ell to McClellan —June 10: “For the third time I am ordered to join you, and 
hope this time to get through. In view of the remarks made with reference to my leaving you 
and not joining you before by your friends, and something I have heard as coming from you on 
































































Jone, 1862.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


357 



woonuDRY AND alexanukr's i.ridge 


arrived on the 12th and 13th. They were posted on the extreme right, the 
point nearest to Fredericksburg. A few new regiments, seven in all, were 
sent from Baltimore and elsewhere to Fortress Monroe, and a like number 
of older ones were sent thence to the Chickahominy. * 1 McClellan moved 
his head-quarters across the Chickahominy on the 13th. By the 20th the 
bridges over the Chickahominy were measurably finished—in all eleven, of 
which seven were practically of use : Bottom’s Bridge; the Railroad Bridge, 
the means of bringing up most of the supplies to the left wing; the Foot 
Bridge, on the shortest line between the two wings, “available for infantry' 
under certain circumstances;” Duane’s Bridge, “practicable for all arms;” 
Woodbury’s Infantry Bridge, “available for infantry;” Woodbury and 
Alexander’s Bridge, “for all arms;” and Sumner’s upper bridge, or the 
Grapevine Bridge, the one over which Sumner had crossed to win the bat¬ 
tle of Fair Oaks, “ in condition to be used in emergency by all arms.” 2 
Franklin’s corps was now passed over, leaving only Porter’s corps and 
McCall’s division on the north side. Earth-works were in the mean while 
thrown up along the entire front on the south side, in an irregular semicir¬ 
cle, from the edge of White Oak Swamp up to Fair Oaks Farm and Station, 
then down to the Chickahominy at Woodbury’s Bridge, five miles measured 
around the arc, and three along its chord formed by the river. The works 
were of no great strength, for the generals in command disapproved of them ; 
they thought they made the men timid. 3 There were half a dozen redoubts, 
each mounting six or eight guns, connected by infantry parapets of timber 
and earth, with a ditch in front. The redoubts had parapets ten or twelve 
feet thick, and some were provided with magazines; the connecting lines 
were three or four feet thick at top. 4 - 

On the 3d of June, two days after the battle of Fair Oaks, Robert E. Lee 
was appointed to the command of the Confederate army in Virginia. For 
almost two centuries the Lees had been among the “First Families of Vir¬ 
ginia.” A century ago, Thomas Lee, grandson of the first American Lee, 
and grandfather of Robert E. Lee, was President of the Council and acting 
governor of the province. He kept almost royal state at his residence in 
Strafford. 5 * * * 9 Three of the sons of Thomas Lee bore prominent parts in our 
Revolutionary struggle. Two of them, Richard Henry and Francis Lightfoot 
Lee, were among the signers of the Declaration of Independence: the for¬ 
mer, on the 7th of June, 1776, moved in the Continental Congress the fa¬ 

that subject, I wish to say I go with the greatest satisfaction, and hope to arrive with my main 
body in time to be of service. McCall goes in advance by water. I will be with you in ten days 
with the remainder, by Fredericksburg.” June 12. “The delay of General Banks to relieve the 
division of my command now in the Valley beyond the time calculated upon will prevent my 
joining you with the remainder of the troops I am to take below at as early a day ns I .named. 
My third division (McCall’s) is now on the way. Please to do me the favor so to place it that it 
may be in a position to join the others as they come down from Fredericksburg .”—{Raymonds 
Administration of President Lincoln , 247.) 

McClellan to the Secretary of War —June 14: . . It ought to be distinctly un¬ 

derstood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram 
from him requesting that McCall’s division might be placed so ns to join him immediately on bis 
arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be 
disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which 
I am now placed, General McDowell should wish the general good to be sacrificed for flic purpose 
of increasing his command If I can not fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but 
would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the result. . . .” 
—(.1 fcC. Rep., 232.) 

1 “On the 12th of June the 16th Massachusetts joined Hooker’s division. Several regiments 

arrived about that time. I got about 6000 men for my corps about that time.”—(Heintzolinan, in 

Com. Rep., 355.) ' 2 Art. Op ., 20,30. 221,222. 

3 “ I was never In favor of those field-works I think they have a tendency to make the men 

timid, and do more harm than good ; and I think the older officers of the army think so. For¬ 

merly it was a matter of army regulation not to throw up field-works, because it made the men 

timid.”—(Sumner’s Testimony, Com. Rep., 866. For the nature of these field-works, see Art. 

Op., 30, 31, with Plan No. 15.) 4 Art. Op ., 29, 30, and Plate 15. 

9 “There is no structure in our country to compare with it. The walls of the first storv are 
two and a half feet thick, and of the second story two feet, composed of brick imported from Eng¬ 
land. It originally contained about otic hundred rooms. Besides the main building, there arc 
four offices, one at each corner, containing fifteen rooms. The stables are capable of accommo¬ 
dating one hundred horses.”— -{Los sing's Field-book of the Revolution , ii., 217.) 


mous resolution that “These United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, 
free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to 
the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the 
State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally- dissolved.” Another son, 
the father of the Confederate general, was Henry- Lee—the famous cavalry 
commander “Legion Harry.” He was chosen by Congress to deliver the 
funeral oration on the death of Washington, in which occurs the phrase, 
“ First in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen.” He 
fell into pecuniary embarrassments, and died in 1818, leaving among other 
children Robert Edmund Lee, a boy of twelve. 1 

It was not hard for the son of “ Legion Harry” to gain admission to West 
Point, ne entered this national institution in 1825, and, after four years, 
graduated with the highest honors of his cla^s. It is recorded of him that 
“he never received a reprimand or had a mark of demerit against him.” 
For more than thirty years his military record was not merely stainless, but 
most honorable. During the war with Mexico he was with Scott as Chief 
of Engineers. He was, indeed, the favorite officer of that veteran command¬ 
er, and was mentioned with special honor in almost every one of his volu¬ 
minous dispatches. This war over, he became Superintendent at West 
Point; but after two years he left, having received a commission in the cav¬ 
alry. He served with honor in various quarters, fighting the Indians on 
the Texan frontier, and capturing John Brown at Harper’s Ferry. The 
outbreak of secession in 1860 found him again in. Texas, with the rank of 
colonel, but standing first on the list recommended for promotion to the 
rank of general. Thirty years before he bad married the daughter and 
heiress of Mr. Custis, the step-child and adopted son of Washington. 
Through her he had become the proprietor of Arlington House, on the 
Potomac, and other large estates, all connecting him directly with the wife 
of Washington. 

He was now fifty-five years old. For thirty-six years he had been in the 
military service of the United States. He bad time and again sworn the 
military oath, binding him by the strongest obligation known among men 
to loyalty to the nation. He had risen high in his profession, and the high¬ 
est rank in it was within his reach. To abandon the Union would peril 
every tiling: professional rank, private fortune, and, if secession failed, his 
good name among men. But he was a Virginian, and, according to the 
theory of his section, his primary allegiance was due to his state. If she 
broke away from the nation, he must go with her. He came to Washing¬ 
ton, and had a meeting with Scott, his old commander and friend. This 
was on the 18tb of April, 1861, the day succeeding that upon which the 
Virginia Act of Secession was passed. He considered himself bound, he 
said, not to retain his commission in the army. Scott urged him not to re¬ 
sign. “ I must,” said Lee; “ I can not consult my own feelings in the mat¬ 
ter.” Two days later he sent in his resignation, accompanying it with a 
pathetic letter, which breathed a hope that he might not yet be called to 
fight against the flag under which he had so long served. 2 The hope was 

1 General Charles Lee, dismissed from the Revolutionary nrmv for his conduct at and after the 
battle of Monmouth, and thenceforth the bitter enemy of Washington, has been strangely con¬ 
founded with “Legion Harry,” one of his most trusted officers during the war, and his intimato 
friend thereafter. Charles Lee was born in Wales, and was in no way connected with the Lees 
of Virginia. For a sketch of the last days of Charles Lee, see John Esten Cooke, in Harper's 
Magazine for September, 1858, p. 502. 

* Lee to Scott, April 20. 1861 : “Since my interview with you on the 18th instant, I have felt 
that I ought no longer to retain my commission in the army. I therefore tender my resignation, 
which I request you will recommend for acceptance. It would have been presented at once but 
for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service in which I have devoted all the 
best years of mv life, and all the ability I possessed. . . . Save in defense of my native state, 

I never desire again to draw my sword.” To his sister he wrote on the same day: “The wholo 
South is in n state of revolution, into which Virginia, after n long struggle, has been drawn ; and 
though I recognize no necessity for this state of things, and would have forlwnnc and pleaded 
to the end for redress of grievances, real or supjioscd, yet in my own person 1 had to meet tho 
question whether I should take part against my native state. With all my devotion to the Union, 
and the feeling of loyalty and duty of aD American citizen, I have not been able to make up my 
















358 


[June, 1862, 



BOUKBT B. LEE. 


futile. Lee soon found himself fighting with his state and against his na¬ 
tion, with what skill, and bravery, and ill-fortune is yet to be told. That 
very month, four years after, he surrendered the fragments of his great army 
to the successor of the man who had so vainly urged him against taking the 

fatal step. 

Three days after his resignation, 
Lee formally accepted from the State 
Convention the position of command¬ 
er of all the forces of Virginia, not yet 
one of the Confederate states, though 
soon to become one. The President 
of the Convention, in formally an¬ 
nouncing the appointment, amplified 
the famous sentence which the father 
of the general had uttered respecting 
the Father of the Union. Lee re¬ 
joined, reiterating that he should only 
fight in behalf of Virginia. * 1 

When the state forces of Virginia 
were merged into the army of the 
Confederacy Lee was appointed brig¬ 
adier general, but was still outranked by Cooper and A. S. Johnston, who 

mind to raise mv hand against my relatives, my children, and mv home. I have therefore re¬ 
signed my commission in the army, and, save in defense of my native state, with the sincere hope 
that my poor services may never be needed, X hope I may never be called on to draw my sword.” 
—(Southern General s, 3(1.) 

1 The President of the Convention said “You are at this day among the living citizens of 
Virginia, ‘First in War;’ we pray to God most fervently that you may so conduct the operations 
committed to your charge that it will soon be said of you that you arc ‘ First in Peace ,' and when 
that time comes, you will have earned the still prouder distinction of being 1 First in the hearts of 
yonr Countrymen.”' Lee replied: “I would have much preferred that your choice had fallen 


had held older commissions in the army of the United States. 1 His unsuc¬ 
cessful operations in Western Virginia have been already narrated. 2 He 
was then sent to superintend tte coast defenses in Georgia and South Caro¬ 
lina. When the Union forces began to menace Richmond, he was recalled 
to superintend the defenses of the Confederate capital. Randolph was 
nominally Secretary of War, but the actual functions of the office were per¬ 
formed by Lee. 

Little had been done to fortify Richmond before the battle of Fair Oaks. 
When Lee was appointed to the command he issued a stirring address to 
his troops. The army, he said, had made its last retreat, and henceforth its 
watchword must be “Victory or Death." He first set himself at work to 
surround the capital with defenses, while he awaited the arrival of new 
troops, and watched the developments of the plans of his opponent. By 
the time McClellan’s bridges were complete Richmond had become a fortified 
camp, and Lee thought himself in a condition to assume the offensive at a 
favorable moment. 3 To ascertain the precise position of the Federal right, 

upon an abler man. Trusting in Almighty God, an approving conscience, and the aid of my fel¬ 
low-citizens, I devote myself to the service of my native state, in whose behalf alone will I ever 
again draw my sword .”—(Southern Generals, 44.) 

1 Of Albert Sidney Johnston, killed at Shiloh, we have had occasion to speak (ante, p. 299, 300). 
We shall not henceforth have to speak of Samuel Cooper, and will here dismiss him in a brief 
note. He was born in the State of New York in 1798; was educated at West Point; rose by 
slow seniority until 1852, when we find him colonel and adjutant general. He married into the 
Mason family of Virginia, and became a Virginian by adoption. When secession occurred ho 
resigned his commission, offered himself to the Confederates, and was named adjutant general. 
Traitor to his state as well as to his nation, like Scmmes of the Alabama, it is notable that his last 
official act as Adjutant General of the United States was to affix his signature to the order by 
which Twiggs was “ dismissed from the army of the United States for his treachery to the flag of 
his country ” Cooper sent in his resignation on the 7th of March, 1861. It was accepted, but was 
to take effect from the 1st, the day when he signed the order for the dismissal of Twiggs. On the 

15th he was at Montgomery tendering his services to the Confederacy. He acted as Adjutant 
General of the Confederacy during the war .—(Southern Generals, 286-294.) 3 Ante, p. 144. 

3 “After the battle of Seven Pines, the Federal army,preparatory to an advance upon Rich¬ 
mond, proceeded to fortify its position on the Chickahominy. . . . The intention of the ex>> 



S AM CEL COOrElt. 

































BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF K1CUHOND AND VICINITY. 


June, 1802.] 


ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY. 


359 


























































































































360 



and the nature of its communications with its base of supplies on the York 
River, Stuart, with fifteen hundred cavalry, was sent to make a raid clear 
around the rear of the Union forces on the north bank of the Chickahomi- 
ny. He set out on the 13th of June, veiling his purpose by going first 
northward, in order to give the impression that his object was to re-enforce 
Jackson. Then turning sharply southeastward to Hanover Court-house, he 
found himself unexpectedly clear to the right and rear of the Federal lines. 
Thence he dashed toward the White House, destroying some depots of pro¬ 
visions, which were protected by scarcely a corporal’s guard, and turned 
southwestward to the Chickahominy, which he reached at midnight of the 
14th, some miles below Bottom’s Bridge. Here he found the ruins of an 
old bridge, from which a temporary foot-bridge was constructed, over which 
the men crossed, the horses swimming the stream. Only a single man was 
lost by Stuart in this daring expedition. He brought with him a hundred 
and sixty-five prisoners, and more than twice as many horses. * 1 McClellan 
saw in this exploit only a raid productive of no important result. 2 But the 
real result was of immense moment. It showed that McClellan’s communi¬ 
cations were utterly unprotected, and that he was open to a blow on this 
vital point. Lee at once directed Jackson to move rapidly down from the 
upper valley of the Shenandoah, and join him upon the north side of the 
Chickahominy, where his main force would be at the appointed time. To 
mask this movement, Whiting’s division was ostentatiously dispatched in 
the direction of Jackson, apparently with the design of strengthening him 
for a movement toward Washington. 3 The ruse succeeded. The move¬ 
ment was hardly made when it was known to McClellan and at Washing¬ 
ton. The President saw in it a weakening of the Confederate force at Rich¬ 
mond equivalent to a corresponding strengthening of McClellan. The gen¬ 
eral saw in it an illustration of the strength and confidence of the enemy 
opposed to him. Lincoln wished to know when McClellan would attack; 
McClellan replied that the attack would be made “ after to-morrow, as soon 
as Providence will permit.” 4 

emv seemed to be to attack Richmond by regular approaches. The strength of his left wing ren¬ 
dered a direct assault injudicious, if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to construct 
defensive lines, so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free 
to cross the Chickahominy and operate on the north hank. By sweeping down the river on that 
side, and threatening his communications with York River, it was thought that the enemy would 
be compelled to retreat or give battle out of his intrenchments.”—( Lee's Rep., i., 5.) “The earth¬ 
works designed by Lee were of considerable magnitude, and were constructed in different shape, 
to suit the conformation of the ground. They swept all the roads, crowned every hillock, and 
mounds of red earth could be seen, in striking contrast with the rich green aspect of the landscape. 
Redoubts, rifle-pits, casemate-batteries, horn-works, and enfilading batteries were visible in great 
numbers in and out of the woods in all directions. Some were mounted with heavy siege-pieces 
of various calibre, but the majority were intended for field-guns.”—( Southern Generals , 52.) 

1 Stuart’s Report, Reb. Rec., v., 192. 

3 “The burning of two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen government wagons, the de¬ 
struction of some sutlers’ stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick’s 
Landing, and some little damage done atTunstall’s Station, and a little €clal, were the precise re¬ 
sults of this expedition.”— McC. Rep., 231. 3 Lee's Rep., i., 5, 6, 60. 

* “ Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been re-enforced by about ten thou¬ 
sand from Richmond, is confirmed. ... If this be true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to 
you of equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can at¬ 
tack Richmond.”—(Lincoln to McClellan, June 18.) “Our army is well over the Chickahomi¬ 
ny .. . the rebel lines run within musket range of ours. Each has heavy supports at hand. 

STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY IN \ 

General J. E. Johnston, at the request of the writer of this History, furnishes the following au¬ 
thentic statement of the force under his command during this period: 

“January 3d, 1866. 

“In September, 1861, the effective strength of the army under my command in Northern Virgin¬ 
ia was about 37,000. It occupied Leesburg, Centreville and Manassas, and the Lower Occoquan. 

“On the 31st of December it had been increased, by improved health and the addition of Lor- 
ing’s and Holmes’s troops, to 54,000, including Jackson’s command. Jackson’s 8000 were near 
Winchester and Romney. There were 2600 at Leesburg; 3*1,800 at Centreville and Manassas; 
7000 on tne Lower Occoquan and near Dumfries; and 5000 about Fredericksburg. This army 
was much reduced during the winter by the effect of what we called the 4 Bounty and Furlough 
Law,’ but received some recruits from the South in the early spring. When, in April, it moved 
to Williamsburg, its strength (effective) was about 50,000, of which 6000 were left with Jackson 
In the Valley, and 6000 with Ewell, on the Rappahannock. 


[June, 1862. 

Jackson commenced his march to join Lee on the 17th. It was expected 
that he would be at Ashland, fifteen miles from the extreme right of the 
Federal line, on the 24th. Up to this time McClellan believed him to be at 
Gordonsville, seventy miles away. Reports, industriously circulated so as 
to reach Washington, placed him every where: at Gordonsville, at Port 
Republic, at Harrisonburg, at Luray, and even at New Creek—a hundred 
or a hundred and fifty miles from his real position. Some informants said 
that he was moving toward Richmond; others that he was to march upon 
Washington and Baltimore as soon as McClellan should attack Richmond. 
The President believed that these reports were mere blinds, and suspected 
that the real movement was toward Richmond, as it proved to be. 1 

Picket-firing and desultory skirmishing with artillery had been going on 
all along at intervals. On the 25th, the “bridges and intrenchments being 
at last completed, an advance of our picket-line on the left was ordered, 
preparatory to a general forward movement.” The object was to ascertain 
the nature of the ground beyond a belt of swampy woods half a mile in 
front of Fair Oaks Farm. The attempt was vigorously opposed, and a 
desultory fight occurred, lasting from eight in the morning to five in the 
afternoon : “ not a battle, but merely an affair of Heintzelman’s corps, sup¬ 
ported by Keyes,” with some aid from Sumner. According to McClellan, 
his point was fully gained. The Confederates give a different report of the 
“ affair.” As events happened, it matters little whether or not a few' hund¬ 
red yards were here won. The “forward movement” for which it was pre¬ 
paratory was made the next day, but by Lee, not by McClellan. 2 

At five o’clock McClellan telegraphed to Washington that the “affair is 
over, and we have gained our point fully ... all is now quiet.” An 
hour and a half later another dispatch from him went over the wires. It 
said that Jackson’s advance was at Hanover Court-house; Beauregard was 
at Richmond; there were 200,000 men opposed to him; he should proba¬ 
bly be attacked next day; he would do all he could, and, if his army was 
destroyed by overwhelming numbers, he could at least die with it, and share 
its fate; if the result of the coming action was disaster, he was not responsi¬ 
ble; there was no use of again asking for re-enforcements. 3 

There were, indeed, some errors in this dispatch. None of Beauregard’s 
army had come to Richmond. Instead of 200,000, the Confederates had 
barely half as many effective men; instead of “having to contend with 
vastly superior odds,” McClellan’s army was somewhat in excess of the en¬ 
emy. Beauregard was at a quiet watering-place in Alabama, because his 
“ physicians urgently recommended rest and recreation.” These physicians 
were apparently none other than Jefferson Davis and his chief adviser Ben¬ 
jamin, who, to say nothing of old grudges dating as far back as Bull Run, 
were displeased with his abandonment of Corinth. 4 But the essential part 
was true. Jackson, for once a day behind his time, was near Hanover 
Court-house, with not merely his advance, but with his whole force. He 
himself had been that day at Richmond, where a general council of war 
was held, at which the plan of attack for the next day was settled ; 5 and 
two hours before the dawn of the next morning six divisions of the Confed¬ 
erate army would be on their march beyond the Chickahominy, to fall upon 
the Union right, not half their number, isolated on the north side of the 
stream. 6 

A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or 
less decisive. . They have certainly great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand 
men have left Richmond to re-enforce Jac kson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After 
to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only 
a favorable condition of earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries.”— 
(McClellan to Lincoln, same day, Com. Rep., 336, 337.) 

1 McC. Rep., 235, 236. 

3 This “affair” is named by the Confederates the Battle of King’s School-house. Its actual re¬ 
sults appear to be that the Federals lost about 600 men—516, not including Palmer’s brigade, as 
stated by McClellan ; the Confederates, probably, not quite as many. McClellan says (Rep., 236, 
237): “ Our object was fully accomplished ; the enemy was driven from his camps.” Wright, who 
commanded the Confederate centre, says (Lee's Rep., i., 386): “When the fight ceased at dark, 

I occupied the very line my pickets had been driven from in the morning, and which I continued 
to hold until the total rout of the Federal army on the 29th.” Lee says (Rep., i., 6): “The ene¬ 
my attacked on the Williamsburg road. The effort was successfully resisted, and our line main¬ 
tained.” 

3 “Several contrabands just in give information confirming supposition that Jackson’s advance 
is at or near Hanover Court-house, and that Beauregard arrived with strong re-enforcements in 
Richmond yesterday. 

“I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 
(200,000) two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend 
against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of 
men to hold their position and repulse any attack. 

“I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I 
have not failed to represent, repeatedly, the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the deci¬ 
sive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I 
will do all that a general can do with the splendid nrmy I have the honor to command, and if it 
is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate. 

“But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, 
is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. 
Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in re¬ 
gard to Jackson’s movements and Beauregard’s arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, 
and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel 
that there is no use in my again asking for re-enforcements.”— McC. Rep., 238. 

4 Southern Generals , 237.—After the evacuation of Corinth, May 30th, “ Mr. Davis telegraphed 
to General Bragg to assume permanent command. General Beauregard was thus laid on the 
shelf, not to be reinstated, as Mr. Davis passionately declared, though the whole world should 
urge him to that measure.”—(General Jordan, Beauregard’s Chief of Staff, in Harper's Magazine 
for October, 1865.) For some of the grounds of the old dispute between Davis and Beauregard, 
see ibid. ; also Southern Generals, 223-225. 

• Pollard, ii., 311. • Lee's Rep., i., 122, 126, 173. 

RGINIA FROM SEPTEMBER, 1861, TO JUNE, 1862. 

“ The remaining 38,000 were sent to the position near Yorktown in two bodies. I accompanied 
the second, which arrived on the 17th of April. Magruder’s own force was about 15,000, making 
our army at Yorktown near 53,000, exclusive of cavalry. Sickness and the fight at Williamsburg 
reduced this number by 6000. Our loss at Williamsburg was about 1800. 

“ According to the above numbers, the strength of this army, when it reached the neighborhood 
of Richmond, was about 47,000. To this were added, near the end of May, Anderson’s and 
Branch’s troops—about 13,000—and three brigades of Huger’s division—not quite 7000. If the 
effect of sickness is not considered, this would make the army amount to 67,000 at the time of the 
fights at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. On that occasion, four brigades of G. W. Smith’s division 
were engaged at Fair Oaks; and at Seven Pines, D. II. Hill’s four, and two of Longstreet’s, were 
engaged on the 31st of May. On the morning of June 1st there were nine Confederate brigades 
at Fair Oaks, five of them fresh, and thirteen at Seven Pines, seven of them fresh —that is to 
say, which had not been engaged the day before.” 











June, 1862.] 


FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


361 



C.VMI* LEE, URAD quabtebs, neab rioumo.nd. 


CHAPTER XX. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 

III. FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 

Plans of Operations.—The Strength of the Armies.—Lee’s General Order.— Battle of Mechanics, 
villa, or Beaver Dam Creek: The March from Richmond.—The Federal Position.—The At¬ 
tack upon the Right.—The Attack upon the Left.—Repulse of the Confederates.—McClellan’s 
Plans.—Change of Base resolved upon.— Buttle of Cold Harbor, or Gaines's Mill • The Federals 
fall back.—The new Position.—Advance of the Confederates.—The Assault by A. P. Hill.—Its 
Repulse. — General Assault by Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Jackson.—Porter hard pressed.— 
Slocum re-enforces him.—The Union Line broken.—Ineffectual Cavalry Charge.—Batteries 
captured.—Arrival of French and Meagher.—The Pursuit checked.—The Federals cross the 
Chickahominy.—Operations on the right Bank.—The Fight at Golding’s Farm.—Tlte Council 
of War.—McClellan’s Letter to the Secretary of War.—Results of the Battle.—Peril of Rich¬ 
mond.—The Change of Base.—Topography of the Region.—The Federal Retreat.—Lee’s Em¬ 
barrassment.—Stuart at, the White House.—The Confederate Pursuit.—Skirmish at Price’s 
Farm. — Battle of Savage's Station . 'Heintzelman’s unauthorized Retreat. — Destruction of 
Stores.—Magruder’s Attack.—The Retreat continued.— Battle of Frazier's Farm, or Charles 
City Cross Roads: The Confederate Pursuit.—Lee’s Plan of Operations.—Why it failed.— 
Holmes’s and Wise’s Movements.—The Federal Position.—Longstreet’s Attack.—McCall’s 
Defense.—The Fight in the Woods.—Hooker’s and Kearney's Divisions.—A. P. Hill’s Attack. 
—Gains Ground.—Is repulsed.—Close of the Action.—The Result.—McCall’s Division.— Bat¬ 
tle of Malvern Hill: The Federal Position.—Repulse of D. H. Hill in the Morning.—Lee’s Or¬ 
der.—Magruder and D. H. Hill attack in the Afternoon.—The Battle as seen from both Sides. 
—The Confederates repulsed.—Condition of their Force.—McClellan retreats to Harrison’s 
Landing.—Errors in this Campaign.—Lee’s first Error should have been fatal.—McClellan’s 
Error at Cold Harbor.—His Failure to attack Richmond.—His general Failure as a Command¬ 
er.—Absent at all important Moments.—Lee’s second strategical Error.—Position and Move¬ 
ments during the six Days.—Lee’s Error at Malvern.—McClellan’s last Error.—Jackson in the 
Battles.—General Review of the Subject.—The Losses in these Battles. 

T HURSDAY, June 26th, had been fixed upon by both McClellan and Lee 
as the day when each was to commence an offensive movement. 
Neither was aware of the intention, and each was deceived as to the object 
and position of the other. Lee presumed that McClellan intended to lay 
siege to Richmond by regular approaches. The city was in no condition 
to sustain a prolonged and close investment. It was not provisioned for a 
fortnight in advance, and its line of supply was liable to be interrupted at 
any moment. His object was simply to raise the siege. This he proposed 
to do by assailing McClellan at the point where he himself was most vul¬ 
nerable: by threatening his line of communications with the York River, 
whence, as Stuart’s raid had shown, his supplies were wholly drawn. 
McClellan’s purpose was to attack Richmond by direct assault. * 1 

The armies by which these two plans were to be carried out were almost 
equal in number, character of troops, and equipment. Each consisted of a 
little more than 100,000 effective men, present for duty. Making every al¬ 
lowance for defective reports on either side, the difference could not have 
been more than 5000. In a contest between forces so nearly balanced, the 
victory would rest with that which was most ably commanded. The gen¬ 
eral who made the fewest errors would win. 2 3 

1 “The intention of the enemy seemed to be to attack Richmond by regular approaches. By 
sweeping down the Chickahominy on the north side, and threatening his communications with 
York River, it was thought that the enemy would he compelled to retreat or give battle out of his 
intrenchments.”— {Lee's Rep., i., 5.) “On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last 
completed, an advance of our picket line on the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward 
movement.” “On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, 
the enemy attacked our right, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications 
and depots of supply.”— (McC. Rep., 236, 239.) 

3 The strength of McClellan’s force at this time is fixed within a few hundreds by official evi¬ 
dence. McClellan ( Report , 53) states its numbers (from which should properly be deducted 1101 
men with Colonel Ingalls, Quartermaster, at the White House) on the 20th of June to have been, 
“Officers and men, present for duty, 105,825.” This is exclusive of Dix’s Corps of 10,000 at 
Fortress Monroe, which was too far removed to take any part in the operations. The Report of 




CONSCBin OFFICE, CAMP LEE. 


Lee’s plan of operations was carefully elaborated by himself and Jeffer¬ 
son Davis, and carried into execution under the eye and by the direction 
of both, who were on the field, and under fire at the most decisive points. 
A chance shot might at any moment, by killing either, have changed the 
whole course of the war. 1 

The whole scheme of operations was set forth on the 24th, in an elabo¬ 
rate General Order from Lee, in which the movements of each division were 
carefully prescribed. A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill, with 34,000 
men, were to march from before Richmond, cross the Chickahominy above 
the extreme right of the Union lines, and join Jackson, who, with 30,000, 
was coming down from the north. Half of the cavalry were also to cross 
the Chickahominy. On the' south side of the river were left only Huger’s 
and Magruder’s divisions, numbering 24.000, and the reserve artillery and 
the remaining cavalry, about 3000 in all, making less than 30,000 men of 
all arms on that side. 2 This plan involved one error, which should have 

McClellan’s adjutant general of the same day (Com. Reji. 337) gives the apportionment of this 
force. From this number should be deducted the losses by casualty and sickness for the week be¬ 
tween the 20th and the 26th. These, including the 600 killed and wounded in the “affair” of 
the 25th, could not vary greatly from 1500. 

The Confederate force consisted of the divisions of Huger, Magruder, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, 
and D. H. Hill,the reserve artillery of Pendleton, and Stuart’s cavalry, in front of Richmond ; and 
Jackson’s command, comprising the three divisions of himself, Ewell, and Whiting, coming down 
from the Valley of the Shenandoah. To these are to be added a portion of Holmes’s division and 
Wise's brigade, brought over from the other side of the James River near the close of the opera¬ 
tions. A. P. Hill (Lee's Rep., i., 173), D. II. Hill (Ibid., i., 187), and Holmes (Ibid., i., 151) give 
the number of their force. Longstreet docs not state his, but four of his six brigade commanders 
(Ibid., i., 330, 331, 346, 353) give the number in their brigades, which enables us to fix very near¬ 
ly the strength of the whole division. Magruder (Ibid., i., 190) gives his, and (Ibid., i., 191, 202) 
enables us, in connection with the statements of two of his four brigade commanders (Ibid., i., 
367, 371), to fix very nearly that of Huger. Pendleton (Ibid., i., 224) enumerates fifteen batter¬ 
ies as constituting the reserve artillery; to each of these we assign 100 men. Stuart’s cavalry 
(Ibid., i., 398) consisted of six regiments and three legions: we give the strength wholly by esti¬ 
mate. The precise numbers are, however, of little consequence, as the cavalry was not actually 
employed on either side. The main possible source of error in estimating the Confederate force 
consists in fixing the strength of Jackson’s command, of which we find no official statement. 
The lowest probable estimate is 27,000, the highest 35,000; we put it at 30,000, not merely as a 
medium between the two, but as the one which, upon careful examination, appears to be the 
closest approximation to the truth. 

From the foregoing data we educe the following table, representing the effective force upon 
each side on the 26th of June. 


Onion Forces. 

Confederate Forces. 

Sumner's Corps... 17,Ml 

HeinUelman’s Corps. 18,810 

Keyes’s Corps. 14,610 

Porter’s Corps. 19,060 

Franklin’s Corps. 19,405 

McCall's Division. 9,514 

McClellan’s Staff, Engineers, Cavalry Divi- ) ^ ^ 

A. P. Hill’s Division. 14,Oi.o 

D. H. Hill’s Division. 10,000 

Longstreet’s Division. 10,000 

Magrucier’s Division. 13,"00 

11 uger’s Division. 11,"00 

Holmes's Division. 7,000 

Jackson's Command. 30,000 

104,724 

Deduct losses, June 20 to 26 (say). 1,500 

Entire Force, June 26. 103,224 

Stuart's Cavalry. 4,000 

Entire Force, June 26. 100,500 


Besides this effective force, “ present for duty,” each army contained many sick. Of these, on 
the 20th of June, there were in McClellan’s army 12,225, probably increased on the 26th to 13,000; 
moreover, there were nearly 30,000 reported as “absent,” a considerable portion of whom were 
undoubtedly away on sick-leave. We have no means of ascertaining the number of these in the 
Confederate army; but scattered incidentally through the reports are evidences that it was very 
considerable. It is clear, however, that Lee brought into the field every effective man at his dis¬ 
posal. 

1 “The plan was submitted to his Excellency the President, who was repeatedly on the field 

in the course of its execution.”— (Lee's Rep., i., 5.) The presence of Davis is repeatedly men¬ 
tioned in the reports of different officers. We find him on the 26th giving direction for the bat¬ 
tle at Mechanicsville; on the 27th and 28th we find him on the field; and on the 30th at Fra¬ 
zier’s Farm, where “the fight was commenced by fire from the enemy’s artillery, which swept 
down the road, and from which his Excellency the President narrowly escaped accident.”— (Ibid., 
i., 177.) 

3 The following are the most important portions of the General Orders of Lee, “No. 75 ; June 
24th ( Lee's Rep., i., 44, 45): 

“General Jackson’s Command will proceed to-morrow from Ashland toward the Slash Church, 
and will encamp at some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch’s brigade of A. 
P. Hill's division will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the Chickahominy, near Half 
Sink. At 3 o’clock Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road 



ASHLAND, 


ifgn HANl fWVn.I.E. 













































362 


[June, 1862. 




insured his destruction. It was made on the assump¬ 
tion that the bulk of the Union army was still on the 
north side of the Chickahominy, whereas, of the 100,000 
men of which it was composed, only 30,000 were on 
that side; the remaining 70,000 had already crossed, 
and were strongly posted on the south side. 1 While 
thus assailing the Union army on that side with double 
its force, he left Richmond open to assault from more 
than twice the number by which it was defended. But 
the very magnitude of the error prevented its being 
suspected. Neither McClellan nor one of his generals 
ever imagined that Richmond was practically uncov¬ 
ered. It is curious to find that during the 27th—the 
decisive day—while on the north side of the river the 
Confederate force was two to one, and on the south 
side the Union force two to one, the commanders on 
both sides, and at all points, believed themselves to be 
fighting with or confronted against superior numbers. 


1 For the data upon which the losses in this and subsequent battles are estimated, see Note at 


JAM SB LONG STREET. 

Jackson had been delayed by the Union skirmishers spread out along his 
line of march. Hill resolved to cross at once, rather than to hazard the 
failure of the whole plan by longer deferring the execution of his part of 
it. The crossing was effected without serious opposition, and the bulk of 
the division, Branch being yet far behind, pressed down toward Mechan- 
icsville. Here, but on the south side of the stream, Longstreet and D. H. 
Hill were in waiting, and, after a little delay in repairing the bridge, also 
crossed the Chickahominy, the Union advance falling back from the vil¬ 
lage for a mile to a position beyond Beaver Dam Creek. 

This was held by two brigades of McCall’s Pennsylvania Reserves, who 
had joined McClellan a fortnight before. The position was a strong one— 
the creek curving around Mechauicsville for a mile; the water, waist-deep, 
was five or six yards wide, with steep banks. It was impassable for artil¬ 
lery except by bridges on two roads, one crossing at Ellison’s Mill, near its 
mouth, the other a mile above. These roads and the open fields between 
them were commanded by artillery, and the whole line on the north bank 
was defended by rifle-pits and felled trees. The position could be carried in 
front only by a superior force, and with heavy loss. But it could be turned 
on the right; and A. P. Hill supposed that this had been already done by 
Jackson, who would then have interposed his force between McCall and 
Porter, cutting off both retreat and re-enforcements. Without waiting to 
ascertain whether this had been accomplished, Hill marched his whole di¬ 
vision across the open fields, swept by the Union batteries. The main stress 
of his attack was at first directed upon the Union right at the upper road, 
which was held by Reynolds. The Confederates advanced gallantly under 
a murderous fire, and reached the edge of the creek. A few even succeeded 
in crossing above Reynolds’s position, and gained a lodgment on the oppo¬ 
site side; but they effected nothing. Elsewhere the assault was repulsed, 
the assailants suffering fearfully. 

Davis and Lee, who were watching the fight from different positions on 
the other side of the Chickahominy, ordered D. H. Hill to send forward a 
brigade to the support of the division which had been roughly handled. 
Ripley’s was dispatched, and a little before dark aided A. P. Hill in a furi¬ 
ous assault upon the Union left at Ellison’s Mill, which was held by Sey¬ 
mour. The attack failed even more disastrously than that upon the right. 
At 9 o’clock, the Confederates, repulsed at all points, fell back beyond artil¬ 
lery range, and the firing gradually ceased. 

This action was fought on the Union side wholly by Reynolds’s and Sey¬ 
mour’s brigades, numbering 6000, and five brigades of the Confederates, 
numbering about 12,000. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was 
about 1500, of which two fifths fell upon Ripley’s single brigade. The 
Union troops had every advantage in position, and their loss was not more 
than 300. 1 


TUESDAY, JUNE 26—MECHANICSVILLE.* 

During the evening of the 2oth—at almost the hour 
when McClellan was awakened from the dream of re¬ 
joicing over what he thought the successful result of 
the advance of his picket line preparatory for the final 
advance of his whole army on the following day, by 
the unwelcome tidings that Jackson was close at hand, 
threatening his right and rear—A. P. Hill had marched 
northward and concentrated his whole division near 
Meadow Bridge. Branch’s brigade had gone still far¬ 
ther in order to communicate with Jackson, who was 
to be at that point at early dawn ; the whole movement 
being entirely hidden by the formation of the ground 
from the view of the Union pickets on the opposite 
side of the Chickahominy. 3 Two and three hours aft¬ 
er midnight Longstreet and D. H. Hill commenced their 
still longer march through mud and darkness in the 
same direction, reaching their assigned positions in 
front of Mechanicsville at eight in the morning. 4 
Branch waited for six hours for the approach of Jack- 
son. At ten word was sent that he was close at hand. 

Branch then crossed the Chickahominy, and moved 
slowly down its north bank, driving the Union pickets 
before him. A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, 
waited at their post for hours, also momently expect¬ 
ing the approach of Jackson. Three o’clock came, and yet no tidings. 


lending to Pale Green [Walnut Green] Church, communicating his march to General Branch, 
who will immediately cross the Chickahominy, and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As 
*'x>n as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his 
division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge, and move direct upon Mechanicsville. 
To aid his advance, the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open upon 
the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville, and the passage 
across the bridge opened, General Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, 
will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point—General D. II. Hill moving to the support of 
General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill—the four divisions keep¬ 
ing in communication with each other, and moving en echelon on separate roads, if practicable. 
The left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharpshooters extending in their front, will 
sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New 
Bridge; General Jackson, bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the di¬ 
rection toward Coal Harbor. They will then press forward toward the York River Railroad, 
closing upon the enemy's rear, and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the 
enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear, and crippling and ar¬ 
resting his progress. The divisions of General Huger and Magruder will hold their positions in 
front of the enemy against attack, and make such demonstrations, Thursday, as to discover his 
operations. Should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack; and should 
an abandonment oHiis intrenchments by the enemy be discovered, he will be closely pursued. . . . 
Commanders of divisions will cause their commands to be provided with three days’ cooked rations. 
The necessary ambulance^ and ordnance trains will be ready to accompany the divisions, and re¬ 
ceive orders from their respective commanders." 

Magruder states (Lee’s Rep. t i., 191) that when these orders had been executed “there were 
but 25,000 men between the enemy’s army of 100,000 and Richmond.’’ He underrates the actual 
force of all arms by some 3000. 

1 Lee seems never to have discovered this error, for in his Report, prepared eight months later, 
he says (p. 8): “The principal part of the enemy w as now [June 27th] on the north side of the 
Chickahominy.’’ 

9 The battle of Thursday, June 26th, is usually styled by Federal authorities that of Beaver 
Dam, from the small stream on whose banks it was fought; Lee, and all Confederate authorities, 
more properly call it that of Mechanicsville. Lee calls the battle of the 27th that of the Chicka- 
hominv; by the majority of Union authorities it is styled that of Gaines’s Mill; but we follow all 
other Confederate Reports, and designate it ns the battle of Cold Harbor. Various names have 
been given to the action of June 30th, such as Glendale, Charles City Cross Roads, and White 
Oak Swamp; we follow Lee and all other Confederate Reports, and call it the battle of Frazier's 
Farm, that being the place where the sharpest fighting occurred. 

9 Lee's Rep., i., 173, 258. 4 Ibid., i., 122, 180. 





















Jcxe, 1862.] 


FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


363 




JOBS F. RZTNOLD6. 

From the moment when McClellan learned of the approach of the enemy 
on his right, he wisely gave up all idea of maintaining his position on the 
north bank of the Chickahominy. At noon of the 26th he telegraphed to 
the Secretary of War that his pickets were being driven in, he supposed by 
Jackson’s advance-guard; that his communications would probably be cut 
off, and even Yorktown might be recaptured; the case was a desperate one, 
but he would do his best to outmanoeuvre, outwit, and outfight the enemy.’ 
ThS Quartermaster at West Point was directed to send supplies to the front 
to the last moment; to hurry the remaining stores up the James River, 
burning every thing which could not be got off—to prepare, in fact, for a 
change of base from the York to the James River—a change which should 
have been made weeks before. 2 More than a week before, McClellan had 
made some arrangements looking to this movement Had it been under¬ 
taken in time, the whole course of the campaign must have been changed. 
Lee, instead of raising the siege of Richmond by threatening the line to the 
York River, must have assailed McClellan in his intrenchments, or subject¬ 
ed the ill-provisioned city, with its immense protecting army, to the hazard 

the end of this chapter. The Reports of the various Confederate Commanders are very minute, 
and fully .set forth the completeness of their defeat. 

Lee says ( Report, i., 6): “Jackson’s march on the 26th was longer than had been anticipated, 
and his progress also being retarded by the enemy, A. P. Hill did not begin his movement until 
3 P. M., when he crossed the river and advanced upon Mechanicsville. Longstrect and D. H. 
Hill crossed the Mechanicsville bridge as soon as it could be repaired, but it was late before they 
reached the north bank. I). H. Hill’s leading brigade, under Ripley, advanced to the support of 
the troops engaged, and at a late hour united with Pender’s brigade of A. P. Hill’s division in an 
effort to turn the enemy’s left; but the troops were unable, in the growing darkness, to overcome 
the obstructions, and after sustaining a destructive fire of musketry and artillery at short range 
were withdrawn.” 

D. H. Hill (Ibid., i., 180) says: “I had received several messages from General Lee, and one 
from the President of the Confederate States, to send forward a brigade. In advancing this bri¬ 
gade I met General Pender, whose brigade had just been roughly handled, who told me that, with 
the assistance of two regiments of Ripley’s brigade, he could turn the position at Ellison’s Mill by 
the right, while two regiments should advance in front. General Ripley was ordered to co-oper¬ 
ate with Pender, and the attack was made about dark. The enemy had intrenchments of great 
strength and development on the other side of Beaver Dam, and had the banks lined with his 
magnificent artillery. The approach was over an open plain, exposed to a murderous fire of all 
arms, and an almost impassable stream was to be crossed. The result was, as might have been 
anticipated, a disastrous and bloody repulse.” 

Ripley (Ibid., i., 230) says: “I was informed by General A. P. Hill that the enemy had a strong 
and well-served battery and force in position near Ellison’s Mill, to attack which he had sent Pen¬ 
der’s brigade by the right, and other troops to the left; and it was arranged that my brigade 
should co-operate. While the troops were in motion I received orders to assault the enemy from 
General Lee, and also from General D. H. Hill. Night coming on, and it being deemed import¬ 
ant to attack the position at once, the advance was ordered along the whole line. We drove back 
the enemy from his advanced positions, and closed in upon the batteries and their heavy infantry 
supports, all of which poured npon our troops a heavy and incessant fire of shell, canister, and 
musketry. The ground was rugged, and intersected by ditches, and covered with abatis a short 
distance in front of the position to be assaulted. A mill-race, with scarped banks, and in some 
places waist-deep in water, rnn along the front of the enemy, at a distance ranging from fifty to 
one hundred yards. To this position our troops succeeded in advancing, notwithstanding the fire 
of the enemy was exceedingly severe. The loss was heavy in the extreme, amounting in the 44th 
Georgia to 335. and in the 3d North Carolina to 142. Some time after nightfall our troops were 
withdrawn. The fragments of the 3d North Carolina and the 44th Georjria were rallied some 
distance in the rear, under some difficulty, owing to the loss of all their field and many of their 
company officers.” In this assault of hardly nr* hour’s duration Ripley’s single brigade of 2366 
men lost 574 in killed and wounded—more than one fourth being killed outright. 

A. P. Hill (Ibid., i., 174), after describing the several assaults made by his division, and their 
“failure with heavy loss,” adds: “ It was never contemplated that my division alone should have 
sustained the shock of this battle; but such was the case, and the only assistance I received was 
from Ripley.” Each of Hill’s four brigade commanders who were engaged in this action speak 
of heavy losses in their command. 1 McC. Rep-, 240. 

* Ibid., 241, 243—“The superiority of the James River route, as a line of attack and supply, is 
too obvious to need exposition.”— Ibid., 242. 


1 “Our retreat was a contingency I thought of; but my impression is, that up to the time of 
the battle of Gaines’s Mill, I still hoped that we should be able to hold our own.”—(McClellan, 
in Com. Rep., 435.) “By desperate fighting, our right wing inflicted so severe a loss upon the 
enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and give us time to get our mate¬ 
riel out of tht wa^.”— Ibid., 434. » MoC. Rep., 250-263. 


of a siege or of direct assault. This change of base demanded that the 
whole army should be united on the south side of the Chickahominy. 
McClellan thought that Jackson — whose force was supposed to be the 
whole, instead of less than half, of that opposed to him on the right—was 
so close that the trains could be saved only by accepting battle on the north 
side. He did not expect to win a decisive victory. His utmost hope was 
to hold his own for a few hours. 1 The battle was to be fought by Porter, 
and McClellan wished to give him all the re-enforcements which could be 
spared from the other side of the river. He asked each commander of a 
corps on the south side how many men be could spare to re-enforce Porter, 
after retaining sufficient to hold his own position for twenty-four hours. 
The answers showed that not one of them imagined that the greater part of 
the force of the enemy which had confronted them had been withdrawn and 
was now on the other side. Keyes wanted to keep all the men he had, “if 
the enemy is as strong as ever in front;” lleintzelman would undertake to 
hold his intrenchments with four brigades, which would leave two disposa¬ 
ble for service on the other side of the river. The afternoon of the next 
day, when the battle of Cold Harbor hung in even scale, Franklin, half of 
whose corps had already been sent over, did not think it prudent to take 
any more troops from him; and Sumner ventured only to say that he could 
send two of his eight brigades, and even that would be hazardous. 2 These 
two brigades were sent, but an hour too late to change the fortune of the 
day. They were too late to take part in the battle, but just in time to pre¬ 
vent a sore defeat from becoming a total rout 

FRIDAY, JUNE 27.—COLD HARBOR. 

The position at Beaver Darn Creek was far in advance of the main force 
and easily turned. During the night the force which had held it was quiet¬ 
ly withdrawn, leaving only enough to serve as a blind, and they were to re 
treat as the enemy advanced. A new line was taken up five miles below. 
The thirty heavy guns which had been placed in batteries between these 
two positions were removed across the Chickahominy, with nearly all the 
wagons of Porter’s corps, and New Bridge, the upper one on the stream, 
was destroyed behind them. This was done during the night, and as the 
morning of the 27th broke, hot and sultry, Porter and McCall, freed from all 
impedimenta, stood ready for action. 

The position was a strong one. A small unnamed stream, curving sickle- 
wise, empties into the Chickahominy. The banks are in most places fringed 
with a belt of swamp, but in places they rise steeply, and the bed of the 
stream forms a ravine. On the eastern side the land rises in a gradual 
slope crossed by gullies, about fifty feet above the swamp, and spreads into 
a flat table-land, with here and there a gentle swell. Patches of woodland 
dot the plain, which is mostly cleared and cultivated, the farm-houses stand¬ 
ing alone each in the midst of its own fields. Two places find names on the 
map: New Cold Harbor, nearest the Chickahominy, and Cold Harbor a 
mile northward. Each consists of two or three dilapidated houses, a rifle¬ 
shot apart. Cold Harbor was the centre of Porter’s line, which thence 
turned sharply eastward for a mile. The whole semicircular line covered 
the heads of the bridges crossing the Chickahominy. Hasty preparations 
had been made for defense. The trees in the swamp had been felled; rifle- 












364 


[June, 1862. 



few regiments even pierced them. But they were soon forced back. For 
two hours the battle raged with equal obstinacy on either side. The Fed¬ 
eral troops gained ground, and from being assailed became the assailants. 
Hill was defeated, crushed, and almost routed. Some of his regiments stood 
their ground; others threw themselves flat on the earth to escape the with¬ 
ering fire; others rushed from the field in disorder. 

The completeness of the defeat at this point is fully shown in the Confed¬ 
erate reports. Lee 1 and Hill 2 affirm it in general terms. Archer 2 says: 
“ My troops fell back before the irresistible fire of artillery and rifles. The 
obvious impossibility of carrying the position without support prevented me 
from attempting to check the retreat. Had they not fallen back I would 
myself have ordered it.” Pender* * says: “My men were rallied and pushed 
forward again, but did not advance far before they fell back; and I think I 
do but justice to my men when I say that they did not commence it. The 
enemy were continually bringing up fresh troops, and succeeded in driving 
us from the road.” Whiting, of Jackson’s command, who came to the relief 
of these troops, says: 5 “Men were leaving the field in every direction, and 
in great disorder; two regiments, one from South Carolina and one from 
Louisiana, were actually marching back from the fire. The 1st Texas were 
ordered to go over them, and through them, which they did. . . . Near the 
crest, in front of us and lying down, appeared the fragments of a brigade. 
Men were skulking from the front in a shameful manner; the woods on 
our left and rear were full of troops in a safe cover, from which they never 
stirred. . . . Still farther on pur extreme right our troops appeared to be 
falling back. . . . The troops on our immediate left I do not know, and I 
am glad I don’t. Those that did come up were much broken, and no en¬ 
treaty or command could induce them to come forward, and I have great 
reason to believe that the greater part never left the cover of the wood on 
the west side of the ravine.” Whiting does great injustice to the troops of 
Hill. They were, indeed, defeated and broken, but it was after two hours 
of desperate fighting, under every disadvantage of position, against a force 
quite equal to them, as the record of their losses shows. Thus the regiment 
from South Carolina, which “ was actually marching back under fire,” must 
have been the “ 1st Rifles, S. C. Volunteers.” Of this regiment its colonel, 
Marshall, reports: 6 “In that charge we sustained a loss of 76 killed, 221 
wounded, and 58 missing; and on the next morning I had only 149 officers, 
non-commissioned officers, and privates for duty. Early on the morning 
after the battle I made a detail from each company to bury their dead, and 
so severe w r as the work of death in some of the companies that it took the 
detail all day to bury their dead;” and of those “missing” in the morning 
all but four rejoined their regiment. 7 Hill states the case fairly. After 
acknowledging the repulse, he says: 8 “My division was engaged full two 

1 Lee’s Rep., i., 8. 3 Ibid., i., 176. 3 Ibid., i., 256. 4 Ibid., i., 253. 

6 Ibid., i., 154. 4 Ibid., i., 502. 7 Ibid., i., 505. 8 Ibid., i., 176. 



1 McC. Rep., 246-253. 

* There is a general discrepancy between tho Union and the Con¬ 
federate notation of the time of the different points of the whole series 
of actions, the latter making them usually about an hour later than 

(be former. 


pits and barricades had been flung up on the hill-side; and the crest was 
crowned by the artillery, which could thus play over the heads of the in¬ 
fantry upon an advancing enemy; but the elaborate earth-works which now 
seam the region were the work of Grant, almost two years later. The plain 
over which was the approach to the front of this line was also swept by the 
heavy guns two miles away on the other side of the Chickahominy. 

Butterfield held the extreme left of this line, extending to the swamps of 
the Chickahominy; next came Martindale—both ofMorell’s division—then 
Griffin’s brigade ; then Sykes, with his division : all of these, of Fitz-John 
Porter’s corps, formed the first line. Behind this was McCall’s division: 
Meade, then commander of a brigade, who was a year and a week after to 
win the battle of Gettysburg, the true turning-point of the war, was on the 
left; next Reynolds, in a few hours to be a prisoner of war; then Seymour, 
who a few hours before had crushed Ripley and Pender at Beaver Dam, as 
reserve behind the second line. Stoneman’s cavalry were miles away to 
the north; they could be of no use on this field, which must be contested by 
infantry and artillery. Porter, fearing that Stoneman would be cut off by 
the advance of Jackson, sent orders to him to retreat to the White House, 
and afterward rejoin the army as best he could—where, no one knew. 

If a battle was to be fought here by these forces, no stronger position 
could have been chosen, and no better dispositions made. Porter expected 
to be hard pressed in front; he hoped to hold his po¬ 
sition without aid long enough to cover the retreat of 
the army; but he asked that some division on the oth¬ 
er side should be held ready to support him. 1 

At dawn of the 27th the Confederates at Mechanics- 
ville were astir. They had been aroused by a sharp 
artillery fire, and expected a renewal of the fight at 
Beaver Dam. After an hour they discovered that the 
firing was a ruse to detain them, and that the Federal 
forces had retired. Another hour was spent in re¬ 
pairing the bridges so that the artillery could cross; 
and then the divisions took up the line of march, as 
prescribed in Lee’s order. D. H. Hill bore to the left 
to unite with Jackson, who was still behind, having en¬ 
camped for the night within sound of the cannonade. 

A. P. Hill and Longstreet — Hill in advance — kept to 
the right, following the road along the Chickahominy. 

The march was slow and cautious, for on rounding any 
swell of land they might come upon their enemy in 
force. Noon had passed before five miles had been 
accomplished. Passing Gaines’s Mill, where a slight 
skirmish occurred, from which has been given one of 
the names to the whole battle, they came in sight of 
the Union force drawn up on the hill-side bejmnd the 
unnamed creek. Between them lay an open plain a 
quarter of a mile wide, swept by artillery from the 
crest in front and from the other side of the Chicka¬ 
hominy, and bounded by a wood tangled with under¬ 
growth, and traversed by a sluggish stream which con¬ 
verted the soil into a dense morass. Here a slight de¬ 
lay occurred to form the line. 

It was past two o’clock 2 when Hill was directed to 
begin the assault. Longstreet was held back, because 
it was thought by Lee that Jackson’s approach on the 
left, which was every moment expected, would cause 
the extension of the Union line in that direction. 

Hill’s brigades dashed across the plain, floundered 
through the swamp, and pressed up the opposite slope 
in the face of a fierce fire of artillery and musketry. 

Some brigades advanced close to the infantry lines; a 




AJiBBOBE P. WTI-I- 
























June, 1862.] 


FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


366 




hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the enemy’s lines, 
but we paved the way for the successful attack afterward, and in which at¬ 
tacks it was necessary to employ the whole of our army that side of the 
Chickahominy. About four o’clock re-enforcements came up on my right 
from General Longstreet, and later Jackson’s men on my left and centre, and 
my division was relieved of the weight of the contest.” 

Longstreet’s division had been drawn up in the rear of Hill, covered from 
fire by a low ridge. Lee, finding Hill sorely worsted, ordered Longstreet to 
make a feigned attack upon the left, hoping to divert a part of the Union 
force to that direction, and thus relieve Hill. Longstreet soon found that 
the force here was too strong to be disturbed by a' mere feint, and that to be 
of service he must make a real attack with his whole force. Jackson now 
came into view; D. H. Hill, who had joined him, in advance, on the extreme 
right, Ewell and Whiting on the left, and Lawton a little in the rear. The 
line was now complete, and a general advance along its whole extent was 
ordered. 

Porter, in the mean while, seeing the immense force advancing upon him, 
had, two hours before, asked for re-enforcements Slocum’s division of 
Franklin’s corps had been all day kept in readiness on the south side of the 
Chickahominy for this purpose. They had, indeed, been ordered over at 
daybreak, and had begun to cross; but when half way over the order was 
countermanded. They were now hurried over, and came upon the field at 
half past four, when the general Confederate attack had been fairly com¬ 


menced. Porter’s whole line was so severely pressed at every point that he 
was forced to divide Slocum’s force, sending parts of it, even single regiments, 
to the points most threatened. 1 

The general Confederate assault was commenced by D. H. Hill upon the 
extreme Union right, held by Syktks with his regulars. He opened by a 
sharp artillery fire; but in half an hour the battery was withdrawn badly 
crippled. Meanwhile he could hear, by the direction of the fire on his right, 
that the Federals were forcing A. P. Hill and Longstreet back. The assault 
must be made hand to hand. In the face of a fierce fire, by which his force 

1 McC. Rep., 243-251 - McClellan says {Rep., 248): “ At 3 30 Slocum’s division reached the 
field, and was immediately brought into action at the weak points of our line.” It is clear that 
he places the arrival of Slocum a full hour too early; for at 3 25 he telegraphed to Porter (Ibid., 
251): “Slocum is now crossing Alexander’s Bridge with his whole command.” To finish the 
crossing, form, march up the bank, and reach the field of action, must have required an hour or 
more. There is some confusion as to the recall of Slocum’s division in the morning. McClellan 
says (Rep., 243): “General Franklin received instructions to hold General Slocum’s division in 
readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direc¬ 
tion of General Porter, to move it at once to his assistance without farther orders;” and (Ibid., 
251) “Slocum’s division commenced crossing the river to support Porter soon after daybreak on 
the morning of the 27th ; but as the firing in front of Porter ceased, the movement was suspend¬ 
ed.” Franklin testifies (Com. Rep., 622): “At seven o’clock in the morning of that day I was 
ordered to send Slocum’s division to assist Porter. This order was countermanded about nine 
o’clock, after a part of the division had crossed the Chickahominy. The order to send the divi¬ 
sion over was signed by Colonel Colburn, and I sent back some word, I do not remember what. 
General Marcy answered that he hardly supposed the general commanding could have intended to 
send the division over; that there must have been some mistake about it, he thought. Then 
about nine o’clock, perhaps nearly ten, the order was countermanded, the order countermanding 
coming from General McClellan, though I do not remember who signed it. What was the reason 
for ordering the division back I do not know.” 











366 


[June, 1862 



was sorely galled, and some of the regiments thrown 
into disorder, he succeeded in passing the swamp 
in his front, and pressed up the opposite slope, only 
to be forced back. Ewell had come up on Hill’s 
left, and attempted to carry the position in front of 
him; but most of his command gave way under 
the fierce fire which they encountered. “ We were 
attacked,” he says, “ in front and flank by superior 
numbers, and were for hours without re-enforce¬ 
ments.” The “ hours” were less than an hour, and 
the “superior numbers” existed only in the imag¬ 
ination of the assailants, justifiable, indeed, by the 
terrible fire to which they were exposed. Trim¬ 
ble, of this division, led his brigade toward the 
Confederate right; he met two regiments coming 
out of the field in confusion, who cried out, “You 
need not go in; we’re whipped; you can’t do any 
thing!” “Get out of our way!” his men replied ; 

“ we will show you how to do it!” and they charged 
at a run across the field against the Union lines. * 1 
Still Ewell was losing ground, when Lawton’s bri¬ 
gade came upon the field. This brigade, 4000 
strong, composed wholly of Georgian troops, Was a 
part of the force sent from Richmond a fortnight before to join Jacxson, 
and “mask his withdrawal from the Valley.” Jackson had incorporated 
this brigade with his “own” division, and it held the rear of his entire com¬ 
mand. It was ordered forward from the place where it had been halted, 
two miles from the battle-field. Lawton went as rapidly as possible over 
a road blocked up by artillery and ambulances. Coming upon the field, be 
learned that Ewell “ was sorely pressed, and that re-enforcements were 
promptly needed.” Here he met two regiments standing in the open field, 
who had just been driven from the open woods. “I moved,” he says, 
“through the interval between these regiments, promptly formed line of 
battle, and accepted the position which they had abandoned. A continu¬ 
ous line of 3500 men moving forward in perfect order, and at once open¬ 
ing fire along its entire length, chiefly armed with Enfield rifles, promptly 
marked the preponderance of musketry on our side.” This long line ad¬ 
vanced toward the thickest of the fight. . In the wood Ewell was seen. He 
shouted “Hurrah for Georgia!” as he saw Lawton’s long line advancing. 2 

It was now half past six, an hour before sunset. The whole Confederate 
force on this side of the Chickahominy, with the exception of Kemper’s 
single brigade of “ 1433 muskets,” of Longstreet’s division, which was held 
in reserve, 3 was brought into action. Opposed to them were only Porter’s 
corps, McCall’s division, and Slocum’s sent over from the other side. Mak¬ 
ing allowance for losses on each side up to this time, the Confederate force 
on the field numbered about 56,000; the Union force, 33,000. 4 The Con¬ 
federates, at a fearful sacrifice, had crossed the swamp at all points, and thus 
neutralized the former great advantage of position against them. The Union 

1 Lee's Rep., i., 309. 1 Ibid., i., 270. 3 Ibid., i., 124, 353. 

4 Confederates: Jackson, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, 64,000 ; deduct losses, thus far, 
8000=66,000. Union: Porter, 19,000; McCall, 9000; Slocum, 8000=36,000; deduct losses, 
thus far, 3000 = 33,000. These are given merely as a close approximation to the actual numbers 
at that moment. 


Tl^B FINAL CHARGE AT COLD UARBOIL 

line was pressed along its whole length by a force of almost two to one. The 
crowning attack was made half an hour before sunset, and the Union line 
gave way almost simultaneously on the right, centre, and left. Where it 
first broke no one can say. Each Confederate commander believed that his 
troops gave the decisive blow. In our judgment the most decisive blow 
was struck near the centre, where Hood’s Texans, of Whiting’s division, 
charged upon a battery which was so posted that it had done fearful execu¬ 
tion all through the fight. “In this charge, in which upward of a thousand 
men fell, killed and wounded, before the fire of the enemy, and in which 
fourteen pieces of artillery were captured, the Fourth Texas, under the lead 
of General Hood, was the first to pierce these strong-holds and seize the 
guns.” 1 About the same time, Longstreet, on the extreme left, had driven 
back the Union force opposed to him, and was pressing them toward the 
brink of the Chickahominy. Five companies of cavalry, who had been 
kept in reserve, charged upon the pursuers, but were scattered at the first 
fire. 2 

D. H. Hill, on the Confederate left, had been annoyed by an isolated bat¬ 
tery which swept the road by which he proposed to attack in flank the 
Union right A sudden charge by two of his regiments captured this bat¬ 
tery ; it was held only for a few minutes, then retaken, and the Confederates 
driven back, the regiment which had captured the guns losing half its num¬ 
ber in the work. Brief as the time was, it was enough. The temporary 

1 Jackson in Lee's Rep., i., 136. 

1 [AfcC. Rep., 248; Lee's Rep., i., 124.] This slight cavalry affair is the only one in which 
that arm was actively engaged on either side during the seven days, with the exception of a Con¬ 
federate charge two days later, which McClellan (Rep., 258) calls “a sharp skirmish with the en¬ 
emy’s cavalry;” but Bowers, the commander of the Confederate cavalry regiment, tells the exact 
story. He says (Lee's Rep., i., 417) that he charged upon the Federal cavalry, but was driven 

back, carrying with him two officers and eleven privates wounded, but leaving behind two more 

officers and “forty-six non-commissioned officers [and privates?] missing, being wounded, killed, 

and thrown from their horses.” 



QATAiiT CHARGE AT OOLD HARBOR. 





























June, 1802.] 


FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


36; 



bSIBMieilLNO IN TUB WOOI«. 


Bilence of the terrible battery enabled the rest of Hill’s division to advance. 
The extreme right of the Union line gave way; it rallied, and was again 
forced back, not without disorder, toward the river-bank. Hill asserts 1 that 
it was “this final charge upon their right flank which decided the fortunes 
of the day.” The truth is, that the Union line, now pressed along its whole 
length by a twofold force, which had at a fearful sacrifice overcome the ad¬ 
vantage of position, gave way on every point almost at once, and fell back to¬ 
ward the bluff which here bounded the Chickahominy. They were follow¬ 
ed, though cautiously, by the enemy in the twilight which was fast closing in. 

It was not a rout, though fast threatening to become one. The core of 
every division remained solid, but fragments were flying off, like sparks from 
an iron under the blacksmith’s hammer. But all, soldiers and fugitives, 
pressed toward the bridges which stretched through swamp and over river, 
beyond which lav safety. All at once a great shout was heard, and French’s 
and Meagher’s brigades—Meagher, they say, leading in his shirt sleeves— 
dashed up the bluff, driving through the stragglers, who were thronging to¬ 
ward the bridge, and advanced to what was now the front. Their presence 
gave heart to the fugitives, who rallied behind them and marched up the 
hill. The Confederates paused in the pursuit, and, after delivering a few 
ineffectual volleys, withdrew as night set in, and the battle was over. An 
hour earlier, and these two brigades alone would have turned the wavering 
scale and won a victory. As it was, they were just in time to prevent a 
great defeat from becoming a disastrous rout D. H. Hill, moralizing after¬ 
ward, says: “A vigorous attack might have resulted in the total rout of the 
Yankee army and the capture of thousands of prisoners. But I was un¬ 
willing to leave the elevated plateau and advance in the dark along an un¬ 
known road, skirted diy dense woods, in the possession of the Yankees.” 2 

When morning broke the whole Union force was safely across the Chicka¬ 
hominy, and the bridges behind them were down. Three regiments, at dif¬ 
ferent points, had been isolated by the Confederate rush, were surrounded 
and made prisoners. Many stragglers, scattered through the wood, wen- 
picked up next day bv the cavalry who scoured the region. In all, the 
Federals lost about. 2000 prisoners, among whom was General Reynolds, 
who, three days later, at Richmond, met his division commander, McCall, 
captured in a subsequent battle. The Union loss in this action was about 
4000 in killed and wounded ; that of the Confederates, 9500. The Federals 
also lost 22 guns, of which 20 were captured by the enemy; the others were 
run off the bridge while crossing. 

During the whole of this action, while Lee was with his troops controlling 
their movements and directing the fight, McClellan was on the opposite side 
of the river. 3 He was kept in alarm by the messages sent to him hour by 

' />'» Rep., i.. 183. * * JU M„ i., 181. 

* “Daring the battle at Gaines’s Mills T was on the right bank of tha rirar, at Dr. Trent’s 
boost, as tba most central position.”—McClellan's testimony, in Com. Rep. ,434. 


hour from different positions on that side. At half past eight, Smith, on the 
extreme right, reported that six or eight regiments had moved down to the 
woods in front of Sumner. At eleven, Sumner telegraphed that the enemy 
threatened an attack on his right, near Smith; and an hour and a half later, 
that there was sharp shelling on both sides; and two hours after, that there 
was sharp musketry firing in front, to which he was replying with artillery 
and infantry, and the man on the look-out reported that there were some 
troops—how many could not be made out—drawn up in line of battle op¬ 
posite bis right. Then, at intervals, Franklin reported. In the morning the 
enemy were massing heavy columns on his right; then, an attack had been 
begun there on Smith, which proved to be an artillery fire; 1 but his own 
shells were bursting well, and Smith thought Sumner would soon have a 
cross-fire upon the enemy which would silence them. At a quarter past 
five, Franklin, half of whose corps, under Slocum, were across the river, 
thought it not prudent to take any more troops from him at present. Ten 
minutes after, McClellan replied that Porter was hard pressed, and it was 
not a question of prudence, but of possibilities; if Franklin could possibly 
hold his position until dark with two brigades, he should send one to sup¬ 
port Porter. This last order seems not to have reached Franklin, for he 
says that during the whole day he did not know that a battle was going on 
across the river. 2 

All the movements by the Confederates on this side of the Chickahominy 
are detailed at length by the different commanders. The substance is, that 
with pickets, skirmishers, and artillery, they felt the Union line along its 
whole length, showing themselves at points here and there, and then the 
force vanished, to reappear at a different spot, thus trebling their apparent 
numbers. The nature of the ground afforded facilities for these operations. 
There was a series of swamps, forests, low ridges, and ravines, which shut out 
all sight of what was passing at a few hundred yards’ distance. If a body 
of troops showed itself at any point, no one could sav whether it was a single 
regiment or the head of a full division. So an artillery fire upon any point 

1 McClellan writes (Report, 2. r >2) “from 3 pieces." This is probably n simply clcricnl error,for 
FrAnklin testifies (Cbm. Hep., 622), “We had pnt np a work during the night of the 26th. The 
rnernv opened upon that work, and snch of our artillery ns he could see, early on the morning of 
the 27th. and there was a very severe cannonading, with 30 guns on each side, I should judge, 
lasting nhont an hour. Their object apj>enrcd to he to drive us away from Golding's, but it was 
evidently a diversion to prevent our sending assistance to Porter. There was no infantry fighting 
till nl*ont dark.” 

* AfcC. li'P •• 251-263. Franklin testifies (Com. Rcjk, 623): “At my position at Golding’s, the 
woods were so dense between Fitz-John Porter and myself that we did not hear a mnsket or 
heavy gun of hi* all day. We did not know that there was any infantry fight going on. We 
saw some of the enemv’s infantry going np to attack what we supposed to he his position, and 
we shelled them as well ns we could from our side. I was about two miles distant from the field 
of battle at Gaines’s Mills.” General J. E. Johnston reports a similar occurrence at Fair Oaks. 
Though not more than three miles from the battle-field of May 31, he did not hear the cannon¬ 
ading, which was vet distinctly audible at the Federal head-quarters, ten miles or more distant, 
across the stream.' Johnston supposed that this was occasioned by some peculiar eeoditioD of the 
atmosphere. 















868 


[June, 1862. 



might be a mere feint, or the prelude to an attack in 
force. All the shows of force which had all day long 
disturbed McClellan were but feints. The only real 
attack on that day, south of the Chickahominy, was 
just at sunset, when Toombs, anxious to distinguish 
himself, sent two small infantry regiments, re-enforc¬ 
ing them afterward, to force the Union pickets. The 
attempt cost dearly. Half of the Georgia Second 
went into action 271 strong, and lost 120; the Fif¬ 
teenth carried in 370, and lost 70 in killed and wound¬ 
ed. Toombs claims that after “two hours of fierce 
and determined conflict” the Federals were “driven 
back and repulsed.” Franklin says: “There was no 
infantry fighting until about dark, when two brigades 
of the enemy attacked Hancock’s brigade, which was 
in position as the advance of the picket line. He had 
a sharp engagement for about three quarters of an 
hour, when the enemy was driven back. It was then 
entirely dark, too late to make any pursuit.” 1 

Toward midnight McClellan held a council of war 
—the only one, apparently, during the campaign. 

Even then he seems to have had some purpose of re¬ 
crossing the Chickahominy and risking another battle 
on that side. If the purpose was a serious one it was 
soon abandoned, and orders were given for a retreat 
to the James River. 2 He then wrote a bitter letter to 
the Secretary of War: lie knew the whole history of 
the day. On this side of the river, the right bank, we 
repulsed-several strong attacks; on the left our men 
did all that men could do, but they were repulsed by 
vastly superior numbers soon after he had brought 
his last reserves into action. If he had 20,000, or 
even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow, he could 
take Richmond ; but he had not a man in reserve, and 
he should be glad to cover his retreat and save the 
material and personnel of the army. A few thousand 
more men would have changed this battle from a de¬ 
feat to a victory; as it was, the government could not 
hold him responsible for the result. “If I save this 
army now," he concludes, “I tell you plainly that I 
owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in 
Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice 
this army.” 3 

SATURDAY, JUNE 28.—THE RETREAT. 

Lee had indeed won a formal victory, but at a fearful cost. In the two 
actions he had suffered a loss in killed and wounded of almost 10,000 men, 
double that which he had inflicted. He had indeed driven the enemy from 
the field of battle, and across the river; but this crossing was just what his 
opponent was endeavoring to effect. He had cut McClellan’s line of com¬ 
munication and supply with the York River; but that line had been already 
given up, and a far better one chosen. To accomplish this, he had placed 
his army in a position which, had his opponent known it, rendered its de¬ 
struction inevitable. Two thirds of it, 54,000 strong after its losses, was on 
the north side of the Chickahominy. The other third, ten miles away in a 
straight line, was before Richmond. Between them, and more than equal 
to both, the Union army, at last united, lay like a solid wedge. The river, 
which McClellan had so long found to be an impassable barrier, lay right 
between Lee’s two wings, which he could unite only by retracing his two 
days’ march up the left bank to Mechanicsville, then down the other side to 
Richmond. Had McClellan on the 28th or 29th struck at Richmond with 
his whole available force, the city must have fallen in five hours. The 
bridges being down, 25,000 men could have held the whole line of the 
Chickahominy from Bottom’s Bridge to New Bridge, leaving fully 70,000 
for the assault of Richmond, which was defended by only 27,000, along a 
line of nearly ten miles. The fall of Richmond must have involved the de¬ 
struction or dispersion of the force across the Chickahominy, for at Rich¬ 
mond were his only ddpots of supplies. His men had marched out with 
only three days’ rations, and were followed by a very small train. The 
rapidity of Jackson’s march, and the nature of the country traversed, show 
that he could have only a meagre train. There is not the slightest reason 
to suppose that, away from Richmond, the Confederates had within a hund¬ 
red miles provisions sufficient to supply Lee’s 54,000 men for five days; 
and without supplies, an army in that time becomes a disorganized and para¬ 
lyzed mass, incapable of offense or defense. If McClellan had but-known 

1 Let's Rep., i., 280; Com. Rr/>., 622 This skirmish at Golding’s Farm is the only affair 
which in any wav justifies McClellan’s assertion ( Report , 257): “On the right bank we repulsed 
several strong attacks.” 

■ Of this council Heintzclman testifies (Com. Rep.. 355). “At atiout eleven o’clock I got. a tele¬ 
gram that General McClellan wished to see me immediately at his head-quarters, about a mile 
and a half off. I found them all parked up and ready to move. The general stated the situation 
of affairs and what he proposed to do. One thing was to move across to the James River. The 
other plan was to collect all the troops from my side of the Chickahominy and have a battle the 
next day, and throw every thing upon the result of that battle. I asked him what would bo the 
result if we lost. He said that if we were defeated the army would be lost, but he was inclined 
to risk every thing upon that battle. I told him that it was of vital importance to the country, I 
thought, to save that army ; that we were ruined if that army waR lost; and that I thought it was 
better for us not to fight that buttle, but to fall back from there to the James River; that we could 
reac h there with a loss, perhaps, of a few pieces of siege artillery and some wagons, and then we 
could receive re-enforcements. He said that was his opinion , still, he felt inclined to risk every 
thing on a battle. The next day we commenced to retreat. That was the first time I was con¬ 
sulted in that campaigu, any thing more than by mere conversation.”—Sec also McC Rep., 254, 
256. J McC. Re r . 257,268. 


B1CUAKI' & bWEI.I. 

his own position and strength, and that of his opponent, he could hardly 
have wished that Lee should have placed his troops in any other position 
than that occupied by them just after the battle of Cold Harbor. Magruder, 
who was in chief command on the left bank, appreciated the sore peril of 
the Confederate capital and cause. He saw that a vigorous attack upon 
him could not be other than successful. 1 

But McClellan had resolved, instead of giving battle to Lee on the left 
side of the Chickahominy, or of assaulting Richmond on the right, to aban¬ 
don the whole position, and retreat with his entire force to the James River. 
The different commanders were ordered to load the wagons with ammuni¬ 
tion and provisions, and the necessary baggage of officers and men, and to 
destroy every thing which could not be carried off. The sick and wound¬ 
ed, who could not march or be carried, were to be left behind. These were 
fewer than might have been expected; Of the 13,000 on the sick-list, and 
the 3000 wounded in the two previous days, about 2500 in all were thus 
abandoned. 

The problem of the “Change of Base” was, after all, a very simple one. 
It was merely to march an army for ten or fifteen miles with no enemy in 
front,but with one, erroneously supposed to be superior, in its rear, and upon 
one flank. The main difficulty was to carry off the guns and trains of sup¬ 
plies and ammunition. The country over which the inarch was to be made 
favored the retreating army. The retreat must indeed be slow, for the roads 
were few and difficult, but the pursuit must be slower, for these roads could 
be obstructed at every step. 

Some three or four miles from the extreme left of the Union position 
White Oak Creek empties into the Chickahominy. This creek is bordered 
by a swamp. For five miles the stream has some volume, and the swamp 
is narrow, three or four hundred yards wide; then it spreads out, for eight 
miles toward Richmond, to a breadth of three miles or more. From the 
Chickahominy to the head of the swamp it was crossed by only two roads. 
Southward, toward the James, the ground rises slowly, and becomes a dry 
flat instead of a wet flat, but with swamps along the sluggish streams, cov- 

1 Magrudcr, in Lee's Rep., i., 191: “From the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to 
tins side of the Chickahominy nnd destroyed the bridges to the moment of his evacuation—that 
is, from Friday night until Sunday morning—I considered the situation of our army ns extremely 
critical nnd perilous. The larger portion of it was on the other side of the Chickahominy ; the 
bridges had all been destroyed, and hut one was rebuilt, the New Bridge, which was fully com¬ 
manded hy the enemy’s guns from Golding’s; nnd there were hut 25,000 men between his army 
of 100,000 and Richmond. I received rejtcatcd instructions during Saturday night from General 
Lee’s head-quarters, enjoining upon my command the*utmost vigilance, directing the men to sleep 
on their arms, and to be prepared for whatever might occur. I passed the night without sleep, 

nnd in the sujKjrintcndcnce of their execution. Hud McClellan massed his whole force in column, 
and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz hy the greatest 
captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum 
would havo insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and conse¬ 
quently the city, might have been his reward. Our relief was therefore great when information 

reached us that the enemy had evacuated his works, and was retreating.” 


















COMMENCEMENT OK THE RETREAT.—JUNE 29.' 



June, 1862.] 


FROM THE CHICEAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


369 






























































































[June, 1862. 


870 



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MAP OF TIIF. REGION NEAR RICHMOND. 


ered with scrubby forests, with here and there a clearing. The maps show- 
roads in abundance and intricate confusion, but they are mainly mere paths, 
over some of which no wheeled vehicle had passed for years. Three roads, 
however, starting from Richmond, spread out like the sticks of a fan, and 
then unite half way between the swamp and Malvern Hill, the point to which 
McClellan directed his retreat. Thence they branch out in every direction 
toward the lower bridges of the Chickahominy, some miles below the rail¬ 
road, and toward the rich plantations which border the James. Just skirt¬ 
ing the swamp is the Charles City Road, then the Central or Darbvtown, 
then the Newmarket. It was by these roads that Longstreet and A. P. Hill, 
who, having recrossed the Chickahominy and turned the head of White Oak 
Swamp, marched to make their attack on the 30th upon the retreating col 
umn; and Magruder, coming from near Richmond, reached Malvern, where 
he was so disastrously beaten back on the 1st of July. 

McClellan’s retreat was in the following order: At noon on the 28th, 
Keyes, who lay nearest, crossed White Oak Creek and took position on its 
opposite bank, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. These, 
which would have stretched for a distance of forty miles if drawn up in 


single line—accompanied by a herd of 2500 cattle—were got safely over, 
and proceeded on their way, Keyes's corps guarding the advance. They 
reached the James River without molestation on the morning of the 30th. 
Franklin and Porter followed from the rear by the same route, and were 
over on the morning of the 29th. At daybreak of this day Heintzelman 
and Sumner evacuated their works in front, falling back toward Savage’s 
Station, which they were to hold until night, and then to cross the swamp 
bv the upper road. A part of these several corps were to keep a line of 
battle fronting toward the creek to check pursuit from the rear, while oth¬ 
ers were to take position across the three roads, and so fronting toward Rich¬ 
mond, in order to protect the trains passing behind them from assault in 
flank. McClellan, having given general directions for the movements and 
positions of the troops, rode to the James to select the best position on that 
river, and to consult with the naval commanders there. 1 

On the morning of the 28th Lee was wholly at a loss what next to do. 
There was no force in front of him on his side of the Chickahominy; but 


1 McC. Rep.. 2A6-9C0. 
















































June, 1862.] 


FROM THE CH1CKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


371 




still McClellan might propose to cross the river lower down, and give bat¬ 
tle, in order to preserve his communications with the York River. The cav¬ 
alry, with Ewell’s division of Jackson’s command, were sent down to the 
railroad to observe the state of things there. As they approached, the few 
troops guarding the railroad passed the river, burning the bridge behind 
them. Ewell remained until evening, and then rejoined his command. Stu¬ 
art, with his cavalry, dashed down the railroad toward the White House, 
which they reached next morning. With him was the proprietor of that 
estate, Fitz-IIugh Lee, son of the Confederate commander. The house was 
in flames; nearly all the immense quantity of stores accumulated here had 
been removed, and were on their way to the James. 1 The abandonment of 
the railroad and the destruction of the bridge showed that no attempt would 
be made to hold that line; but still it might be McClellan’s purpose either 
to move upon Richmond or to reach the lower bridges on the Chielcahominy, 
cross the stream, and retreat down the Peninsula. Lee was therefore forced 
to wait until the intent of his opponent was developed. During the night 
it was evident that the Union army was in motion, and the Confederate 
pickets failing to detect any approach to the lower bridges, it became evi¬ 
dent that the retreat was toward the James River. So, early on the morn¬ 
ing of the 29th, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were ordered to cross the Chicka- 
nomiriy by the New Bridge, which had been rebuilt by Magruder during 
the night of the 27th, and, crossing in front of Richmond, to move down by 
the Central Road ; Magruder and Huger were to move by the Charles City 
Road, thus taking the Federal army on the flank; while Jackson at a later 
hour was to cross by the Grapevine Bridge, and move down near the right 
bank of the river, thus threatening the rear. 5 


SUNDAY, JUNE 29.—SAVAGE'S STATION. 

At dawn Magruder discovered that the Federal works at Fair Oaks were 
abandoned, and Sumner and Heintzelman were slowly falling back toward 
Savage’s Station. The works on the extreme right were held a little longer. 
An attack was made upon them, but it was repulsed, with a loss of 150. 3 * 
Magruder, in the mean time, followed cautiously down the railroad, opening 
a distant fire at intervals—Sumner’s retiring troops turning occasionally, 
and then keeping on the retreat. Late in the afternoon they had fallen 
back nearly to Savage's Station from the front and the right. Sumner and 
Heintzelman had been ordered to hold this point until nightfall, the posi¬ 
tions of each being assigned to them by McClellan. But Heintzelman aban¬ 
doned his position before the time, and crossed the swamp by the upper 
road, giving orders for the destruction of the ammunition and stores remain¬ 
ing at Savage’s Station which could not be carried off by the trains. The 
stores and provisions were piled up in a great pyramid and set on fire. The 
ammunition and shells were heaped upon a train, 
which, with steam up. was sent down the railroad to 
the Chickahorniny. Fire was set to the train, and 
before it reached the. site of the bridge it was ablaze, 
and the shells began to explode. So great was the 
momentum, that the engine and first car leaped clear 
across the chasm and landed on the opposite side. 


1 Smart (Let's Rep., i., 402; piv^s a blowing account of the 

quantity of munitions and stores destroyed hero. lie sttvs: “The 
conflagration had raped fearfully at the White House during the 
nieht previous, uhib explosions of shells rent the nir. I was in¬ 

formed that- , r >000 men hold the place. . . . Provisions and deli¬ 
cacies of every description lay in heaps, and the nn-n repaled them¬ 
selves on the frnits of the tropies ns well ns the snhstantials of 
the land. Larpe quantities of forage were left also. Nine large 
ba rges loaded with stores were on fire ns we approached. Im¬ 
mense numbers of tents, wagons, and cars in long trains, loaded, 
and five locomotives; a number of forges; quantifies of every spe¬ 
cies of quartermaster’s stores and property, making a total of many 
millions of dollars—all more or less destroyed.” Ingalls, the quar¬ 
termaster at the White House, however, testifies (Com. Rfp., 448): 

“There were no stores of any importance destroyed. There was 
some pork destroyed, and some whisky, belonging to the Commis¬ 
sary Department.* There were also the stores on one of the trains 
that I was going to send out at the time the rebels pot possession of 
the road. Most of the stores on that train were abandoned. All 
the vessels, with the exception of two or three barges which had 
been got close to the shore, were got off.” 

* Lee's Rep., i., 10. * Ibid., i., 169, 286. 


At the same instant the whole mass of powder ex¬ 
ploded, and the remaining cars plunged, shattered, 
into the mud of the river. 1 

Magruder, in the mean time, had been delayed 
by various contradictory orders, but at length came 
in sight of Sumner’s corps drawn up a little in 
front of Savage’s Station, and about half past five 
o’clock opened a sharp attack with artillery, sup¬ 
porting it by infantry. lie had one heavy gun 
mounted on a railroad car, protected from cannon- 
shot in front by a sloping iron roof, and from rifle¬ 
shot on the sides by thick walls of wood lined with 
iron. This contrivance, which the Confederates 
named “ the land Merrirnae,” was used with consid¬ 
erable effect. The action continued hot for more 
than two hours, when, darkness coming on, the 
firing ceased as if by common consent, neither side 
gaining any perceptible ground from the other, 
though the action was so close that firing was 
sometimes suspended on account of the impossibil¬ 
ity of distinguishing friends from foes. The num¬ 
bers actually engaged on either side were small. 
Magruder brought fairly into action only MeLnw’s 
two small brigades, numbering together 2250 men ; of these, 345 were killed 
and wounded. His entire loss was about 400. The loss on the Union side 
was considerably larger. Early next morning Magruder was ordered by 
Lee to cross over to the Newmarket Road in order to join in the flank at¬ 
tack of that day. Lee had counted in this action upon the co-operation of 
Jackson ; but he was delayed by the necessity of rebuilding a bridge in or¬ 
der to cross the Chickahorniny. Sumner’s stand had effected its object of 
delaying the enemy, and before midnight his force was on its way to White* 
Oak Swamp, leaving behind 2500 sick, wounded, and their attendants in the 
hospital at Savage’s Station. 2 


MONDAY, JUNE 30.-FRAZIER'S FARM. 

On the morning of the 29th Longstreet and A. P. Hill recrossed the Chick- 
ahominy at New Bridge, and after passing through the deserted Union lines, 
and going almost within sight of Richmond, headed the White Oak Swamp, 
went down the Darbytown Road, and encamped within striking distance of 
the centre of McClellan’s retreating column. They had made a forced march 
under a fierce sun, and many of the men dropped from the ranks in utter 
exhaustion. Magruder and Huger were marching to the same point by par¬ 
allel roads. Jackson and D. H. Hill crossed the Chickahorniny on the 30th, 
and followed straight upon the line of McClellan’s retreat to White Oak 
Swamp. In the mean while, Holmes, whose brigade was at Fort Darling, on 
the opposite side of the James River, was to cross with all his disposable 
force and join in the attack. McClellan’s whole force was stretched in a line 


* This retreat of Heintzelman has occasioned much censure. lie himself (McC. Rep., 261 ; 
Com. Rej)., 356) gives reasons for his movcnvnt which seem hardly reconcilable with each other. 
Sumner, he says, had taken a position in advance of that ordered, and “this movement of Gen¬ 
eral Sumner uncovering my right flank, it became necessary for me to retreat.” But imme¬ 
diately after he says that, after having been ordered to hold his position by Sumner, who was the 
commanding officer on the ground, he saw that Sumner and Franklin had “ more troops than 
could be brought into action judiciously,” and “the reason I left with my corps was that the 
ground wns so constructed that there were absolutely more troops there than could find room. 
The roads in their rear were filled with artillery and wagons. ... I knew that General Sumner 
had as many troops ns were necessary, ntid my corps, in case of a forced retreat, would only have 
rendered it more disastrous. . . . Sumner and Franklin had a very sharp action that afternoon, 
and repulsed the enemy.” Sumner (McC. Rep., 260) says: “When the enemy appeared on the 
Williamsburg road, I could not imagine why General Heintzelman did not attack him. and not 
till some time afterward did I learn, to my utter amazement, that General Heintzelman had re¬ 
treated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. This defection 
might have been attended with the most serious consequences; and although wc l>eat the enemy 
signally, and drove him from the field, wc should certainly have given him a more crushing blow 
if General Heintzelman had been there with his corps.” It is clear that not half of Sumner’s 
force was engaged. 

* McC. Rep., 259-262; Tree's Rep., i., 10, 160, 193, 290, 295, 298. No reliance can be placed 
upon the Confederate estimates of the Union loss in this action. Thus Mngraider (Lee's Rep., i., 
195) says: “I estimate the loss of the enemy to lie not less than 3000 killed and wounded; 
Scmmcs [who lost 53] reporting not less than 400 dond in his front alone;” while Kershaw, who 
was more hotly engaged, “turns (Ibid., i.,299) with pride and satisfaction to 500 dead of the en¬ 
emy left on the field” as evidence of the prowess of his troops. 


SAVAGES STATION ABANDONS!). 






























372 


[June, 1362. 



eight miles long from the swamp to Malvern Hill, on the James; protected 
by this line, his artillery and trains were slowly floundering over difficult 
roads. 

Lee’s plan of battle for this day was an illustration of grand strategy—the 
only one deserving the name during the whole campaign. His purpose was 
to make an attack in column upon McClellan’s long line, break through it I 
at the centre, hurl the left back upon Jackson, and assault the right in the I 
rear. To accomplish this plan, his whole strength—more than 80,000 men | 
—were so situated that they might apparently be concentrated at the right 
moment upon the given point: Jackson upon the rear, all the rest upon the 
flank. The plan failed because the force could not be brought together in 
time; and instead of the attack being made by the whole, the action on his 
side was confined wholly to Longstreet and A. P. Hill, with 18,000 men; 
and in place of a grand and decisive battle, there were a series of combats, 
in which each brigade on both sides engaged almost without concert. From 
the accounts, more or less at variance, and all incomplete, we have to at¬ 
tempt to set forth the leading points in this fierce but desultory conflict. 1 

Holmes, joined by Wise, crossed the James with 7000 men, mostly fresh 
North Carolinians, and on the morning of the 30th came within sight of 
McClellan’s retreating column, upon whom, in the afternoon, he opened fire 
from a distance. A few rounds of artillery and a few shells from the gun¬ 
boats scattered his force, the cavalry and artillery breaking into a wild stam¬ 
pede, and riding over and through the infantry. Two were killed, forty-one 
wounded, and several others seriously hurt by being run over by the cav¬ 
alry and artillery. Holmes and Wise made no farther appearance in this 
campaign, but the day after the battle of Malvern marched quietly back to 
their encampments across the James. 

Jackson reached the White Oak Creek at noon. He found the bridge 
destroyed and the approaches covered by artillery from the opposite side. 

In vain he attempted to repair it all through the afternoon. The men would 
not work under the heavy fire to which they' were exposed. He was but 
two miles distant from the fierce battle in which Longstreet and Hill were 
engaged, and the noise of it could be distinctly heard; but he was power¬ 
less to aid the attack in which he had been expected to bear so prominent 
a part. 

Longstreet ami A. P. Hill resumed their march down the Darby town Road 
in the morning, and about noon came in sight of a part of the Union line 
drawn up, its centre at Frazier’s Farm, near a point where a road leading to 
the James River crosses the roads coming from Richmond, by which they 
were advancing. Huger was supposed to be coming down the Charles City | 
Road, two miles on the right. f 

The whole Union line was so long that it was unoccupied in portions. 3 
At this point McCall was in the centre, with Kearney on the left, and Hook- § 
er, then Sumner, on the right. McCall was somewhat advanced, and upon * * 
his division, weakened by the two battles in which it had been engaged, the 
first onset fell. I 

After some skirmishing, at about four o’clock Longstreet made the onset c 
with the fiery impetuosity which he ever manifested. The first attack was ' 
made by Kemper’s brigade, which had not yet been engaged, it having been | 
the only one held in reserve at Cold Harbor. The brigade was driven back, 
losing 250 killed and wounded, and nearly 200 prisoners—a quarter of its 
whole number. Its place was taken by others, who, in greater force, dashed 
upon the same point. They swept in the Union line for a space, but were 
checked by Hooker and forced back. Th'is was on McCall’s left. All the 
force of Longstreet and Hill now rushed in, each brigade commander appar¬ 
ently acting for himself. Foiled at one point, they dashed upon another, de¬ 
termined to break the line somewhere. At last, Wilcox’s Alabama brigade 
leading, they poured over a swampy stream and through a dense wood, and 
across an open field upon McCall’s right, straight in the teeth of his batteries. 

Of this charge McCall says : 2 “ On the right, Randall’s battery was charged 
upon by the enemy in great force, and with a reckless impetuosity I never 
saw equaled. They advanced at a run over a space of six hundred yards 
of open ground. The guns of the battery mowed them down, yet they nev¬ 
er paused. A volley of musketry was poured into them at a short distance 
by the 4th regiment, in support of the battery, but it did not check them for 
an instant; they dashed on, and pistoled and bayoneted the cannoniers at 
their guns. Part of the 4th regiment gave way; the remainder,however, 
with part of the 7th regiment in their rear, then coming forward, stood their 
ground like heroes. As I was with the baUery at the time, it was my for¬ 
tune to witness, in the bayonet fight that there took place, such a display of 
reckless daring on the part of the Alabamians, and of unflinching courage 
on the part of the Pennsylvanians, as is rarely beheld. My men were, how¬ 
ever, overpowered and borne off the ground. The battery was taken, but 
immediately after abandoned by the enemy, who rapidly retired. Just be¬ 
fore sunset, Cooper’s battery in front of the centre was, after several charges 
had been repulsed, finally taken by the enemy, but only to be retaken by 
the 9th regiment in a most glorious charge.” 

Wilcox says : 3 “ The enemy’s battery had an open field of fire, the ground 
being perfectly level. The 11th Alabama advanced, and, entering upon the 
open field, came on the battery, which began a rapid fire of grape and canis¬ 
ter. The regiment did not halt an instant, but continued to advance, stead¬ 
ily and rapidly, without firing, until it approached within two hundred yards 
of the battery, when it gave loud cheers and made a rush for the "guns. 
Halting in front of it for an instant, they fire upon the battery* and infantry 


1 Our anthnrHc* nrc : I>c (1st'* Rep., i., 10), Longstreet (//. itl. y i., 125), A. P. Hill (7bid. i. 
177), Jacks*»n (/AW., i.. 134), and Report* of flic several Confederate brigade commanders en¬ 
gaged, all given in Lees Report; McClellan’s Report (p. 265-269); the testimony of Heintzel- 
raan, Sumner, and McCall (Com. Rep., 357, 365, 586). 

* Cbm. Rep., 558. » Iju'* Rep., i., 842. 























































FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


373 


June, 1862.] 




immediately in rear of it, and then make a success¬ 
ful charge upon and take it. .... The enemy, at 
first repulsed and driven from the battery, retire to 
the woods, and deliver a terrible and destructive 
fire upon this regiment. With its ranks sadly 
thinned, it heroically stands its ground. The ene¬ 
my, now seeing this regiment isolated and unsup¬ 
ported, advance from their cover against it. The 
sword and bayonet are freely used; many of the 
men received and gave in return bayonet wounds. 

There are no supports for them; no re-enforcc- 
ments come, and they are at length forced to 3 'ield 
and retire to the woods in the rear, having left 
upon the field and around the battery in dead alone 
eight officers, of whom seven were captains or lieu¬ 
tenants commanding companies, and forty-nine pri¬ 
vates.” 

The battle raged with almost equal fury along 
the whole line. Hill, on the Confederate left, press¬ 
ed forward his brigades in a mass, and gained 
ground at first, capturing two full batteries, which 
he retained; but he was unable to gain any ground 
permanently, and at last it became apparent that 
Hooker and Kearney, on their right and left, were slowly gaining, while the 
earlier repulse of McCall’s flanks had been retrieved, and his centre remain¬ 
ed unbroken. Lee, indeed,says: 1 “The enemy had been driven with great 
slaughter from every position save one, which he maintained until he was 
enabled to withdraw under cover of darkness. At the close of the struggle 
nearly the entire field remained in our possession.” Longstreet reports: 2 
“The enemy was driven back slowly and steadily, contesting the ground 
inch by inch. He succeeded in getting some of his batteries off the field, 
and, by holding his last position till dark, in withdrawing his forces under 
cover of night.” Sumner errs equally on the other side. He savs: 3 “After 
a furious contest, lasting till dark, the enemy was routed at all points, and 
driven from the field.” There was no rout; though, as most of the Confed¬ 
erate brigade commanders report, their brigades were greatly shattered. A. 
P. Hill* gives the true account of the condition when darkness closed the 
struggle: “On our extreme right matters seemed to be going badly. Two 
brigades of Longstreet’s division had been roughly handled, and had fallen 
back. Archer was brought up and sent in, and in his shirt sleeves leading 
his gallant brigade, affairs were soon restored in that quarter. About dark 
the enemy were pressing us hard along our whole line, and my last reserve, 
General J. R. Anderson,Avas directed to advance cautiously. Heavy re-en¬ 
forcements to the enemy were brought up at this time, and it seemed that a 
tremendous effort was being made to turn the fortunes of the battle. The 
volume of fire that, approaching, rolled along the line, was terrific. Seeing 
some troops of Wilcox’s brigade who had rallied, they were rapidly re-form¬ 
ed, and, being directed to cheer long and loudly, moved again to the fight. 
This seemed to end the contest, for in less than five minutes all firing ceased, 
and the enemy retired.” 

The Confederates captured in the earlier part of the action about 20 guns, 
and lost about 300 prisoners. Their loss in killed and wounded exceeded 
that of their opponents. Their two divisions kept a part of the field after 
their enemy had retired, thus holding the honors of the battle; but they 
were so fearfully shattered, here and before, that not a man of them was 
brought into the greater fight fought next day at Malvern. A.P. Hill had 
crossed the Chicknhominy four days before with 14,000 men, and at Me- 
ehanicsville, Cold Harbor, and*Frazier’s Farm had lost 4000 in killed and 
wounded. Longstreet had crossed with 10,000, and at Cold Harbor and 
here lost 4200. Some of his brigades had more than half their number 
killed and wounded. Wilcox carried 1850 into action at Cold Harbor; in 
the two battles he lost 1035. Pryor had 1400, and lost 850. 

Accounts current at the time represent the division of McCall as having 


■ Kee'iRep.,i.,U. * rind., i, 126. 1 Mr.C. lirp.. 2fi8 4 Mt Rep., i., 177. 


IUYOSET FIGHT AT HttZlUl'U FARM. 

been thoroughly routed on this field. Parts of it were indeed shattered 
and broken ; but, as a division, it fought bravely and held its ground firm- 
13 '. Of the whole army it alone had fought in two battles—Mechanicsvills 
and Cold Harbor. Here it was opposed to the first onset and the severest 
brunt of the fight. Meade, then leading one of its brigades, and a year aft¬ 
er, lacking two da 3 's, to command the whole Army of the Potomac down to 
the close of the war, claimed for this division no more than its rightful due 
when he wrote: “It was only the stubborn resistance offered by our divi¬ 
sion, prolonging the contest till after dark, and checking till that time the 
advance of the enemy, that enabled the concentration during the night of 
the whole army on the James River, which saved it.”* After the battle was 
over, McCall, riding out into the darkness, fell in with a regiment of the en¬ 
emy and was captured. He had been almost the whole day under the hot¬ 
test fire, escaping unharmed, though every one of his staff was killed or 
wounded. 

TUESDAY, JULY 1.—MALVERN HILL. 

The battle at Frazier’s Farm was hardly over when the Union forces 
again took up their retreat toward Malvern Hill, the point selected for re¬ 
sisting the farther advance of the enemy. The rear of the wagons and re¬ 
serve artillery had arrived there about four in the afternoon. Soon after 
daylight the last division was in, and the post of each was assigned. 

The position was admirably chosen for a defensive battle. Malvern Hill 
is an elevated plateau, a mile and a half long and half as broad, the top 
nearly free from woods. It slopes gently toward the north and east down 
to the verge of a thick forest; westward it falls more abruptly into a ravine, 
which extends to the James River. All along the front are ravines, render¬ 
ing the approach difficult except by the roads which cross them. On the 
crest of the hill seven heavy siege guns had been placed in position, and the 
reserve artillery was so posted that a concentrated fire of sixty guns could 
be brought to bear upon any point in front or on the left, the direction from 
which the enemy must advance to the attack. Here the main force was 
massed. The right, less strongly held, curved backward through a wooded 
region to the James. Both flanks thus rested upon the river, and were pro¬ 
tected b 3 r the gun-boats. Porter’s corps was on the left; then Heintzel- 
man's, a part of Keyes’s, Sumner’s, Franklin’s, and last, on the extreme 
right, the remainder of Keyes’s. 

Jackson crossed the "White Oak Creek, and followed in the track of the 
retreating army. At Frazier’s Farm he found Lee, who ordered him to 
press forward; at 9 o’clock, coming in sight of the Union line, lie took up 
his position, Whiting on the left, then Ewell; D. II. Hill being on the right, 
who was thus brought in front of Hooker, near the Union centre. Hill was 
within range of the artillery on the plateau, and 
suffered severely. “Anderson's brigade was rough¬ 
ly handled, he being wounded and borne from the 
field.” The division was then halted, and the Un¬ 
ion position reconnoitred. 2 “ The Yankees,” sa 3 'S 
Hill, 3 “ were found to be strongly posted on a com¬ 
manding hill, all the approaches to which could.be 
swept by his artillery, and were guarded b 3 ' swarms 
of infantry, securely sheltered by fences, ditches, 
and ravines. Tier after tie/ of batteries were grim¬ 
ly visible on the plateau, rising in the form of an 


1 Com. Rep., 589. 

2 McClellan thus describes this part of the engagement : 
•‘About 3 P.M. n heavy fire of artillery opened upon Kearney’s 
left and Couch’s division, speedily followed up bv n brisk attack 
of infantry on Couch’s front. The artillery was replied to with 
good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch’s division re¬ 
mained lying on the ground until the advancing column was 
within short musketry range, when they sprang to their feet, and 
poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking 
force, and drove them in disorder hack over their own ground. 
This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right 
of our lines some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a 
thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better 
fire. Shortly after 4 o’clock the firing ceased along the whole 
front, hut no disposition w as evinced on the part of the enemy to 
withdraw from our front.”— McC. Rep., 271. 

• Lee’s Rep., i., 186. 


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BATTERY D., FIFTH U. S. ABTILLERY, AT FRAZIER’S FARM. 































































FIRST MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY AT FRAZIER'S FARM. 








































































876 


[July, is62. 



TUK OUN-UOATS AT UALVK&N U1LU 


amphitheatre. We could only reach the first line of bat¬ 
teries by traversing an open space of from three to four 
hundred yards, exposed to a murderous fire of grape and 
canister from the artillery and musketry from the infantry. 

If that was carried, another and another, still more diffi¬ 
cult, remained in rear. I had expressed my disapproba¬ 
tion of a farther pursuit of the Yankees to the command¬ 
ing general, and to Generals Jackson and Longstreet, even 
before I knew of the strength of their position. An ex¬ 
amination satisfied me that an attack would be hazardous.” 

But Lee was resolved that his grand stroke of strategy 
should not fail. He sent a note to each of his division 
commanders ordering an assault. That brief note of forty 
words cost him more than 4000 men. 1 

Huger bad been directed to march down the Charles 
City Bond and join Longstreet and A. P. Hill in the battle 
of the 30th. He failed to reach the point in time. Next 
day he tried to move forward, but got entangled among 
the other divisions, and finally lost his way. He had had 
the same misfortune a month ago at Seven Pines; and 
now, when his divisions came up, they were one by one 
taken from him and given to Magruder, and formed a part 
of his command during the battle. At first he was in¬ 
clined to ignore the arrangement, and even directed one of his brigade com¬ 
manders not to place himself under Magruder; 2 but his order was disregard¬ 
ed, and he could only remonstrate afterward against the slight which had 
been put upon him, not for the first time. After the battle was over he was 
suffered to direct his division in removing the wounded and burying the 
dead. 3 

The afternoon was now wearing away when Lee ordered the artillery at¬ 
tack which he hoped would break the Union lines. “ But, instead of one 
or two hundred pieces, only a single battery opened, and that was knocked 
to pieces in a few minutes; and one or two others shared the same fate of 
being beaten in detail.” Hill knew not what to do. He “wrote to Jackson 
that the firing from the batteries was of the most farcical character;” 4 and 
received for reply that he must advance as ordered upon hearing the shout 
from Armistead. At length, an hour and a half before sunset, be heard 
shouting and firing on his right, and, supposing this to be the signal, urged 
his whole division forward. He shall tell the story of his charge in his own 
words, somewhat abridged : 

“ We advanced alone; neither Whiting on the left, nor Magruder or Hu¬ 
ger on the right, moved forward an inch. The division fought heroically, 
but fought in vain. Garland, in my immediate front, showed all his wonted 
courage, but he needed and asked for re-enforcements. I found Toombs’s 
brigade in our rear, and ordered it to support Garland, and accompanied it. 
The brigade advanced handsomely to the brow of the hill, but soon retreat¬ 
ed in disorder. Gordon pushed gallantly forward and gained considerable 
ground, but was forced back. Ripley’s brigade was streaming to the rear. 
Colquitt’s and Anderson’s brigades had also fallen back. Ransom’s brigade 
had come up to my support from Huger; a portion of it had come, but with¬ 
out its brigadier. It moved too far to the left, and became mixed up with 
the mass of troops there, suffering heavily, and effecting little. Winder was 
sent up by Jackson, but he came too late, and also went to the same belt of 
woods already overcrowded with troops. Finally Ewell came up, but it was 
after dark, and nothing could be accomplished. I advised him to hold his 
ground, and not to attempt a forward movement.”* Hill lost in this action, 

1 Lee’s note, given in Report , i., 212. See also p. 185, 199. “Batteries have been established 

to act upon the enemy’s lines. If they are broken, as is probable, Armistead. who can witness 
the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a veil. Do the same.” 

3 Lee's Rep., i., 200, 212, 868. 

3 “My brigades were, during the action, under the immediate command of General Magruder. 
As they were sent forward into the battle at Malvern Hill, I was directed to report them to anoth¬ 
er commander. As I was treated in the same manner at Seven Pine*:, I can only hope this course 
was accidental, and required by the necessities of the service. I therefore make no report, and re¬ 
fer to reports of others for details of the battle of Malvern Hill. After this battle, as required, 
the division was occupied, under my orders, in removing the wounded and burying the dead.” 
—Huger, in Lee's Rejt., i., 149. 4 D. H. Hill, in fee's Rep., i., 186. 4 Ibid. 


lasting only an hour and a half, of his own division, 336 killed and 1373 
wounded. 1 

McClellan thus describes this part of the engagement: 

“ At six o’clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with 
the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his 
columns of attack to carry the bill. Brigade after brigade, formed under 
cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our 
batteries; but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys 
of our infantry, in every case sent them back reeling to shelter, and covered 
the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry 
withheld their fire until the attacking columns, which rushed through the 
storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few 
yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed for¬ 
ward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the rout¬ 
ed columns in confusion from the field.” 2 

Hill was mistaken in supposing that “ neither Magruder nor Huger moved 
forward an inch,” and in afterward reiterating, “So far as I can learn, none 
of our troops drew trigger excepting McLaw’s, mine, and a portion of Hu- 
ger’s.” McLaw’s division was a part of Magruder’s command ; and all this 
time Magruder, with the whole of his own and Huger’s force, was engaged 
in a fierce conflict on the right. From them came the shouting and firing 
which Hill supposed to be the signal for his own advance. To this attack 
by Magruder, as well as to that by Hill, belongs McClellan’s account just 
quoted. So close were they in space and time that, viewed from the oppo¬ 
site lines, they appeared as parts of one movement. 

Magruder, after a weary and harassing march from the battle-field at 
Savage’s Station, was ordered by Lee to attack on the right of Hill, who 
was in position. He found Armistead, of Huger’s division, awaiting the ar¬ 
rival of artillery. Magruder sent back to hurry it up, and pushed on some 
of his troops within range of a heavy fire. Just then he received a copy of 
Lee’s note, ordering him, as soon as he heard the yell from Armistead, to 
“do the same,” and charge. Armistead had driven in some skirmishers, and 
yelled. Lee, supposing that the Union line was broken, and that the troops 
were retreating, wrote to Magruder to advance and cut them off. 3 ne at¬ 
tempted to carry out the order. His plan was “ to hurl about 15,000 men 
upon the enemy’s batteries and supporting infantry; to follow up any suc¬ 
cesses they might obtain; and, if unable to drive the enemy from his strong 
position, to continue the fight in front by pouring in fresh troops, and, in case 
they were repulsed, to hold strongly the line of battle where I stood, to pre¬ 
vent serious disaster to our arms.” 4 But in a short time his whole force 
was engaged, breasting a terrific fire of artillery and musketry. “The bat¬ 
tle-field,” says Magruder, “ was enveloped in smoke, 
relieved only by flashes from the lines of the con¬ 
tending troops. Round shot and grape crashed 
through the woods; and shells of enormous size, 
which reached far beyond the head-quarters of our 
gallant commander-in-chief, burst amidst the artil¬ 
lery parked in the rear. Belgian missiles and 
Minid balls lent their aid to this scene of surpass¬ 
ing grandeur and sublimity.” This determined 
attack failed in making any impression upon the 
Union lines or in disturbing a single battery. The 
Federal troops had no occasion to leave their strong 
position. It was quite sufficient to mow down the 
enemy with artillery as they advanced. When 
darkness set in, Magruder “concluded to let the 
battle subside,” and his wearied men sank down to 
sleep on the spot they had reached. Some of them 
were within a hundred yards of the Union bat¬ 
teries. 


' It,id., i., 307. * McC. Rcjt., 271. 

3 Lee to Magruder, in Lee's Rep., i., 210: “General Lee ex¬ 
pects you to advance rapidly. It is reported that the enemy is 
petting off. Press forward your whole line and follow up Armi- 
8tead’6 successes.” 4 Magruder, in fee’s Rep., i., 200. 



THE BATTLE (JK MALVKBN HILL. 









































FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


Jvlt, 1862.] 


Ill 


Of these closing scenes, as viewed from the other 
side, McClellan writes: “About 7 o’clock, as fresh 
troops were accumulating in front of Porter and 
Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their 
brigades to relieve stick regiments of Porter’s corps 
and Couch’s division as had expended their ammu¬ 
nition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed 
forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. 

Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take 
the position so tenaciously defended; but, despite 
his superior numbers, his repeated and desperate at¬ 
tacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness 
ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though it was not 
until after 9 o’clock that the artillery ceased its 
fire.” 1 

The Confederates were indeed repulsed fearfully 
—and, had McClellan only known it and followed 
up his advantage—disastrously. 2 But the superior 
forces of the enemy existed, as they had for months, 
only in the imagination of the Union commander. 

Neither Longstreet nor A.P. Hill had a man in this 
action. Jackson’s own command was not engaged 
in the attack, though all of it was within the range 
of our guns, and suffered a loss of just 41 killed and 363 wounded by the 
distant fire. 3 D. H. Hill’s division, reduced to less than 8000, and Magru- 
der’s and Huger’s, then not exceeding 20,000, were all. 4 * 

General Trimble thus describes the condition of the Confederate army on 
the morning after the battle: 6 “The next morning,by dawn, I went off to 
ask for orders, when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder. Thou¬ 
sands of straggling men were asking every passer-by for their regiments; 
ambulances, wagons, and artillery obstructing every road, and altogether, in 
a drenching rain, presenting a scene of the most woeful and heart-rending 
confusion.” The very show of an attack upon such an army by the un¬ 
broken Union force must have defeated it. But there was in the mind of 
its commander no thought of an attack. When, in the morning, the Confed¬ 
erates looked up the hill which they had so vainly attempted to scale, they 
saw not a trace of the grim batteries and serried lines which had confronted 
them the night before. In the storm and darkness the Union army had fled 
from a victory as though it had been a rout. 

McClellan had “perceived that the position at Malvern Hill was the key 
to our operations in that quarter.” 6 His whole army was concentrated here, 
having during the actions and retreat suffered far less loss than it had in¬ 
flicted. Here he had wisely resolved to give battle; and yet before the bat¬ 
tle was fought he had begun the retreat, and as soon as the “complete vic¬ 
tory” was won, the troops were on the march, abandoning the key to the 
position. 7 Hitherto the retreat had been orderly, but for this last seven 
miles it presented the aspect of the flight of a routed army. 8 Keyes, who 
was to form the rear-guard, was instructed: “Bring along all the wagons 
you can; but they are to be sacrificed, of course, rather than imperil your 
safety. Celerity of movement is the sole security of this position.” Next 
day, while the retreat was going on, the chief of staff wrote to Keyes: “ It 
is of the utmost importance that we should save all our artillery and as 
many of our wagons as possible. If you bring in every thing you will ac¬ 
complish a most signal and meritorious exploit, which the commanding gen¬ 
eral will not fail to represent in its proper light to the Department.” 9 On 
the 3d, McClellan wrote to the Secretary of War that the army was thor¬ 
oughly worn out, and required rest and very heavy re-enforcements; but he 
hoped that the enemy was equally worn out. He hoped the army would 
have breathing space before it was attacked again. It was impossible then 
to estimate the losses, but he doubted whether there were more than fifty 
thousand men with their colors. To “ accomplish the task of capturing 
Richmond,” re-enforcements should be sent to him “rather much over than 
less than one hundred thousand men.” 10 

This' hasty and disorderly retreat was performed with little molestation 
from the enemy. Stuart’s cavalry, who had rejoined Lee after the battle, 
followed after, through the storrn, making a few captures of straggling men 
and abandoned arms. Some of the Confederate infantry followed cautious¬ 
ly, and on the 3d came near enough to throw a few shells at the rear-guard, 



THE BE TREAT FROM MALVERN. 


■ MrC. Rep., 272. 

* Some days after the retreat from Malvern Hill McClellan proposed to renew the movement 

upon Richmond, if he could have a re-enforcemem of 20,000 men. In reply to the question, “In 
what do you consider yonr chances of success would have been greater, with the addition of 
20,000 to' the number which you had at Harrison’s Landing, than they were when you were in 
front of Richmond, and b-foro Jackson had formed a junction with the rest of the rebel furces?" 
he answered: “ I should have counted upon the effect of the battles which - had just taken place 
upon the enemy. We had then strong reason to believe that the enemy's losses had been heavier 
than our own, and that portions of his army were very much demoralized, especially after the but¬ 
tle of Malvern Hill.”— Com. Ref t., 438. * /.re's Rep., i., 307. 

* Magrndcr. indeed, says ( Lee's Rep., t.,202) that “there was a force of 26.000 or 28.000 under 

my orders engaged and under fire.” But he must have considered himself in command of the 
whole field, and so have included D. H. Hill's division. For he repeatedly states that his own di¬ 
vision and that of Huger together numbered, at the outset, only 25.000; of these fully 800 had 
been killed and wounded at Golding's, Price's, ami Savage's Station, and many of his men gave 
out in the march before reaching Malvern Hill. As one example out of many scattered through 
the minor Confed -rate reports. General Howell Cohb says (Aee's Rep., i., 279) that his brigade 
“commenced the march on the morning of the 29th of June with 2700 men, but fatigue and ex¬ 
haustion had so reduced our ranks that less than 1500 were carried into the battle of the 1st of 
Julv.” Of his own division and Huger’s. Magrnder could not have had more than 18,000 or 
20,000 at Malvern Hill. 4 Lee's Rep., i., 314. • Ibid., 264.^ 

1 The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison’s Land¬ 
ing dnring the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops 
was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill.—/tutA. 273. 

* “ We were ordered to retreat, and it was like the retreat of a routed army. We retreated like 
a parcel of sheep; every one was on the road at the same time, and a few shots from the rebels 
would have panic-stricken the whole command.”— Hooker's Testimony, Com. Rep., fiff 

* Ibid., 611, 612. 10 Ibid., 342. 


but were quickly dispersed by a fire from the batteries and gun-boats. But 
no serious attempt at annoyance was made; and after passing a few days 
near the battle-field of Malvern, burying the dead and gathering abandoned 
property, the Confederates, on the 8th, retired to Richmond. McClellan felt 
himself in a condition, on the 7th, to write to the President that his position 
was very strong, and daily becoming more so; if not attacked that day he 
should laugh at the enemy; his men were in splendid spirits, and anxious 
to try it again. Meanwhile the President was to alarm himself as little as 
possible, and, above all, must not lose confidence in the army. 1 

With the battle of Malvern Hill properly closed the campaign on the 
Peninsula. To the errors which marked its earlier period, as conducted by 
McClellan, we advert but briefly. They arose mainly from the exaggerated 
estimates which he made of the forces opposed to him. Thus, at the close 
of October, 1861, when the Confederates had at and around Centreville only 
40,000 or 50,000, he believed that they numbered 150,000; when they aban¬ 
doned this point, he put their numbers at 115,000 instead of 50,000. He 
was held in check at Yorktown for weeks by 11,000, 20,000, and finally 
53,000, instead of 100,000, “and possibly more,”as he believed. While ly¬ 
ing idle in the Chickahominy swamps, confronted, as he thought, by a supe¬ 
rior force, there was not a day up to the battle of Fair Oaks when his strength 
was not greater by half than that of the enemy. And when at length Lee 
had gathered all his re-enforcements, including Jackson, his utmost effective 
strength was barely 100,000, instead of the 180,000 or 200,000 which McClel¬ 
lan attributed to him, his own force being fully as great. 

Into the six days—which have somehow passed into history as the Seven 
Days—from June 26 to July 1, in which this ill-starred campaign culmina¬ 
ted, were concentrated on both sides more grave errors than can elsewhere 
be found in modern military history. 

Of Lee’s initial error in dividing his arm)', which should have lost him 
every thing, we have already spoken. The wild attack upon the strong 
Union position at Beaver Dam Creek can be justified only on the ground 
that it was made in utter ignorance of his own force at that point, and of 
that opposed to him. It finds its parallel upon a larger scale in our own at¬ 
tack upon Fredericksburg, six months later. 

The battle of Cold Harbor was fought upon the Union side without any 
assignable object. McClellan indeed says : 2 “ The objects sought for had 
been attained. The enemy was held at bay, our siege-guns and material 
were saved, and the right wing bad now joined the main body of the army.” 
But the material had all been saved hours before the action commenced. 
The very last of the siege-guns was carried off at sunrise, half past four, and 
it was not till “after noon that the enemy were discovered approaching in 
force, and it soon became evident that the entire position was to be attack¬ 
ed.” 3 Here were fully eight hours of daylight during which Porter’s and 
McCall’s troops, unencumbered by trains, could have crossed wholly with¬ 
out molestation. Any two or three hours of that time would have been am¬ 
ply sufficient for the purpose. In the darkness, and after the fatigue and 
confusion of a lost battle, the crossing was effected in three or four hours by 
half more men. The crossing might indeed have been made during the 
night of the 26th, and the right wing, entirely fresh, with the exception of 
McCall’s division, which had won the fight at Beaver Dam Creek, might 
have been with the main body of the army on the right bank of the Chick¬ 
ahominy, in the very position where McClellan had been for weeks trying 
to place them; with the wholly unexpected advantage that the force of the 
enemy was divided, with the whole Union army and the impassable Chick¬ 
ahominy between the portions. With the bridges destroyed, and the ap¬ 
proaches covered by artillery, the whole Confederate force on the left bank 
of the Chickahominy, for at least two days, was wholly useless for the de¬ 
fense of Richmond. 

This battle was not fought to preserve the communications with the White 
House, for on the day before orders had been given to abandon that base, 4 

■ Tree's Rep., i., 13,136. 404: MrC. Rep., 279. 4 MrC. Rep., 249. 

* /Aid., 247. According lo nil Confederate accounts, they were not in position to open the at- 

tack nmil nearly two o’clock. 

4 Ibid., 243. McClellan intimates that this was done in consequence of the operations of th« 

27th. He says (Ibid., 254): “The operations of this day [the 27th] proved the numerical supe¬ 

riority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left bank of thn 








878 


[July, 1862. 


and unite the whole force on the right bank. The reasons which McClellan 
assigns for not effecting this junction on the left bank are valid, and it is only 
to be wondered at that, after having got his whole army together on the 
right bank during the night of the 27th, he should even have suggested the 
idea of recrossing with his whole force and giving battle on the other side. 
His whole army was now just where it should have been long before, wheth¬ 
er for advance or for retreat. But the reasons which he assigns for failing 
to advance upon Richmond are wholly invalid, not only in view of what is 
now known, but in view of what was or should have been known at the 
time. “ The enemy,” he repeats, “ was in our rear, and there was every rea¬ 
son to believe that he would sever our communications with our supply d 6- 
pot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations; 
and if we had advanced directly to Richmond, it would have required con¬ 
siderable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our 
men would have been destitute of food; and even if Richmond had fallen 
before our arms, the enemy could still have occupied our supply communi¬ 
cations between that place and our gun-boats, and turned their disaster into 
victory.” But, as we have seen, the communications had already been aban¬ 
doned. The whole army was furnished with supplies on the right bank of 
the Chickahominy for at least a fortnight. After destroying an immense 
amount of stores, which the train, forty miles long, was unable to convey, 
the army was fed, until it reached Harrison’s Landing, a period of seven 
days, from what it carried with it. Even then “some portions of the army 
had still some rations left.” 1 * The supplies could hy no means have been ex¬ 
hausted; for, besides the amount remaining in the wagons when the army 
retreated from Malvern Hill to Harrison’s Landing, “ the large herd of 2500 
beef cattle was transferred to the James River without loss.”* A few hours’ 
combat on the 28tb or 29th of June must have resulted in the capture of 
Richmond. The victorious army, besides the supplies which it would have 
captured there, would have been in a condition to have drawn its supplies 
from its new and better base, while the Confederate army on the left bank 
of the Chickahominy would have been wholly destitute of supplies from any 
source. 

There was not the slightest occasion for leaving Porter and McCall as a 
forlorn hope, merely to hold a superior force at bay for a few hours. The 
battle of Cold Harbor was one which might either have been accepted or 
avoided. But, if accepted, there was no reason why it should have been 
fought with forces so inadequate as to render defeat a foregone conclusion. 
Ten thousand out of three times the number of men unemployed within hear¬ 
ing, and almost within sight of the battle, would have changed the issue of 
the day. With these Cold Harbor would have been a victory instead of a 
defeat. 

The Union army was united during the night of the 27th ; the Confeder¬ 
ate force was separated, the Chickahominy River and swamp lying between 
the two portions. The operations of the day showed that the main Confed¬ 
erate force was on the left bank. Whether the Union army was to en¬ 
deavor to take Richmond, or was to retreat to the James River, and there 
to find a new and better base, the first thing was to keep the force of the en¬ 
emy apart. This was all the more imperative now that it was determined 
to retreat. To do this long enough to secure that the retreat should be un¬ 
molested, it was only necessary to thoroughly destroy the bridges. This 
was done so imperfectly that it might as well not have been done at all. 
The bridges, which it had cost weeks to build, were so little damaged that 
they were repaired in hours. New Bridge was .rebuilt by Magruder during 
the night of the 27th, without opposition, right under the guns of the Union 
batteries, and over this Longstreet and A. P. Hill crossed. The Grape¬ 
vine Bridge, over which Sumner had so hardly passed a month before to re¬ 
pair the defeat at Seven Pines and win the victory at Fair Oaks, was left so 
little damaged that Jackson reconstructed it in a few hours of the night of 
the 29th. The thorough destruction of these two bridges would have kept 
the Confederate force, then across the Chickahominy, on that side long 
enough to have enabled the retreating army to have gained its new position 
without another battle. 

But the Union army had no commander. From the moment when 
McClellan learned of the approach of Jackson, he seems to have lost head 
and heart. Having resolved to retreat instead of to advance, he posted his 
troops each morning, and his corps commanders saw no more of him for the 
day. He was busy selecting positions and expediting the passage of trains; 
doing the work of an engineer rather than that of a general. Each com¬ 
mander of a corps was left to himself to do the best he could. Except at 
Malvern Hill, the commanding general was not even constructively on the 
field at any important moment during the whole campaign. He was not 
present during the battles at Williamsburg or Hanover Court-house, at 
Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, at Cold Harbor, Savage’s Station, or Frazier’s 
Farm. Few of his generals even saw him at Malvern. 3 


Chickahominy, which had already turned our right, and was in position to intercept the commu¬ 
nications with our ddpofs at the White House, he was also in large force between our army and 
Kichmond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces." 

1 Ingall’s Testimony, Com. Rep ., 449. 3 McC. Rep., 256. 

3 During the Seven Days’ Battles “ the corps commanders fought their troops entirely accord¬ 
ing to their own ideas. If any body nsked for re-enforcements. I sent them. If I wanted rc-cn- 
forccmcnts, I sent to others. . . . General Sumner fought the battle of Savage’s Station entirely 
himself. . . . Tho next day [Frazier’s Farm] General McClellan again posted his troops, and 
then went off to the James River. That battle was fought entirely by the corps commanders; at 
least, I received no directions myself. At Malvern Hill I received no orders from General 
McClellan after the troops were posted. . . . During that fight he was down at his head quar¬ 
ters on the James River. He came up some time late in the afternoon, and was with General 
1‘ortcr about half an hour. ... He was tho most extraordinary man I ever saw. I do not sco 
how any man could leave so much to others, and be so confident that every thing would go right.” 
—Heintzelman’s Testimony, in Com. Rep., 358, 359. Sumner testifies (/hid., 3G4, 365): “The 
action at Malvern commenced on the left at about ten o’clock in the morning. General McClel¬ 
lan bad deemed it necessary to go down to Harrison’s Landing to determine on the points to 



This plan indicates, in a general way, the positions and 
movements of the armies from June 25 to July 1. 

A. A. Union position at Mechnnioville, June 26. 

G. G. Union in trench meats before Richmond : a. Keyes; 

0. Heintzelmuo; r. Sumner; d. Franklin. 

H. H. Porter ami McCall,after crossing the Chickahominy 

b. R 

“ •» Cold Harbor, June 27. 


C. C. 

44 “ Savage’s Station, June 29. 


D. D. 

44 44 Frazier’s Fiirm, June 30. 


E. E. 

F. F. 

“ 44 Malvern Hill, July 1. 

“ 44 Harrison's Landing, July 4 

The retreat of the Union army was by the same line as 


Jackdoa'B march, after crossing the Chickahominy. 


Lee, unless he was greatly misinformed as to the strength of his opponent, 
or entertained the most profound contempt for his capacity, must have 
shared in Magruder’s feeling of relief when he learned, on the morning of 
the 29th, that the Union army, instead of moving upon Richmond, was in 
full retreat for the James River. The siege of Richmond was indeed raised 
for the time, but if the retreating army safely reached its new base, the be- 
leaguerment could be renewed under more favorable auspices. To secure 
any permanent advantage, this army mnst be signally defeated, or, at least, 
greatly crippled on its march. To effect this was the design of the move¬ 
ments of the 29th and 30th. If Lee had succeeded, as he proposed, in con¬ 
centrating 70,000 men on the afternoon of the 30th, half upon the flank and 
half in the rear,’ yet both so near as to constitute one body, his plan would 
have succeeded. . The plan failed from contingencies which should have 
been taken into account. The attacking force had to march twice as far as 
the retreating one, and over a country of which they were ignorant. The 

which the troops should retire. I therefore found myself, bv virtue of my seniority of rank, in 
command of the army, without having been formally invested with that command, or having re¬ 
ceived any instructions in relation to it. I received a note from General McClellan’s chief of staff 
to this effect, that any orders I gave on the field would be approved. About an hour or two 
afterward I received a verbal message from General McClellan. He was then down the river, 
two and n half miles from where the battle was going on. . . . Some time afterward General 
McClellan came on the field. I think he first went up on the left, and came down the line to¬ 
ward the right where I was. He stopped and conversed with me for some time, and then went 
down toward the right, in the direction of the river. I did not sec him again that day. About 
four o’clock that afternoon a very furious attack was made on our left again. That was the time 
when Magruder made the assault. . . . I do not know where General McClellan was during this 
second fight. I presume be was at his quarters. I do not know of bis being on the field.” 
McClellan says ( Rep ., 269): “General Barnard then [the night of the 30th June] received full 
instructions for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to HnxaU’s, and again left for 
Malvern, soon nftcr daybreak, accompanied hy sevcrnl general officers. I once more made the 
entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Ilaxull's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers 
to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious 
fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about 
the right , remained in that vicinity.” But he says, on the same page, ‘‘From tho jtosition of the 
enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come from tho directions of Richmond and Whito 
Onk Swamp, and would of necessity strike us upon our left wing.” There was no fighting on the 
right, in the vicinity of which General McClellan remained. 

1 “When I was taken prisoner I was conducted at once to Lee’s head-quarters. Here Long- 
strcct told me that they had 70,000 men bearing on that point, all of whom would probably arrive 
during the night.”—McCall, in Com. Rep., 588. 























Jolt, 1862.] 


FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES. 


379 


result was that the flank attack at Frazier’s Farm was made by 18,000 men 
instead of 40,000, while Jackson, who was to have assailed the rear with 
30,000, was held in check, utterly unable to cross the White Oak Creek. 1 
The neglect of Lee to acquire minute information of the character of the 
country is inexplicable. The entire operations were carried on within a 
dozen miles of the capital of the Confederacy. One would suppose that 
every rood of ground, and every road and military point, would long before 
have been accurately surveyed and mapped. Moreover, even during the 
siege, this region, on the south side of the Swamp, had never been occupied 
by the enemy. It is doubtful whether, with the exception of a single cav¬ 
alry reconnoisance in May, a single company of Union soldiers had crossed 
to the south side of the swamp until within a week. The first duty of a 
commander is to make himself acquainted with the country where he is to 
operate. If Napoleon owed to any one thing more than to another his mar¬ 
velous triumphs, it was to the care with which he studied the topography of 
his campaigns. Thus alone was he enabled to manoeuvre his forees so as to 
have them, however apparently separated, brought together at the right mo¬ 
ment. “The great art of war,” he said, “consists in knowing bow to sep¬ 
arate in order to subsist, and how to concentrate,in order to fight.” Lee had 
neglected this one essential thing, and, in consequence, his flank and rear as¬ 
sault failed utterly. 

Had there been any real commander of the Union army on the field, the 
Confederate check at Frazier’s Farm might have been rendered a severe de¬ 
feat Before the fight was fairly begun, the last of the Federal trains were 
safe at Malvern Hill. The army occupied a line from front to rear of barely 
eight miles. Jackson,in the rear, was held firmly in check across the Swamp, 
and could not advance a foot. Longstreet’s and Hill’s column struck this 
line near its centre. Keyes’s corps, fully equal to Longstreet’s and Hill’s, 
had not been engaged at all. It had marched but eight miles in two days, 
and must have been fresher than the enemy, who had marched fully twice 
as far, after having fought at Cold Harbor. This corps, or half of it, brought 
back into the fight at Frazier’s Farm, would have given such a preponder¬ 
ating strength to the Union force that Longstreet and Hill, instead of being 
merely checked, must have been overwhelmed. As it was, they suffered so 
severely that they could not be brought into the action of the next day. 
But the commanding general was miles away from the scene of action, and 
no one of the corps and division commanders could have any knowledge of 
the whole field and of the positions of the different troops. Each did the 
best he could under the circumstances, and no troops could have fought 
more bravely; “but no one knew who and where his next neighbor was; 
and, what is worse, there was no common head near at hand to direct, and 
give coherence and unity to the operations.” 2 “It was very late at night,” 
says McClellan, 3 “ before my aids returned to give me the results of the 
day’s fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs.” 

The battle of Malvern Hill was fought by the Confederates without plan 
or concert. Of more than 70,000 men, whom Lee had even then within 
two hours’ march, less than 30,000 were brought into action. 4 5 Opposed to 
these was the whole Union force of fully 85,000 effective men, holding a 
position which they could have maintained against twice their number. 
With such odds, there could have been but one result. The mad Confeder¬ 
ate assault failed utterly, and could not but have failed if it had been made 
with their whole force instead of less than half. D. H. Hill, who had op¬ 
posed it, endeavors to show that, if properly supported by Jackson, he could 
have succeeded; but in the very attempt he is forced to point out the “ blun¬ 
dering arrangements” of his superiors. 3 

In reviewing the operations of these six days one can not but be impress¬ 
ed by the slight part borne by Jackson. He failed to be at his designated 
place at Mecbanicsville. He reached Cold Harbor only in time to turn the 
wavering scale. Had Porter been re-enforced, as he should have been, Jack- 
son would have been too late. He was held at bay at White Oak Swamp, 
utterly unable to aid in the battle raging only two miles away. At Mal¬ 
vern Hill he did not even attempt to bring his own proper divisions into ae- 

1 “ Huger not coming np, and Jackson being unable to force the passage of White Oak Swamp, 
Longstreet and Hill were wiihout the expected support. The advantages in numbers and posi¬ 
tion were on the side of the enemy. Could the other commands have cooperated in the action, 
the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy." . . . “Under ordinary circum¬ 
stances the Federal army should have been destroyed. Prominent among the causes to which its 
escape is due is the want of timely information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the character 
of the country, enabled General McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat, and to add much to 
the obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns.”—Lee'* hep., i., 

] ] I 4 - Barnard, Pen. Camp., 44. 3 McC. Pep., 268. 

i \v e estimate the effective Confederate force within five miles of Malvern Hill, on the 1st of 
July ,hns- Jackson and D. H. Hill, 30,000 ; Longstreet and A. P. Hill, 15.000 1 Magruder and 
Hu'-cr 20,000 , Holmes, 7000: in all, 72.000. Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Holmes were not un¬ 
der fire at all. Of Jackson's “ command ’ only 1). H. Hill's 8000 were brought fairly in; these, 

with Magrudcr's 20.000, were all that actually fonght. 

5 “The battle of Malvern Hill might have been a complete and glorious snccess had not our ar¬ 
tillery and infantrr been fought in detail. My division batteries, having been three times engaged, 
had exhausted all" their ammunition, and had been sent back for a fresh supply. If I had had 
them with me, with a good supply of ammunition, I feel confident that we could have beaten the 
force immediately in front of us. ' Again, the want of concert with the infantry divisions was most 
painful Whiting's division did not engage at all, neither did Holmes's. My division fought an 
hour or more the whole Yankee force, without assistance from a single Confederate soldier. Some 
half hour after mv division had ceased to struggle against odds of more than ten to one, I had to 
fall back McLaw’s division advanced but to share the same fate. Notwithstanding the tremen¬ 
dous odds against us, and the blundering arrangements of the battle, we inflicted heavy loss upon 
the Yankees. The actual loss in battle was, in my opinion (though most persons differ with me), 
greater on our side than on that of the Yankees.’ —D. H. Hill, in Lee s Rep., i., 187. 


tion, though he sent Hill upon bis hopeless effort to storm the heights, which 
even that reckless fighter thought impregnable. Where, as in this case, all 
was accomplished by hard fighting, the losses sustained by each commander 
afford the best measure of his efficiency. Jackson had 30,000 men, and lost 
not quite 2300; Longstreet and D. H. Hill, out of 10,000 each, lost each 
4000; A. P. Hill, out of 14,000, lost 3900; Magruder, out of 25,000 belong¬ 
ing to himself and Huger, lost nearly 4000, fully four fifths of them in the 
single battle at Malvern, in which, if it was to have been fought at all, Jack- 
son should have borne the prominent part. The “blundering arrange¬ 
ments” in this battle, of which D. H. Hill complains, must be mainly charged 
to Jackson. 

Never was there better fighting, and never worse generalship than during 
the six days on the Peninsula “ The Union army,” says McClellan, 1 
“fought an overwhelming enemy by day, and retreated from successive vic¬ 
tories by night, through a week of battle, closing the terrible scenes of con¬ 
flict with the ever-memorable victory at Malvern, where they drove back, 
beaten and shattered, the entire Eastern Army of the Confederacy.” But at 
no point, as we have shown by an analysis of forces, was there an “over¬ 
whelming” or even a superior force of the enemy except at Cold Harbor, 
where such a supremacy should not have existed. “ Richmond," as McClel¬ 
lan says, “ was still within our grasp,” as it had indeed been for a month; 
but the hand which should have grasped it was too feeble for the effort 

We have written, “In a contest between forces so nearly balanced, the vic¬ 
tory would rest with that which was most ably commanded. The general 
who made the fewest errors would win.” We might have said, where the 
whole campaign was a series of errors on both sides, the commander who 
made the last great error would lose. McClellan’s retreat from Malvern was 
t.he last great error, and so Lee won. The fruits of victory remained with 
him; though at a heavy cost, he had won the object at which he aimed, and 
had good right to say, “ The siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of 
a campaign which had been prosecuted, after months of preparation, at an 
enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated.” 3 

1 McC. tep-, 445. 3 Let's Rep., L, 14. 


LOSSES FROM JUNE 26 TO JULY 1. 

After the retreat to Harrison a Landing, the losses of each division of the Union army, in killed, 
wounded, and missing, were summed up, but no .attempt was made to give the proportion in each 
engagement {McC. Rep., 272). If any confirmation of the accuracy of the statement were need¬ 
ed, it would be found in a comparison of the ofikial reports of June 20 and July 20 {McC. Rep., 
53; Com. Rej>., 337, 344). The entire loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, is undoubtedly ac¬ 
curately stated , but as the dead and many of the wounded were abandoned, probably some hund¬ 
reds should be added to these and taken from the number put down as “missing.” Lee, indeed, 
says {Rep , i-, 14) that more than 10.000 prisoners were taken; but this is clearly erroneous. Be¬ 
sides the 2000 at Cold Harbor, and the 2500 at Savage’s Station, almost all of whom were sick or 
wounded, and perhaps 1000 {Let's Reji., i., 11, 134, 134) picked up by Jackson on his inarch to 
White Oak Bridge, very few prisoners were taken by the Confederates. 

Of the Confederate commanders, Jackson, D. H. Hill, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Holmes, and Pen¬ 
dleton, give their exact losses. The losses of Magruder and Huger can be made up very closely 
from the reports of their brigade commanders. Barksdale {Let's Rtj>., i., 296) says that “one 
third of his brigade fell upon the field : it numbered about 2400, which would make the loss 800. 
Cobb {I bid., i., 279) puts his loss in killed and wounded at “nearly 500.” McLaw’s {Ibid., i., 
161, 164), 97\illed, 456 wounded. D. R. Jones {Ibid., i., 172), l"3 killed, 708 wounded. Ran 
som {Ibid., i., 370 >. 69 killed, 354 wounded. Mahunc {Ibid., i., 372, 378). 63 killed, 216 wound¬ 
ed. Armistead ( Ibid ., i., 438. 439, 448, two regiments estimated), 320 killed and wounded. 
Wright {Ibid, i., 397), 55 killed, 243 wounded. In all, 3984, of whom 656 were killed, and 3328 
wounded. Of the cavalry and reserve artillery, we find mention of about 20 killed and 104 
wounded. 

The missing in A. P. Hill’s division are not given; the number was evidently small, probably 
about 100. In Magruder’s command we find about 400 missing in about two thirds of the bri¬ 
gades; we set down the whole at 600. 

From the foregoing data we have compiled the following table of 


Killed, Wounded, and Missing 


1**10*. 

Co* 


T*. 



Killed 

Wc-oeded 

Mistrar. 

Tout 


Killed 

Woanded- 


"lotaL 







3 6 






1076 

S4> 

2,111 

1*. II. Hill. 

714 

3.192 


3, 54 














201 


A. 1*. Hill. 



luoc> 


\ 








GOOtf) 






2,737 

1 If hues.7. 

3 



Engineers and Cavalry. 

IV 

69 

118 

199 

Artillery And Ca\*]rv . 


1*4 


1.4 

Totol. 

1569 

7709 

5958 

15,249 

Toul. 

3151 

15.255 

1*1*9 

19,4** 


The losses in the separate battles can be given only approximately, by considering the troops 
engaged in each, and the nitfnre of the fighting, aided by a few indicia scattered here and there 
through the various reports of Confederate commanders. 

Keyes was engaged mainly at Malvern Hill, we put his entire loss in-fhat battle. Sumner was 
engaged at Savage’s Station, Frazier’s Farm, and Malvern ; we divide his loss between those three 
engagements. Hdntzclman at Frazier’s Farm and Malvern; wc divide his loss between them. 
McCall was at Mechanicsville, where he lost about 300, and at Cold Harbor, and the Farm, losing 
about equally in each. Porter was chiefly engaged nt Cold Harbor and Malvern ; we put three 
fourths of his loss at the former. Of Franklin’s corps, half with .Slocum was at Cold Harbor, the 
other half with Smith at Garland’s and Price’s Farms and elsewhere; we put two thirds of his 
loss at Cold Harbor, dividing the remainder among the other engagements. 

Jackson was engaged at Cold Harbor and slightly at Malvern; 1). H. Hill nt Mechanicsville, 
Cold .Harbor, and Malvern: both of these distinguish between their losses in each engagement. 
A. P. Hill was at Mechanicsville. Cold Harbor, and Frazier’s Farm. We estimate his loss in the 
first at 750. in the last at 900, leaving the remainder for Cold Harbor. Longstreet was at Cold 
Harbor and Frazier’s Farm ; we put his loss in the latter battle at 1100, leaving the remainder for 
Cold Harbor. 

From these data we construct the following approximate table of 


Killed and Wounded in the several Engagements. 




C*ro*. 



Co*F»ca*rc. 


Killed. 

Wound**. 

Total. 

Killed 

Wounded. 

T.4al 

Mechanicsville. 

5*1 

45*) 

3O0 

17«0 

1,460 

1 ,5m# 


75 

3250 

3945 

15*0 

8,000 

9,5 i» 

savage's Station. 

...1 100 

500 

i>0 

75 

95 

4**0 


... I 300 

1500 

1900 

,i 325 

1 7**0 

2.**25 

Malvern Hill. 

... 375 

1800 

2175 

9*d) 

3,500 

4.4 O 

Skirmishes (say). 

...I 82 

5* *9 

»1 

101 

48» 

5S1 

Total. 


7609 

9391 

3151 

15,256 

18,4-6 


























































3&0 


[August, 1862. 


CHAPTER XXI. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 

IV. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA. 

Position of the two Armies.—Petersburg fortified.—Pope placed in Command of the Army of 
Virginia.—Halleck appointed General-in-Chief.—McClellan asks for Re-enforcements.—His 
Plan of carrying on the War.—McClellan and Halleck.—Jackson and Hill sent to Gordons- 
ville.—Night Attack from Coggins Point.—Movement to Malvern Hill.—McClellan ordered 
to withdraw from the Peninsula.—His Remonstrance.—Hooker's Advice,—Halleck’s Reasons 
for the Order.—The Withdrawal.—The Confederates march Northward. 

IX weeks of almost entire inactivity followed the battle of Malvern and 
the retreat of the Federal army to Harrison’s Landing. The Confeder¬ 
ate force remained for some days in the vicinity of the battle-field, and on 
the 8th of July returned to its positions near Richmond, the movement be¬ 
ing so completely masked by the cavalry that no intelligence of it reached 
the Federal commander, who was still fearful of an attack. 1 Lee was ap¬ 
prehensive that an attempt might be made upon Richmond from the new 
Federal base by way of Petersburg. D. H. Hill was detached from his di¬ 
vision, and placed in command of the Department of the South Side, extend¬ 
ing from Drewry’s Bluff to the South Carolina line. Petersburg was utterly 
defenseless, not a spadeful of earth having been thrown up around it. A 
system of fortifications was now begun, which were ultimately developed 
into the formidable works which afterward resisted for so long the approach 
of General Grant. All the troops that could be spared from before Rich¬ 
mond were set to work upon these intrenchments, besides a thousand ne¬ 
groes brought from North Carolina. 2 

On the 26th of June, General Pope had been called from the West, and 
placed in command of the Army of Virginia, comprising the forces of 
McDowell, Banks, and Fremont. Pope strenuously opposed the movement 
of McClellan to the James, urging instead that, if he found himself unable 
to maintain his position on the Chickabominy, he should mass all his force 
on the north bank, even at the risk of losing much material of war, and en¬ 
deavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court-house, but in no 
case to retreat farther to the south than the White House on the Pamunkey. 
After the retreat to the James, it became apparent that the views of Pope 
and McClellan were wholly opposed to each other. Both commanders 
urged the appointment of a commander-in-chief over all the forces. Gen¬ 
eral Halleck, who had successfully conducted operations in the West, was 
appointed to command the whole land forces of the United States as gener- 
al-in-ohief, and was directed to repair to the capital as soon as he could with 
safety to the operations within his Department of the Mississippi. This 
order was dated July 11, and Halleck assumed the command on the 23d. 

McClellan had not fairly established himself in his new position when he 
began to urge that he should be largely re-enforced. On the 1st of July he 
asked for 50,000 men at once. Next day: “Re-enforcements should be sent 
to me rather much over than less than 100,000 men.” In reply to the de¬ 
mand for 50,000, the President said that, according to McClellan’s own plan, 
75,000 were required for the defense of Washington; while, including Banks, 
Fremont, McDowell, and those about the capital, there were not more than 
60,000; adding to these Wool at Baltimore, and Dix at Fortress Monroe, 
there were not, outside of the force then with McClellan, 75,000 men east 
of the Mountains. “Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other 
considerable force promptly, is simply absurd.” McClellan still continued 
to urge for re-enforcements from any and every quarter. The true defense 
of Washington, he said, was before Richmond; Burnside, with all his troops, 
should be brought thither from North Carolina; with a little more than 
half a chance he could take Richmond. 

On the 25th of July General Halleck went to the James in order to con¬ 
sult with the commander of the Army of the Potomac. At that time 
McClellan’s plan was to cross the .James River, attack Petersburg, cut off 
the enemy’s communications with the South, making no farther demonstra¬ 
tions against Richmond. Petersburg being then wholly unfortified, this at¬ 
tempt might probably have succeeded. Halleck was, however, utterly 
averse to the plan, and it was abandoned. McClellan then said that with 
30,000 re-enforcements he could attack Richmond with a good chance of 
success, although he would then have but 120,000 effective men, while he 
estimated the force of the enemy at not less than 200,000. Halleck would 
promise only 20,000, and said that unless McClellan could attack Richmond 
with these, with a strong probability of success, it would be a military ne¬ 
cessity to unite the forces of McClellan and Pope. McClellan, after consult¬ 
ation with his officers, decided that he would make the attempt with 20,000, 
although he would not say that the probabilities were in favor of success; 
still, there was a chance, and he would try it, and Halleck returned to Wash¬ 
ington with the understanding that the attempt should be made. The next 
day McClellan wrote asking 15,000 or 20,000 more re-enforcements. 3 * 

The four weeks’ quiet on the James was interrupted on the night of July 
31. The Union fleet lay stretched along for two miles above and below 
Hari •ison’s Landing. Just opposite, across the James, was Coggin’s Point, a 
peninsular projection jutting out into the river, diminishing its breadth to 
1000 yards. Hill ordered forty-three guns to be quietly placed on the 
point; this was done without being discovered from the opposite shore, and 
just after midnight fire was opened upon the Federal shipping and camp. 

1 “The rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our posi¬ 
tions, or reducing ns by blocking our river communications. I can not but regard our position as 
critical.'’— MrClelltn to the President, July 7. 

8 D. H. Hill, in Lees Rep., ii., 110. * Com. Rep., 456. 


Innumerable lights from the vessels and camp served to show just where 
lay the objects of aim, and for half an hour there was a continuous bom¬ 
bardment. But, owing to the difficulty of the roads, and the necessity for 
concealing the operation, only a small quantity of ammunition had been 
brought forward. In all only 1000 shot were fired, by which ten men were 
killed and fifteen wounded. The attack failed of its main object, the in¬ 
juring of the fleet. The fire was returned briskly from the gun-boats, but 
it was almost harmless, there being nothing to show the position of the ene¬ 
my. Of the Confederates but one man was killed and two wounded. The 
ammunition being expended, the guns were withdrawn as silently as they 
had been advanced. 1 The south bank of the river opposite his position was 
then occupied by McClellan, who wrote cheerily to Halleck, who had urged 
him to press the enemy: “ I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at 
once. I will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, and I will stir these 
people up.” 2 

On the 4th of August McClellan moved, as if to press the enemy. Hook¬ 
er and Sedgwick advanced to Malvern Hill, drove back the enemy’s pickets, 
took possession of the point, and pushed reconnoissances toward Richmond. 
McClellan reported: “This-is a very advantageous position to cover an ad¬ 
vance on Richmond, only 14J miles distant; and I feel confident that, with 
re-enforcements, I could march this army there in five days.” 3 When in¬ 
telligence of this advance reached Richmond, the greater part of the troops 
there were hurried down, and the night of the 6th closed upon the two ar¬ 
mies occupying nearly the same positions as on the 1st of July. Next 
morning, when the Confederates looked to the hill, they found it abandoned 
by the Union force.* McClellan bad, during the night, received peremptory 
orders from Halleck to withdraw his army from the Peninsula. He sent an 
earnest remonstrance against this order. His army, he said, was now in ex¬ 
cellent condition; he held both sides of the James River, and could act in 
any direction. He was within 25 miles of Richmond, and was not likely to 
meet the enemy in sufficient force to fight a battle until he had reached 15 
or 18 miles, thus practically bringing him within 10 miles of Richmond. 
His longest line of land transportation was 25 miles;’ but, by the aid of the 
gun-boats, his army could be supplied by water during its advance until 
within 12 miles of Richmond. The retreat would demoralize the army, 
would depress the people of the North, and would probably influence foreign 
powers to recognize the Confederacy. He therefore urged that the order 
should be rescinded; and that, so far from being recalled, his army should 
be promptly re-enforced to enable it to resume the offensive. 5 Hooker, in¬ 
deed, wished to disobey the order of the general-in-chief. He said that they 
had then force enough to take Richmond; he himself was ready to take the 
advance. If the movement was unsuccessful, it would probably cost McClel¬ 
lan his head, but that “ he might as well die for an old sheep as for a lamb.” 
McClellan for a time seemed inclined to follow Hooker’s counsel. On the 
10th he gave Hooker a written order to supply himself with ammunition 
and three days’ rations, and to be ready to march the next day. “This or¬ 
der,” says Hooker, “ was communicated to the whole army, and I firmly be¬ 
lieved that order meant Richmond ; but, before the time arrived for execu¬ 
ting it, it was countermanded.” 6 * 

To McClellan’s remonstrance Halleck replied briefly by telegraph, “The 
order will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all 
possible promptness;” and at length by letter, setting forth his reasons for 
giving and adhering to the order.’ 

After this definite and final order for the withdrawal from the Peninsula 
ten days passed before the army began to move. Sharp criminations and 
recriminations passed between Halleck and McClellan on account of this de¬ 
lay. But at length, on the 16th, the sick and stores.had all been embarked, 
and the movement of the troops had begun. A long pontoon bridge had 
been thrown across the Chickahominy near its mouth, and by this and other 
bridges the troops recrossed that fatal stream. On the morning of the 18th 
the rear guard was over and the bridge was removed. McClellan, who had 
apprehended an attack upon his rear, did not feel secure until he had his 
whole army across the river. 8 9 But almost the entire Confederate force had 
been gradually withdrawn from Richmond. Jackson and Ewell had been 
sent to Gordonsville five weeks before; they had been followed a fortnight 
later by A. P. Hill. On the 13th of August, Longstreet’s, Hood’s, and the 
bulk of Magruder’s and Huger’s divisions marched northward; and while 
McClellan was congratulating himself that he had got safely across the 
Chickahominy, the whole Confederate force was a hundred miles away, con¬ 
fronting Pope on the Rappahannock.® 

1 Lee's Rep., ii., 232. 8 McC. Rep., 285. * Ibid., 289. 

* Lee's Rep., i., 16. 9 McC. Rej>., 288-296. • Hooker’s Testimony, in Com. Rep., 579. 

7 After replying to the strategical and political arguments advanced by McClellan, Halleck 
says: “If your estimate of the enemy’s strength was correct, your requisition [for 35,000 re-en¬ 
forcements] was perfectly reasonable; but it was perfectly impossible to fill it until new troops 
could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your armv in its 
present position until it could be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate ; and, even 
after you receive the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling 

and the river batteries before you could advance upon Richmond. It is by no means certain that 
the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much those 
at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but, in the mean 
time, General Pope’s forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slight¬ 
est hope of assistance from you. ... I have not inquired, and I do not wish to know bv whose 
advice, or for what reasons, the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the ene¬ 

my between them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan 

has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better plan, I should 

have adopted it. But all of your plans require re-enforcemcnts which it is impossible to give you. 

It is very easy to ask for re-enforccmenis, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no 
disposable troops at your command.”— McC. Rep., 299-301. 

9 McC. Rep., 313-316. * Lee's Rep., i., 13,18; ii., 3, 80. 






July, 1862.] 


POPE'S* CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 


381 



UE.NBT W. HALLBCK. 


CHAPTER XXII. 

POPE’S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 1 

Pope placed in command of the Army of Virginia.—Fremont relieved.—Positions of Pope’s 
Forces.—The Plan of Operations.—Pope’s Address.—His General Orders.—Similar Confeder¬ 
ate Orders.—Pope concentrates his Force.—Jackson ordered to Gordonsvillc.—Re-enforced by 
Hill.—Battle of Cedar Mountain.— Banks attacks and is repulsed.—The Losses.— Pope re¬ 
enforced.—Jackson retreats to Gordonsville.—Lee joins Jackson, and Pope withdraws beyond 
the Rappahannock.—Estimate of the Confederate Force.—The Design of Lee.—Manoeuvring 
on the Rappahannock.—Speedy re-cnforccmcnts promised to Pope.—Stuart’s Raid on Catlett’s 
Station.—Capture of Pope's Dispatch-book, and its Consequences.—Lee’s new Plan of Opera¬ 
tions.—Jackson marches for Thoroughfare Gap.—Longstreet follows him.—Pope begins to fall 
back.—Jackson captures Stoics at Manassas Junction.—Fight at Bristoe Station —Fitz John 
Porter ordered to move.—Taylor’s Brigade routed.—Jackson’s Peril.—He falls back to Bull 
Run.— First Battle at Croveton, August 28.—Pope confident of destroying Jackson.—Jackson 
stand* at Bay.—Pope’s Plan.—Why it failed.—Affairs at Washington.—Hallcck and McClel¬ 
lan.— Second Battle of Groveton, August 29.—Sigcl’s ineffectual Attack upon the Right.—Fight¬ 
ing upon the Centre and Left.—Longstreet reaches Thoroughfare Gap.—Skirmish at the Gap. 
—Longstreet’s Advance unites with Jackson.—McDowell and Porter.—Pope orders Porter to 

1 In addition to the authorities heretofore mentioned, we use mainly in this chapter Pope's Re- 
port, citing from the official copy, published by order of Congress; and the Report of the Fitz 
John Porter Court-martial, ciuri as “ Court-martial 


attack.—The Order not obeyed.—Hooker’s and Reno’s Attack upon the Left.—Hatch’s Assault 
along the Turnpike.—Close of the Battle.—Pope claims a Victory.—Pope’s new Order to Por¬ 
ter.— Third Battle at Croveton, August 30 : Strength of the two Armies.—Pope’s Forebodings. 
—Is convinced that the Enemy is retreating, and orders a Pursuit.—The Confederate Position. 
—The Union Line.—Porter attacks Jackson’s Right.—Reno and Hcintzelman attack the Cen¬ 
tre.—Jackson demands Re-enforcements.—Longstreet’s Movements.—Warren’s Stand.— Re¬ 
treat of the Union Forces.—Losses in the Battles of Groveton.—The Forces after the Battle.— 
Terror at Washington.—McClellan and his Friends.—The Battle of Chantilly, or Ox Hill.— 
Death of Kearney and Stevens.—The Retreat to Washington.—Pope relieved from the Com¬ 
mand.—Estimate of Pope’s Campaign.—The Difficulties in his Way.—His early Measures ju¬ 
dicious.—His Error on the 29th.—The Time of Longstreet’s arrival on the Field.—The greater 
Error of the 30th.—Estimate of Lee’s Campuign.—Its different Phases. 

O N the 20th of June, the day on which the closing operations before 
Richmond were commenced, General Pope was placed in command of 
the “ Army of Virginia,” made up of the corps of Fremont, Banks, and 
McDowell. Fremont took umbrage at being thus placed under an officer 
whom he outranked, and asked to be relieved from his command. The re¬ 
quest was readily complied with, and he disappears from the history of the 
war, Sigel being placed in command of his corps. Pope found his army 
widely scattered. Of McDowell’s corps of 18,500 men, one half, under King, 












































































382 



JOHN POPE. 


was at Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock, the other half, under Ricketts, 
at Manassas Junction, thirty miles to the north; Banks, with 8000, and Fre¬ 
mont, with 11,500, were at Middletown, fifty miles farther to the northwest, 
with the Blue Mountains between them and Manassas. Infantry and artil¬ 
lery numbered 34,000, and there were about 5000 cavalry. A considerable 
part of the force was in bad condition. 

The Federal government was still nervously apprehensive for the safety 
of Washington, though there was not a single Confederate soldier within 
ten days’ march; every man had been withdrawn from the Shenandoah and 
Rappahannock to the Chickahominy. Pope was ordered, as McDowell had 
been, to cover Washington from attack from the direction of Richmond, as¬ 
sure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and then, by menacing the 
Confederate lines of communication with the South by way of Gordonsville, 
to endeavor to draw off some of the force then opposed to McClellan before 
Richmond. The whole plan of the campaign was based upon the supposi¬ 
tion that Jackson was still threatening the Valley, and thence Washington, 
Maryland, and even Pennsylvania. Pope’s first object was to concentrate 
his scattered command upon the line of the Rappahannock, whence he could, 
by rapid marching, interpose between any body of the enemy moving up the 
Valley and their main force at Richmond. The retreat of the Army of the 
Potomac to the James changed the whole aspect of affairs. Pope soon found 
that his plan for operations was wholly at variance with that of McClellan ; 
and at his suggestion Halleck was summoned' from the West, and, as gen¬ 
eral-in-chief, placed in command of both. 

Pope, on taking the field, issued an address to his army 2 censuring, by im¬ 
plication, the course of McClellan, and breathing a spirit of confidence which 
belied the forebodings which he felt. 5 “ I have come,” he said, “ from the 

1 July II. • July 14. 

* I ‘-look the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a determination to 


IMuly. 1862. 

West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army 
whose business has been to seek the adversary and beat him when found; 
whose policy has been attack and not defense. I presume that I have been 
called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. 
I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry 
to find much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of taking strong po¬ 
sitions and holding them; of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us 
discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire is one 
from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study 
the probable lines of retreat of our opponent, and leave our own to take care 
of themselves.” 

This address was followed by a series of General Orders prescribing the 
mode in which the campaign was to be conducted. The troops were, as far 
as practicable, to subsist upon the country in which their operations were 
carried on ; vouchers were to be given for all supplies taken, payable at the 
close of the war, upon proof that the holders had been loyal citizens.* * The 
cavalry should take no trains for baggage or supplies, only two days’ rations, 
to be carried on their persons; villages and neighborhoods through which 
they passed were to be laid under contribution for the subsistence of the 
men and horses. 2 People living along railroad and telegraph lines were to 
be held responsible for all damage done to them, and for guerrilla attacks. 
If roads or telegraphs were injured by guerrillas, the inhabitants living 
within five miles were to be turned out to repair them. If a soldier was 
fired upon from a house, it was to be razed to the ground, and the inhab¬ 
itants sent as prisoners to head-quarters. If such an outrage occurred at a 
distance from any settlement, the people within five miles should be held 
accountable, and made to pay an indemnity. Any person detected in such 
outrages, either during the act or afterward, was to be shot, without await¬ 
ing civil process. 3 All disloyal male citizens near, within, or in the rear of 
the army lines were to be arrested ; those who took the oath of allegiance, 
and gave security for its observance, were to be allowed to remain at home; 
those who refused were to be sent South, beyond the extreme pickets of the 
army, and if thereafter found behind, within, or near the lines, would be con¬ 
sidered as spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. If any 
one violated the oath of allegiance, he should be shot, and his property con¬ 
fiscated. No communication should be held, except through the military 
authority, with any person residing within the lines of the enemy; and any 
person concerned in carrying letters or messages in any other way would 
be considered and treated as a spy. 4 

Stringent as these orders were, their severest provisions had been more 
than anticipated by the action of the Confederate government in Tennessee. 
Eight months before, 5 Judah Benjamin, then Secretary of War, issued offi¬ 
cial instructions “as to the prisoners taken among the traitors of East Ten¬ 
nessee.” All, said the order, who can be “identified in having been en¬ 
gaged in bridge-burning, are to be tried summarily by drum-head court- 
martial, and, if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It would 
be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burnt bridges.” 
All who had not been so engaged were to be sent to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 
and to be kept in confinement as prisoners of war. “ In no case,” continues 
the order, “ is one of the men known to have been up in arms against the 
government to be released on any oath or pledge of allegiance. The time 
for such measures is past. They are to be held as prisoners of war, and 
kept in jail until the close of the war. Such as come in voluntarily, take 
the oath of allegiance, and surrender their arms, are alone to be treated with 
leniency.” The Confederate government, however, denounced the orders of 
Pope as gross violation of the rules of war, and by a General Order® it was 
declared that General Pope, and the commissioned officers serving under 
him, were not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, and if any of 
them were captured they were to be kept in close confinement; and if any 
persons should be executed in pursuance of his General Orders, an equal 
number of these prisoners, selected by lot, should be hung. 

Pope’s first movement was to concentrate his scattered forces, so as to 
bring them within something like supporting distance of each other. Sigel, 
who now commanded Fremont’s corps, and Banks, were withdrawn from 
the Valley of the Shenandoah, and posted near Sperry ville, east of the Blue 
Mountains; Ricketts, with his division of McDowell’s corps, was brought 
down from Manassas to Waterloo Bridge, twenty miles to the east; King’s 
division of McDowell’s corps was still left at Fredericksburg. The Army 
ofVirginia was thus posted along a line of forty miles. The region having 
been abandoned by the Confederates, a rapid march of two days, either from 
his right or left, would have enabled Pope to seize Gordonsville, which com¬ 
manded the main railroad communication between Richmond and the South. 
Banks, who had in the mean while pushed southward a score of miles to 
Culpepper, was ordered, on the 14th of July, to send Hatch, who commanded 
the cavalry, to seize Gordonsville, and destroy the railroads which centre 
there from both directions. Hatch failed to execute this order, and having 
again failed a few days after, he was superseded in the command of the 
cavalry by Buford.’ 

Tidings of the renewed activity of the Federal forces on the Rappahan¬ 
nock soon reached Richmond, and although the Confederate capital was still 
threatened by McClellan’s great army on the James, so important was the 
possession of Gordonsville, the key of communication with the South, that 
Lee ventured to weaken his force at Richmond in order to counteract the 
menacing movements of Pope. On the 13th of July, Jackson, with his own 
division and that of Ewell, was ordered to proceed to Gordonsville, with the 

carry out the plans of the government with all the energy and all the skill of which I was mas¬ 
ter.”— Pope’s Report , 6. 1 Order No. 5. * Order No. S. 1 Order No. T. 

‘Order No. 11. • Nov. 88, 1861. « No. 84, August 1,1862. ' Pope’s Report. 



















August, 1862.] 


POPE’S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 


883 


promise of re-enforcements in case there should be a chance to strike an 
effective blow without withdrawing troops too long from the defense of 
Richmond. Jackson found Pope too strong to warrant him in making any 
offensive movements, and for a fortnight contented himself with holding 
Gordonsville. But there being no indication that McClellan meditated 
moving upon Richmond, Lee, on the 27th of July, sent A. P. Hill to join 
Jackson. 1 II. III. IV. The Confederate force at Richmond was thus reduced by 36,000 
men, fully a third of its number. 

On the 29th of July Pope left Washington to join his army in the field. 
On the 7th of August he advanced their position somewhat, concentrating 
his infantry within a space of ten miles along the road from Sperryville to 
Culpepper, the cavalry being thrown ten miles forward toward Gordons¬ 
ville. On the same day, Jackson, having been informed that only a part of 
the enemy was at Culpepper, marched his command in that direction, hop¬ 
ing to strike a portion of Pope’s army before it could be re-cnforced. On 
the morning of the 9th, Banks was pushed six miles forward to a strong 
position near Cedar Mountain, and Ricketts was posted three miles in the 
rear. Sigel had been ordered to march to Culpepper, so as to be there in 
the morning; but, owing to misconception of orders, he did not arrive until 
late in the afternoon. 

In the afternoon of the 9th, Ewell, whose division was in the advance, 
came in sight of Banks’s position, near the northwestern flank of Cedar 
Mountain; a conical hill which rises sharply a few hundred feet from a plain 
intersected by creeks and low ridges. On the crest of one of these a body 
of Union cavalry was seen, the infantry and artillery being hidden by the 
opposite slope. Two brigades of Ewell’s division, moving to the right, as¬ 
cended Cedar Mountain, and planted their batteries two hundred feet up the 
side, so as to command the valley below. The remainder of Ewell’s divi¬ 
sion, with a part of that of Jackson, keeping to the left, passed beyond the 
base of the mountain, and took up a position on a wooded ridge opposite the 
Union line. Hill’s division had not yet come up. Lawton’s brigade, the 
strongest of Jackson’s division, was left behind to guard the trains, and 
task no part in the action. Between the wooded ridges occupied by the 
two armies lay an open plain a few hundred yards wide; here was a corn¬ 
field, and beyond this a wheat-field, upon which the yellow shooks of grain 
just reaped were still standing. At four o’clock a fierce fire of artillery had 
fairly opened. Some loss was sustained by the Federals from the batteries 
on the mountain side; more by the Confederates in the plain below. Win¬ 
der, who now led the brigade which still bore the name of “Jackson’s Own,” 
was killed, and the command of it devolved upon Taliaferro. The cannon¬ 
ade was kept up for an hour, when Banks, believing that the enemy were 
in no great force, 1 2 threw his whole division in two columns across the grain- 
field. One column charged straight across the field upon the Confederate 
right. Early, who was posted there, being sorely pressed, called for re-en- 
fbrcements. Hill had now come up, and one of his brigades was sent to 
Early’s support. The main assault was upon the Confederate left. So sud¬ 
den was the onset, that the extremity of the Confederate line was turned, 
and, before they were aware of it, they were charged directly in the rear, 
and forced back upon their centre, which also gave way. All seemed lost. 
The artillery, hurried to the rear, disappeared behind the crest of the ridge, 
while the greater part of the infantry broke away in confusion fast verging 
into rout Jackson hurried in person to the front, and at length stopped the 
flight and re-formed his broken line. Two more brigades of Hill’s division 
had now come up, and were pushed into action. The Confederates on the 
field now outnumbered the Federals by nearly two to one. 3 * 5 * The Union 
advance was checked, and then forced back across the open field beyond the 
ridge from which they had come. In the mean while, Pope, who was with 
Ricketts’s division, only three miles in the rear, became convinced, notwith¬ 
standing the assurances which he had just received from Banks, that the en¬ 
emy was really in force, and that a serious action was going on. He hur¬ 
ried forward with Ricketts, and just at dusk met the retreating forces of 
Banks. A new line was formed, toward which Jackson advanced cautious¬ 
ly in the darkness, opening upon it a sharp artillery fire, which was returned 
so vigorously that a Confederate battery was disabled and withdrawn. Jack- 
son then fell back, and passed the night on the battle-field. 

In this accidental engagement, which might be denominated simply an 
“ affair” were it not for the magnitude of the loss on both sides, the Confeder¬ 
ates lost, in killed and wounded, about 1300; the Union loss was estimated 
at about 1400 killed and wounded, and 400 prisoners. Besides these there 
were a large number of stragglers, who never returned to their commands.* 


1 Lee's Rep., i., 15 ; ii., 3. . . 

a Blinks's dispatches to Pope: “ August 9, 2 25. The enemy shows his cavalry,which is strong, 
ostentatiously. No infantry seen, and not much artillery. Woods on the left, said to be full of 

troops A visit to the front does not impress that the enemy intends immediate attack. He 
seems, however, to he taking positions."—“4 60. Abont four o’clock, shots were exchanged by 
the skirmishers. Artillery fire on both sides in a few minutes. One regiment of rebel infantry 
advancing. Now deplove’d in front as skirmishers. I have ordered a regiment on the right, 
Williams's, to meet them ; and one on the left, Augur’s, to advance on the left and in front.”— 

“ 5 P. M. They arc now approaching each other.”— Pope's Ilf)tori, 218. 

5 The Union force consisted only of Banks’s corps, numbering at the outset only 8000. There 
were present, as is 6hown by the report of losses (Ace's Rep., ii., 49), forty-two regiments of Con¬ 
federate infantry, 21,000 men in all; but of these only about one half were seriously engnged in 
the actual fight. -Two thirds of the loss, indeed, fell upon ten of the regiments of Jackson and 

E '* e ‘‘No report of killed and wounded has been made to me by General Banks. I can, therefore, 
only form an approximation of our losses in that battle. Our killed, wounded, and prisoners 
amounted to about 1800 men, besides which, fully 1000 men straggled back to Culpepper Court¬ 
house and beyond, and never entirely returned to their commands. ... No material of war nor 
baggage-trains were lost on either side."—Pope’s Report, 11. Jackson says: “We captured 400 

prisoners 6302 small-arms, one 12-pounder Napoleon and its caisson, with two other caissons and 

a limber and three colors. The official reparts of the casualties in ray command show a loss of 
223 killed 1060 wounded, 81 missing—total loss, 1314. This was probably about one half that 
sustained by the enemy.’’—Ace’s Rep., ii., 7. There is reason to suppose that Pope’s estimate of 
his loss was too low; for he puts down Banks’s forse before the battle at 8000, and afterward he 

counts it at 6000, a diminution of 3000. If half of the 1000 stragglers returned to their com- 


During the next two days the armies lay watching each other, neither 
commander venturing upon any offensive movement. King had, on the 
day before the battle, been ordered from Fredericksburg to join Pope. He 
arrived on the evening of the 11th, raising Pope’s force to about 33,000. 
With these, he proposed to fall at daylight upon Jackson, upon his line of 
communications, and compel him “to fight a battle which must have been 
entirely decisive for one army or the other.” 1 Jackson, whose numbers 
were about tbe same, had learned of the re-enforcements of Pope, and, sup¬ 
posing them to be much greater than they were, fell back during the night 
of the 11th, in order to “avoid being attacked by the vastly superior force 
in front of me, and with the hope that General Pope would be induced to 
follow me until I should be re-enforced.” 2 * 

The Union cavalry followed the retiring enemy to the Rapidan, and cap¬ 
tured some stragglers. They then returned to their former position, and 
occupied the line of the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue 
Ridge. On the 14th, Reno joined Pope with 8000 men of Burnside’s com¬ 
mand, which had been brought from North Carolina to Fortress Monroe, and 
thence to Fredericksburg. Pope, with bis infantry, now numbering 40,000 
men, pushed forward a little beyond Cedar Mountain. A week had not 
passed, however, before Pope became assured that nearly the whole of the 
Confederate army had left Richmond, and were concentrated in his imme¬ 
diate front, designing to overwhelm him before he could be joined by any 
part of the Army of the Potomac. He thereupon fell back beyond the Rap¬ 
pahannock, and by the 19th his army, 45,000 strong, infantry and cavalry, 
was posted for eight miles along the north bank, from Rappahannock Sta¬ 
tion to Warrenton Springs. Across the river was Lee, with 85,000, being 
the whole of the Confederate army of Virginia, with the exception of D. H. 
Hill’s division, which was left a few days longer at Richmond, and Holmes’s, 
which was not moved at all. 3 

Burnside’s corps had been brought from North Carolina to Fortress Mon¬ 
roe, and early in August it was known at Richmond that it was being em¬ 
barked on transports. The direction in which it was sent would furnish a 
clear indication of the Federal designs. If it came up the James to McClel- 


mand, there remain 2500 for killed, wounded, and prisoners, or 2100 killed and wounded, which 
wc think to be about the true number. If all of the stragglers returned, there would still be a 
loss of 4n0 prisoners, and 1600 killed and wounded. 

1 Rope's Report, 11. 9 * Jackson, in Lee's Rep., ii., 7. 

3 The Confederate “Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia,” while minute upon almost 
every other topic, are almost wholly silent ns to the force engaged in the operations of August and 
September. We are forced to rely upon other sources for an approximative estimate of these 
forces. Four independent lines of investigation, taken in connection with a few hints scattered 
through the Reports, give results so nearly nlike, that we consider our estimate as substantially 
correct. 

I. It was shown (ante, pp. 361, 379) that the effective force at the commencement of the “Seven 
Days” was 100,000, and that the losses in battle were about 20,000; to which should be j dded 
probably 10,000 by sickness during the ensuing six weeks. The conscription law had been fairly 
in operation since the close of June, and had, as the writer was informed by General J. E. John¬ 
ston, during the five weeks after the battle of Fair Oaks, added about 40,00(3 to the army at Rich¬ 
mond. The operation of th*is 1 aw.being very uniform, 40,000 were probably added during tbe six 
weeks preceding the middle of August. The recruits, instead of being sent on from the camps of 
instruction in regiments and brigades, were sent >n squads to join the old regiments. This would 
make the entire force at the middle of August a little more than it was at the close of June—that 
is, 110,000. Every division and brigade, w ith the exception of that of Holmes, some 10,000 strong, 
was finally sent from Richmond and Petersburg in the following order: Jackson, July 13; A. P. 
Hill, July 27; Longstrcet, August 13; D. H. Hill, August 21, joining Lee on the 23d of Septem¬ 
ber, three days after the battle of Groveton. This makes the entire force at the outset 100,000 of 
all arms. 

II. The reports of casualties, which will be cited in the appropriate places, give the loss by regi¬ 
ments in the whole scries of battles; and as every regiment was apparently brought into action at 
one time or another these lists contain the entire number of regiments. We find 177 different 
-regiments of infantry from the different stntes, ns fellows: Virginia, 39; Georgia, 37; North Car¬ 
olina, 26: South Carolina, 17; Alabama, 16; Mississippi, 12; Louisiana, 9; Texns, 3; Tennes¬ 
see^; Florida, 2; Arkansas, 1. From indicia scattered here and there, we put the aggregate 
strength of the regiments at 500, which gives 88,500 infantry; the artillery and cavalry wc put 
down at 5000 each, making a total of 98,500 of all arms. 

III. There were, in all, 40 brigades, each of these comprised from three to six regiments. In 

many cases the numbers which were carried into the separate actions are noted in the reports. 

Comparing these, and taking into account the losses previously reported, wc find the brigades to 
have averaged about 2250, making about 90,000 infantry, and 10,000 artillery and cavalry. 

These data thus all indicate, without the probability of any material error, that the entire force 
of tfle Confederate army, previous to any losses on the march or in action, was about 100,000 of all 
arms. The regiments brought into each action, and the losses in every battle being given through¬ 
out, we shall be able to arrive at a very close approximation of the actual force at each important 
period of the campaign. 

IV. After the foregoing estimate had been made, I obtained an abstract of the official returns 

of the various Confederate armies during almost the whole period of the war. These returns 

came into the hands of the government at the surrender of the army of Lee. An abstract of these 
was furnished by the War Department to Mr. William Swinton, author of the “ Campaigns of the 
Army of the Potomac.” F«>r this, and many other documents as yet inaccessible to ihe general 
student, I am indebted to Mr. Swinton. These returns corroborate the accuracy with which my 
previous estimates had been framed. I here give the returns of the Confederate “Army of North¬ 
ern Virginia” from Fob. 28,1862, to Feb. 28, 1865. 1 shall have frequent occasion, in subsequent 

chapters, to refer to this table. The explanatory notes appended to it are my own. In referring 
to the strength of this army at different periods, I shall consider only those reported as “present 
for duty." It will be seen that the returns are wanting for some of the mo6t important periods. 


Returns of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from Feb. 28, 1862, to 

FeiT. 28, 1865. 


n . f . Present and 

D,t *’ AbMOt- 

1862. Feb. 28* .. 84, 25 
“ July 20 b .. 137,030 
“ Sept. 80* .. 130,143 . 
“ Oct. 20 .. 153.778 
“ Nov. 20 .. 153,790 
“ Dec. 31 .. 15'.',85." 

1863. Jan. 3t 
“ Feb. 28 d 
“ Mar. 31 
“ May 31 
u July 31 
“ Aug. 31 
“ Sept. 30* 

“ Oct 81 ‘ 


27,829 .. 56,3% 
42.344 .. 94 f"* 
70,430 . 


47,617 
60,559 
. 52,609 


144,005 

114,175 


62,713 

74,403 .. 79.395 .. 67,805 

07.207 .. 86,583 .. 73,551 

61,799 .. 91,004 .. 79,072 

93,°97 .. 7°,226 

74,435 .. 58,559 

73,379 .. 60.298 

88,751 .. 08.352 


51,308 
3 '.749 
109 v 839 .. 36.460 
133.689 .. 44,5*35 
117,009 .. 63,991 .. 63,611 
133,264 .. 61,300 .. 71,064 
95,’64 .. 39,943 
97,211 .. 39,960 


55,221 

57,251 


. 41,135 
. 56,327 
. 44,367 
45,614 


DaU. 


Present sod 
Absent. 

Abtent 

Aggregate 

Preeent- 

Present 

for Duty. 

1863. Nov. 

20 . 

. 96,576 .. 

40,488 . 

. 56,088 . 

. 48,269 

“ Dec. 

80 . 

. 91,* 53 .. 

, 36,638 . 

. 64.715 . 

. 43,558 

1864. Jan. 

31 . 

. 79,602 .. 

84,463 . 

. 45,139 . 

. 35,849 

“ Feb. 

20 . 

. 68,435 .. 

28,878 . 

. 89,562 . 

. 33,811 

“ Mar. 

10 . 

. 79,-03 .. 

, 33,061 . 

. 46,151 . 

. 39,407 

“ April 

10 . 

. 97,670 .. 

36,358 . 

. 61,218 . 

. 52,620 

“ June 

30 . 

. 9 >,685 ., 

, 30,114 . 

. 62,571 . 

. 51,S63 

“ July 

10' . 

. 135.S05 . 

. 66,961 . 

. 68,844 . 

. 57,097 

“ May 

31 . 

. 146,838 . 

. 87,854 . 

. 68,984 . 

. 44,247 

“ Oct. 

31 . 

. 177,103 .. 

94,468 . 

. 82,635 . 

. 62,875 

“ Nov. 

80 . 

. 181,820 .. 

. 93,966 . 

87,860 . 

. 69,290 

“ Dec. 

90 . 

. 155,772 . 

. 76,454 . 

. 79,318 . 

. 66,533 

1865. Jan. 

81 . 

. 141,027 . 

. 71,fM . 

. 69,673 . 

. 53,445 

“ Feb. 

28* . 

. 160,411 . 

. 87,062 . 

. 73,349 . 

. 59,004 


• It lias been shown (T'tr. p. 860) that at the close of M-y thk army numbered 67,000, and (ante, p. 361) that at the 

end of June it had fully 100,ou0 men pr. sent for duty. ....... .. , 

a Three week* after the close of the “Seven Days," its force present for duty, notwithstanding Its losses, was near¬ 
ly 70,000 on the 20th of iuly. The returns for the next six weeks are wanting; but it is Certain that large additions 
were’received, bringing its marching force in August fully up to 100,000. . „ . , .. 

c On the 30th of September, a fortnight after the battle of Antletam, there were but 72,000 present, including 
sick and wounded. By this time ali those who had fallen out In the march had rejoined their commands so that the 
campaign from Cedar Run to Antletam cost 88,000, disabled and deeertera. During tbe next two months the army 
was largely augmented by conscription. ... ». %,_.. _ , 

o The diminution at this time was owing to a part of Longstreet’e corps having been sent to North Carolina, whore 
he remained until May. 

• At this time Longstreet had been sent with re-eDforcementa to Bragg in Tennessee. 

r from this time the effects of de*ortlon aDd sickness became striki cly apparent. The number of the absent 
exceeds, sometimes verv considerably, that of the “present;** while <»f those “present’ only about two thirda were 
fit for “ duty." The eff. ctlve strength of the array was only abont one third of Its nominal foroe. 

« The returns ibr the remainder of the period before the surrender are wanting. 










■m 



MAP OF TITB CAMPAION IN VIRGINIA. 


Ian, the siege of Richmond was to be pressed. If it went to the Rappahau- 
nock, McClellan would be withdrawn from the James. Mosby, soon to be 
known as a vigorous partisan leader, had been captured; being set free by 
exchange, he passed Fortress Monroe as Burnside was embarking. lie 
learned from a sure source that the destination was the Rappahannock, and 
conveyed to Lee the long-wished-for information. 1 Reports, which, how¬ 
ever, were premature, also affirmed that a part of McClellan’s army had 
gone to the aid of Pope. It was clear, therefore, that active operations 
against Richmond were no longer contemplated; and Lee believed that he 
might venture to leave the Confederate capital, and advance with almost his 
whole army upon Pope, and overwhelm him before re-enforcements could 
reach him. Some changes had been made in the organization of his army, 
linger, whose incompetency had been demonstrated, was displaced; Ma- 
gruder was sent to Texas. Their divisions, and that of Whiting, which had 
been only temporarily attached to Jackson’s force during the Seven Days, 
were united with that of Longstreet, and placed under his command. This 
body of 50,000 men left Richmond by the 13th of August, and moved with 
such rapidity that by the 16tb it had passed Gordonsville, and was advanc¬ 
ing toward the Rappahannock, whither Jackson had proceeded the day be¬ 
fore.’ Thus, two days before McClellan’s advance corps and trains had 
fairly started from their camp on the James, Richmond and Petersburg were 
left defended only by about 20,000, the division of D. H. Hill and Holmes, 
with perhaps a few raw conscripts who had not been assigned to their places 
in the grand army. So secretly had this movement been made, that on this 
very Uay reports reached McClellan that the enemy were advancing against 
him from the Chickahominy; and on the 17th he wrote that he should not 
feel entirely secure until he had his whole army beyond the Chickahominy , 3 
and a week later he thought it necessary to strengthen the defenses of York - 
town to resist an attack from the direction of Richmond. On that verv 
day D. H. Hill left Petersburg with his division, the last to join in the 
movement toward Washington.* * 

Early on the morning of the 20th the pickets of Pope’s right at Rappa¬ 
hannock Station were driven in, and before night the main body of the Con¬ 
federate infantry, outnumbering him almost two to one, were in his front 
across the Rappahannock. During the two following days Lee made repeat- 

1 Cooke’s Stone/call Jackson. 3 L*e's Rep., i., 18; ii., 81. 90. 

* McC. Rep-, 314, 317. 4 MeC. Rep ., 320; Lee's Rep., ii., 111. 


[August, 1862 . 

ed attempts to cross at various points, and an almost continuous ar¬ 
tillery fire was kept up along the whole line of eight miles, with little 
loss on either side. 1 Lee then began to move slowly up the river, in 
order to turn the Union right. Pope had been directed to keep him¬ 
self in communication with Fredericksburg, whither the Army of the 
Potomac was being brought, and could not extend his right to check 
the enemy. He was assured, however, that if he could hold his line 
until the close of the 23d, he would receive re-enforcements sufficient 
to enable him to assume the offensive. 2 On the 22d he resolved to 
cross the river the next morning, and fling his whole force upon the 
flank and rear of Lee’s long column, which was passing toward his 
right. The manoeuvre, except that it involved no long march of the 
attacking column, would have been almost a repetition of that by which 
Lee assailed McClellan’s retreating column at Frazier’s Farm ; but such 
was the disparity of force that it could hardly have been other than a 
disastrous failure. But a fierce rain-storm during the night raised the 
waters of the shallow river six or eight feet, swept away the bridges 
and overflowed the fords, so as to render the movement impracticable, 
and also prevented Lee from any serious attempt to cross above, which 
be had begun to do. 3 

An episode occurred during that stormy night of the 22d which, 
though trifling in itself, changed the whole course of the campaign. 
Pope’s head-quarters were at Catlett’s Station, ten miles in the rear of 
the centre of his line. Here all the army trains were parked, guarded 
by 1500 infantry and five companies of cavalry. Stuart, with 1500 
cavalry, had crossed the river above Pope’s extreme right, and, gain¬ 
ing the rear of his line, pressed, without being discovered, down to Cat¬ 
lett’s Station. Here, iu the midst of the darkest night be ever knew, 
Stuart found himself in the very midst of the Union camp. By chance 
he encountered a negro whom he had known before, who offered to 
guide him to the spot occupied by Pope’s staff. A few companies 
stole unperceived up to the tents “occupied by the convivial staff of 
Pope,” charged upon them, captured one or two of the inmates, and 
seized some plunder. But of far more importance than all was Pope’s 
dispatch-book, which revealed just the situation of his army, his im¬ 
minent need of re-enforcements, and his expectation of the time when 
they would reach him.* This bold dash cost one man killed and one 
wounded. When that unnamed negro, accidentally encountered in 
the darkness, guided the Sixth Virginia cavalry to Pope’s tent, he was 
potentially fighting the battles of Groveton and Antietam. 

The disclosures made by this dispatch-book convinced Lee that, if 
he could at once throw his force directly upon the Union rear, cutting 
its communications with Washington, Pope’s whole army could be de¬ 
stroyed or captured. To do this his force must be divided, a part 
marching rapidly around the enemy's right to his rear, the remainder 
occupying his attention in front until the departing column was well 
advanced, when it would follow by the same route. 5 The manoeuvre 
was a delicate one, depending upon every movement being executed 
at the precise time. A sudden storm, or any other accident interfering 
for a single day, would thwart the whole plan. It was also hazardous, 
for the Union army might fall with equal or superior force upon either 
of the separated divisions. Still, the chance of great success was sufficient 
to warrant the attempt, and not a moment was lost in carrying it out. 

The first part, upon the successful execution of which every thing de¬ 
pended, was confided to Jackson, whose capacity for conducting a rapid 
march had been abundantly tested. On the morning of the 25th he left 
his position, passed up the south bank of the Rappahannock, crossing the 
river beyond Pope’s extreme right, and then pressed rapidly up the narrow 
valley between Blue and Bull Run Mountains. The column pressed on by 
strange country roads and by “ nigh cuts” across open fields, and at mid¬ 
night, after a march of twenty miles, reached Salem, a little town just op¬ 
posite the Thoroughfare Gap, through which he hoped to pass the Bull Run 
Mountains, and emerge directly upon Pope’s rear. If that pass should be 
defended the whole movement would be a failure. Stuart, with all the 
cavalry, accompanied the column on its right, scouring the region between 
it and the Union force. It was hoped that the movement would be unper¬ 
ceived and unsuspected by the enemy. “Don’t shout, boys, the Yankees 
will hear us,’’said Jackson, as the long column passed by a point where he 
stood, proudly watching their rapid march. “ Who could fail,” he said, “ to 
win victory with these men?” 6 7 

Pope, however, was not taken by surprise. Jackson’s march had hardly 
been begun when he was informed that “a large detachment of the enemy, 
numbering 36 regiments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of 
artillery and a large cavalry force, was marching rapidly up the North 
Branch, and was then pressing on toward White Plains and Salem, and 
from these points would be able to turn our right by the direction of Thor¬ 
oughfare Gap, or even north of that place.’” He was, however, compelled 

1 The Confederate loss, August 20-23, was 152 killed and wounded.— Lee's Rep., i., 50. 

3 Hnlleck to Pope, August 21 : “I have telegraphed to General Burnside to know at what hour 
he can re-enforce Reno. I am waiting his answer. Even- effort must be made to hold the Rap¬ 
pahannock. Large forces will he in to-morrow.”—Later, same day: “I have ju*t sent [query 
received] General Burnside’s reply. General Cox’s forces arc coming on from Parkersburg, and 
will be here to-morrow or next day. Dispute every inch of ground, ami fight like the devil till we 
can re-enforce you. Forty-eight hours more, and we can make you strong enough. Don’t yield 
an inch if you can help it.”— Pope's Report , 221, 222. 

General Haupt, Superintendent of Transportation at Alexandria, to Pope, received August 24 : 

“Thirty thousand troops or more demand transport. We can manage 12,000 per dav. The 
new troops might march, the veterans go in cars, horses driven; baggage, tents, etc., wait until 
they can be forwarded. Supplies take precedence.”—Later, same day : “ We expect to clean out 
all the troops now here, and all that are expected to-day.”— Ibid.. 227. 3 Pope's Report , 13. 

4 Stuart, in Lee's Rep., ii., 137. 4 Lee's Rep., i., 21. 4 Cooke's Stonewall Jarkson, 275. 

7 Pope's Report, 16. Colonel J. S. Clark, who at great risk watched Jackson’s march, 6aw 






























POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 


386 


August, 1861] 

by his orders to hold his force in such a position as to enable him to keep 
up his communication with Fredericksburg. Assurances of speedy re-en- 
forcements were so precise and definite that he felt warranted in holding 
his position. He was assured that 30,000 would reach him by the 25th; 
but on the evening of that day only 8000 had come up. * 1 

On the 26th, Longstreet, who had kept up a show of force in front of 
Pope, yet all the while creeping away to his right, commenced his march to 
unite with Jackson, who, having left Salem at daybreak, was pressing through 
Thoroughfare Gap. Pope then abandoned the line of the Rappahannock, 
and undertook to throw his whole force in the direction of Gainesville and 
Manassas Junction. On the morning of the 27th he had 54,000 infantry, 
made up of his own Army of Virginia, and the re-enforcements which had 
readied him from Burnside’s corps and the Army of the Potomac. He had 
also nominally 4000 cavalry, but their horses were so broken down that 
hardly 500 were fit for service. 2 

Jackson, in the mean while, had passed Thoroughfare Gap on the morning 
of the 26th; pressed past Gainesville, which Pope supposed to be strongly 
occupied, but where there was not a single Union soldier, and by sunset was 
at Bristoe Station, on the railroad which formed Pope’s chief means for sup¬ 
plies. At Manassas Junction, seven miles distant, was a large depot of sup¬ 
plies almost without guard. 3 A strong body of cavalry under Stuart, and 
about 500 infantry under Trimble, were dispatched to seize these stores. 
They pressed on through the darkness, though the infantry had made a 
march of more than twenty miles that day, and before dawn had effected 
their purpose, capturing the only considerable ddpot of stores between 
Pope's army and Washington. 4 * These stores were destroyed by the Con¬ 
federates, and so were of little advantage to Jackson beyond giving his 
hungry troops rations for a single day, but their loss proved a serious dis¬ 
advantage to Pope. 

On the morning of the 27th the greater part of Jackson's command moved 
to Manassas, leaving Ewell at Bristoe, upon which place Hooker was march¬ 
ing. A short action took place in the afternoon, in which Ewell was worst¬ 
ed, but he fell back in good order to Manassas. 6 * Fitz John Porter, who, with 
4500 men, was at Warrenton Junction, nine miles distant, was ordered by 
Pope to move during the night to Bristoe, to the support of Hooker, whose 
ammunition was entirely exhausted. He was to be there at daybreak, but 
did not reach the place until six hours later. 6 Meanwhile a considerable 
body of Union troops came down toward Manassas along the railroad. 
They found the Junction too strongly held to be recovered, and after a gal¬ 
lant fight, in which General Taylor was killed, they retreated with much loss. 1 

Pope’s force was now concentrating in the neighborhood of Manassas. 
Had this concentration been effected one day earlier, Jackson would have 
marched into the jaws of destruction. As it was, he was in imminent peril. 
He had no alternative but to retreat, but whither it was hard to say. 
McDowell, marchiug to his right from Warrenton, was at Gainesville, with 
a force equal to his own, cutting him off to the west by the route by' which 
he had advanced. To retreat northward toward Aldie would have removed 
him every step farther from the main army of Lee, which was yet beyond 
the Bull Run Mountains. He adopted the only course which could have 
saved him, and even in this the chances were fearfully against him. This 
was to fall back toward the point from which Longstreet was advancing, 
and at the same time deceive his opponent as to the direction of his retreat. 
His own division, now commanded by Taliaferro, moved from Manassas 
directly north, while Ewell and Hill, with the cavalry, marched northeast¬ 
ward, as if pushing straight for Washington. At Centreville they turned 
sharply west, and during the 28th rejoined Taliaferro a little west and north 
of the battle-field of Bull Run. 8 The ruse succeeded. Pope withdrew 
McDowell from Gainesville, marched him directly toward Centreville, and 
ordered Heintzelman in the same direction. Jackson had now secured 
a strong position a little north and west of the battle-field of Bull Run. 
McDowell’s line of march led him close by the right of Jackson, and ex¬ 
posed him to a flank attack. This was made by Jackson just before sunset, 
and a sharp action, mostly of artillery, ensued, which was terminated by the 
darkness, neither side gaining any decided advantage, 9 and both suffering 
heavy loss. Ewell and Taliaferro were severely wounded. 10 

Pope, supposing that Jackson was in full retreat to Thoroughfare Gap, 
was confident that there was no escape for him. At half past nine he wrote 
to Kearney, “McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy, and is now 

only a part of his •force. Instead of 36 regiments of infantry, Jackson had about 66, all of which 
were on the march. The entire cavalry force of the Confederate army was at this time with 
Jackson, for Longstreet ( Lee's Rep ., ii., 81) says that on the 27th he had no cavalry. 

1 Pope's Report , 15. Also, considerably enlarged, Reb. Rec ., v., 348. Also Note a , ante, p. 384. 

3 Pope's Report , 17. 

* At half past ten on the evening of that day, McDowell, then at Warrenton, wrote to Pope, 
“Centreville and Manassas are fortified, the former sufficiently to offer a stout resistance, and the 
latter enough to aid materially raw troops ."—! J ope's Report , 200. 

4 Among the stores captured were 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1000 barrels of beef, 2000 of pork, 

2000 of flour; two trains loaded with stores and clothing, large quantities of forage, 8 puns, 42 
waeons and ambulances, 200 tents; 300 prisoners, 200 negroes, and 175 horses also fell into tin ir 
hand>. — Lee's Rep., ii., 155. A sharp dispute arose between Stuart and Trimble ns to the credit 
of this operation, each denying the claims of the other. — Ibid., 143, 150-159. Jackson (Ibid., 
93; clearly p’ves it to Trimble. 6 I-**'* Rep., 93. 

* Pope's Testimony on Porter a Trial The failure to execute this order formed one of the 
charges against Porter, who was subsequently tried by court-martial and cashiered. 

’ Lee's Rep , ii , 93. 

8 Pope indeed says (Rejiort, 18) that, if Jackson had massed his whole force and attacked the 
Union centre at Bristoe Statiou, the most serious consequences would have ensued; but the result 
fully justifies Jackson's course. 

* Pope says, *• Each parry maintained its ground." Jackson says, “The Federals did not at¬ 
tempt to advance, but maintained their ground with obstinate determination. Both lines stood 
exposed to the discharge of musketry and artillery until about nine o’clock, when the enemy slow¬ 
ly fell back, yielding the field to our troops." 

10 The actions of this and the two following days are known as indifferently n6 the “Second 
Bull Run Battle," the “ Battle of Manassas Plains," the “Second Manassas Battle," and the “ Bat¬ 
tle of Groveton.” They were all one battle, fought on the same ground. We think Groveton the 
moat appropriate, that being the name of a small hamlet near the centre of the battle-field. 


in hi* front Unless h» can escape by by-paths leading to the north to¬ 
night, he must be captured.” McDowell must hold his ground at all haz¬ 
ards, prevent the retreat of Jackson, and by daylight the next morning the 
whole force would be up from Centreville and Manassas Junction, and be¬ 
tween them the enemy must be crushed. Jackson had now, after his losses, 
exclusive of cavalry, not quite 30,000 men. Pope had, or rather supposed 
that he had, 50,000, who could be brought into action in the morning. Of 
these, 25,000, under McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, were supposed to be 
directly west of Jackson, between him and the Gap; 25,000 more, with 
Kearney, Hooker, and Reno, near Centreville, on the east. His otdy appre¬ 
hension was that Jackson might retreat northward toward Leesburg, and to 
prevent this, Kearney was to keep close to him during the night of the 
28th. 1 

This apparently well-conceived plan was based upon a misconception as 
to the purpose and position of the enemy. Jackson had no purpose of re¬ 
treating, but had taken a position which he meant to hold until he should 
be joined by Longstreet, who was a full day’s march nearer him than Pope 
supposed. The execution of his plan was prevented by a movement previ¬ 
ously made by McDowell, who had sent Ricketts toward Thoroughfare Gap, 
and had before withdrawn King’s division to Manassas Junction, near which 
place Porter now was. Pope’s force, therefore, instead of being in the rear 
and on the front of Jackson, was on his right flank and front—Sigel’s corps 
near Groveton, close on the flank; McDowell and Porter near Manassas; 
Reno and Heintzelman in front, toward Centreville. McDowell and Porter 
were ordered, on the morning of the 29tb, toward Gainesville, and thus gain 
a position somewhat in Jackson’s rear, while Sigel was to fall upon his flank, 
and Heintzelman and Reno, marching from Centreville, to attack him in 
front. ■ These movements would bring the whole force together; and when 
communication was established, the whole command was to halt, and, above 
all things, to occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Run that 
night; for Pope presumed that it would be necessary to do this on account 
of supplies. “The indications,” he said, “are, that the whole force of the 
enemy is moving in this direction at a pace which will bring them here by 
to-morrow night or next day.” 2 

Pope’s expectation upon the morning of the 29th was, with bis whole 
force, two to one, to fall upon Jackson’s front, right flank, and rear; and he 
hoped, with good reason, “to gain so decisive a victory over the army un¬ 
der Jackson, before be could have been joined by any of the forces under 
Longstreet, that the army of Lee would have been so crippled and checked 
by the destruction of this large force as to be no longer in condition to pros¬ 
ecute operations of an aggressive character.” 3 This accomplished, he would 
have fallen back across Bull Run, and have awaited supplies and re-enforce¬ 
ments, which would in a day or two have given him a force superior to that 
of the enemy. This plan failed utterly through the determined resistance 
opposed by Jackson, and from the fact that Longstreet was nearer at hand 
than was supposed. At the very moment when this order was written, 
Longstreet was pressing through the narrow gorge of Thoroughfare Gap; 
and, instead of coming to Jackson’s aid “to-morrow night or next day,” he 
was able to give him essential support that afternoon, and by the next morn¬ 
ing, the 30th, to bring his whole force upon the field. 

In the mean while all was confusion, doubt, and ignorance at the Federal 
capital. McClellan left Fortress Monroe on the 23d for Acquia Creek, on 
the Rappahannock, whither a part of his army had preceded him, and the 
rest was to follow. Next day he telegraphed to Ilalleck for orders, and es¬ 
pecially for information as to where Pope was, and what he was doing. •• I 
do not know,” replied the general-in-chief, “ where Pope is, or where the 
enemy in force is. These are matters which I have been all day most anx¬ 
ious to ascertain.” Two days later Halleck telegraphed, “There is reason 
to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah Val¬ 
ley. Don’t draw any troops down the Rappahannock at present; we shall 
probably want them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you 
had better leave Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and come to Alexan¬ 
dria, as very great irregularities are reported there.” On the 27th still 
there was no sure information as to what was going on. Past midnight, 
McClellan had heard that heavy firing had been heard at Centreville; he 
had sent to ascertain the truth, and, meanwhile, asked anxiously whether 
the works in front of Washington were garrisoned and ready for defense. 
At 1 35 there is news that “ Taylor’s brigade, sent this morning to Bull Run 
Bridge, had been cut to pieces or captured;” and McClellan thinks the best 
policy will be to make the works at Washington “perfectly safe, and mobil¬ 
ize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance them until they 
can have their artillery and cavalry.” At 2 30: “I still think that we 
should first provide for the immediate defense of 'Washington on both sides 
of the Potomac. I am not responsible for the past, and can not be for the 
future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available force according 
to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not 
wish to act in the dark.” At 6: “A dispatch from Pope, dated at 10 AM., 
snvs, ‘All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right, at Gaines¬ 
ville.’ I have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin’s corps, 
about 2500 of General Tyler’s brigade, and Colonel Tyler’s 1st Connecticut 
Artillery, which I recommend should be held for the defense of Wash¬ 
ington. If you wish me to order any part of this force to march to the 
front, it is in readiness to march at a moment’s notice to any point you may 
indicate.” 4 At 4 10, on the 28th: “Franklin is with me here at Alexan- 


1 Pope's Report, 19. 

* Pope’s General Order, No. 5, August 29, to McDowell nnd Porter.— Report, 241. 

3 Pope's Report, 22. 

4 The dispatches are dated 1 35, 2 30, 6 P.M., August 27; but the context indicates that they 






38(5 


[August, 1862. 



•Henry 1 


CftvETUN 


Nl'uKaVMAWET. 


CAINEStfuf^ 


\ Bethlehem Church^ 


>sas Junoi 


Scut or Mils*. 


MAP OF OPERATIONS, ACOD6T 28, 29, 30. 


dria. I will know in a few minutes the condition of the artillery and cav¬ 
alry. We are not yet in a condition to move; may be by to-morrow morn¬ 
ing. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton’s Hill. They 
must be held at any cost. It is the key to Washington, which can not be 
seriously menaced as long as it is held.” Halleck writes: “Place Sumner’s 
corps, as it arrives, near the guns, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. 
The principal thing now to be feared is a cavalry raid into this city, espe¬ 
cially in the night time.” McClellan, on the 29th: “Franklin’s corps is in 
motion; started about 6 P.M. He has but forty rounds of ammunition, and 
no wagons to move more. I do not think he is in condition to accomplish 
much if he meets with serious resistance. I-should not have moved him 
but for your pressing order of last night.” And in the afternoon, the battle 
then being fought, though no one at Washington knew it: “The last news 
I received from Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy 
were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This 
is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be 
adopted: (1st) To concentrate all our available forces to open communica¬ 
tion with Pope. (2d.) To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once 
use all our means to make the capital perfectly sufe. No middle ground 
will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my 
power to accomplish it.” 1 

Official reports from Washington notified McClellan that large bodies of 
the enemy were moving through Vienna, in the direction of the Chain 
Bridge; so McClellan halted Franklin at Annandale, only a few miles to¬ 
ward Pope. 2 Yet there was not a Confederate soldier within thirty miles, 
or between him and the forces at Washington. Jackson was sternly hold¬ 
ing his ground beyond Bull Run, on almost the very spot where a year, a 
week, and a day before he had won the title of “Stonewall;” and Long- 
street, having marched since early dawn, and for three successive days be¬ 
fore, was within hearing of the noise of the battle which Jackson was so 
firmly waging. 

Early on the morning of the 29th Sigel opened the attack on the Confed¬ 
erate right. 3 Jackson’s left, under Hill, stretched northward toward Sudley 
Ford, on the Bull Run; then came Ewell’s division, under Lawton, in the 
centre; then Jackson’s own division, now commanded by Starke, on the 
right, resting near the little hamlet of Groveton. His force lay mainly be¬ 
hind an abandoned railroad, whose deep cuttings formed a strong intrench- 
ment. The ground was thickly wooded. His artillery was mainly massed 
in on low ridges in the rear of his right Jackson’s front fell back about 
half a mile until they reached the abandoned railroad, where a fierce com¬ 
bat ensued. 4 * Milroy and Schurz, of Sigel’s corps, charged fiercely upon the 
enemy, sheltered by this embankment, but-were driven back; the charge 
was repeated, and again repulsed. The Confederates then advanced, but 
were checked by a hot artillery fire, and fell back to their position. 6 Jack- 
son was fighting a defensive battle, in order to hold his position until re-en¬ 
forced by Longstreet, who was rapidly coming up. Pope came upon the 
field about noon, and, in reply to Sigel’s request for aid, told him that he 
must hold his ground, but that he should not be again pushed into action, 
for McDowell and Porter were coming up from Manassas by the Gainesville 

were sent during the night of the 27th, and should properlv have been dated at these honrs A.M. 
of the 28th. * McC. Rep.. 321-330. * Ibid., 332. 

* Pope says the attack began about daylight. Sigel says: “From half past six to half past ten 
our whole infantry and nearly all our batteries were engaged in a most vehement artillery and in¬ 
fantry contest ” Jackson says: “In the morning, about ten o’clock, the Federal artillery opened 
wiih spirit nnd animation upon onr right, which was soon replied to by our batteries.” 

4 Pope says: “Jackson fell back several miles, but was so closely pressed that he was compelled 
to make a stand, and make the best defense possible.” This is clearly an error, for Sigel says, 
“Milroy and Schurz advanced one mile, and Schenck two miles from their original positions 
and tliose were from three quarters of a mile to a mile nnd a half from a belt of woods occupied 
by the Confederate skirmishing-line. This simply fell back a few hundred yards to the railroad, 
Jackson’s real line. 8 Reports of Milroy and Schurz, in Pope's Report, 90, 109. 


road, and would soon fall upon the enemy’s flank and probably upon his 
rear. 1 Heintzelman’s corps, comprising the divisions of Hooker and Kear¬ 
ney, had meanwhile come upon the field and taken position on the right, 
and Reno’s corps between Sigel and Heintzelman. For four hours a series 
of sharp skirmishes ensued along the centre and left of the Confederate 
line. 2 

Longstreet’s command, Lee accompanying, had been advancing in the 
track of Jackson. It reached White Plains, at the western entrance of the 
Thoroughfare Gap, on the evening of the 27th, where the night was passed, 
aud at dawn of the 28th pressed forward to that narrow defile, which a thou¬ 
sand men could have held against five times their number. Presuming it 
to be held, Longstreet sent a part of his force by a rough mountain path to 
Hopewell Gap, three miles northward, to turn the Union rear. But Thor¬ 
oughfare Gap, the key to every thing, was not held. After some skirmish¬ 
ing, the Confederates poured through and gained its eastern mouth. Rick¬ 
etts, commanding a division of McDowell’s corps, had been sent from Gaines¬ 
ville in that direction “to assist Colonel Wyndham, who, at 10 15 A.M., re¬ 
ported the enemy passing through Thoroughfare Gap.” He pushed for¬ 
ward rapidly, but was too late. At three in the afternoon, before reaching 
the Gap, he met Wyndham’s skirmishers retiring before the enemy, who 
were already in possession. After vainly attempting to check them, find¬ 
ing himself outflanked on both sides, he retreated to Gainesville, and thence 
to Manassas, and the way was open for Longstreet to come to the aid of 
Jackson, who stood at bay on his chosen ground. 3 

Early on the morning of the 29th Longstreet’s columns were united, and 
the advance to join Jackson was resumed. Before they reached Gainesville, 
the noise of the battle, five miles distant, was heard. The wearied troops 
pressed on with renewed vigor. His advance passed through Gainesville 
about nine o’clock, 4 and in an hour began to come upon tbe field, and took 
positions on the rear and to the right of Jackson. The Confederate right 
now extended across the Warrenton Turnpike to the Manassas Railroad. 
The joint order to Porter and McDowell directing them to move toward 
Gainesville, found these commands near Bethlehem Church, two miles west 
of Manassas, and four or five miles from the field of battle. King’s division 
had been detached from McDowell, and placed under Porter for a special 
purpose. McDowell, being senior officer, assumed command, and gave Por¬ 
ter an order fo? his movements, 6 and pushed his corps, including King’s di¬ 
vision, toward the battle-field, which he reached at about four o’clock. Pope, 
who was wholly unaware that Longstreet had united with Jackson, 6 now 
sent an order to Porter to come into action. “ Your line of inarch,” he 
wrote, “brings you in on the enemy’s right flank. I desire you to push 
forward into action at once on the enemy’s flank, and, if possible, on his 

1 Pope's Report, 21. 

3 After the attack in the morning, “ the enemy moved around more to our left to another point 
of attack. This was vigorously repulsed by the batteries. About two o’clock P.M. the Federal 
infantry, in large force, advnnced to the attack of our left.” — Jackson, in Lee's Rep., ii., 95. 
“From twelve until four o’clock very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at various parts of 
our line, and were brought on at every indication the enemy made of a disposition to retreat.”— 
Pojte's Report , 21. 

3 Longstreet, in Lee's Rep., ii., 81 ; McDowell, in Pope's Report, 44 ; Ricketts, Ibid., 169. 

4 General John Buford at this time counted 17 regiments of infantry, one battery of artillery, 
and about 500 cavalry. He estimates the regiments at 800 each; this is probably too high.— 
Court-martial, 188. lie, however, saw only a part of Longstreet’s force. 

8 There is an irreconcilable discrepancy as to the nature of this order. McDowell testifies that 
it was to this effect: “You put your force in here [pointing in the direction where a cloud of dust 
indicated that a body of the enemy were approaching], and I will take*mine up at the Sudley 
Spring road, on the left of the troops engaged at that point with the enemy. . . . The question 
with me was how soonest, within the limits fixed by the order of General Pope, this force of ours 
could be applied against the enemy,” the limitation being that “the troops must occupy a po¬ 
sition from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or in the morning.” — Court-martial, 85. 
Porter asserts that the order was that he should remain where he was. No other persons were 
within hearing when this order was given, or of the conversation which preceded and followed it. 

6 “ I did not then believe, nor do I now believe, that at that time [4 80 P.MJ any considerable 
portion of Loncstreet’s corps had reached the vicinity of the battle-field.”—rope’s Testimony, 
Court-martial, 35. 










August, 186-2.] 


POPES CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 


387 



TUOaOCoiiFASE GAP. 


rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The 
enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon 
as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, 
keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to 
fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communi¬ 
cation with the right wing.” This order was dispatched at half past four, 
and received by Porter just two hours later. He attempted to get his lead¬ 
ing division, Morell's, into position; but, thinking the enemy in front in too 
great force, and judging the country impassable for artillery, did not ad¬ 
vance, and retained his former position during the remainder of the day, 
knowing nothing of the battle which was going on four miles away. The fail¬ 
ure to execute this order forms the second and gravest charge against Porter. 

Sharp fighting, something more than mere “ skirmishing," had been going 
on all the afternoon, especially upon the Confederate left, somewhat weakly 
held by A. P. Hill, with considerable intervals between some of his regi¬ 
ments. By three o’clock the fighting here had assumed the proportions of 
a battle. Grover, with his brigade of Hooker's division, rushed in upon the 
enemy a little to the right of his extreme left. Of this charge Jackson 
says: 1 “The Federal infantry, in large force, advanced to the attack of our 
left, occupied by the division of General Hill. It pressed forward, in defi¬ 
ance of our fatal and destructive fire, with great determination, a portion of 
it crossing a deep cut in the railroad track, and penetrating, in heavy force, 
an interval of nearly 175 yards, which separated the right of Gregg’s from 
the left of Thomas’s brigade. For a short time Gregg’s brigade, on the ex¬ 
treme left, was isolated from the main body of the command. But the 14th 
South Carolina Regiment, then in reserve, with the 45th Georgia, attacked 
the exultant enemy with vigor, and drove them back across the railroad 
track with great slaughter. The opposing forces at one time delivered their 
volleys into each other at the distance of ten paces.” Grover says :* “ After 
rising the hill under which my command lav, an open field was entered, and 
from one edge of it gradually fell off in a slope to a valley through which 
ran a railroad embankment. Beyond this embankment the forest contin¬ 
ued, and the corresponding heights beyond were held by the enemy in force, 
supported by artillery. At three P.M. I received an order to advance in 
line of battle over this ground, pass the embankment, enter the woods be¬ 
yond, and hold it. We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, 
and here occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate haud-to-band conflict, with 
bayonets and clubbed muskets. Many of the enemy were bayoneted in 
their tracks; others struck down with the butts of pieces, * 3 * aud onward 
pressed our line. In a few yards more it met a terrible fire from a second 
line, which in its turn broke. The enemy’s third line now bore down upon 
our thinned ranks in close order, and swept back the right centre and a por¬ 
tion of the left. With the gallant 16th Massachusetts in our centre, I tried 
to turn his flank, but the breaking of our right and centre, and the weight 
of the enemv’s lines, caused the necessity of falling back first to the embank¬ 
ment, and then to our first position, behind which we rallied to our colors.” 
In this fierce conflict, lasting only twenty minutes, Grover, out of less than 
2000 men, lost 4S4. 

• In />■« R'p.. ii.. 95. * In Pope's Report. 7«. 

3 John F.-ion C*»ke *av*: “ Without ammunition, the men of Jackson seizes) whatever Uhw 

could lav th ir hands on to tiM njMin-t the enrinr. The piles of stones in the vicinity of the rail¬ 

road cut were used ; and it is well established that many of the enemy were killed by hariog their 
skulls broken with fragments of rock.”— Slonetcall Jackson, 293. 


Kearney 3 , on the extreme Union right, afterward advanced, 1 and swept 
with a rush the first line of the enemy. This was most successful. The 
enemy rolled upon his own right. It presaged a victory for us all. Still, 
our force was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy reserves, so 
that our farther progress was impeded.” 3 

A.P. Hill 3 thus describes the fight toward evening: “'The evident inten¬ 
tion of the enemy was to turn our left, and overwhelm Jackson’s corps be¬ 
fore Longstreet came up; and to accomplish this, the most persistent and 
furious onsets were made by column after column of infantry, accompanied 
by numerous batteries of artillery. Soon my reserves were all in, and up to 
six o’clock my division, assisted by the Louisiana brigade of General Hayes, 
with a heroic courage and obstinacy almost beyond parallel, had met and 
repulsed six distinct and separate assaults, a portion of the time a majority 
of the men being without a cartridge. The enemy 3 prepared for a last and 
determined attempt. Their serried masses, overwhelming superiority of 
numbers, and bold bearing made tbe chance of victory tremble in the bal¬ 
ance. Casting about for help, fortunately it was here reported to me that 
the brigades of Generals Lawton and Early were near by, and, sending for 
them, they promptly moved to my front at the most opportune moment, and 
this last charge met the same fate as the preceding. Having received an 
order from General Jackson to endeavor to avoid a general engagement, my 
commanders of brigades contented themselves with repulsing the enemy 
and following them up but a few hundred yards." Both sides, as usual, 

■ claim to have fought against superior numbers; but a comparison of the di¬ 
visions engaged, as shown in the respective reports, shows that the Confed¬ 
erates had at the close a considerable preponderance. That is, A.P. Hill, 
Ewell, and Lawton outnumbered Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, to whom they 
were opposed. The opportune arrival of Longstreet upon the right enabled 
Jackson to concentrate nearly his whole strength to resist this attack upon 
his left. 

At half past five, McDowell having come up, Pope, supposing that Por- 
J ter was advancing, in compliance with the order sent an hour before, but 
1 only received an hour later, ordered an attack upon Jackson’s right, which, 

| ignorant of Longstreet’s arrival, he supposed to be the extreme right of the 
whole Confederate force on the field.* This attack was made along the 
Wnrrenton Turnpike by King’s division, then commanded by Hatch, of 
McDowell’s corps, who, “trusting to find the enemy in retreat, as he was 
told, and hoping to turn their retreat into a flight, took the men forward 
with an impetuosity akin to rashness.” 5 Instead of finding a retreating en¬ 
emy, he was confronted, after marching three quarters of a mile, by 3 a strong 
; force. A fierce struggle, lasting three quarters of an hour, took place, mainly 
between Doubleday’s and Patrick’s brigades on tbe Union side, and those 


1 Ileintz' lman. in Pope's Report. 55, says not till several orders had been sent to him to dn so, 
aud after Hooker had been driven back. 3 Kearney, in I’o/k's Report, 79. 

3 In Lee’s Rej*., ii.. 125. 

* l*o}« ( Report . 17) strangely says: “ About half past five I directed Generals Ileintzeltnan and 
Reno to assault the left of vlie enemy,*’ and then proceed* to describe Grover’* assault on the rail¬ 
road embankment; and adds: “The whole of the left of the enemy was doubled kick toward its 
centre, and ottr foircs, after n sharp conflict of an hour aud a half, occupied the field of battle, 
with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands.” And again (R‘/>ort, 21): “While this 
nt»a» k [by McDowell] was coin? on, the forces tinder Heintzdinnn nnd Kctio continued to push 
back the left of tha enemy in the direction of the Warn ntou Turnpike, so that at about eight o’clock 
: in the evening the greater portion of tbe field of buttle was occupied by our nriuv.” Whereas the 
truth is that Grover’s artack began at three, aud was soon repul-d, ms «a* also the subsequent 
• one by Kearney and Reno. * McDowell, in I’ope's Report, 40. 













388 





of Hood and Evans on the Confederate. The result, as told by Hatch, was: 
“ Night had now come on. Our loss had been severe, and the enemy oc¬ 
cupying a position in the woods on our left, I was forced to give the order 
fur a retreat. The retreat was executed in good order, the attempt to fol¬ 
low being defeated by a few well-directed volleys from Patrick’s brigade.” 1 
Longstreet says: “Hood, supported by Evans, made a gallant attack, driv¬ 
ing the enemy back until nine o’clock at night. The enemy’s entire force 
was found to be massed directly in my front, and in so strong a position 
that it was not deemed advisable to move on against his immediate front, 
so the troops were quietly withdrawn at one o’clock the following morning. 
After withdrawing from the original attack, my troops were placed in the 
line first occupied, and .in the original order.” 2 

The battle, as a mere conflict of force, was wholly undecisive. The Con¬ 
federates had not been permanently driven a rod from any position which 
they wished to hold; at most, their extreme weak left, which was altogether 
“ in the air,” had been drawn in a little toward the centre. But Jackson 
had gained his object. He had held his ground until Longstreet’s whole 
force had come up and taken position by his side and in his rear. Not so 
thought Pope. He believed that Jackson had suffered a defeat, which only 
the absence of Porter had prevented from being decisive. 3 Early next 
morning he sent to Washington the news of his success. “We fought," he 
wrote, “a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of the en¬ 
emy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until after dark, by 
which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupv. 
Our troops are too much exhausted to push matters, but I shall do so in 
the course of the morning, as soon as Fitz John Porter’s corps comes up 
from Manassas. The enemy is still on our front, but badly used up. We 
have lost not less than 8000 men killed and wounded, and from the appear¬ 
ance of the field, the enemy have lost at least two to our one. He stood 
strictly on the defensive, and every attack was made by ourselves. Our 
troops behaved splendidly. The battle was fought on the identical field of 
Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of our men. The news 
just reaches us from the front that the enemy is retreating toward the 
mountains. I go forward to see. We have made great captures, but I am 
not able yet to form an idea of their extent.” McDowell wrote a little 
more cautiously: “I have gone through a second battle of Bull Run, on 
the identical field of last year, and unhurt. The victory is decidedlv ours.” 4 * 

At half past eight on the evening of the 29th, Pope sent a peremptory 
order to Porter to march at once to the field of battle, where he was to ap¬ 
pear at daylight. 6 Two of his brigades, that of Griffin, and Piatt’s, tem¬ 
porarily attached to his corps, by some misconception of orders, marched 

1 Popf's Report , 179. 9 Lee's Rep., ii., 82. 

3 Popr's Report, 22. * Newspapers, August 31. 

• “Immediately upon receipt of this order, the prerise hour of receiving which you will ac¬ 
knowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and report to me in 
p'*raon. You nro to understand that you are to comply strictly with this order, and to be present 
on the field within three hours after its recoption, or after daybreak to-morrow morning.” 


[August, 1862. 

to Centreville, and took no part in the fighting of the day. The rest of 
his corps, 7000 strong, joined Pope near Groveton early in the morning. 
Pope’s whole force, with the exception of these two brigades, 5000 strong, 
and Banks’s corps of the same number, which was at Bristoe in charge 
of the railroad and wagon trains, was at last concentrated. Its effective 
strength was now reduced to 40,000. Opposed to them were the combined 
forces of Longstreet and Jackson, now under Lee, who was on the field and 
assumed command, numbering about 60,000.* Both armies were exhausted 
by their previous marching and fighting, and neither manifested a disposi¬ 
tion for a while to assume the offensive. Pope was, indeed, greatly dis¬ 
couraged by a letter which he received at daybreak from Franklin, inform¬ 
ing him that rations and forage would be sent from Alexandria if he would 
send a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. He had no cavalry to send, 
and if he had, they could not go and return in time to furnish his men with 
the supplies of which they were in sore need. “It was not till I received 
this letter,” he says, “ that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless 
of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged.” 2 The 
natural course, under the circumstances, would seem to have been the one 
which he had contemplated the day before: to have fallen back to Centre- 
ville, or even beyond, and meet Ins supplies and the re-enforcements, which 
could not have been long delayed, from Alexandria. Meanwhile he be¬ 
came convinced that the enemy was actually retreating. Lee was drawing 
in Jackson's exposed left, and the movement of Longstreet’s strong right 
was hidden from view by intervening hills and woods. A paroled pris¬ 
oner came in and reported that the whole Confederate army was in rapid 
retreat. This soldier had come into Porter’s lines, and was sent by him to 
Pope with an assurance that he did not believe a word of the story. Pope 
replied that he believed the soldier, and ordered Porter to advance. 

At noon Pope gave a general order to pursue the enemy thus presumed 
to be retreating, and special orders to different commanders. 3 Lee had no 
occasion or intention of retreating, nor did lie propose to attack, but chose 
to await the assault of the enemy. His position was the same as on the 
previous day, except that Jackson’s extreme left was drawn in a little. His 
line stretched northward for a mile, in a somewhat irregular crescent form, 
the convex side facing the east, and following the course of thickly wooded 
heights; its centre was also protected by a deep cutting for an unfinished 
railroad, which formed an admirable earth-work. Longstreet’s line ran 
southeastward behind the crest of another wooded ridge, which concealed 
him wholly from the view of the enemy, to whom his presence and position 
was entirely unknown. His reserves lay considerably beyond the rear of 
Jackson, so that at any moment, without disturbing his front, he could sus¬ 
tain Jackson. His force being larger and his line shorter than that of Jack- 
son, his brigades were much more closely massed, The whole line resem¬ 
bled an irregular LJ Jackson forming the perpendicular, Longstreet the 
horizontal line. Between Jackson’s right and Longstreet was a considera¬ 
ble interval; this was, however, swept by artillery massed behind the crest 
of a ridge in the rear, only the muzzles of the guns being visible. Pope, 
still believing that Jackson’s right was the right of the entire Confederate 
force, instead of being in fact its centre, directed his main attack, or, as he 
fancied, his “pursuit,” upon this point. His line of battle conformed close¬ 
ly to that of Lee. On the extreme right was Heintzelman, then Reno, then 
Sigel, forming the perpendicular, confronting Jackson; the other wing con¬ 
sisted of McDowell’s command, which comprised his own corps, that of Por¬ 
ter, and the Pennsylvania Reserves under Reynolds—Porter being in the 
advance, and Reynolds to his right. During the action some changes took 
place. Of McDowell’s corps, King’s division, now, as on the previous day, 
under Hatch, were sent forward with Porter, and Ricketts was added to 
Heintzelman, while Reynolds was in effect left to act for himself. 6 

After some hours of sharp cannonading, Sykes’s division of Porter’s corps 
was pushed forward to support an advance to be made by Butterfield. Thus 
far they had seen none of the Confederate infantry or cavalry, and of his ar¬ 
tillery only the muzzles of the cannon. Butterfield’s advance must have 
been ordered upon the supposition that Jackson was in full retreat. It was 
gallantly made, and gallantly supported, but it failed utterly. Jackson, shel¬ 
tered bv the railway embankment, was as secure as earth-works could make 
him, and poured in a furious fire, which tore in pieces the assailants as they 
emerged from the woods, their own fire being almost harmless against a 
sheltered foe. 6 Reno and Heintzelman at the same time assailed Jackson 
farther to the right, aided by Reynolds, who had been moved thither from 
the rear, where they had been posted to support Porter’s “pursuit” 7 Jack- 
son found his centre and left sorely pressed. “The Federal infantry,” he 
says, “about four o’clock moved from under the cover of the wood, and ad- 

1 Those estimates include only infantry, the cavalry b mg of little avail on either side. 

The Uni«»n force is stated bv Pope ( Report, 23) as follows: “McDowell, 12,000; Sigel, 7000; 
Heintzelman, 7000; Reno, 7000; Porter, 7000—40,000 in all. 

\Ve arrive at an approximation to the Confederate force from the following data: Longstreet’s 
whole force was on the field, as well as that of Jackson. These comprised 35 brigades, and at the 
outset, according to our previous estimate, numbered 78,750. In the various engagements from 
Cellar Mountain to the battle of the 29th, they had lost about 8000. The march had been long 
and exhausting, and probably quire 5000 bad fallen out of the ranks from fatigue or sickness, 
thus leaving 65,000 available. The entire force seems not to have been actually brought into 
action, for in tbe detailed list of casualties losses are mentioned in only 115 regiments, which 
probably at the time averaged 400 each—46,000 in all, leaving 19,000 not direcily in action. 
Pope brought nearly his whole force into action, probably about 35,000. 3 Report , 23. 

3 Extracts from Orders: “The following forces will be immediately thrown forward and 

in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously the whole day. Major General McDowell is 
assigned to the command of the pursuit.” McDowell to Porter: “Major General McDowell be¬ 

ing charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue the enemy, directs that your corps will be 

followed immediately by King’s division, supported by Reynolds’s.Organize a strong advance 

to precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact 
with him.*’— J y ope's Rrpoi-t , 47. 

* Longstreet and Sykes describe the line as an irregular V reversed (<), but an !_ represents 
it more closely. * McDowell, in l y oj>e's Report, 48. 8 Syke9, in Pofte’s Report , 147. 

1 Pope's Report , 24; Heintzelman, Ibid., 5G ; Reynolds, Ibid.. 67; Hatch, Ibid., 178. 












POPES CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 


Acgvbt, 1862.] 


380 


vanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending the at¬ 
tack to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged 
in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was re¬ 
pulsed another took its place, and pressed forward as if determined, by force 
of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous 
and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the com¬ 
manding general for re-enforcements.”' Lee informed Longstreet of Jack- 
son’s peril; but, before any succor could be sent, Longstreet found that he 
could better aid Jackson by another movement. “ From an eminence near 
by,” he says, “one portion of the enemy’s masses attacking General Jackson 
were immediately within my view, and within easy range of batteries in 
that position. It gave me an advantage that I did not expect to have, and 
I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and 
one placed in position and immediately opened. As it was evident that the 
attack upon General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the 
fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the 
second battery could be placed in position the enemy began to retire, and 
in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken, and that portion of the 
army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended 
diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward 
at a charge.” 2 

Let us now look at the field on the Union left, as seen from its positions. 
Butterfield’s brigade had marched up the hill upon the as yet invisible ene¬ 
my. “ As he advanced there was a great commotion among the rebel forces, 
and the whole side of the hill and edges of the wood swarmed with men be¬ 
fore unseen. The effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails.” 3 War¬ 
ren—then colonel, soon to be major general—commanding a weak brigade 
of two regiments, numbering together 1000 men, seized a commanding posi¬ 
tion which had been vacated by the withdrawal of Rej'nolds, and held it 
until he was fairly enveloped by the advancing enem)’, and retreated only 
when the rest of Porter’s corps had been driven back. Out of 480 men of 
the oth New York, he lost, in killed, 79; wounded, 170; missing, 48. The 
10th New York, out of 510 men, lost 23 killed, 65 wounded, 48 missing— 
412 out of 1000 in this one action. 4 Porter’s corps was thus compelled to 
bear the whole onset of Longstreet’s advance. Outnumbered fully three to 
one, outflanked on the left, and unsheltered on the right, where Reno and 
Heintzelman were falling back from the enfilading fire of Longstreet’s bat¬ 
teries and the fierce onset of Jackson’s advance, it retreated, first to the pla¬ 
teau of the Henry House—the scene of the final struggle at Bull Run a year 
before—and then, the enemy still outflanking, across Bull Run to Centre- 
ville. Warren’s desperate stand had not, however, been unavailing. To all 
seeming, it saved the defeat from becoming a rout 5 The retreat was made 
in good order. Porter’s corps, though defeated, was not routed, and Sykes’s 
regulars covered the retreat of a portion of the army. They had performed 
the same service on the same ground a year before. Out of scarcely 7000 
men, Porter’s corps lost, in the few hours during which this action lasted, 

1 J.ickson, in Lee's Rp., ii., 96. * I.nngstrver, in Lee's Hep., ii„ 82. 

5 Warren, in Hope's Report, 150. 4 fcjvkcs, in Hope's Report, 147, IG2. 

4 Longstreet says, “The commanding general soon joined me, anil a few minutes after Major 
General Anderson arrived with his division.” (This division, the largest in the force, numbering 
at least 24 regiments, formed the rear of Longstreet’s command, and had been held in reserve a 
little to the rear.—Lee's Hep., i., 25.) “The attack was led by Hood's brigade, closely support¬ 
ed by Evans. These were rapidly re-enforced by Anderson's division from the rear, Kemper’s 
three brigades and D. R. Jones’s division from the right, and Wilcox’s brigade from the left. The 
attacking columns moved steadily forward from point to point, following the movements of the 
g -neral line. These were, however, somewhat detained by an enfilade tire from a battery on my 
left." (This was Hazlitt’s battery, attached to Warren’s brigade. See Warren, in Hope's Report, 
150 ) “This threw more than its proper shnre of fighting upon the infantry, and enabled the cn- 
etnv to escape with many of his batteries, which should have fallen into our hands."—Longstreet, 
in Lee's Rep., ii., 83, 


2164 men, of whom 323 are put down as killed, 1323 wounded, and 518 
missing. 1 

The main stress of the battle had fallen upon the centre of both armies, 
from thence extending to the Confederate left and the Union right. Hook¬ 
er, on the Union right, assailed Hill, and gained some advantage.’ But 
when the main attack had failed, and the anticipated pursuit had become a 
retreat, the whole Union force was ordered to fall back toward Centreville. 
The order was given at eight o’clock. The army retreated in order. It 
had suffered a defeat; but there was no disgraceful panic like that which 
had marked the close of the battle fought a year before on almost the same 
ground. 

In this three days’ battle the Confederate loss was about 8400: 1400 
killed, 7000 wounded. The Union loss was much larger, probably about 
11,000. 4 This, however, by no means measures the diminution which the 
army had undergone. Many had been made prisoners; Lee says “ more 
than 7000, in addition to about 2000 wounded left in our hands.” The 
straggling had been enormous. “Half of the great diminution of onr 


1 General Pope says ( Rejmrt , 24): “The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor pcr>ist( nt, 
and his troops soon retired in considerable confusion. ... As soon ns they could be rallied, I 
pushed them forward to support our left, and they there rendered most conspicuous service, opc- 
cially the brigade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan.” Buchanan, however (Ibid., 152), says: 
“Abont 6 P.M. the brigade was withdrawn in admirable order.” Chapman, who commanded 
another brigade of Sykes’s division, says ( Ibid ., 172): “About 3 3<» I' M., by General Porter’s 
order, the brigade retired in admirable order to the point designated. . . . The movement was 
executed with surprising order, and elicited my warmest admiration.” These, ns well as Warn n’s 
brigade, belonged to Sykes's division. Of Morell's division of this corps we have no special reports; 
but Sykes incidentally mentions the gallantry with which Butterfield's htigadc of this division made 
the attack upon Jackson. The losses in Morell's division of two brigades amounted to 1247, ex¬ 
ceeding by a third those of Sykes, which certainly docs not indicate any want of vigor in its at¬ 
tack. Among the specifications in the charges against Porter was, that on this day he “did so 
feebly fall upon the enemy’s lines as to make little or no impression on the same, and did fall back 
and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without making any of the great personal efforts to 
rally his troops or keep their lines, or to inspire his troops to meet the sacrifices and make the re¬ 
sistance demanded by the importance of his position,”etc. This specific.•• ion was, however, with¬ 
drawn by the judge advocate, without offering any proof to substantiate it.— Court-wat/ud, 0. 

* “Hooker’s division now advanced into the woods near our right, and drove the enemy back 
some distance.”—Heintzelman, in 1’o/te's Report, 5G. “The onset was so fierce, and in such 
force, that at first some headway was made; but their advance was again checked, and eventually 
repulsed with great loss.”—A. P. Hill, in Lee's Rep., ii., 126. 

3 The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly, and in good order, no pursuit w hatever being at¬ 
tempted by the enemy.”— Rojte's Report , 24. “The obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty 
of the fords over Bull Run, rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning, when the 
cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position at Cen¬ 
treville.”— Lee's Rep., i., 25. 

4 The Confederate loss can be fixed very closely upon official evidence. In Lee's Rep., i., 50, is 
a detailed “List of Casualties at Manassas Plains in August, 1862,” made out bv regiments, giv¬ 
ing the loss in each. The whole number there given is 101)0 killed, 6154 wounded. This list is 
apparently not complete, the reports of Longstreet and Jackson adding considerably to the number. 

Killed. Wounded. Total 


Longstreet (Ibid., ii., 89): “ Total lose fn tfre eorna nnder my eommnnd between the 
‘23d and 30th of August, embracing actlona ut Rappahannock, Freeman’a Ford, 

Thoroughfare Gap, and Manassas*. 

Jackson t/6iV/., 11., 9>): “ Losses in my command In its operations from the Rappa¬ 
hannock to the Potomac". 


Deduct from the above losses in minor engagements before the 27th 


(Ihid., I, BO). . 27 94 

And losseu (estimated) at Chantilly, Sept 1. 100 4<K) 


Total in the^e actions. 


GG3 

4"16 

4CT9 

snij 

3547 

4358 

w3. 

7563 

*JU3l 


127 

4'.'4 

621 

1341 

7069 

8410 


This includes the losses at Bristoe on the 27th. which are also included in the Union losses. 

The Union losses can be given to a considerable extent only by estimate. Porter’s and Rey¬ 
nolds's loss is given in full, Heintzelman's w ith the exception of one br igade. Sigel puts his w hole 
loss at 1083, but does not discriminate between killed, wounded, and missing. We put the last at 
500, and apportion the others in the usual proportion. Of the losses of McDowell and Reno we 
find no lists. 

Killed. Wounded. Mining. 


Porter. 333 1333 518 

Reynolds. 67 3 7 189 

Heintzelman (su\). 200 1300 4"*> 

Sigel (say). 3u0 1-00 400 

Total in these divisions. 000 4220 15oT 


The losses in McDowell's and Reno's corps were probably about equal to the above, and as the 
field remained in the hands of the enemy, many of those reported ns missing were doubtless killed 
or wounded; these may be estimated at 600. Putting all these imperfect data together, we esti* 
mate the Union loss as in the text. 



MONUMENT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF GROVltTON. 




































































390 


[September, 1862. 



rillLU’ KEARNEY. 


ISA AO I. STEVENS. 



forces,” says Pope, “ was occasioned by skulking and straggling from the 
army. The troops which were brought into action fought with all gallantry 
and determination, but thousands of men straggled away from their com¬ 
mands, and were never in any action. I had posted several regiments in 
the rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, and although many 
thousand stragglers and skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed 
around through the woods, and did not rejoin their commands during the 
remainder of the campaign.” 1 

At Centreville, on the morning of September 1, Pope had remaining of 
McDowell’s corps, 10,000; Sigel, 7000; Heintzelman, 6000; Reno, 6000; 
Porter, 9000, including the two brigades which had strayed thither on the 
morning of the 30th. Banks, with 5000, had rejoined the arm}', and Sumner, 
with 11,000, and Franklin, with 8000, had come up from Alexandria, rais¬ 
ing the whole army to 62,000, exclusive of cavalry, which was so used up as 
to be unavailable. 2 Lee, after the battle, had, besides cavalry, about 60,000 
present; but D. H. Hill, with his division, which had left Hanover Junction 
on the 26th, was close at hand, and on the 2d of September came up with 
his division of 10,000. The advantage of the situation was then really in 
favor of the Union army. The forces present were nearly equal; but Pope 
had strong intrenchments, and might certainly expect considerable re-en¬ 
forcements at once. 3 His troops were, indeed, greatly exhausted by the 
fighting, and marching, and privations of the previous week; but Lee’s could 
not have been in better plight. They had fought as much, marched as far, 
and fared quite as hard. 4 

But it was determined at Washington that Centreville should be aban¬ 
doned, and the whole army once more retreat and take shelter within the 
defenses of Washington. The alarm for the safety of the capital rose again 
to its height. In their terror, the President and Halleck turned to McClel¬ 
lan. Pope had written to Halleck, charging “ many brigade and some di- 
vision commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula” with unsol- 
dierly and dangerous conduct. “The constant talk, indulged in publicly 
and in promiscuous company, is, that the Army of the Potomac will not 
fight. You can have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers 
of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal 
feeling in relation to changes in commander-in-chief and others. I am en¬ 
deavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall 
fight or run away.” He urged that Halleck “should draw back this army 
to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure 
place to reorganize and rearrange it.” 5 * The President urged McClellan to 
telegraph to his friends in the old Army of the Potomac, adjuring them not 
to fail in their duty. He complied by writing to Porter: “I ask of you, 
for my sake and that of the country, that you and all my friends will lend 
the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the opera¬ 
tions now going on. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the 
Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is that, for their 
country’s sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever 

1 Pope's Report , 26. * Ibid. , 25. 

* Halleck to Pope: “August 31, 11 A.M. You have done nobly. All reserves are being sent 
forward. Couch’s division goes to-day. Part of it went to Sangster’s Station last night with 

Franklin and Sumner, who must be with you. Can’t you renew the attack ?”— Pope's Report , 246. 

4 “Many of the men were barefooted, and limped along weary unto death. They were faint 
from want of food, and broken down by absence of rest. The phenomenon was here presented 
of an army living for many days upon green corn and unripe apples only, and during this time 
making exhausting marches, engaging in incessant combats, and repulsing every assault. The 
flower of the Southern youth, raised in affluence and luxury, were toiling on over the dusty high¬ 

ways, or lying exhausted by the roadside, or lighting when so feeble that they could scarcely han¬ 
dle their muskets.”—Cooke’s Stonewall Jackson , 277. 5 Pope's Report, 250. 


have to me.” In writing thus, McClellan merely complied w'ith the request 
of the President. “Neither then, nor at any other time,” he says, “did I 
think for one moment that Porter had been, or would be, in any manner de¬ 
relict in the performance of his duty.” Porter replied, “You may rest as¬ 
sured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever 
give, as they have given to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and 
constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed and 
wounded attest our devoted duty.” Halleck wrote to McClellan, whom a 
hurried order had virtually stripped of all command, “You will retain the 
command of every thing in this vicinity not temporarily to be Pope’s army 
in the field. I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and 
experience.” 1 

On the 31st, the day after the battle, a heavy storm set in; but Jackson 
was pushed forward toward Fairfax to turn the Union right, and Pope sent 
McDowell, Heintzelman, and Reno in that direction, intending to attack on 
the morning of the 2d of September. But the heads of the two forces came 
in contact just before dark on the 1st, at Ox Hill, near Chantilly. A fear¬ 
ful thunder-storm was raging, in the midst of which the engagement began. 
A portion of the Confederates were thrown into some confusion; then re¬ 
enforced, they drove back Stevens’s division of Reno’s corps. Stevens was 
killed in the front of his troops. Kearney rushed in with his wonted dash¬ 
ing bravery, and, riding forward alone in advance of his men to reconnoitre 
the ground, fell in with a Confederate soldier, from whom he inquired the 
position of a regiment. Discovering his mistake, be turned to ride away, 
when the soldier fired, and Kearney fell from his saddle mortally wounded. 
Darkness closed the action, each army retaining a portion of the field, and 
both claiming a victory. But before morning the whole Union army was 
in retreat for Alexandria. Lee, with Longstreet’s corps, came up during the 
day, and was joined on the battle-field by D. H. Hill, with his division fresh 
except for its rapid march. 

With the battle of Chantilly, or Ox Hill, as the Confederates name it, 
closed Pope’s campaign in Virginia. He requested at its close, as he had 
done at its beginning, to be relieved from the command of the Army of 
Virginia, and to be returned to his former post in the West. His request 
was granted, and on the 7th of September he departed from Washington. 
The Army of Virginia ceased to exist as such, and the whole force, resum¬ 
ing its old name of the Army of the Potomac, was again placed under the 
immediate command of McClellan. 

It would be unjust to judge of the campaign of Pope by its unfortunate 
result, or by the censures to which it has been subjected, or even by the ac¬ 
count of it as told by its commander. If we turn from what was said, and 
review what was actually done, in the light thrown upon it by the Confed¬ 
erate Reports, we shall find much to praise, and, until the last two decisive 
days, little to censure. The task imposed upon him was a difficult one. 
He found the army which he was to command disorganized and scattered. 
Some of the corps commanders were hostile to others. 2 His appointment 
was distasteful to many, and he had not acquired a reputation which would 
compel all to acquiesce in its wisdom, however much it might stand in the 
way of their advancement. Then his first address to his army alienated 
the feelings of the whole Army of the Potomac, a portion of whom w'ere to 
serve under him. This feeling, though less strong than he supposed, stood 

1 MrC. Rep., 840, 844. 

• We do Dot care to dwell upon this point. Abundant proofs of it may be found by any one 
who chooses to read the Reports of the commanders of corps and divisions. 















POPE’S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. 


391 


September, 1862.] 



in the way of that open and hearty co-operation which is essential to the 
highest efficiency of an army. While there was, we think, no purposed 
neglect in supporting him in act, still the fact that his plans and movements 
were openly censured by officers high in rank could not fail to demoralize 
those of lower grade, and through them the soldiers. Hence the fearful 
amount of straggling and skulking with which he had to contend from the 
outset. That he was opposed to a general who in this campaign, and ever 
after, manifested military capacity of a high order, and whose plans were 
carried out with unswerving fidelity, was a contingency always to be taken 
into account. That he was from the first called to meet greatly superior 
forces was owing to no fault on his part; it should be charged to those who 
failed to send to him the re-enforcements so absolutely essential and so 
positively promised. His first steps toward concentrating his forces were 
none the less commendable because so perfectly obvious. For the battle 
of Cedar Run he is nowise responsible. Hud it proved a disastrous defeat 
instead of a bloody but indecisive passage of arms, no blame could have 
attached to him. Fettered by his instructions, and buoyed up by unful¬ 
filled promises of aid, he could not afterward have done other than attempt 
to bold the line of the Rappahannock. The discovery of his weakness 
made by Stuart’s dash upon Catlett’s Station was an accident which might 
have happened to any one, and the like of which happened to Lee three 
weeks later. The destruction of the stores at Manassas could not have 
occurred had the assurances been true, as he had a right to believe, of the 
force by which that place was held. The marchings and countennarch- 
ings from Manassas to Gainesville, then back toward Centreville, and again 
toward Gainesville, were warranted, and in a measure compelled, by what 
he had at the moment good reason to believe to be the position and move¬ 
ments of the enemy. 

The battle of the 29th was delivered, and all the orders given on the sup¬ 
position that Jackson, with about 25,000 men, was the only enemy to be 
encountered, and that Longstreet was at a distance. In the morning he 
thought that “ the indications are that the whole force of the enemy is-mov- 
ing in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night 
or the next day.” He must have been of the same opinion at half past four 
in the afternoon, when the order was written informing Porter that “your 
line of march brings you in on the enemy’s right flank,” and directing him 
to “push forward into action at once on the enemy’s flank.” But before 
the order was received, and even before it was written, a considerable part 
of Longstreet’s corps had come upon the field, and taken position upon 
Jackson’s right, so that the line of march prescribed to Porter would have 
brought him far to the left of what was then the enemy’s right flank, and 
directly in front of at least the advance of the enemy’s “ whole force.” It 
is certainly strange that at this hour Pope should have been uninformed 
that Longstreet was on the field, instead of being thirty or forty hours’ 
march away; for between nine and ten o’clock Buford reported to McDow¬ 
ell that before that tune he had seen a large body of the enemy, estimated 
by him at more than 13,000 men, passing Gainesville and apparently march¬ 
ing directly to the battle-field. 1 Pope, indeed, on the morning of the 30th, 
when he supposed that he had won a victory and that the enemy were in 
retreat, declared that he had met and 
driven from the field “ the combined 
force of the enemy," which can only 
be interpreted to mean the united 
commands of Jackson and Long¬ 
street. Still, the battle of the day 
was indecisive, and if Pope had car¬ 
ried out his plan of the morning, and 
fallen back beyond Bull Run, the 
substantial fruits of victory would 
have been his. 


The attack of the 30th was a grave military error, and wholly without 
excuse, if we regard General Pope’s subsequent explanations as setting forth 
the knowledge which he then had of bis condition and that of the enemy. 
Shortly after daylight he “ began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless 
of any successful issue to the operations with which he was charged.” He 
was aware, by “twelve or one o’clock in the day, that we were confronted 
by forces greatly superior to our own, and that those forces were being every 
moment largely increased by fresh arrivals;” and he “therefore advanced 
to the attack,” in order to “lay upon the enemy such blows as would crip¬ 
ple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any farther 
advance toward the capital.” 1 Yet at twelve o’clock he ordered the forces 
under McDowell to “ be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the en¬ 
emy, and press him vigorously during the whole day.” 2 That is, an infe¬ 
rior force was to pursue one already superior, wliich was every moment 
largely re-enforced, in the very direction from which those re-enforcements 
were advancing. Surely the thing then to be done was to fall back beyond 
Bull Run. If his force was sufficient to warrant him in attacking with any 
hope of escaping a complete defeat, it was more than sufficient to have en¬ 
abled him to hold the line of Bull Run against the same enemy; and so long 
as this line was held, the enemy would be effectually prevented from mak¬ 
ing any further direct advance toward the capital. 

This campaign was conducted throughout by Lee and Jackson with rare 
ability. It grew in the end into something very different and far greater 
than was at first intended. Jackson was sent toward the Rappahannock 
merely to prevent the seizure ofGordonsville and the railroad. Lee’s first 
object was to remove McClellan from his position on the James, and it 
seemed to him that “the most effectual way to relieve Richmond from any 
attack from that quarter would be to re-enforce Jackson, and advance upon 
Pope.” 3 * Halleck, at the same time, was equally desirous of relieving Rich¬ 
mond by withdrawing the Army of the Potomac, and McClellan, sorely 
against his wish, was carrying out this determination. As soon, therefore, 
as Lee was assured that Richmond was no longer threatened from the James, 
he pushed his main force toward the Rappahannock, hoping to overwhelm 
Pope before he could be joined by McClellan. To do this, he must cross 
the Rappahannock in front, or by the l ight or left of Pope, who confronted 
him on the opposite bank. While thus manoeuvring, the seizure of Pope’s 
dispatch-book informed him of the precise strength and position of the Union 
forces, and convinced him that it was possible by a rapid march to gain its 
rear, cut it off from retreat, supplies, and re-enforcements, and fall upon it 
with such a preponderance of force as to render its destruction almost in¬ 
evitable. Rapidity of execution was essential to the success of this plan, 
and a slight failure in any point of detail might be fatal. We have seen 
how the plan was executed. Lee’s operations from the 24th to the 30th of 
August must take a high place in the history of the war. To find its equal 
in boldness of conception, we must go forward nine months to the time 
when Grant passed the batteries at Vicksburg. To find its superior, we 
must go forward two years and three months to the time when Sherman be¬ 
gan his great March to the Sea. 

Rejiort^22^2i. 5 Ibid., 47. * Lee's Rep., i., 19. 


1 Buford, in Court-martial, 188. Whatever 

was then known or might have been known, 

nothing is now more certain than that a consid¬ 

erable part of Longstreet’* force joined Jackson 
by noon, and bore a con>id' , rahlo part in the ac¬ 
tion of the 29th, and that bef-re night his whole 
corps, with the exception of Anderson’s divi¬ 
sion, had arrived, and this dime lip on the fol¬ 
lowing morning. Lee says (/fry*or/, i., 23—2/5), 

“On the morning of the 20th the whole com¬ 
mand resumed their inarch, the sound of can¬ 
non announcing that Jackson was already en¬ 
gaged. Longstreet entered the turnpike near 
Gainesville, and moving down toward Gmve- 
ton. the head of his column cnm rt upon the field 
in the rear of the enerm’s left" After some 
manoeuvring, which is described, “Longstreet 
took position on the right of Jackson, Hood’s 
two brigades supported by Evans, being de¬ 
ployed across the turnpike, and at right angles 
to it. These troops were supjiortcd on the left 
bv three brigades under Wileox, and by a like 
force on the right under Kem|>er, 1) It. Jones’s 
division firmed on rheexfrem • right of the line, 
resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad." D. R. 
Jones (//#**/., ii., 217) fixes the time of his ar¬ 
rival at “about noon.” Longstreet says (//*/</., 
81) “that the noise of battle was heard before 
we reached Gainesville [which must have lxcn 
about eight, fur Buford saw his strong advance 
beyond that place by nine], and the head of my 
voluma soon after reached a fosition in rear 
of the enemy’s flank, and within easy cannon 
shot.” Hood, whose division was in the ad¬ 
vance. says (Ibid., 209),“ Early in the day we 
came up with the main body of the enemy on 
the plains of Manassas, engaging General Jack- 
son's forces.” 
















































392 


[September, 1862 



THE CONFEDERATES CROSSING THE POTOMAC. 













































































































September, 1862.] 


THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.—ANTIETAM: 


393 


CHAPTER XXIII. 

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.—ANTIETAM. 

Result of the Campaign in Virginia.—The Invasion of the North.—Mary la ml! my Maryland !— 
Jackson’s Scheme.—Lee’s Design.—IIis Force.—Crossing the Potomac.—The Confederate 
Force.—Lee’s Address to the People of Maryland.—His Reception.—The Command given to 
McClellan.—Reorganization of the Federal Army.—Movements of the Army.—Lee divides 
his Force.—Harper’s Ferry.—The March upon the Ferry.—Lee’s Order comes into the Hands 
of McClellan.—The Investment of Harper’s Ferry.—Its Capture.—McClellan and Ilullcck.— 
McClellan advances.—Battle at Turner’s Gap.—Battle at Crumpton’s Gap.—Lee’s Position.— 
He falls back across the Antictam.—The Battle-field of Antictnm.—Approach of the Union 
Force.—Confederate Troops come up from Harper’s Ferry.—Movements of September 16.— 
McClellan’s Plan of Battle for the next Day. — Hooker attacks the Confederate Left. — Is 
wounded.—Ilis Corps repulsed.—Sumner attacks the Left and Centre.—Sedgwick repulsed 
on the Left.—The Fight in the Centre.—State of the Action at Noon.—Arrival of Franklin's 
Corps.—Its Part in the Engagement.—The Confederates worsted.—Their critical Position on 
the Left.—Over-caution of Sumner and McClellan. — Burnside’s dilatory Movements. — He 
crosses the Antictam and drives back the Enemy.—A. P. Hill comes up from Harper’s Ferry. 
—Burnside repulsed.—Close of the Battle.—Forces in and out of Action.—Estimate of Losses. 
—Results of the Battle.—The President’s Proclamation freeing the Slaves.—After the Battle. 
—Lee recrosses the Potomac.—Affair at Shephcrdstown.—McClellan and the Administration. 
—Stuart's Raid.—The President’s Orders to Advance.—His Letter to McClellan.—McClellan’s 
Plans.—He crosses the Potomac.—Advances toward Wnrrenton.—Lee moves to Culpepper.— 
Position of the Armies.—McClellan removed from Command, and Burnside appointed. 

I N the brief campaign, lasting only twenty days from the time when the 
contending forces first encountered at Cedar Run, and only a week after 
the decisive movement for taking Pope’s army in the rear was commenced, 
Lee had accomplished more than he had ventured to hope. Not oulv had 
the siege of Richmond been raised, but Virginia was virtually freed from the 
presence of the Federal armies; the main part of the force which had threat¬ 
ened North Carolina was withdrawn, ami the whole plan of the Peninsular 
campaign thwarted ; and, what was of still greater importance, the abundant 
harvests of the Valley of the Shenandoah would be reaped by Confederate 
sickles, and serve for the maintenance of Confederate armies. A bolder 
thought now came into the mind of the Confederate leader. There were 
yet sofne weeks, the most favorable in all the year for active military oper¬ 
ations. During these, at least, the war might be carried on in the enemy’s 
country. And so the noise of the battle of Groveton had scarcely ceased, 
when it was resolved to invade the State of Maryland. 

Political considerations had much to do with this determination. It had 
come to be an article of faith that Maryland, from geographical position and 
community of institutions, belonged to the. Confederacy. Richmond was 
thronged with refugees from Maryland who declared that the state was held 
within the Union by mere force, and that she wanted only an opportunity 
to break the hated bond. The song, “Maryland! my Maryland!” was 
thrummed on every piano, and sung by every voice. It was held to be the 
utterance of the people. 1 It needed only the presence of a powerful army 
to arouse the whole state, and bring her at once into the Confederacy. This 
accomplished, all the slave states—for Kentucky and Missouri were already 
claimed by the Confederacy and were represented in its Congress—would 
be detached from the Union. After the secession of Maryland, Washington 
could be no longer held as the Federal capital. 

Jackson had long wished to lead or follow in an invasion of the North. 
Immediately after the battle of Bull Run he proposed to march directly into 
Western Virginia with 10,000 men, there recruit his army to 25,000, and 
then the Army of the Potomac, crossing at Leesburg, should unite with his 
own force; both should advance upon Harrisburg, and thence upon Phila¬ 
delphia in the spring of 1862. With the heart of the North thus pierced 
by the Southern troops, the strategic points captured, and Washington evac¬ 
uated, he believed that tbe Federal government would succumb and agree 
upon terms of peace. 2 How far Lee shared in these sanguine anticipations 
is doubtful. His Report, prepared seven months later, seems to imply that 
he proposed merely to occupy Maryland, and threaten Pennsylvania. He 
savs: “To prolong a state of affairs every way desirable, and not to let the 
season for active operations pass without endeavoring to inflict farther in¬ 
jury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be to transfer the army 
into Maryland. The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the 
presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce 
the Washington government to retain all its available force to provide 
against contingencies which its course toward the people of that state gave 
it reason to apprehend. At the same time.it was hoped that military suc¬ 
cess might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any 
efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.” “It was 
proposed to move the army into Western Virginia, establish our communi¬ 
cations with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by 
threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw' him 
from his base of supplies.” 3 

On the 2d of September Lee was joined at Chantilly by the division of 
D. II. Hill, consisting of five brigades. This gave him a force of about 
70,000 men of all arms with which to undertake the invasion of the North; 
for by battle, disease, and straggling he had lost 30,000. The united army 
pushed rapidly on to the Potomac, Jackson in the advance, ne crossed 
the river at a ford midway between Harper’s Ferry and Washington, thirty 
miles from each, almost at the point where eight months before the Union 


1 Here are two stanzas of this song: 
“The despot’s he: 1 1* on thy shore, 

Marylnnd! my Maryland! 
His touch 1* oti thy temple door, 

Maryland! my Maryland! 
Avenge the patriotic go e 
That decked the ctreet-* of Baltimore, 
And ho the »nttle-<iueen of yore, 

Maryland ! my Maryland ! 

• Oookc’b Stonewall Jackson, 86-88. 


“I hear the Oiatnnt thunder hum, 

Maryland my Maryland! 

The Old Line’" b gle, fife, »nd drum, 

Marylnnd! my Maryland! 

Phe 1* not dead, nor de »L nor dumb, 

Huzzah "he spurn" the No -them »etrn, 
fihe breathe", she burns, she’ll come, she’ll come, 
Maryland ! ray Maryland !” 

* Let's Rep., i., 27, 28. 


forces had passed over into Virginia to meet the disaster of Ball’s Bluff. 
There was nothing to oppose the passage. As the head of the column 
reached tbe middle of the river, Jackson, raised from his usual calm de¬ 
meanor by what seemed the beginning of his cherished plan of an invasion 
of the North, paused, raised his hat, while bands and voices struck up the 
words and music of “My Maryland.” 1 The entire Confederate force fob 
lowed hard after, and on the 7th was concentrated near Frederick City, next 
after Baltimore the largest town in Maryland. All told they numbered 
barely 60,000, for without a battle thousands had fallen exhausted bv the 
way, unable to keep up with the swift march. 2 

Lee issued an address to the people of Maryland. It was right, he said, 
that they should know, as far as concerned them, the purpose which had 
brought the Confederate army into the state. “The people of the Confed¬ 
erate States had long watched the wrongs and outrages which had been in¬ 
flicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the states of the South 
by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties,” and, “believing that 
the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a gov¬ 
ernment,” the people of the South wished to aid them in “throwing off this 
foreign yoke.” There would be no constraint or intimidation ; “this army 
will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the Southern peo¬ 
ple will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they 
will only welcome you when you come of your own free will.” 

But if Lee had anticipated a general rising in Maryland, or even any con¬ 
siderable accession to his army, he was doomed to disappointment. Brad¬ 
ley Johnson, a Marylander who held a command in the Confederate arm}', 
was placed in charge of the provost-guard at Frederick. He put forth an 
address to the people calling upon them to join tbe delivering forces. “We 
have arms for you,” he said; “ I am authorized to muster in for the war 
companies and regiments. Let each man provide himself with a stout pair 
of shoes, a good blanket, and a tin cup. Jackson’s men have no baggage.” 
This prospect was not alluring to those to whom war had presented itself 
as a gay holiday show. When the theoretical secessionists of Maryland saw 
their liberators, officers as well as men, barefoot, ragged, and filthy, 3 they 
looked upon them with hardly concealed aversion. Yet that ragged and 
begrimed army was as brave a body of soldiers as the world ever saw. The 
enthusiasm of the Maryland secessionists exhausted itself in a few women 
secretly sewing clothing for the army, and in presenting to Jackson a mag¬ 
nificent horse, which threw him the first time he mounted it. 4 

The command of the Union army passed quietly and almost as a matter 
of course into the hands of McClellan even before Pope had asked to be re¬ 
lieved 5 The President and General Halleck went to McClellan’s house on 
the morning of the 2d. Lincoln said that tilings were going on badly in 
front; the army was in full retreat upon the defenses of Washington, and 
the roads were filled with stragglers. McClellan should go out and meet 
the army, take command of it as it approached the works, and put the troops 
in the best position for defense. Until this was said Halleck had no knowl¬ 
edge of the President’s purpose. 6 Lincoln had resolved, in his quiet way, 
that he must exercise Ins authority as commander-in-chief of the army until 
he could find some man into whose hands this power could be intrusted. 
How often he tried to find such a man, and bow fully he trusted him when 
found, this history will show. A formal order was forthwith issued: “Ma¬ 
jor General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washing¬ 
ton, and of all the troops for the defense of the capital.” 

McClellan set vigorously to work to reorganize the shattered army. 
Some changes were made in the distribution of corps and commanders. 
Banks was placed in charge of the fortifications around Washington, the 
command of his corps in the field being given to Mansfield, a veteran offi¬ 
cer wlio had never held any prominent command, but had shown at Nor¬ 
folk high qualifications. Hooker was placed in command of the corps of 
McDowell, who disappeared from active duty. Burnside, Sumner, Frank¬ 
lin, and Porter retained the command of their corps. Thus, with the ex¬ 
ception of Burnside, who was his personal friend, all the corps commanders 
had served under McClellan on the Peninsula. The core of the army 
consisted of the force brought from before Richmond. So admirably had 
this been organized by McClellan that, in spite of the shock which it had 
experienced in its retreat from the Cbickahominy, its withdrawal from the 
James, and the disasters which a part of it had suffered under Pope, it took 
at once the form of a regular army, and formed a nucleus around which 
were rallied the troops gathered from every quarter. In a week, besides 
72,000 men around Washington, and 13,000, mostly new recruits, left tin- 


1 Sloneicall Jackson, 308. 

3 The extent to which the army was reduced by fatigue and exhaustion is abundantly testified 
to bv all Confederate aceonnts. Lee says {Rep., i., 35): “The arduous sendees in which our 

S lops l ad been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches without 

oes, had greatly reduced our ranks. These causes had compelled thousands of brave men to 
absent themselves, and many more had done so through unworthy motives." Cooke says (Stone¬ 
wall Jackson, 341): “All the roads of Northern Virginia were lined with soldiers, eomprehensive- 
|v denominated ‘stragglers;’ but the great majority of these men had fallen out from the advanc¬ 
ing column from physical impossibility to keep up wiih it; thousands were not with General Leo 
because they had no shoes, and their bleeding feet would carry them no farther, or the heavy 
march without rations had broken them down. 'Phis great crowd toiled on painfully on the wake 
of the army, dragging themselves five or six miles a day; and when they came to the Potomac, 
near Leesburg, it was only to find that General Lee had swept on, that. General McClellan’s col¬ 
umn was between him and them, and that they could not rejoin their commands. The citizens 
of that whole region, who fed these unfortunate persons, will bear testimony that numbers suffi¬ 
cient to constitute an army in themselves passed the Blue Ridge to rendezvous, by General Lee’s 
orders, at Winchester. These ’20,000 or 30,000 men were not in flic battle.” 

* “Never had the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill-provided ns on this march.” — D. R. 
Jones, in Lee's Rep., ii., 221. * Stonewall Jackson, 309, 312 ; Lee's Rep., ii., 111. 

6 The government had, indeed, wished to remove him from the command, and had twice urged 
it npon Burnside. He declined to accept it, and declared that if matters could be so arranged 
as to remove the objections to him, McClellan could do more with the army than any other 
man.— Com. Rep., 650. • McC. Rep., 345; Halleck, in Com. Rep. t 45L 






394 


[September, 1862. 



accountably and against McClellan’s wish at Harper’s Ferry, there was a 
movable force of nearly 100,000 men to operate against Lee in Maryland. 
McClellan took the field at the head of this force. 

McClellan took the field in Maryland in person on the 7th, when the 
march toward Lee was fairly begun. The army moved in three columns. 
The right wing, under Burnside, comprised his own corps and that of 
Hooker. The centre, under Sumner, comprised his own corps and that of 
Mansfield. Franklin, in command of his corps and Couch’s division, had 
the left. Porter’s corps, not fully organized, followed after. The move¬ 
ment was slow, for Lee’s plan had not yet developed itself. In the six 
days, from the 7th to the 13th, the advance was barely thirty miles. 
McClellan was also deceived as to the strength of the enemy, estimating it 
at 120,000 men—twice the real number. 

Lee’s object in crossing the Potomac at a point so near Washington, in¬ 
stead of at Harper’s Ferry or above, and thence advancing into the heart of 
Maryland, was to assume a position which should threaten both Washing¬ 
ton and Baltimore. This lie supposed would draw the enemy after him ; 
and lie proposed to give battle to the Union army as far as possible from 
its base of supplies. For the accomplishment of this purpose, he believed 
that, the possession of Harper’s Ferry was indispensable, in order to ena¬ 
ble him to keep open his communications with Richmond through the 
Valley of the Shenandoah. He assumed that the march into Maryland 
would have caused the Union troops at Harper’s Ferrv to be withdrawn, 
as they should have been, and ns McClellan wished. This not being done, 
Lee undertook to dislodge, and, if possible, capture the forces there. T^i 
effect this, he divided his army, sending the whole of Jackson’s command 
and half of Longstreet’s toward Harper's Ferry, retaining with himself D. 
n. Hill's division, half of Longstreet’s corps, and the greater part of the 
cavalry. 1 McClellan’s advance had been so slow that Lee trusted that 

' Jackson's “command," including A. 1*. liill’s division, comprised 14 brigades. Long- 


Harper’s Ferry could be reduced and his army reunited before he would 
be called upon to meet the enemy. 1 In forming his plan of operations, Lee 
must have under-estimated the Federal force as greatly as McClellan over¬ 
estimated that of the Confederates. He could not have supposed that the 
enemy whom he had outnumbered and defeated at Groveton, and whom he 
had seen in full retreat to the fortifications at Washington, should within 
ten days have swelled to a force outnumbering his own almost three to 
one. 2 He must have supposed that his own effective force and that of the 
enemy were about equal. 

Harper’s Ferry is at the junction of the Potomac and the Shenandoah. 
The Potomac, coming from the north, meets the Shenamloah, ranging from 
the west, at the foot of a spur of the Blue Ridge, here known as Elk Mount¬ 
ain. The united streams have torn a narrow passage through the mountain, 
rending it from summit to base, leaving on either side steep cliffs a thou¬ 
sand feet high. The eastern cliff is Maryland Heights; the western, on the 
Virginia side, Loudon Heights. In the angle at the junction of the rivers 
is an elevated plateau, falling steeply toward the Potomac, and sloping gen¬ 
tly toward the Shenandoah, and stretching backward at the level of the 
surrounding country. The ridge of this plateau is Bolivar Heights, at the 
foot of which nestles the village of Harper’s Ferry. Some one had once 

street's “command" properly comprised 21 brigades; but nt this time 10 of these were detached 
for the Harper's Ferry opcrution, and did not act during the remainder of this campaign under 
Longstrcot. In the remainder of this chapter “ Longsrrcet's corps" will indicate only the II 
brigades which remained with him. The others will he designated by the name of the respect¬ 
ive division commanders, McLaws, Anderson, and Walker. D. II. Hill's division consisted of 5 
hritrades. Thus 24 brigades were detached to Harper’s Ferry, and 16 remained with Lee. The 
eft -ctivc strength of a brigade at this time, previous to losses in battle, was 1500; some, however, 
were much stronger, some much weaker. 1 Lee's Rep., i., 28. 

3 On the 20tli of September, after the loss of 15,000 at South Mountain and Antietam. no con¬ 
siderable re-enforccments having l»ecn received in the interval, the Army of the Potomac num¬ 
bered “present for duty” 164.359, of whom 71.210 were stationed within the defenses at Wash¬ 
ington, leaving in the field directly under McClellan 93,169. The nominal force—present for 
duty, sick, and absent—was 293,798.— Com. Rep., 492. 























VIEW FROM MARYLAND HEIGHTS. 






































396 


[September, 1862. 


called this place “ the Thermopylae of America.” It 
might have been so in the times when war was waged 
with bow and sword, with spear and sling, but with 
the appliances of modern warfare the place has no 
defensive value. It is completely overlooked by 
both Loudon and Maryland Heights at such a dis¬ 
tance and height that a plunging fire of artillery or 
musketry can be poured into it from either without 
the possibility of reply. It is a mere military trap, 
unless the commanding heights are also held in force; 
and then it is worthless, as no enemy need go near it 
in order to cross the Potomac from either direction 
to invade Maryland or Virginia. Johnston had per¬ 
ceived this fifteen months before, and abandoned the 
place without resistance, and against positive orders, 
the'moment it was menaced. Lee strangely consid¬ 
ered its possession essential to his proposed opera¬ 
tions, and, in order to seize it, divided his army. 

Had he done otherwise, the course of the campaign 
must have been wholly different. He would have 
fought the decisive battle far in the interior with the 
whole, instead of with a part of his force. Had he 
been defeated, his army must have been annihilated, 
for the victorious enemy would have been between 
him and Virginia, cutting oft'all possibility of succor 
or retreat. Had be been victorious, he might prob 
ably have anticipated Sherman’s march to the sea, 
for beyond the Alleghanies there was no army to 
oppose him; and from Philadelphia he might have 
dictated terms of peace. 

Harper’s Ferry was held by a force of about 13,000, 
including an outpost at Martinsburg. They were 
raw troops, commanded by Colonel Miles. About 
1500 men were posted on Maryland Heights, the re¬ 
mainder were intrenched on Bolivar Heights. Lee’s 
plan was to surround this force, and thus capture it. 

His orders were issued on the 9tb, and their execu¬ 
tion commenced the next morning. Walker, whose 
two brigades bad been sent to the mouth of the Mo- 
nocacy to destroy the canal aqueduct, was to cross 
the Potomac, ascend its right bank, and seize Lou¬ 
don Heights. McLaws, with eight brigades, was to 
march from Frederick, pass the South Mountain at 
Crampton’s Gap, cross the narrow valley to the foot 
of Maryland Heights, which he was to ascend and 
occupy, disposing his forces in such a way as to hold 
the roads winding around its base, thus cutting oft 
all retreat in that direction. Jackson, with fourteen 
brigades, was to cross the South Mountain at Tur¬ 
ner’s Gap, advance to the Potomac, cross it high 
above Harper’s Ferry, sweep down its right bank, 
capturing or driving back the force at Martinsburg, 
and then march directly upon Harper’s Ferry. The 
remainder of the army was to march toward Hagers¬ 
town, where, or at Boonesboro’, it was to be rejoined 
by that portion which, it was assumed, would have 
succeeded in its designs upon Harper’s Ferry. ; 

The directions of this order were executed with 
great precision. Walker took possession of Lou¬ 
don Heights on the 13th, without encountering the 

slightest opposition. McLaws reached the foot of Maryland Heights on the 
12th. He sent two brigades to scale the ascent and gain the summit. They 
encountered some resistance from the troops posted thfcre, but this was over¬ 
come, the Federals abandoning their works, pitching the guns down the 
clifF, and making their way across the river to Harper’s Ferry. Maryland 
Heights was in the possession of the infantry of McLaws on the evening of 
the 13th. The next morning was employed in cutting a road to the top of 
the Heights practicable for artillery, along which four guns were laborious¬ 
ly dragged, and from these fire was opened upon the town. 

Jackson, in the mean while, was pressing upon his longer march with 
that speed which had gained for his command the name of the “ foot cav¬ 
alry.” Leaving Frederick on the 10th, he reached the Potomac next day 
at Williamsport, 25 miles above Harper’s Ferry, and on the 12th entered 
Martinsburg. The Federal troops abandoned this place at his approach, 
and fell back to Harper’s Ferry. Jackson followed hard after, and on the 
following morning came in sight of the Union force, drawn up on Bolivar 
Heights. In three days he had marched 80 miles. The remainder of that 
day and the whole of the 14th were spent by Jackson in ascertaining, by 
courier and signal, the positions of Walker and McLaws upon Loudon and 
Maryland Heights. He found that they had gained the positions appointed 
for them, and commanded the only roads by which the Federals could re¬ 
treat down the Potomac or up the Shenandoah, but that the enemy on 
Bolivar Heights were beyond the effective range of his light guns. Sepa¬ 
rated as they were from him by rivers, they could afford no direct assist¬ 
ance in capturing the Federal force as it then stood. Jackson undertook to 

‘ fjee'a i, 28. For the full text of this order, see MrC. Rrj>., 353. I). H. Hill had left 

his copy of the order in his room at Frederick, where it was found and given to McClellan three 
days after. It placed him in full possession of the plans of his enemy; too late, indeed, to enable 
hitn to thwart them entirely, but in time to enable him to strike an unexpected blow. 



SIGNAL STATION, bIMMIT OF NABVI.ANH IILK.IITS 


dislodge the enemy from Bolivar Heights, and drive them down into the 
slaughter-pen of Harper’s Ferry. The force with which he was to do this 
exceeded only slightly that opposed to him. Miles had 12.000 or 13,000. 
Jackson’s “command” numbered at the outset about 32,000. It had fought 
at Cedar Run, Bristoe, the three battles near Gmveton, and at Chantilly, 
losing in all 6000 men, killed and wounded. Not less than 10,000 had 
fallen out from sickness or exhaustion on the long march from the Rapidan 
to the Potomac. He could not have brought more than 15,000 to Harper’s 
Ferry. For the rest, the affair reads almost like a farce, with a few tragic 
lines interpolated. 

By the morning of the loth Jackson had fairly surrounded Miles; bat¬ 
teries from one side opened upon the other on the Bolivar plateau; the 
guns from Loudon and Maryland Heights played at the heads of those be¬ 
low, and were duly answered; none doing harm, except that one Confed¬ 
erate shot struck a Federal caisson. Miles called a council of war, and said 
he had resolved to surrender; one or two of his officers wished to “cut 
their way out;” the cavalry, 1500 strong, rode up the Potomac, with or 
without orders, and got off, encountering no opposition, and destroying in 
their way 75 wagons of the Confederate train. If the infantry had gone 
the same way there was nothing to hinder; but they were raw troops, com¬ 
manded by worse than raw officers. Miles raised the white flag in token 
of surrender. Before it was perceived, he was mortally wounded by a 
chance shot. White, his superior in rank, who, on coming in from Mar¬ 
tinsburg, had waived the command in Miles’s favor, went to Jackson to ar¬ 
range terms of surrender. There was then nothing else to be done, for the 
troops had degenerated into a crowd of frightened men. He found the 
Confederate general fast asleep on the ground. Hill, whom White had first 
encountered, aroused Jackson. “ General,” said he, “ this is General White, 

























September, 1862.] 


THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.— ANTIETAM. 


397 



Franklin followed tlic mime route ai McLaws from Frederick to Ple-i«ant Valley; tlie remainder of the L'nion army 
that of bmgureet from Frederick to Hooneaboro', and thence to the Antiet im. The arrows hIiow the direction of the 
march. Where two or more lett. re come togeth r, it indicated that the several bodies followed the came route. 


of the United States army.” Jackson made a gesture of recognition, and 
again closed his eyes. “He has come to arrange terms of surrender,” con¬ 
tinued Hill. Jackson made no reply; he was fast asleep. Again, half 
awakened, he said, drowsily, "The surrender must be unconditional; every 
indulgence can be granted afterward,” then fell fast asleep once more, leav¬ 
ing Hill to decide upon the terms. 1 The terms granted were certainly lib¬ 
eral. All were to be paroled, retaining their personal effects, and officers 
their side-arms; transportation to be furnished to carry away the propert}'. 
Upon these terms more than 11,000 men were surrendered. The Confed¬ 
erates gained 73 guns, with but little ammunition, 13,000 small-arms, and a 
considerable amount of stores. The capture cost the Confederates perhaps 
two score of lives, and the Federals about as many. 2 

Although the affair at Harper's Ferry proved of ultimate disadvantage 
to the Confederates, it was disgraceful alike to the military authorities at 
Washington, who left the force in a place where it was of no use, and to the 
officers who attempted no adequate defense. Miles died a few hours after 
the surrender, but his conduct was sharply censured by the Military Com¬ 
mission. Ford, who shamefully abandoned Maryland Heights, was dis¬ 
missed from the service on the ground of “such lack of military capacity as 
to disqualify him from a command in the service." White was commend¬ 
ed as having “acted with decided capability and courage.” 3 

Slow as had been McClellan’s advance, it yet carried him farther from 
Washington than was thought prudent by Halleck. With more than 70,000 
men in garrison, the authorities at Washington were nervously apprehen¬ 
sive for the safety of the capital. When tidings were brought that a Con¬ 
federate force had recrossed the Potomac, it was assumed that the whole 
army had crossed or was about to cross and assail Washington, either in 
front, or in the rear by recrossing into Maryland below McClellan. Even as 
late as the 16th, when the two armies were face to face on the Antietam, Hal¬ 
leck still believed that the bulk of the Confederate force was in Virginia. 4 

‘ Cooke’s Stonewall Jackson, 325. 

* MeLaws speaks of a “sharp and spirited engagement” on Maryland Heights, but does not 

give his losses. — />*'« Rep., ii., 1G3. Walk r lost on Loudon Heights one killed and three 
wounded. — find., 204. A. P. Hill lost three killed and 6G wounded. There appear to have been 
no losses in the remainder of Jackson’s command. * General Orders, 18G2, No. 183. 

4 The President to McClellan , IScpt. 12: “Governor Curtin telegraphs me, ‘I have advices that 


The Confederates left Frederick on the 10th, and the place was occupied 
by the Federals on the 12th, after a skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry left 
behind as a rear-guard. On the evening of the next day, accident, which 
had three weeks before favored Lee by disclosing to him the situation of 
Pope, placed in McClellan’s hands the order from Lee disclosing his designs, 
and the position and movements of every division of the Confederate army. 
Thus informed, McClellan’s course was plain. He had 100,000 men within 
a few hours’ march from Frederick. Lee had divided his army into two 
parts, neither of which, by McClellan’s own exaggerated estimate, consisting 
of more than 60,000, and, in fact, of only half as many. By a rapid march, 
the whole Union army could be thrown right between these two portions. 
He proposed to “cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail.” 1 His ar¬ 
rangements were for once made with due promptness. That night orders 
were sent to every general. Franklin was to cross the South Mountain by 
Crampton’s Gap, cut off McLaws, and relieve Harper’s Ferry. The remain¬ 
der of the army, Hooker and Reno in the advance, followed by Sumner with 
his own corps and that of Mansfield, with the division of Porter which had 
come up, was to march upon the heels of Lee toward Boonesboro’, crossing 
the South Mountain at Turner’s Gap, six miles above Crampton’s, and fall 
upon that half of the Confederate army which had not been sent toward 
Harper’s Ferry. 

Lee had meanwhile moved leisurely past the South Mountain. On the 
11th Longstreet had reached Hagerstown, D. U. Hill stopping at Boonesboro’. 
On th„ afternoon of the 13th the Confederate commander was startled by 
intelligence that the Federals, whom he had supposed to be quietly resting 
at Frederick, were pressing swiftly toward Turner’s Gap. If they succeed¬ 
ed in passing the mountains they would be fairly between the portions of 
his divided army. Hill was hurried back to the Gap at once to keep the 
enemy in check until Longstreet could be recalled from Hagerstown. Lee 
felt the full peril of his position. He had with him barely 28,000 men, and 
these stretched along a distance of 25 miles. To provide for the worst, he 
sent his trains across the Potomac, escorted by only two regiments. 2 

Hill reached the summit of the Gap early in the morning of the 14th, just 
before the head of the Federal force came up. Ilis division had left Han¬ 
over Junction, a few miles from Richmond, on the 26th of Jul v, and joined 
Lee at Chantilly, fully 150 miles distant, on the 3d of September, and were 
then,'without a day’s rest, pushed forward to the Potomac and into Mary¬ 
land. They had not been engaged in a single action. But “ the straggling 
had been enormous, in consequence of heavy marches, deficient commissa¬ 
riat, want of shoes, and inefficient officers,” so that he could bring less than 
5000 men into action 3 out of more than twice that number with which he 
had set out. 

The South Mountain rises to a height of about 1000 feet, the depression 
at Turner’s Gap being about 400 feet. But the Gap is so narrow that a few 
hundred men with artillery could hold the summit against an army. But 

Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army w ill be drawn 
from Maryland.’ Receiving nothing from Harper’s Ferry or Mnrtinsbitrg to-day, and positive in¬ 
formation that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is rcerowing the Potomac." 
Halleck to McCLl/un, Sept. 13: ‘‘Until you know more certainly the enemy’s force south of the 
Potomac, you are wrong in uncovering the capital. I ant of the opinion that the enemy will send 
a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on 
Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over.” Sept. 14: 
“Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you arc ex¬ 
posing your left and rear.” Sept. IG: “I think you will find that the whole force of the enemy 
in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will reeross at Harper's 
Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington.”— M< C. Hep., 350. 

General Halleck indeed testified ( Com. Rep., 453): “In respect to General McClellan’s going 
too fast or too far from Washington, there can be fourtd no such telegram from me to him. He 
has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent to him. I lelegra| lied to him that he was go¬ 
ing too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportun ty to 
come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington.” Rut, as McClellan’s left actu¬ 
ally hugged the Potomac, and his centre and right, moving by parallel roads, were more nearly 
within snpjiorting distance than if they had followed in the rear, it is hard to see how, if lie moved 
at all, he could have gone at a less distance from the river. 1 M* C. llejK, 360. 

• This significant fact is mentioned only by I). H. Hill, and that merely incidentally, in his re¬ 
port of the battle of Antietam. “Our wagons had been sent off across the river on Sunday, the 
14th, and for three days the men had been sustaining life on green corn and such cattle as they 
could kill in the fields. In charging through an apple orchard at the Yankees, with the imme¬ 
diate prospect of death before them. I noticed men eagerly devouring apples .”—Lees Rej>.,\i., 118. 

J D. H. Hill, in Lee's Rep., ii., 114 



MOOJhAUO&O' ▲AL* 1 OO-Oi&'d OAT, fSOM TAX WHAT. 






















































306 



a road, rough though passable, runs along the summits of each of the ridges 
which bound the Gap on either side; by these the main attack of the Fed- 
erals was made, the object being to turn, either by the right or the left, or 
by both, the Confederate force holding the summit of the Gap. Reno’s di¬ 
vision took the road to the left, and, after sharp fighting, succeeded at noon 
in gaining the summit, or rather one of the summits, for the crest of the 
mountain is cloven by a deep ravine, and beyond this the enemy held a 
strong position. There was now a lull in the contest lasting for a couple 
of hours, while Hooker, who had reached the base of the mountain after 
Reno, was working his way up the road on the right of the pass. A soli¬ 
tary peak, which overlooked the country for miles, was the key to the whole 
position. Whoever held that held the pass. Both sides seemed to appre¬ 
hend this at once, and each endeavored to gain it Hooker’s men were 
climbing the steep slope, too steep for artillery to he dragged up. Hill, 
from the valley below, trained his guns upon the peak, but with little effect. 
He sent three brigades of infantry up to hold the peak. The lines met, and 
engaged in a fierce but desultory combat, each availing itself of every nat¬ 
ural defense. 

Until late in the afternoon the battle on the Confederate side had been 
fought wholly by Hill. But about four o’clock Longstreet had come up 
with eight brigades, worn and exhausted bv the long march from Hagers¬ 
town. Some of these were hotly engaged, but they came two hours too late 
to change the fortunes of the day. When night closed in the Federals had 
won every position and held the Gap, through which their whole force could 
pour on the following morning. Nothing was left for Lee but to retreat, 
leaving his dead and wounded behind. The action was fought with de¬ 
termined bravery on both sides. In all, the Federals had brought in about 
30,000 men, the Confederates 17,000.' The Federal loss in this action was 
312 killed, 1234 wounded. That of the Confederates was greater. Hill 
lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, nearly 2 00; for at Antietam, three 
days later, he could bring into action only 3000. 2 Some of Longstreet’s 
brigades also lost heavily. The Federals secured 1500 prisoners, most of 
them from the wounded. The entire loss of the Confederates, in killed and 
wounded, was probably something more than 2000. Reno was killed near 
the close of the battle. The Confederates lost Garland. Both were brave 
officers and accomplished gentlemen. 3 

Simultaneously with the battle at Turner’s Gap, an action had been going 
on at Crampton’s Gap, a few miles distant. Franklin, with his corps, lack¬ 
ing Couch’s division, which had not come up, advanced toward this gap. 
The foot of the pass was slightly held, and the force pressed on up the slope. 
'I’idings of the approach of Franklin reached McLaws, who had just estab¬ 
lished himself on Maryland Heights. He sent Cobb back with three bri¬ 
gades, directing him to hold the pass if it cost the last man. Cobb took 
post near the top of the mountain, behind a stone wall; Slocum’s division 

1 McClellan pays: Wo went into notion with about 30.000 mnn." lie supposed that he lntd 
encountered “I). II. Hill’* * corps. 15,600, and a part, if not the whole of Longstreet’*. and |«erhnps 
n portion of Jackson V’ {Rep.. 372). But he had actually met eight lvignde* of Longstr et’«. nh»ut 
12,000, and D. H H ll’s. 6000. Such was howcrcr. the strength of the position, that if flic Con¬ 
federates hail been able in the morning to have bron dit 10,000 or 16.000 men to it* dof ns's and 
so held the crests on the two sides of the Gup wi»h artillery, they could not h-ive h -en dislodged by 
five times their nnmber —See Longstreet and D. II. Hill, in Tree's Rep., ii., 84, 11 4. 

* Ia*'b Rep., ii., 114. 

* D. H. Hill thn* brutally mention* the d~nth of the«e two general*: “Thi* brilliant -service 
cost us the life of that pure, gallant, and nccunv li-lipd Christian soldi r. G neml Garland, who had 
no superior and few equal* in the service. The Yankee*, on their sidr*. lost General Reno, a ren¬ 
egade Virginian, who was killed by a happy shot from the 23d North Carolina.” 


[September, 1802 . 

charged this in front, while Smith moved round to assail it in flank and 
rear. The Confederates broke and fled down the slope in confusion, and 
in the evening Franklin debouched into Pleasant Valley, three miles from 
Maryland Heights on the opposite side, and only six from Harper’s Ferry, 
whence the sound of firing indicated that the place was still held. The 
Federals lost 115 killed and 416 wounded; the Confederates more, for they 
left behind 600 prisoners, mostly wounded. 

On the morning of the 15th McLaws drew back his whole force, leaving 
only two regiments upon the heights, and formed it across the lower end of 
the Valley, Franklin forming his across the upper end. Both lay watching 
each other all the morning, each supposing the other to be superior, and 
neither daring to attack. The numbers were, in reality, nearly equal, the 
Confederates having a small preponderance.' 

The passes of the South Mountain having been forced, the position of 
Lee was perilous. He had with him less than 25,000 men of all arms, in¬ 
fantry, cavalry, and artillery. So long as Harper’s Ferry held out, the forces 
sent to capture it were cut oft - from reuniting with him. The position here 
was singular. If Jackson and McLaws held the garrison of the Ferry in a 
vice, that garrison and Franklin held McLaws and Walker in as close a 
grip. McLaws could not join Lee by marching up Pleasant Valley, for 
Franklin barred the way; he could not cross the Elk Mountain, for that 
was impassable for an arm} 1 ; until Harper’s Ferry was taken, be could not 
cross the Pototnac, and, by going up its south bank and recrossing, rejoin 
Lee. “There was,” he says, “no outlet iu any direction for any thing but 
the troops, and that very doubtful; in no contingency could I have saved 
the troops and artillery.’’ 2 Walker, on Loudon Heights, was equally iso¬ 
lated, for between him and Lee was interposed both the Shenandoah and 
the Potomac. But when Turner’s Gap was forced, Harper’s Ferry was still 
uncaptured; but tidings had just conic that the place must soon fall, when 
the troops beleaguering, and themselves beleaguered, would be set at lib¬ 
erty. If a battle could be postponed two days, Lee would be able to bring 
into action as many of these separated forces as would be able to endure the 
long march to join him. To shorten this march, he retreated during the 
night of the 14th toward the Pototnac, and, placing the Antietam Creek be¬ 
tween himself and McClellan, took up a strong defensive position near the 
village of Sharpsburg. 

The Potomac makes a bond shaped somewhat like the two-borned antique 
bow, about six miles from tip to tip. The Antietam is like the loosened 
string of this bow. This stream in itself is no formidable military obstacle. 
It is passable for infantry at almost every point. Three stone bridges and 
several fords, within a distance of three or four miles, afford abundant pas¬ 
sage for artillery, provided the approaches to them are not fully command¬ 
ed by an enemy. The region beyond, that is, on the western side, is some¬ 
what broken. There are low swells, with narrow intervening valleys, and 
patches of woodland and cultivated fields, cut up by roads, fences, and stone 
walls. The limestone rock every where crops up above the surface, afford¬ 
ing tolerable shelter for troops. The position is such that, in case of need, 
a general with 20,000 men might fairly venture to hold it against 30,000; 
one with 30,000 might fairly venture to assail an enemy posted there with 
20 , 000 . 

Lee reached this position on the morning of the 15th, the cavalry form¬ 
ing bis rear-guard, somewhat closely pressed by tbe Union horse. The 
bead of the foremost pursuing infantry column reached the east bank of the 
Antietam in the afternoon. McClellan had hoped to bring on an action 
that day. nis orders were, that if the enemy were overtaken on the march, 
they should be attacked at once; if found in force and position, tbe advanced 
corps should halt and await his arrival. Coming to the front late in the 
afternoon, McClellan found the enemy drawn up beyond the Antietam, 
making an ostentatious display of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the op¬ 
posite crests. The Union corps, coining after in different columns, had be¬ 
come somewhat entangled, ami McClellan decided, in view of wlmt he saw 
and could then have known, that it was too late to attack that day. If lie- 
had been aware bow weak was the force in his front, he might, perhaps, 
have determined otherwise. 

Lee had scarcely crossed the Antietam before be learned that Harper’s 
Ferry bad been surrendered, and that all obstacles, except those of time and 
space, to the reunion of his army were removed. Orders were at once sent 
for the whole force near the Ferry to hasten to Slmrpsburg. Jackson was 
the first to move. 

At 3 in the afternoon his men were ordered to cook two days’ rations, 
and be ready to inarch. The inarch was begun an hour past midnight. 
On the morning of the 16th the corps were within two miles of Sharps- 
bnrg. They had made a night-march of fifteen miles in less than six 
hours, fording the Potomac by the way. The addition which he brought 
to Lee was small in numbers. The two divisions, Jackson’s, or the “Stone¬ 
wall,” and Ewell’s, had set out from Richmond 20,000 strong. Within six 
weeks they had fought at Cedar Run, Bristoe, and during all the three days 
at Groveton. They had marched from the Rappahannock to Manassas, 
from Manassas to the Potomac, from the Potomac to Frederick, from Fred¬ 
erick to Harper’s Ferry, from Harper’s Ferry back to Sharpsburg, losing 

1 Franklin’* corps (Conch not 1»nvinfr arrived) numbered not quite 13.000. M» Laws’* c< mrmind 
\vn< made up of troops which had suffered least in the previous actions, having l»een mostly in 
reserve, and only partially engaged at Groveton. Hi* eight brigades would pn bnblv average at 
rhi* time 1800 each. Deducting ilt« los'es of the day before, and the two regiments left on the 

Height*, there would be b tween 13.000 and 14.000. He himself says (Lee’* Rep., ii., 1G7): 

“The force in Harper’* Ferry was nearly, if not quite equal 10 my own, and that above was far 
superior ’’ He had just before estimated the “force nbove,” that is, Franklin’s, at “from 15,000 
to 26 000 and upward.” The force at HaqKw’s F< rrv he knew, at the time of making the ivpert, 
to have b on more than 11,000. f..r that number had surrendered, and the whole cavalry force bad 
escajK-d. Our estimate of McLnws’s strength is also confirmed by the numbers which he was able 
to bring upon the field at Antietam two'days lat«r. * See McLaws, in Lee's Rep., it, 167. 














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